The US. A~R Se~oice in 

Woda WaR I 

Volume I 

The Final Report 

and A Tactical History 

Edited by 

Maurer Maurer 

The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center 

Maxwell AFB Alabama 

The Office of Air Force History 

Headquarters USAF 

Washington 1978 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Main entry under title: 

The U.S. Air Service in World War 1. 

CONTENTS: v.1. Final report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF. A 

tactical history of the Air Service, AEF. 

1. European War, 1914-1918-Aerial operations, American. 

2. United States. Army. A.E.F., 1917-1920. Air Service. I. Maurer, 

Maurer. 

D606.U54 940.4’49’73 75-42296 

For sale by the Superintent of Documents 

US. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

Stock Number 008-070-00358-9 
iii 

Advisory Committee 

Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr. 

Duke University 

Lt. Gen. James R. Allen 

Superintendent, USAF Academy 

Dr. Robert F. Byrnes Indiana University 

Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark 

USAF( ret.) 

Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong Commander, Air University 

Dr. Henry F. Graff 

Columbia University 

Dr. Louis Morton 

Dartmouth College 

Dr. Forest C. Pogue Director, Dwi ht D. Eisenhower 

Institute for dstorical Research 

Mr. Jack Stempler General Counsel, USAF 

Office of Air Force History 

Maj. Gen. John W. Huston, Chief 

Chief Historian 

Dr. Stanley L. Falk 

Deputy Chief Historian 

Max Rosenberg 

Chief, Histories Division 

Carl Berger 

Senior Editor 

Lawrence J. Paszek 

FOK~OK~ V 

In December 1918 Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), directed his 

newly appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, to 

prepare a history and final report on U.S. air activities in Europe 

during World War I. The narratives written and compiled by 

Gorrell and his staff were submitted by Patrick to Gen. John J. 

Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF. They summarized Air 

Service activities from the arrival of the first airmen in France in 

the spring of 1917 until the Armistice on November 11,1918. The 

“Final Report” was published by the Air Service in an lnformation 

Circular in 1921, and by the Army in a multivolume collection of 

World War I documents in 1948. Although it has been used and 

cited by a number of historians over the years, it deserves to be 

better known. The Office of Air Force History, therefore, is 

republishing it so as to reach a wider circle of persons interested 

in the Great War and the early history of military aviation. 

Another important document produced under Gorrell’s supervision as part of the history of the Air Service, AEF, is a “Tactical 

History” written by Lt. Col. William C. Sherman and a group of 

officers working with him in France at the end of the war. 

Although published in part in an Air Service Information Circular 

in 1920, Sherman’s “Tactical History” has remained virtually 

unknown, or at least has not had extensive use. Since it provides 

excellent information about the conduct of combat operations, it 

should be of value to persons interested in aerial warfare in the 

First World War. It has been included, therefore, in this volume 

with the “Final Report.” 

This is one of a seriesof volumesof World War I documentation 

that the Office of Air Force History is planning to publish. 

John W. Huston 

Major General, USAF 

Chief, Office of Air Force History . 

Pwgace vii 

The “Final Report” published in this volume has been taken 

from Air Service lnformation Circular (Aviation), Vol. II, No. 180, 

15 February 1921. Substantive changes made in the Office of the 

Chief of Air Service when the “Final Report” was being prepared 

for publication in 1921 have been pointed out in notes provided by 

the editor. 

The source for the section on corps observation in the “Tactical 

History” included in this volume is the Air Service lnforrnation 

Circular (Heavier-than-Air), Vol. I, No. 75, 12 June 1920; the 

source for the section on army observation, pursuit, day 

bombardment, and observation balloons is a microfilm (T-619) 

copy of “Gorrell’s History of the Air Service, AEF,” Ser. D, Vol. I. 

The last four sections, which vary greatly in style, have been 

edited in the same general manner as the section on corps 

observation was edited when it was prepared for printing in 1920. 

The first part of the “Tactical History,” a seventeen-page section 

entitled “The Achievement of the Air Service,” has been omitted 

since a revised and edited version of the same material appears as 

Chapters I-Ill of the “Final Report.” 

Associated with the “Tactical History” and included with it in 

“Gorrell’s History” are a “Manual for the Employment of Air 

Service (Tentative)” and “Notes on the Employment of the Air 

Service from the General Staff Point of View.” Both the “Manual” 

and the “Notes” are scheduled for publication in another volume 

of this series. 

The general editorial policy in preparing the “Final Report” and 

“Tactical History” for publication has been to copy the materials 

as they were found in the places indicated, and keep the editing 

and annotation to a minimum. Typographical and other minor 

errors have been corrected, but no attempt has been made to 

verify data and correct any inaccuracies that may exist in those 

materials. The editor has not tried to straighten out such 

inconsistencies as the numbering of units (1st or First Pursuit 

Group; 2d or Second Army; Third, 3d, or Ill Corps, etc.) or the 
viii 

spelling of thevariousformsof theverb“tostrafe” (strafeorstraff, 

strafing or straffing) when there seemed to be no established 

usage during the First World War. Except for the previously 

mentioned editing done on parts of the “Tactical History,” no 

effort has been made to establish uniformity throughout this 

volume in punctuation, capitalization, spelling, format, and other 

stylistic matters. The introduction, graphs, maps, photographs, 

and abbreviation list were added by the editor. Mr. Deane J. Allen 

and Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek of the Office of Air Force History 

assisted in readying the manuscript for publication by proofing 

the editorial changes, preparing the graphics, selecting the 

photographs, and maintaining a close liaison with the printers to 

resolve the numerous difficulties that arise in the final phases of 

production. Mr. John Hamilton and Mr. Jim Eschinger, Typography and Design Division of the Government Printing Office, 

designed the interior layout of the book. 

Photographs were selected from collections held by USAF‘s 

1361st Photo Squadron, Air Force Art Collection, and by the 

Audiovisual Archives Division of the National Archives. 

Maurer Maurer 

Editor 
colztents ix 

. 

Foreword ...................................................... ........ 

Preface .................................................................. 

Introduction ............................................................ Final Report of the Chief of Air Service. AEF 

I . 

II . Ill . IV . 

V . VI . VII . VIII . 

IX . 

X . XI . XI1 . XIII . XIV . xv . XVI . XVII . XVIII . 

Achievement .................................................... Thehoevre and the Marne ........................................ St . Mihiel and the Argonne-Meuse ................................. Early Problems and Their Solutions ............................... Reorganization and Development ................................. Period of Expansion .............................................. The Working Organization ........................................ Difficulties ...................................................... Scope of Activities and General Remarks ........................... Training ......................................................... The Supply Section ............................................... TheTechnical Section ............................................ The Balloon Section .............................................. The Aircraft Armament Section .................................... The Photographic Section ........................................ The Radio Section ................................................ The Medical Consultant ........................................... Conclus.ion ...................................................... 

A Tactical History of the Air Service. AEF 

Part One: The Achievement of the Air Service. AEF 

Part Two: Tactical History of Corps Observation 

I . Introduction ..................................................... II . The First Corps Observation Group in the Toul Sector ............. 111 . The 12thAeroSquadron in the Baccarat Sector ..................... IV . TheThird Flight of the99th Squadron in theVosges ................. V . The 1st Corps Air Service at Chateau-Thierry ....................... VI . The Third Corps Air Service on theVesle River ...................... VII . The Corps Air Service in the St . Mihiel Offensive ..................... VIII . The Corps Air Service in the Argonne-Meuse Offensive .............. 

v 

vi i 

1 

17 

29 

37 

51 

65 

71 

75 

81 

85 

93 

117 

131 

137 

145 

151 

157 

161 

163 

169 

171 

185 

193 

197 

221 

235 

245 
X 

Part Three: Tactlcal Hlstory of Army Observation 

I . On the Toul Sector ............................................... II . The St . Mihiel Offensive ........................................... Ill . The Argonne-Meuse Offense ...................................... 

. I . The Toul Sector .................................................. II . Chateau-Thierry .................................................. 111 . St . Mihiel Offensive ............................................... I’d . Argonne-Mme Offensive ......................................... V . American Pursuit Units on the British Front ........................ VI . Second Army Pursuit ............................................. Appendices to Tactical History of Pursuit Aviation 

Sample Battle Orders. Air Service. First Army ......................... 

Table: Percentage of Casualties to Available Pilots .................... 

Part Four: Tactical History of Pursuit Aviatlon 

A . 

B . Sample Operations Oder. 1st Pursuit Wing ........................... C . Sample Operations Order. 1st Pursuit Group .......................... D . 

E . Chart: Enemy Aircraft Brought Down ................................. F . Chart: Ratio of Confirmed Victories to Casualtias ..................... G . Table: Planes on Hand and Available for Service and Pilots Available ... 

1 . From the Beginning to the St . Mihiel Offensive ..................... II . The St . Mihiel Offensive ........................................... 111 . The Argonne-Meuse Offensive ..................................... 

I . In the Toul Sector ................................................ II . At Chateau-Thierry ............................................... 111 . In the St . Mihiel Battle ............................................ IV . In the Argonne-Meuse Offensive ................................... V . Miscellaneous .................................................... Appendices 

A . Directive for “Final Report” ........................................... B . Outlineof Tactical Organization. 11 November 1918 ................... Abbreviation List ................................................. Notes 

Part Five: Tactical History of Day Bomba 

Part SIX: Tactical History of American Obsenration Balloons 

To the Introduction ...................................................... To the Final Report ...................................................... To the Tactical History ................................................... Index .................................................................. 

259 

269 

275 

283 

291 

301 

313 

325 

341 

343 

346 

348 

350 

351 

352 

353 

357 

365 

371 

379 

381 

383 

385 

387 

389 

391 

393 

395 

397 

403 

406 
xi 

List of Photographs 

Col . Henry C . Whitehead .................................................. 3 

Col . Edgar S . Gorrell ..................................................... 4 

Col . Thomas Dew . Milling ................................................ 5 

Lt . Col . William C . Sherman ............................................... 6 

Lts . Douglas Campbell and Alan Winslow .................................. 30 

Observers leave observation baltoon ....................................... 32 

A Caquot balloon .......................................................... 35 

The Arizona Balloon Buster (Art by Merv erning) ......................... 36 

Capt . Field E . Kindley ..................................................... 45 

Lt: Col . "Billy" Mitchell and Maj . Raynal C . Bolling ......................... 53 

Lafayette Escadrille hangars at Ham airdrome; Officers of the 103d 

Aero Squadron, formerly of the fsc'adrille, receive decorations ............ 56 

Pilots of the Lafeyette Escadrille with one of their pet lions; 

Maj . William K . Thaw ................................................... 57 

Spad VII ................................................................. 60 

Repair shop at lssoudun .................................................. 64 

Parachute descent from free balloon ....................................... 70 

Brig . Gen . Benjamin Foulois with Gen . John J . Pershing .................... 75 

Aviators in training ....................................................... 80 

A Handley-Page bomber readied for a mission on the Aisne front ........... 84 

Observers train in aerial gunnery; Miniature planes used for sighting with 

machine guns in aerial gunnery ......................................... 96 

Secretary of War, Newton D . Baker and Brig . Gen . Foulois 

at Issoudun; Lt . Quentin Roosevelt ...................................... 106 

Flying field at lssoudun ................................................... 107 

An RAF class in gunnery training .......................................... 109 

DH-4 aircraft of the U.S. Air Service at Romorantin ......................... 127 

Aviation Mechanics uniform insignia of the U.S. Air Service ................. 132 

Observer climbs into a basket of an observation balloon; Balloon ascends; 

Balloon shot down by enemy fire ........................................ 139 

Observers parachute from French balloon shot down by enemy fire ......... 141 

Lt . Col . John Paegelow ................................................... 143 

A machine gun on a Scarff mount ready for action ......................... 144 

Aerial observer reaches for camera prior to a reconnaissance mission ....... 150 

Camera on Salmson; Movie camera mounted on aircraft; Photo printing 

room at Tours; Composition of aerial maps and models .................. 153 

A British Sopwith stockroom for engines and spare parts ................... 116 
xii 

Capt . Albert W . Stevens with DeRam camera on a Salmson ................. 155 

Radio operators receive message from fliers ............................... 156 

Maj . Gen . Mason M . Patrick ............................................... 163 

The Eagle of Lille (Art by Merv Corning) ................................... 168 

A railroad gun ............................................................ 180 

An aerial view of trenches taken during photo reconnaissance .............. 194 

Maj . Lewis H . Brereton and Col . “Billy” Mitchell ............................ 196 

Messages received from aircraft for transmission to artillery units ........... 215 

Maj . Joseph T . McNarney ................................................. 220 

Maj . Harry B . Anderson and Lt . Arthur R . Christie .......................... 234 

Field radio station ........................................................ 241 

French soldiers watch an observation balloon falling in flames .............. 244 

Lt . George C . Kenney ..................................................... 258 

Maj . John N . Reynolds .................................................... 261 

A 155-mm artillery battery ................................................. 268 

A pilot’s view of a battle ................................................... 271 

Night bombardment scene ............ ................................... 274 

Lt . Everett R . Cook ....................................................... 277 

Capt . “Eddie” Rickenbacker and Lt . Reed Chambers ........................ 282 

Maj . Bert M . Atkinson ..................................................... 287 

Graveside services for 1 st Lt . Quentin Roosevelt ........................... 297 

Fall of the Flying Fool (Art by Mew Corning) ............................... 300 

Burning balloon shot down by an aircraft .................................. 310 

“Balloon Buster’’ Frank Luke, Jr ........................................... 312 

Capt . James A . Summersett. Jr ............................................ 317 

Maj . Harold E . Hartney .................................................... 320 

An Attack in World War I (Art by Merv Corning) ............................ 327 

Maj . Reed G . Landis ...................................................... 341 

Breguets of the 96th Aero Squadron head for a daylight bombing assault 

on German territory .................................................... 356 

A Breguet 14-82 of the 96th Aero Squadron ............................... 360 

DH-4 aircraft of the 11th AerCSquadron conduct a bombing attack ......... 364 

Capt . Cecil G . Sellers ..................................................... 366 

Bombs loaded for a mission ............................................... 367 

Maj . James L . Dunsworth observes bomb loading .......................... 370 

Col . Charles Def . Chandler; Col . Frank P . Lahm; Observation balloon 

and winch .............................................................. 378 
xiii 

Maj . John H . Jouett; Caquot balloon with winch ............................ 382 

An observer with a telephone set in a balloon basket ....................... 383 

Partially inflated balloon-10th Balloon Company; Col . Frank P . Lahm 

and hisstaff ............................................................ 386 

List of Tables, Maps, and Charts 

Combat Squadrons in AEF-Dates of Assignment and Demobilization ....... 18 

First Day Bombardment Group-Chart of Complete Operations .............. 19 

U.S. Balloon Companies in AEF-Dates of Assignment and Demobilization . . 20 

1 st Day Bombardment Group-Bombs Dropped During October ............ 21 

Squadrons. Balloon Companies. Photo Sections and Air Parks Assigned to 

Armies in the AEF ...................................................... 22 

Flying Time of Air Service Assigned to Armies from Beginning of 

Operations until July 1st. 1919 .......................................... 24 

Total Number of Airplanes Dispatched to Zone of Advance ................. 25 

Air Service Stations in AEF-Establishment and Demobilization ............. 26 

Casualties of U.S. Air Service Personnel ................................... 27 

Air Service. AEF. Chart of Organization .................................... 63 

Airplanes Received from All Sources-From Beginning of Qperations to 

Dec . 31. 1918 ........................................................... 66 

Monthly Arrival of Air Service Personnel in AEF ............................ 67 

Air Service Personnel in AEF-Arrival and Departure ....................... 68 

U.S. Air Service. AEF. Location of Air Service Centers in France ............ 77 

Handley Page Flow Sheet ................................................. 86 

Hours Flown in Training. AEF ............................................. 98 

Chart Showing When Instruction Commenced and Finished at all Flying 

Schools in AEF ......................................................... 100 

U.S. Air Service. AEF. Training Centers for Co-operation with Artillery. 

U.S. Air Service. AEF. Training Centers in France. 1917-1918 ............... 111 

Air Service. AEF. General Flow of Aeronautical Material Airplanes. as of 

November 11. 1918 ..................................................... 118 

Air Service. AEF. General Flow of Aeronautical Material Spare 

Parts. as of November 1 1. 191 8 .......................................... 120 

Air Service. AEF. General Flow of Aeronautical Material General 

Supplies. as of November 11. 1918 ...................................... 121 

Air Service Units of the First American Army. Nov . 11. 1918 ................. 23 

191 7-191 8 .............................................................. 102 
xiv 

U.S. Air Service, AEF, Location of Sources of Supply and Distributing 

Stations for Zone of Advance, 1917-1918,. .............................. .129 

US. Air Service, AEF, Balloon Centers in France, 1917-1918 ............... .136 

Air Service, AEF, General Flow of Aeronautical Material Balloons 

and Balloon Supplies, as of 11 November 1918 .......................... .141 

Enemy Aircraft Brought Down by 1st 2nd, and 3rd Pursuit Compared 

with American Pursuit Casualties ....................................... .351 

Enemy Planes Brought Down by American Pursuit Compared 

with American Pursuit Casualties ................................... .: .. -352 

Planes on Hand, Available for Duty, and Pilots Available in First, Second, 

and Third Pursuit Groups, AEF ......................................... ,353 
The US, Ak Serrvice in 

worzla WaK I 

Volume I 

The Final Report 

and A Tactical History 

1 

The “Final Report” and “Tactical History” published in this 

volume are products of the historical program of the Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). They are part of that 

monumental compilation of historical narratives and documentary materials that has come to be known as “Gorrell’s History.” 

Persons seeking source materials on US. military aviation in the 

First World War would do well to research this multi-volume 

collection housed in the National Archives. All who do so are 

forever indebted to Mason M. Patrick, Edgar S. Gorrell, Ernest L. 

Jones, William C. Sherman, and the many other people who had a 

part in documenting and preserving the history of Air Service 

activities in Europe in 1917 and 1918. 

When the United States entered the war in April 1917, the Army 

had two reporting systems for obtaining historical information 

from some of its major components, but that was theextent of the 

historical program.’ In February 1918, however, the War 

Department created a Historical Branch of the General Staff to 

write the history of the World War. About the same time, Gen. 

John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF, set up a 

historical unit in AEF General Headquarters at Chaumont-enBassigny, France. During the weeks that followed, historical 

programs were established by various elements of the U.S. Army, 

including the AEF’s Services of Supply (SOS), with headquarters 

at Tours, France.2 

On 9 May 1918, SOS established a Section of Historical 

Records and directed SOS departments to appoint historians, 

write their histories up to the end of May, and thereafter submit 

monthly historical reports3 Since the Air Service, AEF was then 

under SOS, a copy of thedirective wassent to its Chief, Brig. Gen. 

Benjamin D. Foulois, whose office was on the second floor of 

Beaumont Barracks 6 at Tours. One of Foulois’ assistants, Col. 

Oliver S. Eskridge, bucked the order down the hall to the 

Information Section, Room 203: “Captain Jones-This is your 

job. Go to it.”4 

Ernest L. Jones, who had learned to fly in a Curtiss pusher in 

1909, had edited and published the magazineAeronautics in New 

York before the war. Commissioned a first lieutenant in June 

1917, he had been assigned as intelligence officer in the 

Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps in Washington. 

Promoted in October, he had gone to France with Foulois and had 

organized the unit that had become the Information Section of the 

Air Service, AEF. As Chief of Information, Jones was responsible 

for collecting and distributing aeronautical, technical, and 

military data. To this he now added the jobof historian. Receiving 

the SOS directive on Saturday, 11 May, Capt. Jones penciled a 
2 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

“Yes, Sir!” on Eskridge’s note and entered a new phase in what 

was to be a long career as chronicler of aviation e~ents.~ 

To get the SOS historical program started, the secretary of the 

SOS staff called a meeting of the newly-designated historians for 

1000 the following Monday morning. There Jones learned that 

SOS wanted historical records-orders, bulletins, memoranda, 

other documents, statistical data, official statements by 

commanders, etc.-covering Air Service activities at all levels. 

But that was not all. In addition to “comprehensive, all-inclusive, 

constructive historical facts,” SOS wanted “the living, the human, 

the American story of the Services of Supply of the American 

Expeditionary Forces.”B At this time, however, the Air Service 

historical program covered only administrative, logistic, and 

training activities; it did not then include the Zone of Advance and 

units in combat. 

Jones was able to do very little before thedeadlineof 1 Junefor 

submitting the initial history to SOS. He described the work he 

turned in as consisting of “a chart and explanations of the then 

existing organization, a map showing the location of A.S. centers, 

various charts indicating the organization sub-divisions, methods 

and progress of training, very brief accounts of certain training 

centers and ‘stories’ of several A.S. Sections which were hardly 

more than statements of duties assigned.”’ 

Soon after receiving the initial histories, SOS canceled the 

requirement for monthly installments. Each organization was to 

keep its history up to date and on file subject to call. With the 

pressure off and so many other things requiring Jones’ attention, 

little more was done with the history of the Air Service until after 

2d Lt. Lucien H. Thayer was assigned to the Information Section 

on 2 September for historical work. 

After Thayer took up his duties, Jones took two important steps 

to move the program forward. First, he obtained an extension of . 

the program to include all Air Service activities in Europe. 

Second, he set up a system for obtaining historical reports from 

the various units of the Air Service. Each unit was to write its 

history, including data about its origin, movement overseas, 

activities in the AEF, commanders, and awards. The emphasis, 

however, was to be on operations. Jones wanted “picturesque 

accounts of notable air battles and the human story of their 

participants.” Such accounts were needed, he believed, “to 

please the public who will be eager for authentic stories of the 

deeds of American soldiers.” In preparing the material, he said, 

every effort “should be made to present facts of dramatic, comic, 

or tragic interest, tales of obstacles overcome, of discouraging 

conditions, of problems of personnel, equipment, supplies, 
Introduction 

transportation or maintenance, or tests and experiments that may 

have historical value.’’8 

Jones soon discovered, however, that “difficulties of gathering 

information in the midst of intense military effort” would make it 

impossible to accomplish much in the Zone of Advance so long as 

the fighting continuedP Furthermore, in reviewing the histories 

received from the various organizations, Thayer found that many 

were incomplete or inaccurate, or that they dealt in generalities 

and needed to be filled out with factual data from interviews or 

from research in files. 

The only other important development in the program before 

the Armistice on 11 November 1918 apparently was the 

assignment of a photographic unit to take whatever pictures 

Jones needed for the history of the Air Service. 

At the Armistice, Jones had a historical staff of 2 officers, 2 

enlisted men, and 1 civilian as part of the Information Section at 

Tours. Foulois, who had ended up as Assistant Chief of Air 

Service at Tours, apparently had never given any particular 

attention to the historical program. Nor had Maj. Gen. Mason M. 

Patrick, who had succeeded Foulois as Chief of Air Service. 

Patrick’s attitude changed, however, as the fighting came to an 

end. He and some of his staff at Chaumont, which had become 

headquarters for the Air Service as well as for the AEF, began to 

show interest in documenting Air Service activities in Europe. 

Patrick’s attitude at this stage apparently was reflected in the 

answer that his Chief of Staff, Col. Henry C. Whitehead, gave to a 

question from the Photographic Section concerning pictorial 

records of the war. Whitehead said that the Chief of Air Service “is 

not only extremely anxious but demands” that as many such 

records as possible be obtained. Whitehead continued: “We must 

do everything as thoroughly as is possible to complete all 

records, to obtain all information, and to profit in the interest of 

future progress, investigation, [and] study . . . thru aerial 

photography and thru all other phases of aviation.”10 

A week later, on 18 November, Whitehead directed Air Service 

organizations to finish their histories “at their earliest convenience” and send them to the Information Section. Although 

Whitehead’s message indicated a desire to get the histories in 

from the units, its wording did not indicate any great urgency. 

Rather, it instructed the units to take enough time to make their 

histories “as complete and interesting as possible.”” Jones, 

however, was asking the units to complete their histories through 

11 November 1918 and send them in “at the earliest possible 

moment.”I2 Afterwards the units were to keep their histories up to 

date so they would be ready when requested. 

I 

/I 

I Col. Henry C. Whitehead. 
4 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

A little later Jones asked the units to send in with their histories 

any original poems, verses, and cartoons they had, as well as 

drawings of squadron insignia and rosters of officers. Units that 

were slow in submitting their histories received reminders from 

Jones, who also took steps to see that each unit turned in its 

history before sailing for home. 

By early December, Patrick had decided on a program for 

compiling a complete record of all Air Service activities in Europe. 

In addition to narratives covering the development of the various 

Air Service organizations, this record was to include sufficient 

facts and figures to answer any question that might be asked 

about the Air Service, AEF. Such a comprehensive historical 

record, Patrick believed, would assist in establishing military 

aeronautics on a sound basis in the future. To supervise and 

coordinate the work of compiling this record, the Chief of Air 

Service created a new position of Assistant Chief of Staff on 4 

December 1918. The man selected for this job was Edgar S. 

Gorrell, who was to report directly to Patrick.I3 

Born in Baltimore in 1891, “Nap” Gorrell (pronounced gor’rel) 

had graduated from the US. Military Academy in 1912, learned to 

fly at San Diego in 1915, and served with the 1st Aero Squadron 

during the Mexican expedition. After earning a master’s degree in 

aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, he had been assigned as intelligence officer in the 

Aeronautical Division in Washington, where he was when the 

United States entered the war. He had gone to Europe in June 

1917 as a member of the aeronautical commission headed by Maj. 

R. C. Bolling. Afterwards he had been Chief of the Technical 

Section and later of the Strategical Section of the Air Service, 

AEF, and had served as Aviation Officer in G-3 at General 

Headquarters, AEF. Having been commissioned a second 

lieutenant upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy, 

Gorrell had advanced rapidly, as many other aviation officers did 

during the war. Henry H. Arnold, for example, rose from captain to 

colonel in less than six weeks in 1917 and claimed that when he 1 pinned on his eagles he was, at age31, the youngest colonel in the 

Army. But Gorrell topped that when he became a colonel on 28 

Col. Edgar S. Gorrell October 1918 at age 27. It was this bright, young colonel who 

became the chief historian of the Air Service, AEF, on 4 December 

191 8.14 

One thing that apparently helped to shape the historical 

program of the Air Service, AEF, in the days following the 

Armistice was a history compiled by the Air Service of the First 

Army. This history (if it could be called that) had been sent to the 

Commanding General of the First Army, Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett, 
Introduction 5 

on 25 November 1918, with a copy evidently being sent to Patrick’s headquarters about the same time. The purpose of the history, which covered operations from the time the First Army was 

formed on 10 August 1918 until 11 Novemberl918, wasdisclosed 

in the final paragraph of a two-page introductory statement 

signed by Lt. Col. William C. Sherman, Chief of Staff, Air Service, 

First Army: 

In a branch which is as new as the Air Service, and about 

which so little was known at the beginning of the war, it was 

only natural that there would be a certain lack of appreciation of 

the difficulties under which we were working. I feel, however, 

that the histories and data submitted will give acomprehensive 

idea of what has been ac~omplished.~~ 

The histories referred to by Sherman were those of the various 

sections of the Office of the First Army Air Service Commander 

and of the various service (i.e., tactical) organizations-corps air 

services, wings, groups, and squadrons-of the Air Service, First 

Army. The data mentioned by Sherman included station lists, 

general orders, personnel rosters, intelligence reports, operations reports, statistical summaries, and other documents 

pertaining to the operations of the Air Service, First Army, in its 

two campaigns, St. Mihiel and Argonne-Meuse. Altogether, the 

histories and documents constituted a comprehensive record of 

what the Air Service, First Army, had done. 

Someone at Chaumont was sufficiently impressed to want 

something like it for the period before the First Army wasformed. 

Whitehead asked Sherman’s boss, Col. Thomas Dew. Milling, 

Chief of Air Service, First Army, for a comprehensive report on Air 

Service operations in the Chateau-Thierry campaign. Since Capt. 

Philip J. Roosevelt, then a member of Milling’s staff, was familiar 

with these operations, Whitehead wanted Roosevelt to prepare 

the history. When Roosevelt submitted his narrative on pursuit 

aviation, it was accompanied by one that he had asked 1st Lt. 

Burdette S. Wright to prepare on observation operations.16 

Gorrell, who by then was established in his new job as Assistant 

Chief of Staff, recognized that although the materials assembled 

by the First Army Air Service provided valuable information they 

did not constitute a proper history of Air Service operations in 

combat. Such a history was needed, and Gorrell thought that 

Sherman was the man to write it. 

A graduate of the US. Military Academy in 1910, Bill Sherman 

had ranked third in a class of 83. He was commissioned in the 

Corps of Engineers but had become interested in aviation and 

had received his first flying lessons from a friend, Tom Milling, at 

College Park in 1911. Assigned to aviation duty in September 

Col. Thomas Dew. Milling. 
6 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Lt. Col. William C. Sherman, Chief of 

Staff, First Army AS. 

1912, Sherman was one of the original members of the 1st Aero 

Squadron, which was organized at Texas City in March 1913. 

Later that year, however, Sherman had been sent back to the 

Corps of Engineers, and in June 1917 he had gone to France with 

the 1st Division. He had served as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of 

the 1st Division during combat operations around Montdidier and 

at Chateau-Thierry from April to July 1918, and had held the same 

position in Ill Corps during combat operations on the Marne and 

Vesle and during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He had been 

assigned toaviationdutyonceagainon 15October1918, when he 

became Chief of Staff under Col. Milling, who was succeeding 

Brig. Gen. William Mitchell as Chief of Air Service, First Army.” 

Selected by Gorrell to write the tactical history of the Air Service, 

Sherman set up an office and gathered a staff at Chaumont. 

On 12 December, a week after Gorrell had become Assistant 

Chief of Staff, Patrick announced that in addition to a comprehensive historical record he wanted a “final report” on Air Service 

statistics in Europe to give to General Pershing. The project was 

assigned to Gorrell, who was to set up a staff at Paris to do the job. 

The idea of the report, Patrick said, “is to show what has been 

done . . . and why it was done.” No one was to be permitted to 

return to the United States without first putting into writing any 

information of value that he had acquired while in the Airservice. 

Officers in key positions were to prepare statements of lessons 

learned from the war and send them, along with books, 

pamphlets, maps, photographs, and other supporting data, to 

Gorrell in Paris before the end of December. Directing that this 

work be “thoroughly done,” Patrick said he wanted answers for 

“the questions that those in authority may investigate concerning 

the conduct of our Air Service.” To be sure there would be no 

doubt as to the origin of the order, and to ensure that it reached 

the right people, the Chief of Air Service added: “This telegram 

has been sent by me personally . . , . Acknowledge receipt.. . . 

Patrick.”l8 

The staff that Gorrell set up in Paris included 1st Lt. Charles B. 

Nordhoff. A native of Los Angeles, Nordhoff had served with the 

American Ambulance Service in France before joining the French 

Aviation Service in June 1917. After pilot training, he had been 

sent to the front for duty with Escadrille N.99. Transferring to the 

US. Air Service in February 1918, he had been attached to 

Escadrille N.99 until July, when he was assigned to the Executive 

Section of the US. Air Service in Paris. While serving with the 

French, Nordhoff had written a series of articles published in the 

Atlantic Monthly. The reputation he had thus gained as a man of 

letters may have been responsible for his spending the rest of the 
Introduction 7 

. war “removing split infinitives from military reports,” as the 

former chasm pilot described his work in Paris.l8 It was there that 

Gorrell found him and made him editor-in-chief for the final 

report. 

With the help of hi8 staff, Gorrell drew up lists of questions for 

the various organizations to answer concerning their activities. 

To expedite work on the report, he also asked key officers to 

prepare resumes of the information they would like to see 

incorporated in the final report concerning the work of their 

departments. 

Gorrell’s assignment as chief historian had not relieved Jones 

of any responsibilities. Instead, Jones’ historical work increased 

greatly. In December his staff grewto loofficersand a largeforce 

of clerks and typists who were busy editing, copying, and 

assembling four copies of the historical narratives and documents received from the various organizations. Called upon to 

produce a history of the Air Service for use as a chapter in a book 

that SOS was writing about its activities in Europe, Jones 

assigned the task to Lt. C.I. Wheat. Jones also had to help 

Sherman by copyin9 thousands of pages to replace First Army 

records destroyed by fire. 

On 6 January 1919 Gorrell moved his staff from Paris to Tours 

and temporarily took control of the Information Section, which 

then had 13 officers, 53 enlisted men, and 2 civilians. Two days 

later, on 8 January, a number of important decisions were made in 

a conference that Gorrell had with Jones and others at Tours. The 

histories submitted by the various organizations no longer would 

be edited and made up in four copies; one copy would be enough. 

It would be checked to see that it was complete. If it were not, a 

wire would be sent tQ obtain the missing information. The history 

would be indexed, bound, and tabbed to mark pages containing 

information worthy of being included in the final report. The 

history then would be sent to Gorrell’s office for use with the 

lessons learned and resumes submitted by the various departments in preparing the final report. At that time, on 8 January, 

about two-thirds of the more than 500 reports that had been 

requested in the t,hree categories-histories, resumes, and 

lessons learned-had been received. 

The necessary changes in organization and procedures were 

quickly made. When narrative histories and documents arrived at 

the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, the adjutant sent them on 

to the compilation office, where they were assembled, indexed, 

and bound. This work was handled by Jones with a staff of 22 

officers: 72 soldiers, and 3 civilians. The bound volumes were 

then delivered to the file room, run by Lt. W. A. MacCalmont and 
8 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

one soldier. An editorial board of 24 officers, 5 soldiers, and 1 

civilian under Maj. R. I. Mowry read the narrative histories, as well 

as the lessons learned, and marked the pages to be called to the 

attention of the editor-in-chief. Nordhoff, assisted by 1 soldier 

and 1 civilian, used this material to supplement the resumes, 

which constituted the foundation of the report being prepared for 

Patrick. I 

At the same time a photographic unit at Tours had 9 officers and 

64 men copying documents and photographs for the history. At 

Chaumont, 8 officers and 5 men were helping Sherman write the 

story of combat operations. At Paris the Technical Section had 7 

officers and 16 civilians compiling technical matter, and the 

Executive Section was preparing statistical data, for inclusion in 

the history. Thus, on 5 February 1919, when the activity was near 

its peak, more than 250 people were working on the various 

projects under Gorrell’s direction. And this did not include the 

many other people throughout the Air Service, AEF, who had 

written historical narratives, statements of lessons learned, and 

resumes, or had helped to collect data, documents, and other 

materials for the history. 

When the first chapters of the final report were finished on 5 

February, copies were sent by airplane to Air Service headquarters at Chaumont and to the Air Service office in Paris for 

criticism. The courier service continued daily until the middle of 

February. By that time the “Final Report,” the “Tactical History,” 

and the Air Service chapter for the SOS history had been 

completed. Most of the work of assembling the historical 

narratives and documents had also been finished, although some 

materials were to be added later. 

The “Final Report” had 19 chapters, with 134 single-spaced, 

typewritten pages of text, 36 pages of photographs, 17 pages of 

tables and charts, and 3 maps. With a table of contents, picture 

captions, index and other materials, the document had a total of 

252 pages. 

The 19 chapters fell into 3 major parts, the first of which 

consisted of 3 chapters, 28 pages, summarizing the combat 

record of the Air Service. The second part, 6 chapters with a total 

of 40 pages, was a review of organizational development and of 

logistical and training problems and accomplishments. The third 

part, 9 chapters totalling 64 pages, was concerned with training 

and with the work of some of the more important sections-supply, Technical, Balloon, Aircraft Armament, Photographic, Radio, 

and Medical-of the Air Service. This was followed by a brief, 2- 

page, concluding chapter. 

Only about one-fifth of the text had to do with military 

operations, the other four-fifths being devoted to activities in 
Introduction 9 

preparation for, or in support of, combat. The relative amounts of 

space given to combat on the one hand and to preparation and 

support on the other probably was a fairly accurate reflection of 

the division of Air Sgrvice efforts between those two broad areas 

of activities. In a situation in which much of the necessary 

materiel, including aircraft, had to be procured overseas, from 

foreign sources, and,much of the training had to be accomplished 

in the theater of operations, the Air Service had to expend a large 

part of its effort in Europe in the development of a combat force. 

The Armistice, however, made it unnecessary for the Air Service 

to realize and commit to battie the full combat potential that it had 

set out to develop. TMus, some of the greatest achievements of the 

Air Service in Europe were in preparation for combat. The way in 

which the contents of the “Final Report’’ were apportioned 

between development and employment tended to show the Air 

Service in the best light. That evidently is what Patrick wanted, 

and that is what he was given. 

As would be expected, the “Final Report” also reflected the 

interests and concerns of the man charged with its preparation. 

Gorrell’s fondness for quantitative data is seen in the use of 

statistics in the text and accompanying charts to depict progress 

and achievements af the Air Service in various programs and 

areas of activities. Many other examples could be cited. For 

example, Gorrell undoubtedly was responsible for the inclusion 

of a paragraph on the de Ram camera, one of his pet projects. On 

the other hand, therg is not one word about “strategical aviation” 

and the contributions that Gorrell made in the development of 

strategic bombardmient, the thing for which he is perhaps best 

remembered. The absence of any mention of that subject may be 

because his plan for strategic bombing was not put into effect 

during World War I, and the significance of his ideas regarding 

such employment of airpower was not fully appreciated until 

later.20 

Critical reading of the report reveals repetition, poor organization, and other weaknesses, many of which obviously were the 

result of the speed with which the report had to be prepared. 

Despite its defects, however, the “Final Report” is a document of 

great historical interest and one of considerable value as a 

summary of the activities of the Air Service, AEF. 

Air Service officials in the period after the war thought highly 

enough of the “Final Report” to publish it in an Air Service 

Information Circular in 1921.” In 1948 the Army’s Historical 

Division included it in a multi-volume collection of documents 

that it published on the United States Army in the World War, 

1 917-1 919.22 
10 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

In preparing the “Final Report” for printing in 1921, the Office of 

the Chief of Air Service made few substantivechanges in the text, 

and those mostly to correct statistics. But the editors, as editors 

so often do, made many stylistic Changes (these included 

changing “planes” into “airplanes” and “motors” into “engines”) 

to suit their own ideas as to what constituted good writing and 

editing. As seems to be inevitable in such an undertaking, not all 

of the editing was for the better. For instance, the abbreviation 

“S.O.S.”, after being properly transcribed “Services of Supply” in 

several chapters, was changed to “Source (or Sources) of 

Supply” in Chapter XI, a slip that helps to confirm that various 

parts of the report were edited by different people. 

