ORDER OF THE COURT (Eighth Chamber)

10 November 2016 ([\*](#Footnote*))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Preamble and Articles 6, 20, 41, 47 and 48 — Powers of the national criminal prosecution authorities — Failure to implement EU law — Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court)

In Case C‐321/16,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Dublin District Court (Ireland), made by decision of 27 May 2016, received at the Court on 6 June 2016, in the criminal proceedings against

**Owen Pardue,**

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of M. Vilaras, President of the Chamber, M. Safjan (Rapporteur) and D. Šváby, Judges,

Advocate General: E. Sharpston,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court,

makes the following

**Order**

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the preamble and Articles 6, 20, 41, 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2        This request has been submitted in criminal proceedings brought in Ireland against Mr Owen Pardue.

**Irish law**

3        The Prosecution of Offences Act 1974 established the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the DPP’), responsible for criminal prosecutions.

**The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling**

4        The order for reference indicates that, on 9 February 2014, Mr Pardue had an altercation with his landlord. The next day, he was arrested in connection with those facts by the Garda Ms Harmon, a police officer, who charged him with offences under: (i) section 12(1)(b) and (3) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, for trespass; and (ii) section 11 of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, for possession of a screwdriver at the time of the altercation.

5        On 10 February 2014, the Dublin District Court (Ireland) admitted Mr Pardue to bail and remanded him to 24 February 2014, pending the decision of the DPP on the point whether the case was to proceed to trial as a minor offence to be heard by the District Court or by way of indictment to be heard by the Circuit Criminal Court.

6        The referring court states that, at the hearing on 24 February 2014 before the Dublin District Court, however, the DPP had still not taken a decision whether the case was to proceed summarily or on indictment; nor were any reasons given for the failure to take a decision. In those circumstances, the referring court set a new hearing date, namely 7 April 2014, and ordered the DPP to inform it of how the case was to proceed against Mr Pardue.

7        At the hearing on 7 April 2014, neither the DPP nor the police officer who laid the charges were in a position to advise the Dublin District Court of whether the case was to proceed by way of indictment or otherwise. To that end and in order to obtain a decision from the DPP, the police officer asked the Dublin District Court for more time, which was granted, further to which Mr Pardue was again ordered remanded in custody to 10 April 2014.

8        At the hearing on 10 April 2014, the DPP failed to inform the Dublin District Court of the decision as to how the case was to proceed against Mr Pardue, in consequence of which the proceedings were struck out.

9        On 12 June 2014, Mr Pardue was arrested a second time in respect of the same incident on 9 February 2014, although this time the police officer preferred a different charge against him, committed in a different location. The Dublin District Court ordered the DPP to serve it with the Book of Evidence for 24 July 2014, the date to which Mr Pardue was remanded.

10      Despite that order, the DPP was not in a position to serve the Book of Evidence on 24 July 2014. Consequently, the Dublin District Court struck out the proceedings.

11      On 9 December 2015, Mr Pardue was arrested a third time in respect of the incident that occurred on 9 February 2014, with the charges against him as recorded by the police officer being the same as those that had been struck out on 24 July 2014, with a change being made to the location where the incident occurred.

12      The referring court is concerned about the impact of this third arrest on Mr Pardue’s liberty and takes the view that his fundamental rights as a citizen of the European Union have been infringed in this case.

13      It was in those circumstances that the Dublin District Court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Having regard to [what is set out in the order for reference], has the DPP breached the fundamental rights of Mr Pardue and in particular those rights as provided for in Articles 6, 20, 41, 47 and 48 and supplemented for in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

(2)      Having regard to [what is set out in the order for reference], has the DPP the right to refuse to comply with legitimate Court Orders and/or if she fails to comply and/or fails to give an explanation or reason for the non-compliance, is this compatible with the Charter?

(3)      Having regard to [what is set out in the order for reference], and given that the DPP’s decisions are only reviewable by a court if demonstrated that the DPP reached a decision *mala fides* or influenced by an improper motive or improper policy, as the present state of Irish law permits, is this consistent and compatible with the Charter having regard to the facts of this case?’

**The Court’s jurisdiction**

14      Under Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case or where a request or an application is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

15      That provision should be applied in the present case.

16      According to the Court’s settled case-law, in a request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the parameters of the jurisdiction conferred on the Union (order of 18 February 2016, *Rîpanu*, C‐407/15, not published, EU:C:2016:167, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

17      The questions referred in the present case concern the interpretation of the preamble and Articles 6, 20, 41, 47 and 48 of the Charter.

18      Furthermore, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Like Article 51(2) of the Charter, Article 6(1) TEU states that the provisions of the Charter do not in any way extend the scope of EU law beyond the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties (see orders of 19 June 2014, *Balázs and Papp*, C‐45/14, not published, EU:C:2014:2021, paragraph 20, and of 15 April 2015, *Burzio*, C‐497/14, not published, EU:C:2015:251, paragraph 27).

19      It follows from the Court’s consistent case-law that where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (judgment of 26 February 2013, *Åkerberg Fransson*, C‐617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and order of 25 February 2016, *Aiudapds*, C‐520/15, not published, EU:C:2016:124, paragraph 20).

20      In the present case, there is nothing in the order for reference to indicate that the main proceedings, in which the national authorities responsible for criminal prosecutions are exercising their powers, concern an interpretation or application of a rule of EU law other than what is laid down in the Charter. It gives no basis for considering that in the main proceedings national rules are at issue involving the implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, orders of 15 April 2015, *Burzio*, C‐497/14, not published, EU:C:2015:251, paragraph 29, and of 25 February 2016, *Aiudapds*, C‐520/15, not published, EU:C:2016:124, paragraph 21).

21      In those circumstances, it is clear, on the basis of Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, that the Court lacks jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Dublin District Court.

**Costs**

22      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders:

**The Court of Justice of the European Union clearly lacks jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Dublin District Court (Ireland) by decision of 27 May 2016.**

Luxembourg, 10 November 2016.

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| --- | --- | --- |
| A. Calot Escobar | | M. Vilaras |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| Registrar | | President of the Eighth Chamber |

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[\*](#Footref*) Language of the case: English.