MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 23 Docket: Fra

- 17

- 275 Submitted

On	Briefs: November	29,	2017 Decided: February 6 ,	2018 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER , MEAD, JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STACY	B. ( GREENLEAF )	MOOAR

v. TERRY	L.	GREENLEAF

HUMPHREY ,	J. [¶1] Terry	 L.	 Greenleaf appeals	 from a judgment	 of	 divorce	 from Stacy B. ( Greenleaf )	 Mooar entered	 by	 the	 District Court	 (Farmington, Carlson, J. )

. In	this	appeal, Greenleaf contends that	the	court erred	by	failing	to classify	 the	 increase	 in	 value	 to	 the	 property	 in	 Jay,	 Maine	 as	 marital	 or nonmarital and	that	it abused	its	discretion	in its award	of	spousal	support

. We vacate	the	jud gment	in	part	and	remand	for	fur ther	proceedings.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ]	 	 On	 January	 6,	 2016, Mooar filed a	 complaint for	 divorce	 from Greenleaf after	over	nineteen	years	of	marriage. The	parties	have	five	minor children,	including	three	adopted	children,	and	one	adult	child	who	lives	with Greenleaf

. The	 adult	 son	 n either	 attends	 school	 nor	 works. Greenleaf has2 worked	 for	 the	 Town	 of	 Jay	 for	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 earning	 $51,104.80

a nnually

. Mooar is a	stay
- at
- home	parent	and	receives	 $26,097.50 in	annual adoption	subsidies. [¶3 ] During	 the	marriage,	 the	parties	lived	in	 Jay on	land conveyed to Greenleaf by	his	parents	prior	to	the	parties’ marriage. Greenleaf purchased a mobile	ho me before	 the	marriage	 for	 $18,500, providing a	down	payment of $10,000 and	financing $8,500

. At	the	time	of	the	divorce,	the re	was	a	mortgage on	 the	 property	 with	 a balance	 owed of $28,594.57

. 1 T he	 value	 of	 the real

estate ,	including	the home , was $44,930. [¶4 ]	 	 The	 court	 held	 a	 contested	 hearing	 on	 March	 17,	 2017. 2 In	 its divorce	 judgment,	 the	 court	 awarded	 the real	 estate in	 Jay and	 the	 debt associated	with	it to Greenleaf and	ordered Greenleaf to	pay Mooar ( 1 ) child support	arrearages	of $12,408; ( 2 )	ongoing child	support	pursuant	to	the	child support	guidelines; and ( 3 )	spousal	support	of $350	per	week	for	9.75	years.
The	court	also	ordered Greenleaf ’s	retirement	account,	worth	$132,799.64	and

1 Although	the	court	does	not	articulate	this	in	its	judgment,	t his amount is	the undisputed balance owed	on	a	home	equity	loan that the parties	 took	out in	2005 in Greenleaf ’s	name	 to	pay	 off	 the remainder	of	the loan	on	the mobile	home	and to	pay	for	home	improvements.

2 Before	 the	 hearing,	 the	 parties	 engaged	 in	 mediation	 and	 agreed	 to	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	and	p rimary	residence	of	the minor children. Mooar was	awarded	primary	residence for	the	four	youngest	children	and Greenleaf was	awarded primary residence	for the	parties’	oldest minor	son.3 subject	to	a	loan	of	$19,050.68, to be	liqui dated	to	pay off the	outstanding	loan as	 well	 as the child	 support arrearage, and ordered	 that the	 remainder be divided	between	 the	parties,	with	 sixty	 percent	awarded	 to Mooar and	 forty percent	to Greenleaf

. Mooar was	allocated	any	and	all	debts	solely	i n	her	name and Greenleaf was	allocated	any	and	all	debts	solely	in	his	name	as	well	as	an y and	all	joint	marital	debts. [¶5 ] Greenleaf filed	a	timely	motion	to	amend	the	court’s	findings,	make additional	 findings,	and	amend	 the	divorce	judgment	pursuant to	M.R.	Civ.	P. 52(b)	and	59(e), or ,	in	the	alternative, for	a	new	trial	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P. 59(b). The	court	granted	the	motion	in	part,	amending	its	judgment	to	reduce Greenleaf ’s	 weekly	 child	 support	 obligat ion to	 account	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 the child ren’s	 health	 insurance,	 but	 summarily	 denied	 the	 other	 relief	 sought. Greenleaf timely	appealed. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 104	(2017 ) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2 (b)(3) (Tower	2016 ). 3
II.		DISCUSSION [¶6 ] Before addressing Greenleaf ’s arguments regarding	 the	 court’s failure	to	classify	the real	estate	in	Jay as	marital	or	nonmarital and	its award	of

