United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Report to the Senate and House 

Committees on Armed Services 

May 2004 CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE 

DOD Needs to 

Continue to Collect 

and Provide 

Information on Tests 

and Potentially 

Exposed Personnel 

GAO-04-410 

Highlights of GAO-04-410, a report to 

Senate and House Committees on Armed 

Services 

In the 1962-74 time period, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

conducted a classified chemical 

and biological warfare test 

program—Project 112—that might 

have exposed service members and 

civilian personnel to chemical or 

biological agents. In 2000 the 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) began obtaining information 

from DOD about the program. 

Concerned that veterans and others 

might have health problems from 

exposure during Project 112 and 

similar DOD tests, Congress 

required DOD in the 2003 Defense 

Authorization Act to identify 

Project 112 tests and personnel 

potentially exposed—service 

members and the number of 

civilian personnel—and other 

chemical and biological tests that 

might have exposed service 

members. GAO was required by the 

act and subsequent guidance from 

the congressional requesters to 

evaluate (1) DOD’s process to 

identify the Project 112 tests and 

the service members and the 

number of civilian personnel 

potentially exposed, (2) DOD’s 

progress in identifying similar tests 

outside Project 112, and (3) VA’s 

progress in notifying DODidentified veterans. 

GAO is making three 

recommendations to enhance 

DOD’s responsiveness to the 

legislative requirement. DOD 

concurred with all of our 

recommendations and agreed to 

implement them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-410. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Raymond J. 

Decker at deckerrj@gao.gov or (202) 512­

6020. 

May 2004 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE


DOD Needs to Continue to Collect and 

Provide Information on Tests and 

Potentially Exposed Personnel 

DOD appears to have accurately identified all major chemical and biological 

tests associated with Project 112. DOD identified 134 planned tests of which 

50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests, 19 were ship-based and 31 were landbased. GAO found no evidence of any other Project 112 tests. DOD 

performed a reasonable investigation of service members potentially 

exposed to agents in the tests. However, GAO believes that there likely are 

service members and civilian personnel potentially exposed to agents who 

have not been identified for various reasons. First, DOD was unable to 

identify any service members for 21 land-based tests because it was unable 

to find the needed records. Second, although DOD addressed the basic 

mandate requirement regarding civilian personnel by estimating that 350 had 

been potentially exposed, it did not specifically search for individual civilian 

personnel exposures or foreign national exposures. DOD limited its 

investigation of specific exposures to identifying military veterans who 

might be eligible for medical services from VA. Third, DOD did not pursue all 

possible sources of information during its investigation, and additional 

identifications continue. DOD recently identified 51, and VA, 172 more 

military personnel. GAO identified 167 additional service members and 

civilian personnel who might have been exposed, plus additional sources of 

information. DOD has not determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts 

to identify additional potentially exposed service members or civilian 

personnel. 

In February 2004, following GAO inquiries, another DOD office began 

preparing a plan to identify tests outside Project 112 that might have 

exposed service members. Since World War II, DOD has conducted 

hundreds of classified tests within the 48 contiguous states. Although not 

required by the act, DOD also plans to identify service members and civilian 

personnel who were potentially exposed by these tests. However, that office 

has not yet completed its plan for doing this. 

As of March 2004, VA had notified 3,397, or 58 percent, of the 5,842 service 

members DOD reported in June 2003, including 751 VA determined to be 

deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases but is having difficulty 

making these notifications due to the absence of key needed information 

such as military service numbers. VA is developing a plan to resolve these 

more difficult cases and expects to complete its notification process by 

September 1, 2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of 316 benefit claims related 

to Project 112. Recent changes to VA’s eligibility requirements could 

increase the number of Project 112-related medical visits. 

DOD has not designated an office to act as a single point of contact for 

collecting and providing information regarding the results of its 

investigations of DOD chemical and biological tests conducted inside or 

outside of Project 112. 
Contents 


Letter 

Results in Brief


Background


DOD Accurately Identified Project 112 Tests, Performed a


Reasonable Investigation for Service Members, and Estimated 

Civilian Personnel Potentially Exposed 

DOD Plans to Investigate Tests outside Project 112 

VA Notified the Majority of Service Members Identified by DOD 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

1 

3 

6 

8 

18 

20 

22 

23 

23 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 

Appendix II Project 112 Tests Reported as Conducted 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs 37 

Table 

Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of 

June 30, 2003 

Figures 

Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test 9 

Figure 2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests 10 

Figure 3: Results of DOD’s Investigation of Service Members and 

Others Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests 15 

Page i GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 

25 

28 

34 

28 
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 


GAO General Accounting Office


OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 


This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

May 14, 2004 


The Honorable John W. Warner


Chairman 


The Honorable Carl Levin 


Ranking Minority Member


Committee on Armed Services 


United States Senate 


The Honorable Duncan Hunter 


Chairman 


The Honorable Ike Skelton 


Ranking Minority Member


Committee on Armed Services 


House of Representatives 


During the 1962-74 time period, the Department of Defense (DOD) 


conducted a classified chemical and biological warfare test program,


called Project 112, that might have exposed U.S. service members and 


others—including DOD civilian personnel, DOD contractors, and foreign 


nationals—to chemical or biological agents1

 employed in these tests. As a 


result of questions raised by Members of Congress and veterans, the 


Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began working with DOD in


September 2000 to obtain information about the test program and possible 


military participants. Subsequently, concerned that veterans and other 


individuals might have experienced health problems as a result of being 


exposed while participating in Project 112 and other classified chemical


and biological tests, Congress required DOD, through the Defense 


Authorization Act for 2003,2

 to develop and implement a plan (1) to 


identify the Project 112 tests and the service members and the number of


civilian personnel3

 who were potentially exposed by the tests and (2) to


work with veterans and veterans’ service organizations to identify other 


1

 In this report, the term “agent” is used to mean chemical and biological agents, simulants 

(a substitute for a more-toxic agent), and tracers. 

2

 Pub. L. No. 107-314, section 709 (Dec 2, 2002). 

3

 For this report, we have interpreted the act’s use of “civilian personnel” to mean DOD 

employees, DOD contractors, and foreign government participants who took part in Project 

112 tests. 

Page 1 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
chemical and biological projects or tests that may have exposed service 

members to chemical or biological agents. The act also mandated that we 

evaluate DOD’s efforts to identify the tests and potential service members 

and number of civilian personnel exposed, as well as VA’s progress in 

notifying potentially exposed service members.4

 Thus, our objectives for 

this review were to (1) evaluate the effectiveness of DOD’s process for 

identifying chemical and biological tests conducted under Project 112 and 

the service members and number of civilian personnel who might have 

been exposed to agents employed under these tests, (2) determine DOD’s 

progress in identifying projects or tests conducted outside of Project 112 

that might have exposed service members to chemical or biological 

agents, and (3) review VA’s progress in notifying service members whom 

DOD determined might have been exposed. 

We assessed the reliability of DOD and VA data by interviewing agency 

officials knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing 

information about the data and the systems that produced them. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our 

objectives. 

To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD’s identification process for Project 

112 tests and potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel, 

we visited repositories of DOD test records, analyzed test reports, and 

selected a representative sample of conducted tests for more detailed 

analyses. In addition, we reviewed other available documents and 

interviewed DOD officials and scientists, including those involved in 

developing and conducting Project 112 tests. We systematically 

corroborated the information we developed independently from various 

sources before assessing whether DOD’s Project 112 identification 

methodology was effective. To determine DOD’s progress in identifying 

chemical and biological tests or projects outside Project 112, we 

interviewed DOD officials concerning DOD’s process for assigning 

responsibilities for such legislative mandates and its current oversight of 

such DOD testing. To review VA’s progress in notifying potentially 

4

 The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated that we prepare two reports: one on 

DOD’s plan for identifying tests and a second one on DOD’s implementation of its plan. 