The “Tactical History” prepared by Sherman consisted of a 

narrative of 141 single-spaced, typewritten pages, with 16 pages 

of appendices. It was divided into six major parts. The first part, 

“The Achievement of the Air Service,” was used, with some 

additions, deletions, and editorial changes, for the introductory 

chapters of the “Final Report.” The second part, which was 

concerned with corps observations, was published in -an Air 

Service Information Circular in 1920.23 The other four parts were 

devoted to army observation, pursuit, day bombardment, and 

observation balloons. 

The various parts of the “Tactical History” evidently were 

written by different people who, unfortunately, were not identified 

in the document or in related materials included in “Gorrell’s 

History.” The authors obviously were experts in the areas about 

which they were writing. They knew their subject matter 

thoroughly and were able to describe in detail the way in which 

combat operations were organized, planned, and executed. It is 

this detailed descriptive information that makes the “Tactical 

History” particularly valuable and useful to students of aerial 

operations in World War 1. The commentsand criticisms included 

by the authors also are of considerable interest. 

Patrick found some statements in the “Tactical History”that he 

would have preferred not to have seen included. He did not 

eliminate them, however, and did not even finish reading the 

history before he sent it to Brig. Om. FoxConner, Assistant Chief 

of Staff, G-3, at General Headquarters, AEF, on 14 February 1919. 

Patrick thought it would help to complete G-3 files and might be 

of value to Connor’s study af the operations of the AEF. 

The “History of the Air Service, AEF” which was started by 

Ernest Jones in May 1918 and which today Is known as “Gorrell’s 

History” consists of 280 volumes (plus 2 index volumes) in 18 

series lettered A through R.,The narratives and documents were 

arranged with the idea of bringing together in asingleseriesall of 
Introduction 11 

the materials of one kind or relating to one broad subject area. 

Squadron histories, for example, make up Series E, with 

squadron designatipns being used to arrange the units in 

numerical sequence through the first 25 volumes, with supplemental histories bound in the 2 additional volumes that complete 

the series. In the $ame fashion, the materials on balloons, 

including those pertbining to the Balloon Section as well as the 

histories of balloon companies, make up the seven volumes of 

Series F. 

A rough idea of the general arrangement of the materials in 

“Gorrell’s History” is shown in the following listing of the series as 

given in the first index volume: 

Series 

A 

B 

C 

C) 

E 

F 

G 

ti 

I 

,I 

K 

1. 

M 

N 

0 

P 

u 

R 

Subject (number of volumes)24 

Early HiStOFy and General organization (29) 

Foreign Relations (15) 

Tactical Units [groups and above] (15) 

Air Service Tactical History of the War, & Manual (2) 

Squadron Histories (27) 

Balloon Section, S.O.S. and Zone of Advance (7) 

Photographic Section, S.O.S. and Z. of A. (7) 

Mechanic8 Regiments, Construction Companies and 

Air Parks (5) 

Paris Headquarters, and Supply Section, S.O.S. and Z. 

of A. (32) 

Training Ssction and Schools (12) 

Technical Section (2) 

Personnel, Information, Radio and Cable Section, and 

Medical Service (14) 

Miscellaneous [Intelligence, maps, photographs, welfare organizations, prisoners of war, poems, cartoons, 

newspapers, insignia, etc.] (48) 

Duplicates of All First Army Material (25) 

[Reports an Air Service Activities] (31) 

[Third Ardy] (2) 

[Air Service Liquidation] (5) 

[Investigation of Effects of Allied Bombing] (2) 

The series titles, however, provide only a rough guide to the 

subject matter of the narratives and documents. Fortunately, a 

more detailed index is available. As noted earlier, the volumes 

were indexed as they were assembled at Tours in January and 

February 1919. Copigs of the indexes not only werg bound in the 

respective volumes but also were assembled in one folder as a 

master guide to the contents of the history, volume-by-volume, 

through the different series. In addition, there is in a separate 

volume an alphabetical index to subject matter. While these 2 
12 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

indexes are of great value to researchers, they do not cover all 280 

volumes of the history. They do not indicate the presence of some 

volumes, such as one on Recording and Accounting of Air 

Service Property, A-28, or the one containing a Supplementary 

History of the Air Service, First Army, N-24. Further, they omit 

reference to the last four series, O-R, which were later additions to 

the history. 

Some 20 years after the history had been compiled, Gorrell said 

that an effort had been made “to include a report of every activity 

undertaken or accomplished in the AEF, of every battlefought, of 

every production problem met, of every success or failure-in 

fact, a complete story.” He then went on to describe theobjective 

of this effort: 

It was anticipated that that history, when compiled, would later 

be made available to the air officers under the American flag 

everywhere so they could take it home to their quarters and 

study it, perhaps pipe in mouth and carpet-slippered feet on the 

desk, learning now of oneevent and later of another, and calmly 

and gradually profiting by the lessons learned and the mistakes 

made by those who had pi~neered.~~ 

But the history in the form in which it existed at the end of the war 

did not lend itself to that purpose. When it was shipped to the 

United States in the summer of 1919 the intention was to use the 

information contained in the narratives and documents to 

produce a history of the Air Service, AEF that could be published 

and made available to officers and others who wanted it to read 

and study. But that was not to be. Although work on a history of 

the Air Service, AEF was started by the Information Section of the 

Office of the Chief of Air Service in Washington, the project soon 

faltered and then collapsed as a result of reduced appropriations 

for the Air Service.26 

Gorrell observed in 1940 that his history was% thevaults of the 

War Department in Washington, some of the pages torn, some 

yellowing, many hard to read. But small use has been madeof it,” 

he said, “because of its inac~essibility.”~~ 

Accessibility did not improve greatly with the transfer of the 

history to the National Archives. In 1961, however, the history 

became available on microfilm made by the National Archives at 

the request of the U.S. Air Force Historical Division. The58 rolls of 

35-mm. film, with the 2 index volumes at the beginning of the first 

roll, are identified by the National Archives as MicrocopyT-619.** 

For his contributions to the “History of the Air Service, AEF,” 

Ernest L. Jones was promoted to major on 20 February 191 9. He 

returned to the United States the following April and was 

assigned to the Office of the Chief of Air Service in Washington 
Introduction 13 

until he was discharged in 1920. He worked at various editorial 

and writing jobs in the field of aviation in the 1920’s and 1930’sand 

returned to uniform as an intelligence officer in the Air Corps in 

1941. He served as a historical officer at Headquarters of the Army 

Air Forces and the US. Air Force in Washington from 1943 until 

1948, when he retired from military services as a lieutenant 

colonel. He stayed with the Air Force historical program as a 

civilian historian, however, until 1952. 

During all those years, and until hisdeath in 1955, Ernest Jones 

devoted much effort to compiling a detailed chronology of U.S. 

military aviation from the Civil Warthrough World War I, which he 

gave to the Air Force.29 This remarkable, multi-volume chronology, which included additional data that Jones collected for the 

period to 1941, is now in the Albert F. Simpson Historical 

Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, where researchers 

find it a valuable guide to events in the early history of United 

States military aviation. 

With the “Tactical History of the Air Service” as a beginning, 

Sherman went on to win recognition as an expert in military 

history and tactics. He taught at the Air ServiceTactical School at 

Langley Field, Virginia, in the early 1920’s and later at the Army’s 

Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. He was the author of a book on Air Warfare, which was 

published in New York in 1926. But death, which followed a long 

illness, cut short the career of this brilliant officer in 1927 at age 

39. Like many other officers who had received temporary 

promotions during the war, Sherman dropped back to his 

permanent rank-captain-in 1920. A few weeks later, however, 

he received an Air Service commission as major, the rank he held 

until he was posthumously promoted to lieutenant c01one1.~~ 

Nordhoff was introduced in Paris to another American, James 

Norman Hall, who also had flown for the French before becoming 

a member of the US. Air Service, and whoalso had written for the 

Atlantic Monthly. The two men collaborated on the history of The 

Lafayette Flying Corps and then went on to produce such famous 

works as Mutiny on the Bounty, Men Against the Sea, Falcons of 

France, and Pitcairn’s Island.31 

Gorrell resigned his commission in 1920and made hiscareer in 

the world of business and industry until his death in 1945. During 

that period he headed the Stutz Motor Car Company, the Air 

Transport Association, and an investment company he organized 

in Washington. When war broke out again in Europe in 1939, 

Gorrell saw the events of an earlier day repeating themselves. The 

United States Air Service had not been prepared for war in 1917, 

and it appeared to Gorrell that the same thing was going to 
14 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

happen again. Turning back to the history he had helped to write 

in France, Gorrell tried to use the experience of the First World 

War to show the need for preparedness, for developing the 

aircraft industry and building up an air force so the nation would 

be ready when the challenge cameagain. The lessons were there, 

he believed, if the nation would learn from the torn and yellowing 

pages of “Gorrell’s History.”32 

16 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 
17 

When hostilities ceasjed on 

Novemtler 11, 1918, there 

were actually assigned to armies 45 American squddrons 

and 767 pilots, 481 obsqrvers, 

23 aerial gunners, anld the 

complement of so1piers.l 

These squadrons were 

equipped with 740 airdlanes, 

with armament of the latest 

type, arid the flying pgrsonnel, trained in Air arvice 

schools was second to none 

in the world for aggrqssiveness and skill. Twelve oi these 

squadrons were eqyipped 

with American built airplanes 

and Liberty engines. This 

engine in actual serviqe fulfilled the highest hope# of it 

which hind been entertaihed in 

the United States. 

On the Marne, at St. Mihiel, 

and in the Argonne opr air 

forces were pitted agairlst the 

best which Germany ,could 

produce, and the resultsshow 

that the enemy more than met 

his match. Qur pilots shot 

down 781 enemy airplanes2 

which were officially confirmed, and many others, too 

far behind the lines to b$ confirmed by our own witngsses, 

but which were nevertheless 

undoubtedly destroyed. They 

also destroyed 73 (confikmed) 

enemy balloon^.^ Our total 

losses in air battles were 289 

airplanes and 48 balloons 

brought down by the enemy.4 

Our squadrons, in round 

numbers, took part in 150 

bombing raids, during which 

they dropped over 225,000 

pounds of explosives on the 

enemy. They flew 35,000 

hours over the lines and took 

18,000 photographs of enemy 

positions, from which 585,000 

prints were made by the Photographic Sections attached 

to observation groups. On innumerable occasions they 

regulated the fire of our Artillery, flew in contact with Infantry during attacks, and 

from a height of only a few 

yards from the ground they 

machine-gunned and bombed 

enemy batteries, convoys and 

troops on the march. 

Of the 35 balloon companies then in France, with 446 

officers and 6,365 'men, there 

were 23 companies serving 

with the armies at the front. 

This balloon personnel had 

also been trained in American 

Expeditionary Forces schools 

and in every test proved its 

worth. Our balloons at the 

front made 1,642 ascensions 

and were in the air a total of 

3,111 hours. They made 316 

artillery adjustments, each 

comprising all the shots fired 

at one target: they reported 

12,018 shell bursts, sighted 

11,856 enemy airplanes, reported enemy balloon ascensions 2,649 times, enemy batteries 400 times, enemy traffic 

and roads and railroads 1,113 

times, explosions and destructions 597 times. 

Air Service depots to supply the squadrons and balloon companies at the front 

were in full operation and 

others were being prepared to 

maintain this force, which was 

to be increased rapidly. Needed steps had been taken to 

provide for the equipment of 

this force as it was placed at 

the front, and it was certain 

that it could be fully maintained. A production plant had 

been built and was in full operation, where some 10,000 

men were employed in assembling airplanes and in repairing airplanes, engines, 

and balloons which had seen 

service at the front. 

Our balloons were attacked 

by enemy airplanes on 89 occasions; 35 of them were 

burned during such attacks, 

12 others were destroyed by 

shell fire, and 1 blown over 

enemy 1ir1e.s.~ Our observers 

jumped from the baskets 116 

times; in no case did the parachute fail to open properly. 

One observer lost his life 

because pieces of the burning balloon fell on his descending parachute. 
18 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

COMBAT SQUADRONS IN AMERICAN E. F. 

(DATE OF ASSIGNMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION) 

5

"1 

. ~...nrorl7,,1,1~r,,narr in1,.14 

b 8.'.""or*,,~~,I.lllnRlr I"b.ld 

c 8.1." work 21,8111 Wlfh Fr A I 4" ',.Id 

ti-1 PURSUIT mmfl - OBSeRVATlON 

DAY BOMBING 

Sept. 12. 1918. First Day of St. Mihiel offensivs. 

Sept. 26. 1918. First Day of Forst AqJonne Meuse offenwe 

Nov. 1, 1918. First Day of Last Argonne Meuse offenswe. 

NOV. 11. 1918. Armistice. 

NIGHT BOMBING 

I 
Achievement 19 
20 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

U.S. BALLOON COMPANtW ASSlONED TO ARMIES IN AMERICAN E. F. 

(WITH DATES Of ASSIGNMENT AND DEMOBIUUTION) 

SWl. 12. l9lL FMIT DAY OF ST. MIHILL OFFENSIVE. 

SEPT. 26. 1911. FlRlT MY OF FIOIT ARQONNE MCUIE OFFENSIVL 

NW. 1. 1918. FlMT DAY OT LAW ARQONNE MIUSL OFfENSlVL 

NOV. 11. 1911. ARMISTICL 

- 

NO 

1 

2 

s 

4 

5 

6 

7 

I 

9 

10 

It 

12 

I3 

14 

I6 

16 

I7 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

- 

- 

lLRlAL No. 

1 

2 

4 

3 

5 

6 

? 

I 

9 

u 

63 

16 

10 

11 

12 

42 

15 

13 

14 

24 

25 

26 

- U 

)ATE ORDERED DEMOBILUCD 

Apdl 1. 1919 

May It. I919 

D.C. 11. 1919 

Mw 11. 1919 

Me. 11, 1919 

M. 11. 1919 

D.C. 11. 1919 

0.0. 11. 1919 

M. 11. 1919 

0.c. 11. 1919 

M. 22. 1919 

May 11. I919 

me. 22, I919 

Dn. 11. 1919 

D.e 11. 1919 

nC. 11. 1919 

May 11. 1919 

May It. 1919 

July 1, 1919 

July 1. 1919 

May 11. 1919 

May 11. 1919 

July 1. 1919 
Achievement 21 
22 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. 1 

SQUADRONS, BALLOON COMPANIES, PHOTO SECTIONS AND AIR PARKS ASSIGNED TO ARMIES IN THE A. E. F. 

90- 

W70 - 

60- 

50- 

40 - 

M20 - 

10 - 

0 -. -?= 

QUADRONS 

- 

1 

I 

4 

10 

I4 

17 

27 

32 

U 

45 

BALLOON 

COMPANIES 

2 

3 

3 

8 

16 

I7 

I7 

July 

E(ICND 

md SQUADRONS 

- - BALLOON COMPANIES 

PHOTO SLCTION 

>rw AIR PARKS 

. 
23 
24 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

FLYING TIME OF AIR SERVICE ASSIGNED TO ARMIES FROM BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS UNTIL JULY lST, 1919 

HOURS 

9,000 

8,000 

7,000 

6,000 

5,000 

4.m 

3.000 

2.000 

1.m 

1,000 

500 

0 

h 

DATE 

1918 

May 

June 

July 

AW"l 

September 

October 

November 1st 

November 11th 

Oeccmber 

1919 

J*"".IY 

FebruaIY 

March 

April 

MSY 

June 

JVlY 

PURSUIT 

13822 

1166:25 

732:05 

290650 

242351 

649802 

8583:40 

53658 

16W42 

41908 

94541 

391:14 

92813 

58927 

51925 

- 

DBSERYATION 

32 

40749 

44740 

218632 

86733 

267521 

416931 

43257 

101017 

11725 

129558 

1369:20 

121929 

11m21 

51910 

- 

BOMBAROMENT 

6650 

83:45 

421:41 

59753 

1526 

12810 

209345 

12320 

37550 

251:55 

33650 

101:06 

- 

- 

TOTAL 

17022 

1574:11 

124635 

399710 

371305 

9771:16 

1427911 

109805 

2884:44 

95953 

261729 

2012:29 

248632 

184054 

1038335 

- 

LEGEND 

PURSUIT 

____ __ - OBSERVATION 

- BOMBARDMENT SOURCE Operation Reports, Irt. 2nd 4 3rd Army. 
25 TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRPLANES DISPATCHED TO ZONE OF ADVANCE 

SUBDIVIDED AS TO TYPE 

CAUDRON G-3 

CAUDRON R-9 

D. H. 9 

NIEUPORT 21 

N IEUPORT 27 

SPAD 16 

SPAD 12 

CAUDRON G-3 

NIEUPORT 24-8 

N IEUPORT 83 

NIEUPORT 81 

SOPWITH A-2 

SOPWITH (CAMEL) 

A. R. 1 

F. E. 2-6 

SPAD 11 

BREGUET 14-A-2 

s. E. 5-A 

BREGUET 14-8-2 

SOPWITH 8-2 

A. R. 2 

SOPWITH A-2 

SOPWITH (CAMEL) 

BREGUET 

SPAD 

NIEUPORT 

SALMSON 

D. H. 

SPAD 

TOTAL 

1917 OCTOBER 

” NOVEMBER 

” DECEMBER 

1918 JANUARY 

” FEBRUARY 

“ MARCH 

” APRIL 

” MAY 

” JUNE 

” JULY 

” AUGUST 

” SEPTEMBER 

” OCTOBER 

14-A-2 

2-A-2 

13 

2i k 

* lnclu 

- 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

4 

5 

8 

8 

8 

23 

27 

30 

30 

36 

46 

50 

65 

73 

87 

103 

181 

557 I 

8771 

6961 

- ‘9251 

planes dispatched, bi ater returned to fleld. 

SUBDIVIDED AS TO MONTHS 

9c 

- 9 

” NOVEMBER (10th to 30) 

” NOVEMBER (to 10th) 

” DECEMBER 

TOTAL 

Approved: 

- 30C 

- 

18/ i 
lN3WHSIWVlS3) (INV (NOllVZll1~0W3(1 

MlV 331hM3S SNOIIVIS NI NV31M3W '3 '4 
Achievement 27 

CASUALTIES OF U.S., AIR SERVICE PERSONNEL 

(ATTACHED TO AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN ARMIES) 

TO NOVEMBER 11. 1918 

600 I 

575 

550 

525 

500 

475 

450 

425 

400 

375 

350 

325 

300 

275 

250 

225 

200 

175 

150 

125 

100 

75 

50 

25 

0 

E 

3 

E 

- 

ii 

msueities of Combat S 

Died of disease not inc 

All Totals Cumulative. 

APPROVED 2/16/20. 

7 

; 

,; 

b 

_I -

- 

- 

4 

9 

37 

56 

105 

129 

145 

- 

C 

3 

P 

C 

:: 

e 

- 

- 

- 

4 

13 

28 

46 

82 

118 

130 

adron only. 

ied 

19 

27 

42 23 

45 25 

... Fab. Mar. ACr. May June July Aus. Sevt. Oct. Nov. Dee. Prisoners 

Killed in 

Action 

- 

- I 

! 

- 

4 

8 

33 

66 

139 

219 

406 

537 

583 - 

II. The Woeuae 

aria the MaKbe. 

29 

The Toul Sector 

The Air Service, Amprican 

Expeditionary Forces, commenced actual operati ns at 

the front in the spring o t 1918. 

The Toul sector was choben as 

the place where American 

squadrons would be Igcated 

and given their final plactice 

to bridge over the gap which 

must always exist between 

training in schools and work 

in two well-defined poqitions, 

and since the early dayd of the 

war this had been a corpparatively quiet sector. Meaqs of liaison had been developgd and 

there existed airdromeslwhich 

provided all needed fa ilities. 

In the air, ason thegrould, the 

enemy was comparativbly inactive, using this sector,i as did 

the French, either as ~a rest 

area for tired units or as 4 position to be held by units which 

had no1 been so thor ughly 

trained. It was well ecognized that these con itions 

imposed one serious disadvantage. They bred fals ideas 

of what constituted re I war, 

for, from the beginni g the 

staff of the American Ebpeditionary Forces thorougthly understood that movemerlt constitutes the essence of war. 

However, our state OY preparedness, a situation which 

will always be encountered 

where actual preparatim for 

war must be carried on while 

the war is waged, made it seem 

wiser to take but one step at a 

time, and fortunately this particular part of the western 

front remained inactive until 

the St. Mihiel offensive on 

September 12, 1918. 

Corps observation 

In April, 1918, the 1st Corps 

Observation Group, consisting of the lst, 12th, and 88th 

Squadrons, was organized. 

The pilots for the most part 

were men who had never 

served at the front. On the 

other hand, the observers had 

nearly all seen service with 

French squadrons and their 

experience so gained proved 

of great value. This group was 

placed under the tactical control of the French 37th Army 

Corps and under the administrative control of the American 1st Army Corps. Its mission was primarily to keep the 

command informed by visual 

and photographic reconnaissances of the general situation within and behind the enemy lines. To accomplish this, 

a routine schedule of operations was prescribed for each 

day, consisting of several 

close-range reconnaissances 

of the sector, and toward dusk 

a reconnaissance for hostile 

batteries in action. In addition 

to this routine work, special 

missions were arranged, in 

many instances for the day following. Artillery adjustments, 

in particular, were carried out, 

and many long distance and 

special reconnaissances. Except in the one case of the attack on Seicheprey,’ no opportunities offered for contact 

patrols. 

Value of Experience in the 

Toul Sector 

From a command point of 

view the work of this group in 

the Toul sector was comparatively unimportant. There 

were no marked opportunities for obtaining information 

of value, as no active operations occurred. The instruction of the group itself in its 

duties during this time was 

carried on consistently and 

with great advantage. Individuals made rapid strides in 

learning thedetails of theirduties and except training in actual combat they had arrived 

at a state of excellence by the 

time they were to take part in 

real warfare. This period was 

also utilized in organizing and 

operating the group as such, 

as opportunity existed for so 

doing without paying theordinarily heavy price of mistakes 
30 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

in war. A proper organization 

was evolved rapidly and the 

principles and methods established stood the test of 

time. Changing conditions 

made minor modifications 

necessary, but the essentials 

proved sound and were the 

model for succeeding groups. 

Work in Quiet Sectors 

During this period one of 

these squadrons was detached for duty in the Baccarat 

sector,* where its experience 

was along the same lines as 

those followed by the other 

twosquadrons in theToul sector. 

During the summer while 

American divisions were in 

line in the Vosges Mountains 

the 99th Aero Observation 

Squadron received its first 

battle training, operating over 

the southern end of thissector 

and participating in the attack 

on Frapelle. 

Army Observation 

The 91st Squadron, our first 

army observation unit, commenced active operations on 

the front on June 6,1918, also 

in this Toul sector. Its personnel, too, had much to learn of 

its work from its own experience. The best methods to employ in obtaining information 

of the enemy's rear areas were 

studied and developed. Many 

material difficulties in doing 

photographic work were met 

and overcome. Aerial gunnery was brought to a high degree of efficiency. Formation 

flying was constantly practiced and when active operations began in this sector the 

91st Squadron had gained 

confidence in itself and had 

acquired knowledge of longdistance reconnaissance that 

proved of great value to our 

staff in later operations. It may 

be noted here that subsequently officers of the allied 

armies who knew the work 

done by this squadron stated 

emphatically that no better 

work had been done at any 

time during the war byanyobservation squadron on the 

western front. 

-. + 

Lts. Douglas Campbell (left) and Alan Winslow, 94th Pursuit Squadron, scored the two 

victories in the Toulsector on April 14, 1918. 
Wouvre and Marne 31 

Day Bombardment 

Day bombardment had its 

beginning on May 18, 

when the 96th Aero Squ 

was established on the Amanty airdrome, also in this Toul 

sector. Its personnel had received some training with bolth 

French and British units. The 

shape of the St. Mihiel salimt 

and the installations within 

and behind it offered excellent opportunities for bombing. The first raid was 

June 12, when the y 

Dommary-Baroncourt 

successfully attacked. 

July owing to overea 

in adverse weather a 

flight of this squad 

lost, and as at this time there 

was also difficulty in replecsecured and 20 

raids were made 

month. These di 

troops and according to 

French intelligence reparts 

the enemy took to his dugouts long before the bombers 

reached their objectives. 

Much tactical knowledge 

was gained by this squadron 

while in the Toul sector. 

trial the most satisfactory f 

rnation fdr encountering enemy pursuit was developed. 

The enemy methods of attack 

were studied closely, and the 

experience gained proved of 

value during the more serious 

enemy efforts which 'were 

made later. 

Pursult 

The Toul sector likewise 

served as a place for giving final practice to the pursuit 

units. The 94th Pursuit Squadron commenced operations 

on April 14, 1918,3 and on that 

same day, thanks largely to 

the excellent liaison with the 

anti-aircraft defenses and to 

blunders of the enemy, two 

enemy airplanes were shot 

down in our lines without loss 

to ourselves: The moral effect 

of this was great and from this 

very first day our pursuit 

squadrons showed in their 

work that aggressive spirit and 

high morale which alone can 

win in war. 

In May, 1918, three other 

squadrons5 were ready to be 

sent into battle, and the 1st 

Pursuit Group of four squad- 

- 

ions was formed. Fortunately, 

there were among the pilots 

some who had served with the 

Lafayette Escadrille and their 

experience in war was invaluable in teaching our new pilots, 

who had much to learn. The 

very best of school work can 

not give a pilot the atmosphere and feeling of the front. 

Not alone is this true in general, but schooling can not impress upon the students the 

relative importance of vision in 

the air, aerial gunnery, formation flying and fighting, and 

acrobacy. In particular, teamwork and formation flying had 

to be emphasized at the front. 

These matters were vigorously undertaken, and with 

marked success. For a time 

the enemy was neither numerous nor aggressive and combats were infrequent, but there 

was always the atmosphere 

and many of the conditions 

which prevailed in active warfare. 
32 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

In June, 1918, advantage 

was taken of bombing raids 

carried on by the British Independent Air Force to cooperate by attacking enemy 

pursuit airplanes which 

sought to interfere with these 

raids, and on three occasions 

enemy pursuit airplanes were 

shot down by our pilots. 

Our pursuit squadrons, like 

the observation squadrons, 

came out, aftertheirstay in the 

Toul sector, while not veteran 

fighting organizations, yet 

possessed of excellent morale, and well equipped to 

undertake the more serious 

work in which theywereabout 

to be engaged. 

Balloons 

This quiet sector was also 

chosen for thedevelopment of 

our balloon companies. In 

February, 1918, the2d Balloon 

Company joined the 1st Division, which was then in line. 

Two other companies (one 

sent to this Toul sector, one to 

near Baccarat)6 reached the 

front in April, relieving French 

companies. Specialists from 

French units remained with 

our balloon companies until 

the men had become sufficiently adept, which ordinarily required but a short time. 

After our own companies had 

been thus trained they themselves undertook the training 

of newly arriving American 

balloon units. The mission of 

these balloon companies was 

to regulate artillery fire, to 

locate targets, to report all 

activity within the enemy lines 

by day and, when possible, by 

night. 

The Marne and the Vesle 

The work of all of our air 

forces became of a much 

sterner type when they entered more active sectors 

which were the scenes of hard 

fighting in July and August. 

The operations on the Marne 

and the Vesle may be roughly 

divided into three periods-the preparation for the 

expected German offensive, 

which came on July 15; the 

Observers leave observation balloon. 
Wouvre and Marne 33 

crushing of that offensive and 

preparations for the Allied 

counter offensive of July 18; 

and this counter offensive 

itself, from Soissons to Chateau Thierry, with the comequent retreat of the Germans 

to the line of the Vesle and 

later to the Aisne. Each of 

these periods called for a 

somewhat different disposition of the air forces to effect 

the best results. 

Observation 

The 1st Corps Observation 

Group, consisting of the 1st 

and 12th Aero Squadrons, 

reached the Marne sector 

during the first days of July, 

1918, and occupied) an airdrome about 55 kilometers 

from the existing front line. It 

was assigned to duty with the 

1st Army Corps, which at that 

time held the front extending 

from a short distance f 

Chateau-Thierry to - 

champs, with two divisions in 

the front line. Although the 

positions of the opposing 

forces had somewhat stabilized after the German ofknsive of May 27, 1918, conditions were quite different from 

those existing in theToul area. 

There werea numberof strmg 

points hastily organized rat 

than a continuous line 

trenches. The enemy had also 

powerful artillery and by this 

time had massed the heavy 

guns that were intended to 

support his formidable attack 

of July 15. A very powerful 

enemy air force had also been 

assembled, and our squadrons, accustomed to the lesser 

and not so highly trained air 

forces of the Toul sector, now 

daily encountered enemy patrols of some 7 to 20 machines 

of the latest Fokker type and 

flown by the best of German 

pilots, who were vigorous and 

aggressive and who showed a 

teamwork and persistency 

new to our experience. 

On July 1, 1918, the American attack on Vaux gave an 

opportunity to employ contact 

patrols and advantage was 

taken of this to give all our 

available teams the experience which can not be 

gained otherwise. 

The arrival of the 88th 

Squadron on July 6 completed 

this group, which operated as 

such from July 7. From this 

last date to July 15 the main 

purpose of operations undertaken was a thorough reconnaissance and surveillance of 

the enemy opposite our sector, in order to keep our 

command informed of his 

movements and dispositions. 

Missions were sent out for this 

purpose daily at dawn and 

dusk, while other missions 

were dispatched throughout 

the day according to the 

existirlg situation. All missions 

were quite definite. Great 

importance was attached to 

photographing the enemy 

works. Visual reconnaissances and photographic missions were both fraught with 

difficulties and the enemy 

often endeavored to interfere 

with them. Nevertheless, our 

staff received timely and important information, the result 

of the work of this observation 

group during this period. In 

addition, a certain number of 

artillery adjustments and contact patrols were undertaken. 

When the enemy attack 

finally came and was repulsed 

the corps observation worked 

during every hour of daylight 

and again brought invaluable 

information 

Observatlon Work in the 

Counter-Offensive 

The allied counter offensive 

of July 18 changed materially 

the work of the observation 

squadrons. A war of movement had begun and there 

became apparent at once the 

greater difficulties in the way 

of keeping groynd and air 

forces closely in touch with 

each other. Contact patrols 

became of far greater importance. Photography decreased in importance, while 

the regulation of artillery fire 

on hostile batteries became 

much more difficult. Our patrols, in spite of these obstacles, did obtain important 
34 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

information and transmit it to 

its destination. Our corps 

observation did effective 

work, wen deep photography, 

while enemy attempts at photograplqy and visual reconnaissance were greatly hampered by our own pursuit. 

Throughout all of these operations, in spite of the larger 

number of enemy airplanes in 

this sector and their aggressiveness, our pilots maintained their fighting spirit 

against heavy odds. 

Early in August, 1918, the 

American 3d Army Corps 

came into line on the Vesle 

and ain observation group, 

consisiing of the 88th American Squadron and two French 

squadrons, was organized for 

its use. Theenemy had paused 

in his retreat and held strongly 

the heights north of the Vesle. 

The character of the observation work demanded Of both of 

our observation groups was 

essentially the same as that 

undertaken on the Marne. 

Added experience made for 

greater efficiency, and the 

difficult problem of liaison 

with both Artillery and Infantry 

was attacked with erlergy. On 

the whole, it may be stated that 

during this, their first taste of 

real warfare, the observation 

squadrons did good service. 

Though opposed by a vigor- while it became the rule that 

ous enemy pursuit, they kept no patrol should go out at 

our command informed of medium altitudes without a 

enemy movements and of the covering patrol high above. 

locations of our own troops. Fighting at all times against 

heavy odds our pilots carried 

Pursuit the war into the enemy’s 

The 1st Pursuit Group commenced operations in the 

Marne sector early in July, 

1918, as part of the Air Service of the French Vlth Army. 

Here conditions were decidedly different from those 

which had been encountered 

in the Toul sector, where 

single airplanes were comparatively safe and where 

formations of three to six 

airplanes did excellent work. 

In the Chateau-Thierry sector the squadron formation 

became the rule almost from 

thevery beginning. At all times 

the enemy had a superior 

number of pursuit airplanes, 

the French Intelligence Service estimating the odds at one 

period to be 4 to 1. 

From the beginning of the 

German attack on July 15 it 

was planned to maintain during daylight hours a doubletier barrage, one tier at medium and the other at high 

altitudes. For a time it was attempted to utilize a single 

squadron formation. This, 

however, proved unwieldyand 

the squadrons were echeloned by separate flights, 

country and the majority of 

combats took place well within the enemy lines. 

Close protection of observation airplanes proved costly 

and could be undertaken only 

exceptionally, where the moral support afforded justified 

the probable losses. Pursuit 

airplanes are intended primarily for offensive work. It is 

the role of the pursuit pilot to 

seek and to attack enemy airplanes. To distract the attention of the pursuit pilot from 

this primary duty by directing 

him to guard observation 

airplanes, requiring him to 

follow them and to keep track 

of their movements while at 

the same time he endeavors to 

watch for hostile aircraft, renders him just so much less 

efficient. Playing his proper 

role, devoting his entire attention to attacking and driving 

away or destroying enemy 

airplanes, the pursuit pilot 

protects the observation airplanes more effectively than 

when charged with this specific mission alone. It is evident, however, that thorough 

protection to observers can be 

given only when there is a 

sufficiently large number of 

pursuit airplanes to keep the 

enemy out of the air. 

? 
Wouvre and Marne 35 

Balloons. panies not only did valuable 

work in adjusting artillery fire 

Three balloon companies’ but also kept constant watch 

took part in the Chateau Thi- upon the progress of the 

erry counter offensive. Two of advancing infantry, reporting 

them operated south Of SOiS- to the divisional staffs new 

sons, accompanying the, 1st developments from hour to 

and 2d American Dlvlslons hour. The aggressive enemy 

when those divisions, as Part pursuit aviation brought down 

of the French Xth Army, ad- 8 of our balloons and 1 more 

van& to cut the Soissons- was damaged by shell fire. In 

Chateau-Thierry road. The all, 12 observers were forced 

4th Balloon Company reached to make parachute descents A ba”oon 

the vicinity of the Chateau- during these operations. 

Thierry salient after this counway. It joined the 3d Division 

and took part in the advance to 

the Vesle. These balloon comter offensive was well under .,S’ 

J 
36 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 
37 

Organization for the St. 

Mihlei Battle. 

On August 10, 1918, the 

United States 1st Army wasorganized. Army headquarters 

were located at La Ferte-sousJouarre but soon moved to 

Neufchateau, in the vicinity of 

the St. Mihiel salient, where 

plans were perfected for the 

attack soon to take place 

there. 

In mid-August the American 

Air Service comprised 1 Army 

observation squadron, half a 

dozen corps observation 

squadrons, 1 of which was 

equipped with DH-4 airplanes 

and Liberty engines, 1 day 

bombardment squadron, sand 

14 pursuit squadrons. Two of 

the pursuit squadrons were 

serving with the British Expeditionary Force.’ 

In anticipation of the St. 

Mihiel offensive, the French 

placed at the disposal of the 

American Army a considerable number of their own air 

squadrons, which were put 

under the command of the Air 

Service commander of our 

own 1st Army.* 

Additional American squadrons were being equipped as 

rapidly as possible. It was a 

task of no little magnitude to 

prepare these new squadrons 

for actual battle, to organize 

the group, corps, and wing 

staffs, to make dispositions for 

sheltering our own units and 

the French units under our 

command, and to link up the 

units of the Army Air Service 

with each other and with the 

various corps, division, and 

artillery production centers by 

wire, radio, courier, and “airplane drop-message’’ 

grounds. 

On August 26 the headquarters of the 1st Army moved to 

Ligny-en-Barrois, and shortly 

thereafter these French 

squadrons reported for duty. 

An airdrome and a dropmessage station were immediately prepared. The order of 

battle of the 1st Army placed 

the United States 5th Corps on 

the left of the line, its left flank 

joining the French Ild Army at 

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes; on 

its right was the French Ild 

Colonial Corps, near the point 

of the salient, and on the south 

side of the salient were the 

United States 4th and 1st 

Corps, from left to right, with 

the right flank of the 1st Army 

joining the Vlllth French Army 

at Pont-sur-Seille. 

To each corps was assigned 

an observation group made up 

of French and American 

squadrons. These corps Air 

Service units are component 

parts of the corps to which 

they are assigned and are 

under the direct orders of the 

corp commanders. 

The Army observation 

group was formed around the 

91st Aero Squadron as a nucleus by adding two new aero 

squadrons, the 24th and the 

9th, but as these had not had 

actual battle experience, they 

did little work other than 

perfecting their own training. 

The 91st Aero .Squadron, 

therefore, took care of all of 

the long-range day reconnaissances. 

Four French squadrons 

were organized into a group 

for the regulation of the army 

artillery, which included several regiments of long-range 

guns capable of reaching the 

Metz fortifications. 

A number of bombing 

squadrws belonging to the 

British Independent Air Force 

were also placed at the disposal of the commander in chief 

for the coming offensive. 

This concentration of air 

forces placed under the orders 

of the Air Service commander 

of our 1st Army 701 pursuit 

airplanes, 366 observation airplanes, 323 day bombardment 

airplanes, 91 night bombardment airplanes, a total of 1,481 

airplanes, and gave us the 

largest aggregation of air 

forces that had ever been 

engaged in one operation on 

the western front at any time 

during the entire progress of 

the war. 

The Arizona Balloon Buster (Art by Merv 

Corning) 
38 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Preparritlon 

for the Attack. 

The concentration of forces 

in preparation for an attack is a 

difficult problem. Any marked 

increase of aviation activity is 

sure to be noted instantly and 

to arouse the suspician of the 

enemy, as every airplane approaching the lines is tracked 

both by sight and by sound. 

During the period of our 

intensive preparation road 

circulation was abnormally 

heavy, new gun emplacements were being instaited, 

and new ammunition dumps 

established. It was necessary 

to prevent enemy reconnaissance of our rear areas at all 

cost and this called for much 

activity on the part of our own 

air forces. There was also an 

immense demand by troops 

designaied for the attack for 

photographs permitting a 

minute study of the terrain. 