3 This	appeal	was	commenced	before	September	1,	2017,	and	therefore	the	restyled	Maine	Rules of	Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply. See M.R.	App.	P.	1

.4 spousal	support ,	we	must first consider	how Greenleaf ’s	Rule	52	motion	affects the standard	 of appellate review. See Ehret	 v.	 Ehret ,	 2016	 ME	 43,	 ¶ 8, 135 A.3d 101

. [¶7 ] After	the	entry	of	a	judgment,	if	a	party	moves	for	findings	pursuant to	 Rule	 52,	 “the	 trial	 court	 must	 ensure	 that	 the	 judgment	 is	 supported	 by express	 factual	 findings	 that	 are	 based	 on	 record	 evidence,	 are	 sufficient	 to support	t he	result,	and	are	sufficient	to	inform	the	parties	and	any	reviewing court	of	the	basis	for	the	decision.” Id. ¶	9. Although	we	ordinar il y	assume	that a	trial	court	found	all	the	facts	necessary	to	support	its	judgment,	when,	as	here, “a	motion	for findings	has	been	filed	and	denied,	we	cannot	infer	findings	from the evidence	in	the	record.		Instead,	the	court’s	decision	must	include	sufficient findings	to	support	its	result	or	the	order	must	be	vacated.” Douglas	v.	Douglas , 2012	ME	67,	¶	27,	43	A.3 d	965 (citation	 omitted). We	 review a trial	court’s denial	 of	 a	 Rule	 52	 motion for	 abuse	 of	 discretion. See Dalton	 v.	 Dalton , 2014 ME 108,	¶	21,	99	A.3d	723

. [¶8 ] Because	the	court	denied Greenleaf ’s Rule	52 motion as	it	pertained to	 the	 property classification and	 spousal	 support ,	 we cannot infer	 findings from	the	record. See Douglas ,	2012	ME	67,	¶	27,	43	A.3d	965

. If	we	conclude that	the	court abused	its	discretion	when	it	denied Greenleaf ’s	Rule	52	motion5 regarding	the property	classification	or spousal	support	award ,	we	must	vacate the	 denial	 of Greenleaf ’s	 motion	 and	 must	 also	 vacate those	 portions	 of	 the judgment and	 remand	 for	 further	 findings. See	id

. ; Ehret ,	2016	ME	43,	¶	16, 135 A.3d	101

. A

. Property Classification [¶9 ] Greenleaf contends that	the	court erred when	it	failed	to	classify	the real	 estate in	 Jay	 as	 marital	 or	 nonmarital	 property and that	 it abused	 its discretion	 when	 it	 denied	 his	 Rule	 52	 motion regarding the	 property distribution

. See Dalton ,	2014	ME	108,	¶	21,	99	A.3d	723

. In	his	Rule	52	mo tion and	 on	 appeal, Greenleaf argues that	 the real	 estate should	 have been designated	as	nonmarital. [¶1 0 ] In	 its	 judgment,	 the	 court discussed the real	 estate in	 Jay , explaining that Greenleaf had received the	land by	gift and	had	purchased	the mobile	home prior	to	the	parties’	marriage	by providing a	down	payment	and financing	the balance	of	the	purchase	price ,	with	the	majority	of	the	payments on	 the	 mortgage made	 during	 the	 marriage

. The	 jud gment referenced	 the outstanding	mortgage	and	present	property	value,	which	had	increased	over the	years of	the	marriage .		It	did	not,	however,	classify	the	property	as	marital or	nonmarital	before	awarding	it	and	the	associated	debt	to Greenleaf