Because DOD conducted the planning and identification simultaneously, we agreed with 

your office to prepare one report. The mandate also specified Project 112 tests for the 1963­

69 period. However, because some Project 112 tests did not conclude until 1974 and DOD 

reported on tests conducted from 1962 through 1974, we included the longer period in our 

review. 

Page 2 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Results in Brief 

exposed service members, we gathered and analyzed statistics concerning 

VA notifications and its identifications of deceased service members and 

interviewed VA officials about the process and likely impact on future 

medical treatment. For a more complete discussion of our scope and 

methodology, see appendix I. 

We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. 

We believe that DOD accurately identified all tests associated with Project 

112.5 We also believe that although DOD performed a reasonable 

investigation of service members potentially exposed to agents employed 

in these tests, in view of the fact that many records were unavailable 

owing to the passage of time, DOD likely has not identified all potentially 

exposed military or civilian personnel. From October 2000 through June 

2003, DOD identified 134 planned chemical and biological tests associated 

with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. Of the 50 tests that were 

conducted, 19 were Shipboard Hazard and Defense, or ship-based tests, 6 

and 31 were land-based. These tests were conducted primarily on or near 

U.S. territory, although some tests were in Canada, Panama, and the 

United Kingdom. DOD’s methodology for identifying planned and 

conducted tests under Project 112 appears sound, and we found no 

evidence of additional Project 112 tests, planned or conducted. With 

regard to the identification of personnel potentially exposed during 

testing, DOD reported in its final report to Congress on June 30, 2003, that 

it had determined that 5,842 service members had been potentially 

exposed to chemical or biological agents. Because of its extensive 

comparison of test and other documents in conjunction with other actions, 

we believe that DOD’s methodology and efforts to identify potentially 

exposed military personnel as required by the mandate appear sound. 

Furthermore, DOD addressed another mandate requirement by estimating 

that 350 civilian personnel might have been exposed but did not focus on 

civilian personnel during its investigation. Nevertheless, we believe that it 

is likely that service members and civilian personnel who participated in 

these tests have not been identified for the following reasons: 

5

 The DOD organization that investigated the Project 112 tests was a small element of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Deployment Health Support Directorate. 

6

 DOD public documents, such as fact sheets, refer to Shipboard Hazard and Defense tests 

as ship-based. 

Page 3 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
• 	 DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to 

land-based tests because it was unable to locate the needed records. 

DOD identified no service members who were potentially exposed 

during 21 of the 31 land-based tests, and in the remaining 10 land-based 

tests, fewer than the total known to have participated were identified. 

Approximately 94 percent of the identified service members were from 

the 19 ship-based tests that comprised about one-third of all the tests 

conducted. 

• 	 DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel—DOD civilian 

employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants—in 

its investigation. The department’s rationale for not including such 

individuals was that it believed the scope of its investigation was 

limited to military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits 

from VA. However, the act requires DOD to report the number of 

civilian personnel potentially exposed, and following our inquiries, 

DOD reported that an additional 350 civilian personnel (250 identified 

in records and 100 more estimated) might have been exposed. 

• 	 DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information during its 

investigation, and additional potentially exposed personnel continue to 

be identified. On January 20, 2004, DOD reported 51 additional 

potentially exposed service members to VA. Furthermore, through our 

research we identified and reported to DOD a total of 167 additional 

potentially exposed personnel—39 service members, 125 civilian DOD 

employees, and 3 contractors—who participated in the tests. In 

addition, 172 other veterans, not identified by DOD, who reported a 

Project 112 connection, have contacted VA. We also identified and 

reported several possible new sources of additional Project 112 

exposure information. 

Since issuance of its final report in June 2003, DOD has curtailed its efforts 

to identify service members and civilian personnel who were potentially 

exposed. However, DOD has continued to respond to inquiries from VA 

and individual service members concerning issues such as test 

participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not 

determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional 

potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel. 

Although the Defense Authorization Act for 2003 requires DOD to work 

with veterans and veterans’ service organizations to identify projects or 

tests outside Project 112 that might have exposed members of the armed 

forces to chemical or biological agents, DOD has not yet begun this 

investigation. As a result of our review questions about DOD’s progress in 

Page 4 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
responding to this requirement, in February 2004 an office under the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics7

 began preparing a plan to fulfill this mandated requirement, but 

has not yet determined such essential plan elements as the scope, 

reporting requirements, milestones, and responsibilities for those involved 

in completing the effort. This is an entirely different DOD office from the 

one that investigated the Project 112 tests, and coordination between 

these investigations has only recently begun. Although not required by the 

act, DOD plans to attempt to identify service member and civilian 

personnel who were potentially exposed by these tests. We determined 

that since World War II DOD conducted hundreds of other classified tests 

within the 48 contiguous states outside the scope of Project 112. 

As of March 2004, VA had sent notification letters to 58 percent of the 

5,842 veterans identified by DOD, of which 751 were determined to be 

deceased. VA is still processing over 2,400 cases, but it is having difficulty 

making further notifications owing to the absence of key information such 

as military service numbers. VA is planning to resolve these more difficult 

cases and expects to complete its notification process by September 1, 

2005. To date, VA has granted 10 of 316 benefit claims related to Project 

112. The passage of Public Law 108-170,8

 title 1, on December 6, 2003, 

changed the eligibility requirements for medical services, which in turn 

could increase the number of medical visits associated with Project 112 

tests. 

DOD has not designated what office will serve as the primary point of 

contact for providing information relating to tests in and outside Project 

112. The DOD office that is involved in identifying tests outside Project 112 

had not begun its work and DOD has designated no entity, including the 

Project 112 investigative office, to provide information about tests outside 

Project 112. This situation could result in DOD’s having no single point of 

contact for providing information—including the additional identification 

of personnel potentially exposed—to VA, individuals, and other interested 

parties, such as foreign countries. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate 

DOD office(s) to (1) determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved 

7

 Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological 

Defense. 

8

 Veterans Health Care, Capital Asset, and Business Improvement Act of 2003. 

Page 5 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Background 

issues associated with Project 112, such as identifying and contacting 

potentially exposed service members and civilian personnel; (2) finalize 

and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests conducted 

outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members to chemical 

or biological agents; and (3) designate a single point of contact to provide 

information relating to tests and potential exposures in and outside of 

Project 112 to VA, individuals, and other interested parties such as foreign 

countries, as appropriate. The report contains no recommendations for 

VA. 

In commenting on this report, both DOD and VA concurred with our 

findings. DOD concurred with our recommendations and established 

dates for their implementation. Both DOD and VA also provided suggested 

technical changes and updated information, which we incorporated in the 

final report where appropriate. 

Project 112 encompassed a series of classified operational chemical and 

biological warfare tests from 1962 through 1974 that DOD initiated under 

the auspices of the Army’s Deseret Test Center, Fort Douglas, Utah. The 

project was so named because in 1962 it was the 112th project of 150 

delineated by the then Secretary of Defense and involved the classified 

testing of chemical and biological agents. Annually, the armed services 

and the commanders in chief of the combatant commands submitted their 

testing requirements to Deseret Test Center where they were discussed at 

annual planning conferences and, when possible, incorporated in the test 

program for the following year. 

Project 112 included both ship-based and land-based tests. Ship-based 

tests were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of protective measures 

against chemical and biological agents, and risks to U.S. forces. Landbased tests were generally conducted to learn how chemical or biological 

warfare agents behaved in different environmental conditions, e.g., frigid 

or tropical climates. The ship-based tests involved service members from 

the Navy and Army and to a lesser extent personnel from the Marine Corps 

and Air Force. According to a Project 112 chief scientist we interviewed, 

test teams consisted largely of military and civilian personnel from DOD’s 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, with an Army, Air Force, or Naval officer 

as test director. Ship-based tests were conducted in the open waters of the 

North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and near the Marshall Islands, the 

Islands of Hawaii, Baker Island (a U.S. possession located 1,650 miles 

southwest of Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean), Puerto Rico, and the California 

coast. Land-based tests took place in the states of Alaska, Florida, Georgia, 

Page 6 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Hawaii, Maryland, and Utah, as well as in Panama, Canada, and the United 

Kingdom. These land-based tests sometimes included foreign personnel 

observers—both military and civilian. 