This too caused an increase of 

our aerial activity, as did the 

registration of batteries on 

sensitive points in thememy’s 

rear areiis. This was to be the 

first major action of the American Army, and the staff, endeavoring to make adequate 

preparation for it, made further demands upon the Air 

Service in the way of visual 

and photographic reconnaissances. 

All of the Air Service units 

assigned to this 1st Army had 

moved into position before 

September 12 and had had 

time to familiarize themselves 

with the country over which 

they were to operate. 

Observation at 

St. Mihiei 

The actual operation of 

wiping out this St. Mihiel 

salient required but four days, 

September 12 to 15. On the 

first three days the weather 

was bad, and while it did not 

prevent all flying, it seriously 

interfered with the air program. Throughout all daylight 

hours whenever it was possible to fly, command airplanes, 

artillery surveillance airplanes, infantry contact patrols, and long-range army 

reconnaissance missions 

were undertaken. 

September 14 was the only 

day when it was possible to 

dispatch photographic missions, the results of which 

were entirely satisfactory. 

Particular credit is due the 

corps and army Air Service 

pilots and observers for their 

gallantry in flying in most 

unfavorable weather, rain, and 

high winds during the St. 

Mihiel operation. The army 

observation penetrated as far 

as 60 kilometers beyond the 

enemy’s front line at a time 

when rain was falling heavily 

and clouds prevented flying at 

an altitude higher than about 

1,000 meters. 

Pursuit at St. Mihiel 

On September 11, the day 

before the battle, and on the 

next two days, our pursuit 

pilots showed the value of fast, 

high-powered, single-seater 

airplanes for missions of visual reconnaissance in unfavorable atmospheric conditions. 

These airplanes could fly at 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

39 

times when it was almost impossible for the biplace machines to take the air, and 

although the pilots had not 

been specially trained in observation, they brought back 

important information of our 

advancing troops. 

These pursuit pilots also 

attacked ground objectives or 

engaged in “ground straffing,” 

as this work came to be called. 

On September 12 American 

and French pursuit airplanes 

found the Vigneulles-St. Benoit Road filled with the enemy’s retreating troops, guns, 

and transport. This road was a 

forced point of passage for 

such of the enemy as were 

endeavoring to escape from 

the point of the salient. All day 

long our pursuit airplanes 

harassed these troops with 

their machine-gun fire, throwing the enemy columns into 

confusion. The airplanes of 

the 3d Pursuit Group, which 

were equipped to carry small 

bombs, did particularly effective work in destroying a 

number of motor trucks on 

this important road. 

This ground straffing was 

effectively continued on September 13 and 14, when good 

targets presented themselves 

on the St. Benoit-Chambley 

and Chambley-Mars-La Tour 

Roads. On September 14 the 

pursuit pilots devoted most of 

their time to the more normal 

work of fighting in the air, 

during which they inflicted 

many casualties on the enemy 

Air Service and gained a 

marked aerial superiority. This 

was a day of good weather. 

Early in themorning it became 

evident that the enemy pursuit 

squadrons had been heavily 

reinforced. At least four new 

enemy organizations were 

positively identified. The enemy pursuit fought persistently 

and tenaciously in an effort to 

cover the German retreat, but 

they were heavily outnumbered and succeeded only 

rarely in approaching the line 

of battle to attack any observation airplanes. They did, however, inflict heavy casualties 

upon our day bombardment 

airplanes, French, English, 

and American, when the latter 

penetrated deep into the enemy’s rear areas. Throughout 

the days of the attack particularly good work was done by 

the American 1st Pursuit 

Group in destroying enemy 

balloons. So well was this 

work done that it is doubtful 

whether the enemy received 

any information at all from his 

balloons on the western side 

of the salient. 

Day Bombing 

at St. Mihiel. 

The weather hampered the 

day bombers throughout the 

battle. Expeditions were dispatched daily, but except on 

September 14 low clouds and 

high winds interfered with 

formation flying and accurate 

bombing. The enemy opposed 

this day bombing with all his 

might, and his use of his 

pursuit airplanes in this 

manner drew them away from 

the line of battle and made 

more easy the work of our 

observation airplanes on their 

all-important missions of 

keeping the higher command 

informed of the progress of 

the battle and thus assisting in 

its favorable development. 

Night Bom bing 

at St. Mihiel. 

While the daylight hours 

during this battle were unusually rainy and foggy, the 

nights were for the most part 

clear. The British Independent 

Air Force cooperating in the 

American attack made nightly 

expeditions to Longuyon, 

Conflans, Metz-Sablons, and 

other pointson the railway line 

which the enemy was using to 

bring up reserves, while the 

French night bombardment 

group, containing one Italian 

squadron, also attacked these 
40 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

points as well as enemy pats 

of command and concentration centers nearer to the 

front. The enemy bombers 

were also very active at night. 

In the absence of any night 

reconnai!ssance squadrons, 

airplanes of the French night 

bombardment group were 

used to lceep watch over the 

enemy’s movements at night 

as well LIS for bombing purposes, arid they greatly aided 

the Intelligence Section of our 

Army Staff. 

Balloonrr at St. Mihiel. 

Under our commend 15 

American and 6 French balloon companies took part in 

this battle. There were approximately 12 enemy balloons 

opposite the American sector. 

The weather conditions during the first two days prevented effective balloon observation, but the biplloon 

companies moved forward 

with the advancing lineandon 

September 14 regulated artillery fire and sent to the different army corps and divisional 

staffs milch important information. During these September days the 21 balloon 

companiies moved forward a 

total disiance of 202 kilometers by straight line measurement. 

Summary of 

Operations at 

St. Mihiel. 

Despite handicaps of 

weather and inexperience, the 

Air Service contributed all in 

its power to the success of this 

St. Mihiel operation. The staff 

was kept informed of developments practically hourly by 

clear and intelligible reports. 

The hostile air forces were 

beaten back whenever they 

could be attacked, the rear 

areas were watched, photographed, and bombed. Our 

airplanes participating in the 

battle, by the material damage 

and confusion which they 

caused, helped to increase the 

total prisoners. 

The Argonne-Meuse 

Offenslve. 

The tactical history of the 

Air Service prior to the Argonne-Meuse offensive is 

largely concerned Ath its 

training. By the end of the St. 

Mihiel offensive, however, it 

was felt at last that the American units then on the front had 

developed into trained combat 

organizations. All grades, 

from individual pilots or observers, had learned much 

from both the French and 

British and had had the invaluable experience of fighting, 

which alone completes the 

training forwar. The American 

Army, having successfully and 

with comparatively small loss 

wiped out the St. Mihiel salient, was now to undertake 

the much more serious task of 

attacking the enemy’s line 

from the Argonne to the 

Meuse, a line which it was of 

vital importance to the enemy 

to hold. During the period 

from September 14 to 26, the 

bulk of the American Army 

had to be transferred to the 

new attack area. To assure the 

essential secrecy was a serious problem for the AirService. The troop movements had 

to be screened from enemy 

aerial observation, yet it was 

desired that no great increase 

in our own aerial activity 

should give to the enemy an 

indication of our battle plans. 

The attack on St. Mihiel had 

drawn there a large part of the 

enemy’s air forces, which had 

been operating in the Conflans-Briey area. On the other 

hand, while the French had 

placed at our disposal some 

742 French airplanes for the 

St. Mihiel battle, nearly threequarters of them were withdrawn before the beginning of 

the Argonne-Meuse offensive. 

The difficulties of close 

cooperation with the other 

arms of the service being fully 

realized, every effort was 

therefore bent toward bringing about a close understanding between the aerial and 

ground troops. 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

41 

Corps Observation. 

The corps observation 

units, on arrival in the newsector, became acquainted with it 

by using French airplanes already in that sector, thus 

avoiding a show of increased 

force. 

During the entire period 

from September 14 to November 11, weather 

tions remained on the 

unfavorable. Low clou 

fog obscured the ground almost every morning and afternoon. Photographic missions 

were sent out, but were instructed to cover only the 

most important points, while 

elaborate preparations were 

made for more extensive work 

whenever the weather would 

permit. 

Pursuit machines flew over 

attack the enemy, they furnished protection which was 

of value. 

Where the weather permitted the missions for Artillery 

surveillance were successful. 

Attempts to make adjustmsnts 

on fugitive targets did not 

succeed so well. The batteries 

were moved frequently and 

communication was difficult. 

The radio work was far below a 

proper standard, and in fact 

nothing but dropped messages, the simplest but slowest of methods, proved successful. 

Visual reconnaissance did 

supply much valuable information. Nothing but the heaviest rain or densest fog was 

permitted to stop these missions by which the corps and 

divisional staffs were kept 

informed of the enemy’s 

movements. During many periods they were the sole 

source of information. Infantry contact patrols increased 

in their efficiency. Instruction 

courses were inaugurated and 

men from Infantry organizations were given a short but 

intensive course in aerial liaison, our pilots and observers 

were sent into the front line, 

Infantry officers were urged to 

visit airdromes and were taken 

up in airplanes. By these 

means and by the wide distribution of educational matter, 

there commenced to develop 

the mutual understanding 

which is the foundation of all 

good cooperation. 

A noticeable departure from 

methods employed in the past 

was the sending out of what 

came to be known among our 

pilots as “Cavalry reconnaissance” patrols. These were 

observation airplanes flying at 

very low altitudes scouring the 

terrain immediately in advance of the Infantry and 

returning to drop messages 

showing the locations of machine-gun nests, strong 

points, or other obstacles in 

the way of our advance. Although not strictly their role, 

such patrols frequently attacked with machine guns the 

enemy’s infantry. 

Army Observatlon. 

During this offensive two 

squadrons of the army observation group were assigned to 

daywork and one to night reconnaissance~.~ Day reconnaissances were mainly visual, missions being dispatched 

as frequently as necessary in 

order to keep the sector under 

constant surveillance. Airplanes penetrated deeply into 

the enemy’s lines, and returned with much information 

of his rear areas. Photographs 

were taken of all railroad 

centers and important points. 

Of particular value were photographs taken, before and 

afterfireon these points bythe 

army artillery, of Montmedy, 

Longwy, Spincourt, Dommary-Baroncourt, and Conflans. Though these important 

stations were protected by 

concentrations of antiaircraft 

artillery and pursuit airplanes, 

they were successfully photographed, allowing our ar- 
42 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

tillery to fire effectively during 

the attack. In addition, the 

group ltept four command 

teams constantly on duty at 

army Air Service heedquarters. These teams wet% called 

upon to perform almokt every 

class of reconnaissance mission, frequently making flights 

at an altitude of not more than 

100 meters. Their wo* proved 

of great valueto thearfnystaff. 

As the great part of enemy 

movements now took placie at 

night, night reconnaissance 

work was of increasing importance. Iin order for this to be 

successful, however, perfect 

conditians of visibility and a 

highly trained personnel are 

essential. Only a few of our 

fliers had as yet become 

sufficiently experienced in 

night recon naissanae and 

weather conditions were rarely favorable. However, OR the 

few nights suitable for observation, much information of 

value was obtained. 

Pursuit. 

Our pursuit, on entgring the 

Argonne-Meuse operation, 

had reached a stage at whkh it 

ranked in efficiency wit 

pursuit aviation of tne 

armies. It now consisted of 

three groups of highly trained 

squadr~ms,~ with pilots second to none. 

The moral effect of an attack 

by air forces upon ground 

troops was fully realized. 

Furthermore it was believed 

that the Germans would use 

their low-flying battle airplanes in considerable 

numbers, to harass our 

ground forces, and also that 

German balloons would be a 

peculiar menace to large concentrations of our troops. It 

was, therefore, decided to 

assign an entire group, the 

first, to the task of combating 

low-flying battle airplanes and 

to the destruction of balloons. 

This proved a wise measure. 

On the first day 10 enemy 

balloons were destroyed and 

the remainder were so constantly attacked that their 

value to the enemy was negligible. Many German battle 

airplanes were also destroyed, with remarkably 

small losses to our own forces. 

Conditions on both sides had 

now reached a stage at which 

it was believed that more enemy airplanes would be destroyed and a greater moral effect produced by using larger 

concentrations at points 

where a study of the enemy’s 

methods indicated he would 

be present. On the first day of 

the offensive, September 26, 

1918, a group sortie was made, 

and resulted in the destruction 

of eight enemy airplanes; a 

second one the same afternoon brought down three 

more. Thereafter, these concentrations were made almost 

daily, weather permitting, the 

hour and place being based on 

the enemy’s probable actions. 

A successful sortie at Bayonville, on October 18, succeeded in bringing 40 enemy 

airplanes into combat. Their 

formation was broken up and 

9 of them destroyed, the remainder escaping to their airdromes. 

Night Pursuit 

A study of pursuit tactics 

would not be complete without reference to the night 

pursuit. Whatever the material 

damage done by night bombing may have been, its moral 

effect was very great. This was 

due in no small part to the 

consciousness of helplessness. The Germansdid littleor 

no day bombing, but did 

considerable night bombing 

and were believed to be preparing for even more extensive efforts. Hence every effort 

was made to combat night 

bombers, and a squadron for 

this purpose was organized 

during the Argonne-Meuse 

~ffensive.~ It had little time in 

which to operate, and was 

seriously handicapped by 

shortage both of material and 

of pursuit pilots experienced 

in night flying. Nevertheless it 

did succeed on two occasions 

in coming into contact with 

! 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

43 

enemy night bombers, and the 

success achieved in a limited 

time led to the belief that the 

night bomber would have 

been compelled in ashort time 

either to modify his operations 

or to adopt an entirely different type of airplane. 

“Ground Straffing.” 

“Ground straffing” having 

proved so efficacious this was 

continued during the Argonne 

offensive, and the enemy’s 

troops were attacked by our 

pursuit airplanes with machine guns and light bombs. 

Our intelligence reports 

showed that a much desired 

effect was obtained, for the 

mere sight of any of our airplanes, no matter of what type, 

caused much confusion 

among the enemy. 

Day Bombing 

The Argonne-Meuse offensive saw a great improvement 

in the work of the day bombardment group.6 The early 

history of day bombardment 

units had been one of heavy 

losses, not alone in our own 

service but in that of our allies. 

Several steps were taken to 

prevent this. The utmost stress 

was laid on gunnery, and 

constant practice soon began 

to have its effect. Formation 

flying was insisted upon, and 

the bombers were taught that 

a tight formation meant safety; 

an airplane that left the formation was almost certain to be 

lost. Objectives now began to 

be attacked by the whole 

group, instead of by a single 

squadron; and better cooperation was secured with pursuit. 

This reduced our own losses 

and increased those of the 

enemy. 

Such is the demoralizing 

effect of bombing, that the 

enemy in an effort to prevent it 

will attack with all hisavailable 

forces and at what ever cost. 

Our own tactics recognized 

this fact. As an example, on 

October 4, Dun-Sur-Meuse 

and Landres St. Georges were 

each hit with a ton and a half of 

bombs. Low clouds afforded 

many pockets for lurking 

enemy pursuit airplanes, and 

our bombers were attacked by 

a group of 30 Fokkers and 

Pfalz. They fell upon our 96th 

Squadron, which was in the 

lead, and which closed in and 

held these enemy pursuit 

airplanes at a distance. Two 
44 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

other bombing squadrons, the 

20th arid the llth, following, 

attacked this enemy pursuit 

from the rear, shooting down 

two of them. Ageneral fight 

then ensued, during which 

and when it was hattest, 30 

Spads of the American 2d 

Pursuit Group, accoirding to 

plan, arrived on schedule time 

and attacked with vigor, The 

enemy, thus trapped, lost 13 

airplanes, while we lost only 1. 

As further proof of the 

efficacy of these tactics, over 

two-thirds of all the enemy 

airplanes shot down during 

this Argonne offensive were 

destroyed by just such concentrations and under similar 

conditions. 

The material effect of these 

bombing raids is also great. In 

one such attack on Bayonville, 

250 enemy troops ware killed 

and 750 wounded. Again these 

raids invariably drew enemy 

pursuit from the rest of the 

front, rendering it saferforour 

corps observation. 

The rnost remarkable concentratilm of air forces during 

this offensive took place in the 

late afttwnoon of October 9, 

when something over 200 

bombing airplanes, about 100 

pursuit airplanes, and 53 triplace machines, after rendezvousing in our rear area, 

passed over theenemy lines in 

two Qchelons. A total of 32 

tons of bombs were dropped 

on the cantonment district 

between La Wavrille and Damvillers, in which locality a 

counterattack had been anticipated throughout the afternoon. This concentration was 

strongly attacked by the enemy, and during the engagement 12 enemy airplanes were 

brought down out of control, 

while only 1 of our own 

airplanes of all this large 

number failed to return.’ 

Balloons. 

Thirteen American balloons 

operated during this offensive. 

They were not inflated until 

the night of September 25, and 

the enemy is believed not to 

have been aware of their 

presence. Of particular note is 

the success that attended the 

maintenance of liaison. The 

balloon companies at all times 

kept pace with the general 

advance, one company covering a record distance of 32 

kilometers in a day, overshelltorn ground. Nevertheless, telephone communication was 

established at each stage and 

information sent in to corps 

and divisions. 

Americans with Royal 

Alr Force, B. E. F. 

The tactical history of American pursuit would be incomplete without reference to 

American pilots and unitswith 

the Royal Air Force. Of the 21 6 

pilots sent to the Royal Air 

Force in the field, someserved 

in British squadrons, but two 

wholly American aero squadrons, the 17th and 148th, 

operated under British wings, 

in all respects on the same 

footing as British units. Still 

others of the pilots trained in 

England, who were intended 

to be employed in the American night bombardment program, were sent to the Independent Force, Royal Air 

Force, and later returned to 

England to act as instructors 

in the American Expeditionary 

Forces school. Confirmed 

casualties inflicted upon enemy aircraft by Americans 

serving with the British totaled 

225, whereas their battle casualties were 71, or a superiority of 3 to 1.8 

The 17th Aero Squadron. 

Organized at Kelly Field, 

May 13, 1917, the 17th Aero 

Squadrong was trained in 

Canada and at Fort Worth, 

Tex. While its future pilots, as 

individuals in British organizations, were completing their 

training with the Royal Air 

Force on the British front, the 

soldier personnel of the 

squadron was divided for 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

45 

training into three flights 

which were attached to units 

of the Royal Air Force in the 

field. Finally, organized as a 

complete squadron, its own 

pilots made their first flights 

over the Dunkirk front on July 

15, 1918. From August 18 to 

September 20, 1918, the 17th 

Aero Squadron was engaged 

at Auxi-le-Chateau with the3d 

Brigade, Royal Air Force, in 

the British drive on Cambrai. 

As the Cambrai front was broken and the line swung rapidly eastward, the squadron 

moved to an airdrome near 

Doullens, from which, under 

the 3d British Army, it carried 

on normal pursuit operations 

and developed to a high state 

aerial bombing by pursuit 

airplanes and “ground strafing.” The squadron completed 

its work with the Royal Air 

Force on October 28, 1918, 

and on November 1, 1918, 

proceeded to join the American 2d Army on the American 

front. The advent of an armistice prevented further service 

over the lines. In itsoperations 

from July 15, 1918, the American 17th Squadron destroyed 

64 confirmed enemy aircraft. 

Twenty-four of its own 

members were battle casualties.lo Its 2,600 hours over the 

lines were variously employed 

in all branches of pursuit 

aviation. Four of itsflvers were 

/ 

decorated with the British 

distinguished flying cross. 

The 148th Aero Squadron. 

The 148th Aero Squadron 

was likewise formed at Kelly 

Field, Tex., on November 11, 

1917. With its complement of 

flyers from Fort Worth, it 

sailed for England in February, 

1918. As with the 17th, the 

English flying schools and the 

squadron to the Royal Air 

Force in the field. It was on 

July 20 that the first flight was 

made by the squadron over 

the lines from thd Cappelle 

airdrome near Dunkirk. The 

officers of the squadron were 

not those who had accompanied it overseas, but were 

other American flyers trained 

1 flying officers were sent to 

f 

,#J 

Capt. Field E. Kindley left the RAF in May 

1918 and joined the 148th Aero Squadron 

as a Night commander. He is credited with 

shootrng down 11 enemy aircraft. 
46 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

in England who had already 

been enjgaged in war flying 

with the British. After three 

weeks of preliminary work on 

the Nieuport-Ypres front, the 

148th Squadron was sent to 

the British 4th Army operating 

from Albert to Roye, and 

shortly began its share in the 

drive on Cambrai. The dropping of 20-pound bombs on 

the retre,ating enemy became 

a daily feature of the squadron’s work, as did the use of 

machine-gun fire against 

ground targets. The squadron 

advanced with the British and 

was enginged in all actions in 

its sector. During the bitterly 

contested retreat of the enemy, the ‘148th advanced from 

Albert to the Canal-do-Nord, 

thence lto Le Cateau, and 

finally to Le Quesnoy. With the 

17th SqiJadr0n,lt it was ordered to ithe American front on 

October 28th. The two squadrons proceeded to Toul, but 

were not again engaged in 

active operations before the 

signing of the armistice. In the 

course of its work the 148th 

American Squadron destroyed 66 (confirmed)12 enemy aircraft. In accomplishing 

this it suffered but 11 casualties. In (111 2,100 hours were 

spent over the enemy lines in 

offensive patrols, low bombing and “strafing” raids, and 

attacks on balloons. Three of 

its members were decorated 

with the British distinguished 

flying cross and one with the 

distinguished service cross. 

The individual pilots with 

British squadrons and the two 

American squadrons serving 

with the Royal Air Force were 

all many times Commended by 

the officers of the Royal Air 

Force under whom they 

served directly and also by the 

General Officer commanding 

the Royal Air Force in the 

Field.l3 

American Pilots on Italian 

Front. 

Of the American pilots 

trained in Italy, 65 served 

gallantly with Italian squadrons on the Italian front and 17 

others had been assigned to 

the Italian naval station at 

Foggia-Renatico for operations against Austrian submarine bases. They were all 

commended most highly by 

the officers under whom they 

served. 

Honors and Awards. 

Of the Air Service officers 

and soldiers who took part in 

active operations while members of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, 

 individual^'^ were decorated 

or cited for great gallantry 

displayed in action against the 

enemy, and the total number 

of decorations and citations 

awarded was 611.15 One officer received the congressional medal of honor.16 The 

American distinguished service cross was awarded to 235 

individuals, of which number 

41 were also awarded the oak 

leaf Four individuals 

were cited in American orders. 

Two individuals received the 

British distinguished service 

cross and 20 the British distinguished flying cross.18 Thirtynine persons were awarded 

the French Legion of Honor, 5 

the medaille militaire, 158 the 

croix de guerre (and of these8 

individuals were each cited a 

second time); eight individuals became entitled to wear 

the fourragere, and 149 Americans (4 of whom twice 

received this honor) were 

awarded French citations.’S Of 

the Americans serving with 

the Italians, six received the 

corona d’ltalia, one the medaglia d’oro al valor militare 

(gold medal of valor), two the 

medaglia d’argento al valor 

militare (silver medal of valor),2o and 41 the croce di 

guerra. Thirteen Belgian decorations were bestowed upon 

Legion of Honor 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

47 

Air Service officers, 2 Roumanian, 1 Serbian, 2 Montenegrin, and 1 Chinese.21 

General Remarks 

in the Light of Experience. 

Nothing but actual experience in battle can complete 

the training of any armed 

force. The first active operations in which such a force 

takes part always brings to 

light deficiencies from a tactical point of view. This waatrue 

in our own case, but the more 

largely so because of our 

failure to prepare for war until 

war was actually upon us. In 

addition to this greatest of all 

causes for our deficiencies, 

there were other points so 

clearly brought out that it 

seems well to mention those 

for which remedies exist. 

The Air Service 

a Combat Arm. 

There was throughout our 

experience a marked tendency on the part of commanders 

of the larger ground units and 

their staffs to regard the air 

force as a staff service rather 

than as a combat arm. There 

was lack of knowledge of the 

best ways in which to use this 

new arm, and too little regard 

was paid to the local tactical 

situation and to the necessity 

for the combined employment 

of the air force and all other 

combatant arms. While the air 

forces assigned to tactical 

organizations are entirely 

under the orders of the division, corps, and army commanders, in many cases this 

command was not fully exercised. This was due, of course, 

to lack of experience with this 

newest of all arms, and the 

remedy is obvious. In the 

future it will be essential forall 

commanding officers and 

their staffs to possess knowledge of the limitations and 

possibilities of their air forces 

just as they know what, for 

example, their artillery can or 

can not do. The Air Service 

may well originate and suggest employment for its units, 

but the final decision rests 

upon the commanding general of the tactical organization 

to which they are assigned, 

and to regard the air forces as 

separate and distinct from the 

other component parts of this 

organization is to sacrifice the 

cohesion and unity of effort 

which alone distinguish an 

army from a mob. 

In the Air Service as well 

there was lack of knowledge of 

the capabilities of the other 

arms with which it was associated. This was due likewise 

to the newness of the air force 

and to the fact that there had 

not been time for air and 

ground troops to become 

thoroughly acquainted with 

each other. 

In all future training provision must be made for Air 

Service officers to learn the 

work of other arms, and particularly for aerial observers 

there must be a sufficient 

amount of General Staff training which will render of great 

value the reports which they 

must submit. Acting as the 

eyes of the Army and making 

reports upon which weighty 

decisions will be based, these 

observers must be trained so 

that their reports will be accurate and will contain the facts 

of real importance. 

Mobliity. 

Many of the conditions 

which existed during the period of trench warfare and fairly stabilized conditions were 

greatly modified or ceased to 

exist with the coming of a war 

of movement. In this latter 

phase mobility is of the greatest importance and the ability 

of the air force to move, like 

that of all other arms, depends 

upon an adequate supply of 

transportation. It is a fact that 

the efficiency of the air forces 

was greatly lessened by reason of the lack of sufficient 

transportation. This same lack 

existed throughout the Army, 

but attention is called to it here 

because it is believed that the 
48 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

necessity for rapid movement 

on the part of air forces and 

their dependence upon transportatiori make it essential 

that sufficient should be furnished. 

Difficulties and 

Delays in Forming an 

Air Service. 

Again owing to the many 

technical problems which had 

to be solved, to the many difficulties connected with the 

procurement of equipment 

which had to be overcome, 

and to the considerable time 

that it takes for training, it has 

been shown that it requires 

longer to place an efficient Air 

Service in the field than is the 

case with any other arm of the 

Service. In all planning for the 

future this fact must be given 

full consideration. 

Night Reconnaissance 

and Night Pursuit. 

During the war just ended 

the extreme importance of 

night reconnaissance and of 

night pursuit work was little 

realized until the spring of 

1918. In future wars these two 

methods will be of increasing 

importance and in time of 

peace every effort should be 

made for their development. 

All experience has shown that 

it has become increasingly 

dangerous to move ground 

troops during the day and that 

most large movements will 

take place at night. Plansmust 

be made for night reconnaissance by aircraft in order that 

such movements may be detected and interrupted. 

Day Bombing. 

The importance of bombing 

operations has been mentioned. While the material 

damage done by such bombing raids has been questioned, and while it has been 

proved that in many cases 

such damage was not great, 

there is absolutely no doubt 

I I 

i- - - 6.d - - 1 
St. Mihiel and 

Argonne-Meuse 

49 

that the moral effect of these 

operations is most considerable, and it must be borne in 

mind at all times that armies 

are defeated not by absolutely destroying them but by the 

destruction of their morale. 

“Ground Strafflng.” 

The attack by aircraft upon 

ground troops, using machine 

guns and small bombs, 

showed clearly that this has a 

most demoralizing effect. 

When properly employed, this 

aid from the sky in assisting 

during an attack by our own 

troops or in repelling an attack 

or counterattack by the enemy 

greatly raises the morale of 

our own forces and much 

hampers the enemy. It wlll be 

well to specialize in this 

branch of aviation and to 

provide squadrons or groups 

with armored airplanes provided wiith a number of machine guns and small bombs 

for just such work against 

ground objectives. LacMng 

such specially prepared airplanes, we did employ Our 

pursuit airplanes in this Way, 

and at tirnes even our obsesvation airplanes joined in such 

attacks upon enemy infantry. 

Just before hostilities ceased 

it had been decided by the Air 

Service to organize a number 

of such battle squadrons and 

sample airplanes had been 

equipped and armed for their 

use. This project should be 

thoroughly developed in the 

future. 

Shortage of 

Staff Officers. 

In common with the rest of 

our forces the Air Service 

suffered from a shortage of 

properly qualified staff officers, and this too must be 

borne in mind in all plans for 

future development. 

Sptendld Morale of 

Air Service Personnel. 

There must be made some 

mention of the excellent morale of both flying and nonflying personnel with the Air 

Service. The skill of our flyers, 

the aggressive spirit displayed 

by both pilots and observers 

were beyond praise. These 

men asked only to fly and to 

fight. On the ground the nonflying personnel with squadrons at the front were untiring in their efforts to keep the airplanes in the air. They 

worked with great spirit and 

marked efficiency. Back from 

the front, at the training tenters, at the production center, 

at depots and other stations, 

officers and men gave the best 

that was in them, worked 

whole-heartedly and intelligently; no man spared himself, 

and all strove for the common 

end-to make the Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Fortes, count for something in the 

struggle in which our entire 

Army was taking part. 
50 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 
IV. Eadq Przobfems 

an6 Tbek Solutions, 

51 

Seventeen Months 

of Achievement. 

When, in April, 1917, the 

United States declared war on 

Germany, the Air Service of 

the American Army, then 

called the Aviation Section, 

Signal Corps, had a strength 

of only 65 officers and about 

actual battle fronts, nor were 

any airplanes of this type 

being manufactured in the 

United States. There was no 

existing foundation of practical experience or knowledge 

upon which could be based 

plans for the development of 

an overseas force and for the 

placing of an aerial army in the 

air. 

Seventeen months later, on 

November 11, 1918, in the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces, there were 

7,738 officers' and 70,769 

men, of whom 6,861 officers 

and 51,229 men were in 

France (of this number 

and the remainder training 

and fighting in Italy. 

There were being operated 

26 training schools3 for pilots 

and observers, and in addition 

American officers were being 

trained in three schools operated by our allies. From the 

training schools on November 

11, 1918,4 there had been 

graduated 1,674 fully trained 

pilots and 851 observers. 

There had been sent to the 

front 1,402 pilots and 769 

observers. These schools 

were being operated with 

greater and greater efficiency, 

as evidenced by the fact that 

between November 11, 1918, 

and January 1, 1919, there 

were graduated 675 pilots and 

357 observers. 

From the balloon school 

there had been graduated a 

total of 199 officers and 623 

enlisted men, specialized, who 

were taught the operation of 

balloon winches, lookout 

work, machine gunnery, and 

radio ope rat ion. 

The development of the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces, during the 

time we were in this war was 

the result of much effort 

during which delays and technical difficulties were being 

overcome. It is proposed to 

give a brief account of the way 

in which the problems were 

met and solved. 

Prewar Information. 

Shortly before the declaration of war five officers of 

the Aviation Section, Signal 

Corps, had been sent to Europe. One was an observer, 

one was in the office of a 

military attach6, and three 

were flying ~tudents.~ Owing 

to theshort time they had been 

on this duty they had been 

unable to send to the United 

States much information of 

real value. 

Developments in 

Washington, and the First 

Program. 

To collect data, to coordinate the interests of the United 

States, and to provide for the 

production of aviation material, the Aircraft Production 

Board of the Council of National Defense began its work 

in Washington in May, 1917, 

just after the arrival of military 

missions sent by the French 

and British, which brought 

with them certain information 

concerning the character of 

the aviation equipment 

needed. A cable had been 

received from the premier of 

France in which he urged the 

United States to form a flying 

force of 4,500 airplanes to be 

on the front during the campaign of 1918. This program, it 

was stated, would necessitate 

5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics and require 2,000 

airplanes and 4,000 engines to 

be constructed monthly in 

American factories. The Aviation Section of the Signal 
52 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Corps and the Aircraft Production Board adopted the 

program contained in this 

cablegram, and it was subsequently approved by the Oenera1 Staff in Washington and 

became the basis of the whole 

development of American military aviation. The Joint Army 

and Navy Technical Aircraft 

Board in Washington was 

called upon to determine the 

number of airplanes which 

should be produced for this 

force. lit reported that for 

service use on the front 12,000 

airplanes and 24,000 engines 

would be necessary. 

Creation of the Air Qewlce, 

American Expeditionary 

Forces. 

Shortlly after ,his appointment, the Commander in 

Chief of the American’ Expeditionary Forces6 appointed 

Maj. T. IF. Dodd, A. S. S. C., as 

aviation officer, American Expeditionary Forces, and a 

member of his staff. 

Upon his arrival in France in 

June, 1917, Lieut. Col. William 

Mitchelll, A. S. S. C., ope of the 

five officers previously mentioned as being on duty in 

Europe succeeded Mtaj. bodd 

as aviation officer. The aviation activities were at once 

separated from Signal Corps 

control, henceforth the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces, was considered an organization on a 

footing similar to that of other 

combat arms of the Service. 

First Air Program, 

American Expeditionary 

Forces. 

The Commander in Chief 

instructed his staff to prepare 

at once a program for the 

American Expeditionary Forces. The result of this work was 

the general organization project, approved July 11, 1917, 

and intended to be merely a 

preliminary draft outlining the 

desired tactical organization 

of the overseas forces. This 

project provided for only 59 

Air Service squadrons to ballance the then proposed number of ground troops. Later it 

was learned that the United 

States had adopted an Air 

Service program as proposed by the French, 4,500 

airplanes on the front during 

the campaign of 1918. This 

number was the equivalent of 

about 260 aero squadrons, 

and in order to conform to the 

United States plan, the additional 201 squadrons were 

included in what was known 

as “The service of the rear 

project,” approved by the 

Commander in Chief, September 18,1917. This program 

also included additional balloon companies in accordance with recommendations 

received from the French 

general headquarters. 

Growing Difficulties of 

Liaison Between Europe 

and America. 

It soon became apparent in 

Washington that questions 

concerning types of equipment to be manufactured and 

the materials required must be 

studied first-hand in Europe. It 

was essential to secure samples of the types of aeronautic 

equipment to be manufactured in the United States and 

all necessary technical data, 

much of which had never been 

committed to paper and which 

could be found only among 

those actually engaged in 

such work. Serious questions 

arose with respect to royalties 

demanded by the European 

Governments on behalf of 

their citizens who were inventors or owners of special 

processes and devices. 

Without careful study on the 

ground it was obviously impossible to determine just 

what would be the requirements of a production program, what should be built in 

Europe, what in America, the 

assistance the United States 

could render the Allies or 

receive from them, the opportunity for training American 

personnel in European 

schools, or the relative priority 

of the vcjrious demands made 

by the Allies upon the United 

States. 
Problems and Solutions 53 

Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William ("Billy") 

Mitchell. 

Ma/. Raynal C. Bolling, head of 

aeronautical mission. 

Work of the Aeronautical 

Mission. 

In order that all these matters might be investigated with 

accuracy and dispatch, the 

aeronautical mission of the 

Aircraft Production Board was 

sent to Europe in June, 1917, 

under the charge of Maj. R. C. 

Bolling, S. 0. R. C. This rnission included 2 flying officers of the Army, 2 officers 

of the Navy, a number of 

industrial expert^,^ and 93 

skilled mechanics and factory 

experts whom it was intended 

to place in factories for the 

purpose of securing first-hand 

practical information regarding methods of manufacture 

which could not be readily 

embodied in plansand specifications. 
54 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

This mission made a thorough canvass of the production situation in England, 

France, ,and Italy. The principal matters with which it dealt 

during the first few months 

were the principle of free 

exchange between the Allies 

and for the duration of the war 

of the rights to manufactureall 

classes of aeronautic material; 

the rapid transmission to the 

United States of sample airplanes, engines, and accessories, with data neces$ary for 

their production; the collection of general information 

needed lor American producers; the choice of types of 

aircraft to be produced in the 

United States; the possibility 

of purchlasing aviation material in ElJrOpe; the assistance 

the United Statescould giveto 

the Air Services of the Allies 

including the allocation of raw 

materials; the possibility of 

sending personnel for training 

in Europe; and the coordination and standardization of 

aircraft production in all Allied 

countries, with the consequent elimination of obsolete 

types wherever manufactured. 

This rieronautical mission 

performe#d invaluable work in 

gathering and transmltting to 

the United States essential 

information and in bringing 

together more closely than 

had hitherto been the case the 

Air Services of Italy, England, 

and France on questions concerning the production and 

allotment of material. 

Procurement of Material. 

The studies of this mission 

early convinced its members 

that no matter how optimistic 

were the promises of production in the United States, 

nothing in the way of finished 

and satisfactory aviation material could be expected to 

arrive in Europe from the 

United States before about 

July, 1918. This meant that the 

Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, in order to 

participate in the spring campaign of 1918 must obtain 

elsewhere its necessary 

equipment. 

A contract with the French, 

known as the agreement of 

August 30,1917, was prepared 

and signed by the French Air 

Ministry and the Commander 

in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces. This contract 

provided that the French 

Government would deliver to 

the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, by June 1, 

1918, 5,000 airplanes and 

8,500 engines. On its part, the 

United States was to furnish 

by November 1, 1917, certain 

specified tools and materials 

needed for the fulfillment of 

the French obligation. It provided also that the airplanes 

and engines to be furnished by 

February 1, 1918, would be 

supplied even though the 

United States should be unable to deliver on schedule 

time, its quota of materials and 

tools. It was upon the provisions of this agreement that 

the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, planned 

its program of training and of 

putting squadrons in the field. 

Motor Mechanics Return to 

United States. 

Small squads of the mechanics who had accompanied this mission were sent 

back to the United Statesfrom 

time to time, carrying to the 

Aircraft Production Board the, 

lessons they had learned and 

valuable samples of aeronautical material. Eighteen of 

these men were later examined and commissioned in the 

Air Service. 

Development of 

the Organization, 

The magnitude of the problem confrontin 

enlarge the organization. Col. 

William Mitchell, still with his 

title of aviation officer, Ameri- 
Problems and Solutions 55 

Allies and of the United States. 

This Iorganization, with one 

sponsibility. General 

No. 26, Headquarters 

can Expeditionary 

August 28, 1917, a 

Col. (later Maj. Gen. 