.6 [¶1 1 ] We	 have	 “long	 recognized	 a	 three

- step	 process	 for	 distributing property	in	a	divorce. ” Laqualia	v.	Laqualia ,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838 ; see	 also 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 953(1)	 (2017)

. First,	 t he	 trial	 court	 must	 distinguish marital	 from	 nonmarital	 property. See Laqualia ,	 2011	 ME	 114,	 ¶	 13,
30 A.3d 838

. P roperty	 acquired by	 one	 party before	 marriage	 is	 typically designated	 as	 nonmarital

. See Miliano	 v.	 Miliano ,	 2012	 ME	 100,	 ¶¶ 16,	 23, 50 A.3d	 534

. T he other	 party must	 then	 demonstrate that	 the property	 has marital	components before the	burden	shifts	to	the	first	party	to	show	which portion	of	the	property	is	nonmarital. S ee	id. ¶	23 ; see also Violette	v.	Violette , 2015	ME	97,	¶	23,	120	A.3d	667 (explaining	that	when	a	spouse	obtains	real property	before	marriage,	but	the	parties	make	mortgage	pa yments	during	the marriage,	 the property	 will	 have	 both	 marital	 and	 nonmarital	 components). Second, the	 court	 must	 set	 apart the nonmarital	 property to its	 owner

. See Laqualia ,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838 ; see	also Miliano ,	2012	ME	100,	¶ 16, 50	A.3d	534 (stating	that	the	court	has	no	discretion	to	distribute	nonmarital property	because	 “such	 property	is	 simply	not	 subject	 to	 the	court’s	general equit able	 powers	 of	 distribution” (a lteration omitted ) (quotation	 marks omitted ))

. “ Finally,	the	court	must	divide	marital	property	in	such	proportion7 as	the	court	deems	just.” Laqualia ,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838 (quotation marks	omitted)

. [¶1 2 ] Although	the	court’s	findings suggest	that the real	estate in	Jay	has both	marital	 and	 nonmarital	 components,	 the	 court did	 not determine wh at portion	 of it is	 nonmarital	 to	 be	 set	 aside to Greenleaf and thus missed an integral	 part of the	 first	 step	 in	 th e	 property	 distribution	 process	 outlined above. 4 See Laqualia ,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838 .		Because	the	court	denied Greenleaf ’s	 Rule	 52	 motion, we	 cannot	 i nfer	 whether	 the	 remainder	 of	 the property	 division,	 including	 the	 division	 of Greenleaf ’s retirement	 account, would	have	been	affected	by	a	classification	of	the	Jay	real	estate ,	or	portions	of it, as marital	or	nonmarital. See Douglas ,	2012	ME	67,	¶ 27,	43	A.3d	965

. [¶1 3 ] In	its	judgment,	 the court neither set	 forth	adequate	 findings	on
t his	contested	issue nor made findings on	the	issues	raised by Greenleaf in	his Rule	 52	 motion, thus	 preventing effective	 appellate	 review. See Finucan	 v. Williams ,	2013	ME	75,	¶	15,	73	A.3d	1056

. Accordingly,	t he denial	of Greenleaf ’s
motion regarding	the	property	classification constitutes	an	abuse	of	discretion

. We must vacate	 this	 portion	 of	 the	 judgment	 and	 remand	 for	 the	 court	 to

4 Nor	 did	 the	 court	 indicate	 that	 the	 parties	 had	 presented	 insufficient evidence	 to	 shift	 the burdens

. See Miliano	v.	Miliano ,	2012	ME	100,	¶ 23,	50	A.3d	534

.8 classify	the real	estate in	Jay,	or portions of	it,	as	marital	or	nonmarital and	to reevaluate	the	entire	pr operty	distribution,	if	necessary

. B. Spousal	Support [¶1 4 ]		Greenleaf also contends	that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	in	its determination	of	spousal	support	and	asserts	that	he	does	not	have	the	ability to	pay	 the	required	amount.		 In	his	Rule	52 motion	and	on	appeal,	Greenleaf highlight s the	 judgment’s	 silence	 on	 his	 ability	 to	 pay.	 	We	 review	 a	 court’s decision	 regarding	 spousal	 support for	 abuse	 of	 discretion. See Jandre au	 v. LaC hance ,	2015	ME	66,	¶	14,	116	A.3d	1273