In August 2000, following occasional veteran and congressional contacts 

concerning veterans’ involvement in Project 112 tests, VA’s Acting 

Secretary wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting information on 

ship-based testing conducted by DOD. In October 2000 DOD assigned 

responsibility for this action to its Deployment Health Support Directorate. 

DOD committed to obtaining information about three tests—Autumn 

Gold, Copper Head, and Shady Grove (see app. II)—such as dates, 

locations, chemical or biological agents used, and names of military 

personnel aboard the ships during the testing. DOD investigators, 

representing only a small element of the Directorate, discovered and 

provided information on these as well as on the remaining Project 112 

tests, planned or conducted, despite having a number of difficulties to 

overcome with respect to the availability of test records. The available 

records were stored in multiple locations, not easily searchable, and still 

largely classified because of operational concerns. 

When the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act was passed, it 

expanded the requirements beyond what DOD envisioned when it began 

its investigation. The act required DOD to provide VA with the information 

developed concerning Project 112 tests VA for its use in notifying service 

members who might have been exposed. The act also required DOD to 

submit to Congress reports, which were to include the test names, test 

objectives, chemical or biological agents involved, number of service 

members and civilian personnel potentially affected by each test, and 

other information. The act also required us to review and report to 

Congress on DOD’s test and personnel identification efforts, its 

procedures for providing VA with information and VA’s notification 

efforts. As mandated by the act, DOD concluded its investigation of 

Project 112 with a report to Congress on June 30, 2003. In addition, the act 

required DOD to work with veterans and veterans’ service organizations to 

identify other DOD projects or tests that might have similarly exposed 

service members. While this second investigation had not started when we 

began our work, an office under the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is now preparing a plan 

for doing so. This second investigation is being envisioned as completely 

separate from and is being conducted by a different office from the one 

that investigated Project 112. 

Page 7 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
DOD Accurately 

Identified Project 112 

Tests, Performed a 

Reasonable 

Investigation for 

Service Members, and 

Estimated Civilian 

Personnel Potentially 

Exposed 

The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 required DOD to identify Project 

112 tests, as well as the service members and the number of civilians who 

might have been exposed to agents employed in these tests. A small office 

of the Deployment Health Support Directorate that reports to the Under 

Secretary for Health Affairs conducted this investigation. We believe that 

DOD accurately identified the tests associated with Project 112 and, given 

the unavailability of many records due to the passage of time, performed a 

reasonable investigation of service members who were potentially 

exposed to the agents employed in these tests. DOD identified 134 planned 

Project 112 tests of which 50 were conducted—either on land or on ships. 

Some tests were conducted on or near U.S. territory, although some were 

in foreign countries. We found no evidence of any additional Project 112 

tests. Because of its extensive comparison of test documents and ship 

personnel rosters, in conjunction with other actions, we believe that DOD 

used a sound methodology to identify 5,842 service members who were 

potentially exposed to agents employed in these tests. DOD addressed 

another mandate requirement with respect to reporting the number of 

civilian personnel who might have been exposed to agents by these tests 

by including in its final report an estimate that 350 DOD civilian personnel 

were potentially exposed. For several reasons, we believe it is likely that 

both service members and civilian personnel remain unidentified. First, 

DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to landbased tests because it was unable to find much of the needed 

documentation. Second, DOD did not specifically search for civilian 

personnel—DOD employees, contractors, and foreign government 

participants—in its investigation because it considered civilian personnel 

beyond the scope of its investigation. Third, DOD did not identify all 

possible sources of information such as additional Project 112 

repositories, and substantial numbers of potentially exposed personnel 

continue to be identified. We identified 167 additional potentially exposed 

personnel mostly associated with land-based tests.9

 DOD identified an 

additional 51 and VA, an additional 172. Nevertheless, DOD has not 

determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional 

potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel. 

9

 On the basis of our document search, which went beyond the records DOD reviewed, 

these personnel appear to be in addition to the 350 potentially exposed civilian personnel 

that DOD estimated in its June 2003 report to Congress. 

Page 8 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Identification of Project 

112 Tests 

As required by the legislative mandate, DOD accurately identified the 134 

planned tests associated with Project 112, of which 50 were conducted. 

DOD believes that the systematic approach it used to identify these tests 

provides a high degree of assurance that it has captured all of the Project 

112 tests, and we agree. We did not find any evidence of additional Project 

112 tests, planned or conducted, during our review. 

Of the 50 Project 112 tests that DOD conducted, 19 were ship-based and 31 

were land-based. (See fig. 1 for an example of land-based testing.) 

According to information provided to VA, the ship-based tests occurred, 

among other places, in the Pacific Ocean off the Hawaiian Islands and off 

the coast of San Diego, California; in the Atlantic Ocean off 

Newfoundland; in the Pacific off the Marshall Islands; and off Vieques 

Island, Puerto Rico. The land-based tests were conducted in Alaska, Utah, 

Canada, the Panama Canal Zone, and the United Kingdom. The tests were 

conducted from December 1962 through May 1974. (See app. II for a 

summary of the 50 conducted tests.) 

Figure 1: Dispensing Chemical Simulants during a Land-Based Test 

Page 9 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
In the absence of distinct overall program documents, DOD relied on a 

myriad of documents from various sources to identify Project 112 tests. As 

shown in figure 2, DOD (1) determined the repositories of potential test 

records, (2) performed electronic and physical searches of the documents 

contained at each repository to identify applicable documents, (3) 

reviewed each document to determine its relevance to Project 112, and (4) 

interviewed selected scientists and test participants. In addition, DOD 

conducted outreach programs to veterans and veterans’groups and 

corroborated the evidence obtained from the various sources. 

Figure 2: DOD Methodology for Identifying Project 112 Tests 

Repositories of Project 112 test records included but were not limited to 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; and 

the Navy’s Surface Warfare Center located at Dahlgren, Virginia. Using this 

approach, according to DOD officials, DOD located documents that 

addressed tests planned and conducted for each of the years during which 

Project 112 tests were being performed. In particular, DOD officials noted 

Page 10 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
the corroboration of evidence from the annual and semiannual reports 

from the Deseret Test Center, Utah, the organization responsible for the 

tests; the planning documents for each of the tests; and the final test 

reports. This enabled them to close the “information gaps,” thus providing 

a high level of assurance that virtually all of the tests were identified. The 

annual reports, for example, typically discussed not only the plans for the 

coming year but also included information on the tests that had been 

conducted during the previous year. DOD supplemented the evidence it 

gathered from documents and discussions with former managers of the 

Deseret Test Center. 

We did not identify any additional Project 112 tests in our review of DOD 

documents and our discussions with DOD and former officials and 

managers of the Deseret Test Center. It appears that DOD used a 

reasonable approach for identifying the locations of records and source 

documents, particularly since some of the Project 112 tests were 

conducted more than 40 years ago and the record-keeping systems were 

much less sophisticated than today’s. 

DOD’s determination of whether Project 112 tests were conducted was 

complicated by the fact that a number of tests were postponed, had name 

changes, or were combined with other tests. DOD essentially used an 

iterative approach to track each test from its first mention in a test 

document until its final resolution—conducted or canceled. 

Determinations were made on a case-by-case basis whenever possible, on 

the basis of the evidence that was gathered for each test. The existence of 

a final test report was considered to be sufficient evidence that a test had 

been conducted; DOD obtained final test reports for each of the 50 tests 

that it concluded were conducted. DOD located specific documentation 

for 62 of the 84 tests it determined were canceled. The determination that 

the remaining 22 tests had been canceled was based on a combination of 

factors. The moratorium on biological tests that was issued on November 

25, 1969, for example, was the partial basis for the determination that eight 

tests were canceled. Other cancellation determinations were based on (1) 

the decommissioning of the fleet used for the ship-based tests, (2) test 

requirements canceled or met by other tests, and (3) the Deseret Test 

Center’s closure. We agree with DOD’s conclusions regarding tests that 

were conducted or canceled. 

DOD developed unclassified fact sheets that described each conducted 

Project 112 test, which were provided to VA, and made available on the 

DOD Web site. These fact sheets provide available information concerning 

the test objectives, dates, and locations as well as the names of 

Page 11 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
participating units or ships. The fact sheets also provide information 

concerning the agents used and current information concerning the 

medical implications of exposure. 

Potentially Exposed 

Service Members and 

Civilian Personnel Remain 

Unidentified 

Although the methodology to identify potentially exposed service 

members appears to be sound, we believe that the service members that 

DOD identified and the number of civilian personnel it estimated do not 

represent all of the service members and civilian personnel who might 

have been exposed for the following reasons: 

• 	 DOD had limited success in identifying service members exposed to 

land-based tests because it was unable to find much of the needed 

documentation. 

• 	 DOD did not specifically search for individual civilian personnel—DOD 

employees, DOD contractors, or foreign government participants—in 

its investigation because it considered such personnel outside its 

scope. 

• 	 DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of pertinent information, and 

additional potentially exposed personnel continue to be identified. 

Nevertheless, DOD has not evaluated the feasibility of addressing 

unresolved Project 112 issues, such as identifying additional potentially 

exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, and foreign 

nationals who participated in the tests. DOD has also not determined what 

office has responsibility for reporting new information to VA, individuals, 

or other interested parties, such as foreign countries, as appropriate. 

In its last report to Congress on June 30, 2003, DOD identified 5,842 

service members who had been potentially exposed during Project 112 

tests; some during more than one test. DOD reported an additional 51 

potentially exposed service members to VA on January 20, 2004. Owing to 

the absence of important documentation, DOD had limited success in 

identifying service members exposed to land-based tests. DOD did not 

identify any potentially exposed service members in 21 of the 31 landbased tests and limited numbers in the remainder. Ship-based tests 

commonly had 1,000 or more participants. Land-based tests, according to a 

former Deseret Test Center scientist, generally involved fewer than 200 

participants. Because of the aforementioned reasons, almost all those 

identified—-94 percent—were from ship-based tests that comprised about 

one-third of the total number of tests conducted. Also, fewer service 

Page 12 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
members were identified for some land-based tests than the number 

known to have participated. For example, in Elk Hunt I, a land-based test 

that involved personnel from at least seven Army units of various sizes, 

DOD identified only six service members. 

DOD did not specifically search for civilian personnel in its investigation— 

such as DOD civilian employees, DOD contractors, or foreign nationals— 

because it believed that the scope of its investigation was limited to 

military veterans who might be eligible for medical benefits from VA. DOD 

addressed the basic mandate requirement with respect to identifying the 

number of civilian personnel by including in its final report an estimate 

that 350 DOD civilian and contractor personnel were potentially exposed. 

However, during the course of its investigation, DOD did not focus on 

DOD civilian personnel. In April 2003, when we inquired about the 

progress DOD had made in determining the number of DOD civilians who 

might have been exposed, DOD had not performed any work to make this 

determination. Subsequently, DOD identified 250 DOD civilians using the 

records it had gathered in its investigation of service members. Since it 

had not reviewed any civilian records, it increased the aforementioned 

number by 100 to cover additional civilian participants who might not have 

been included in the records that had been gathered. Although not 

required by the legislative mandate, we noted during the course of our 

review that DOD had not disseminated information concerning civilian 

personnel or attempted to notify them about the investigation into the 

Project 112 tests. A records-holding area at Dugway Proving Ground 

contained 1,300 boxes with approximately 9 million historical records, but 

it is unclear how many of these relate to Project 112. Our examination of 

the records contained in 12 of the boxes that we believed might be useful 

resulted in the identification of the names of 128 civilians (DOD employees 

and contractors) who might have been exposed during Project 112 testing. 

The problems DOD experienced in making the identifications of service 

members appear to have been largely due to the lack of available 

documentation, given that some of these tests were conducted more than 

40 years ago and given the unsophisticated records systems that existed at 

that time. DOD officials indicated that there was no requirement for DOD 

during the Project 112 test period to document Project 112 test 

participants, service members, or any others who might have been 

exposed to agents employed in these tests, and it did not do so. The test 

plans and reports, for example, include quantitative data on personnel and 

equipment support requirements but do not identify the names of test 

conductors or participants. Absent this information, DOD had the rather 

complex task of collecting information from various sources, even 

Page 13 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
informal test notes, to make these identifications. DOD’s methodology 

used the information contained in the fact sheets for each test, such as the 

names of the ships or units involved, and then searched available 

documentation for service members who might have been involved. For 

ship-based tests, for example, DOD obtained archived rosters of 

participating ships for the appropriate time frames, along with messages 

regarding ship personnel changes. DOD analyzed this information to 

determine the personnel who likely participated in the ship-based tests. 

According to DOD officials, the identification of land-based test 

participants was more difficult and, for many tests, even impossible. DOD 

took several steps to identify these participants including (1) requesting 

personnel rosters of participating units, (2) conducting key word searches 

of computer databases, and (3) performing general searches of boxes 

containing test records. For example, DOD reviewed the contents of a 

number of classified and unclassified boxes of test data at Dugway 

Proving Ground, Utah seeking participant data. In addition, DOD 

contacted service members who had sought assistance from VA and 

former employees of the Deseret Test Center. (See fig. 3.) 

Page 14 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Figure 3: Results of DOD’s Investigation of Service Members and Others Potentially Exposed during Project 112 Tests 

Despite some success, DOD encountered a number of difficulties in 

locating information concerning participants in land-based tests. 

According to DOD, a number of commonly available military records were 

not useful in its investigation. For example, unit history records typically 

did not include useful information because units participating in these 

tests were platoon sized or smaller and unit history records are generally 

not recorded for units of this size.10 Also, most test participants traveled to 

10 A platoon is typically fewer than 50 service members. 

Page 15 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
the test locations from their home unit. However, the documents needed 

to identify individuals who traveled to the test sites, such as travel orders 

and vouchers, were not retained. For some tests, DOD was able to locate 

participant names and, in other cases, it could not. Ultimately, DOD 

electronically provided to VA with the names of service members who 

were deemed likely participants in either ship-based or land-based tests. 

These included the 5,842 service members that DOD reported to Congress 

in June 2003 and 51 that were reported to VA in January 2004. Since 

issuance of its final report in June 2003, DOD has sharply curtailed its 

efforts to identify service members and civilian personnel who were 

potentially exposed. However, the DOD has continued to respond to 

inquiries from VA and individual service members concerning issues such 

as test participation. At the time we concluded our review, DOD had not 

determined the feasibility of continuing its efforts to identify additional 

potentially exposed service members or civilian personnel. 

Additional Potentially 

Exposed Personnel and 

Source Material Identified 

During our review, both we and VA discovered additional service 

members, previously unidentified by DOD, who had been potentially 

exposed during Project 112 tests. We identified and reported to DOD a 

total of 167 additional personnel potentially exposed—39 service 

members, 125 civilian DOD employees, and 3 contractors, as well as 

several possible new sources of additional Project 112 exposure 

information. VA identified an additional 172 service members. DOD is 

currently processing these additional service member identifications. We 

also learned of additional potential sources of information including films 

taken of all land-based tests and other repositories of possible Project 112 

documentation. 

• 	 Unidentified service members: In a records-holding area at Dugway 

Proving Ground containing 1,300 boxes with approximately 9 million 

historical records, including Project 112-related test records, our 

examination of the records contained in 12 of the boxes uncovered 

approximately 39 additional potentially exposed service members’ 

names not identified on DOD’s list. Since we examined only a few 

dozen records, it is very likely that more service members potentially 

exposed to Project 112 testing could be identified from this recordsholding area. According to Dugway officials, in July 2003 a contract 

was negotiated to scan and digitize the 9 million records being held 

there. Once this process is completed, access to the records will be 

greatly facilitated. 