L. Kenly, then of the 

cer, American Expeditionary 

Chief of Air Service 

Expeditionary For 

(later Col.) Boiling 

in charge of the A 

Lines ot Communic 

the title of Assistan 

vance, were moved to Chaumont, where were established 

the headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Early Work in 

the Zone of Advance. 

During the early autumn of 

1917 the work in the Zone of 

Advance consisted chiefly of 

making plans and projects for 

1st Aero Squadron, which had 

arrived in Europe on September 1, 1917, and after a 

period of training at Avord had 

been located at Amanty, near 

the 1st Corps School. 

The main problems at the 

front were therefore the preparation of organization projects, the selection of suitable 

sites for airdromes and supply 

depots, and the study of Air 

Service tactics and strategy. 

These studies were madefirsthand with the Fren 

British Air Services 

connection with the operations of their ground troops. 

First Air Depot. 

The constructi 

would need such a depot as a 

receiving and - distributing 

point for personnel, material, 

supplies in general, and as a 

site for shops for engine, 

airplane, and motor transport 

repairs which were not serious 

enough to require shipment 

further to the rear. At this 

locality there would also be 

covered 185,977 

square feet, but this authorization was increaeed in September, 1918, to 587,293 

square feet, of which by November 11, 1918, 357,363 

square feet had been completed. 

Problems of the Rear 

Schools and Training. 

The task of the Assistant 

Chief of Air Service Lines of 

Communication was the making of all preparations for 

placing the fighting units at 

the front and the providing for 

their training, theirequipment, 

and their maintenance. This 

was a huge and complex 

undertaking which necessitated great foresight and much 

organizing ability. The fall of 

191 7 was occupied particularly with the establishment of 

schools and training centers 

sufficient in number and ca- 
56 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Lafayette Escadrille hangars at Ham 

airdrome 

Officers of the 103d Aero Squadron 

formerly oi the Escadrille receive 

decorations 
slualqoid pue suo!gnlog LS 
58 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

pacity to provide for trainlng 

Air Service personnel, flying 

and noriflying. The known 

lack of training machines and 

other essentials in Aimerica 

made it improbable that the 

United States could produce 

before Jenuary 1, 1918, more 

than 500 pilots, and these with 

no mow than preliminary 

training. To meet the immediate emerlgency, it was necessary to take advantage of 

schools already established 

by the Alllies. As early 6s June 

26, 1917, cables were 

the United States cal 

cadets who were there 

flying training to be $ent to 

Europe to be trairled in 

French, English, and I 

schools. ‘The officers oft 

Aero Squadron and, 

other flying officers as could 

be spared from ad 

or technical duties we 

to French finishing sc 

Training Section in ch 

all this iristruction 

nized. Three training 

were imrriediately sta 

site at lssoudun 

mended by the French military 

mission lo the United Stms 

was accepted, and during the 

latter pait of July, 1917, the 

construction of a center for groups have been comadvanced flying tralning was manded by former Lafayette 

begun. A French school al- flyers,* and this corps proready in operation at Tours vided usalso with aconsiderawas taken over about Novem- bl er of squadron comber 1, 1917, with the intention m flight commanders, 

of using it for preliminary a rienced instructors. 

training. Later this developed 

into an important center for Soldler Personnel. 

The Pafayette 

Flying Corps. 

aviation. Three of our 

cases had to assist in their 
Problems and Solutions 59 

cdhuction. Two hundred 

mechanics were placed in 

seven French ai 

ries rear Paris, 

served until Janu 

There were a 

French aviation fields 475 

soldiers, the nucleus of a 

much larger number which it 

was irtended temp 

for instruction to 

French schools in 

to the! number of 

flyers being trained therein. 

An important agreement 

was made with England on 

December 5, 1917, whereby a 

total of 15,000 mechanics 

were to be kept in Erqland 

under instruction, and inaddition a total of 6,200 laborers 

were lo be assigned to temporary duty in that country. It 

was provided that these mechanics would be withdrawn 

for service in France when 

other untrained personnel was 

sent from the United Stas to 

Technical Section 

Organized. 

A Technical Section of the 

Air Service was organized? It 

was to secure and compile 

technical information from 

every possible source. This 

section was also charged with 

the responsibility for recommending the types of airplanes, engines, motor cars, 

photographic and wireless 

appliances, and all other apparatus and equipment to be 

purchased in Europe gr produced in the United States. 

Liaison Section. 

In accordance with the 

orders of the Chief of Air Service that all negotiations with 

the air ministries of allied 

Governments should be carried on by the Assistant Chief 

of the Air Service, Lines of 

Communication, a Liaison 

Section was established in 

November, 1917, which sooner or later acted as an intermediary in all questions of supply 

from foreign sources.10 

Search for Material. 

The European markets were 

canvassed and such material 

as would serve our purpose 

was ordered. This included 

airplanes for service an 

ing purposes, trucks, and automobiles, hangars, and innumerable articles of equipment, instruments, and 

accessories. 

Recommendation of 

Airplanes-DH-4. 

In order to hasten the time 

when materials produced in 

America would be available, it 

was necessary to gather and 

forward to the United States 

all possible information on 

allied Air Services and the 

equipment used by them and 

to make recommendations 

concerning the various types 

of airplanes, armament, motor-transport equipment, and 

accessories to be put into 

production in the United 

States for use overseas. This 

called for much study and the 

exercise of good judgment on 

the part of the members of the 

aeronautical mission. Its first 

recommendation was that the 

DH-4 airplane be built in the 

United States. In the spring 

and summer of 1917 this 

machine, equipped with the 

Eagle Rolls-Royce engine, 

had been tried on the British 

front, where its performance 

in speed and altitude and in 

climbing ability surpassed 

that of other airplanes then in 

use over the lines.11 
60 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

It was believed that this 

airplane, with the Liberty engine, of greater horsepower 

and lighter than the Eagle 

Rolls, would be satisfactory 

for our use. Assurance was received from the United States 

that the firstof these machines 

would be delivered in Europe 

by January, 1918. As a matter 

of fact, the first deliveries in 

quantity of these machines in 

Europe were not made until 

June and July, 1918, and by 

that time the supremacy of the 

DH-4 had been partially lost. 

This is an illustration of one of 

the difficulties always encountered in recommending any 

type of aircraft for production 

and for future use. If the type 

chosen is merely in the experimental stage it may turn out to 

be entirely unsuited for the 

purpose it was to serve; if it has 

passed beyond this stage and 

proven ot value by actual use 

at the front, so rapid is the 

development that by the time it 

could be produced in the 

United States and delivered in 

Europe it may have been rendered obsolete by improved 

machines. 

Recommendation of 

Pursuit Machines. 

These facts apply with 

marked emphasis to the second instance, the recommendation that no single-seater 

machines should be built in 

the United States for serviceat 

the front. The improvement in 

pursuit airplanes was so rapid 

that few types retained their 

superiority for more than six 

months. In the summer of 

1917, the Spad with the 150 

Hispano-Suiza engine had 

been in use for nearly a year, 

but although it still held first 

place among single-seaters, 

its supremacy was threatened 

by the Spad Monocoque with 

the 160-horsepower Gnome 

Monosoupape engine. This 

airplane was, however, still in 

an experimental stage, and 

though it was reasonably 

certain that the Spad would 

ultimately be displaced, it was 

by no means sure what would 

supersede it. The HispanoSuiza Co. had increased the 

power of their engine to 180 

and even to 220 horsepower. 

The former did not give a 

sufficiently great increase in 

performance and the 220 

horsepower was not at that 

time fully perfected. Of all 

single-seater types then being 

tried it seemed that the Spad 

Monocoque would be the 

machine of 1918. 

To those charged with the 

selection of machines to be 

produced in the United States, 

it was plain that none of the 

pursuit type could be built in 

time to insure that they would 

not be out of date when 

actually placed in service on 

the western front. 

The Allies took this same 

view and made urgent and 

persistent recommendations 

that the building of singleseaters be not attempted in the 

United States, while they 

promised to supply the Air 

Snad VII. 









70 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOI. I 

sufficient material for the 

enlargement it might be able 

to realize. The concluding of 

this agreement proved the 

turning point in the history of 

American aviation supply 

questions in France and laid 

the foundation of the supply 

for our efforts at the front. 

Development of the 

Balloon Program. 

Fortunately for the Balloon 

Section of the Air ServicePthe 

balloon industry in France had 

been well developed through 

the previous 10 years, and 

there were available industrial 

facilities for the production of 

captive balloons and the necessary access0 ri es. Contracts 

were placed for such material 

with the French in September, 

1917, and there had also been 

drawn up for the Balloon Section a sound production program of material to be manufactured in the United States. 

The organized training and 

equipment for the Balloon 

Section therefore progressed 

steadily and with a minimum 

amount of difficulty compared 

with like problems in the Heavier-than-Air Service. 

One of the chief difficulties 

of the Balloon Section wasthe 

procurement of sufficient hydrogen and gas, and it became 

necessary to draw upon the 

United States for approximately 1,500 tons of ferrosilicon and 238 tons of caustic 

soda. Special apparatus, such 

as winches and tenders, did 

not arrive from the United 

States in the quantities expected, and this compelled us 

to call upon the French for 

such equipment,-although a 

lack of raw materials for its 

production caused a shortage 

never quite made up until 

hostilities ceased. 

Free balloon with parachute: parachute is 

attached to the balloon during ascent 

(left); ready to drop (center); off balloon 

(rightJ. 
71 

New Chlief of 

Air Servlce. 

By General Order 81, G. H. 

Q., A. E. IF., May 29,1918, Brig. 

Gen. (laier Maj. Gen.) Mason 

M. Patrick was announced as 

Chief of Air Service, American 

Expeditionary Forces. 

Problems. 

By this; date the program for 

the ground troops of the 

American Expeditionary Forces had been greatly enlarged 

and it hecame necessary to 

employ lrhe small number8 of 

Air Service personnel in such 

a way as to maintain in operation the inumerous Air Service 

establishments. The deveiopment of ,the production center 

at Romorantin was pressed to 

the utmost. The acceptance 

park which had been established a't Orly near Paris was 

enlarged; the completion of 

the aviation instruction center 

at Issoudun was hastened, as 

it soon became apparent that 

the expected fully trained 

personnel would not arrive 

from the United States in time 

and that this instruction center 

would be required to train 

large numbers of flying officers needed to meet the Air 

Service program. Another 

grave question was the procurement of sufficient aerial 

observers to meet the needs of 

the increased number of 

American divisions to be 

placed at the front. 

202-Squadron Program 

The most pressing problem 

at this time was the balancing 

of the Air Service program 

with the enlarged program for 

ground troops. The rate at 

which such ground troops 

arrived from the United States 

had been greatly increased by 

the utilization of British tonnage which had been made 

available after the opening of 

the enemy offensive in the 

spring of 1918, and a corresponding change in the Air 

Service program was imperative. Instead of being composed of one army of five 

corps the American Expeditionary Forces was now to be a 

much larger body. At the same 

time while the shipment of 

ground troops from theunited 

States was proceeding at this 

increased rate the sending of 

Air Service personnel was 

absolutely stopped for some 

months. A balanced Air Service program to correspond to 

this increase and at the same 

time to develop on the front an 

Air Service in proportion to the 

number of divisions, corps, 

and armiesthen contemplated 

was sent by the chief of staff, 

American Expeditionary Forces, to the Chief of Air Service 

on July 29,1918. From the Air 

Service point of view, however, the delays already experienced in procurement of 

material and in the arrival of 

personnel made it imperative 

that the original Air Service 

program must be decreased 

rather than increased. 

The Commander in Chief 

realized fully the existing 

conditions and that the Air 

Service could not carry out the 

enlarged program, and therefore approved a modification 

which covered the formation 

of observation squadrons to 

meet the requirements of the 

artillery and infantry and of 

only 60 pursuit, 14 daybombardment, and 27 nightbombardment squadrons. 

This revised program submitted by the Chief of Air 

Service, August 16, 1918, and 
72 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

approved on August 17,1918, 

became known as the “202- 

squadron program” and was 

based upon the very best 

estimates then obtainable of 

the total number of squadrons 

which might with great effort 

be placed on the front by the 

end of June, 1919. It was 

formulated after consideration of the programs which 

each of the Allies expected to 

carry out by that date. It was 

also based upon a very careful 

estimate of the matenial which 

could be secured as indiated 

by the production probabilities in the United Stiates and 

known conditions in fhefactories in France and England. 

The opinion that the personnel to carry out this program 

would be available was 

founded upon cable advices 

earlier received from the 

United States indicating what 

would be available for sending overseas. 

It was thoroughly realized 

that the Commander in Chief 

and the authorities in the 

United States wished to place 

on the western front the largest and the most efficient Air 

Service which cauld be 

equipped and maintained. 

Continued Problem 

of Personnel. 

The deficiency of commissioned and enlisted personnel 

previously emphasized was at 

all times a serious matter. 

Priority had been granted to 

the Air Service for approximately 7,500 men per month 

from November, 1917, and 

cables from the United States 

indicated that such numbers 

would be sent, but this personnel did not arrive. After March 

21,1918, thedateonwhichthe 

enemy broke through the 

allied front, a practical embargo was placed upon sending 

from the United States of any 

other than Infantry and machine guns, which absolutely 

stopped the coming of Air 

Service personnel. 

It was impossible to draw 

upon the mechanics trained in 

England, as this same embargo prevented the sending of 

untrained men to take their 

places. One result of this lack 

of much-needed men was the 

inability even to maintain 

existing Air Service establishments in operation at full 

capacity, while their enlargement and the undertaking of 

new projects was an absolute 

impossibility. The Air Service 

training centers planned and 

under construction would 

need, to operate at full capacity, not less than 11,000 enlisted men. Since these men 

themselves had to be trained, 

results of any magnitude 

could not be expected until 

after a lapse of from five to six 

months from the time of commencing operations at these 

centers. The Air Service program at the front had contemplated active operation on a 

considerable scale by July 1, 

1918. This meant that on 

January 1, 1918, there should 

have been available for work at 

the schools alone at least 

10,000 men. On that date there 

were, however, in the whole 

Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, only 5,600 

enlisted men and these were 

nearly all entirely untrained. 

The imperative need of men 

for work in the Zone of Advance and at the supply depots continually decreased 

the small number of squadrons available for service at 

the schools. Issoudun, which 

should have had not less than 

6,000 men in February, 1918, 

was in that month reduced to 

2,700, and this number could 

not be increased beyond 3,700 

until August, 1918. 

The arrival of even 10,000 

men in the early spring of 191 8 

would have advanced the Air 

Service program on the front 

by approximately four 

months, but it was not until the 

late summer that the arrival of 

Air Service troops in France in 

considerable numbers actually commenced. 
Expansion 73 

Mobilization of PersonnelCoordin stion Staff. 

The distribution of these 

squadroris to their ultimete 

destinations in what was now 

called thle Services of Supply 

(S. 0. S), or in the Zone of 

Advance needed careful regulation in order that the real 

necessities at each station 

should he met in the fullest 

measure possible. The mobilization of these squadrons 8nd 

their distribution was first 

handled by the Personnel 

Section, Air Service, and later 

by what was called the Coordination Staff,' created to provide a central body to assure a 

thorough understanding and 

complete! accord among all Air 

Service activities, excepting 

actual combat operations in 

the Zone of Advance, to balance the needs of the different 

sections, to provide for the 

proper allocation of available 

personnol, and as a center of 

information concerning all Air 

Service matters. This staff 

developed plans which were 

carried out up to the date 

when hosti I it ies ceased. Al I 

sections of the Air Service 

made their requests for personnel 10 this staff, which 

secured notification of the 

dates of 'arrival in France of all 

Air Service units, and was 

responsilole that the necessary 

orders were prepared in advance so that there might be 

no delay in the movement of 

these troops after their disembarkation. 

As it was found that the 

arriving squadrons were unbalanced, many of their men 

not having been trade tested, 

practically all of them were 

sent to St. Maixent, where 

there had been established a 

concentration post for Air 

Service troops, and where 

facilities had been created for 

trade testing and completing 

the organization and equipment of all squadrons before 

sending them to their destinations. This staff kept itself 

informed daily of the progress 

of the work at St. Maixent and 

kept constant track of the 

movements of all Air Service 

personnel throughout the 

American Expeditonary Forces. It was also responsible for 

the assembly at proper times 

and places of all of the equipment intended for the squadrons going to the front, and for 

its delivery to the squadron 

supply officers, and in general 

for the regulation of the movements of all personnel and 

equipment so that the mlnimum delay would be experienced. 

In addition, this staff made 

calculations of the personnel 

and material required to meet 

each part of the entire Air 

Service program. It maintained records of Air Service 

development, of the capacity 

of Air Service establishments, 

and of the demands made 

upon them. Its Accountability 

Division was charged with a 

systematic inspection of Air 

Service projects under development. The Plans and Progress Division was responsible for the provision of data for 

proposed development. 

Weekly progress reports covering all Air Service activities 

were prepared and issued. 

Executive Section. 

The Executive Section2 succeeded to the duties of the 

Coordination Staff on November 4, 1918. When the 

process of liquidation became 

necessary, after November 11, 

1918, the valuation of all Air 

Service property was done by 

this section. 

Personnel Section. 

The Personnel Section3 

dates from July 23, 1917. Its 

duties, although on a smaller 

scale, may well be compared 

to those of the adjutant general ofthe American Expeditionary Forces. Upon it have 

devolved the maintenance of 

complete records of all personnel of the Air Service, the 

issuance of orders to such 
74 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

personnet, and other duties 

necessary in the distribution 

of all Air Service forces During the first months Of its 

operation it was also charged 

with recruiting in Paris, examining over 500 applicants 

from the American Ambulance and other American 

activities in France. The Air 

Service post office was likewise at first a branch of this 

Personnel Section. In February, 1918, it moved to Tours, 

where it has been maintained 

ever since. 

Cable Section. 

Of the greatest importance 

in the administration of the Air 

Service is the Cable Se~tion.~ 

In the early days the Assistant 

Chief of Air Service, Lines of 

Communication, sent cables 

covering Air Service production problems direct to Washington through the American 

embassy in, Paris. There was a 

resulting initial saving of time, 

but an aftermath of mixed and 

incoherent references, and 

the transmission of cables to 

the United States without the 

sanction of the general staff, 

American Expeditionary Forces, led to a temporary lack of 

coordination of Air Service 

efforts and those of the remainder of the American Expeditionary Forces. This was 

later corrected and the cable 

office was specifically 

charged with handling all such 

messages and with seeing that 

needed approval was secured 

before they were transmitted 

to the United States. 

Information Section. 

The Information Section 

was first created at Air Service 

headquarters, general headquarters, in September, 1917.5 

Its efforts were mainly directed toward the collection of 

such data as would be useful 

in the development of the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces. 

The present Information 

Section is a growth of an 

Intelligence Section, Air Service Training Department, organized in Paris in December, 

1917. During the closing 

months of the war it was a 

central collecting and distributing agency within the Air 

Service for technical, military, and aeronautical data. Its 

work was concretely expressed in comprehensive 

bulletins, of which 313 were 

issued. Secret documents of 

importance were circulated 

among the proper officersand 

general inquiries of all sorts 

were answered. Intimate relations weremaintained with the 

French and British Air Services and with Washington by 

means of special officers who 

traveled between these centers. During the year 1918, 

25,725 miscellaneous publications and 19,169 maps were 

distributed. Early in the year a 

French-English Aeronautical 

glossary was compiled after 

exhaustive research. In September, 1918, an information 

officer was appointed at each 

of the training centers. During 

the summer of 1918, preliminary work, which was foreseen to be necessary for the 

compilation of a history of the 

Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, was assigned to this section. The 

armistice altered the situation 

and necessitated the rapid 

completion of this history. 

Col. E. S. Gorrell, assistant 

chief of staff, Air Service, was 

assigned to prepare an exhaustive record covering the 

narrative, statistical, technical, and tactical history of the 

Air Service.6 Having been 

assigned to this duty at Tours 

on January 9, 1919, such 

portion of the Information 

Section personnel as was 

engaged on this historical 

work was transferred to his 

direct control, leaving the 

remainder of the Information 

Section to bring to a conclusion the otherwork with which 

it was charged. 
VII, The Worzking Orzganization. 75 

Organization Air Service, 

American Expeditionary 

Forces, November 11, 

191 8. 

It seems appropriate that 

there should be given a statement of the organization of the 

Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, at the time 

when hostilities ceased and 

when it was a cohesive working body. 

The Chief of Air Service, 

American Expeditionary 

Forces. 

Responsible to the Commander in Chief for the organization, training, material, 

equipment, methods, and all 

other matters affecting the 

efficiency of the Air Service 

was the Chief of Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Forces. The official headquarters 

of the Air Service were at 

general headquarters and 

under the immediate supervision of the chief of staff, Air 

Service. 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Foulois (left), with Gen. John J. Pershing in France. 
76 a 

U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Major Branches of Air 

Service, American 

Expedltlonary Forces. 

The Chief of Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Forces, established all general 

policies. For the administration of matters not affecting 

policies there were two assistant chiefs of Air Service, 

one at headquarters, Services 

of Supply, and the other in 

Paris.2 There was also an Air 

Service representative in London charged with the responsibility for Air Service matters 

in Great Britain and Ireland; 

and an officer in Italy with 

similar duties3 The Paris office maintained liaison with 

the Allies and with the Air 

Service of the United St!tes 

Navy. The functions, the duties, and the authority of the 

heads of each of these sections were clearly delined. 

Assistant Chief of 

Air Service, Tours. 

The Assistant Chief of Air 

Service at headquarters, Services of Supply, was charged 

with keeping personnel records, with the supervision of 

training, with the administ ration of Air Service centers in 

the Services of Supply, and 

with the supervision of the 

Balloon Division, Air Service, 

which maintained schools for 

training and centers for equipment and repair. The most 

important sections of his office were those which actually 

conducted flying training, all 

balloon activities, and radio 

and photographic work. 

Assistant Chief of 

Alr Service, Park 

The Assistant Chief of Air 

Service, Paris, was in command of all Air Service personnel in that city. His most 

important duties were those 

connected with the supply of 

aviation material. He was 

responsible for the provision 

of the material and equipment 

necessary for the carrying out 

of the Air Service program. 

Under him were divisions 

making and supervising contracts with the allied and 

neutral Governments and with 

individual concerns, receiving, assembling, and dispatching airplanes, engines, 

war material, and equipment 

secured from all, sources, 

including the United States: 

also the Technical Section, 

Night Bombardment Section, 

Aircraft Armament Section, 

the latter operating directly 

under the Chief of Ordnance, 

but in closeaccord with the Air 

Service. The Technical Section supplied advice on engineering questions, provided data and estimates for 

proposed developments and 

maintained an experimental 

flying field. It was likewise 

charged with the inspection 

and test of airplanes and engines and with their acceptance. The Night Bombardment Section supervised the 

American multiengine night 

bombardment program, and 

worked in close accord with 

the other Air Service sections 

concerned in this project, 

while its London office was 

charged with the training of 

flying and mechanic personnel in England, and with the 

assembly in British plants of 

Handley-Page airplanes fabricated in the United States. 

Air Service Construction. 

Construction of Air Service 

projects was under the control 

of the Director of Construction and F~restry.~ The Air 

Service Designs and Projects 

Section was responsible for 

selection of sites, the preparation and approval of airplanes, 

the necessary surveys and 

drawings, and for procuring 

the needed sanction of headquarters for the execution of 

each project. 

/ 

78 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Mobthation of 

Flying Personnel. 

Flying personnel was supplied directly to the Zone of 

Advance from Air Service 

Schools. Upon atrival in 

France flying officers were 

sent to the Air Service Concentration Barracks at St. 

Maixent, where they were instructed concerning the details of foreign engines and 

other apparatus until the 

Training Section gave notice 

that they could be received at 

any of the flying schools. In 

the preliminary schools in the 

United States these officers 

had been assigned to some 

particular branch of aviation 

-pursuit, army or corps observation, day or night bombardment. Subject to emergency calls from the Zone of 

Advance and to the preference of the pilot when not in 

conflict with immediate needs, 

this classification was followed in sending flyer officers to the proper advance 

training Air Service centers. 

The 1st Air Depot in the 

Zone of Advance gave daily 

notice of the needs at the 

front. Based upon this information, officers ready for active service were ordered to 

the 1st Air Depot and from 

there they were sent to the 

armies as they were needed. 

Mobilization of Units. 

All Air Service troops arriving in France likewise passed 

through the Air Service Concentration Barracks at St. 

Maixent. The individuals were 

trade tested and assigned to 

squadrons which were formed 

in accordance with tables of 

organization, ground officers 

being provided at this point. In 

case a squadron was being 

prepared for early assignment 

to the Zone of Advance, a 

squadron commander nominated by an army Air Service 

commander and approved by 

the Chief of Air Service was 

usually sent to join this command at St. Maixent. The 

squadron, as soon as it was in 

readiness, then moved to a 

training ceilter, to the acceptake field at Orly, or to the 

production center at Romorantin, for temporary duty in 

order that men in specialized 

trades might gain some familiarity with their duties. Each 

squadron then proceeded to 

the 1st Air Depot, the date of 

its departure being determined by the availability of its 

equipment and flying personnel. The squadron supply 

officer with a detachment was 

sent to a supply warehouse to 

collect the squadron equipment and accompany it to the 

point of assembly. Pilots and 

observers were collected at 

the 1st Air Depot. The squadron commander, with a nucleus of officers and soldiers, 

preceded the remainder of the 

squadron to prepare for its 

coming and to assure himself 

that the airplanes and squadron equipment were in readiness. Upon its arrival in the 

Zone of Advance, the squadron was reported to general 

headquarters, G-3, for assignment to an army. Squadrons 

for instruction centers went 

directly from St. Maixent to 

their destinations. 

Movement of Supplies. 

The supply of airplanes, 

engines, and other replacement equipment for units at 

the front was maintained by a 

system of dispatch from factodesigned to provide the most 

direct transportation and to 

insure the immediate fulfillment of the needs of individual units. Aviation material was 

secured from two sources, 

European and American, and 

the supply system was built up 
Working 

Organization 

79 

dispatched all material 

air parks, which in turn krnished supplies to the units 

actually operating at the front. 

maintained. These air parks 

r park was performed 

r depot 20 to 50 miles 

farther in the rear and designed to supply from 30 to 50 

squadrons with engines, spare 

parts, ammunition, armament, 

radio, tools, special clothing, 

and general accessories. The 

air depots also undertook 

stores of supplies, including 

full squadron equipments and 

all spare parts. All major 

repairs, overhaul, and rebuilding of engines, was carried on 

at the Air Service Production 

lnterreirition of 

Units 01 Supply. 

Center No. 2. Much salvage The service squadr work was also done at this 

the front were compl establishment. self-contained, each 

machine-shop truck Alr e Command at 

these cciuld be suppli the 

material not with the 

The Air Service was orgagral parts of larger units, 

divisions, army corps, armies, 

and the general headquarters 

reserve. They are therefore 

commanded in the full sense 

of the allotted 

officer commanding the unit 

or units involved. The Air 

Service originates and suggests employment for its units 

but final decision is vested in 

Air Service forms a part6 

Since the Air Service is a 

combat arm, the principles 

which govern its use are 

similar to those of other such 

arms: 

(a) Concentration for offense and defense. This is 

executed by reinforcing corps 

and army Air Services by units 

from the general headquarters 

reserve, when such exists. 

(b) Commanders of larger 

organizations exercise direct 

control over all units, including Air Service units, in their 

command. There is no separate chain of tactical command in the Air Service. 

81 

importcance of Technical 

Difficullties in the Air 

Service!. 

The problems con 

the Air Bervice, Amer 

peditioriary Forces, 

and technical nature. 

tance of 3,000 miles 

the western battle fro& in 

Europe and the base of supplies in the United States was 

an obsiacle of no mean proportions. When we declared 

single airplane or engine conturers in America had had no 

experience in the technical 

aeronautic development 

1914, nor in the product 

service airplanes. The 

Governments after 2% years of 

experience were continually 

faced with questions of mgineeringi and procurement due 

to the development of new 

types ad aircraft and engines, 

to the promising performance 

of experimental products, and 

to the subsequent failure of 

some of them. When we enre was everyshortage of 

such vital things as machine 

tools, seasoned wood, dope, 

castor oil, and linen. 

The Changing Methods of 

Aerial Warfare. 

One of the major problems 

faced by all air services was 

the difficulty of keeping 

abreast of progress in this 

newest arm of warfare. Specialized pursuit aviation can 

not be said to have been wholly developed until the fall of 

1915. Systematic long-distance bombardment came 

somewhat later and day 

bombing was not fully developed until the last year of the 

war. Infantry liaison was early 

attempted and continually 

used, but even at the close of 

hostilities it had not been 

perfected. It was not until the 

spring of 1918 that night reconnaissance by aircraft became of great importance. The 

Allies owed mainly to night 

reconnaissance their foreknowledge of the coming of 

the final German attack on the 

Marne on July 15, 1918. 

The Change in Airplane 

Design. 

Progress in airplane construction had been equally 

rapid. A machine that dominates the air one 

totally obsolete 

later. A complex 

not be changed within a few 

days to meet each radical 

invention or improvement in 

design. The ceaseless competition between belligerents is 

illustrated by Germany’s effort 

during the last year of the war 

to dominate the pursuit field. 

She placed on the front in 

rapid succession no less than 

six new types of monoplace 

machines-the Pfalz, the 

Fokker triplane, two types of 

Fokker biplanes, the SiemensSchuckert, and the Junker 

monoplane. The experience of 

the French has been that 10 

months must ordinarily elapse 

between the official acceptance of an airplane of new 

type and its appearance in 

numbers on the front. An Air 

Service desiring to place on 

the front the largest possible 

number of machines of best 

types and with the least delay 

is faced on the one hand with a 
82 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

bewildering succession of 

changed or improved designs 

and on the other by a complexity of a modern industrial 

quantity production program. 

The result is a compromise, 

and we can hope for nothing 

better. 

Difficulties in 

Allied Aviation. 

In no spirit of criticism it 

may be remarked that the 

Allies themselves from the 

beginning of hostilitieg in 1814 

had met a series of diff iculties 

and disappointments in the 

development of their eviation 

programis. In general their 

difficulties and failures were in 

many respects similar to those 

of the United States. A complete knowledge of the conditions arid capabilities of the 

aeronautic factories was for a 

long time not availablp to the 

respective Governments. 

There was not adequgte definite Government supervision 

of manu facture. Wastage inevitable in any air program 

occurred from time to time. 

When we remember qur own 

experierlces with thei Briatol 

Fighter, the many ahanges 

necessary in the Liberty engine, the De Haviland airplane, and all other aviation 

equipment produced in the 

United States, it is not surprising to note that a number of 

like instancesoccurred during 

the development of allied 

aviation from the meager 

foundation existing in 1914. 

Need for Initiative. 

An air program can be successful only by encouraging 

individual initiative, invention, 

and experimentation, following which there must be the 

necessary abandonment of 

unsuccessful types. Much 

wastage is inevitable. A great 

variety of types of airplanes 

and engines have been under 

construction in the allied 

countries but very few of them 

may be considered as entirely 

successful. In order to secure 

air supremacy, the allied nations have at all times been 

forced to maintain large 

experimental fields and other 

expensive organizations 

which play no part in actual 

aerial warfare. The successful 

development of allied airplanes, engines, and accessories has come only after 

lengthy, discouraging, and 

costly attempts. Just as the 

DH-4 airplane did not reach 

the front until much of its 

superiority had disappeared, 

many allied airplanes were 

built and used at the front at 

times when they were obsolescent, for example, the Sopwith 1A2, the Farman, and the 

Avion Renault. 

Need for Comprehension 

Before Criticizing. 

The difficulties which we 

encountered in our attempt to 

develop night bombing are 

curiously parallel to those of 

the French, British, and Italian 

Air Services. It follows that the 

air programs of any two nations will show a remarkable 

similarity until more fundamental and precise knowledge 

of the sdence of aviation is 

available. The mistakes made 

can not be considered as unusual nor as avoidable. Each 

disappointment, each failure 

of judgment, might have been, 

and in many instances was, 

duplicated in the case of every 

warring nation. Criticism of 

the mistakes made by the 

United States Air Service 

frequently indicates that those 

who make it fail to comprehend the subject of which they 

speak rashly. 

Problem of Trained 

Personnel. 

As has been said over and 

over again, the lack of trained 

personnel was one of the most 

serious obstacles to the execution of our Air Service 

program. On account of the 

lack of training facilities in the 

American Expeditionary Forces it was understood that the 

United States would undertake the task of organizing and 

training the sorely needed 

commissioned and enlisted 

specialists. It was necessary, 

however, to establish at once 

in the American Expeditionary Forces training centers for 

all types of flying instruction, 

for it was soon realized that 

the American schools were 

incapable of the immediate 

production of a sufficient 
Difficulties 83 

number of pilots and observers. No small difficulty in 

carrying on such training was 

the necessity for developing 

standardized instruction for 

American personnel which 

would fit in properly with the 

scheme of instruction employed in foreign schools to 

which American students had 

also to be sent. 

The supply of enlisted personnel was from the first 

mainly a physical problem for 

the American Expeditionary 

Forces, the procurement of a 

sufficient tonnage to transport 

the needed troops. A number 

of factors, however, combined 

to raise this to a point of 

supreme importance second 

to none in its relation to Air 

Service development. Facing 

the Air Service at all times was 

the newness of the aviation 

forces in the United States, the 

practical nonexistence there 

of mechanical training centers, the variety of the types of 

foreign airplanes, airplanes, 

and tools with which our 

mechanics would have to deal, 

and the great amount of construction necessary in the 

American Expeditionary Forces. 

Ignorance of Equipment 

Needed. 

The problem of the supply 

of equipment and material was 

further complicated by the 

lack of knowledge in the 

United States of exactly what 

was needed for air forces at 

the front 01 how to undertake 

the production of such equipment. Types of airplanes for 

service use were not known 

with technical exactitude, nor 

were American manufacturers 

familiar with drawings, tolerances, or materials necessary 

for their production. Lack of 

tonnage likewise was a serious hindrance to our giving 

aid by sending raw materials 

to the allies. 

Importance of an Efficient 

and Adequate Service 

of Supply. 

An efficient air force at the 

front can not be maintained 

without a highly efficient 

supply service and the maintenance of many large warehouses, depots, and other 

installations. The building 

program was necessarily a 

large one, and it was early 

realized that a large numberof 

construction troops and a vast 

amount of raw material must 

be procured at once in order 

that this program might keep 

pace with the ever growing 

needs of the Air Service it was 

intended to place at the front. 
04 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

A Handley-Page bomber readied for a mission on the Aisne 

front in France. 
85 

Air Seivice Activities in 

England. 

Althcugh there w8s delay in 

sending untrained personnel 

to England to replace trained 

mechanics and thus permit 

them to be sent to France, 

ultimately 71 squadron 

trained in England did 

France with our armies. 

total of 211 squadrons and 

further additional large detachments of Air Service 

troops were at some time 

during 1917 and 1918 on 

training duty in England at the 

70 or 80 airdromes which were 

operatod jointly by American 

and British troops. 

The first American detachment for flying trai 

England of 1 officer 

cadets arrived at Li 

September 2, 1917. 

cember 21, 1918, 203 untrained cadets and 176 officers 

from ithe Royal Air Force 

schools in Canada and the 

United States, and 80 casual 

officer:; with preliminary flying 

training had arrived for prelicomplotely trained; 96 were 

sent to1 the American Expeditionary Forces: 20 were transferred for final training in 

France, and 60 were returned 

to the United States upon the 

signing of the armistice; 83 

officers sent to England for 

special training as instructors 

had been returned to France 

upon its completion. 

From pilots trained in England on Sopwith Camel airplanes, two complete American squadrons, the 17th and 

148th, with American enlisted 

personnel, were formed and 

served with the Royal Air 

Force in the field until November 1, 1918, at which date 

they were ordered to join the 

American 2d Army. The record of these two squadrons, as 

well as the records of the 

individual American pilots 

who served with British 

squadrons, was most brilliant. 

A number of the individual 

pilots were decorated by the 

British for deeds of great 

gallantry, and the squadrons 

were most highly commended 

by the officers under whom 

they served directly, as well as 

by the general officer commanding the Royal Air Force 

in the field.' 

Some of the personnel for 

the Handley-Page program 

which completed its training 

in England was assigned to 

duty with the British Independent Force, Royal Air 

Force, and later returned to 

England to act as instructors 

in the American school which 

was conducted there. This 

personnel also while in France 

rendered most efficient service and was highly complimented by the commanding 

general of this Independent 

Force. 

Handiey-Page Agreement 

and Night-Bombardment 

Section. 

In order to provide for the 

equipment necessary to engage in night-bombing operations, after much discussion 

and preliminary negotiations 

an agreement was concluded 

with the English Government 

January 26,1918, by which the 

United States undertook to 

fabricate parts for HandleyPage machines, which parts 

were to be shipped to England 

and there assembled in factories by English workmen. This 

agreement covered also the 

sending to England from the 

United States of a certain 

number of laborers to be 

employed primarily in the 

conStruction of airdromesand 

acceptance parks to be utilized by night bombardment 

squadrons which were to be 

organized in the United States 
86 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

and sent to England, where 

they would receive their final 

service training, the pilots, 

after sufficient instruction, to 

fly airplanes to France and the 

squadron personnel to be sent 

to France simultaneously. 

The Night Bombardment 

Section, Air Service, on June 

28, 1918, established an office 

in London to supervise all 

work under this agreement. 

The Paris office of this Night 

Bombardment Section selected six airdromes in France 

and planned an air park and a 

depot, much of the latter of 

which was constructed. 

This night-bombardment 

program covered the development of 30 Handley-Page 

squadrons. All of the work 

under this Handley-Page 

agreement was stopped 

abruptly the day after the 

armistice was signed. No 

Handley-Page night bombing 

squadron ever reached 

France, although two such 

squadrons had corn pleted 

their training in England, and 

there was available other partially trained personnel for the 

rapid organization of sufficient additional squadrons as 

the airplanes became ready 

for use. There was a delay in 

the shipment of fabricated 

parts from the United States, 

and the result of this inability 

to forward these parts on 

schedule time was the failure 

of the United States to put any 

Handley-Page night bombing 

squadrons at the front. 

HANDLEY PAGE FLOW SHEET 
Activities 

and Remarks 

87 

Air Service 

Activities In Italy. 

A number of flying officers 

were also sent to Itaty for 

training and after havlngbeen 

given courses on Caproni machines, 65 of our pilots saw 

servicc! with the Italian squadrons 81' the front. In additbn 17 

American pilots had been 

assigned to the Italian naval 

statiorl at Foggia-Renatico for 

operations against Aurtrian 

naval bases. Two American 

officers were killed on the 

Italian front when their machine 'was shot down in combat. From June 20 to Novembor 2, 1918, these 

American pilots flew 587 

hours over the lines and took 

part in 65 bombardment misthe ltailian Air Service. Wrtyone of them received kalian 

ing its ability to prepare aeronautical equipment for the 

American Air Service in 

France. In August, 1917, a 

verbal arrangement was made 

for the purchase of 500 S. I. A. 

airplanes and 200 Caproni 

airplanes. The 450-horsepower Caproni was at that 

time a successful, but slightly 

out-of-date type, bombing 

machine. The 600-horsepower Caproni was still in the 

experimental stage. Of the S. I. 

A. airplanes ordered, only 50 

were ever built and these 

proved a disappointment. 

None of the Capronis were 

ever built for us. 

Further study of the Caproni 

airplane and further information concerning its performance warranted the issue of 

instructions in the fall of 1918 

to concludeadefinitecontract 

for obtaining a considerable 

number of such machines. 

There was difficulty in meeting the conditions imposed by 

our Air Service, but finally a 

favorable and practicable 

agreement was concluded 

whereby the United States 

Army and Navy Air Services 

were to receive one-sixth of 

the monthly production of 

Caproni airplanes, beginning 

in October, 1918. Tentative 

plans were also made for 

securing a factory whose 

output would be reserved 

exclusively for American use. 

According to the original 

agreement made with the 

Italian Government in the 

summer of 1917, 500 pilots 

were to be trained in Italy. A 

more definite contract was 

made on April 1, 1918, in 

which the course of training 

was clearly prescribed. 

In connection with the training of American pilots in Italy 

many difficulties ware encountered. The training center 

at Foggia was about 450 miles 

from the base of supplies, 

which were scarcely ever 

available in sufficient quantities, causing much loss of time 

and some dissatisfaction. In 

all, 406 Americans received 

preliminary flying training in 

Italian schools, of which 131 

were given special bombing 

training . 
88 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

The DH-4 Airplane andthe 

Liberty Engine. 

The first DH-4 airplanes 

were received from thd Untted 

States in May, 1918. A bumber 

of minor changes were mcessary in the first aiirplanes 

received before they Were 

regarded as entirely fit for 

service at the front, While 

great improvements in airplanes had been made du 

the timo which elapsed 

tween the sending of 

recommendation to the United Statos for the building of 

the DH-4 airplane, and its 

actual appearance in Fr 

and while the supire 

which this airplane h 

1917 was largely a thing of the 

past, th(3 Liberty engine with 

which the DH-4's were 

equipped proved equal to the 

highest expectations of its 

designel-s and builder$. Combining great power with unusual reliability and great lightness of weight it is one of the 

most successful aeronautical 

engines ever produced, and 

the confidence of the Allies in 

its performance was shown by 

their eagerness to secure 

more Liberty engines than we 

were able to furnish. The fact 

that it could be produced in 

great quantity and that its 

spares were standardized 

made it a most valuable asset 

for the American Air Service, 

and perhaps the greatest single material contribution of 

the United States to aviation. 

The first use made of the 

DH-4 airplane fitted with the 

Liberty engine on the western 

front was on August ~ 2, 1918, 

when a patrol 18 strong of the 

135th Aero Squadron in formation went from the airdrome at Ourches along the 

lines. The pilots and mechanics of this squadron had been 

trained in England. 

Up to November 11,1918, a 

total of 1,213 DH-4 airplanes 

and 2,083 Liberty engines had 

been received overseas, and 

of these 543 airplanes* had 

been sent tothefront. Someof 

these American-built airplanes were used at American 

Expeditionary Forces flying 

schools in order that the pilots 

who were to fly them at the 

front might have the proper 

amount of training on them 

before they were sent into 

action. 

' 
Activities 

and Remarks 

89 

inequislities in 

Pay of Aviators. 

Before our declaration of 

war with Germany and while 

the development of military 

aviation in the United States 

was in its infancy under peace 

conditions then existing, it 

had been considered equitable to adjust the pay of flying 

officers according to their 

ability and experience. Three 

ratings had therefore been 

established: The re9ierve military aviator, the junior military aviator, and the mtiitary 

aviator, with increases of pay 

of 25, 50, and 75 per cent, 

respectively, calculated upon 

the pay of their line rank. 

Participation in active operations changed radically the 

conditions which had made 

this adjustment of pay equitable, and furthermore, ovdng to 

the developments in flying, 

these arrangements no IOnger 

represented the ability of their 

holders to pilot machines. The 

Air Service, American Expeditiontiry Forces, therefore 

proposed a cable which was 

transmitted to the United 

States, October 18, 1918, 

recommending the abolition 

of these grades and the establishment of a just and equitable system of additional pay 

for all flying personnel engaged in regular and frequent 

aerial flights. 

Temperament. 

Much has been heard during the present war of what 

has been called “temperament” of flying officers. The 

truth is that the flyer is no more 

temperamental than any other 

healthy young man and is 

equally anxious to live up to 

the best traditions of the 

profession of arms. It is a fact 

that the insignia worn by flying 

officers is more conspicuous 

and that they are more readily 

identified than officers of 

other branches of the service. 

This largely accounts for criticism which has been directed 

at flying officers as a class and 

for the statements sometimes 

made that these officers were 

more prone than others to 

commit breaches of discipline. Such statements were 

investigated with great care 

from time to time, not only by 

direction of the Chief of the Air 

Service but by the Inspector 

General’s Department, and all 

reports indicated without exception that the behavior of 

Air Service officers was in no 

degree more blameworthy 

than that of any other officers 

of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Morale and 

Esprit de Corps. 

In the Air Service, as in other 

branches, nothing contributes 

more to success than the 

cultivation of the best possible 

esprit de corps. In fact, this is 

probably more important in 

the Air Service on account of 

the voluntary nature of the 

duties perforbed. This becomes apparent when it is 

remembered that it i8 impossible to teach a man to fly or 

become an observer against 

his will and that it is extremely 

difficult, even after he has 

been taught, to utilize his 

knowledge fully except with 

his own most hearty cooperation. While companionship 

and inspiration of exampleare 

never lacking in the midst of 

the dangers attending work 

done in time of war by ground 

troops, the flyer, on the other 

hand, is practically alone in 

the air and is often the final 

judge of his own conduct 

under fire. It is evident at once 

that the very highest morale is 

essential to the success of an 
90 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Air Service in active operations. Similarly in the case of 

the enlisted personnel belonging to this service, not every 

man can be made a good 

mechanic, nor can his failure 

to become one render him 

amenable to discipline or 

reflect upon him in any way. 

The work of these men is 

judged mainly by their ability 

to care for intricate meuhanisms, and the relation of the 

members of a squadron t6 the 

officers who pilot the machines is to a great extent that 

of advisers and guardians to 

men whose lives depend upon 

the advice and the care given. 

Discipline. 

It is thoroughly realized that 

discipline is an essential to the 

success of an army. The Air 

Service officers and men must 

be as welt or even better 

disciplined in the truesenseof 

the word than those of any 

other combatant arm. The 

nature of the duties performed 

by these men is mentioned in 

order to call attention to the 

necessity for bearing these 

facts in mind and for exercising control over this personnel 

intelligently. 

Relations with Other 

Branches of the American 

Expeditionary Forces. 

The administration and development of the Air Service 

has been in many ways dependent upon important aid 

rendered by other arms. The 

Director of Construction and 

Forestry has been charged 

with the construction of all Air 

Service projects. The Aircraft 

Armament Section, while acting in close liaison with the 

Supply Section, Air Service, 

has been under the direct 

control of the Chief Ordnance 

Officer. The Medical Research 

Boards have compiled most 

valuable information and rendered indispensable service in 

afield previously undeveloped 

in the United States. A large 

portion of the radio work of the 

Air Service has been done in 

close cooperation with the 

Signal Corps. The Motor 

Transport Corps, since August, 1918, has been in charge 

of all transportation supplied 

to the Air Service. The uninterrupted supply of gasoline and 

lubricating oil was assured by 

the Quartermaster Corps. All 

gasoline came from the United 

States and castor oil was 

procured largely from the 

French. In all, there was supplied for the Air Service, 

4,825,697 gallons of aviation 

gasoline and 617,815 gallons 

of caster oil. All of theseother 

branches lent their aid and 

gave hearty support to the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces. 

0 bservers. 

The procurement and training of observers for the Air 

Service presented many difficulties. Officers who are to act 

as aerial observers should 

have sufficient General Staff 

training to enable them to 

know what to look for, to 

recognize what they see, and 

to report accurately and intelligently the result of their 

observations. While it was not 

possible in this warto secure a 

considerable number of officers so trained, this fact must 

be borne in mind in the future 

and all such observers must be 

given this through training in 

order that the work done by 

them may be of real value. 

Relief Organizations. 

The Air Service, American 

Expeditionary Forces, is deeply indebted to the relief organizations which operated at its 

centers and with some of its 

squadrons at the front. The 

Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A. 

have at all times been present 

and have rendered invaluable 

assistance at periods when the 

only comforts and cheer for 
Activities 

and Remarks 

91 

officer!; and soldiers alike 

were procured by the unremittingeffortsof thesetwo bodies 

of workers. The canteens, 

clubs, libraries, and messes 

wherever established 

organizations were 

greatest value to the Air service at 1:imes when such facilities were sorely needed. 

Liquidation and 

Retrenchment. 

When it becameevident that 

the signing of the armistice 

was possible, steps weretaken 

to prepare the way for the 

liquidation of Air Service 

property and contracts. On 

Noverriber 5,1918, the French 

undersecretary of state for 

aeronautics was verbally informed that in the event of the 

signing of an armistice the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces, would probably camel all orders and cease 

its activities and was requested to be ready to furnish a 

statement showing our total 

liabilities to the French Government. This was followed 

two days later by orders to all 

Air Service stations and depots to prepare a complete 

inventory and definite records 

which would be of me in 

ment of all Air Service 

obligations, while the Order 

and Acceptance Division and 

the Purchasing Division were 

instructed to place no further 

orders except for small 

amounts of material necessary for immediate use. Information as to incomplete contracts was collected. Upon the 

signing of the armistice, contracts with the French Government were immediately canceled and notice was served 

that no further deliveries 

would be accepted. At the 

same time work on all Air Service projects was discontinued 

and a cable was sent to the 

United States asking that no 

more Air Service supplies be 

floated. 

Air Service representatives 

in England and Italy were 

directed to conclude all business under their supervision 

with the least possible delay, 

to cancel all obligationsand to 

negotiate equitable settlements for the approval of the 

Chief of Air Service, communicating direct with him upon 

all questions of policy and 

asking instructions concerning all settlements which 

would involve large disbursements or considerable quantities of material. 

Steps were taken to cancel 

all informal agreements and to 

stop deliveries under them in 

France, England, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. An Air 

Service Liquidation Board was 

appointed and’ sat daily in 

Paris, investigating and reporting upon all questions 

concerning these business 

settlements. Commanding officers of all schools and other 

Air Service stations were ordered to prepare supplies and 

equipment for immediate 

shipment to Romorantin, 

where they were to be classified, put into stock, shipped to 

the United States, salvaged, or 

otherwise disposed of as directed by the Chief of Air Service. The supply and depot 

officers were directed to estimate the amount of material 

which would be needed for 

replacements for the aero 

squadrons which were to be 

kept with the armies. Ordnance supplies were disposed 

of as outlined in General 

Order No, 41, Headquarters S. 

0. S., September 2, 1918. 

A board of officers was 

constituted to investigate the 

status of all material being 

produced for the Air Service in 

French factories, to ascertain 

the amount of such material 

and its degree of completion. 

There were some 1,600 separate outstanding orders with 

French merchants and the 
92 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

value of the undelivered material thereunder amounted to 

approximately 18,000,000 

francs. Every one of these 

orders was carefully examined 

and adjustments were made 

with the creditors. In practically all cases the dealers were 

quite willing to settle on fair 

terms. Many of them accepted 

complete cancellation of their 

orders without compensation. 

Where material which could 

be of use wasactually finished 

deliveries were accepted, and 

in some cases where the 

material was either incomplete or would not be needed 

in the Air Service the settlements were made by agreeing 

to pay to the dealers sums 

which would avoid any loss on 

their part, the salvage value of 

the material being fixed with 

care. 

The French Government 

expressed a desire to take over 

the Air Service installations at 

St. Jean-de-Monts, Tours, 

Issoudun, Aulnat, and Orly, at 

a fair valuation, to assume all 

obligations toward landowners and to arrange for the 

payment by the United States 

of a reasonable rental covering the period of occupation. 

Subject to any general policy 

which might be adopted bythe 

American Expeditionary Fortes, this offer was accepted. 

Throughout all of.this period of retrenchment and liquidation every matter of an 

important nature received the 

personal attention of the Chief 

of Air Service. 
93 

The Problem on Aprll 6, 

191 7. 

When the United States 

declared war there were in the 

Army 65 flying officers. Of 

them a few had seen active 

service in Mexico and the rest 

were either recent graduates 

of the school at San Diego or 

still under instruction. Noneof 

them hEid ever flown a modern 

service airplane, and the majority had been trained on a 

system of controls differing 

wholly from that in use on 

airplanes in Europe. No observers or bombers had been 

trained, and practiaally no 

specialized instruction, as the 

term is now understood, had 

been given. From this nucleus, an Air Service numbering thousands of trained flyers 

was to be developed and 

placed in service on the western front within the shortest 

possiblo time. 

Necesrlty for 

Schools Overseas. 

It was evident from the 

first that as much as possible 

of the enormous training program involved would have to 

be carried out in the United 

States. Only preliminary training, however, could at first be 

given I here, because there 

were no machines in the 

United States suitable for 

advanced training and no 

pilots qualified to give advanced instruction. The 

necessity of large schools and 

training centers in Europe for 

advanced and specialized 

training was therefore obvious. it was also necessary to 

make use of allied schools to 

the greatest extent possible, 

until such time as American 

installations came into operation. 

Acceptance of the 

loroudun Site. 

The French had recommended the prompt construction of a large American 

school, at a site some 11 kilometers from the town of Issoudun, and had offered to make 

arrangements for the land and 

construct the necessary 7 

miles of railway. In June, 1917, 

this site was examined and 

accepted, but owing to the 

necessity of building the railway and the delay in the arrival 

of materials, construction was 

not started until August 18, 

191 7. 

Creation of the Training 

Section. 

On July 2, 1917, a Training 

Section' was tentatively created by order of the aviation 

officer, American Expeditionary Forces. The section was 

subsequently divided into five 

divisions, viz: Personnel, Records, Material, Training, and 

Inspection and Intelligence. 

Officers assigned to the section were placed in charge of 

pursuit instruction, bombardment instruction, aerial 

gunnery, and observation. A 

number of assistants were 

added from officers and 

cadets sent to Europe for 

training, and the necessary 

clerical personnel was recruited from civilians found in 

Paris. At this time there were 

no officers qualified by training or experience to take 

charge of the higher phasesof 

aviation instruction, and the 

officers assigned to special 

instruction duty knew little or 

nothing of the subjects in 

which they were called upon 

to instruct. In addition to their 

organization wgrk they had 

therefore to perfect themselves in their subjects by 

such training and investigation as was possible under the 

circumstances. 
94 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

The Cadets. 

It had become apparent in 

the early summer of 1917 that 

a sufficient number of pilots 

with preliminary training 

could not be expected from 

the United States in time to 

meet the program then in contemplation, and that it would 

be necessary to make use to 

the utmost of allied schools in 

Europe, both for preliminary 

and advanced training. Based 

on assurances of allied Air 

Services that opportunities 

would be furnished in their 

schoots for the training of a 

large number of untrained 

men, the United States was 

asked on June 26, 1917, to 

send overseas 100 cadets a 

month, beginning July 1,1917. 

A number of eligible Americans, who were in France, 

where most of them had been 

serving in the Ambulance 

Corps, were examined by an 

aviation examining board and 

enlisted for flying training. In 

all, approximately 2,300 

cadets, without preliminary 

flying training, were sent to 

Europe or enlisted overseas. 

Difficulties 

and Delays. 

The preliminary training of 

these men did not proceed as 

contemplated.The assurances 

of the allied governments 

with respect to vacancies 

in their schools were based 

on the arrival of the cadets 

during the summer of 1917. 

Some few of them arrived 

during August and September, 

but the majority did not 

reach Europe until October, 

November, and December. 

The loss of thefavorabletraining weather, the increase in 

the allied Air Service Programs, which made it necessary for them to utilize their 

schools to the utmost and the 

then existing situation on the 

Italian front, all combined to 

defeat, in a large measure, the 

plan for early preliminary 

training, with the result that 

most of the cadets were 

thrown back on the American 

schools for this instruction. 

The only American school 

where primary flying could be 

taught was the school at 

Tours, which had been taken 

over from the French on 

November 1,1917. The school 

at Issoudun, planned for advanced training, had no machines of the type required for 

preliminary training, nor could 

these machines beobtained. It 

was in fact impossible to 

supply a sufficient quantity of 

them for the school at Tours. A 

number of cadets awaiting 

training were, however, 

placed at Issoudun, where the 

enforced inaction,and the fact 

that from time to time they 

were called upon to assist in 

the absolutely necessary construction work, which this post 

was carrying on under the 

most difficult conditions, owing to shortage of personnel, 

led to great dissatisfaction. 

The situation on January 1, 

1918, presented a more discouraging aspect; 1,060 

cadets were then in Europe 

awaiting training, forwhom no 

training could be provided. 

These men for the most part 

had been honor graduates of 

ground schools and had been 

sent abroad as a reward for 

their good work and high 

qualities. At the rate at which 

training was then proceeding 

it would have required 10 

months to ayearto placethem 

all under instruction. Only the 

high caliber of the men themselves prevented a complete 

loss of morale under these 

conditions. It was necessary 

to withdraw from the schools 

all cadets who could not be 

placed in training and to 

concentrate them at the Air 

Service concentration camp, 

St. Maixent, to await theirturn. 

This step was taken in January, 1918. 

Commissioning of Cadets. 

Another unfortunate feature 

was that cadets' who had 

remained in the States were 

now arriving ascommissioned 

officers, having received their 

commission on completion 

of their preliminary training 

there. In many cases these 

men had entered the service 
Training 95 

later than the men who had 

been sent abroad and were 

there awaiting training. The 

result was deemed so unjust 

that a lplan was presented to 

the Secretary of War, on his 

visit to the American Expeditionary Forces, and approved 

by him, to commission all 

cadets in Europe with therank 

they would have had had they 

been commissioned at the 

date of their graduation from 

ground school. The commissions so given were temporary, in the sense that if &y of 

the cadets holding them did 

not successfully complete 

their flying training in Europe, 

the commissions would lapse 

and the cadet would fall again 

to enlisted status and be 

returned to the United States. 

This plan went into operation 

during February and March, 

and all cadets in Europe were 

commi!rsioned under it. 

The Liimiting of Primary 

Traininig in American 

Expeditionary Forcss. 

By good fortune, tr 

proceeded somewhat more 

rapidly than had been anticipated, and owing to this fact, 

and to (assistance rendered by 

the French and British in 

creating vacancies in their 

schools, practically every 

cadet it1 Europe was placed in 

training by May 15. By the 

middle of July, 1918, preliminary training in American 

schools had been practically 

completed, so far as all the 

cadets were concerned, and Training. 

the question was presented 

whether preliminary training It was also decided to call on 

could not be continued for the all squadrons of the American 

benefit of deserving enlisted Expeditionary Forces periodimen, many of whom had cally for a recommendation of 

enlisted in the Air Service with one or two exceptionallyqualthe idea that they would even- ified men per squadron, who 

tually be taught to fly. It s 

seemed desirable also to give re excellence of 

instruction to a number of th 

officers who were performing m 

duties which it was thought tember, and a number of 

would be better performed by enlisted men were given trainthem if they were practical ing as a result of the recomflyers. On the other hand, it mendations so made. The 

was clear that in order to meet excellent showing made by 

the program the schools these leads to the concluwould be forced. to the utmost sion it might have been 

to give finishing and “re- advisable in the first instance 

fresher” courses to men al- to withhold from aviation 

ready trained, and that the students both their wings and 

continuance of preliminary commissions until such time 

training would seriously im- as they had fully completed 

pede production of finished their training and were actualpersonnel. The decision was ly ready to go to the front. 

finally reached toestablish the Though the wisdom of this 

general principle that no pre- coursecould hardly have been 

liminary training would be foreseen the inauguration of 

given thereafter in the Ameri- the system in the spring of 

can Expeditionary Forces, but 1917, its advantages seem to 

to make exceptions in the be sufficiently proved to warcases of a number of enlisted rant its adoption in the future. 

men, whose applications had 

already been approved by the 

examining board, and in the 

case of officers whose training 

was deemed necessary for the 

mare effective performance of 

their duties. 

The Squadrons 

Recommend Men for 

Train i n!g 97 

Isrouduin. 

The situation which confronted theTraining SE)ctibn in 

the beginning of the autumn of 

1917, was, to say the least, disheartening. Construction of 

the main American center at 

Issoudun had been seriously 

delayed, owing to lack of materials aind shortage of personnel. It was imperative to 

get this center into operation 

as soon as possible, and also 

to establish schools of obrervation, bombardment, and 

aerial gunnery. Efforts were 

concentrated upon Issoudun. 

The first French airplanes 

were delivered there in October and a provisional school 

put in operation in October24, 

1917. The situation was, however, very unsatisfactory, as 

the barracks and accomodations at the school were of the 

crudest kind, and it had been 

impossible to build roads 

before the rainy weather made 

the camp a sea of mud. The 

flying field itself was newly 

sown arid mud thrown from 

the wheels of the airplanes 

broke propellers almost as fast 

as they could be put on. No 

machine shops had been 

established and no materials 

for their erection wereat hand, 

nor were there any machine 

tools or power available. All 

mechanical work had to be 

done in two machine-shop 

trucks brought from America. 

It was clear that a great 

amount of time and labor was 

necessary before the school 

could function effectively. 

Tours. 

On November 1, 1917, the 

French School at Tours was 

taken over by the American 

service. This school was originally intended for observation 

training, but the necessity of 

giving preliminary training to 

cadets required that it be 

devoted to this use. The 

school was poorly equipped 

and had a capacity of not over 

100 students a month. 

Clermont-Ferrand. 

In November, 1917, the 

French School at ClermontFerrand was also taken over 

for bombardment training. 

This school was small and by 

no means ideally situated. It 

was, however, the only school 

already constructed) that was 

availab!e, and the shortage of 

men and material did not at the 

time permit of entering into a 

new construction project, 

Training in day bombardment 

commenced at this school 

about December 1, 1917, and 

was continued throughout the 

war. 

St. Jean de Monts. 

Numerous proposed sites 

for an aerial gunnery school 

were examined, but none 

found satisfactory, as all of 

them involved an amount of 

construction impossible at 

that time. It was thought that 

an aerial gunnery school required either a large expanse 

of water or an uninhabited 

stretch of country over which 

shooting could be done. Neither of these conditions could 

be found readily in locations 

convenient to railway transportation, or adapted to rapid 

completion. The problem 

seemed almost insurmountable until a place adapted for 

shooting over water was finally discovered on the west 

coast, near St. Jean de Monts 

(Vendee). The project for the 

construction of a school to 

graduate 300 pilots a month 

was submitted for approval on 

March 10, 1918. The difficulties encountered in the construction of this school were 

very great. The site was located some 10 miles from a 

railway, and all materials had 

to be hauled over roads by 

truck. The field itself was covered with trees and traversed 

by banks, which had to be 

leveled and resown, and con- 

Train i ng 99 

struction was delayed by lack 

of men and material. The 

uselessness of commencing 

operations before the completion of shops and the means of 

maintaining airplanes in commission having been amply 

proved in the past, instruction 

was not started until August 9, 

1918, when the school was 

pract ica Ily completed. 

Traininla of Mechanics. 

The training of mechanics 

presented extreme difficulties 

from the beginning. The handful of experienced airplane 

mechanics in the United 

States tit the outbreak of the 

war had been retainttd there 

for the most part in order to 

operate the United 

schools, and the enlis 

sonnel of squadrons 

Europe was composed largely 

of men with no mechanical 

experience whatsoever. Even 

those who did have mechanical explerience were wholly 

ignorant of the European 

engines, on which they were 

called upon to wo 

condition threatened 

serious that every ef 

made ‘to alleviate it. Five 

hundred mechanics, arriving 

in England, on September 15, 

1917, were stopped at Southampton and diverted to British schools; some 200 were 

placed in factories in and 

about Paris, where they assisted in the construction 

of airplanes and engines, 

and 207 were sent to the 

French Mechanician School 

at Bron (Rhone), for training. 

Drawbacks in Training 

Mechanics in Flying 

Schools. 

Shortage of personnel, necessary for the construction of 

Issoudun, and the working of 

other Air Service schools, 

soon made these methods of 

instruction impracticable and 

the majority of the Air Service 

enlisted men received up to 

January 1,1918, got onlysuch 

training as they could pick up 

at schools in connection with 

the duties which they were 

called upon to perform. This 

system of training mechanics 

in flying schools proved unsatisfactory from the first. It 

not only reduced the efficiency of the schools but 

caused constant disorganization when squadrons were 

withdrawn from the school for 

service at the front. 

Contract with British 

December 5,1917. 

It was the early appreciation 

of this situation which led to 

the making of the contract 

with the British authorities on 

December 5, 1917, whereby it 

was agreed that a pool of 

15,000 men should be kept 

constantly in England, working and training in British 

schools and factories. As 

additional men were added to 

this pool it was contemplated 

that the surplus over 15,000 

could be organized into 

squadrons from such men as 

had received training in England and withdrawn to France 

for service. This scheme 

would have worked satisfactorily had enlisted personnel 

arrived from the United States 

as promptly as promised and 

had it not been necessary to 

curtail the number of Air Service troops sent to Europe in 

the first half of the year 1918. 

As it was it operated seriously 

to reduce the man power available for work in France, and 

this at a time when ample force 

was absolutely necessary to 

lay the foundations of the 

large production which the 

schools were expected to turn 

out in the following summer. 

Training in Italy. 

The Italian Government had 

offered to erect a school in 

Italy, with a capacity of 500 

students. This offer was accepted in the autumn of 1917, 

and a school at Foggia (a city 

about 360 kilometers southeast of Rome) was constructed by the Italians for the 

use of American flyers. Instruction in preliminary flying 

was started on September 28, 

1917, and continued during 

the autumn and winter. In all, 

about 450 students were sent 

Traininlg 101 

to this school for preliminary 

training. On January 19,1918, 

an extension to the camp was 

opened and the school was 

made to include advanced 

training on S. I. A. biplanes, 

and bombardment training on 

the Caproni bombardmentairplane. In all, 406 pilots graduated from the preliminary 

course, of whom 131 subsequently graduated from the 

bombardment course.2 

Unsatisfactory 

Results at Foggia. 

Training in Italy, however, 

did not prove satisfactory. The 

preliminary training was carried out on Farman airplanes, 

this being the only type procurable. It developed on the 

return of graduates to France 

for advanced training that the 

Farman airplane differed so 

much from the airplanes on 

which they had to continue 

their training that almost as 

much difficulty was experienced in teaching them as 

would have been the case had 

they received no flying instructions. In the advanced 

training, the S. I. A. airplanes 

in use at the school, although 

exceedingly good as far as 

performance was concerned, 

showed certain structural 

weaknesses which led to their 

being condemned for school 

purposes. The training in 

Caproni flying was reduced to 

small proportions by lack of 

Caproni airplanes, spare 

parts, and labor at the school. 

Nor did this training, when 

complete, qualify men for 

night bombardment according to the standards set on the 

western front. The 96 men who 

completed the course were 

placed with Italian squadrons, where they rendered 

creditable service on the Italian front. 

Fur ba ra. 

In the spring of 1918 an 

attempt was made to establish 

a school of aerial gunnery at 

Furbara, Italy, and instruction 

was started on April 24. Lack 

of machines and the distance 

from other training centers, 

which made it difficult tocarry 

out the scheme of instruction 

deemed necessary, resulted in 

the abandonment of this project after two classes, 52 pilots, 

had gone through the school. 

Training in 

French Schools. 

The French at all times gave 

as much assistance in training 

American pilots and observers 

as the equipment of their 

schools and the exigencies of 

their program permitted. In all, 

444 students were graduated 

from preliminary training in 

French schools. These men 

t! 

received from 25 to 30 hours 

instruction in Farman and 

Caudron airplanes, thus materially lightening the burden of 

preliminary training in the 

American Expeditionary Forces. 

Aerial Gunnery 

at Cazaux. 

By far the most important 

contribution made by the 

French to the American Air 

Service training was the finishing course in aerial gunnery which they permitted the 

American Air Service to give, 

under their supervision and 

direction, at their aerial gunnery school situated at Cazaux (Gironde). This work, 

which commenced on December 28, 1917, in a large measure neutralized the delay in 

getting an American aerial 

gunnery school into operation, and overcame the early 

difficulties caused by our lack 

of machine guns and ammunitions. In addition to the 

above, 24 bombing teams 

were given some training at Le 

Cretoy; 148 pilots completed 

an intermediate course in 

Nieuport and Sopwith flying at 

Avord, and about 100 pilots 

and observers had experience 

in French squadrons at the 

front. French instructors and 

advisers rendered valuable 

service. 

Training 103 

Training in 

British Schoois. 

The training in British 

schools covered three phases-the training of cadetswho 

had no previous flying training, the training of officers 

who had received preliminary 

flying training in the Royal Air 

Force schools in Canada and 

the United States, and the 

training of casual officers who 

had received preliminary 

training and included selected 

officers sent from France for 

specialized instruction in 

higher phases of training, 

The training of cadets commenced on September 4, 

1917, with the arrival of a detachment of 53 cadetsand one 

officer, at the British School of 

Military Aeronautics at Oxford. In all, 204 cadets were 

completely trained; 176 officers, trained at the Royal Air 

Force schools in Canada and 

the United States, were also 

completely trained, and casual officers to thenumberof162 

received some training, making a total of 542 men who received training in England. 

This number includes 6 observers and 83 officers who 

were returned to stat 

France, where they we 

as instructors. In all, 2’1 

were sent to the R6yal Air 

Force in the field, and operated either with the British or 

in the two American pursuit 

squadrons (17th and 148th) 

which were completely 

trained and equipped by the 

Royal Air Force, and operated on the British front. Ninety-six completely trained pilots were furnished direct from 

British schools to the American Air Service. Twenty-three 

cadets were also given preliminary training at the British 

school at Vendome (near 

Tours), France. 

Our Debt to the 

Royal Air Force. 

The assistance given by the 

Royal Air Force to the Training 

Section of the Air Service was 

invaluabte. While the contribution in completely trained 

pilots delivered to the American Service was small, the 

value of the training given to 

instructors in methods of 

instruction in flying, gunnery, 

bombardment, navigation, 

and night flying can not be 

overestimated. The British 

officers, furnished to the 

Training Section as instructors and advisers, performed 

in all cases the most valuable 

work. The price paid to the 

British by the American Air 

Service for the training of 

American pilots, and the assistance rendered them 

through American personnel 

in England and their use of 

American pilots in active service on their front, were by no 

means disproportionate to the 

benefits received. 

Training in the 

United States. 

It became apparent during 

the autumn of 1917 that such 

school installations as could 

be provided in Europe would 

be wholly inadequate, even 

under the most favorable 

circumstances, to give fyll 

courses in advanced and specialized training to the number 

of pilots and observers required to meet the Army 

program. If thenumberof men 

necessary for this program 

were to be passed through the 

schools of the American Expeditionary Forces, all that 

could be accomplished with 

men and material available 

would be to give finishing and 

“refresher” courses, and to 

provide facilities for transformation to the actual machines they would use in service. In accordance with this 

the United States was advised 

by cable, dated November 23, 

1917, that it would have to 

assume the burden of the 

complete training of all aviators sent abroad. This burden 

. 
104 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

was assumed by the United 

States in cable 6454 dated 

January 15, 1918, and the 

most strenuous efforts appear to have been made to 

provide the installations 

necessary to carry it out. It was 

estimated that the advanced 

schools of the United States 

would begin during June and 

July, 1918, to turn out pilots, 

fully trained or at least very farr 

advanced in pursuit, bombardment, observation, and 

gunnery, as well as observers 

and bombers. These estimates were based upon 

information received from the 

United States by cable and 

otherwise during the spring 

and early summer of 1918, to 

the effect that schools for advanced and specialized training were in operation. Efforts 

were accordingly directed to 

gearing the schools in the 

American Expeditionary Forces to meet this situation. 

The output of trained personnel from the States was, 

however, delayed, and up to 

the time of the armistice the 

schools in the American Expeditionary Forces were required to bear a much larger 

proportion of the burden than 

had been contemplated. One 

realizes the extreme difficulty 

of placing a large and thoroughly trained flying personnel into service, when it is considered that in spite of 

unlimited efforts to train this 

personnel in the United States 

not a single American trained 

pursuit or observation pilot 

and only eight bombing pilots, 

who could be said to have received complete training in 

the United States, reached the 

front before November 11, 

191 8. 

Observation Flylng and Its 

Importance.g 

The progress of the war in 

the year 1918 has clearly 

demonstrated the fact that the 

work of the observer and 

observation pilot is the most 

important and far-reaching 

which an Air Service operating 

with an Army is called upon to 

perform. This was neither the 

general nor public impression 

at the time of the entry of the 

United States into the war. The 

spectacular elements of aerial 

combat, the featuring of successful pursuit pilots, and the 

color of romance which was 

attached to the work of men 

whose only business was to 

fight in the air, combined to 

create a popular idea of the 

importance of pursuit duty. 

This idea has from the beginning proved a serious handicap to the development of other branches of the Air Service. 

The impression was rendered 

more difficult to combat by the 

fact that the airplanes used for 

pursuit work are in general 

more difficult to pilot than 

airplanes used in observation 

or bombardment, with the 

\ '\ 
Training 105 

result that a tendency has 

existed to select the best flyer 

for pursuit duty. The idea that 

pursuit was a higher and more 

desirable form of aviation duty 

than observation permeated 

the entire flying personnel of 

the Air Service, with the inevitable result that observation 

pilots and observers lost caste 

among their fellows, and during their training periods, and 

before the true state of affairs 

was revealed to them by active 

service, tended to resent assignment to this duty or to 

regard such assignment as 

proof of their own lack of 

ability. 

Observation Tralning. 

The training of obse 

the American Exped 

Forces commenced 

autumn of 1917, upon the 

arrival of the first brigades of 

artillery in France. Observers 

were detailed from 

gades and the firs 

was given by a Fren 

ron stationed at Le 

This training was soon supplemented by the opening Qf a 

station at Amanty, and by the 

sending of qualified 

men to serve with 

trained in this wa 

Tours. 

It had been decided to use 

the school at Tours as a center 

for training observers and 

observation pilots, but the 

pressure to give preliminary 

training made it impossible to 

use this school for training of 

observers until January 16, 

1918. On this date the observation school was opened and 

the first class of 200 students 

com menced their training . Five other finishing schools 

were put in operation during 

the winter and spring of 1918. 

These were: Chatillon, Souge, 

Le Valdahon, Meucon, and 

Coetquidan. At all of these 

schools observers who had 

finished the course at Tours 

were given actual practice 

with either infantry or artillery 

or both. The increase in the 

strength of the ground army in 

the spring of 1918, and the 

consequent large increase in 

the number of observers and 

observation pilots needed, 

made their production during 

the recent summer and autumn the most pressing Air 

Service training problem. 

Lack of Observer 

Personnel. 

Up to June the chief obstacle to the training had been 

lack of installations and equipment. At this time, however, it 

became apparent that the observer personnel which was 

being received by the Air Service was becoming insufficient, both in number and 

quality. Urgent calls were 

made upon the United States, 

but it soon became evident 

that sufficient personnel 

would not arrive from there in 

time to meet the requirement. 

Of 725 observers called for in 

June and July only 145 arrived 

in August, 86 in September, 

and 149 in October, or a total 

of 380 who could be made 

available for front line work 

before the cessation of hostilities. To meet the deficiency a large number of officers 

were detailed to observer 

schools from the Artillery during the summer and autumn of 

1918; of these 825 passed the 

flying examination and commenced training. In all 1,250 

observers commenced training in the American Expeditionary Forces and 851 graduated.4 The large percentage of 

the men who failed to qualify 

for observer work is the result 

of two factors-the very high 

standard required for the 

modern observer, and the fact 

that it is impossible to instruct 

a student in this extremely 

technical and arduous duty 

unless he himself desires 

earnestly to serve in this 

capacity. In the last phase of 

the war the work of the observer was constantly becoming 

more diversified, more important, and more difficult. 

The training of a largenumber 

of men able to do this work ef- 
106 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

fectively, is to-day, and apparently will continue to be, one 

of the most difficult problems 

confronting the Air Service. 

Pursuit Training. 

The school at lssoudun was 

primarily intended for advanced and pursuit training, 

and all pursuit training has 

been carried on there. After a 

thorough course in advanced 

flying, the student was carefully drilled in acrobatics, 

formation flying, and combat, 

with camera guns installed on 

machines. He was also in 

some cases given special 

training in night flying, the application of which to pursuit 

work was developed to a successful result by the British 

during the last few months of 

the war. After graduation from 

these courses the student was 

given a full course in shooting 

from the air, either at Cazaux 

or the American school at St. 

Jean-de-Monts, or (in cases 

where preliminary gunnery 

training had been received in 

the United States), on a shooting area recently established 

near the school of lssoudun 

itself. In all, 766 pilots were 

graduated as pursuit pilots 

with complete training, including aerial gunnery. Up to 

the close of hostilities 627 of 

these men were sent to the 

Zone of Advance, the balance 

being retained as instructors, 

testers, and staff pilots. 

Secretary of War, Newton D. 

Baker and Brig. Gen. Foulois 

at lssoudun (above). Lf. 

Quentin Roosevelt, son of exPresident Theodore 

Roosevelt, commanded the 

field in 1918. 

108 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Day Bombardment 

Training at ClermontFerrand. 

Bombardment training was 

started on December 1, 1917, 

at the school at ClermontFerrand (Puy-de-Dome), taken over from the French. The 

installation for this work was 

very modest, only two squadrons of enlisted personnel and 

20 Breguet airplanes being 

available. The 17 pilots who 

were first to arrive had received preliminary training 

only and had not only to be 

taught to fly Breguet airplanes 

but also to serve as instructors to train future classes. 

The method of training was 

developed from the French 

and British systems, and was 

directed to impress on the 

students the possibility and 

need of precision bombing. 

The first class of students 

arrived in February, 1918, but 

training was delayed owing to 

the fact that 10 of the 20 

Breguet machines had to be 

set aside for use at the front, 

and no other machines could 

at the time be obtained. It was 

not until September, 1918, that 

the school received DH-4 airplanes, and most of these machines even then were without 

bomb racks. The graduates of 

Ellington Field, the bombing 

school in the United States, 

never arrived in sufficient 

number to keep the schools 

running to capacity, and lack 

of personnel hampered 

throughout the production of 

trained men. In all, the school 

trained up to December 1, 

1918, 212 bombing pilots and 

262 bombers. The average 

number of airplanes at the 

school for this purpose was 

60. 

Night-Bombardment 

Training. 

Owing to the small capacity 

of the school at ClermontFerrand and the location of the 

field, which was situated in a 

valley surrounded by mountains and stretches of country 

on which no landingscould be 

made, night flying could not 

be taught at ClermontFerrand, and it was necessary 

to establish night-bombardment training in a separate 

school. Theairplanes contemplated for use in night bombardment were Handley-Page 

airplanes, equipped with two 

Liberty engines. The parts of 

these machines were to be 

fabricated in America and 

shipped to England to be 

assembled. None of them became available before the ..- 

cessation of hostilities. 

During the spring and summer of 1918 approximately 20 

pilots and 6 observers were 

selected for training as instructors in night bombardment and sent through British 

schools and then to the British front for further experience. These were the only 

officers fully trained in night 

bombardment. In the latter 

part of September, 1918, an 

American school in night 

bombardment was opened at 

Ford Junction in the Chichester training area, England, but 

the delay in receipt of airplanes prevented any effective instruction being given up 

to November 11, when the 

center was evacuated and all 

personnel returned to the 

United States. 

Aerial Gunnery. 

To provide facilities for 

training in aerial gunnery 

constituted one of the most 

difficult problems encountered by the Training Section 

of the Air Service in France. 

When the United States entered the war the importance 

of gunnery training was only 

beginning to be realized, and 

up to this time many British pilots, and most French pilots, 

had been forced to take theair 

without having fired one shot 

from a synchronized machine 
Training 109 

gun mounted on a service machine. The French Government was reluctant to permit 

the promiscuous firing of machine guns from the air, except in districts where inhabitants were not likely to be 

injured, and this made necessary the erection of a school 

either near a large stretch of 

water, or in some very sparsely inhabited area, which was 

most difficult to find in France. 

In addition to these difficulties the delay in supply of machine guns and machine-gun 

ammunition from the United 

States made even effective 

ground-training impossible 

during the early stages. The 

extent of the installation required many be gathered from 

the fact that it was necessary 

to give a course in aerial gunnery to all flying personnel, pilots, observers, and gunners 

who were sent to the front. 

Vital Importance of 

Accurate Shooting. 

The correctness of the idea 

that a fighting airplane should 

be regarded mainly as a moving platform fora machinegun 

has been fully demonstrated, 

and it is hardly too much to say 

that the length of a pilot’s life 

at the front is directly proportionate to his, and his observer’s, ability to shoot. Up to 

the date of the armistice little 

assistance could be expected 

from the United States, owing 

to the lack of service type 

An RAP class in gunnery training. 

machines equipped with synchronized guns available 

there for training. Moreover, 

the long delay necessarily 

intervening between the completion of training in the United States and the arrival of the 

pilot in Europe necessitated in 

all cases further refresher 

courses. 

Gunnery Training 

November 11, 1918. 

At the time of cessation of 

hostilities training in gunnery 

was being carried on by the Air 

Service at St. Jean-de-Monts, 

which had a capacity of between 500 and 600 pilots and 

observers a month. In addition, shooting was being done 

from the air in the areas adjacent to the schools of Issoudun, Tours, Clermont-Ferrand, Chatillon, and Souge, 

and full courses in ground 

gunnery, including courses in 

deflection, were being carried on coincident with flying 

training at all principal 

schools. The camera gun was 

also extensively used in combat and other practice maneuvers, and constant shooting practice, both ground and 

aerial. was given to all pilots in 

squadrons at the front, at 

times when their services were 

not required over the lines. 

The gunnery training of pursuit pilots had by this time 

been transferred from Cazaux to lssoudin and St. Jeande-Monts, but the French 

school was still instructing approximately 100 observers 

and gunners per month. 
110 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Casualties in Training. 

On November 11, 1918, a 

total of 218 pilots and observers had been killed at training centers: 169 were students undergoing instruction 

and 49 were instructors, testers, and transfer pilot^.^ Of 

these accidents 19 deaths 

were due to collision in theair, 

and of the rest, a great many 

can fairly be ascribed to engine failure and lack of judgment or poor flying on the part 

of the pilot. The balance must 

be put down to “causes unknown.” Classification into 

the particular maneuver which 

the machine was performing 

at the time of the crash, such 

as “stall”, “vrille”,e ‘‘side-slip”, 

“dive”, etc. is not very helpful, 

since these effects have probably in all cases resulted from 

the fundamental failure to 

maintain sufficient flying 

speed. 

Greater Danger in P 

Trainlng. 

Examination of the f 

however, shows that the 

number of fatalities i 

rapidly with the use 

fast machines. Thus, 

Avro or similar type o 

nary training airpla 

one death for 3,000 an 

hours need be anticipated, 

while experience has pointed 

out the greatly increased risk 

of training on such machines 

as the Sopwith Camel, Dolphin, and Spad. Of course, the 

fact that these machines are, 

as a rule, used for the more 

advanced and dangerous 

work such as combat, gunnery, and acrobatics, has an 

important bearing on any 

comparative figures. 

Hours Per Fatality. 

In the schools of the American Expeditionary Forces the 

hours flown per fatality vary 

from 2,738 for preliminary 

training, to 1,023 for advanced 

and pursuit training. The general average is 1,173 hours per 

fatality. It seems asafeconclusion that approximately 1 fatality per 1,000 hours is to be 

expected in advanced training under war conditions. The 

proportion of fatalities to 

graduation in the American 

Expeditionary Forces shows 1 

fatality to 90 graduates in preliminary work, 1 fatality to 9.2 

graduations in pursuit tralnfatality to 50 grad in 

observation and bombarding, and an average tl 

ment. The total average appears to be 1 fatality for every 

18 completely trained flying 

officers available for service. 

The Use of Parachutes. 

No method of entirely preventing casualties in flying 

training has been found. It is 

true that parachutes were 

successfully uSed on the front 

by the German Air Service 

during the last few weeks of 

the war, to enable pilots and 

particularly observers, whose 

machines had been shot down 

or set on fire at great altitudes, to land without injury. 

This use of these appliances 

is, however, most recent, and 

is still in the experimental 

stage. The question was being 

studied at the close of hostilities and some examples of 

parachutes and their attachment to the airplane had been 

procured and a number ordered. While experiments indicate that the parachute will 

eventually prove of service in 

furnishing means of escape to 

pilots and observers whose 

airplane catches fire or breaks 

in some vital part at high 

altitude, their value in preventing casualties in training 

seems doubtful, as by far the 

greater proportion of accidents in training are the result 

of conditions which occur at 

altitudes so low that the use of 

a parachute would be 

impossible. 

112 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

The Normal Method 

of Keeping Down 

Casual ties. 

For the present at least it 

seems that proper flying rules, 

rigidly enforced, prompt: elimination of inapt pupils, constant care in the maintenance 

and testing of airplanes, and 

careful attention to the health 

and morale of the flyers themselves are the only method by 

which training casualties can 

be kept down. 

Training 

Accompllrhmenb. 

In considering the results 

accomplished in Air Service 

training in the American Expeditionary Forces, it must be 

borne in mind that the efforts 

made had constantly to be 

directed toward production of 

trained personnel on an enormous scale. The delays which 

are always incident to targescale production and which 

were so fully evidenced in the 

production of ordnance, 

ships, and airplanes during 

the present war, affected 

equally the productions of 

trained personnel. A school to 

turn out 20 pilots a month 

might be constructed and put 

in operation in three wegks. A 

school to turn out 800 pilots a 

month will take ayear before it 

settles into running order. In 

order to reach a fair judgment 

of the results accomplished, 

the figures of the trained 

personnel turned out must be 

considered in connection with 

the development capacity of 

the schools and installations 

at the time of the cessation of 

hostilities. 

Salient Facts. 

Tables and charts annexed 

give full details with respect to 

the personnel under training 

in the American Expeditionary Forces. The following 

figures, however, deserve particular notice. By November 

11, 1918, there had been 

graduated in the American 

Expeditionary Forces 1,674 

fully trained pilots and 851 

observers, of whom 547 were 

aerial observers and the remainder bombers and gunners. Of the personnel graduated 1,402 pilots and 769 

observers’ were sent to the 

Zone of Advance before the 

close of hostilities, the balance at that date being held on 

duty as instructors, testers, 

and transfer pilots. The training of 349 students was 

permanently discontinued 

owing to physical disability, 

inaptitude, and other causes. 

Fatalities in training totaled 

219.8 A total of 2,948 airplanes 

was furnished in the schools 

for training purposes, and 

173,098 hours0 were flown in 

training toNovember11,1918. 

Final Capacity 

of Schools. 

As bearing on the developed capacity of the schools 

at the date of cessation of hostilities, it should be noted that, 

in addition to the above, 675 

pilots and 357 observers were 

graduated during the period 

from November 11, 1918, to 

January 1, 1919, bringing the 

grand total of fully trained flying personnel, piloting and 

nonpiloting, to 3,557. At the 

close of hostilities the Air 

Service was operating 10 

schools1o overseas of which 7 

were constructed by American forces. Personnel was 

also under training in 3 

schools under the jurisdiction 

of allied services. 

Morale. 

The most important element in the success of a flying 

school is morale. It is impossible to teach a man to fly or 

become an observer against 

his will, and in fact no really 

satisfactory results can be accomplished unless students, 

as well as the mechanics and 

workmen, are animated by the 

highest esprit de corps and 

most earnestly desire to succeed themselves, and to have 
Training 113 

the service make a creditable 

showing. Owing to a niumber 

of causes, of which perhaps 

the technical nature of the 

service, its novelty, and the 

danger involved in training, 

are the main ones, the morale 

of flying schools is more sensitive and more easily effected 

than that of other military institutions. It is essential that 

the officers in charge be men 

of charaoter which will command respect and inspire the 

highest confidence in their 

subordinates. It is well for 

them to be masters of the subjects taught and willing themselves to perform any of the 

exercises which they order 

their students to perfarm, In 

this manner only can the 

necessary respect and confidence be inspired. 

Discipline. 

In order to maintain the requisite esprit de corps the 

elimination of undesirableand 

unfit students must be prompt 

and rigid. The disciplip enforced must be of a character 

which will not only keep the 

pilot out of trouble at the 

school, but will fit him to assume heavy individual responsibility. It must be remembered that in action the pilot is 

necessarily his own master 

and that treatment of him as a 

school boy and not as a man 

during the course of his instruction, though it may save 

trouble at the time, will tend to 

produce an irresponsible and 

worthless officer. The principle should be to give the students, especially when commissioned, such liberty as will 

tend to let them “find” themselves during their course of 

instruction and those who are 

not able to comport themselves properly under such 

conditions should be 

eliminated. 

Delays in Training. 

Delays in training must be 

avoided as much as possible, 

also excessive purposeless 

flying. Experience indicates 

that most men are at their best 

between approximately 100 

and 300 hours, and that they 

rapidly lose keetmess after 

flying more than the latter 

amount at schools. In short, 

great care must be taken to do 

everything to encourage the 

highest morale obtainable, 

and all factors which militate 

against it must, wherever 

possible, be eliminated. 

The Industrial Side 

of a Flying School. I 

Flying training differs primarily from all other forms of 

military training, in the 

amount of special equipment 

required, its enormous cost, 

and the difficulty of maintaining it in a serviceable condition. A flying field, to render 

efficient service, must be in 

effect a factory on a large 

scale. It must have shops with 

the latest high-speed machinery, and storehouses for 

the carrying of enormous 

quantities of spare parts. This 

aspect of a flying school is 

sometimes overlooked, but it 

becomes evident when the 

machine shop, construction, 

repair, and supply activities of 

a large school are considered. 

lssoudun Cited 

as Typical. 

The main shops at lssoudun 

comprised a machine shop, a 

foundry, a magneto repair department, an acetylene welding room, and a room for instrument repair, where the 

most delicate instruments 

could be wholly remodeled, 

repaired, or rebuilt. In addition the Aero Repair Department is equipped to repair or 

construct any portion of an 

airplane, including wings, 

spars, struts, and even cables. 

At a time when thisschool was 

averaging 500 to 600 flying 

hours a day, the shops were 

called upon to turn out, after 

complete overhaul, 100 to 120 

engines a week, and the Aero 

Repair Department to rebuild 

from the ground up, out of 

spares and salvaged parts, 
114 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

more than 20 airplanes a week. 

When it is considered that the 

complete overhaul of the 

simplest aviation engine requires approximately 100 

man-hours, and that 32 full 

working days are required for 

the rebuilding of an airplane, 

the magnitude of the above 

figures becomes striking. This 

work, moreover, did not ihclude top overhaul and minor 

(in some cases even major) 

airplane repairs, which were 

made at the outlying fields of 

the school, each of which had 

its own shops. 

The Need of Standardizing 

Tralnlng Planes. 

Bearing in mind the factory 

element in a school, and the 

number of highly trained 

mechanicians required to carry it on, the necessity of reducing so far as possible the 

number of types of airplanes 

used at any one instattation 

becomes evident. Owing to 

the fact that the Air Service 

could not secure in Europe the 

types of training machines 

which it desired, but had to 

take such machines as were 

procurable, no less than 32 

types of airplanes were at 

various times in use at Issoudun, 17 types of Nieuports 

alone being constantly in service. This resulted in thesupply 

department of that school 

having to carry approximately 44,000 separate airplane parts and 20,000 different engine parts. The amount 

of supplies required at a 

school of this size is enormous. Between 50 and 100 

carloads of material have been 

received at lssoudun in a single day. While the difficulty of 

conducting the factory end of 

this school, could, of course, 

be diminished under ideal 

conditions, it is clear that this 

element of the flying school 

must always constitute the 

most important part of its ini 

stallation and any disregard of 

it or of the railroad communications which are necessary 

to make it possible will result 

in failure. 

Training of 

Engineer Officers. 

The training of the engineer 

officers, who must conduct 

these factory activities, and 

supervise the maintenance of 

airplanes, in squadrons and at 

outlying posts, requires careful attention. It has been found 

that the only men competent 

for this work were men who, 

before entering the Army, had 

had practical mechanical experience as a part of their 

professions or means of livelihood. No academic course 

can fit men to supervise properly these activities. The 

mechanics used for the actual 

labor are in many cases highly 

trained workmen, with long 

experience, and the result of 

placing them under the immediate command of officers 

less experienced than themselves is disastrous. 

Fine Quality of Enlisted 

Personnel. 

During the past year, the 

work of the enlisted mechanics of the Air Service, in shops 

and squadrons, has been 

beyond praise. Drawn in many 

cases from highly remunerative trades, they pursued these 

same trades in the American 

Expeditionary Forces, under 

the dullest and most difficult 

conditions and for the modest 

remuneration of the soldier, 

with an enthusiasm and success deserving the highest 

commendation. On frequent 

occasions, to offset lack of 

man power, work was carried 

on in shops throughout the 

night so as to have the airplanes ready for use in the 

morning, and extra work outside of hours was more the 

rule than the exception. 
Training 115 

The Layout of a School. 

In order to permit the expansion of a school to any 

measurable size, its activities 

must be divided between outlying fields. Failure to appreciate this fact leads to 

many expensive installations, 

which are neither wholly wasted, or the use of which is seriously impaired by the fact that 

they are concentrated at one 

point. The number of machines which can be used effectively, without danger of 

collision, on any given field, 

no matter how large, is limited. 

A considerable increase in 

flying can only be accomplished by placing fields at a 

distance of some 2 or 3 miles 

from the main field, in order to 

provide the necessary air 

room. These separate installations must be self-contained 

and able to operate independently; their only relation with 

the main field being reliance 

upon it for supply and major 

airplane and engine repairs. At 

the date of the armistice, 10 

separate fields were in operation at the school of Issoudun. 

Of these fields, the first three, 

devoted to the more elementary training , were cI ustered 

about the school headquarters. The seven additional 

fields were wholly separate 

and complete installations, 

placed at a distance of several 

miles from the main camp. In 

addition, a landing field was 

reserved for use of the acrobatics class, no installation 

being placed there, however. 

This system permitted indefinite expansion, established a high esprit decorpsat 

the different fields, and permitted ready comparison as to 

the respective merits of officers and engineers in charge 

of the commands. 

Selection of 

Flying Instructors. 

In Air Service training, as in 

all other training, the ability 

and character of the instructors is the most important 

factor making for success or 

failure. The greatest possible 

care should be given to the 

selection of flying instructors. 

Not every man who is himself a 

good flyer can impart his 

knowledge. The instructor, in 

addition to being an excellent 

flyer, must be able to analyze 

his pupils thoroughly, and to 

impart his knowledge in the 

manner in which it can best be 

assimilated by ,them. It is an 

advantage, and of course 

lends great weight to the instructor’s word, if in addition 

to his qualities he isa man who 

has had actual experience on 

the front, but the mere fact of 

having experienceon the front 

by no means qualifies him as 

an instructor. The work done 

at all times by instructors and 

testers can not be too highly 

praised. They were drawn 

necessarily from among men 

of exceptional ability as pilots, who possessed, in addition, qualities of character far 

above the average. Their duties at schools were not only 

monotonous, but in some 

cases, as in testing and combat instruction, extremely 

dangerous. It presented little 

chance for their advancement and defeated their one 

great ambition to serve over 

the lines. The patience and 

uncomplaining devotion to 

duty of our instructors can 

never receive sufficient recognition. 

XI, The Supply Section. 117 

The Fruit of a Vast Effort. 

On November 11, 1918, 

there were 45 American 

squadrons working along 137 

kilometers of the western 

front. These 45 fighting units 

represented the fruit of a vast 

and far-reaching effort in 

which every section of the Air 

Service played its part, and 

one of the most intricate problems involved in this effort, 

that of equipment and supply, 

was met and solved by the 

Supply Section.’ 

Actlvltbo of the Supply 

Section. 

The Supply Section handled 

all aviation material from its 

arrival or purchase overseas to 

the moment of its final distribution to training centersorto 

units in the Zone of Advance. 

At the close of hostilities, the 

quantity of aviation freigM had 

reached a daily avera e d 500 

tons. The Material tivirion, 

which had charge of incoming 

material at the seven base 

ports, had a personnel of 1,200 

and handled as many as 1,700 

requisitions and 1,300 manifests per month. A system of 

depots was established and 

operated by the Supply Section to store and distribute 

material; the principal one 

of these, the First Air Depot 

at Colom bey-les-Belbs, handled an average of 18 tons of a 

wide variety of material per 

day. The most important Air 

Service project in France, Air 

Service Production Center 

No. 2 at Romorantin, planned, 

maintained, and operated by 

the Supply Section, was in 

itself a huge industrial enterprise. It was here that the 

DH-4 airplanes received from 

the United States were assembled, tested, and equipped with all accessories. From 

May 11, 1918, when the first 

American-built airplane arrived in France, to the close 

of hostilities, a total of 1,087 

DH-4 airplanes were assembled at Romorantin, and 

of this number 543 were dispatched to the front. During 

the same period, Production 

Center No. 2 had also salvaged 308 airplanes and a 

great number of engines, reclaiming wornout or crashed 

material which would otherwise have been a total loss 

to the Service. In order to 

meet the 202-squadron program had the war continued, 

there would have been necessary at Romorantin a personnel of more than 25,000. At the 

close of hostilities there were 

50 acres of covered floor 

space, 509 acres of prepared 

flying field, and a personnel of 

12,000 officers and soldiers. 

Purchasing in Europe. 

The Supply Section purchased all material which the 

Air Service found it necessary 

to procure in Europe. A total of 

5,151 airplanes was secured 

from European sources. 

France alone furnishing us 

with 4,874. An average of 

spare engines in the proportion of 1 to 4 was maintained 

for service airplanes brought 

overseas, and our squadrons 

were furnished with quantities 

of spare parts 50 per cent in 

excess of those furnished by 

the French to similar units. 

Orly. 

Three weeks after the site 

had been located on the map, 

the aviation acceptance park 

at Orly was built and in operation. This park was used for 

the reception of foreign-built 

airplanes, which were 

equipped with machine guns, 

instruments, and other accessories at Orly before being 

flown to the front. On November 11, 1918, there was at 

Orly a personnel of 323 officers and 2,283 en-listed men. 

The park was designed to 

equip 25 airplanes daily, but 

during active operations as 

many as 91 airplanes have left 

the field for the front in the 

course of a single day. Al- 




122 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

The Airplane and Motor 

Division. 

The Airplane and Motor Division of the Supply Section 

placed orders and accepted 

deliveries from the French of 

airplanes, engines, and spare 

parts. As the French were unable to furnish fully equipped 

airplanes, it was necessary to 

equip and test every airplane 

dispatched to the schools or to 

the front. The acceptance park 

at Orly was organized under 

direction of this division, and 

when American-built airplanes began to be assembled at Romorantin, a system 

was organized for dispatching airplanes from that center 

as well. Every airplane bought 

in Europe was subjected to a 

rigid test and inspection before acceptance. Test groups, 

consisting of a pilot, an inspector, an airplane mechanic, an engine mechanic, and a 

clerk, went the rounds of the 

French fields where airplanes 

awaited our acceptance, and 

each airplane in this way 

received a trial flight and a 

careful inspection by experts. 

Out of all the airplanes presented by the French for 

acceptance, only 2,100 were 

accepted when first presented. After defects had been 
Supply Section 1 23 

remedied, 597 airplanes were 

accepted after one rejection 

and 191 after two rejections; a 

few airplanes were accepted 

after as many as six rejections, which were neaessary in 

order to enforce the remedy 

for serious defects. The majority of rejections were due to 

poor quality of material, but 

many were due to poor flying 

qualities developed in thetrial, 

or to engine troublb dkovered either on the groundor in 

flight. It was the ori$inal idea 

of the French Government to 

deliver its airplanes to us at Le 

Bourget, near Paris, but during March, 1918, the Germans bombed this place and 

destroyed several $pad airplanes already accepted by 

the American Air Service. The 

French then notified us that 

we would have to establish an 

acceptance park of our own, 

as they quite naturally ref used to assume responsibi I i ty 

for American property; Orly 

was the result. Orly will be remembered as one of the most 

compact, efficient, and notable projects of the Air Service in France. On March 31, 

1918, the field existed only in 

the minds of its founders; on 

April 6, the first lot of airplanes was accepted there, 

and at the close of hostilities 

there were 78 hangars, scores 

of barracks and buildings, several miles of cinder road, and 

complete water, light, and 

telephone facilities. The average length of time between the 

arrival of an airplane and its 

dispatch, fully equipped and 

tested, to the front was two to 

three days. More than 97 per 

cent of these airplanes 

reached their destination safely, and 86 per cent arrived at 

the front without forced landings. There were dispatched 

from Orly tothefront altogether more than 1,800 airplanes 

fully equipped and 332 unequipped, as well as 1,000 

which were sent to the various 

American schools throughout France. In addition to the 

acceptance park at Orly, the 

Airplane and Motor Division 

operated two depots-one at 

Vinets, where airplanes and 

spare parts were stored in the 

Zone of Advance, and one at 

Chatenay, where great quantities of spare parts for airplanes and engines were concentrated, at a point readily 

accessible to the front, but at a 

reasonably safe distance from 

the enemy. 

Materiel Divislon. 

The Materiel Division of the 

Supply Section maintained 

and operated port clearance 

offices and base and intermediate depots, kept stock 

records of all material handled 

by the division in France, prepared tonnage priority schedules, and maintained records 

of tonnage allotments, kept 

records of aviation production in the United States, received all accomplished requisitions for general aviation 

material, and prepared forecasts for general material to be 

purchased in Europe and 

statements of that to be procured from the United States. 

The work of this division may 

be judged from the fact that 

up to the close of hostilities 

it received more than 10,000 

requisitions, issued more than 

7,600 manifests, and made 

more than 4,300 purchase recommendations. Its personnel 

grew from 150 in December, 

1917, to 1,213 on November 

11, 1918. The base depots 

operated by the Materiel Division were located at Clichy, 

Tours, and Romorantin, and 

the intermediate depot was 

placed at Is-sur-Tille. The latter depot made shipments to 

more than 40 different units of 

the Air Service, exclusive of 
124 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

isolated shipments to individuals, and to one-half of 

these consignees the depot 

made regular shipments at 

weekly intervals or oftener. 

More than 90 per cent of all 

orders received were acted 

upon and the material placed 

in the hands of the forwarding 

agencies within 24 hours. 

Aviation clearance officers 

were maintained at the ports 

of St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Le 

Havre, Brest, Marseille, La 

Pallice, and London. The tonnage that passed through 

these ports was enormous, 

including as it did gasoline, 

oil, airplanes, engines, and all 

other aviation material received from the United States. 

Purchasing Division. 

The Purchasing Division of 

the Supply Section was organized to supply the Air Service with whatever materials 

and supplies it was necessary 

to procure in Europe, thus 

forming a central purchasing 

agency to control all buying 

for the Air Service, American 

Expeditionary Forces. A somewhat complicated procedure was necessary before the 

French purchasing boards 

and the French Government 

would approve our orders, and 

for this work a special department of the division was organized, whose function was to 

visit the various French bureaus each day to place our 

orders before the proper officials, and thus to obtain as 

prompt action as possible. 

Transportation Division. 

The function of the Transportation Division of the 

Supply Section was to secure 

transportation for the Air Service units. Owing to the shortage of transportation throughout the whole American 

Expeditionary Forces and the 

fact that on August 15, 1918, 

the Motor Transport Corps 

took over entire control of allocation of transportation in 

the American Expeditionary 

Forces, the problem was 

chiefly one of liaison with G-4, 

general headquarters, and 

with the Motor Transport 

Corps. To carry on this liaison 

work to the best advantage, 

Air Service transportation officers were attached to the 1st 

Army, to the 2d Army, and to 

the office of the Chief of Air 

Service at general headquarters, American Expeditionary 

Forces. Routine liaison work 

with the Motor Transport 

Corps, and G-4, Services of 

Supply, was carried on by the 

Assistant Chief of Transportation in the office of the 

division at Tours. 

Disbursing and 

Legal Division. 

The foundation upon which 

the Disbursing Division of the 

Supply Section, first organized in August, 1917, built its 

structure was the clauseof the 

aviation supply contract negotiated with the French Government on May 3, 1918, 

which provided that the 

French Government should 

furnish us with aviation materials of the same quality and 

type as those furnished its 

own units. There is not space 

in this report to enlarge on the 

complex and delicate work 

performed by the Disbursing 

Division, but its experience 

has thrown light on certain 

basic facts which seem worthy 

of mention. It has been proved 

that initial appropriations in 

time of war should be large 

enough to meet any possible 

demands, and that such appropriations should not bedesigned to cover a specified 
Supply Section 125 

period, but should cover the 

emergency as long as it exists. 

Regulations governing the 

method of expenditure should 

be made to conform to the 

laws of the country in which 

business is being done, rather 

than to the requirements of a 

set of rules made in peace 

times in accordance with the 

laws of the United States. 

Oxygen Equipment 

Division. 

The task of the Oxygen 

Equipment Division of the 

Supply Section was to organize the supply, installation, 

and maintenance of equipment to furnish oxygen for 

pilots flying at high altitudes. 

The investigation of the Medical Board has proved the great 

value of oxygen under these 

circumstances. The division 

on November 11, 1918, was in 

a position to cover the maximum needs of the Air Service. 

During the summer of 1918, it 

was necessary to purchase a 

certain amount of equipment 

in France, but at the close of 

hosti I ities oxygen eq ui pment 

was beginning to arrive from 

the United States. 

Hangar Division. 

The duties of the Hangar 

Division of the Supply Section were purely administrative, as the personnel for 

handling and erecting hangars was supplied by depots 

and other stations of the Air 

Service. The problem of SUPplying hangars was like the 

airplane problem, for it was 

necessary to obtain simultaneously large quantities of 

material both from Europeand 

from the United States. This 

was not easy, as the French 

had few hangars to spare, and 

during the German advance in 

the spring of 1918, the hangar 

situation was grave. Steel 

hangars did not begin to arrive 

from the United States until 

July, 1918, and in August 

deliveries began on hangars 

which had been ordered from 

the British. At the close of hostilities all requisitions for 

hangars had been filled and 

there was a reserve of some 

200 steel hangarsat Romorantin. 

Information Division. 

The Information Division of 

the Supply Section was 

charged with compiling the 

Equipment Manual, which 

included also general infor- 
126 U.S. Air Service 

in World' War I 

VOl. I 

mation on aerial armament, 

photography, quartermaster, 

radio, transportation, medical, 

and chemical warfare equipment. The scope of this manual was broadened in order to 

assist future squadron commanders, who would prokbly 

be selected from among pilots 

on active duty and not entirely familiar with all the 

branches of their new work. 

The Information Division acted also as a central infonnation office for the Supply Section. 

Production and 

Maintenance Division. 

The Production and Maintenance Division of the Supply Section, which formed a 

major part of the organization 

of Air Service Production Center No. 2, saw the growth at 

Romorantin of an industrial 

community of 10,000 where 10 

months before a pine forest 

stood. Airplanes and engines 

arriving from the United States 

were sent to Romorantin for 

assembly, equipped with armament and accessories, and 

dispatched to the front. Damaged airplanes and engines 

from all parts of the front were 

sent to Romorantin for salvage 

and repair, a valuable service 

of reclamation. At the close of 

hostilities, Romorantin was a 

large manufacturing plant, 

complete in every detail and 

equipped to assemble engines 

and airplanes, to make tests, 

and to do armament and photographic work of all kinds. 

With its equipment and skilled 

personnel, this plant could 

produce equally well a delicate instrument or an airplane engine. There was also a 

supply depot for general aviation supplies and equipment, a 

depot for raw material, steel 

hangars, and construction 

supplies, and a large spare 

parts depot for American 

airplanes and engines. The 

total construction at Romorantin amounted to more than 

2,800,000 square feet: 36,000 

linear feet of roads had been 

laid; there were 55,000 feet of 

railroads and 425 acres of 

flying field. This construction 

was accomplished only by the 

utmost determination and 

ingenuity: at one time the 

shortage of lumber became so 

serious that it was necessary 

to erect a sawmill to cut up 

timber felled in clearing the 

grounds for flying fields. On 

another occasion, when it 

became impossible to obtain 

demountable barracks, special barracks were designed 

and built out of the packing 

cases in which DH airplanes 

were shipped.3 

The Production and Maintenance Division opened its 

office at Romorantin on March 

31, 1918. On April 1, the first 

work of preparing for airplane 

assembly was begun, and 

when the first DH-4 airplane 

arrived at Romorantin, on May 

11, 1918, there was a crew of 

35 men available to begin its 

assembly, testing, and dispatch to the front. On November 11, 1918, there were 

1,101 men available for DH-4 

assembly work. During many 

months, particularly while 

preparations were being made 

for the American offensives, 

Romorantin was kept going 

day and night. The record for 

the dispatch of airplanes to the 

front was established when 60 

airplanes were dispatched in 

one day. Of all the airplanes 

dispatched to air depots at the 

front, 200 miles away, only 5% 

per cent have been crashed en 

route, and onequarter of 

these crashes were due to fog, 

rain, and other causes beyond control. No casualties 

have occurred to Air Service 

production center pilots on 

the field at Romorantin, and 

only two lives have been lost 

on ferry duty. Regarding the 

DH-4 aircraft ot the US. Air Service at 

Romorantin. 
Supply Section 127 

work of salvage and repair, 

889 DH-4 airplanes and 295 

airplanes of foreign make 

were received in a damaged 

condition. Deliveries of repaired airplanes were small as 

compared with airplanes received, but it must be kept in 

mind that no airplane wassent 

to Romorantin if it were possible to repair it elsewhere. If 

major repairs of engines had 

been permitted at squadron 

airdromes and air parks at the 

front, the number of spare 

parts required to keep complete stocks at these points 

would have been enormous, 

and it, therefore, was necessary to centralize the major 

repairs of engines at Romorantin. In spite of the great difficulties arising from the shortage of spare parts for foreign 

engines, the Engine Repair 

Department has acquitted 

itself well. Spare Parts Depot 

No. 2, which was located at 

Romorantin handled all the 

spare parts for Liberty engines 

and DH-4 airplanes used in 

France. Up to the close of 

hostilities this depot had received more than 2,600 propellers and issued more than 

1,600; 2,706 Liberty engines 

were received and 1,199 were 

issued. The depot had received 1,526 wings and issued 

1,038. A total of more than 

3,750 tons of material was 

handled by this depot. 

The London Branch. 

In order to obtain from 

British sources supplies which 

it was becoming more and 

more difficult to procure in 

France, the London branch of 

the Supply Section was established on June 18, 1918. Several airplane orders had been 

placed through the British 

Government, and this fact also 

made it desirable, for purposes of inspection, acceptance, and dispatch to France, 

to establish an office in London, where the movements of 

airplanes could be recorded, 

and to which ferry pilots could 

report and receive instructions. The officer in charge of 

this branch reported to the 

aviation officer, base section 

No. 3, Service of Supply, and 

also to the Chief of the Supply 

Section in Paris. In the beginning, the work of the London 
128 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

branch was somewhat hampered by the fact that the 

British Air Ministry could be 

approached only by permission of the general purchasing 

agent in Great Britain. On 

August 21, the Chief of the 

Supply Section authorized the 

London Branch to initiate all 

Air Service purchases necessary in England, and the 

general purchasing agent of 

Great Britain was instructed to 

that effect by the general purchasing agent of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

The London Branch also acted as purchasing agent forthe 

Night Bombardment Section 

with the British authorities or 

in the open market. In the 

beginning, British inspection 

was employed for all airplanes dispatched to France, 

but it was found later that 

some friction was avoided by 

American inspection of the 

SE-5 airplanes sent from 

England. 

Projects and 

Designs Division. 

The Projects and Designs 

Division had charge of the 

selection of sites for projects, 

obtained the necessary approvals, prepared projects for 

construction, and made surveys and layouts. In the beginning, this division had 

charge of the actual construction, but later all Gonstruction work forthe Air Service was turned over to the 

Director of Construction and 

Forestry , Corps of Engineers. 

The 1st Air Depot. 

In closing this brief account 

of the activities of the Suppty 

Section, it is fitting that mention be made of the 1st Air 

Depot at Colombey-lesBelles. Lying 11 miles south of 

Toul, this site was chosen as a 

convenient location for an 

advanced supply depot, and 

on November 11, 1918, Colom bey-les-Belles was the 

only large air depot in the 

Zone of Advance. Nearly all 

airplanes and supplies for 

squadrons operating on the 

front were received at Colombey-les-Belles, and a large 

amount of repair work on airplanes and enginesof a nature 

which could not be done in 

squadrons, was done at this 

depot. Construction began on 

November 1,1917, and 75 per 

cent of theoriginal project was 

complete on April 5, 1918.' At 

the close of hostilities, 90 

officers and 2,000 soldiers 

were engaged in carrying on 

the work of the depottransportation, advance supply, quartermaster, machine 

shops, airplane repairs, and 

airplane acceptance and replacements. During the month 

of September, 1918, 2,595 

requisitions were handled. 

These requisitions were from 

units in the Zone of Advance, 

and each one comprised from 

40 to 50 items. At the time of 

the armistice, this air depot 

was supplying 23 headquarters groups, 18 observation 

squadrons, 7 bombardment 

squadrons, 20 pursuit squadrons, 12 park squadrons, 8 

photographic sections, and 23 

balloon companies. Between 

April 1 and November 11, 

1918, it dispatched more than 

206,000 gallons of transportation gasoline, nearly 280,000 

gallons of aviation gasoline, 

more than 167,000 gallons of 

special fighting gasoline, 

more than 47,000 gallons of 

castor oil, and 27,000 gallons 

of mineral oil. It was only on 

the day that the armistice was 

signed that the Quartermaster 

Department took over the 

gasoline and oil business of 

the 1st Air Depot. The Airplane Repair Department received more than 175 crashed 

airplanes in August, 1918, and 

of these 52 were rebuilt and 

returned to service; in all, the 

1st Air Depot rebuilt and 

returned to service 237 

crashed airplanes. On the 

airplane acceptance and replacement field, many 

hundred airplanes were often 

in storage at one time. Since 

United States have turned in 

their airplanes and Air Service equipment to this air depot. 


XIL Tbe Technical Section. 131 

Origin and Functions. 

Technical questions pertaining to aeronautics were 

first handled in the American 

Expeditionary Forces by the 

aeronautical mission of the 

Aircraft Production Board. 

Upon the dissolution of this 

mission and the return of most 

of its members to the United 

States, an officer who had 

been one of its members remained in Paris, assigned to 

the Air Service, Line of Communications, and eapecially 

charged with the responsibility of obtaining technical information for the useof the Air 

Service. The organization 

which was gradually built up 

from this origin became the 

Technical Section, Air Service, whose function was the 

preparation of aeronautical 

data to be sent to the United 

States, the recommendation 

for the placing of orders for 

material to be used in the Air 

Service, and the selection of 

types of airplanes, instruments, and equipment for 

immediate use. The work of 

the section was done by 

divisions specializing in airplanes, engines, airplane instruments, metallurgy, order 

and acceptance, chemistry, 

technical data, history and 

research, and drafting. Inconjunction with the duties of the 

section there was maintained 

an aviation experimental field. 

Of these nine divisions, seven 

formed part of the initial 

organization. One other division, Armament, was later 

transferred from the province 

of the Technical Section.’ The 

entire trend of the work of this 

section was toward the practical, rather than the theoretical. Experimental work was 

done only when necessary in 

the betterment of existing 

material. Work of a research 

nature was not developed until 

the fall of 1918, and then only 

to secure information as to 

the comparative value of different types of aviation material. By making recommendations and suggestions 

regarding the best types of 

materials obtainable, the 

Technical Section aimed toward the highest degree of efficiency in the Air Service. 

Growth. 

In August, 1917, one officer 

was engaged in the technical 

work of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. In 

November, 1917, the total personnel was 50, of whom 19 

were officers. At the close of 

hostilities the section possessed a roster of 126 officers, 276 soldiers, and 55 

civilians; a total of 457, of 

whom 26 officers and 193 

soldiers and 1 civilian were 

located at the experimental 

field, American Aviation Acceptance Park No. 1, at Orly. 

Summary of Duties of 

Technical Section. 

In its relations to the development and improvement of 

the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, the Technical Section was charged 

with a large number of most 

important duties and with 

direct responsibility for aeronautical progress. To the 

Chief of Air Service it gave 

information accompanied by 

recommendations on the 

technical problems which 

faced the Air Service. In view 

of the entire lack of standardized equipment of all kinds, 

the Technical Section was 

charged with the approval of 

all new designs in airplanes, 

engines, and accessoryequipment before their official 

adoption and purchase. The 

Technical Section decided all 

questions of airplanes and 

airplane equipment, with the 

exception of armament, photographic, and radio material, 

which concerned the section 

only as regards problems of 

installation. The investigation 

of new equipment, as well as 

experimental and test work 

necessary in the development 

of aviation equipment under 
132 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

production, was under control 

of this section. Data on the 

performance of all airplanes, 

engines, and accessories in 

field service and determlnation of their comparative 

values were a portion of the 

information which was collected and organized. When 

such information made it 

evident that changes and 

modifications should be made 

in any type of equipment, the 

approval of the Technical 

Section was called for. The 

preparation of specifications 

and orders for the procurement of aeronautical equipment in the United States or 

from foreign Governments 

was a portion of its duties, as 

was also the inspection for 

acceptance of the material 

received from foreign Governments. With especial regard to 

the collection and proper 

filing of information, theTechnical Section prepared instructional manuals and descriptive pamphlets and 

bulletins concerning the operation, maintenance, adjustment, and repair ofthevarious 

types of airplanes and equipment in use, and compiled for 

reference in this connectlon 

complete technical files and 

bulletins giving the results of 

studies and investigations 

with which it was concerned. 

The Alrplane Division. 

The most important accomplishment of the Airplane 

Division of the Technical Section was the improvements 

which it effected in the DH-4 

airplane. Investigations and 

recommendations were made, 

and approval obtained, for the 

installation of protective gasoline tanks on the DH-4 and 

other types of airplanes. At the 

close of hostilities the first lot 

of these tanks which were then 

in production, had arrived at 

the 1st Air Depot. A DH-4 airplane was remodeled into a 

DH-9 type for the purpose of 

obtaining information relative to the performance of the 

U 

latter machine. In liaison with 

the Aircraft Armament Section, armored seats for the 

protection of pilots were designed, and a DH-4 airplane, 

equipped with eight machine 

guns for “ground strafing” 

purposes, had been dispatched to the Zone of Advance. Mud guards to prevent 

the breaking of DH-4 propellers by flying mud were designed and sample sets produced. Studies were made in 

the design of camera suspensions to apply to the DH-4 and 

Salmson 2A2 airplanes. The 

Nieuport training machine 

was somewhat remodeled 

upon recommendations of 

this division. 

Aviation Mechanics uniform 

insignia of the U.S. Air Service. 
Technical Section 133 

Engine Division. 

The Engine Division, which 

dated from November, 1917, 

made like contributions with 

respect to engines. It had 

investigated the changes necessary to improve the deeign 

and fittings of the QhOme160- 

horsepower engine for the 

Nieuport Type 28; these airplanes, as modified, were 

ready for delivery at the close 

of hostilities. In connection 

with the installation of protective tanks on the DH-4, the 

Selden pump 'nonpressure 

gasoline system was installed. 

Successfu I i nvestigatlons 

were conducted regarding oil, 

spark plug, and ignition troubles, as encountered with 

Liberty and other engines. Experiments in carburation and 

various other engine tests 

were carried out at the experimental field for the information of squadrons at training 

centers and with the armies. 

Airplane instrument 

Dlvlslon. 

Since October, 1917, recommendations coricerning 

the purchase of different types 

of airplane instruments has 

been in the hands of the Airplane Instrument Division of 

the Technical Section. ThiS division has assisted the Supply 

Section in obtaining prompt 

deliveries and has superintended the installation of instruments on airplanes at the 

aviation acceptance park. 

During its existence, the Instrument Division has completed 40 separate tests of 

airplanes, under conditions as 

nearly as possible approximating those at the front. 

Studies were made of British 

and French methods of testing. Following special experiments which were made on 

various types of parachutes, 

recommendations were made 

as to the most efficient types. 

A large number of new designs of instruments were investigated and reported upon 

with a view to their adaptability to the material in use and 

their probable success. 

Metallurgy Division. 

With respect to the comparative qualities of the metals 

used in airplanes, in engines, 

and as fittings, the Division of 

Metallurgy has conducted exhaustive laboratory experiments. Availing itself of the 

laboratory facilities generously offered by the Citroen 

Works, the Metallurgy Division has supervised all tests 

made in connection with metals used by the Air Service. It 

has analyzed broken parts of 

engines and metal fittings of 

airplanes and made recommendations concerning the 

proper specifications of metals to be used. It has likewise 

maintained inspection at the 

plants supplying metal products, recommending as it saw 

fit that certain changes be 

made in the manufactured 

products. 

Order and 

Acceptance Dlvlslon. 

The Work of the Order and 

Acceptance Division has been 

concerned solely with orders 

placed with foreign Governmehts for aeronautic material 

and with the inspection of this 

material. Since April, 1918, 

this division has flight-tested 

all foreign-built airplanes submitted for acceptance. Upon 

the signing of the armistice, 

the personnel of the division 

then engaged in acceptance 

work was transferred, by request, to the French board for 

the acceptance of airplanes. 

This placing of Americans on 

the French board of acceptance came as a consequence 

of the thorough inspection 

service previously maintained 

by the members of the Order 

and Acceptance Division. 

Chemical Division. 

The Chemical Division collected information relative to 

the standardization of airplane dope, the methbds of 

camouflage and the fabrics in 

use, and compiled chemical 

data of interest to theAirService. It obtained analyses of 
134 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

water, gasoline, oil, varnish, 

glues, and paints in order to 

facilitate future orders for 

these materials. 

Technical Data and 

History and Research. 

The Divisions of Technical 

Data and History and Research were among the last organized. Their special functions were the collection and 

compilation of technical information in such forms as to 

make it of practical service. 

Particular attention was paid 

to obtaining the most accurate 

historical information available bearing upon the design, 

employment, and history of 

the different types of airplane 

material; this has been done 

with a view to having concise 

and accurate information after 

the war.2 

The Draftlng Division. 

The Drafting Division has 

furnished drawings and blueprints as needed by the different divisions of the Technical 

Section and by other sections 

of the Air Service. During its 

existence it has completed a 

total of 1,400 tracings and 

drawings and 75,000 blueprints. 

Experlrnental Field. 

In connection with Aviation 

Acceptance Park No. 1 at Orly 

an experimental field was 

maintained, where were conducted airplane and engine 

tests and experimentation in 

equipment. The aerial testing 

of radio apparatus was largely 

the duty of this field in the 

early days of its inception. It 

also assisted in the acceptance of the Marlin synchronized machine gun for use on 

the DH-4 and other American 

airplanes. At this experimental field was performed also 

the work made necessary by 

the changes in the typesof airplanes and by the adaptation 

of airplanes to meet the requirements imposed by service at the front. 

Lialson. 

Through special officers detailed for this work the Technical Section maintained a close 

liaison with the Air Services of 

the Allies. At London a branch 

office of theTechnical Section 

was established to devote 

itself exclusively to obtaining 

information regarding aeronautical progress in England. 

The section was particularly 

closely allied to the French 

Section Technique, from 

which much valuable information was obtained. A technical officer was also stationed in Italy. At the 

production center at Romorantin officers representing 

the section assisted in solving 

the technical problems which 

arose. Technical questions 

arising in the Zone of Advance 

were taken up and acted upon 

through representatives of the 

Technical Section, traveled between Paris, the first 

Air Depot, and the squadron at 

the front. 

Value of Section. 

The Technical Section of 

the Air Service has rendered 

material assistance in connection with the procurement 

of technical equipment and 

supplies. It has given sound 

advice on important aeronautical questions. The permanent files of technical information which have been 

collected have been and will 

hereafter be of great value. It 

has cooperated heartily with 

all branches of the Air Service. In these ways the Technical Section of the Air Service 

has proved its worth and has 

demonstrated that such a 

body composed of experts in 

the different lines must be 

maintained as a component 

part of the Air Service as an aid 

in future development of aeronautics. 


XIII. The Balloon Section. 137 

No Balloon Service 

Before the War. 

The United States Army had 

almost no Balloon Service 

previous to our declaratiw of 

war. On December 18, 1917, 

four companies, comprlsing 

the 2d Balloon Squadron, arrived overseas, and were assigned to Artillery training 

centers in the Services of SupPly. 

Size of the 

Balloon Section. 

The general organization 

project, as amended and completed by the service of the 

rear project, for the American 

Expeditionary Forces, called 

for 69 balloon companies, and 

the revised project, approved 

by general headquarters, 

American Expeditionary Forces, on August 17, 1918, provided for a total of 133 companies by June 30, 1919. 

According to the latter schedule, 70 balloon Companies 

should have arrived in France 

by October 31, 1918. There 

were actually, at the cessation 

of hostilities, a total of 35 

companies operating in 

France, of which two had been 

organized from balloon casuals in the American Expeditionary Forces. Of these, 12 

were stationed at Artillery 

firing centers and balloon 

schools in the rear, 6 assigned 

to armies were en route to the 

Zone of Advance, and 17 were 

serving with the 1st and 2d 

Armies at the front. On November 11, 1918, the personnel of the Balloon Section’ 

consisted of 446 officers and 

6,365 soldiers. Of the officers, 

230 were commissioned in the 

Air Service, and the remainder attached from other arms 

for duty as instructors or observers. Only 14 officers of the 

Balloon Section were on a 

nonflying status. 

First Arrival 

at the Front. 

The 2d Balloon Company 

arrived in the Toul sector on 

February 23, 1918. Although 

many American aviators were 

serving with both British and 

French squadrons before that 

date, this was the first completely equipped American Air 

Service unit assigned to the 

1st Army Corps, to which were 

assigned the first American 

units to take their places at the 

front. 

Training. 

Valuable training in the regulation of Artillery fire was obtained in France by sendingall 

Balloon Companies, as they 

arrived over seas, to Artillery 

firing centers in the Services 

of Supply. They remained at 

these stations until relieved by 

newly arrived companies from 

the United States, and were 

then assigned to a quiet sector 

on the front for battle training. 

Although it was intended to 

give observers and maneuvering officers a full course of 

instruction in the United 

States, it was not at first possible to do so without seriously 

delaying the arrival overseas 

of balloon troops. This condition made it imperative to 

establish a balloon school in 

the American Expeditionary 

Forces. The school was first 

located at Cuperly (Marne), 

close to the French balloon 

school of Vadenay, from 

which valuable technical 

assistance was secured. The 

enemy advance in the latter 

part of March, 1918, made 

necessary a hasty move, and 

Camp Souge was chosen for 

the new location. The first 

classes at Souge began on 

May 5, and from that time a 

new class for observers and 

maneuvering officers was 

started on the 6th of each 

month, including December 

1918, the month in which the 

activities of the school ended. 

The classes graduated a total 

of 199 officers and trained 623 

soldier specialists, who were 

taught the operation of balloon winches, telephone line 

work, look-out work, machine 
138 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

gunnery, and radio operation. 

It was necessary to maintain 

the school in France for the 

instruction of observers detailed from the Artillery and 

other arms of the American 

Expeditionary Forces, as well 

as for the instruction of Balloon Section enlisted men 

seeking commissions in this 

branch. 

Failures to Qualify. 

Twenty per cent of the officers taking the observer’s 

course, and 12 per cent of 

those taking the maneuvering 

course, failed to qualify. ttwas 

found that officers with no 

previous balloon experience 

were not qualified to follow the 

advanced instruction given at 

the balloon school unless 

given preliminary training of 

three or four weeks with a 

balloon company. Attaohed 

officers who were found unsuitable as observers were 

returned to their own arm of 

the service. Officers commissioned in the Air Service and 

found unsuitable for baltoon 

work were assigned to supply 

or other administrative duties, 

provided that they were properly qualified; if not, they were 

reported for reclassification 

and assignment to other arms 

of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Operations. 

In the Services of Supply, 

4,224 ascensions were made, 

covering 3,721 hours; in the 

Zone of Advance, 1,642 ascensions were made, covering 

3,111 hours; this gives a total 

of 5,866 ascensions, with a 

duration of 6,832 hours. Artillery adjustments numbered 

623 in the Service of Supply 

and 316 in the Zone of Advance, making a total of 939 

(each artillery adjustment 

comprising all the shots fired 

at one target). Balloons were 

attacked by enemy airplanes 

on 89 occasions. Thirty-five of 

our balloons were burned in 

this way, 12 were destroyed by 

enemy fire, and one blown 

over the lines.* Our observers 

jumped from the basket 116 

times, and in no case did the 

parachute fail to open properly. One life was lost because 

pieces of the burning balloon 

fell on the descending parachute. Several observers were 

injured in rough landings, and 

two were captured when during a high wind the cable of 

their balloon broke and they 

were blown into the enemy 

lines. 

Summary of 

Surveillance Reports. 

A summary of general surveillance reports from balloons includes the following 

totals: Enemy shell bursts 

reported, 12,018; enemy airplanes sighted, 11,856; enemy 

balloons reported in ascension, 2,649; enemy batteries 

observed firing, 400; enemy 

infantry seen, 22 times; enemy 

traffic on roads and railroads 

reported, 1,113 times; smokes, 

fires, and flares reported, 

2,941 times; explosions and 

destructions reported, 597. 

In the Offensives. 

The 1st and 2d Balloon 

Companies took active part in 

the operations north of Chateau-Thierry during the latter 

part of July, 191 8, while serving with the 1st Army Corps. 

Both these companies kept up 

with the advance at all times, 

the 2d Company building six 

different balloon sheds within 

10 days. During the St. Mihiel 

offensive the balloon troops 

with our 1st Army consisted of 

15 American and 6 French 

companies. In the Argonne 

Ascending balloon. 

Observer climbs into a basket of an 

observation balloon. 

Balloon shot down by enemy fire. 

140 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

battle, 15 companies, including 2 French companies, operated with the 1st Army. There 

were four American companies with the 2d Army. 

Shortage of 

Balloon Troops. 

The few companies available attempted in every possible way to make up for our 

serious shortage of balloon 

troops. The 2d Balloon Company, for example, was sent to 

the front in February, 1918, 

and from that time until the 

signing of the armistice, it was 

only once relieved from front 

line duty, and then for a period 

of only one week. From the 

beginning of the Second Battle of the Marne until November 11, 1918, this company was almost continually 

engaged in open warfare. The 

service of the 3d and 4th Companies was almost as strenuous. It is doubtful if the combat troops of any other arm of 

the service have operated so 

continuously at the front. 

Whatever measure of success 

has been attained by American balloon troops with the 

armies has been due to tt-# determination of the personnel 

to overcome all obstacle) and 

to work to the limit of human 

endurance in order to do 

their share toward defeeting 

the enemy. 

Equipment . There has been no occasion 

on which a Balloon Company 

of the American Expeditionary Forces has been unable to 

operate because of lack of 

equipment. Owing to the failure of companies to arrive as 

rapidly as desired there was 

on hand on November 11, 

1918, sufficient equipment to 

maintain the 35 companies for 

one year. Balloon equipment 

was procured either from the 

French or from the United 

States on requisition through 

the established agencies of 

the Supply Section. The distribution of special equipment 

was left to the Balloon Supply 

Officer. It was handled with a 

minimum of paper work by 

troops in the field. The first 10 

companies to arrive overseas 

were completely supplied with 

French equipment, since replaced in constantly increasing quantities by equipment 

arriving from the United 

States. 

Balloons and Winches. 

The two principal items of 

equipment were balloons and 

winches. Twenty type “R” 

balloons of French manufacture were secured at first, after 

which American-made balloons were received in sufficient quantities and constantly improving quality. In all, 265 

American balloons were received, 30 being furnished to 

the French and 15 to the 

British upon their requests. 

Losses of balloons included 

35 burned3 by the enemy, 1 

because of the cable breaking, 

12 destroyed4 by shell fire, and 

25 condemned on account of 

long service. For the year 

ending October 1, 1918, the 

French requirements were 4V7 

balloons per company per 

year. Our statements to the 

United States were based on 

an allowance of 6 balloons per 

company per year. The French 

double-engine balloon winch, 

known as the Caquot, was 

considered the most efficient 

developed up to this time. Fifty of these were obtained from 

the French. Although they 

were reproduced in the United 

States, none of American 

make reached France. The 

early adoption by the aeronautical mission of the Aircraft 

Production Board of the successful French type “R” balloon and Caquot winch, and 

their immediate reproduction 

in the United States, proved a 

wise procedure and resulted 

in a great saving of time. 

Hydrogen. 

Hydrogen supply was assured by pooling all our resources, including chemicals 

and cylinders, with the 

French. Most of the gas was 

produced by commercial 

plants under contract with the 

142 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

French Government. The average price paid for hydrogen 

was practically the same as 

that paid to commercial plants 

in the United States. A total of 

51,345 cylinders were received from the United States, 

of which 34,545 were filled 

when received. For the ~ production of hydrogen 1,857 

tons of ferrosilicon, sufficient 

to produce more than 

82,500,000 cubic feet, were 

shipped to France. The total 

amount of compressed hydrogen received from the French 

was only a little more than 

7,000,000 cubic feet, or about 

one-eleventh of the quantity 

obtainable from the ferrosilicon shipped from the United 

States. The average daily oonsumption of hydrogen for a 

balloon company in active 

operations was * found to be 

2,600 cubic feet. Our generous 

contribution of chemicals for 

the manufacture of hydrogen 

made it practicable for the 

French to expand their protection balloon service to an 

extent -that would not otherwise have been possible. 

Plans for a Large 

Hydrogen Plant. 

In order to prepare for the 

Air Service program to June, 

1919, and to supply the demand for hydrogen to inflate 

the small balloons for carrying 

propaganda into enemy countries, plans were made to 

construct near Paris the largest hydrogen plant in the 

world, with a production of 

one-half million cubic feet 

daily. This plant would have 

been in operation by March 1, 

1919. 

Transportation. 

The statement that equipment and supply were satisfactory refers only to Air Service equipment. Several 

balloon companies were at 

times unable to operate on account of the shortage of transportation, and theefficiency of 

others was greatly reduced by 

the same cause. On November 

11, 1918, the balloon companies had only 40 per cent of the 

transportation allowed them 

by the approved Tables of 

Organization. The change 

from trench warfare to open 

warfare involved no particular 

difficulties for our balloon 

companies except those 

caused by the lack of sufficient motor transportation. 

Balloon Barrages. 

Although the American 

Army did not undertake the 

installation of barrage balloons for the protection of 

cities and factories, the Balloon Section procured samples of French equipment both 

for the balloon school at 

Souge and for shipment to the 

United States. In addition to 

this a field officer was sent to 

the French protection balloon school, where he took the 

complete course of instruction and visited many of the 

French protective balloon installations. sufficient information is therefore in the 

hands of the Balloon Section 

of the Air Service to provide 

protective service whenever 

necessary. 

The Repair Depot. 

The inspection and repair of 

balloons, adjustment of cordage, repair of parachutes, etc., 

was accomplished at the repair depot first established at 

Is-sur-Tille, and later removed 

to larger and more satisfactory 

buildings at Romorantin. This 

depot inspected and adjusted 

163 balloons, made complete 

sets of rigging for 71, and extensive repairs on 28. Seventy-four parachutes were repaired. The depot was called 

upon also for othervarieties of 

fabric work, such as aerial targets for the Air Service. 
Balloon Section 143 

General Remarks. 

The procurement of balloon observers by assignment from the Artillery only, a 

plan which was effective until 

August, 1918, was not satisfactory. When Artillery officers were detailed as balloon 

observers against their inclinations, the result was a waste 

of time and effort. The procurement of balloon equipment by the Supply Section 

and its distribution by the Balloon Section gave entire satisfaction. The life of our balloons can be materially 

lengthened when it is possible to provide hangars for their 

protection. Under existing circumstances company requirements should beestimated at six balloons per 

company per year. Experience in the field proved the 

value of carrier pigeons. Except for dirigible and airplane 

use, the basket-type parachute is preferable to the 

individual type, and it is suggested that all parachute fabric should be treated with fireproof solution. The French 

type “R” balloon was satisfactory, but a similarly shaped 

balloon of the extensible type 

is preferable on account of 

greater economy of gas consumption. 

Lt. Col. John Paegelow, Commanding 

Officer, I Army Corps Balloons, later 

became Balloon Officer, Air Service, 

Group of Armies. 

145 

Origin of the Section. 

Shortly after our declaration of war, a preliminary 

survey of the aircraft-armament situation was made by 

officers of the European aircraft mission of the Aircraft 

Production Board. During the 

summer of 1917, questions 

pertaining to armament were 

handled by Air Service personnel of the Technical Section of the Air Service, arrd in 

November, 1917, four Ordnance officers were attached 

temporarily to the Technical 

Section. 

Placed Under Ordnance 

Control. 

The Aircraft Armament Section‘ is now a unit of the 

Ordnance Department, but 

works in intimate liaison with 

the Air Service. Up to the 

spring of 1918, the Aircraft 

Armament Section acted 

mainly as a technical advkor 

to the Air Service, as ell supplies of armament and ordnance material were under 

control of the Supply Sectton, 

Air Service. On April 15,1918, 

however, an agreement was 

made between the Chief Ordnance Officer and the Chief of 

Air Service (superseding the 

A machine gun on a Scarff mountready 

for ection. 

tentative agreement of December l3,1917),wherebythe 

Aircraft Armament Section 

took over the supply and 

control of all armament material. A special system of supply, under exclusive Ordnance control, was organized, and has so functioned 

up to the close of hostilities. 

Early Dlfflculties. 

It was contemplated that the 

Air Service should procure 

airplanes as rapidly as possible from the allied Governments, and in planning to obtain these airplanes it was 

specified that they should be 

turned over to the American 

service fully equipped with 

armament. The allied Governments, however, proved unable to deliver the airplanes 

equipped as contemplated. It 

became necessary, therefore, 

to arrange forthe manufacture 

of a variety of parts and accessories which could best be 

made in French factories, and 

it was for this reason that the 

Aircraft Armament Section 

was located in Paris, the industrial center of France. It 

soon proved undesirable, 

however, to have all of the 

manufacturing and installation work done in these factories, and in order to expedite 

matters a machine shop at 

Courbevoie, a suburb of Paris, 

was taken over from a private 

concern and developed until it 

provided a large proportion of 

the manufacturing facilities 

demanded by the section’s 

program. 

Installation Fields. 

At Orly and at Romorantin 

installation fields were established for the purpose of installing armament equipment 

on airplanes as they were delivered to us by foreign Governments and from the United States. Up to the close of 

hostilities, 1,672 airplanes 

were equipped with armament at Orly and 1,331 at Romorantin. This section was 

able at all times to meet the 

delivery of foreign-built airplanes as well as2 to meet 

delivery of those built in America. Facilities were provided 

for the modification of equipment, for “running in” and 

testing machine guns, and for 

modifying the various types 

of bomb-dropping apparatus 

which had to be adapted to the 

classes of bombs purchased 

from different sources. 

Personnel. 

This section had developed 

from a personnel of 1 officer in 

August, 1917, to 5 on November 1, 1917, and to 3,216 

officers and soldiers on November 19, 1918, including all 

the armorers working in 

squadrons, and 995 men in 

training at the armament 
146 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

school, St. Jean-de-Monts. On 

the date of the armistice it was 

handling approximately 2,600 

items of armament for the Air 

Service of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Organizatlon 

of the Section. 

The Aircraft Armament Section was divided into four 

branches: (1) Engineering, (2) 

Equipment, (3) Supply, and 

(4) General Control and Administration. These branches 

were all located at the Paris 

headquarters. The inatallation field at Orly was devoted 

to work on foreign type airplanes, while the field at 

Romorantin was devoted to 

American-built machines. 

This section also maintained 

personnel working in conjunction with the Air Service in 

advance, intermediate and 

base depots, such as Colombey-les-Belles, Behonne, 

Vinets, and Chatillon. 

The Paris Depot. 

At 10 Rue Huyghens, Paris, 

the section had its own depot, 

which, in connection with 

those mentioned above, 

worked to keep the squadrons equipped with ammunition and armament material. 

The main machine shop at 

Courbevoie looked after the 

manufacturing of small parts, 

and certain other classes of 

work were still done in factories about Paris. At Orly, 

St. Jean-de-Monts, and Clermont-Ferrand experimental 

fields has been established, 

where the various classes of 

armament material were tested. 

The School at 

St. Jean-de-Monts. 

At St. Jean-de-Monts, under 

the auspices of the chief ordnance office, there was a training school for ordnance personnel, including supply officers, ordnance officers, and 

armorers, for duty with squadrons. Thisschool trained practically all of the 3,000 men who 

were prepared for service in 

the field, approximately 1,000 

of whom were under instruction when hostilities ceased. 

The Engineering Branch. 

The function of the Engineering Branch of this section 

was to design and develop machine-gun parts, airplane cannon, gun mountings, sights, 

synchronizing gears, bombs, 

bomb gears, link fabric belts, 

armor plate for airplanes, etc. 

It became necessary to design 

armament material for 

production in France, pending 

its production in the United 

States. Problems of installation of American armament on 

foreign airplanes were met 

almost daily, and overcome 

only after much study and 

experiment. An idea of the 

amount of designing and 

drafting this made necessary 

may be had from the fact that 

at the time of the armistice 

there were over 3,000 blueprints in the files of the Engineering Branch. The trouble 

with the Marlin guns is a typical instance of the emergencies which had to be met. The 

first consignment of these 

guns arrived in February, 

1918, but was not accompanied by any drawings, and it 

was found that the type of gun 

in quantity production contained no synchronizing gear 

connections. In order to 

mount it, the guns had to be 

rebuilt and the airplane al- 
Aircraft 

Armament Section 

147 

tered. Finally, in August, when 

a serious shortage of Vickers 

guns seemed possible, the 

French Government consented to make the necessary 

changes in the machines being delivered to us. The gun 

connections had been already designed and placed in 

production, and during August 1918, Marlin guns were 

mounted on Spads for the first 

time. In October, 1918, Ssimson airplanes, also prepared 

to mount the Marlin, were 

delivered to us. Armament 

studies had been made for 

mounting these guns dn olher 

late-model service ailrplenes 

(including the BreguetLiberty and LePere), though 

the cessation of hostilities prevented the parts from being 

manufactured. 

Liaison with the Front. 

In order to anticipate the 

needs of the squadrons and 

familiarize armament officers 

and pilots with new devices, 

an experimental officer made 

frequent trips to the Zone of 

Advance. These trips put the 

Engineering Branch in touch 

with changing conditions at 

the front, and were the means, 

for example, of introducing 

the Marlin gun to our plfots, 

a few weeks before it was regularly installed on new airplanes. 

Equipment Tables. 

The Engineering Branch 

has prepared detailed descriptions of the armament 

material in use, as well as complete equipment tables for the 

latest service airplanes. The 

files also contain armament 

specifications for the service 

airplanes used by the French 

and British, and studies of the 

armament of German airplanes are now being made. 

Difficulties Encountered. 

There has been scarcely an 

item of armament material in 

which some changes or development were not necessary. Some of the more important difficulties encountered overseas by the Engineering Branch were: The 

confusion caused by the 303 

and 30 caliber machine guns, 

remodeling the ground-type 

Vickers for air work, arranging 

the Marlin gun to fire by means 

of the French mechanical synchronizing gear and equipping it with a jam preventer, 

modifying the Lewis gun for 

use in the air, and designing 

practical machine-gun 

mounts, bomb racks, etc. 

Standardization. 

In the past the matter of 

armament standardization has 

not been entirely satisfactory; 

practically all airplanes, for 

instance, have been designed 

to use certain specified arm+ 

ment, making changeof armament extremely difficult. This 

phase of the subject seems 

worthy of study for a number 

of years to come, or until the 

existing material which is 

satisfactory and serviceable 

shall have been utilized. The 

Vickers and the Marlin have 

proved satisfactory. Armament installation should be 

regarded with an eye to no 

single gun or synchronizing 

gear. The French airplanes, 

redesigned to receive the Marlin gun, had been so arranged 

that either the Vickers or the 

Browning could be installed 

with no great changes. This 

example seems worthy to be 

followed by the designers of 

aircraft-armament layouts for 

some time to come. 

Bomb Unit. 

The bomb unit of the Engineering Branch was intrusted 

with the study and design of 

bombs and pyrotechnic material. The problems constantly met and solved were 

parallel to those encountered 

by the machine-gun unit. It 

was necessary to make a close 

and constant study of all the 

accomplishments of our Allies 

in this phase of modern warfare, in order to bring our 

bombing equipment up to the 

high standard attained by 

other services. In America, 
148 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

bombs different in type and ice necessitated their estab- agents of the Aircraft Armacharacter from those of our lishment. The duties of the ment Section in improving the 

Allies were being manufac- branch consisted in the in- service. 

tured. In order to drop these spection before delivery, the 

bombs from the foreign-built installation and the mainte- -30 and -303 Calibers. 

One of the chief difficulties airplanes with which, it was nance of armament material, 

contemplated, the American up to the point at which such encountered by the Equip- Air Service was to be material was totally lost to the ment Branch was caused by equipped, it was necessary to service, either through loss the difference in caliber of the construct new types of bomb over the lines, or complete ammunition used by the suspensions, releases, gears, destruction. It was charged 

sight mounts, etc. The bomb also with the salvage of mate- French and American Air 

unit, both through thestudy of rial not completely destroyed, Services. In Order to use Our 

foreign practice and by actual and acted as liaison agent with ammunition it was necessary 

experiments, was able to meet the squadrons in receiving to install new ammunition 

all demands placed upon it by weekly Iettersfrom theirarma- boxes On the airpianesi a step 

the Air Service, and has now in ment officers, who pointed out which appears simple* but 

its files material which will difficulties encountered, kept which in reality could Only be 

form a splendid basis for track of the expenditure of am- done in the before the 

further development of this munition and reported on any airplanes were delivered to 

After several months of effort, important weapon of war. inventions or experimental 

Equipment Branch. October, ,9,8, the aircraft Vickers guns, the French finalarmament officer on the staff ly consented to build Our 

In the beginning, the Equip- of the ordnance officer of the airplanes with .30 caliber ammerit and Engineering Branch- First Army became the liaison munition boxes, thereby rees of the section were con- agent of this section. The lieving this section of a great 

ducted under one head, but Equipment Branch published source of trouble. 

with an increasing demand for weekly bulletins of informa- the armament of airplanes, it tion useful to officers and became necessary to separate 

the two. The Equipment 

Branch provided for the production of armament material 

and accessories in French 

factories prior to the establishment of our own machine 

shops and continued this 

production in our own shops 

and installation fields when 

the demands of the Air Servwork done at the front. In and in view Of a shortage Of 
Aircraft 

Armament Section 

149 

At Orly. 

By the end of June, 1918, a 

large number of airplanes had 

been accepted by the American Air Service and flown to 

Orly for their equipment. As 

the armament of these airplanes proceeded, it was 

found necessary to form an 

installation unit to mount the 

guns, sights, etc., a testlng 

unit to test the synchronization of the guns, and an inspection unit to see that the 

material was perfected and the 

installation properly done. As 

the guns received frbm the 

United States were new and 

stiff and it was congidered 

necessary that armament on 

airplanes leaving Orly should 

be ready to be used in combat, 

with the possibility of jems 

reduced to a minimum, a 

“running in” plant for machine 

guns was installed. The armament of foreign-built airplanes at Orly continued until 

the close of hostilities. 

At Romorantin. 

The history of the Equipment Department at Romorantin is a record of the arming 

of the American DH-4 airplanes for active service. 

About May 15,1918:when the 

first shipment of these airplanes was received, it &as 

discovered that it would be 

necessary to complete the 

armament, run in the machine 

guns, and make the necessary changes. A large plant 

and an adequate force became necessary. Day and 

night shifts were worked from 

July 25 to November 11, at 

which date the armament 

personnel numbered 511, of 

whom 31 were officers. 

The Handley-Page 

Ouestion. 

The Equipment Branch of 

the Aircraft Armament Section followed closely the attempts of the Air Service to 

procure airplanes for nfght 

bombardment purposes, and 

had worked out problems 

incidental to the arming of 

the Handley-Page machines, 

which were to be assembled 

in England. When the signing 

of the armistice put an end to 

this activity, the materials 

received were reboxed and reshipped to the United States. 

The Supply Branch. 

The Supply Branch of the 

Aircraft Armament Section 

procured, produced, maintained, and distributed supplies of aircraft armament material. lt received requisitions, 

placed orders, made deliveries, maintained warehouses, 

and kept the records involved 

in these transactions. The 

Supply Branch was authorized to draw material from the 

Ordnance Department, or to 

purchase it from foreign Governments, this latter under a 

definite system of requisitioning. 

First Depot. 

In April, 1918, an inventory 

of all aircraft armament material was made, and the first 

armament depot established. 

An adequate system was provided for buying from French 

warehouses and factories 

through the Purchasing Division of the Air Service. About 

the middle of August, the 

warehouses of the several depots were so well stocked that 

demands for double supplies 

of armament for a prospective drive were met with very 

little difficulty. About July 1, 

1918, a typical layout of buildings necessary for armament 

supply officers at air depots 

was furnished to the Designs 

and Projects Division of the 

Air Service. In October, 1918, 

the Supply Branch formulated 

a table of unit equipment 

designed for the maintenance 

of supplies on the basis of the 

numberofgunswith which the 

unit was equipped. 

XV, The Photogrzaphic Section. 151 

Accomplishment 

of the Section. 

The Photographic Section' 

of the Air Service, during the 

short period of its existence, 

had placed our aerial photography on the same high level 

as that of the allied armies. 

Requirements of the Air Service for photographic supplies 

and personnel in the Zone of 

Advance have always been 

promptly met, but this at times 

was accomplished by a narrow margin and not without 

sacrifice e I sewh ere. 

Personnel. 

Since October, 1918, the 

soldier personnel has been 

sufficient to meet all requirements, and on November 11, 

1918, the photographic personnel in the American Expeditionary Forces was large 

enough to meet the Air Service program up to January, 

1919. There existed a shortage of specialists, owing to the 

fact that qualified officers with 

the training necessary for this 

Aerial observer reaches for camera prior lo 

a reconnaissance mission. 

work were difficult to obtain, 

and it was not until November 

6,1918, that thisseriousshortage was relieved. 

Training in the 

United States. 

The Photographic Sections 

arriving from America were of 

excellent material, and their 

training, received at the Rochester School of Aerial Photography, was highly satisfactory. 

Equipment. 

In the United States, at the 

time of our declaration of war, 

aerial photography was almost unknown, and it was 

necessary to make a study of 

the material used by our Allies 

with a view to selecting and 

producing in quantity for our 

Air Service the latest and 

most sat isfactory equipment . 

Meanwhile, it was realized that 

the Photographic Section, to 

fill the immediate needs, must 

depend on European sources 

of supply. Owing to the depleted conditions of these 

markets, it wasextremely difficult to secure the required 

materials in Europe, for what 

raw material remained available was of low grade, particularly in the case of plates and 

paper. Bromide paper was at 

one time almost unobtainable, and until theopening of a 

new bromide paper factory 

near Paris by an American 

photographic manufacturer,2 

the skill of the Photographic 

Section was taxed to the limit 

to obtain the desired results 

on a less satisfactory paper. 

Since the arrival of American 

materials, the photographic 

work produced shows an 

improvement of at least 50 per 

cent. Up to the closeof hostilities, 15 photographic section 

equipments had arrived from 

the United States. In April, 

1918, the Photographic Section prepared an equipment 

list which was adopted as 

standard for the American Expeditionary Forces. 

Lens Difficulties. 

The most serious problem 

on the hands of the section 

during the early days of its 

service was that of securing 

photographic lenses. It was 

only after the most persistent 

effort, first exerted in the 

summer of 1917, that this 

matter was finally brought to 

the attention of the highest 

French authorities, and the 

question placed before an interallied board. Under the 

direction and guidance of the 

French Service Geographique, the production was soon 

increased and the output 

placed on an allocation basis 

entirely satisfactory to our Air 

Service. 
152 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Transportation. 

With the exception of the 

electrical generating,set the 

American photographic 

trucks and trailers proved 

better than the French. The 

American set had a capacity of 

only 1 kilowatt and was not of 

standard voltage. The standard 110-volt equipment permits the use of local current 

when available. At the front, 

the section was seriously 

handicapped by lack of the 

authorized motorcycle transportation. 

Training in the American 

Expeditionary Forces. 

As there was no American 

personnel available for this 

purpose, the photographic 

training of pilots and observers at Air Service training 

centers was generally intrusted to the French, and it was 

not until shortly before the 

close of hostilities that the 

section was able to send its 

own instructors to the more 

important centers. In July, 

1918, the Air Service considered the establishment of a 

specialist course in aerial photography at one or more of the 

training centers, but the project could not be put into 

effect before the close of hostilities. 

Cinema Training Films. 

Through the lnterallied 

Photographic Conference arrangements had been made 

for the mutual exchange of 

motion-picture training films. 

The films made by the British 

and French for this purpose 

cover a considerable range of 

subjects, and it was intended 

primarily to use them for the 

benefit of training schools in 

America. At the close of hostilities the first consignment of 

these films had just been 

received from the French. 

Operations. 