. [¶1 5 ]		Section	951

- A(5)	o f	t itle	19

- A	outlines	the	factors that a	court	must consider	when	determining	an	award	of	spousal	support.		Included	in	the	list	of factors	is	the	“ability	of	each	party	to	pay.” 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	951

- A(5)(B)	(2017)

. The	statute	requires	the	court	to	make	a statement	accompanying	its	award	of spousal	 support,	 referencing	 the	 factors	 on	 which	 it	 relied. 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 951

- A(1) (D) (2017)

. [¶1 6 ]	 	 In	 its	 order	 granting	 spousal	 support,	 the	 court	 made	 such	 a statement,	discussing	the	length	of	the	marriage,	the health	of	the	parties,	the parties’	 contributions	 to	 homemaking,	 and	 the	 divergent	 employment	 and income	histories	of	 the	parties.		Absent	 from	 that	list	is	Greenleaf’s	ability	 to9 pay.	 	 Although	 the	 court	 may	 rely	 on	 some	 of	 the	 factors	 listed	 in	 section 951

- A(5)	to	the	exclusion	of	others, Jandreau ,	2015	ME	66,	¶	16,	116	A.3d	1273 , and	 “the	 court	 need	 not	 detail	 its	 rationale,	 it	 has	 a	 duty	 to	 make	 sufficient findings	to	inform	the	parties	of	the	reasons	for	its	conclusions,	and	to	allow	for effective	app ellate	review,” Finucan ,	2013	ME	75,	¶	15,	73	A.3d	1056 (alteration omitted ) (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 7 ]		According	to	Greenleaf,	he	would	be	left	with	$18	each	week	after weekly	 deductions,	 expenses,	 and	 the	 spousal	 support	 payment. Mooar disputes	Greenleaf’s	calculation.		Further,	a	calculation	using	 the	information provided	by	Greenleaf	in	his	financial	statement	does	not	support	the	amount calculated	by	either	party	in	their	briefs. 5 Nevertheless,	given	the	small	amount of	money that G reenleaf	alleges	he	will	have	left	over	each	week,	Greenleaf’s ability	to	pay	is	a	relevant	factor that the	court	should	have	considered

— and explained	 how	 it	 considered

— in	 its	 spousal	 support	 award. See Ehret , 20 16 ME 43,	¶	17,	135	A.3d	101

. Because	we	c annot	infer	findings	after	a	denial of	 a	 Rule	 52	 motion,	 the	 court’s	 failure	 to	 address	 Greenleaf’s	 ability	 to	 pay precludes	 effective	 appellate	 review. See Finucan ,	 2013	 ME	 75,	 ¶ 15,

5 This	 calculation	 uses	 the	 amended	 child	 support	 payment	 and	 removes	 the	 loan	 payment because	 the	 court	 ordered	 the	 loan	 to	 be	 paid	 off	with	 the	 proceeds	 from Greenleaf ’s liquidated retirement account.10 73 A.3d 1056

. Accordingly,	 we	 conclude	 that	 the	 court also abused	 its discretion	 when	 it	 denied	 Greenleaf’s	 Rule	 52	 motion	 as	 it	 pertained	 to	 the spousal	 support	 award.	 	 We	 therefore	 vacate this portion	 of	 the	 divorce judgment	and	remand	for	the	court	to	consider,	and	explain	how	it	considered, Greenleaf’s	ability	to	pay. S ee	id. ¶	18. The	entry	is: Order	denying	motion	 for	 further	 findings	with reg ard	 to the property	 distribution and	 the spousal	 support vacated.	 	 Divorce	 judgment vacated	 only	 as	 to property	 distribution	 and spousal	 support

. Remainder	 of	 judgment	 is affirmed. Remanded	 for	 further	 proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion.

Patrick	R.	Nickerson,	Esq.,	Paradie,	She r man,	Walker	&	Worden,	Lewiston,	for appellant	Terry	L.	Greenleaf Caroline	Y.	Jova,	Esq.,	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Portland,	for	appellee	Stacy	B. ( Greenleaf )	Mooar

Farmington	District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2016

- 03 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY