RETHINKING THE AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

Air Force Command and Control in Conventional War

by 

J. Taylor Sink, Major, USAF 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF 

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER 

STUDIES, 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR 

COMPLETION OF GRADUATION 

REQUIREMENTS, 

ACADEMIC YEAR 1992ó93. 

June 1993
Disclaimer 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school 

environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of 

national defense-related concepts. The view expressed in this publication 

are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of 

the Department of Defense or the United States Government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review officials 

and is cleared for public release. 

ii 
Abstract 

The Air Operations Center (AOC) is the centerpiece of the Air Forceís new 

command and control (C2) system for prosecuting theater conventional war. The AOC is 

a direct outgrowth of the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). In Vietnam, the TACC 

mirrored the divided command structure of the U. S. military establishment in Southeast 

Asia. This resulted in a C2 system that allowed air power to be responsive to the needs 

of traditional land campaigns, and yet require extensive planning time for deep 

interdiction and strategic attacks. Additionally, since a land strategy dictated targeting 

priorities in South Vietnam, the Air Forceís measure of effectiveness in the South was its 

ability to strike targets requested by ground commanders efficiently. Similarly, agencies 

other than the Air Force selected and approved deep interdiction and strategic targets 

during Rolling Thunder. Thus, the Air Forceís measure of effectiveness in the North 

likewise became its efficiency of attacking targets there. Assessment thereby became

disconnected from the political and military objectives. 

Following the Vietnam War, the Air Force did not conduct a reassessment of the 

fundamental purposes or theoretical foundations of tactical command and control. Thus, 

although technology had improved the efficiency of the TACC, the Air Force entered 

Desert Storm with a C2 system that doctrinally was little changed from Vietnam. There 

are two implications. First, the air commander cannot execute responsive strategic 

conventional air war without disrupting the mission planning process, or without 

sacrificing his attack plan. In addition, since the value of targets may change drastically 

over time, the system cannot provide the air commander with an objective means of 

determining the relative importance of pre-planned and ìopportunityî targets. Second, 

assessment remains disconnected from political and military objectives. Despite efforts 

to improve Battle Damage Assessment, the Air Forceís primary measures of

effectiveness are still measures of efficiency. Experience in the Persian Gulf War 

supports both conclusions. 

The latest improvements to the Air Operations Center are still below the level 

where change is most needed. While increasing data capacity and speeding information 

flow will no doubt improve the efficiency of the AOC, the basic structure requires 

overhaul. The Air Force must seek doctrinal and organizational means, as well as 

iii 
technological means, to improve its ability to prosecute strategic conventional air war 

responsively. Additionally, Air Force doctrine must refocus on the need for mission 

assessmentóas opposed to target assessmentóto determine whether the air attacks are 

achieving campaign objectives. 

The study concludes with recommendations for rethinking the Air Operations 

Center. Methods for improving responsiveness include time-value based target analysis, 

greater use of alert or reserve forces, on-board mission planning, and limited 

decentralization, with mission-type orders and commanderís intent transmitted to lower 

echelons. Solutions for improving assessment include delegating target assessment 

functions to the wings, focusing theater-level intelligence personnel on mission 

assessment, using statistical and effects-based evaluation techniques, using Air Force 

Special Operations forces to evaluate target system degradation, and acquiring 

technology that can conduct ìtop-downî assessment of the enemyís war-making systems. 

iv
The Author 

MAJOR J. TAYLOR SINK (B. S. Astronautical Engineering, United States Air Force 

Academy, M. S. Aeronautics and Astronautics, Stanford University) has held flying 

assignments in F-117A, A-7, A-10, and AT-38B aircraft. Major Sinkís experience with 

the Tactical Air Control System began as a Second Lieutenant at Eielson Air Force Base, 

Alaska, where he flew the O-2A Skymaster and augmented the 172nd Light Infantry 

Brigade as a ground forward air controller. Since then, he has worked with command 

and control systems in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Major Sink flew aboard a KC135 as an airborne controller for the F-117A during Operation Just Cause, and was 

F-117A duty officer in the Tactical Air Control Center in Riyadh during the final weeks 

of Operation Desert Shield. A flight commander during Operation Desert Storm, he flew 

21 combat missions in the F-117A. Major Sinkís combat decorations include the 

Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters. He is the 

1987 winner of the Harold George Daedalian Foundation Fellowship, and is a graduate of 

the USAF AirñGround Operations School, the Squadron Officer School, the Air 

Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Alabama. 

v 
CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER.................................................................................................................... ii 

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii 

THE AUTHOR................................................................................................................... iv 

CHAPTER 1 Command and Control 

The Problem........................................................................................................ 1 

CHAPTER 2 Concept for Command and Control 

A Simplified Structure ........................................................................................ 6 

CHAPTER 3 Command and Control in Action 

How the Tactical Air Control Center Evolved.................................................... 15 

CHAPTER 4 How the Duality of the TACC Caused Functional Rigidity....................... 28 

CHAPTER 5 Post-Desert Storm

The Air Operations Center.................................................................................. 36 

CHAPTER 6 Recommendations 

Toward Future War............................................................................................. 45 

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................ 58 

vi
CHAPTER 1 

COMMAND AND CONTROLóTHE PROBLEM

ìCommand and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the 

mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 

of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by 

a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 

operations in the accomplishment of the mission.î

1

óDictionary of Military and Associated Terms

The purpose of an air forceís command and control system is twofold. First, as an 

extension of the commanderís authority, the system provides the means to direct air 

forces and supporting elements in order to achieve the unity of effort vital to 

accomplishing the air commanderís military objectives.2 Second, the system provides the 

air commander with the breadth and depth of vision needed to understand the situation, 

the so-called ìair picture,î despite the fog and friction inherent in warfare.3 Thus, it must 

provide information not only about the disposition of friendly and enemy forces, but also 

about the results of actions by those forces, in order for the commander to evaluate his 

own effectiveness as well as that of the enemy. The U. S. Air Force has traditionally 

upheld the concept of centralized control of air forces under an air commander at the 

theater level as the best way to achieve these dual aims.

4

 Indeed, this advocacy is tightly 

intertwined with the history of the USAF in its struggle to gain independence from the 

Army. 

Rooted in the experiences of the First World War and the thinking of the Air Corps 

Tactical School, the idea of centralized control has been vindicated by historical 

experience in every major war in which the Americaís air arm has flown and fought.5

 

The experience of the U. S. Army Air Forces in North Africa during World War Two, 

specifically problems with disjointed, uncoordinated effort resulting from small packets 

1 
of airpower assigned to field commanders, led to the Armyís acceptance of airmenís 

centralized control concepts.6 The U. S. Air Forceís experience in Korea further 

bolstered proponents of central control of air assets. In the Korean conflict, the USAF 

found the coordination arrangements with the Navy and Marines unsatisfactory, and 

worked with limited success to centralize command of all air forces in theater.7 By

Vietnam, the Air Forceís mechanism for commanding and controlling tactical air forces 

was highly developed. The ìground sideî of the Tactical Air Control System allocated 

air sorties to support both the ground campaign in the South, as well as the interdiction 

and strategic air campaigns of Rolling Thunder and Linebackers I and II in the North. 

The 1991 war in the Middle East offered a new template for modern conflictó

strategic conventional war. ìStrategic,î because many of the targets struck by air were 

unrelated to immediate battlefield outcomes, and ìconventional,î since these targets were 

attacked with high-explosive (and in some cases, non-lethal) weapons. Since the advent 

of atomic weapons, most air force leaders thought of strategic attacks primarily in nuclear 

terms. In fact, Air Force doctrine did not even include strategic attack as a mission for 

the conventional bomber force.8 In short, there was ìno such animalî as strategic 

conventional war. Yet, six weeks of air war in the Gulf, followed by a short, conclusive 

ground campaign, energized Air Force proponents of strategic conventional attack 

against the sources of enemy military capability.9 For 37 days and nights, this largely 

independent air campaign was fought with the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), a 

command and control (C2) structure largely designed to support traditional tactical air 

operationsóthat is, those aimed toward achieving victory on the land battlefield.10 This

system is worth examining, since the demise of the Strategic Air Command makes the 

central headquarters of the TACSóthe Tactical Air Control Center (TACC)ówhich has 

been renamed the Air Operations Centeróor AOCóthe only command and control 

system in the Air Force capable of planning and executing any kind of conventional war, 

strategic or tactical. To understand fully the implications of this fact, this paper will 

2 
examine the evolution of our conventional air command and control mechanism, and 

compare that system with the likely demands of future warfare. Is the AOC up to the 

task of implementing this new vision of regional conventional war? Will the AOC be 

able to adapt to the changing requirements of future war, which some have dubbed as 

ìinformation warfareî and ìthe military-technical revolution?î11

To answer these questions, an investigation should focus on organizational and 

doctrinal issues, rather than technology. Although the pace of technological change 

dictates that we consider advances in physical command and control systems, evaluation 

of the effectiveness of any C2 structure must begin with its conceptual foundations. As 

General Michael Loh, Commander of Air Combat Command, has noted, ìIf our national 

military strategy and supporting force structure have changed, so are the systems we say 

are required to meet the needs generated by the new paradigm.î12 The evidence so far 

suggests that while much thought has been given to the technology of implementing 

command and control, little has been done to examine fundamental concepts driving our 

command and control systems. In fact, this examination will show that command and 

control improvements have focused almost entirely on technology issues, with little 

thought toward the fundamental concepts driving the system. What are these concepts 

underlying our vision of command and control, and why are they so important?

An air forceís command and control system must accomplish three main tasks in 

order for the commander to conduct air-to-ground operations rationally óIntelligence 

Analysis, Targeting, and Assessment.13 Analysis identifies and evaluates the target 

systems which are most critical to the functioning of the enemyís war capability, and are 

most vulnerable to attack from the air. The targeting function matches the commanderís 

objectives and guidance to individual components comprising these systems for attack 

with specified weapons, paying close attention to certain key elements which are the 

linchpins of critical or vulnerable systems. Finally, assessment evaluates the 

effectiveness of the attacks, as well as the impact of the loss of these targets and target 

3 
systems on the enemyís military capability. Assessment completes the loop, and 

provides vital feedback to the commander for improving and adjusting his attack plan. 

Although there are many other tasks the AOC must accomplish (such as execution and 

coordination functions), these three are the most crucial to the air commanderís task of

planning, executing, and evaluating theater air operations. These functions must be 

performed effectively for the commander to conduct coherent air offensives. 

Does this vision of how we will use airpower coincide with the control structures 

which have evolved? My contention is that it does not, and current planned 

improvements to the AOC will not solve its inherent structural problems. The AOC 

evolved from a system which optimized air support of land operations, the Vietnam-era 

TACC. This genesis has led to serious discontinuities in the Intelligence-TargetingAssessment Cycle, which cannot be corrected by technical solutions. Only a top-tobottom examination of how airpower works in theater war can guide us in designing 

control structures that will meet the challenges of the future.

This paper will provide that examination, and offer recommendations for 

fundamental and lasting improvements to our theater war control structures. The next 

chapter discusses what an ideal air-to-ground C2 system should be able to doónot from

a technical viewpoint, but from a theoretical perspective. Chapter 3 looks at how and 

why the TACC evolved as it did from the peculiar requirements of the Vietnam War. 

Chapter 4 compares that system with our ideal system to identify areas for improvement. 

Chapter 5 describes developments in the Tactical Air Command after Operation Desert 

Storm, and evaluates currently proposed improvements to the AOC, specifically, the new 

Contingency TACS Automated Planning System. The final chapter draws together 

conclusions in order to recommend a course for the future. Perhaps the most profound 

conclusion is that while technical improvements are vital for keeping pace with changing 

military requirements, the Air Force has potentially the most to gain from conceptual and 

4 
organizational changes to both the Air Operations Center and its subordinate elements. 

The study begins with a look at an ideal C2 structure. 

NOTES

 

1

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 

December 1989, 77. 

2

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Vol. II, Mar 1992, 130ó

131. 

3

See Barry D. Watts, The Foundations of U. S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War 

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1984), for a comprehensive discussion of 

friction in air warfare. 

4

AFM 1-1 Vol. II, March 1992, 113ó115 

5

The most recent example of this is the Persian Gulf War, where all air resources were 

commanded and controlled at the theater level by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, through his 

Joint Air Force Component Commander (JFACC), Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner. See 

Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography, with Peter Petre (New York: Linda 

Grey Bantam Books, 1992), and Horner, ìThe Air Campaign,î Military Review, September 1991, 

17ó27. General William Momyer, among others, disparages the disjointed command 

arrangements that existed during the Vietnam War. See his Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, 

Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1978). 

6

FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, 1ó2. 

7

Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950 - 1953, Rev. Ed., (Washington, 

DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983) 

8

Thomas A. Keaney, Strategic Bombers and Conventional Weapons: Airpower Options (Fort 

Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University. Press, 1984). 