Page 16 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
• 	 Unidentified civilian participants in Project 112 tests: Our 

examination of the test records in 12 of the 1,300 boxes of historical 

records at the Dugway records-holding area also enabled us to identify 

civilian personnel not previously identified by DOD. We identified 125 

civilian DOD employees and 3 contractors who had participated in 

land-based Project 112 tests, such as the 1967 Green Mist test on the 

Big Island of Hawaii and the 1965 West Side II test in Canada for which 

DOD identified no service members. According to a former scientist 

responsible for conducting the tests, Dugway Proving Ground 

furnished over half of the personnel, mostly civilians, who remain 

unidentified. This official also stated that the civilians employed at 

Deseret Test Center and Dugway Proving Ground were exposed to 100 

times more agents than the military personnel who participated. 

• 	 VA-reported unidentified service members: Since VA began 

notifying DOD-identified service members potentially exposed during 

Project 112 tests, other veterans have contacted VA directly indicating 

connections to the tests. These veterans learned of the VA interest 

mainly by word-of-mouth according to VA officials. As of January 2, 

2004, 172 veterans, in addition to those identified by DOD, have 

themselves reported a Project 112 connection directly to VA. 

• 	 Project 112 films as test documentation: According to Dugway 

officials, films were made of every land-based Project 112 test; and 

most tests involved multiple phases or trials. As these trials were 

conducted, an Army photography and film team recorded the test 

activities, and a total of 109 films were made. These films, which were 

done in what is now an obsolete format, are being converted to a 

format that can now be viewed. As of January 2004, about 25 percent of 

the films had been converted. These films might be useful in identifying 

participating units as well as service members and civilian personnel. 

The films might show, for example, ships or helicopters that 

participated in the tests and were not previously identified. 

• 	 Other record-holding repositories identified: During the course of 

our interview process, we were informed of additional locations 

containing possible Project 112-related documents that were not 

included in DOD’s investigation. Two such locations are the Army 

Corps of Engineers, St. Louis, Missouri, and the National Personnel 

Records Center, also in St. Louis. However, investigating these 

repositories would likely be difficult and costly because these records 

might be voluminous, unorganized, and general in nature. In addition, 

these records might not be easily searchable by topics related to 

Project 112. 

Page 17 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
DOD Plans to 

Investigate Tests 

outside Project 112 

The Defense Authorization Act for 2003 mandated DOD to work with 

veterans and veterans’ service organizations to identify DOD projects or 

tests conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service 

members to chemical or biological agents. DOD has not yet begun its 

investigation to identify such projects or tests. However, the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological 

Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense Office)

11 began preparing a plan 

for doing so after our inquiry about the investigation’s status. According to 

DOD officials, the office plans to identify the primary projects and tests 

conducted, attempt to identify service members and civilian personnel 

who might have been exposed to agents during the tests, and provide VA 

or other interested organizations with this information. Our current review 

and prior work from the mid-1990s have shown that extensive chemical 

and biological tests and projects were conducted during the Project 112 

1962-74 time period and that much greater numbers of service members 

and civilian personnel than DOD has reported for Project 112 were 

potentially exposed. 

DOD Has Not Begun 

Investigating Other 

Projects or Tests 

While DOD has aggressively investigated the Project 112 tests, it has not 

yet begun its investigation of projects or tests outside Project 112 as also 

mandated by the 2003 act. On the basis of an internal DOD agreement in 

November 2002, the identification of tests and projects outside Project 112 

became the responsibility of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics because this organization has 

overall responsibility within DOD for chemical and biological defense. 

Subsequent to our inquiries, in February 2004, DOD’s Chemical and 

Biological Defense Office began preparing a plan for accomplishing this 

mandated requirement. 

Officials of the Chemical and Biological Defense Office stated that they 

plan to identify major chemical and biological tests and projects 

conducted outside the scope of Project 112 since World War II and will 

attempt to locate repositories of information concerning these tests and 

projects. Using these and other sources of information, they plan to 

identify service members and civilian personnel who might have been 

exposed to the agents employed in these tests. These officials indicated 

that they plan to coordinate with the Deployment Health Support 

11 This office ultimately reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 

Technology. 

Page 18 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Directorate, the DOD office that investigated Project 112, and use the 

experience gained during the Project 112 investigation to facilitate their 

own efforts. As information concerning these tests and projects is 

developed, DOD plans to provide VA and to other interested organizations 

with this information, as appropriate. DOD anticipates that it might take 

up to 5 years to complete the investigation of tests outside Project 112. 

However, this approach does not provide a single DOD focal point for 

providing VA, individuals, and other interested parties with information 

related to chemical and biological testing. Responsibility for completing 

the investigation of Project 112 tests remains with the Deployment Health 

Directorate, which reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Health 

Affairs. Responsibility for investigations of tests outside the scope of 

Project 112 now resides with the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, which 

ultimately reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics. Under this arrangement, no one office has 

overall responsibility for providing oversight and coordination for these 

investigations. Also, neither office is currently designated to serve as the 

primary point of contact for administering the identification and reporting 

of additional potentially exposed service members and DOD civilian 

personnel. This situation could result in DOD’s having no single official 

point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and other interested parties, 

such as foreign countries, as appropriate, with information, including the 

additional identification of personnel potentially exposed. 

Hundreds of Classified 

Tests outside Project 112 

Were Conducted with 

Thousands of Potentially 

Exposed Personnel 

While there is no database that contains information concerning the 

biological and chemical tests that have been conducted, we determined 

that hundreds of such classified tests and research projects were 

conducted outside Project 112 while it was ongoing. In addition, 

information from various sources shows that personnel from all services 

were involved in chemical and biological testing. 

We learned during this review that hundreds of chemical and biological 

tests similar to those conducted under Project 112 were conducted during 

the same time period. A former Deseret Test Center scientist estimated 

that the number of chemical and biological tests conducted at just one 

location—Dugway Proving Ground, Utah—was over 100, or more than 

double the number of tests conducted under Project 112 during the same 

Page 19 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
time period. According to an Army study, some of these tests reflected the 

same objectives as Project 112.12 This study listed 31 biological field tests 

performed at various military installations including Dugway Proving 

Ground, Utah; Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Detrick, Maryland; and 

Edwards Air Force Base, California.

13 The study did not quantify the 

number of test participants nor did it identify them. 

In addition, we reported in 1993 and 1994 that hundreds of radiological, 

chemical, and biological tests were conducted in which hundreds of 

thousands of people were used as test subjects. 14 We also reported that 

the Army Chemical Corps conducted a classified medical research 

program for developing incapacitating agents. This program involved 

testing nerve agents, nerve agent antidotes, psycho chemicals, and 

irritants. The chemicals were given to volunteer service members at 

Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Forts 

Benning, Bragg, and McClellan. In total, Army documents identified 7,120 

Army and Air Force personnel who participated in these tests.15 Further, 

GAO concluded that precise information on the scope and the magnitude 

of tests involving human subjects was not available, and the exact number 

of human subjects might never be known. 

VA Notified the 

Majority of Service 

Members Identified 

by DOD 

Of the 5,842 Project 112 service members identified by DOD in its final 

report on June 30, 2003, VA sent notification letters to the majority— 

3,397—from May, 2002 through March, 2004. However, 751 of these 

veterans were determined to be deceased, and notification efforts 

regarding the remaining potentially exposed veterans—over 2,400—are 

ongoing. These numbers do not include recent additional identifications of 

potentially exposed service members by DOD, VA, or us during our 

review. VA is having difficulty making the remaining more than 2,400 

notifications largely because of incomplete data. VA officials said that the 

information provided by DOD concerning service members was in many 

cases missing key data, such as service numbers. To resolve these more 

12 U.S. Army Activity in the U. S. Biological Warfare Programs (Feb. 24, 1977). 

13More than 80 of these tests were conducted prior to Project 112, dating as far back as 

1949. 

14 GAO/NSIAD-93-89 and GAO/T-NSIAD-94-266. This work covered testing performed by the 

services between 1942 and 1975. 

15 The medical research program began in 1952 and continued until 1975. 

Page 20 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
difficult cases, VA is developing a plan involving the use of Social Security, 

the National Personnel Records Center, and other databases to obtain 

additional needed information. VA plans to complete its notification of the 

remaining service members by September 1, 2005. As of March 31, 2004, 

VA had granted 10 of 316 claims for benefits directly related to Project 112 

tests. However, recent changes to the eligibility requirements for medical 

services could increase the number of medical visits. 

As of March 2004, VA had identified the addresses of and mailed at least 

one outreach letter to 3,397—or 58 percent—of the 5,842 Project 112 

veterans identified in DOD’s June 2003 final report. To accomplish this, VA 

matched the list of potentially exposed service members from DOD 

against its own database to find a Social Security number. If no Social 

Security number was located, VA matched the available service member’s 

information to the information contained in the National Personnel 

Records Center. Once VA received a Social Security number, it used the 

services of the Internal Revenue Service and credit bureaus to locate the 

veteran’s current address, or if applicable, the date of death. According to 

VA, many additional veterans alerted by word of mouth have in turn 

contacted VA through the use of toll-free numbers, submission of benefit 

claims, and calls or visits to health-care facilities. In addition, VA has 

sponsored a number of outreach efforts to veterans and veterans’ groups, 

including establishing a Web site containing Project 112 information and 

issuing press releases. According to VA officials, VA received 2,217 Project 

112-related calls since the May 2002 activation of its toll-free helpline. 

VA’s notification efforts are ongoing but have slowed recently owing to 

difficulties in obtaining Social Security numbers and addresses for the 

potentially exposed service members who have not yet been notified. As 

of March 2004, more than 2,400 service members—or more than 40 

percent—remain to be processed. VA officials said that the information 

provided by DOD concerning service members was in many cases missing 

key data, such as service numbers. While it is still possible to locate 

service members without this information, VA officials said that it is 

difficult to do so. To complete these more difficult cases, VA is developing 

a plan involving the use of Social Security, the National Personnel Records 

Center, and other databases to obtain additional needed information. VA 

plans to complete its notification of the remaining service members that 

DOD identified by September 1, 2005. 

The VA notification letters, or “outreach letters,” include the name of the 

specific test(s) in which DOD indicated that the service member was a 

participant and information on the type of agent employed in the test. In 

Page 21 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
addition, a copy of a DOD fact sheet concerning each test that the service 

member participated in was enclosed with each letter. These fact sheets 

provided available information concerning the objectives, dates, and 

locations of the tests, as well as the participating units or ships. In 

addition, the fact sheet provided information concerning the agents used, 

as well as current information concerning the medical implications of 

exposure to them. 

As of March 2004, VA had received 316 claims for benefits related to 

Project 112 tests. Of the 316 claims, 88 are pending, 168 have been denied, 

50 have been granted for a condition not connected to Project 112, and 10 

were granted for a condition connected to Project 112. 

VA does not anticipate significant increases in approved claims as a result 

of notifying service members who were potentially exposed during Project 

112 testing. Notably, the requirement of eligibility has traditionally been 

that the illness or injury was service connected. Consequently, only 10 

notified service members had met this service-connected requirement for 

Project 112-related exposures as of January 2004. However, the passage of 

Public Law 108-170 on December 6, 2003, allows service members who 

participated in Project 112 tests to be eligible for hospital care, medical 

services and nursing home care from the VA for any illness until December 

31, 2005—without having to establish that their illness was connected to 

Project 112 testing. Nevertheless, VA officials still do not anticipate any 

significant increase in the number of medical visits. 

DOD has made a reasonable effort to identify Project 112 tests and the 

service members who might have been exposed to chemical or biological 

agents during these tests. However, DOD has not exhausted the 

possibilities for identifying additional service members and, although not 

required by the mandate, individual DOD civilian employees, DOD 

contractors, and foreign government participants. Additional 

identifications will likely result if DOD continues this investigation. DOD is 

also only in the preliminary planning stages of a mandated second 

investigation identifying tests outside Project 112 that might have exposed 

service members. DOD officials have stated their intention to include the 

identification of both service members and civilian personnel in its second 

investigation. The completion of both DOD investigations would mean the 

review of all reasonably available documentary evidence in an attempt to 

identify those service members and civilian personnel who might have 

been exposed to chemical and biological agents. However, DOD has not 

designated a single official focal point for providing information from the 

Conclusions 

Page 22 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
investigations to VA, individuals, and other interested parties. 

Furthermore, VA is having difficulty notifying more than 1,700 of the 5,842 

identified service members and recently formulated a plan for dealing with 

this problem. A single DOD focal point could be helpful not only for DOD’s 

coordination with VA but also for VA’s efforts to continue service member 

notifications. Without a committed effort to identify and notify all 

potentially exposed personnel, some participants, especially civilian 

personnel, might not be aware of their potential exposure to chemical and 

biological agents or be able to use this information to seek medical 

assistance, if needed. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the following 

three actions be taken by the appropriate office(s): 

• 	 determine the feasibility of addressing unresolved issues associated 

with Project 112 and the appropriateness of and responsibility for 

reporting new information, such as the identification of additional 

potentially exposed service members, civilian employees, contractors, 

and foreign nationals who participated in the tests; 

• 	 finalize and implement a plan for identifying DOD projects and tests 

conducted outside Project 112 that might have exposed service 

members to chemical or biological agents and ensure that the plan 

addresses the scope, reporting requirements, milestones, and 

responsibilities for those involved in completing this effort; and 

• 	 designate a single point of contact for providing VA, individuals, and 

other interested parties such as foreign governments, as appropriate, 

with information related to tests and potential exposures in and outside 

Project 112. 

DOD concurred with our report findings and recommendations and agreed 

to implement our recommendations. In commenting on our report, DOD 

acknowledged our recognition of its aggressive investigation of Project 

112 tests and agreed to address the unresolved issues with these tests as 

well as investigate the chemical and biological testing programs conducted 

since World War II. While we did not make recommendations to VA, the 

department concurred with our report findings. Both DOD and VA also 

Page 23 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
provided suggested technical changes and updated information, which we 

incorporated in the final report where appropriate. DOD’s comments are 

shown in appendix III, and VA’s comments are provided in appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 


committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the 


Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of


the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We 


will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 


report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at


http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding


this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6020, or my Assistant Director, 


William W. Cawood, at (202) 512-3959. Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Harry A. 


Knobler, M. Jane Hunt, Rebecca Shea, and David A. Mayfield were major 


contributors to this report. 


Raymond J. Decker, Director 


Defense Capabilities and Management


Page 24 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 


We assessed the reliability of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and the 

Department of Veterans’ Affairs’ (VA) data by interviewing agency officials 

knowledgeable about the data and by reviewing existing information about 

the data and the systems that produced them. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. 

We reviewed and analyzed available reports, briefings, documents, and 

records and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. 

To evaluate the effectiveness of DOD’s process to identify chemical and 

biological tests conducted under Project 112 and the service members and 

number of civilians who might have been exposed to agents employed 

under Project 112 tests, we (1) interviewed officials at the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., including the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Dugway Proving 

Ground, Utah; and the Deployment Health Support Directorate, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (hereafter referred to as 

DOD), who were responsible for conducting DOD’s investigation of 

Project 112 tests. In addition, we (1) reviewed the methodology and 

process that DOD used to locate, declassify, and review appropriate 

sources of Project 112 data, (2) obtained and systematically analyzed 

Project 112 data; (3) interviewed former employees and test participants, 

and (4) corroborated the evidence from documents and interviews. 

We evaluated DOD’s methodology by reviewing the work it had 

performed, retracing its steps, and doing independent research and 

analysis to develop the universe of Project 112 tests and identify the 

service members and civilians who might have been exposed to the agents 

employed under these tests. We visited the primary repository for Project 

112 records at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. At Dugway, we interviewed 

officials, performed data searches,and reviewed available documentation. 

The documentation we reviewed included test plans and reports, the 

Deseret Test Center’s annual and semiannual reports, and unorganized 

boxes of test materials in storage. In addition, we interviewed scientists 

who lived in Salt Lake City, Utah, who were former employees of the 

Deseret Test Center, the organization that conducted the Project 112 tests. 

We reviewed the files of the DOD investigative team, as well as the 

Page 25 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

periodic and final report of its investigation to Congress, to determine if 

there were “information gaps” for the time period during which the Project 

112 tests were conducted. We developed a data collection instrument to 

systematically document the tests that DOD concluded were conducted. 

With the use of the data collection instrument, we collected specific, 

uniform information concerning test location, dates, agents employed, and 

the number of service members identified who might have been 

potentially exposed. We selected a sample of tests for more detailed 

analysis and included, in our data collection instrument, information on 

DOD’s basis for determining that the test was conducted, whether specific 

participating units or ships were identified, the documents or sources used 

to determine service members who might have been exposed, and the 

likelihood that indirect exposures occurred. We also reviewed DOD’s 

outreach efforts and the extent to which DOD coordinated with other 

agencies that might have useful information, including the Department of 

Veterans’ Affairs. We reviewed and analyzed our prior reports as well as 

reports of other organizations to provide a historical and contextual 

framework for evaluating DOD’s efforts. In formulating our conclusion as 

to whether DOD’s methodology was effective, we systematically 

corroborated the information we developed independently and from 

various sources to make this determination. 

To determine DOD’s progress in identifying projects or tests conducted 

outside Project 112 that might have exposed service members, we held 

discussions with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, which oversees current chemical 

and biological testing. We also contacted the OSD Office of Legislative 

Affairs, as well as the DOD Office of the Inspector General, to determine 

the process for assigning responsibilities for fulfilling mandates of this 

type within DOD. 

To determine VA’s progress in notifying service members whom DOD 

determined might have been exposed, we interviewed VA officials, 

gathered statistics concerning their success in making the notifications; 

and, in response to our data request, received information in writing 

concerning pertinent issues. In particular, we documented the number of 

service members whose names had been provided to VA by DOD, and the 

extent to which notification letters were sent and service members were 

deceased, or cases where sufficient documentation was not available to 

make the notifications. In addition, we discussed with VA officials the 

likely impact of service members seeking medical treatment as a result of 

being potentially exposed and the passage of Public Law 108-170, which 

allows service members who were potentially exposed to these tests to 

Page 26 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

receive medical treatment from VA until December 31, 2005, without proof 

of service connection. 

We performed our review from March 2003 through May 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. 

Page 27 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

Table 1 below shows the 50 tests conducted, with the locations and dates 

of the tests, the agents employed, participating units or organizations, and 

the number of service members identified who were potentially exposed. 

There are gaps in the test numbers for several reasons, including that tests 

were combined with other tests, cancelled, or had name changes. 

Table 1: Summary of DOD Project 112 Submissions to VA as of June 30, 2003 

U.S. service Date of 

Test number members Test submission 

and name identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA 

63-3, Whistle Down Dec. 1962- Unidentified U.S. Ft. Greely, AK GB, VX Oct. 3, 2002 

Feb. 1963 Army, DTC personnel 

63-1, Eager Belle I 

(ship-based) 

119 Jan.-Mar. 1963 USS George Eastman Pacific Ocean BG Jan. 31, 2002 

Eager Belle II 1,076 Jan, Mar., June USS Carpenter, USS Pacific Ocean BG Dec. 2, 2003 

(ship-based) 1963 George Eastman 

USS Granville S. Hall 

USS Navarro 

USS Tioga County 

63-4, Big Jack A Feb-Mar. 1963 VMA 225, Marine Near Ft. BG, FP Oct. 31, 2002 

Aircraft Group 14 (A-4) Sherman, 

Panama Canal 

Zone 

Big Jack B Feb.-Mar. 1963	 VMA 225, Marine 

Aircraft Group 14 

(A-4) 

Near Ft. 

Sherman, 

Panama Canal 

Zone 

TOF Oct. 31, 2002 

63-2, Autumn Gold 1, 536 May 1963 Marine Air Group 13, Pacific Ocean BG Sept. 13, 2001 

(ship-based) USS Carpenter, USS 

Granville S. Hall, USS 

Hoel, USS Navarro, 

USS Tioga County 

(60 mi. from 

Oahu, Hawaii) 

64-1, Errand Boy 95 Sept. 1963 USS George Eastman Near Pearl BG, June 30, 2003 

(ship-based) (YAG-39) Harbor, Oahu, 

Hawaii 

betapropriolactone 

64-5, Night Train Nov. 1963- Not identified Ft. Greely, AK BG, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

Jan. 1964 

64-5, Night Train (F-105, F-100, and an 

(continued) Army personnel 

carrier) 

64-2, Flower 268 Feb.-Apr.1964 USS George Eastman Pacific Ocean GB, S02 May 23, 2002 

Drum I 

(ship-based) 

USS Granville S. Hall MAA 

Page 28 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

U.S. service Date of 

Test number members Test submission 

and name identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA 

Flower Drum II 5 Aug.-Sept. Navy tug ATF-105 Pacific Ocean VX, phosphorous May 23, 2002 

(ship-based) 1964 (off coast of 32 

Hawaii) 

Navy covered lighter BIS 

(barge),YFN-811 

64-6, Yellow Leaf 184 Feb. 1964 	 DTC personnel, other Ft. Sherman, BG Oct. 31, 2002 

units or ships not Panama 

identified 

Apr.-May 1966 	 DTC personnel, other Island of Hawaii Tiara 

units or ships not 

identified 

65-14, Elk Hunt I, 6 July-Aug. 1964 171ST Infantry Brigade Ft. Greely, AK VX Oct. 9, 2002 

Elk Hunt II 111 	 June-July 1965 15TH Artillery Battalion Ft. Greely, AK, VX Oct. 9, 2002 

& Oct.-Dec., Edgewood 

1965 Arsenal, Md. 

40TH Armor Battalion Canada 

4th Battalion 

9th Infantry 

1st Battalion 

47th Infantry 

538th Ordnance 

Company & Selected 

Personnel Assigned to 

HHC 

65-1, Copper Head 289 Jan.-Feb. 1965 USS Power Atlantic Ocean BG, FP, Sept. 13, 2002 

(ship-based) (off coast of betapropiolactone 

Newfoundland) 

65-3, West Side I 29 Jan.-Feb. 1965 F-105D (Air Force) Ft. Greely, AK BG, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

66-8, West Side II Jan.-Mar. 1965 F-105D (Air Force) Central Canada BG, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

JHC-47 (contractor 

aircraft), 

DTC personnel 

65-13, High Low 1,120 Jan.-Feb. 1965 USS Berkeley, Pacific Ocean MAA Mar. 31, 2002 

(ship-based) USS Granville S. Hall (off coast of 

San Diego) 

USS Fechteler


USS Okanogan


USS Wexford County


Page 29 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

U.S. service Date of 

Test number members Test submission 

and name identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA 

64-4, Shady Grove 223 Jan.-Apr. 1965 Army light tugs 2080, Pacific Ocean, BG, OU, UL Sept. 13, 2001 

(ship-based) 2081, 2085, 2086, and Eglin Air Force 

2087 Base, FL 

Marine Aviation 

Group 13 

USS Granville S. Hall 

65-4, Magic Sword 129 May 1965 Dugway Proving Baker Island, Unaffected Aedes Oct. 9, 2002 

(ship-based) Ground Pacific Ocean Aegypti 

(mosquitoes) 

USS George Eastman 

65-6, Big Tom 236 May-June 1965 USS Carbonero, USS Oahu, Hawaii, BG, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

(ship-based) Granville S. Hall and surrounding waters and 

airspace 

A-4, F-105, and an 

Aero Commander 

65-12, Devil Hole I 151 Summer 1965 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK GB, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

65-17, Fearless 261 Aug.-Sept.1965 USS George Eastman Pacific Ocean VX, diethylphthlate May 23, 2002 

Johnny (shipbased) 

USS Granville S. Hall (SW of Oahu, 

Hawaii) 

66-5, Purple Sage 310 Jan.-Feb. 1966 USS Thomas Pacific Ocean MAA May 23, 2002 

(ship-based) (off coast of 

San Diego) 

66-6, Scarlet Sage 356 Feb-Mar. 1966 USS Thomas Pacific Ocean BG Jan. 31, 2002 

(ship-based) (off coast of San 

Diego) 

65-11, Sun Down Feb.-Apr. 1966 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK GB, MAA, Tiara Oct. 9, 2002 

64-8, Tall Timber 135 Apr.-June 1966 Not identified SW of Hilo, BZ Oct. 9, 2002 

Hawaii 

65-16, Pine Ridge 90 May-June 1966 Not identified SW of Hilo, GB, BZ Oct. 9, 2002 

Hawaii 

66-1, Devil Hole II 16 July-Sept. 1966 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK VX Oct. 9, 2002 

Page 30 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

U.S. service Date of 

Test number members Test submission 

and name identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA 

66-12, Half Note 367 Aug.-Sept. Light tug 2085 Pacific Ocean BG, E. coli, SM, Oct. 9, 2002 

(ship-based) 1966 USS Barbonero (80 nautical mi. FP, calcofluor 

SSW of Oahu) 

Light tug 2080 

Light tug 2081 

Light tug 2086 

Light tug 2087 

USS George Eastman 

USS Granville S. Hall 

67-7, Red Cloud 	 Nov. 1966-Feb. Not identified Ft. Greely, AK BG, E. coli, SM, Oct. 9, 2002 

1967 TT, ZZ 

66-10, Pin Point 1966 U.S. Army Unknown CS Oct. 31, 2002 

U.S. Air Force 

U.S. Marine Corps 

DTC personnel 

68-52, Cliff Rose Sept. 1967- U.S. Army Ft. Stewart, Ga., CS2 Dec. 9, 2002 

Jan. 1968 U.S. Air Force and Panama 

Canal Zone 

DTC personnel 

66-4, Green Mist 46 Mar.-Apr. 1967 Not identified Island of Hawaii GB, MAA Oct. 9, 2002 

67-2, Dew Point June-July 1967 Not identified Ft. Greely, AK GB Oct. 9, 2002 

U.S. Army DTC 

personnel 

68-13, Rapid Tan July-Aug. 1967 Not identified Porton Down, GA, GB, GD, VX Oct. 9, 2002 

England 

(Phases I & III), 

May-June 1968 DTC personnel Ralston, 

Aug-Sept. 1968 Canada 

(Phase II) 

67-8, Watch Dog Summer 1967 U.S. Army, DTC Near Ft. Greely, BG, E. coli, SM, Oct. 9, 2002 

personnel AK TT, ZZ 

66-2, Red Oak I 24 Apr.-May 1967 U.S. Army, DTC Island of Hawaii GB Oct. 31, 2002 

personnel and the 

Panama Canal 

Zone 

67-6, Blue Tango 30 Jan.-Feb. 1967 Not identified Island of Hawaii BG, SM, E. coli, June 30, 2003 

FP 

Page 31 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

U.S. service Date of 

Test number members Test submission 

and name identified Date of test Units/Ships involved location(s) Agent to VA 

68-71 Folded 252 Apr.-May 1968 USS Carbonero, USS Oahu, Hawaii, BG June 30, 03 

Arrow (ship-based) Granville S. Hall and surrounding 

waters 

69-31 (ship-based) 313 Aug.-Sept. USS Herbert J. Pacific Ocean BG, MAA Oct. 9, 2002 

1968 Thomas (off San Diego) 

69-75 Oct.-Dec. 1968 F-4 aircraft (U.S. Near Yeehaw TX Oct. 9, 2002 

Air Force) and DTC Junction, Fla. 

personnel 

68-50, (68-11) 127 Sept.-Oct. USS Granville S. Hall Eniwetok Atoll, BG, PG2, uranine May 23, 2002 

Speckled Start 1968 Marshall Islands dye 

(ship-based) 

69-32 (ship-based) 150 Apr.-June 1969 USS Granville S. Hall Pacific Ocean BG, E. coli, SM, May 23, 2002 

(SW of Hawaii) calcofluor 

69-10 (ship-based) 786 May 1969 Landing Force Carib1- Vieques Islands TOF Oct. 9, 2002 

69/BLT 1/8, 2nd (near Puerto 

Marine Div., VMA-325, Rico) 

MAG-32, 2nd Marine 

Aircraft Wing, USS 

Fort Snelling (LSD-30) 

69-12 Spring 1969 DTC personnel Edgewood GA, GB, GD, VX Oct. 9, 2002 

Arsenal, Md. 

68-53 Apr.-Dec. 1969 Not identified Dugway Proving CS2 Oct. 9, 2002 

Ground, Utah 

70-73 July-Dec. 1970 DTC personnel Dugway Proving BG, FP Oct. 9, 2002 

Ground, Utah 

70-11, Phase I, June 1972- Not identified Dugway Proving BG, FP June 30, 2002 

Subtest 3 Nov. 1973 Ground, Utah 

70-74 Aug. 1972-Jan. Not identified Dugway Proving BG, SM June 30, 2003 

1973 Ground, Utah 

74-10, Phase I Sept.-Oct. Not identified Dugway Proving DMMP, BIS, June 30, 2003 

1973 Ground, Utah trichloropropane 

70-C (ship-based) Oct. 1972, USNS Samuel Phillips Pacific Ocean Passive collection June 30, 2003 

Feb.-Mar. 1973	 Lee (T-AGS 31), (off San Diego) of naturally 

USNS Silas Bent (T- and Pacific occurring particles 

AGS 26) Ocean in a marine 

(between San environment 


Diego and 


Panama Canal 


Zone) 


73-30 Jan.-Feb. 1973 Not identified Dugway Proving BG, SM, P June 30, 2003 

Ground, Utah 

70-11, Phase I, May 1974 TA-4F Aircraft Dugway Proving BIS June 30, 2002 

Subtest 4 (U.S. Navy) Ground, Utah 

Sources: DOD (data): GAO (analysis). 

Page 32 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix II: Project 112 Tests Reported as 

Conducted 

Legend:


BG = Bacillus globigii


BIS = (2 ethyl-hexyl) hydrogen phosphite


BZ = Ester of benzilic acid


CS/CS2 = Riot-Control Agent


DEHP= Di (2 ethyl-hexyl) phthalate 


DMMP = Dimethylmethylphosphonate 


E. coli = Escherichia coli 


FP = Zinc Cadmium sulfide 


GA = Tabun Nerve Agent


GB = Sarin Nerve Agent


GD = Soman Nerve Agent


MAA = Methylacetoacetate


OU = Coxiella burnetii


P = T-3 coliphage viruses 


PG2 = Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Type B 


SM = Serratia marcescens


SO2 = Sulfur Dioxide 


Tiara = luminescent gelatinous material


TOF = trioctyl phosphate (tri [2 ethyl-hexyl] phosphate) 


TT = Francisella tularensis (wet) 


TX = Puccinia graminis tritici 


UL = Pasteurella tularensis


VX = VX Nerve Agent (phosphonothioic acid) 


ZZ = Francisella tularensis (dry) 


Page 33 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 

Page 35 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

Note: The enclosure to 

this letter provided 

technical comments, 

which we considered and 

incorporated in our report 

as appropriate. 

(350313) Page 37 GAO-04-410 DOD's Chemical and Biological Tests 
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