9

One of those proponents was Colonel John A. Warden, III, head of the ìCheckmateî division of 

the Air Staff. The divisionís plan was accepted by General Schwarzkopf in August 1990 as the 

foundation for offensive air operations against Iraq. See James P. Coyne, ìPlan of Attack,î Air 

Force Magazine, April 1992, 40ó46. 10The air-to-surface functions of the TACC were designed to prosecute air interdiction, close air 

support, and tactical reconnaissance. These were by no means the only functions of the Air 

Forceís tactical command and control system. The TACC also planned and executed counter-air 

missions, which are dedicated to gaining and maintaining control of the air. Occasionally, the airto-surface and air to air functions of the TACC overlapped. For example, a single Control and 

Reporting Post might direct attack sorties to their surface target, while also directing fighters 

against enemy aircraft. See Lt. Col. John J. Lane, Jr., Command and Control and Structures in 

Southeast Asia, The Air War in Indochina, Vol I, Monograph I (Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower 

Research Institute, 1981), 16ó19, for the structure of the TACC as it existed during the Vietnam

War. Also, AFM 2-1, Tactical Air OperationsóCounter Air, Close Air Support, and Air 

Interdiction, 2 May 1969, was current as of the Persian Gulf war (and is still current as of this 

writing). 

11Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Assessment of 

the Military-Technical Revolution (U), 15 July 1992, 22ó23. (Secret) Information extracted is 

unclassified. 

12Gen John M. Loh, ìAdvocating Mission Needs in Tomorrowís World,î Airpower Journal, 

Spring 1992, 6. 

13These are the most important functions for translating a commanderís air strategy into an 

executable attack plan, and modifying that plan based on perceived results. A more detailed 

discussion of these functions, along with the rationale for choosing them, follows in Chapter 2. 

5 
CHAPTER 2 

CONCEPT FOR COMMAND AND CONTROLóA SIMPLIFIED STRUCTURE

ìÖcommand and control is not a collection of sensors, processors, displays, and data 

links. Rather, command and control is an extension of basic human decision processes 

by means of procedures, organization, and equipment.î

1

óJoseph G. Wohl

Selection of targets for attack is the sine qua non of air-to-ground operations. No target 

means, simply, no air power, since the sole reason for an air force is to apply force from the air. 

The target is the objective, the point at which air forces achieve a concrete, measurable result. 

Even if attacks on the proper targets are only partially successful, the result may still lead to 

victory. Conversely, fully-effective strikes on poorly selected targets will, at best, merely waste 

effort, and are quite likely to be counter-productive. Thus, choosing the right points to direct 

airpower is crucial to the success of the air operation. Even then, it may not be possible to attack 

the ìcorrectî targets, for a variety of reasons.2

Therefore, translation of military objectives into an executable target list is a primary 

responsibility of the air commander. In theater war, the air commanderís authority derives from

the theater commander, who is ultimately responsible for translating the political objectives and 

war aims into military objectivesóthe conditions for war termination.3 Ideally, there exists a 

hierarchy of aims which ultimately results in a target list for the air forces (Figure 1). 

Political 

Objectives

Military 

Objectives

Grand 

Strategy

Target 

List

Air Tasking 

Order

Air 

Strategy

Figure 1 

From Political Goals to Air Tasking Order 

6 
In regional war, the theater commander translates political aims into military goals via the 

military component of grand strategy, although the political goals are often determined in part by 

what is militarily feasible.4 He and his component commanders then devise strategies to achieve 

those goals, and plan military operations to implement the strategies. In air forces, these plans 

are the air commanderís vision of future operationsóthe ìAir Strategyîó which ultimately 

takes physical shape in the form of a target list. The air commander prioritizes the target list in 

time, and divides the planned operations among the various air units. The resulting Air Tasking 

Order (ATO) tells each unit who will attack what. Since war is a dynamic, ever-changing 

activity, the ATO is normally good for a set period of time, say, 24 hours. Then the 

commanderís staff issues a new ATO for the next time period. 

Theoretically, the exhaustion of the air commanderís target list equates to the achievement 

of the theater commanderís strategy and the accomplishment of the overall political aims. Since 

every military action is directed toward the achievement of the political objectives, the design of

any command and control structure for conducting air war should facilitate this ultimate end. 

Not surprisingly, the associated command and control systems tend to mirror the organization of 

the force, and control the implementation of that force.5 

Planning

Directing

Executing

Locating

Observing

Assessing

Deciding Identifying

 

Figure 2 

The Command and Control Cycle 

7 
The functions of a command and control system are observing, locating, identifying, 

deciding, planning, directing, executing, and assessing.6 Observing, locating, and identifying 

target systems comprise Intelligence Analysis. The concept here is to identify the elements and 

structure of the enemyís war-making capabilities, and understand how individual targets making 

up these systems fit in to the enemyís plan for achieving his aims.

7

 Historically, this function 

has required a substantial knowledge and understanding of the enemyís political, economic, and 

military organization as well as the ability to combine diverse sources of intelligence data to 

produce meaningful information. For example, identification of the various components of the 

German war machine in World War II was relatively easy. However, the relationships between 

these elements was never fully understood by any of the organizations tasked with creating target 

lists for the Combined Bomber Offensive. The fact that the transportation of coal was the most 

critical element of the German war economy went almost completely unnoticed until mid-1944, 

even though substantial open-source information on this aspect of the German economic 

structure was widely available.8

 Thus, an effective analysis function combines data gathering 

tasks with a wider responsibility of integrating the information to produce a meaningful picture 

of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemyís war-making apparatus, as well as a detailed 

schematic of the relationships between the various (often interdependent) components. Once the 

crucial systems are identified and understood, reconnaissance can further locate individual 

elements of the various potential target systems. 

The targeting function then comes to the fore, focusing on planning and directing. 

Targeting is the complex process of selecting specific objectives for attack by various means, 

and matching those objectives with weapons and delivery systems in order to achieve the 

commanderís military goals.9

 Targeting requires detailed analysis of the targeted system to 

identify critical and vulnerable elements, select aim points, and assign weapons or non-lethal 

techniques against the aim point. Ideally, destruction of crucial individual targets leads to the 

collapse of the associated target system. The air objective is achieved when the target system

ìdies,î and the air force progresses toward attainment of the overall military and political goals. 

8 
The strategic targeting function has historically been hampered by lack of comprehensive air 

power theory. In the absence of such a theory, knowledge of which targets are most important, 

at what time, and for what objectives, can only be based on an analysis of the expected 

destruction or damage to enemy capabilities. In other words, whatever the commander believes, 

based on the analysis, will do the most harm to the enemyís war-making system becomes the 

priority target. Hopefully, subsidiary effects will be cumulative and assist in defeating the foe. 

Since every potential enemyís society is unique, every war-making political, economic, and 

social organization is unique, and thus requires tailored analysis. This type of detailed planning 

is a dynamic process. Even as the analysis is completed, the military situation may significantly 

change, requiring continual revision and adjustment of the plan. 

Once the air commander has designed the attack plan, he directs his subordinate forces to 

neutralize targets, based on the concept of centralized control. Centralized control at the theater 

level is important because the air commander can focus air effort when and where it is needed; 

that is, he can allocate his resources efficiently. In addition, the air commander can optimize and 

coordinate capabilities of various weapons to achieve the best overall effect.10 Based on internal 

and external conditions, such as the capabilities and numbers of the various aircraft, the strength 

of enemy defenses, the weather, and so forth, the air commander will allocate missions to the 

unit best suited. The means of directionóthe control structureómust be secure and responsive. 

It must be secure from interception and exploitation by the enemy, since it contains the air attack 

plan. It also must be responsive, because a centralized control structure that is too slow to react 

to changing conditions impedes flexibility and introduces friction into the targeting/execution 

cycle. Lastly, tasking must allow time for subordinate units to plan missions that exploit enemy 

uncertainty of when and where the attack will occur. Generally, the more time available, the 

better planned the mission. A typical mission planning cycle is shown in Figure 3. Not only will 

thorough planning optimize the attack against enemy defenses, but aircrews flying the mission 

will also have more time for devising alternative courses of action to deal with both uncertainties 

(the fog of war) as well as the unforeseen occurrences that inevitably accompany real war 

9 
(friction). In fact, this ability to pre-plan is the primary advantage of the attacker over the 

defenderóthe attacker knows when and where he will strike, and can stack the odds in his favor, 

while the defender must remain alert to attack at any time and from any direction.11

Analysis Planning

Targeting

Tasking

Mission 

Planning 

& Prep

Weapon 

on target

Assessment

Identification

Mission Planning Cycle 

(typical)

Launch Decision

Figure 3 

Mission Planning Cycle 

The purpose of a command and control system that probably most often comes to mind is 

execution. The execution function aims to fulfill the commanderís directions efficiently and 

effectively. Sound execution should follow from a properly organized and technically capable 

C2 system. In practice, friction, in the form of both enemy reactions and oneís own response to 

internal and external difficulties, intervenes to disrupt the process. Physical C2 structures must 

be robust and flexible to deal with friction. As Chapter 5 will show, the USAF probably has the 

most technically advanced C2 systems in the world. Of far more consequence for achieving 

military objectives, however, are doctrinal and organizational foundations.12 Therefore, this 

paper will not discuss execution in detail. Ideally, if the air commanderís plan has been well 

thought-out and clearly communicated to his subordinates in a timely manner, execution will be 

straightforward (although not necessarily easy), and the theater-level air commander will need to 

monitor mission execution in order to intervene if required. 

10 
Finally, an effective C2 structure should ìclose the loopî by evaluating the results of the air 

operation. The assessment function should use relevant measures to determine whether the 

desired goals are being achieved.13

Figure not Available. 

Figure 4 

ìBottom-upî Assessment 

Traditional assessment focuses on individual mission results.14 The concept is to ìpollî the 

individual targets to evaluate the extent to which they have been neutralized, collate that 

information, and report to the commander the overall degree of effectiveness against the target 

system (Figure 4). The evaluation of the effects on the individual target is termed ìtarget 

assessmentî here.15 For example, during a campaign designed to destroy the enemyís air 

defense system, planners will identify numerous surface-to-air missile sites for attack. 

Following the strikes, the percentage of sites destroyed, neutralized, damaged, and missed is 

compiled, then combined with similar data on attacks on other target sets, such as enemy 

airfields, command centers, early warning sites, and communications links, to estimate the 

overall degradation of the enemyís air defense, which is the operational objective. Because the 

11 
assessment is based primarily on the results of strikes against individual targets, this is a ìmicroî 

or ìbottom-upî approach to assessing the effectiveness of the air campaign. 

Clearly, there must also be a method for determining how well attacking the target sets 

have accomplished the military goals, in order to evaluate the the translation of military 

objectives to air force targets. It is critical to understand that exhaustion of the target list equates 

to achievement of the airpower goals only if two conditions hold: first, the translation of the 

objectives into the target list is perfect; second, the targets on the list are neutralized in a short 

enough time, so that the enemy does not have a chance to accomplish his goals by effectively 

ìworking aroundî the attacks. In other words, the air attack plan flawlessly translated the 

military objective into a target list, and that list did not change over the period of time necessary 

to neutralize all the targets. Therefore, an effective assessment must also measure the attackís 

effect on the enemyís target systemsónot just on the individual targets, as well as the effects of

the degradation of those systems on the enemyís overall capability. The Air Force calls this 

ìmission assessment,î which ìevaluates the total impact on the enemyís fighting and sustaining 

capability.î16 Ideally, mission assessment must continually evaluate the translation of military 

goals into targets lists, and constantly recommend adjustments to those lists to account for an 

enemy who constantly tries to negate or mitigate the effects of the attack. However, this can be a 

difficult prospect in practice. As one commentator has noted, 

Generally speaking, the effectiveness of air power has been more difficult to 

assess that that of surface forces. ÖTerritory seized or successfully defended by 

an Army can be readily depicted on a map. ÖThere are, after all, certain 

elementary differences between seizing and holding a piece of terrain with land 

forces and the comparatively fleeting, harder-to-measure consequences, direct and 

indirect, of air attacks against a target, or set of targets, over time.17

The evolution of our present day C2 structure illustrates the difficulties of translating 

theoretical requirements into a practical, functioning system. The next chapter will trace the 

development of tactical air control concepts since Vietnam.

12 
NOTES

 

1

Joseph G. Wohl, ìForce Management Decision Requirements for Air Force Tactical Command and 

Control,î IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 11, no. 9 (September 1981): 618. 

2

One of the most obvious constraints may be lack of capability. The target may be out of range, or cannot 

be destroyed or neutralized with existing weapons, or may be too heavily defended. Political constraints 

can also inhibit plans for attacks against otherwise viable targets. For example, if the political object of 

the attacks is coercion, the leader of the enemy nation may not be a suitable target if his would-be 

successors are expected to be even more intransigent. Finally, public support may be an important 

requirement for a successful military operation. Even if militarily important targets can be legally

attacked according to international norms and the Law of War, neutralizing certain categories of these 

targets negatively influence public opinion. See Lt. Col. Marc D. Felman, The Military/Media Clash and 

the New Principle of War: Media Spin (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 1993). 

3

JFACC [Joint Force Air Component Commander] Primer, HQ USAF/XO, August 1992, 8. 

4

The classic work on the dynamic relationship between political and military ends and means is, of 

course, Carl von Clausewitzís On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1976). For a modern discussion of the interrelationships between policy and 

strategy, see Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: In Introduction to 

National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Aug 88). For a 

case study in development of policy and strategy before the Gulf War, see Bob Woodward, The 

Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 199ó376. 

5

Joseph G. Wohl describes a command and control system as ìa technological, procedural, and 

organizational extension of the sensing, processing, and communicating capabilities of the military

commanders whose decisions it supports.î See his ìForce Management Decision Requirements for Air 

Force Tactical Command and Control,î IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 11, no. 9 

(September 1981): 618. 

6

This is a compilation of functions taken from various Air Force publications on the subject. For 

example, the Air Forceís Targeting Handbook for intelligence personnel lists the functions as detection, 

location, identification, decision, execution, and assessment (AFP 200-18, Intelligence Target Intelligence 

HandbookóUnclassified Targeting Principles, 1 October 1990, 9). The latest theater command and 

control concept of operations for Air Combat Command names planning, dissemination, execution, and 

assessment (Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for Theater Battle C4I, Langley AFB, VA: 

Headquarters, Air Combat Command/XPJC, 11 Mar 93, 8). However, there is general agreement among 

the publications on the subject that the functions listed above, in some form, are necessary to plan, 

execute, and evaluate air operations. 

7

AFP 200-22, Targeting Profession and Process, 12 May 89, 3. 

8

See Alfred C. Mierzejewskiís discussion of the criticality of coal to Nazi Germany in his book, The 

Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944ó1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

1988). Mierzejewski blames bureaucratic infighting as the reason intelligence and targeting agencies 

failed to understand the German economy (180ó181). 

9

A formal definition of targeting is ìthe process of selecting targets and matching the proper response to 

them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.î While the term ìtargetingî can be 

used in its broadest sense to include six phasesóObjectives and Guidance, Target Development, 

Weaponeering Assessment, Force Application Planning, Execution Planning, and Combat Assessmentó

ìtargetingî here means selecting individual aim points and match weapons to achieve a desired outcome. 

See AFP 200-18, Intelligence Target Intelligence HandbookóUnclassified Targeting Principles,

1 October 1990, 8, and AFP 200-17, An Introduction to Targeting, 23 June 1989. 

10JFACC Primer, 2. 

11For a comprehensive discussion of offensive vs. defensive in both air-to-surface and air-to-air 

operations, see Col John A. Warden, III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: 

Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), Chapters 2ó4. 

13 
 

12France probably had the most technically advanced Army of any nation on the eve of the Second World 

War. Her tanks and artillery were particularly formidable, and the Dewoitine 520 was arguably the 

Alliesí best fighter in 1940 (although there were far too few of them). However, French doctrine and 

organization were notably deficient. See Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of 

the French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985), 181ó183, and Charles 

Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of French Military Aviation, trans. Frances Kianka 

(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 299ó303, 329. 

13AFP 200-22, 5ó6. 

14ìPoststrike [combat assessment] is the examination of targets to determine how effective the damage 

mechanisms were, to decide how successful the strike or attack was, and to recommend any restrikes, 

changes in weapons, forces, tactics, or strategies needed.î [emphasis added]. AFP 200-18, 30. 

15Bomb Damage Assessment (now termed Battle Damage Assessment) and Munitions Effects Assessment 

are combined here as ìTarget Assessmentî (as opposed to Mission Assessment). 

16AFP 200-22, 5. 

17Gulf War Air Power Survey [hereafter referred to as GWAPS], Effects (U) (draft, March 1993), 1-17. 

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

14 
CHAPTER 3 

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN ACTION: 

HOW THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER EVOLVED

ìInitiated by the apparent failure of some of these command control computer systems to 

satisfy their users, questions about the commanderís real needs led to two interesting 

conclusions. First the requirements which had been levied on the system developers 

were simply the sum total of everything the commanderís staff thought might be nice to 

have. And second, there was no general analytic or theoretical basis for making 

judgements about what information was needed by whom, or how quickly and in what 

detail he needed it.î

1

óDr. Joel Lawson, Jr, 1981.

The Vietnam conflict was a watershed in the formation of Air Force concepts for the 

control of forces in regional war. Air operations in the theater were divided both geographically 

and organizationally, reflecting the divided command structure in Vietnam. This division 

persists in our contemporary control structures. 

Army General William Westmoreland, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam (COMUSMACV), headed all U. S. military operations in South Vietnam. He was 

therefore responsible for air operations in South Vietnam, and exercised control through his air 

deputy, the commander of the 2nd Air Division, later 7th Air Force. Westmoreland also 

exercised direct control over air operations in Route Package One (RP1), the bombing tract just 

north of the demilitarized zone (See Figure 5), arguing that enemy activity in that area directly 

affected his combat operations in the South. To complicate matters, Westmorelandís air deputy 

did not ìownî the heavy bomber force operating in South Vietnam, and later, in North Vietnam.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha and its subordinate headquarters, 8th Air Force in 

Guam, controlled the B-52s, and coordinated with Westmoreland and other agencies through an 

advanced echelon in Saigon.2

 Air command arrangements for operations over North Vietnam

15 
were also complex (Figure 6). The route packages were designed to facilitate coordination 

between the different services, but ended up dividing command, thereby violating the Air Force 

tenet of centralized control. The Navyís Task Force 77 was responsible for RPs II, III, IV, and 

VIB, and reported to 7th Fleet, a subordinate of the Commander-in Chief, Pacific Fleet 

(CINCPACFLT), who in turn reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The Air 

Force, meanwhile, controlled operations in RPs V AND VIA, and reported to 7th Air Force, a 

subordinate of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF), who also worked for 

CINCPAC. Centralization of all air assets, including SAC bombers, theoretically occurred only 

at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), if at all. 

Figure 5 

Route Packages in North Vietnam3

16 

Figure not Available. 
Figure not Available. 

Figure 6 

Command Structure for North Vietnam Operations4

While Air Force leaders like General William Momyer, the ranking airman in Vietnam

from Spring 1966 onward, hoped to increase operational effectiveness by replacing theater-level 

coordination with theater-level centralization, problems with command arrangements were 

intractable at the political level.5

 The Vietnam War, in particular, illustrated the difficulties of

translating political goals into target lists. President Lyndon Johnsonís ìTuesday Lunch Group,î 

whose direct control over target selection is well known and has been widely criticized, reflected 

a wider problem of fragmented command arrangements.6

 This fragmentation of authority and 

responsibility effectively eliminated the Air Forceís ability to develop a command and control 

system that would exercise responsive, centralized control over all of the disparate air 

operations, from analysis and planning to execution and assessment. Instead, the Air Forceís 

17 
response was to build a system that would coordinate with maximum efficiency, and perform its 

tasks under the political and operational constraints of the time. The primary influence on that 

system was Westmoreland, since he was the commander with the preponderance of assets. 

Westmorelandís vision of the war in Vietnam emphasized the ground campaign in the South, 

rather than a coercive air campaign against the North. Thus, Westmorelandís perception caused 

the Air Force to optimize its C2 arrangements in South Vietnam for a traditional ìtacticalî role 

(i.e., in support of land campaign). The 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at 

Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon became the primary air command element for the war in 

South Vietnam. A second TACC, the 7th Air Force Command Center (7 AFCC), was also 

established at Tan Son Nhut.7

 Manned exclusively with U. S. personnel, 7 AFCC controlled the 

air war in Laos and North Vietnam, which was primarily an interdiction campaign with 

occasional episodes of strategic attack against the North Vietnamese. 

Another TACCóthe 7/13 AF TACC in Thailandówas originally established in 1965 to 

control strikes in Laos, but later became the alternate 7 AFCC. Its primary function was to 

monitor missions returning to their bases, ìarranging any necessary aerial refueling or searchand-rescue efforts.î8

 Earlier in the war, the Air Force had supported the establishment of an 

overall theater air commander for Southeast Asia, but political difficulties prevented giving the 

ranking airman in Saigon control of all air assets in Southeast Asia.9

 The Thai authorities would 

not allow their Air Force to be commanded by an American airman outside Thailand, so the Air 

Force opted for the easy solution and established a separate command in Bangkok, thus creating 

another TACC. The result was three separate organizations responsible for planning and 

executing Air Force air operations in Southeast Asia: 7 TACC for the air war in the South, and 7 

AFCC (with its subordinate element in Thailand) for the air war in Laos and the North.10

As in Korea, the TACC system was initially found to be too slow to react to Army requests 

for air support in South Vietnam.

11 7 TACC improvements focused on reducing response times 

for fulfilling Army requests, improving communications and radar coverage, and coordinating 

various air units. Gradually, the control structures for executing close air support missions 

18 
became highly responsive, mainly due to the network of Direct Air Support Centers (Figure 7) 

and their subordinate elements assigned to Army corps headquarters.12 This system made 

extensive use of ground and airborne forward air controllers for final target identification and 

positive control over the strike aircraft, not only to direct them to the precise location of the 

enemy, but also to avoid friendly casualties.13 Airborne elements of the system, such as C-130 

Airborne Battlefield Command Control and Communications aircraft, were developed to help 

reduce response times against moving targets in the fluid ground battle. The concept of 

operations was to launch alert aircraft, maintain airborne alert aircraft, or divert lower-priority 

missions to fulfill immediate needs. Thus, by the height of the war, the C2 structures in South 

Vietnam had evolved to facilitate responsive air support to ground commanders.14

Figure not Available. 

Figure 7 

DASCs in South Vietnam15

In contrast to the air war in the South, a highly responsive C2 system did not develop for 

targets in the North. First, the lengthy approval process for strategic and tactical interdiction 

targets during Rolling Thunder meant that the services submitted their target lists several weeks 

in advance.16 This delay allowed for extensive and thorough target analysis and mission 

planning of most targets, excepting the occasional last-minute change. Second, the air war in the 

North and in Laos was controlled by a different element, the 7 AFCC. This division of this 

control center into a primary unit in Saigon and a subordinate unit in Thailand ìsolvedî both the 

19 
political problem (Thai sensitivities) and the organizational problem (the debate over 

Westmoreland controlling the theater air effort versus centralization at a higher echelon). 

Control of Air Force operations outside South Vietnam was exercised from these TACCs. Since 

these operations were almost exclusively pre-planned deep interdiction and strategic efforts, 

responsive planning for air operations was likewise unnecessary. Thus, the control systems for 

the ìtacticalî air war in the South, and for the strategic/interdiction campaign in Laos and the 

North, developed somewhat independently. 

The Spring invasion of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese Army in 1972 prompted a 

U. S. response, Operation Linebacker. Since this was, in the North, a classic interdiction 

campaign against a conventional ground force on the move, one might expect that a highly 

responsive C2 system evolved during the seven months of the operation. Yet, little additional 

analysis at the strategic level was accomplished, mainly due to the concept of operations. 

Linebacker I targets were largely the same ones attacked during Rolling Thunder.17 For three 

years during the bombing halt in the North, analysts could observe and study North Vietnamís 

war making systems, and catalog target coordinates and photographs at an unhurried pace. 

Short-notice analysis was largely unnecessary, since the railroad junctions, power plants, road 

networks, and other deep targets had been so well studied previously.18 Airpowerís success in 

frustrating Hanoiís war aims, even under the fragmented command arrangements reflected by the 

Route Package system, served as well to obscure the Air Forceís inability to responsively target 

strategic objectives. Although during Linebacker, 7th Air Force succeeded in modifying its C2

system for near-real-time targeting in air-to-air combat,19 air-to-surface war still imposed 

constraints, requiring substantial time to analyze a strategic target, weaponeer the target, task a 

sortie, attack the target, and assess the results. 

Likewise, Linebacker II missions against strategic targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area in 

December 1972 were also pre-planned and pre-scripted in accordance with Strategic Air 

Commandís nuclear war doctrine. The targets were nominated by SAC the previous August, and 

the final mission planning was accomplished by 8th Air Force in Guam.

20 These missions 

20 
against strategic targets were thus the fruit of months of detailed analysis,21 as opposed to 

missions in the South, where the Air Force identified and attacked tactical targets according to 

the needs of the situation. 

Tactical targets generally do not make target ìsystemsî in a classical strategic sense. The 

value of troops, tanks, vehicles, and other fielded forces is mainly dependent on their strength 

and position in relation to the ground battle lines.22 Therefore, there is little need, nor is there 

time, for the detailed analysis required in strategic targeting to determine how the enemyís entire 

war-making system is structured and identify its key vulnerabilities. Additionally, the land battle 

is the prime concern of the ground commander. His intelligence staff is highly motivated to 

determine the location, disposition, strength, and intentions of the enemy ground force, and 

constantly passes on his priorities for ìdeepî attacks to the air forces. The result is that 

responsive command and control is required by the nature of air war in support of land forces, 

and the system of Direct Air Support Centers, forward air controllers, and airborne C2 aircraft 

developed in South Vietnam as a direct result of this need. 

The upshot is that the strategic air war in the North was planned and controlled quite 

differently from the tactical war in the South. There was little incentive to develop responsive

planning functions for air war in North Vietnam, while there was little need to develop 

comprehensive intelligence analysis, targeting, or assessment functions for air support of fluid 

ground operations in South Vietnam. The Army set targeting priorities in South Vietnam. The 

vast majority of missions flown in the South were in support of ground force requirements.23 

Thus there was little need for the Air Force to develop its own tactical targeting analysis system, 

since the concept of close air support holds that the ground commander has the final say on the 

target. Since the Army nominated the targets, the only meaningful measure of effectiveness was 

the efficiency with which the ground commanderís priorities were fulfilled. Likewise in the 

North, there was only occasional need to react to changes in missions which were pre-planned 

well in advance. Ironically, the assessment requirements were similar to that in the South. 

Effectiveness was based on the efficiency with which the individual targets were neutralized, 

21 
since the 7th AF commander did not ìcall the shots.î The targets were chosen by others; either 

by the President, the JCS, CINCPAC, or COMUSMACV. While it is true much time was 

devoted in Washington to analyzing the overall air effort, the regional assessment requirements 

were generally limited to collecting data on the efficiency of individual strikes.24

Thus, the ìground sideî of the Tactical Air Control Center emerged from Vietnam as a dual 

system: pre-planned (primarily interdiction) targets were handled as part of a 24 - 72 hour 

tasking cycle. Fixed targets such as bridges, railway yards, truck parks, supply dumps, tunnels, 

etc., were not moving; there was time to do detailed intelligence analysis and properly 

weaponeer targets to assign the most suitable ordnance and aircraft to accomplish the mission. 

Deep, heavily defended targets (including deep interdiction and strategic targets) were treated in 

this fashion. The attacks were mostly planned and assigned well in advance of the strike date, 

allowing for a division of labor between the planning and execution personnel at the TACC. 

Those targets that were not had been assigned on the ìspur of the momentî by higher echelons. 

Yet the Air Force had little stake in the success of these strikes, since they were not part (in the 

Air Forceís view) of any coherent strategy. These targets were chosen by someone else, and 

received emphasis commensurate to their worth, or lack thereof. 

Mobile tactical targets, however, such as convoys and enemy ground forces, either on the 

move or engaging friendly troops, required rapid response. There was no time, and indeed, no 

need for the same level of detailed planning. The assigned aircraft would be sent to a general 

location, or launched from alert status, or diverted from a lower priority mission (there were 

plenty of these), and sent to a forward controller for final target assignment based on the ground 

situation. The pilot would receive enroute a briefing on the target area air defenses, friendly 

troop locations, and other pertinent information, and plan his attack in flight, usually while 

holding over friendly lines in safe airspace. Thus, since the ground forces set the target 

priorities, the major portion of the TACCís assessment efforts was devoted to determining 

damage to targets as an end in itself. According to the McNamara Pentagon, if information was 

22 
not quantifiable, it was not considered useful.25 At the same time, in the Air Forceís tactical 

community, effectiveness became equated with efficiency. 

After Vietnam, the Air Forceís command and control structures reflected the supposed 

lessons of Southeast Asia. The USAF maintained air command and control elements that had 

largely been lost during the post- Korean era.26 The Air Force retained its Tactical Air Control 

Wings, forward air controllers, and Direct Air Support Centers, and Air Force liaison officers 

trained regularly with the Army. The Air Force exercised its fighter forces primarily in air 

defense and joint army exercises. There was little emphasis on strategic air war.27 Gone were 

the days of F-105s training to deliver nuclear bombs on Soviet surface-to-air missile sites. Thus, 

in the í70s and í80s, conventional war became synonymous with tactical (i.e., in support of an 

army) operations. 

Airmen who fought in Vietnam rose to leadership positions. Their subordinates accepted 

their leadersí vision of conventional war as tactical war. The TACC became the doctrinallyapproved air command element of conventional war.28 Additionally, the Eifel system, a C2

system designed for use by NATO forces in Europe, was also optimized to fight an air war in 

support of a land campaign against the Warsaw Pact.29 NATOís declared strategy of forward 

defense held that airpower would primarily support the ground forces to hold back a 

conventional Soviet armored invasion of Western Europe.30

During the late 70s, there were few changes to the TACC; those were mainly technical. 

Little was written on the theoretical foundations of command and control of air forces. A 1978 

study on the Tactical Air Control System concluded that the TACS needed better equipment and 

better training.31 However, since the TACS usually rated lowest priority in budget battles, the 

recommendations were largely ignored. The Tactical Air Command was in the midst of

modernizing its fighter forces and did not allocate money to C2; the Air Force was increasing 

procurement of the F-15 and A-10, which had recently become operational, and fielding the F-16 

as well. Finally, by the mid-80s, the TACS was in such disrepair that major changes were 

urgently needed.32

23 
In December 1985 General Robert Russ, the TAC commander, initiated ìThe Year of the 

TACS.î33 General Russí specially appointed task force reviewed equipment, manning, and 

training of the Tactical Air Control System and all of its subordinate elements.34 Briefly, while 

technical improvement programs were begun, and immediate organizational and training 

problems were addressed, the ìYear of the TACSî initiatives did not alter the underlying 

concepts of control of conventional air war that had remained mostly static since Vietnam.

Equipment modernization programs initiated such improvements as the Computer Assisted 

Force Management System for producing and distributing Air Tasking Orders, which aided the 

efficient operation of the TACC.35 However, doctrinal foundations remained unquestioned. 

Studies continued to define characteristics of C2 systems in such terms as ìsupportability,î 

ìinteroperability,î ìtransportability,î and ìsurvivability.î36 The need for any fundamental 

change was unrecognized,37 and TAC entered the 90s with a vision of its role in conventional 

war as supporting the land campaign.38 By this time, the Air Force had signed letters of

agreement with the Army, emphasizing its commitment to supporting the Armyís ìAirLand 

Battleî doctrine, which envisioned the Air Force in a supporting role for land operations.39 

Figure 8 shows a diagram of the planning concept for tactical air employment in the then-current 

TACC regulation. 

Thus, the USAF entered Desert Shield with a conventional war command and control 

structure based on the TACC, whose fundamental concepts of operation were mostly unchanged 

since Vietnam. The next chapter will compare those concepts with the ìidealizedî C2 structure 

described in Chapter 2. 

24 
Figure not Available. 

Figure 8 

Excerpt from TACR 55-45, Tactical Air Control Center, 8 April 1988 

NOTES

 

1

Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr., ìCommand and Control as a Process,î IEEE Control Systems Magazine 16 

(March 1981): 5. 

2

Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force , Vol II 

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Dec 1989), 282. 

3

Lane, Command and Control, 66. 

4

Ibid., 68. 

5

See General Momyerís discussion of centralized control in his Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, 

Vietnam) (Washington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1978). 

25 
 

6

See Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: 

The Free Press, Macmillan, 1989), 120ó125, for a discussion of decision process at the Tuesday Lunch 

group, as well as military reactions to Johnsonís guidance. 

7

Lane, Command and Control, 76ó77. 

8

Ibid, 77. 

9

John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965ó1968, The United States 

Air Force in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 71. 

10Actually, there were a total of five separate installations which carried the TACC name. The other two 

were established to extend communications and radar coverage, and were not true TACCs in the doctrinal 

sense. See Lane, Command and Control, 77ó78. 

11John Sbrega, ìSoutheast Asia, ì Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, Benjamin 

Franklin Cooling, ed., (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), p. 423. 

12Headquarters 2nd Air Division (PACAF), 2nd Air Division Historical Reports, Tactical Air Control 

Center, AHRC K526.07. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

13Ibid.

14Schlight, War in South Vietnam, 292ó295. 

15Lane, Command and Control, 84. 

16Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 99. 

17Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, 173. 

18Most targets required precision ordnance, further increasing the need for detailed intelligence. See Ibid, 

159. Most of the materials were available, however, after three years of building target folders. 

19Maj. William J. Nichols, From Teaball to Fastball: The Evolution and Future of Real-Time Intelligence 

in the Cockpit, Maxwell AFB, AL, thesis submitted to the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, May

1992. 

20Maj Cregg Crosby, 8th Air Force History, Vol. II, quoted in BGen James R, McCarthy and Lt Col 

George B. Allison, Linebacker II: A View from the Rock, ed. Col Robert E. Rayfield, USAF Southeast 

Asia Monograph Series, Vol. VI, Monograph 8 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower Research Institute, 1979), 

26ó27. 

21Ibid. The original target list was received by 8th Air Force on ì10 or 12 Augustî 1972. The planner 

estimated 90ó95% of the actual Linebacker II targets were on the original list. 

22Surprisingly, directives shed little light on how to determine the value of enemy ground force targets. 

AFR 200-18 advocates first priority for the ìmost threateningî formations, presumably the strongest units 

nearest the battle line. The section on targeting in TACR 55-45 indicates targeting formations which pose 

ìthe greatest threatî to friendly forces. AFP 200-18, Vol. I, 72, and TACR 55-45, 7-4. 

23Sbrega, ìSoutheast Asia,î 449. 

24An example of the type of information the highest commanders considered important, see Adm U. S. G. 

Sharp, Report on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 June 1968) (Washington DC: U. S. Govít Printing Office, 

1969). In his ìNorth Vietnam Target Element Summaryî tables, he lists numbers of targets in various 

categories ìDestroyed,î ìDamaged,î and ìTotal Destroyed and Damaged.ì While these figures are 

precise, their significance in terms of achievement of the military goals is not explained. 

25David Halberstam recounts a story, apparently told to him by Jack Raymond of the New York Times, of 

the Defense Secretaryís visit to Danang in 1965, which typified McNamaraís obsession with quantifiable 

data: while a Marine colonel briefed him on the local situation, the Secretary interrupted and ìspouted his 

own version, all in numbers and statistics. The colonel, who was very bright, read him immediately like a 

man breaking a code, and without changing stride, went on with the briefing, simply switching his terms, 

quantifying everything, giving everything in numbers and percentages,Öso blatant a performance that it 

was like a satire.î Raymond ìbegan to laugh and had to leave the tent.î Later McNamara commented 

that the colonel was ìone of the finest officers Iíve ever met.î David Halberstam, The Best and the 

Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 249. 

26For example, the 25th Tactical Air Support Squadron, a forward air control unit flying O-2A Cessna 

Skymasters, was assigned to Eielson AFB, Alaska, in 1974. In fact, the entire Tactical Air Control 

26 
 

System, from Direct Air Support Centers to air liaison elements, became a large ìholding tankî for fighter 

pilots during the drawdown after the Vietnam war. (author) 

27AFM 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 15 Jan 75, describing the mission of ìStrategic 

Attack,î adds the following afterthought: ìÖthese [strategic] aerospace forces maintain a capability to 

use either conventional or nuclear weapons.î (3-2) The following version, published in 1979, divides air 

operations into ìTheater,î which are either conventional or nuclear, and ìStrategic,î which are not so 

categorized. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 14 February 1979, 

1-10ó1-11. 

28TACM 2-1, Aerospace Operational Doctrine: Tactical Air Operations, 15 April 1978. 

29Eifel was developed to provide a common network for disseminating air tasking information among 

various elements throughout various countries in Europe. (author) 

30Sir Michael Knight, ìAir Power in the NATO Alliance,î in War in the Third Dimension, ed. R. A. 

Mason (London: Brasseyís, 1986), 81ó82. 

31TACS Special Study Final Report (U), 7ó30 August 1978, ACC Historical Office, Langley AFB, VA, 

#913, Safe 27, File YOT, (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified. 

32Action Memorandum 85-134 from BGen. Harold G. Hermes, HQ TAC/COS, to Lt Col Lloyd McGrady,

ACC Historical Office File YOT-1(5), Langley AFB, VA, 16 Dec 85. 

33Memorandum from Lt Col Lloyd McGrady to staff, 21 February 1986, ACC Historical Office File 

YOT-1(5), Langley AFB, VA. 

34Letter from Maj Gen John Conaway, Chief of the Air National Guard, to Gen Robert Russ, Commander, 

Tactical Air Command, 22 Dec 86, ACC Historical Office File YOT-1(5), Langley AFB, VA. 

35The recommendations of the working group, which reviewed ìreadiness, sustainability, force structure, 

and modernizationî were briefed on 26 Apr 86 to General Russ. See TACS Quarterly, Special Editionó

Year of the TACS, (Jan 87?), Langley AFB, VA Headquarters Tactical Air Command/DOY, 5, 15. 

3621st Century Tactical Command and Control Study (TC2-21), Vol.I, Headquarters, Air Force Systems 

Command/XRX, SAIC-85/1733, Science Applications International Corp., August 1985, p. II-6. 

37Ibid, p. II-11. The authors recognized Force Planning as a specific operational task, and sub-divided it 

into Assess/Reassess, Plan, Task/Direct, and Control/Monitor. However, this is simply a listing of 

operational functions. See also Tactical Air Control System (TACS) 1986 (U), Headquarters, Tactical Air 

Command/XPJSG, 21 April 1986. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

38ìOne of the critical reasons for establishing a [Joint Force Air Component Commander] is to have a 

central authority and facility to execute the joint air campaign and respond in near real-time to the fluid 

battlefield.î [emphasis added]. TACP 2-2, 9. 

39ìMemorandum of agreement on U. S. ArmyóU. S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process, 22 

May 84,î in The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions, ed. Richard I.Wolf 

(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 415. Briefly, AirLand Battle was the Armyís 

vision of war against the Warsaw Pact. Ground commanders would attempt to influence enemy

formations far in advance of actual contact, in order to attrit them prior to engagement. The means for 

influencing the so-called ìdeep battleî would be airpower. Although the Air Force emphasized that 

AirLand Battle was Armyórather than Air Forceódoctrine, the memorandum reflected the reality that 

the Supreme Commander in Europe was an American Army general. 

27 
CHAPTER 4 

HOW THE DUALITY OF THE TACC CAUSED FUNCTIONAL RIGIDITY

ìAfter two weeks of war, my instincts and experience told me that weíd bombed our 

strategic targets enough to accomplish our campaign objectives. ÖBut our [battle 

damage assessment] expertsÖdisagreed. ÖTheyíd say things like, ëYou failed to destroy 

the power plant in Baghdadí; yet we knew that in Baghdad, the lights were out.î

1

óGeneral H. Norman Schwarzkopf 

On the eve of the Persian Gulf War, Tactical Air Commandís concept for planning and 

directing air operations centered around the TACCís two main operations divisions: Combat 

Plans and Combat Operations.2

 This divided structure, mirroring the dual requirements of the air 

war in Vietnam, resulted in the inability to strike targets of opportunity without incurring 

unknown, but possibly heavy, costs. 

The Combat Plans Division was responsible for ìtomorrowísî war. Because of the dual 

nature of the ground side of the TACC, Combat Plans was responsible for detailed targeting and 

weaponeering of interdiction (including strategic) targets, but not for air support missions on the 

friendly side of the Fire Support Coordination Line, a geographical limit denoting where air 

attacks must be coordinated with the movement of friendly troops. To handle the problem of 

close air support, Combat Plans would anticipate a notional number of ground support sorties 

based on the guidance of the theater commander, but did not plan to assign specific targets, since 

tactical targets generally move, and may not be positively located until engaged by friendly 

troops. Ground support sorties would receive specific target assignments once airborne. The Air 

Tasking Order would normally direct units to provide aircraft on ground alert or airborne alert in 

anticipation of receiving specific target information some time closer the actual moment of 

ordnance on target. Sorties diverted from other pre-planned missions would, in emergencies, 

increase support for the ground force. 

28 
In contrast, the Combat Operations Division was responsible for executing ìtodayís war.î 

Combat Operations would take over monitoring and controlling a mission beginning about 

twelve hours prior to launch, because, by this time, details of the planned mission would pass to 

the unit executing it. Once inside that unitís mission planning cycle time, the mission scheduled 

against that target would be constrainedóchanges would likely either delay the mission or 

reduce planning time available, lowering the probability of success. This is because operational 

wings need a finite period of time to plan, in order to maximize their advantages over the enemy, 

particularly against a fixed, heavily-defended target. The planning time can vary with the 

difficulty and objective of the mission and type of aircraft, but planners generally attempt to have 

tasking and coordination information to the affected unit 12 to 6 hours prior to takeoff.

But in real war, reconnaissance is ongoing. New possible targets are constantly being 

located and identified. A target can suddenly become valuable, often because of its relationship 

to the battlefield. For example, a bridge in the enemyís rear areas has a fixed location and may 

be struck at the air commanderís leisure, depending on his objectives and timetable. But if a 

large enemy ground unit is enroute to the bridge, and by crossing will soon influence the ground 

battle, the bridge suddenly becomes a time-sensitive target. 

Strategic targets change value with time as well, not necessarily because of their 

relationship to the ground battle, but because of the nature of strategic air warfare.3

 Every

nationís war-making system is unique. As Alfred Mierzejewski wrote of the Alliesí strategic 

bombing effort in Europe during World War II, ìThe inability to comprehend how the relative 

importance of target systems changed over time was the greatest failing of Allied intelligence 

after its fundamental misappreciation of the German industrial effort.î4

 Strategic targets change 

value over time for a variety of reasons: the enemy is constantly trying to foil the air 

commanderís plan by devising work-arounds, thus changing the structure of his war-making 

system; battlefield successes and failures influence the importance of different supporting 

complexes, shifting the enemyís logistics vulnerabilities; political and military objectives can 

change during the course of a war, further requiring modification of target lists; and strategy is 

29 
often phasedóthe commander makes a conscience decision to emphasize different targets at 

different times in the campaign. For example, an enemyís air defense sector control center may 

be an extremely lucrative target when the immediate objective is to gain air superiority. But 

once that superiority has been won, the value of the center as a target substantially drops. The 

center has not moved, so its value is related to its function, rather than its proximity to the battle 

lines. Similarly, a supply depot may become less valuable as a target if the supplies have all 

been consumed. 

The Director of Combat Operations, usually the officer to whom the air commander 

delegates his authority for diverting missions, normally has little problem diverting a ground 

force support sortie to time-sensitive tactical targets.5

 Aircraft assigned this mission usually 

have a compatible ordnance load, and the crews are generally prepared to attack the types of 

targets they are likely to encounter (tanks, troops, artillery, etc.). Moreover, the essence of air 

support to engaged troops is the ability to quickly shift airpower from one location to another. 

The purpose of real-time control elements, such as forward air controllers, is to do just that. The 

sortie has already been taskedóthe question becomes finding a target for it. 

The air commander executing a strategic or interdiction campaign has a different problem. 

He will almost always have more targets than sorties to neutralize them. If a new target is 

suddenly identified and located, there are few unassigned sorties he can send to attack it. So in 

order to neutralize a new ìdeepî target that might become visible after the unit has received the 

air tasking order, but before it had executed the strike, the commander faces a dilemma: on one 

hand, he can add the target to a list of aimpoints to be attacked later. This has advantages in that 

the mission can be well-planned and optimized for the target and its defenses. But this method is 

unresponsive. If the new target is fleeting, or time sensitive, its value might decrease (or even 

disappear) by the time it is eventually struck. On the other hand, he can change a missionís 

previous target to the new one, if the aircraft has ordnance capable of neutralizing the new target, 

and can suppress the defenses surrounding it. In this case, the air commander is deliberately 

30 
forgoing the opportunity to strike the originally planned target, which had been placed on the list 

because of its presumed value to the war effort. 

Therefore, there is no practical way for handling heavily defended targets requiring 

extensive planning, which become apparent between the beginning of the planning cycle and the 

completion of execution. The air commander cannot force the cycle time to work faster without 

sacrificing quality of mission planning, nor can he send a ìshallowî sortie to strike a ìdeepî 

target.6

 A mission assigned to ground support does not normally have the specific ordnance 

needed to attack a specialized target deep in the enemyís rear area, nor has the pilot received a 

detailed briefing on the target characteristics or surrounding defenses. Usually a controller 

would rather divert a deep sortie to a tactical support mission than to send a mission which was 

originally tasked for Close Air Support deep.7

 

Ordinarily, the decision whether to divert a sortie from striking a previously designated 

target in order to neutralize a newly-visible one is based on balancing the air commanderís 

guidance and priorities against costs. But there is not now in existence any system for assisting 

the commander to assess those costs accurately, since there is presently no way to determine 

quickly the relative importance of specific targets, other than the commanderís intuition. 

Although one could argue one ìknowsî the value of the foregone target (because it was analyzed 

extensively), that value may change with time if the commander defers attacking it. Its new 

priority could be vastly different from its previous one. Now, one may have a general idea of the 

value of the new target based on intelligenceís analyses of the value of similar targets or the 

same types of targets. But this is far more likely to be true in the case of tactical targets (one 

tank is like another) than in strategic targets, where the relation of the target to other elements of 

the enemyís war making system is much more importantóand complexóthan the individual 

target itself. Even if one could assess the relative value of both targets at some time in the 

future, this analysis would still fail to account for the cost of disruption to the commanderís war 

plan, and the self-induced friction to friendly operations resulting from communicating, 

coordinating, and reacting to the changes. Such valuations fail to address the effect of last 

31 
minute changes on aircrews, such as probability of decreased effectiveness against the new target 

and decreased survivability in a hastily planned mission. 

Therefore, in general, one would suspect that the perceived benefits of attacking a strategic 

target of opportunity would obscure the substantial and real costs of abandoning the 

commanderís original plan. But there is an even more serious flaw in the foundations of the 

TACC. The problem is the way the TACC assists the air commander to assess his results. 

The evolution of the TACC obscured the purpose of assessment, in that the efficiency of 

target servicing became an end in itself. Because the political ends of the Vietnam War were 

ultimately disconnected from the air targets chosen, measures of effectiveness were based on 

quantifiable, though not necessarily relevant, criteria. The ìbody countî is an Army example of 

a measure of efficiency masquerading as a measure of effectiveness. The Air Force had its 

equivalentóthe sortie count. Sortie counts and sortie rates can tell one about the efficiency of 

an air force, but nothing about the effectiveness.8

 Unless those sorties score with the right 

ordnance on the right targets at the right time, they are ineffective. In fact, they are less than 

militarily useless--they are counter-productive, since they are wasting scarce resources. 

Likewise, target assessment is a measure of efficiency. It can be used as evidence for a measure 

of effectiveness, but in itself only tells the extent the individual target has been neutralized. 

The USAF has traditionally focused on target assessment because it is possible. For 

example, intelligence can, with some effort, measure how many trucks and locomotives aircraft

have destroyed in an interdiction campaign. It is more difficult, however, to measure directly the 

flow of troops and materiel into the combat area, which is what the count of trucks and trains 

attempts to measure. Rather than framing requirements for systems which could measure 

effectiveness directly, the Air Force focused on the unambiguous, technical-quantitative 

solution: more capability to observe, report, and transmit effects of strikes on individual targets.9 

In other words, the Air Force asked for more data gathering and faster handling, rather than 

better information. The focus was on quantity and speed, rather than quality. Why is this a 

problem?

32 
ìBottom upî assessment carries with it the implicit assumption that the exhaustion of the 

target list automatically results in the accomplishment of the military objectives. Unfortunately, 

without some way of directly measuring progress toward the commanderís goals, we are 

condemned to remain stuck in the ìtarget assessment loop.î (Figure 9) 

Political 

Objectives

Military 

Objectives

Grand 

Strategy

Target 

List

Air 

Tasking 

Order

Air 

Strategy

Target Assessment

Figure 9 

Target Assessment 

An example is the Korean interdiction campaign from July í51 to Spring í52 . During this time, 

interdiction targets in North Korea were persistently destroyed. However, we still failed to 

achieve our ultimate objective of persuading the Communists to sign the Armistice. The 

interdiction campaign was ineffective militarily for a number of reasons. However, target 

assessment alone would have mistakenly given the impression that the operation was ìworkingî 

(because the targets were being destroyed), when in reality, the campaignís objectives had not 

been achieved.10

No doubt, target assessment is still an important component for assessing the extent to 

which the commanderís military objectives are being accomplished. If, for example, one of the 

theater commanderís objectives is the destruction of enemy aircraft for reasons, say, of post-war 

regional stability, counting destroyed aircraft is a completely appropriate measure of 

effectiveness. Additionally, aircrews need target results for mission planning and threat 

33 
avoidance. But to the air commander, individual target results are only valuable in themselves to 

the extent that their destruction is connected to the overall effectiveness of the campaign. 

In summary, tactical doctrine, based on experience in Vietnam, made it impossible for the 

deep interdiction and strategic targeting function to perform optimally with less than 24 - 72 

hours of planning time. Fluid battlefield support would be handled dynamically by air elements 

collocated with the Army. The concept succeeded because the mission planning requirements 

for tactical targets are generally lower than for strategic targets. Additionally, the Air Force 

concept of target assessment, as an end in itself, disconnected the target set from the political and 

military goals. Air commanders might translate objectives into target sets, but evaluation of

effectiveness would be based primarily on how efficiently the set was attacked. The formal 

command and control structure did not provide a mechanism for validation of the set itself.11

Preliminary studies of Operation Desert Storm infer that many of these problems remain 

embedded in todayís conventional command and control system. While a detailed analysis of

C2 in the Gulf War is beyond the scope of this paper, reports and articles on Command and 

Control in the Desert Storm, as well as writings by personnel involved in planning and executing 

the war, tend to support the conclusions set forth here.12 Already the Air Force is implementing 

improvements to its ability to command and control regional war. The keystone of this 

capability will be the new Air Operations Center. Whether the USAF has truly adapted its C2

system to fight conventional strategic air war is the topic of the next chapter. 

NOTES 

1

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography, with Peter Petre (New 

York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, Oct 1992), 430. 

2

In addition, the TACC had two intelligence divisions that mirrored the ìtodayís warî and ìtomorrow's 

warî structure of Combat Operations and Combat Plans. These are the Enemy Situation and Correlation 

Division and the Combat Intelligence Division. 

3

AFR 200-18, Vol. I, Target Intelligence Handbook: Unclassified Targeting Principles, 1 October 1990, 

14.

4

Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944ó1945 (Chapel Hill: 

University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 181. 

5

In Desert Storm, this function was performed by the leader of the Airborne Command Element (ACE), 

who performed this duty in an EC-135 command and control aircraft. 

34 
 

6

Lt Col M. Williams, 9 COS, Shaw AFB, SC, telephone interview with the author, March 1993. 

7

Ibid.

8

Even so, sortie counts in themselves are not direct measures of efficiency. For example, one uses 16 

sorties to carry 32 500-lb. bombs when 4 sorties could do the job. 

9

21st Century Tactical Command and Control Study (TC2-21), Vol.I (Unclassified), Headquarters Air 

Force Systems Command/XRX, SAIC-85/1733, Science Applications International Corp., 30 August 

1985. 

10Col. R. L. Randolf and Lt Col B. I. Mayo, ìThe Application of FEAF Effort in Korea, 1952,î staff 

study, AFHC K720.1, 12 April 1952, 1ó14. 

11While intelligence manuals recognized the importance of mission assessment, and stressed the need to 

plan assessment at the outset of an air campaign, the structure of the TACC didnít recognize that the 

target set itself would necessarily be an imperfect translation of political and military objectives. 

12See GWAPS Summary, April 1993. See also Lt Col Richard B. Lewis, USAF, Desert StormóJFACC 

Problems Associated With Battlefield Preparation, Individual Study Project, U. S. Army War College, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 April 1993 and ìAir Tasking Order (ATO) Planning Process for Desert Storm,î 

(Briefing Notes, 2 July 1991). See also CDR Daniel J. Muir, ìDesert Storm: A View from the Black 

Hole,î Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1991, 85ó86. 

35 
CHAPTER 5 

POST-DESERT STORM: THE AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

ìAOCóAir Operations Center. This is the wartime facility for the Joint Task Forceís Air 

Force Component Commander (AFCC), the unified CINCís Air Component Commander, 

or the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). For the old TACS heads, 

remember AOC is much easier to say than ëTACC.íî1

óBattle Management Systems Quarterly 

Preliminary studies of the Persian Gulf War indicate that many of the theoretical 

difficulties of command and control occurred during Operation Desert Storm. The number of

sorties flown was so massive that intense friction, much of it self-induced, was generated when 

commanders attempted to react to targets of opportunity. Coalition air forces relied heavily on 

the Computer Aided Force Management System (CAFMS), the automated system for writing 

and disseminating the Air Tasking Order. The sortie load was so heavy, the Gulf War Airpower 

Survey noted, ì[i]f [CAFMS] was disabled or shut down for even a short period of timeóa few 

hoursóit would have been impossible for the ATO to be distributed throughout the theater 

within an acceptable period of time.î2

 The interaction of this huge sortie rate with a planning 

system designed for long lead times, and assessment which was efficiency-based rather than 

effectiveness-based, produced difficulties. As the Gulf War Air Power Survey noted, 

If the prime purpose of the air campaign was to attack the Iraqi ability to 

understand what was happening to them and to defend [from an attack], then 

attention to absolute physical destruction of targetsóas the intelligence 

community recommended and the [targeting cell] planners rejectedówas 

unnecessary.3

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition forces, was so frustrated with the 

disconnection of Battle Damage Assessments from actual operational effects that he 

implemented a system for forwarding his own mission assessments to his superiors.4

 The

intelligence divisions of the TACC, after long years of continued Air Force emphasis on 

efficiency-based assessments, found that attack planners, who wanted effects-based assessments, 

36 
did not consider their contributions particularly useful. Yet, these same planners were constantly 

adjusting the attack plan in response to recent intelligence, frustrating the intelligence 

organizations who were trying to keep track of the campaign. The survey further noted, 

After the start of the war, [Brigadier General Buster] Glossen and [attack planner 

Lt Col David] Deptula argued, it was important to keep the Iraqi military 

confused and disorganized by a relentless, constant attack. Yet, if functional 

degradation was of overriding importance, then it was not necessary to have so 

many last minute target and timing changes. The new target could easily have 

been added to the third day of the planning cycle.5

Perhaps. But how does one really know if an attack can be delayed without understanding the 

expected change of value of the target over time? Indeed, problems of opportunity targeting and 

assessment were ìbuilt inî to the C2 framework. Much activity in the Department of Defense, 

particularly in the various intelligence agencies, is currently devoted to learning the lessons of

that war.6

 The real question is whether changes resulting from the experience in Desert Storm

will be institutionalized. 

Following the Persian Gulf War, Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command 

merged, partly due to the growing recognition that the lines between ìstrategicî and ìtacticalî air 

forces had blurred. For example, B-52 heavy bombers had struck Iraqi troop positions while 

F-15E multi-role fighters had attacked Scud missile launching and production facilities.7

 The

result of the merger, dubbed Air Combat Command (ACC), will provide the forces and their 

supporting control structures to the air commander in regional conventional war.8

 In 1991, TAC 

changed the name of the Tactical Air Control System to the ìTheater Air Control System,î and 

renamed the TACC the ìAir Operations Center,î anticipating the upcoming merger.9

The new Air Combat Command also revised TACís operational doctrine. ACC Manual 

2-1, Operational Doctrine, adds ìStrategic Attackî to the traditional tactical missions of Counter 

Air, Interdiction, and Close Air Support.10 Additionally, the command issued a new ìConcept of

Operations for Theater C4Iî (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 

Intelligence), and is developing an operating regulation for the new Air Operations Center.11

37 
But the AOC looks like a TACC with a different name. While introducing the term to 

TACS personnel in January 1992, Brigadier General Michael Short, Air Combat Command 

Deputy Director for Operations, emphasized the name change and the new organizational 

shoulder patch, but did not describe any change of mission or function from the older ìtacticalî 

organizations to the Theater Air Control System and Air Operations Center.12 In addition, only 

two paragraphs of ACCís new operational doctrine are devoted to explaining and developing the 

concept of Strategic Attack, as opposed to about six full pages for Counter Air, four and one-half 

pages for Air Interdiction and two pages for Close Air Support.13 There is no recognition that 

an independent air campaign might require a different command and control doctrine than a 

campaign fought primarily in support of land forces.14 The structure of four main divisions of 

the TACC (Combat Plans, Combat Operations, Combat Intelligence, Enemy Situation and 

Correlation) remains, and the process for planning and executing air operations, though 

improved, remains conceptually similar. Because of the Air Forceís commitment to tight 

centralized control, incompatibility between mission planning time and response time remains. 

The potential for friction and high costs associated with diverting combat sorties persist. The 

fundamental concept of assessment through bottom-up collating of target data also remains.15 

Battle Damage Assessment is still primarily focused on gathering individual target results. 

ìTarget System Assessmentî is the official Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) term for 

assessment of the effectiveness of strikes on the operation of the targeted system.

16 Not only has 

this concept been relegated to the status of a sub-category of Combat Assessment under Battle 

Damage Assessment (See Figure 10), but Target System Assessment focuses on the individual 

targetís effect on its parent system, not the value of the system itself, or the relation of the 

various systems to the commanderís accomplishment of his military objectives.17 There seems 

to be little recognition in DIA of the importance of mission assessment as a broader concept than 

just a sub-category of battle damage assessment. Assessment data for individual targets must 

still travel to the top for decision on restrike, then back down for tasking. There is only limited 

capability for providing mission-level assessment aids to commander.18

38 
 

Combat 

Assessment

Battle Damage 

Assessment

Munitions Effects 

Assessment

Reattack 

Recommendation

Target System 

Assessment

Physical Damage 

Assessment

Functional Damage 

Assessment

Figure 10 

Combat Assessment 

There are some encouraging trends. Intelligence support to air operations has undergone a 

major overhaul, partly in response to deficiencies recognized in the Gulf War. The air 

intelligence community performed a ìStrategies to Tasks,î top-down reassessment of the entire 

intelligence function in the Air Force. Intelligence requirements teams conducted a 

comprehensive survey of Desert Storm intelligence users, in both operations and intelligence 

fields, to identify and correct problems.

19 Unfortunately, there still seems to be no recognition 

for the need to continually revalidate the translation of military objectives into air strategy during 

a dynamic air war. Rather, ACC is again attempting to use primarily technical improvements to 

cope with conventional war requirements of the future. 

The Contingency Tactical Air Control and Planning System (CTAPS) began development 

under General Russ as a ìYear of the TACSî initiative.20 The purpose of CTAPS is to link 

together the disparate elements of the Theater Air Control System and sister service C2 systems 

in order to share the information required by the various users (Figure 11).21

39 
Figure 11 

Mature CTAPS Architecture22

The concept is for huge relational data bases to store information; CTAPS will transmit and 

distribute the information to various users. For example, planners desiring details of a potential 

target will access the data base to extract details such as target location, dimensions, and 

construction. Weaponeers would access the information in order to choose the most effective 

ordnance. Aircrews could extract information about threats such as missile defenses surrounding 

the target. Following an air strike, information regarding the results of the strike would go back 

into the data base. Thus, each user from the bomb loader to the air component commander could 

enter and retrieve information tailored to his own needs and responsibilities (Figure 12). 

40 

Figure not Available. 
Figure not Available. 

Figure 12 

CTAPS Data Flow23

Although CTAPS will offer much needed improvements by speeding the flow of 

information to those who need it, these are improvements to the implementation of air force 

command and control, not to the fundamental concept. CTAPS will not change the limitations 

to opportunity targeting inherent in ACCís C2 construct, nor will it change the reliance on 

bottom-up assessment. Not surprisingly, in structuring CTAPS, TAC specified requirements 

such as ìsurvivability,î ìcapacity,î and ìflexibility.î For example, the developers are concerned 

with sufficient capacity for storing and communicating data, and whether the system will be 

interoperable with C2 equipment of other services. So while these are important considerations, 

the foundations upon which ACCís approach to command and control rests have been ignored. 

41 
In order to adapt to future requirements, the ACC should design its command and control 

structures from the top down. Future theater war will likely be rapid-paced and information 

intensive.24 The ability to gather and distribute certain types of intelligence information in real 

and near-real-time already exists. Although the information processing and distribution 

capabilities of CTAPS will be tremendously welcome, the structural problems of a command and 

control system designed to fight tactical war will persist. For example, a primary use of realtime intelligence will likely be for threat avoidance. A typical scenario might include 

information on a newly detected mobile SAM site passing directly from sensor to aircrew, so to 

avoid the threat. Yet, as implied by the Air Forceís centralized control doctrine, the decision 

whether to strike that particular SAM site will occur only after details pass all the way to the 

theater air component for validation and inclusion in a tasking order. So without somehow 

speeding up the entire process of targeting and mission planning, the organizational and 

structural problem of evaluating reconnaissance information and translating it into targeting 

objectives will force us to remain outside of the tasking cycle. 

Even if CTAPS could react fast enough to exploit targets of opportunity fully, there is still 

the problem of opportunity costs. The costs of delaying attack on a previously-assigned target 

may outweigh benefits of diverting sorties, but the air commander will have no way of knowing 

without a systematic approach to target valuation. He will still be faced with foregoing attacks 

on planned targets in order to react to targets of opportunity, at an unknown cost to the 

effectiveness of the air operation. Additionally, assessment emphasis on individual target strike 

results (the bottom-up approach to Battle Damage Assessment) will continue to mask the overall 

validity of target selections. The system will continue to confuse the efficiency of striking 

targets with the effectiveness of achieving the military objectives of the theater campaign. 

A fundamental question for the future is how scarcity of air assets will alter conceptions of 

command and control requirements. Fewer aircraft may mean fewer total sorties, so there would 

likely be less friction due to overloaded C2 structures (as occurred in Desert Storm). On the 

other hand, fewer sorties also underscore the importance of proper targeting. To a large extent, 

42 
the sheer size of the effort in Desert Storm masked both the efficiency and the effectiveness of 

the implementation of coalition air strategies. Yet, the trend of U. S. Air Force operations 

continues toward higher sortie generation rates, and even faster operations tempo.25 Regardless 

of the expected size of future air operations, command and control deficiencies must be 

remedied. The historical record shows that an air forceís C2 structure is crucial to its success in 

battle.26 The U. S. Air Force cannot afford simply to ìmuddle throughî in an era of declining 

force structure and training budgets. The nature of the possible solutions to these problems is the 

subject of the final chapter. 

NOTES

 

1

ìAir Combat Command and the TACS,î Battle Management Systems Quarterly #19, Headquarters Air 

Combat Command, July 1992, 14. 

2

GWAPS, Command and Control (U), 6-26. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

3

Ibid., 7-48. 

4

Schwarzkopf, It Doesnít Take a Hero, 431ó432. 

5

GWAPS, Command and Control (U), 7-48. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

6

For example, Air Force Intelligence command completed a major survey of intelligence and operations 

personnel in late 1992, and has instituted major changes based on the results. See Department of the Air 

Force, Intelligence Requirements SurveyóPhase I Final Report (U), Washington, DC: Air Force 

Intelligence Command, 22 Jul 92, (Secret) and Briefing Notes, Air Force Intelligence Command 

Intelligence Requirements Survey, Phase II (U), Washington, DC: Air Force Intelligence Command, 28 

October 1992, (Secret). Information extracted from both sources is unclassified. 

7

GWAPS, Summary, 12, 14. Interestingly, similar examples occurred during the Vietnam war. 

8

ACC, CONOPS for Theater C4I, 2. 

9

Air Control System Quarterly, no. 17, 2. 

10ACCR 2-1, Operational Doctrine: Air Operations, 31 August 1992, 6-1ó6-2. 

11ìAir Combat Command Concept of Operations for Theater Battle C4I,î Headquarters, Air Combat 

Command/XPJC, 11 March 1993 and teleconference with ACC/DOY, 26 May 1993. 

12Air Control System Quarterly, no. 17, 2. 

13ACCR 2-1, 31 August 1992, Chapter 6. 

14Ibid., 3-8. The strategic attack mission is excluded from the from the ìGeneric ATO Cycleî in Fig. 3-1, 

while the traditional tactical missions are included. 

15Intelligence Requirements SurveyóPhase I Final Report (U). (Secret) Information extracted in 

unclassified. 

16Message, 07/2230Z, Defence Intelligence Agency/DIW-4, MTIC Battle Damage Assessment Working 

Group, Message to U. S. Military Intelligence Activities, Approved Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 

Terminology , 17Ibid.

18For example, see USCENTAFR 55-45, U. S. Central Command Air Forces Air Employment Planning 

Process (Draft), Shaw AFB, SC, 1 April 1993, 5-11. The Targets Branch will provide ìÖcombat 

assessment (when available)Öî 

19Intelligence Requirements SurveyóPhase I Final Report (U). (Secret) Information extracted in 

unclassified. 

43 
 

20A History of the Contingency TACS Automated Planning System (CTAPS) Program, Part One - 

Background, Langley AFB, VA: Headquarters Tactical Air Command, January 1991, vióvii. 

21Ibid., II-8. 

22Briefing Notes, Contingency TACS Automated Planning System (CTAPS), Science Applications 

International Corp., (undated). Information was current as of 17 December 1992. 

23Ibid.

24Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Assessment of the 

Military-Technical Revolution (U), 15 July 1992, 22ó23. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

25Ibid., 8, 15ó16. Information extracted is unclassified. 

26Wohl, Joseph G., ìForce Management Decision Requirements for Air Force Tactical Command and 

Control,î IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 11, no. 9 (September 1981): 619ó620. 

44 
CHAPTER 6 

RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARD FUTURE WAR

ìÖour reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national security policy to 

preclude the development of a global threat contrary to the interests of the United States. 

Should such a threat begin to emerge, we would use available lead time to forestall or 

counter it at the lowest possible levels of militarization.î

1

óSecretary of Defense Dick Cheney, January 1993 

This study has examined historical influences on the Air Forceís command and control for 

conventional war, and has produced some definite conclusions. However, they are merely 

starting points for progress toward correcting some of the deficiencies identified here. The Air 

Operations Center inherited a legacy of a divided command structure from the Vietnam War, a 

legacy that remains imbedded in its organization for fighting conventional air war. The C2

problems identified in the Persian Gulf War highlight the importance of this observation. In that 

war, the United States and its allies had both qualitative and quantitative advantages so 

pronounced that, in retrospect, it seems hard to imagine any other outcome. In the next war, the 

U. S. may not be as fortunate. The next aggressor may not stand idly by and wait while America 

builds up her forces. As a result of reductions in force size, readiness and procurement, the Air 

Force will need to make every sortie count. 

Yet so long as the current conceptual foundations for C2 remain, commanders who want to 

attack targets of opportunity will face the dilemma of either diverting a sortie from a pre-planned 

target or waiting for the next cycle. Additionally, the Air Forceís traditional ìbottom-upî 

approach to assessment will continue to frustrate efforts to evaluate his results. In order to reshape the AOC into a responsive means for conducting air war, the Air Force must solve these 

two fundamental problems. 

45 
Solutions for reducing the conflict between cycle time and responsiveness

The AOC must improve its ability to attack strategic targets rapidly, just as its predecessor 

improved responsiveness for tactical targets. One strategy would be to shorten the mission 

planning/execution/assessment cycle time. Commanders are already attempting to do this, but 

the usual approach is to try to move data faster. CTAPS and other technical improvements will 

shorten data transmission times. But much more can be done. To be truly effective, the AOC 

must not only communicate information faster, but must allow planners and aircrews the time

they need to plan and execute a well-thought-out mission. 

In each phase of the mission planning cycle, the commander can improve responsiveness. 

First, during the location, identification, and analysis phase, Combat Intelligence (with assistance 

from national resources) must use the time before hostilities commence to conduct pre-analysis 

of likely target sets. The Air Force must learn to pre-analyze the enemyís war making system in 

strategic conventional war, just as it has learned to do for projected a nuclear war. Not only must 

enemy target systems be identified and prioritized (which intelligence structures can do well 

now), but additional methodology must be developed for predicting the importance of targets 

over time. Targeting is a dynamic processóa targetís value periodically changes. Just as 

tactical targets vary in importance with time, operational and strategic-level targets change value 

with time as well. The AOC must develop and formalize methods for predicting this timechange of target value. 

If the air commander is provided with educated predictions of how targets and target 

systems will change value over the course of the campaign, he can grapple effectively with the 

question of opportunity costs incurred by forgoing individual elements of the target system set. 

Simply because a target is fleeting doesnít make it valuable. The commander must evaluate all

effects of diverting sorties from their primary targets on his overall air campaign, to include not 

only friction associated with reshuffling support aircraft, but also loss of mission effectiveness 

and lowering of probability of survival. He must resist the impulse to go after a real-time target 

46 
simply because he may ìloseî it. Until he has better analysis for predicting target value 

changes, air commanders may be better off in the long run by ignoring the temptation to strike 

every target that becomes visible. As one researcher noted in 1975, 

The concept [of opportunity targeting] assumes that any target identified by realtime or near-real-time reconnaissance is worth the expenditure of airpower to 

destroy or neutralize it. It presupposes an abundance of strike aircraft which 

would allow a response to every sighting, but like betting all the combinations on 

a roulette table to insure some sort of payoff on one spin of the wheel, the cost of 

the bets easily offsets any winnings realized.2

Once the commander has a clear idea of the value of target systems and how they are 

changing with time, he needs to be able to take advantage of opportunities without jettisoning his 

well-crafted plan. Alert or Rapid-Reaction Forces offer greater responsiveness to near-real time 

tasking without many of the disadvantages of either diverting sorties or deferring targets to the 

next planning cycle. Commanders could designate a greater portion of their forces to respond to 

targets of opportunity. The concept is similar to air defense alert, where aircraft and crews are 

held in readiness for short notice tasks. These missions could be ìgeneral supportîó

multipurpose aircraft with multipurpose munitions.3

 Or, the commander could task specific 

airframes and weapons, e. g., Stealth loaded with penetrating bombs. To avoid the problem of

ìlosingî the sortie if no opportunity target becomes visible during its cycle, the mission could 

have a pre-planned target that is relatively non-time-critical. This technique was used 

occasionally for strategic missions in the Gulf War. The disadvantage of this scheme is that 

ordinarily, force-multipliers such as tankers and electronic support aircraft must support several 

strike packages, so often there is a scarcity of resources to support alert taskings. But preplanned alternative routes, tanker tracks, and package coordination for the alert missions could 

greatly increase the chance of success without tying up limited resources. 

Another objection is that ìa sortie not flown is a sortie lost.î This argument is specious.4

 

Even if a maximum effort is needed, a set of new alert aircraft, including the supporting aircraft 

(if required), could be generated before the launch time period for the previous alert mission 

expires. The commander could then launch the first set either toward their pre-planned fixed 

47 
target, or to an airborne command aircraft for assignment to a tactical target. In addition, an alert 

force from a Composite Wing could greatly reduce coordination difficulties for large strike 

packages and minimize friction, since all the strike and supporting assets are physically 

collocated. If the commander expects opportunity targeting to be an important part of his plan, 

dedicating deep strike packages to an ìoperational reserveî makes sense. 

To enjoy the same advantages that a well-planned strike mission has against an unprepared 

defender, some sort of on-board mission planning is essential for both alert aircraft and diverted 

sorties. Flexible mission planning systems are now being introduced into squadrons throughout 

the Air Force. It is not a far leap of imagination to envision miniaturizing these systems and 

placing them on board aircraft, so that the time between launch (or even engine start) and 

weapons on target can be productively used to shorten the overall response time. Here is a 

technical solution that is relatively easy to implement, but would have the potential for 

dramatically increasing the probability of mission success.5

 In any event, similar capabilities 

will be required to transmit real-time and near-real-time intelligence to the cockpit for threat 

location and avoidance. 

Probably the most potentially controversial recommendation is that the Air Force consider 

decentralization of some execution decisions, since the organization has long been wedded to the 

doctrine (some say dogma) of centralized control. Decentralized decision-making has great 

potential for increasing responsiveness. The commander could issue mission-type orders and 

ìcommanderís intentîóthe ìwhyî of the commanderís prioritiesóand allow lower echelons to 

make the attack decision. This might be particularly effective for strategic conventional attacks, 

where targets are often fixed installations not subject to the same fluidity of movement for 

tactical level targets. Delegating a target system or sets of individual targets to a single unit 

would result in a more methodical and thorough campaign. The unit would be focused on the 

target set, and would likely have better continuity of effort within its particular guidelines. Much 

of the assessment of their effort could occur within the unit, which would spare scarce theater 

reconnaissance systems to identify and task surviving targets.6

48 
Decentralization would allow wing commanders to react faster to retaskings and targets of 

opportunity. Rather than information traveling all the way up to the air component commander 

for a decision, a reattack could be decided at a lower level, since subordinates would understand 

the commanderís priorities, thus speeding destruction. This would also allow the theater-level 

air commander more time to concentrate on critical aspects of his plan. In fact, issuing missiontype orders and commanderís intent to subordinate units can assist the commander in 

conceptualizing his air strategy in a changing environment. Communicating a clear daily 

mission statement, along with intentóthe ìwhyî of the air strategyówould help the commander 

to articulate his air operation plan in the heat of the struggle. Finally, limited decentralization 

would improve the robustness and survivability of the air commanderís plan. If a wing 

commander knew what the JFACC wanted for the next three days, for instance, the wing would 

continue to prosecute the war according to plan, even if the AOC were destroyed or 

communications were disrupted. 

Limited decentralization is probably most appropriate for conventional war, since many 

efforts are being conducted simultaneously and some mistakes can be tolerated. 

Decentralization is not appropriate for raids and demonstrations of force, where a specific 

political result is vital and mistakes not tolerable. Also, limited decentralization will require 

training subordinates how to make operational targeting decisions. One could argue that 

overcentralization at the theater level has encouraged atrophy of strategic thinking in 

commanders at wing level and below. Limited decentralization in exercises as well as war 

would provide training our future air commanders need to make operational and strategic 

judgments. However, the main benefits remain responsiveness and survivability. As one 

squadron commander who flew in Desert Storm noted, ìMission-type orders are the laxative for 

constipated communications.î7

Some of the solutions to the responsiveness problem may change with the types of targets 

themselves. For example, some targets will be fixed or relatively immobile. These may be good 

candidates for the air commander to set priorities, give his intent, and then assign general sets of

49 
these targets to wings for decentralized control and execution. Other targets will be traditional 

tactical targets, where ìkill boxesî or other geographic control measures will be the primary 

method of control. For example, missions assigned to a general area may receive final aim

points enroute to the target area. In this instance, a provision for on-board mission planning may 

be imperative, in order to respond to short-notice real- and near-real-time targets. Indeed, a 

commander could create his own opportunities by planning for his Alert Force to follow a 

specifically tasked reconnaissance sweep. This type of attack may be suitable in a situation 

where the target systemís function is well understood, but specific aim points are elusive or 

difficult to identify. In this way, the commander could pre-plan a mission incorporating nearreal-time intelligence. The reconnaissance asset could provide final target identification and 

location to an alert strike package already enroute. The point is that there are several alternatives 

for making strategic attacks more responsive to opportunities, other than simply speeding 

communications in an older conceptual framework. Gleaning lessons from the decentralized 

execution processes of the responsive ground-support function should improve responsiveness in 

planning and executing conventional air war across the entire spectrum of targets. 

Solutions for reconnecting assessment to military and political objectives 

To have worthwhile measures of effectiveness, assessment planning must begin in the 

earliest stages of analysis and planning. The concept of target systems is fundamental to this 

vision of air war. We must focus on the effect of neutralization of the target systems, not on the 

individual targets themselves. Therefore, the air commander should have a realistic plan for 

measuring how well air operations are accomplishing the theater commanderís military 

objectives. There is nothing new about this idea. Intelligence directives note the importance of

planning assessment in the early stages of the targeting process.8

 The problem is that the 

ìassessmentî discussed is bottom-up assessment. Examination of the effects of strikes on 

individual targets provides little guidance on what to do should those ìsuccessfulî attacks fail to 

50 
achieve campaign goals. One way to determine overall effects would be direct measurement of 

degradation of the target systems, or a ìtop-downî approach to assessment (Figure 13). 

Target System

Individual Targets

Figure 13 

Top-Down Assessment 

Direct measurement of air power effects on target systems, rather than on targets, should 

become a priority for theater air intelligence. The top-down approach to mission assessment will 

validate the translation of military objectives to the target sets themselves, by making apparent 

the link between the ATO and the commanderís objectives. For example, one of the 

commanderís objectives might be the disruption of the enemyís ability to communicate with his 

forces. One could destroy every communications node identified, but if the enemy has other, 

unidentified means, he could still have 100% capability of communicating with his subordinates. 

The only valid way of assessing achievement of this goal is to measure his communications 

traffic directly. 

51 
Certainly, the absence of communications traffic is a more accurate measure of 

effectiveness than counting the number of constituent sub-components destroyed (how do you 

know these are the only nodes?). Direct measurement will not only assess the effectiveness of

the missions flown against the set, but will assess the extent of achievement of the commanderís 

objective as well. Here is another example: the air commander cannot truly measure his 

effectiveness against an enemyís electrical power distribution system by counting the power 

plants destroyed, because the enemy may have back-up generators which are not known or are 

not vulnerable to attack. But if there were a method for measuring directly the current flowing 

through the enemyís power grid, the air commander would know when his goal had been 

accomplished, and thus, when to move on to other targets. Conversely, if air power has 

destroyed every one of the enemyís power plants and switchyards, and yet reconnaissance still 

detects electricity, the commander knows he must either find other electric system targets to 

attack, or devise an alternative strategy. 

How could one directly measure the effect of attacks on the enemyís target systems? 

Actually, the USAF has done this in the past. In Korea, aircraft maintained tight surveillance 

over the enemyís supply routes, and were able to directly measure logistics traffic into the 

theater.9

 Though 5th Air Force was unable to conduct a successful interdiction campaign during 

this time, its assessment of its own effectiveness was accurateónot much good.10 A more recent 

example was Desert Storm. Although coalition air forces destroyed only a portion of the 

enemyís aircraft and had reduced, rather than shut down, his airfield operations, they nonetheless 

achieved air superiority by the tenth day of the war.11 The enemy wasnít flying. Had 

commanders only counted individual aircraft destroyed, they never would have gotten an 

accurate picture. Other effects, however, are more difficult to measure. For instance, how does 

one know when the enemyís electrical grid is truly inoperative? He may have electricity but is 

keeping the lights turned off for deception purposes. 

Therefore, Air Combat Command may need to generate requirements for new assessment 

capabilities. One reason for not having a satellite or aircraft that can measure electrical current 

52 
in transmission lines may be that no one has asked for it. Top-down assessment requires a new 

way of thinking about assessment. The Air Force has been wedded to the methods developed in 

Vietnam for so long, change has been stymied. Also, top-down assessment may be considered 

either too costly or beyond current capability. 

One way to measure effects on target systems directly might be to use Air Force Special 

Operations Forces. The purpose of these forces is to conduct ìair operations that influence the 

accomplishment of strategic and tactical objectivesÖ[and are] usually conducted in enemy 

controlled or politically sensitive territories.î12 Rather than assessing the results of individual 

strikes, these forces could directly measure the target system of interest to determine 

effectiveness of strikes. In fact, assessment could become an important mission for Air Force 

unconventional forces. Combat assessment requires an understanding of the concept of target 

systems. Airmen recognize that, in the example above, denying the enemy electricity is the goal, 

not destroying power plants. In any case, top-down assessment can provide a true measure of 

how well our air operations have achieved the commanderís military goals, and the Air Force 

must make a major commitment to achieving it. 

AOC assessment personnel can be tremendously valuable in validating the objective-toATO translation. Theater-level Air Force intelligence should be the primary agency for 

measuring effectiveness of strikes based on this top-down approach. Other intelligence 

organizations can support this effort by operating systems and fusing sources which can support 

this goal. The operational wings have a multitude of personnel dedicated to assessing success 

against individual targetsóthe aircrews themselves. The most important measure of 

effectiveness at wing level is the individualís perception of his effectiveness against the target. 

Most bottom-up assessment functions can, and should, be delegated to the wings. While some

theater-level personnel will be required to check the quality of target assessment produced by the 

wings, the majority of work can be delegated to the lower echelons. With increased reliability 

and lethality of weapons, and increasing availability of on-board video, many target assessments 

can be input to the system by the individual units. Additionally, a system like CTAPS will help 

53 
speed data flow from wings to the AOC, to be fused with other, top-down assessment products. 

Target assessment will continue to be important, but primarily to wing-level planners. They will 

want to know if individual targets, especially enemy defensive systems, have been destroyed, in 

order to plan missions. In fact, with increased delegation will come an even greater need for 

ìlateralî information flow. For example, the wing will want to know if some other unit has 

struck a target already. What were the defenses? When was the last time the target was 

attacked? This concept makes wing-level target assessment even more attractive, since such 

information can go directly out to other wings rather than up to the AOC first, thus further 

reducing mission planning time. In addition, theater-level assessment personnel will have more 

time to perform their vital function of supporting the JFACC with overall mission assessment. 

Most importantly, the Air Force simply may not be able to afford to divert so many 

scarce reconnaissance resources to ascertain if individual targets have been neutralized. 

Although the limitations of on-board video and aircrew reports will require some external 

imagery to determine attack results, many of these resources can be better used assessing direct 

effects or searching for new targets. The lethality of modern weapons and better peacetime 

training have drastically raised the probability of killing individual targets.13 Improved weapons 

reliability and better pre-analysis of the dynamics of the expected air war may allow planners to 

more confidently predict expected effects, even considering fog, friction, and enemy opposition, 

reducing the need to obtain assessments of individual targets. Scarce intelligence assets could 

then be refocused on determining the validity of the target sets and overall military effects, rather 

than merely confirming the results of strikes on individual aim points. 

The ultimate goal of assessment would thus be to evaluate the effect of neutralizing the 

various target systems on the enemyís overall war-making capability. Emphasizing missionlevel assessment early in the C2 cycle will force planners to think about the connection between 

target systems and military aimsóìwhyî they should advocate attacking a particular target 

system, not simply its composition and function. Thoughtful strategy-making requires a clear 

vision of the mechanics of the enemyís defeat. The commander may believe that the cumulative 

54 
effect of various military actions may bring about his foeís collapse through sheer weight of 

effortóbut belief alone is merely supposition. What if military objectives change? What if the 

enemy does not behave as expected? What if new alliances form, or old ones fall apart? 

Without a concrete understanding of the desired causes and effectsóthe mechanisms for victory, 

that connect military acts with their ultimate outcomesóa commander may well find his actions 

producing undesirable and contradictory results. Thus, mission assessment provides the 

commander with a true measure of his effectiveness by constantly reevaluating the chosen 

strategy (Figure 14). 

Political 

Objectives

Military 

Objectives

Grand 

Strategy

Target 

List

Air Tasking 

Order

Air 

Strategy

Target Assessment

Mission Assessment

Figure 14 

Mission Assessment 

The ultimate top-down evaluation would be to answer the question, ìHow is the collapse of

this target system helping to achieve the military goal?î Direct measurement of targeted systems 

will provide clues to the effectiveness of the entire campaign. While it may be impossible to 

objectively gauge overall progress toward victory until the military objectives have been 

accomplished, indication that the strategy is working could come earlier with major changes in 

the enemyís behavior. These changes are often seen at the tactical level of war. For example, 

once daylight interdiction missions began to take a heavy toll, communists in North Korea 

55 
switched to night convoys. Behavioral change can occur at the strategic level as well. The 

German economy continued to produce armaments while on the verge of collapse, but German 

drivers had begun fueling their cars with charcoal. 

Therefore, combat assessment really begins with the formulation of strategy. Strategy must 

be grounded in a sound analysis of the enemyís war-making system, not only as it exists at the 

beginning of the campaign, but as it will likely react under the stress of air attack. To have a 

reasonable chance of predicting the opponentís reactions, this analysis must also look at the 

world from his political, economic, military, ideological, social, and cultural viewpoint.14 Then,

to an air commander having a comprehensive understanding of both the mechanisms for 

achieving victory and his foeís probable work-arounds, major shifts in enemy behavior can 

indicate effectiveness of the air effort. If targeted systems are collapsing, but no behavioral 

change occurs, either in terms of battlefield outcomes or effects at home, the predicted means of

the enemyís defeat must (and will) be reexamined and adjusted. Conversely, changes in enemy 

activity foreseen by the air strategist may provide evidence that the air operation is achieving its 

goals. 

Conclusion 

Centralized control of air operations is a meansónot an end. Rather, informed and 

intelligent unity of effort toward a common objective is the goal. Somehow, in its quest for more 

efficient use of air power during the war in Vietnam, the Air Force lost ìthe big picture.î 

Improvements since the 1970s have merely added capability to the same core design. While 

rapid advances in information technology have made C2 more efficient, one cannot assume that 

data processing and distribution capability will solve command and control problems. Although 

new systems will greatly assist the commander to analyze and control the progress of the air 

campaign, without an understanding of how those systems support the translation of political 

aims to military means, they are efficiency improvements only. Air Combat Command must 

frame future C2 system requirements in terms of new tasks, rather than simply the more efficient 

56 
execution of current tasks. Current ìrequirementsî such as responsiveness, survivability, 

redundancy, data storage capacity, etc., are vital, but only after the fundamental needs are 

defined. 

The Air Force must resolve the conflict between mission planning cycle time and 

responsiveness if commanders are to be able to respond knowledgeably and effectively to 

opportunity targets. Intelligence must change the current efficiency-oriented assessment system

to an effectiveness-oriented system. These are primarily doctrinal and organizational problems, 

not technological ones. Airmenónot statesmen, politicians, or even soldiersómust reestablish 

the connection between target sets and military and political aims, while exploiting potential 

opportunities offered by the domination of information. Changing the name of a command and 

control structure is not enoughóthe flawed system the Air Force built must change as well. 

NOTES

 

1

Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, White Paper, U. S. 

Department of Defense, January 1993 

2

Maj. Robert T. Saginario, ìTactical Intelligence and the Real Time and Near Real Time Sensor Input,î 

(Thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, May 1975), AUL MU 35582-7 S129t, 32. 

3

A new generation of cockpit-selectable weapons is currently under development at the Air Warfare 

Center. The concept is to select a fuze setting while in flight which would produce the desired effect 

(blast, fragmentation, incendiary, penetration) based on mission requirements. 

4

Warden, The Air Campaign, 102. 

5

Obviously, technical solutions per se are neither ìgoodî nor ìbad.î The difficulty lies in integrating 

technology with the proper doctrine and organization in order to fully exploit its advantages. See 

Metersky, M. L., ìA C2 Process and an Approach to Design and Evaluation,î IEEE Transactions on 

Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 16, no. 6 (November/December 1986): 880ó889. 

6

A detailed discussion of this concept follows in this Chapter. 

7

Lt Col Pat ìDocî Pentland, 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron. 

8

AFR 200-1, Intelligence: Air Force Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, Washington, DC: 

Department of the Air Force, 14 June 1984, 3ó4. 

9

Futrell, USAF in Korea, 437. 

10Randolf and Mayo, ìThe Application of FEAF Effort in Korea, 14. 

11Department of Defence, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (Title V Report), 

Vol. I, Washington, DC: Gov't Printing Office, April 1992. 

12AFM 2-10, Special Operations, 25 October 1991, 3. 

13Gen Michael Dugan, ìThe Air War,î U. S. News and World Report, 11 February 1991, 28ó29. 

14Pentland stresses the importance of looking at the enemyís system as dynamic, and his power as 

including ideological and social/cultural elements besides the traditional components of national power.

57 
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64