The Photographic Section 

developed and finished all the 

aerial photographs made at 

the various training centers, as 

well as at the front, and was intrusted with the production of 

training gun films, identification photographs of Air Service personnel, and photostat 

work. 

At the Front. 

Although the normal output 

of the Photographic Section 

working with squadrons at the 

front might properly be considered mass production, it is 

true that special occasions 

arise when this mass production is inadequate. Early in the 

war, this mass production was 

assigned to G-2, but during 

the first part of the Argonne 

offensive it was found necessary to call on the Photographic Section of the Air 

Service to meet the enormous 

demands for photographs. In 

view of thesuccess with which 

this impromptu work was 

achieved (56,000 prints being 

produced and distributed in 

four days), a project to have 

the Photographic Section of 

the Air Service take over such 

work in the future was submitted to the general staff, American Expeditionary Forces, in 

October, 1918, and approved. 

Within one week three base 

photographic laboratories 

were established; one with the 

1st Army, one with the 2d 

Army, and one as a base 

laboratory for all armies and 

general headquarters. These 

laboratories were equipped 

with apparatus for making 

enlargements and large direct 

copies of assemblages and 

mosaics, as well as for speedy 

production of the enormous 

quantities of reprints from the 

aerial negatives required previous to an offensive. 

U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

154 

Output of the Section. 

In spite of the fact that our 

greatest quantities of photographic work were produced 

during periods of poor light 

and unfavorable weather 

conditions, new speed records were established. The 

maximum amount of work 

planned for a photographic 

section was 10,000 prints per 

day. Photographic Section 

No. 5 made a record of 11,500 

prints in one day. 

With the 1st Army 

Observatlon Group. 

The 1st Army Observation 

Group, which was charged 

particularly with long-distance reconnaissance, became a specialist photographic group, and as such 

produced an unusual number 

of valuable photographs. Although the Tables of Organization contemplated but one 

photographic section to each 

observation group, it was 

necessary to assign two complete sections and equipments to this group. During 

the few clear days which preceded the offensive of November 1, the activity was 

such that these sections produced 10,000 photographic 

prints in one day, and it is 

recorded that at one time this 

group of two squadrons had 

14 cameras over the lines. 

The De Ram Camera. 

In August, 1917, the De Ram 

automatic plate camera3 was 

selected by the Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Forces, as the most desirable aerial 

camera for use during the 

campaign of 1918. In spite of 

meager facilities, the De Ram 

camera was successfully produced in France and it received its baptism of fire in the 

Argonne offensive, where it 

was employed by the observation groups with the 1st 

Army. With this camera the 

observer is not obliged to 

crouch in thefuselage,continually changing plates and 

making exposures, but is 

entirely free to use his eyes, 

and his machine gun when 

necessary. In one case two of 

our airplanes, engaged in a 

photographic mission, were 

attacked by seven of the 

enemy. They succeeded in 

driving off the enemy airplanes and shooting down two 

of them, without in any way 

interfering with their photographic work, which was SUCcessfully and automatically 

accomplished throughout the 

fight by the De Ram camera. 

A Word of Pralse. 

The long hours and working 

speeds required of the laboratory forces during periods of 

activity made the work very 

arduous, particularly the night 

work, in closed and stuffydark 

rooms. The men fully realized 

the importance of their work 

and the necessity for speed, 

and their tenacity through 

these long periods without 

sleep or relaxation was admirable. 

Relations wlth the Allled 

Sewlces. 

The Photographic Section 

is especially indebted to the 

numerous officers of the allied 

photographic services with 

whom it has come in contact. 

The French mission has rendered valuable services to our 

aerial photography in all its 

branches, and the Photographic Branch of the Royal 

Air Force has always been 

most generous with any material required. 

Work on Military History. 

As the sections were still 

mobilized for active service, 

new work WBS undertaken 

after the armistice. The classification and filing of all aerial 

negatives was undertaken, 

and every effort made to complete the photographic side of 

the military history of the war. 
Photographic 

Section 

Ground photographs were 

made of all the important 

points pictured in aerial 

photography, so as to make 

the latter as intelligible as 

possible, both for future training purposes and for military 

history. Steps were taken to 

obtain from the French and 

British photographs of areas 

in which American units had 

fought in liaison with theallied 

forces, areas which, in many 

cases, had not been. covered 

by our Air Service. In these 

aerial pictures will be read the 

history of our contribution to 

the great struggle, and they 

will depict the sum total of 

man’s ingenuity turned to a 

work of devastation. 

155 

Capt. Alberl W. Stevens with a De Ram 

camera mounted on a Salmson of the 24th 

Aero Squadron. 

XVI. The RaMo Section. 157 

Origin of the Section. 

Before the formation of the 

Radio Section,’ the Technical 

Section of the Air Service, 

which began its operations in 

August, 1917, handled all 

questions concerning Air 

Service radio. During this period the Technical Section, in 

its advisory capacity, andafter 

extensive technical investigation of British, French, and 

Italian apparatus, caused an 

order to be placed (by the 

Signal Corps for the Air Service) with the French Government for about $1,OOO,OOO 

worth of Air Service radio 

equipment. The formation of 

the Radio Section of the Air 

Service was authorized on 

April 9, 1918, and the preliminary work necessary to provide an immediate supply of 

apparatus, and to install this 

apparatus on airplanes, was at 

once undertaken. 

Technical Development. 

Throughout the operations 

of the American Expeditionary Forces, all technical development in the production 

of radio apparatus for use on 

airplanes was in the hands of 

the Radio Development Section of the Signal Corps in the 

United States, and the assistance of radio experts of the 

Research Division of the Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, was given to 

the Air Service in the most 

generous and satisfactory 

manner. 

Equipment. 

Equipment purchased from 

the French Government was 

used to fill the needs of the Air 

Service as regards apparatus 

for radio liaison with the Artillery, and a total of 1,688 installations of this radio apparatus 

on airplanes, both for training 

purposes and for actual operations, was made in the American Expeditionary Forces up 

to the closeof hostilities. Electrical material for the heating 

and lighting of airplanes, as 

well as apparatus for illuminating airdromes for night-flying operations, was also purchased from French sources. 

Radio Telephony for 

lnterplane 

Communication. 

Samples of airplane telephone apparatus received in 

the American Expeditionary 

Forces during May, 1918, were 

turned over to the Research 

Division of the Signal Corps, 

and flying facilities for testing 

this apparatus were provided 

at the experimental field of the 

Technical Section, Air Service. It was intended, provided 

the apparatus fulfilled active 

service requirements, to commence training in voice-cornmand flying at the 7th Aviation Instruction Center 

(Clermont-Ferrand) on a sufficiently large scale to permit 

the simultaneous operation of 

as many bombing squadrons 

as possible, using this system. 

Owing to various technical 

and mechanical defects, the 

details of which have already 

been covered in reports by the 

Research Division of the Signal Corps, the apparatus did 

not prove satisfactory. None 

of this apparatus was employed in operations on the 

front. 

Night Flying by 

Radio Direction. 

The navigation of night-flying airplanes by radio direction, which was developed by 

the Royal Air Force in England during January and February, 1918, was investigated, 

and an extensive program for 

using this system in our nightbombing operations was 

adopted. A radio installation 

detachment of 60 men who 

had been given previous training in British radio schools 

was established at the Handley-Page factory in Oldham, 

Lancashire, in readiness for 

Radio operntors receive message from a flier. 
158 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

the commencement of the 

American Handley-Page construction program at that 

point. Pending the development of apparatus in the 

United States, a contract was 

placed with the British for 550 

special radio navigation sets 

to equip our night-bombing 

airplanes. A school for the 

instruction of flying personnel in the night navigation of 

airplanes by radio direction 

was established at the training 

and mobilization field of the 

Night Bombardment Section, 

Ford Junction, England. This 

school was opened on September 15, 1918, and 28 officers and 70 soldiers were 

enrolled as students, though 

none of this personnel completed the prescribed course 

before the signing of the 

armistice. 

Radio Llalson 

with Artillery. 

In August and September, 

1917, the Chief of the Technical Section,2Air Service, made 

a study of Air Service radio 

communication as regardscooperation with the Artillery, 

and after conferring with officers of the Italian, French, 

and British Air Services, it was 

recommended by him that the 

Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, should take 

immediate measures to provide its own personnel for the 

operation of special stations 

to receive airplane radio signals at batteries and higher 

artillery commands. The system by which such ground stations are provided and controlled by the Air Service itself 

had been in effect in the 

British Expeditionary Forces 

since the inception of fire control by airplane radio in 

December, 1914. The subject 

was referred to thechief signal 

officer, American Expeditionary Forces, and, based on his 

recommendations, an agreement was approved on October 10,1917, whereby the Signal Corps was to have charge 

of radio stations for communication with airplanes. For this 

reason, no action was taken by 

the Air Service toward the 

development of a force of 

radio operators to conduct its 

liaison with the Artillery. 

Division of Responsibility. 

The establishment by the 

Artillery of a separate radio 

organization to maintain both 

its interior ground liaison and 

its communications with airplanes had, however, been 

approved in the United States, 

and Artillery brigades arriving in France after January 

1, 1918, included certain radio 

personnel for this service. It 

was found, however, that this 

personnel had not had a sufficient course of training before 

arriving in France. Under 

General Order 30, Section VII, 

paragraph 3-F, general headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, February 15, 

1918, the Signal Corps was 

required to supervise Artillery 

radio stations, both in training 

and operations, including stations for communication with 

airplanes. The personnel for 

maintenance of radio equipment on airplanes was included in Air ServiceTablesof 

Organization of January 15, 

1918, and also in the revision 

of these tables as approved by 

general headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, on 

September 8,1918. Asituation 

was thus created by which 

three separate divisions of the 

responsibility for radio efficiency ensued between the 

transmission of a message 

from an airplane and thedelivery of the message to the artillery command concerned. 
Radio Section 159 

There wasthe responsibilityof 

the Air Servicesquadron commander, charged with the correct procedure of his observers in using the radio 

apparatus on the airplane, and 

the efficiency of the radio 

detachment of his squadron 

which maintained it; the responsibility of the Signal 

Corps radio officer charged 

with supervision of ground 

artillery stations; and that of 

the Artillery radio officers and 

operators, who reported direct 

to commanders of their own 

batteries or other units. This 

division of responsibility did 

not make for efficiency and 

there were many cases of failure in liaison between artillery and aero squadrons dispatched to conduct fire-control missions. 

Training of Squadron 

Personnel. 

A shortage of suitable personnel in the spring of 1918 

made it impossible for the Air 

Service, American Expeditionary Forces, to conduct the 

advanced training necessary 

for its squadron radio officers 

and radio mechanics, and the 

radio school established in 

connection with the 2d Aviation Instruction Center, on 

May 23, 1918, was supplied 

with instructor personnel by 

the Radio Division of the Signal Corps. The school was 

well equipped and efficiently 

conducted, and up to the close 

of hostilities, a total of 37 Air 

Service radio officers and 161 

radio mechanics and operators for squadron maintenance duties were given final 

training and “refresher” 

courses and assigned to 

squadrons in the Zone of Advance. 

Final Agreement 

with Signal Corps. 

General Order 152, general 

headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, September 10, 1918, charged the 

chief signal officer, American 

Expeditionary Forces, with 

general supervision and control of all radio operations, 

including those of the Artillery, Air Service, Tank 

Corps, and other special services. Based upon this order 

and because the Signal Corps 

had previously provided instructor personnel for the 

training of aero squadron 

radio officers and radio mechanics, an arrangement was 

concluded on October 2,1918, 

by which the chief signal 

officer assumed responsibility for the training of all personnel of the Air Service 

requiring radio instruction; 

the development and supply, 

through the regular channels 

of the Signal Corps, of all radio 

equipment for the Air Service, 

and the installation of all radio 

equipment on airplanes. Air 

Service radio personnel was 

also to receive technical 

orders and operating instructions from the supervisory 

radio officers of the Signal 

Corps, and the reserve supply 

of airplanes radio apparatus 

was transferred to the supply 

system of the Signal Corps. 

Up to the close of hostilities no 

changes were made in airplane radio installation 

methods of operation. 

or 

XVII. The Meical Consultant. 161 

Medical 

Responribiiity for 

Flying Fitness. 

In considering the medical 

aspects of aviation one salient 

fact has been emphasized by 

our experience in the present 

war: The need of the utmost 

discretion in selecting flying 

personnel and of the most 

constant and skillful care of 

pilots and observers while in 

training and in active service 

at the front. The basic principle is a simple one-the proper medical responsibility for 

flying fitness-and medical 

officers of special knowledge 

and ability should be at all 

times attached to the Air Service and provided with the 

proper facilities for a study of 

the problems involved. 

The Medical 

Research Laboratory. 

In order to arrive at a knowledge of the problems that 

arise in connection with flying fitness, it is necessary to 

investigate the general conditions which affect the efficiency of pilots, to make experiments and tests to 

determine the ability of pilots 

to fly at high altitudes, to 

develop by test and experiment the best means of 

providing oxygen for pilots 

flying at high altitudes, and to 

study and develop the tests to 

which candidates for flying 

commissions are subjected. 

With such investigations in 

view a Medical Research 

Board was organized at Mineola on October 18, 1917. 

The officers composing this 

board were physicians and 

surgeons of the very highest 

quality and specialists in the 

various departments of medicine covered'by their investigations. The work of the 

Medical Research Board in the 

United States was from the 

first successful; its personnel 

increased and it developed a 

complete and specialized laboratory equipment. On August 6, 1918, a group of 4% 

officers and soldiers, divided 

into four units, embarked for 

service in the American Expeditionary Forces. The most 

important of these units was 

assigned to the 3d Aviation 

Center at Issoudun, where its 

equipment was set up and a 

complete medical research 

laboratory established. The 

splendid work of this organization is recorded in detail in 

its repdrt. Tests and recommendations were made in 

regard to the personnel then 

under flying instruction at l lssoudun and a very interesting series of special invastigations were conducted concerning the condition of successful flyers returned from 

the front. It is not practicable as yet to give any conclusion as to the results of this 

investigation for the material 

collected of unique value in 

the history of aviation must be 

carefully compiled and studied before the essential facts 

are adduced. 

Special Leaves and 

Rest for Piyers. 

An important constructive 

accomplishment of the Medical Consultant's office' was 

the acceptance by general 

headquarters of the proposal 

that aviators be put on a separate leave basis from that in 

force throughout the Army. 

The experience of both the 

French and English air services has demonstrated the fact 

that flying men should have 

frequent rest and change of 

scene. The methods in use by 

our Allies might be improved 

by controlling places of 

recreation, so that the flyer 

may have a thoroughly agreeable change, with amusements and sports, away from 

the centers of population. Flying fitness is so intimately 

dependent on personal conduct and standards that no 

amount of legislation alone 

will produce the results desired: it is only through the 

active cooperation of the flyers themselves that we may 

hope to maintain the morale 

and esprit de corps which 

make for the maximum of 

efficiency . 

XVIII. conclusion^ 163 

A Tribute to Our Allies. 

No account of the activities 

of the Air Service, American 

Expeditionary Forces, would 

be complete without paying 

due tribute to the assistance 

rendered by the Air Service of 

the Allies. From the timeof our 

declaration of war they threw 

open to us their sources of 

information, cooperated with 

us in every possible manner, 

and supplied us with much of 

the material we lacked so 

sorely. In all of the relations 

between our Air Service and 

those of the other powers 

alongside of whom we fought, 

there was ever present the 

finest spirit of helpfulness and 

cordiality. France in particular, on whose ravaged soil the 

decisive battles of the western 

front have been fought, supplied us, in spite of her own 

vast effort and dire need, with 

material without which our Air 

Service would have found it 

impossible to operate. England and Italy likewise aided 

us to the full measure of their 

ability. 

A Tribute to the 

Air Service Personnel. 

Whatever measure of success the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, attained was above all other 

things due to the splendid 

qualities of its officer and 

soldier personnel. The squadrons actually at the front 

worked untiringly, the flying 

officers displayed great gallantry, and the ground officers and the soldiers in the 

squadrons worked continuously, faithfully, and intelligently to make this service 

count for something in the 

war, to keep the equipment in 

order, and to promote efficiency. But much of the great task 

of carrying on a modern war is, 

however, performed far from 

the sights and scenes of battle, unstimulated by the heat of 

struggle, and without hope of 

glory. In the offices, in the 

shops, in the hangars, at depots, production centers, and 

at schools the soldiers of the 

Air Service have labored tirelessly at duties which were 

often irksome and monotonous. Their contribution to 

our victory was a large one, it 

was given in full measure, and 

in all cases they put into their 

work the best that was in them. 

Conclusion. 

In the course of the development of the Air Service 

overseas mistakes have been 

made and disappointments 

have been encountered, as 

was inevitable in the building 

up of a new and highly technical arm. As we consider these 

errors with a view to their 

avoidance in the future. one 

fact stands out most prominently, one common source of 

all of our difficulties becomes 

apparent; these fai I u res were 

the unavoidable result of our 

unpreparedness and of the necessity for actually preparing 

for war while hostilities were in 

progress. 

Respectf u I I y submitted. 

Mason M. Patrick, 

Major General, U.S.A., 

Chief of Air Service, A.E.F. I 
164 
Tactical Historzy 
166 
* Part 1, The Achievement of the Air Service, AEF, has been eliminated in 

this section, since a revised and edited version appears at the beginning 

(Chapters 1-111) of the “Final Report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF. 

169 

The narrative to follow will deal with tactical phases of the history of 

the corps observation branch of the American Air Service operating 

on the western front. No attempt will be made to narrate incidents or 

events of a purely human interest nature. Only those phases and 

details of the ground covered by the corps observation organization 

having an important bearing, either direct or indirect, on tactics will be 

dealt with. The narrative, in so far as possible, will be carried on 

according to the chronological order of developments and events. 

Particular stress will be laid upon the development of the Corps Air 

Service in its intimate relation to other branches and arms of the 

service. 

This history will tell, campaign by campaign, in sequence: 

(a) What the Corps Air Service was; its organization. 

(b) What its mission was under varying conditions. 

(c) How it planned to accomplish its mission. 

(d) The operations uhdertaken in accordance with the plan. 

(e) The work actually accomplished. 

V, Comments and criticisms, campaign by campaign. 

A final commentary in the form of a digest will conclude the history. 

11, The Firzst CORPS Obserzuatioa 

GKOU~ in the Toul Secton171 

What the Corps Air Service Was; Its Organization. 

Three squadrons composed the 1st Corps observation group, 

which early in April commenced active operations over the front 

occupied by the 26th Division, United States Army, between Flirey 

and Apremont on that portion of the front known as the Toul sector. 

The airdrome was situated at Ourches, about 30 kilometers behind 

the lines. The lst, 12th, and 88th Aero Squadrons formed the group. 

The airplanes of the 1st Aero Squadron were of the Spad type, two-. 

seater, 200-horsepower, Hispano-Suiza engine. Those of the 12th 

were of the A. R. type, two-seater, 190-horsepower, Renault engine. 

The 88th flew airplanes of the Sopwith type, two-seater, Rhone rotary 

engine, 120-horsepower. 

The pilots of these three squadrons, with one or two exceptions, 

had never before operated on the front. The group and squadron 

commanders were in every case men of long experience in training 

work but had never flown to an appreciable extent under war 

conditions. The greater portion of the observers, after a course of 

intensive tactical and technical training in observation schools, had 

spent from one to two months on duty as active fliers with French 

squadrons at the front. These officers brought to their organizations a 

very considerable and exceedingly valuable practical knowledge of the 

work about to be undertaken. 

The enlisted mechanical and special technical personnel was well 

trained and ih most cases proved thoroughly qualified for the work in 

hand. 

The installation and equipment of the airdrome was practically 

complete by the time the group of three squadrons was formed. 

Hangar and barrack space was ample and operations were not 

hindered by faulty or incomplete installation. 

The Tactical Situation. 

The 1st Corps group was assigned for duty to the 26th Division, 

United States Army. The division sector extended along the front 

from Flirey to Apremont, a distance of 15 kilometers. No major 

operations were in course nor were any foreseen as an immediate 

contingency. Our positions were strongly organized for defense by 

lines of trenches and barbed-wire entanglements. Our troops were 

supported by the usual complement of divisional artillery organized in 

carefully prepared positions. 

The friendly situation in the air was satisfactory. Two American 

pursuit squadrons with station at Toul were available for the aerial 

defense of the sector. These were sufficient in view of the inactive 

aspect of that portion of the front. 
172 US, Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

The situation of the enemy on the ground was essentially the same 

as our own. His lines were strongly organized, by means of trenches 

and barbed-wire systems, for defense. He was strongly supported by 

artillery of various calibers. 

In the air the enemy was weak. Isolated observation airplanes were 

reported from time to time. No pursuit formations of more than five 

airplanes were operating, and the presence of pursuit airplanes, even 

in small numbers, over the sector was rare. The enemy depended for 

aerial defense very largely upon an unusually strong concentration of 

mobile antiaircraft artillery. 

The Mission of the 1st Corps Group. 

The mission of the 1st Corps observation group was primarily to 

keep the friendly command informed of the general situation within 

the enemy lines by means of visual and photographic reconnaissances. 

It was called upon to effect, whenever necessary, the adjustment of 

our own artillery fire. It yas required to be in readiness to accomplish 

contact patrols with our troops in case of attack. In addition, it was 

called upon to furnish the means of training our ground troops in the 

use of the aerial arm, e.g., to take part in terrain exercises with the 

troops of the 26th Division and to conduct panel exercises with the 

divisional artillery by means of radio. It was not expected at this time 

that the work of the 1st Corps group would produce any important 

tactical results or render any great assistance to the conduct of 

operations. It was expected, rather, that this period on a quiet sector 

of the front would serve to complete the schooling of pilots and 

observers and render them more competent to undertake intensive 

operations elsewhere on a larger and more complete scale. 

Plans for Accomplishment of Mission. 

In order to fulfill its mission efficiently, to coordinate its activities, 

and to insure centralization of command and eliminate lost motion, the 

group headquarters was organized as follows: 

(a) Group commander. 

(b) Group adjutant. 

(c) Group supply officer. 

(d) Group transportation officer. 

(e) Group operations officer. 

v) Assistant group operations officers. 

@) Branch intelligence officer. 

(h) Group photographic officer. 

(i) Group radio officer. 
Corps 

Observation 

173 

Functions of Group Officers. 

The group commander was responsible for the accomplishment of 

the tactical and administrative functions of the group. 

The group adjutant was responsible for all matters of routine 

administration pertaining to the organizations of the group. This 

officer was conceded no tactical functions. 

The technical and routine supply of the organizations of the group 

was supervised by the group supply officer. 

The group transportation officer was responsible for the solution 

and adjustment of transportation problems arising in the group. 

The operations officer was responsible, under the group 

commander, for the successful conduct of aerial operations. It was the 

duty of this officer to plan the day’s work in such a way as to most 

effectively carry out the demands of the tactical situation. It was his 

duty to keep in constant touch with the posts of command (P. C.’s) of 

combat troops; to fulfill their requirements, foresee their needs, and 

take such steps as appeared requisite to inform them thoroughly as to 

the possibilities and limitations of the Air Service in its relation to their 

work. He was further charged with the work of collecting, compiling, 

and distributing for the entire group all tactical data necessary to the 

proper functioning of th squadrons. He was responsible for the 

assignment to each squadron of its daily missions. He was charged 

with the preparation of the daily operations orders and operations 

reports of the group, and with the maintenance of an accurate file of all 

reports, orders, and other bulletins and data having to do with the 

conduct of the operations of the group. 

The assistant operations officer seconded the operations officer in 

all his functions and replaced him in his absence. 

The branch intelligence officer was assigned to the group by the G-2 

section of the General Staff. This officer was responsible for the 

collection, compilation, and distribution of all information of the enemy 

pertaining, directly or indirectly, to aerial operations. He was further 

responsible for the collection, compilation, and transmission to all 

higher commands of information of the enemy gathered from Air 

Service sources. The assemblage, study, interpretation, and 

distribution of aerial photographs, functions which have to do properly 

with information of the enemy, was accomplished by the branch 

intelligence officer, assisted in each case by the observer who had 

carried out the photogrhphic reconnaissance. 

The group photographic officer commanded the photographic 

section. He was responsible for the photographic equipment of the 

group and was charged with the duty of supervising the installation of 

photographic apparatus aboard the airplanes of the squadrons. He 

supervised the development and printing of all photographs. 
174 U.S. Air Service 

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The group radio officer was responsible for the proper functioning 

of the radio equipment of each squadron. He commanded the group 

radio station. He acted as technical advisor and instructor to the entire 

group in all matters pertaining to radio. He was responsible for the 

accomplishment of the necessary liaison between the group and the 

radio stations of posts of command in the division. It was his duty to 

collect, compile, and transmit all data pertaining to the functioning of 

airplane and ground radio in accordance with the radio liaison plans of 

higher command. 

Technical and Tactical Installations. 

the group operations officer a center of tactical information and 

intelligence for the use of all organizations was installed at the 

headquarters of the group. This center was known as the operations 

room. 

By direction of the group commander and under the supervision of 

The Operations Room. 

In this room were conveniently displayed detailed large-scale maps 

of the division sector and of the enemy’s defensive organization in so 

far as known. A bulletin board was installed, and on it appeared 

charts, diagrams, and tabulations of all available tactical and technical 

information collected by the operations and intelligence officers. 

Roomy worktables were provided for the use of pilots and observers. 

Riggng a post for receiuing messages 

from airplanes. 
Corps 

Observation 

175 

\ 

Maps and photographs for the individual use of flying officers were 

kept on file for distribution. A collection of technical books and 

pamphlets was provided for purpose of reference. 

The Photo Section. 

A complete photographic laboratory and a shop for minor repairs of 

photographic apparatus was installed under the direction of the 

group photographic officer to supplement the photographic motor 

truck and trailer which formed a part of the equipment of the group. 

The Radio Section. 

A group radio station was organized by the radio officer, using as its 

basis the radio equipment of one squadron. The radio station was 

equipped with sending and receiving apparatus of the E-3 bis type for 

terrestial communication and with a receiving set of the artillery spark 

type for receiving airplane messages on short-wave lengths. 

Group Security and Defense. 

In order to provide against the contingency of enemy air raids, the 

buildings and hangars of the group were camouflaged as carefully as 

the available means permitted. Camouflage nets were spread across 

the hangars. The roofs of huts were screened with boughs. Hangars 

and huts were widely separated and irregularly disposed. Refuge 

dugouts, from 30 to 40 feet underground, heavily shored with logs, 

were constructed. A post regulation, stringently enforced, required 

the screening of all lighted windows after sundown. Antiaircraft 

machine guns were scattered about the airdrome. 

Tactical Organization of Squadrons. 

The tactical staff and personnel of each squadron of the group 

comprised the commanding officer; three pilots, designated as flight 

commanders; two observers, designated, respectively, as operations 

and’assistant operations officers; 15 additional pilots, of whom three 

were designated as deputy flight commanders; and 16 additional 

observers. Each squadron was divided into three sections of six 

airplane teams each, each section known as a flight. 

Technical Organization of Squadrons. 

Three technical sections having an important bearing upon 

tactical activities formed a part of each squadron. 

The engineer department was headed by an expert mechanical 

officer (the engineer officer) and comprised the engine mechanic 
176 U.S. Air Service 

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personnel of the squadron, including the machine-shop and airplane 

repair units. This department was responsible for the maximum 

mechanical efficiency of engines and airplanes at all times. 

The armament department, headed by an officer detailed from the 

Ordnance Department of the United States Army (the armament 

officer), assisted by a staff of specially trained gunsmiths, was 

responsible for the maintenance and repair of the machine-gun 

armament of the airplanes. This department was further responsible 

for the supply of machine-gun ammunition, star-shell pistols, and 

signal rockets, and for the maintenance of a stock of metal containers, 

with streamers attached, for use by the airplanes in communication 

with the ground by means of dropped messages. 

The radio section, headed by an officer from the Signal Corps (the 

radio officer), was responsible for the installation of wireless 

equipment aboard the airplanes of the squadron and for its proper 

functioning. A staff of electrical mechanics was detailed from the 

enlisted personnel of each squadron to the radio sections. The 

squadron radio sections were under the supervision of the group radio 

officer and were required to lend him any necessary assistance. 

Assignment of Tactical Duties by Squadron. 

manner: 

To the 1st Aero Squadron: 

(command missions). 

The tactical work contemplated was assigned in the following 

(a) Missions of a special nature requested by the command 

(b) Long-distance photographic missions. 

(c) Adjustment of divisional heavy artillery fire. 

(d) Long-distance visual reconnaissance. 

(a) Short-range visual reconnaissance. 

(b) Short-range photographic missions. 

(c) Adjustment of light artillery fire. 

(d) Infantry contact patrols. 

To the 12th Aero Squadron and the 88th Aero Squadron: 

Assignment of Missions. 

The distribution and assignment of special missions to squadrons 

was effected by the group operations officer or his assistant. The 

assignment of pilots and observers for a particular mission was made 

by the squadron operations officer. The general practice in each 

squadron in the apportioning of the work for the following day was 

approximately as follows: 

Upon the assignment of the work on hand to the squadrons, the 

squadron operations officers prepared a schedule of the following 
corps 

Observation 

177 

day’s work with the assignment by name of the pilot and observer to 

comprise the team which should carry out the mission contemplated. 

Copies of this schedule were posted upon bulletin boards in the group 

operations room, the squadron mess hall, and the tent for pilots and 

observers located at the flying field. Other copies of this schedule were 

distributed to the squadron radio and armament officers and to the 

group photographic officer for whatever preparation on the part of 

each might be required. In so far as conditions permitted, it was the 

prgctice to place one flight daily from each squadron on active duty 

basis. To the members of this flight were assigned the missions for the 

current day. A second flight was held upon “alert,” i.e., in reserve, the 

members of that flight to remain available at all times during the 

current day for the performance of any urgent missions required. The 

remaining flightwas off duty unless exceptional circumstances 

required its participation in operations. Advance schedules for each 

day were issued by the squadron operations officer so as to allow 

sufficient time for the proper preparation of missions by pilots and 

observers as well as for the accomplishment of necessary work on 

airplanes and equipment by the technical officers of squadrons and the 

group. 

Communication and Liaison. 

Interior communications of the group consisted of direct telephone 

lines from the group to the squadron headquarters and to the pilots’ 

and observers’ teht on the field. Long-distance lines to tactical posts of 

command in the division and to Hgher Air Service headquarters were 

maintained through the regional exchanges. Radio liaison between the 

group and all points in the divisional area was established from the 

group radio station. Two pigeon lofts stationed at the airdrome made 

possible a liaison service from advanced posts of command in the 

divisional sector. By means of airplane the following types of liaison 

were possible: 

(a) By radio from the airplane to the ground. 

(b) By visual signals from the airplane to the ground, e.g., signal 

(c) Dropped written messages from the airplane to the ground. (d) Visual signals from the ground to the airplane, e.g., rockets, 

A courier service was dntained between the posts of command of 

the division and the group (motorcycle dispatch service). By means of 

automobile and motorcycle sidecar transportation, personal liaison 

by the officers of the group and the squadrons was established with all 

posts of command in the divisional area, Higher Air Service 

headquarters, and the pursuit aviation forces operating in the same 

sector. 

, rockets. 

bengal flares, and signal panels. 
178 U.S. Air Service 

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Arrangements for rapid calling by airplanes equipped with radio of 

specially designated batteries to react upon enemy sensitive points, 

e.g., columns on roads and batteries in action, were made by 

observers of the group in conference with artillery commanders and 

battalion radio officers. It was planned that all sector reconnaissance 

airplanes should be prepared at all times to call the batteries 

designated for this work whenever suitable targets were observed and 

to conduct rapid adjustments according to prearranged methods. 

Plan for Routine Operations 

of Each Flying Day. 

Weather permitting, a routine schedule of operations for each day, 

to include the followins. was prescribed: 

One close-range’reconnaissance of the sector at daylight. 

One close-range reconnaissance of the sector between the 

hours of 9 and 12. 

One close-range reconnaissance of the sector between 2 p.m. 

and 5 p.m. 

One close-range reconnaissance of the sector shortly before 

sundown to take advantage of the semilight for distinguishing 

the flashes of enemy batteries in action and reporting on their 

location, as well as to gather information as to enemy routine 

night circulation which began at this hour. 

One team (pilot and observer) on duty at the airdrome, with 

airplane in readiness for immediate departure, to answer urgent 

calls. 

The 12th and 88th Squadrons were held responsible in turn for 

carrying out the plan of routine operations during succeeding weeks. 

Types of Missions-How They 

Were Prepared and Accomplished. 

Special missions, such as artillery adjustments, photographic and 

long-distance reconnaissances, reconnaissances of particular zones or 

localities, contact patrols, and exercises, were accomplished by 

prearrangement and usually prepared under the direction of the group 

or squadron operations officer on the day preceding the date set for 

the accomplishment of the mission, the team to execute the work 

being designated in advance. 

The Short-Range Reconnaissance. 

preparation of only one airplane. The observer was first notified of his 

The reconnaissance mission, if short-range, required the 
Corps 

Observation 

179 

assignment to the mission and instructed by the operations officer in 

the details of locality, type of information desired, tactical situation, 

liaison data, etc. The pilot was then assigned and conferred with his 

observer. Pilot and observer then proceeded to prepare their 

equipment. The observer applied to the squadron radio officer for the 

mounting of radio equipment and the assignment of proper wave 

length. He then saw to the loading and mounting of his guns by the 

armament section. The pilot similarly assured the loading and 

mounting of his gun or guns, the testing of engine, and the tune-up 

generally of his airplane. Both provided themselves with maps drawn 

from the group operations room. Before leaving on the mission they 

checked out at the assembly tent, signing their names and indicating 

the nature of the mission. Once in the air over the field, the observer 

carefully tested his radio and signaled to his pilot to proceed to the 

lines only upon receiving the panel “Understood” from the detail on 

duty at the group radio station. The mission was then undertaken, the 

observer ordinarily directing the course of the airplane by hand signals 

or interphone communication with the pilot. Upon return from the 

mission the team checked in, noting briefly the conditions 

encountered, any abnormal incidents, and the duration of the flight. 

The pilot then saw to the care of the airplane, engine, armament, and 

radio equipment, report and armament officers any faults 

in the functioning of the for which each was responsible, 

and to the engineer offic hanics assigned to his airplane, any 

engine or airplane troub in the course of the flight. The 

observer proceeded without delay to the operatioris room of the 

group, where he discussed the results of his mission verbally with the 

communication of the re the mission to the tactical authorities 

concerned. The observe en report was carefully filed for 

reconnaissance missions of the type just outlined were under standing 

orders to report direct to the division post of command by wireless 

any abnormal aspect of the enemy’s sector, and, further, if the 

situation warranted and the conditions permitted, to assist the artillery 

in reacting by means of rapid adjustment of zone fire. At this time the 

communication of urgent information to the division by means of 

dropped message was not contemplated, excepting in the case of 

infantry contact patrols. 

The Long-Range Reconnaissance. 

The long-range reconnaissance differed in execution from the shortrange type in that no radio was employed and that for the purpose of 

Corps 

Observation 

181 

added security the airplane undertaking the mission was accompanied 

by two or more protecting airplanes from the same squadron. Details 

of preparation, execution, and recording were essentially the same. 

The Photographic Reconnaissance. 

The photographic mission resembled closely the long-range 

reconnaissance. Even for photographic missions in close proximity to 

the friendly lines, two protecting airplanes were usually furnished, 

aerial photographs being ordinarily secured at an altitude which 

rendered encounter with enemy pursuit patrob a possibility. The 

observer detailed to accomplish a photographic reconnaissance 

carefully measured the territory to be covered and reported on the 

basis of his measurements to the photographic officer the number of 

photographic plates and camera magazines required for the complete 

covering of the zone in question. The photographic officer assured the 

mounting of the camera and accessories in the airplane designated for 

the flight. The mission then proceeded in the ordinary way, the 

photographic airplane leading. Upon completion of the mission, 

airplanes and equipment were checked by the pilots flying the 

formation. Observers made the customary reports. The observer 

taking the photographs held himself in readiness to identify the plates 

after development and to assist in their interpretation by the 

intelligence officer. The mission was not considered completed until 

plates had been identified with respect to their location on the terrain 

and the interpretation completed and reported to the tactical 

authorities concerned. Report on interpretation was rendered in every 

case by the intelligence officer, not by the observer, whose report 

merely recounted the routine incidents of the flight. 

3 

The Artillery Adjustment. 

Preparation of the prearranged artillery adjustment mission was 

similar to that of the short-range reconnaissance. The observer, just 

before leaving for his mission, announced his departure by telephone 

to the battery with which he was about to conduct fire. Upon return 

the observer and pilot followed the same routine prescribed for the 

ordinary reconnaissance flight. In reporting, the observer was required 

to state, in addition to any generalizations regarding the incidents and 

result of the mission, the number of shots fired and the number of 

shots observed. 

The Contact Patrol. 

In addition to the routine preparations prescribed for the shortrange reconnaissance, the observer detailed to fly an infantry contact 
\ 

182 U.S. Air Service 

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patrol was required to provide himself, from the stock maintained by 

the armament officer of his squadron, with Very pistols (two, in the 

event of a misfire from the first pistol employed), Very cartridges of 

various numbers of stars, to conform with the divisional plan of liaison, 

and metal containers for use in dropping messages to the posts of 

command. 

Operations Undertaken. 

Technical and tactical preliminary preparations having been 

completed, the 1st Corps group undertook actual operations. In a 

general way the ground covered during the two and one-half months 

spent by the group in the Toul sector was of limited extent. Work was 

light. One squadron, operating at high tension, would have been 

sufficient for the accomplishment of all missions required by the 

tactical situation. 

Numerous artillery adjustments, neither very important nor very 

arduous, were successfully carried out by the group, and particularly 

by the 12th Aero Squadron. The 1st Aero Squadron effected 

successful photographic missions at frequent intervals. The 88th Aero 

Squadron, which joined the group late in May, was particularly active 

in effecting close-range reconnaissances of the enemy sector, although 

it was afforded one or two opportunities to undertake closerange 

photo missions, long-range reconnaissances, and light-artillery 

adjustments. 

It is notewarthy that the work of the group was seldom hampered 

by the presence of enemy pursuit aircraft. Practically no experience in 

combat was gained. On the other hand, the enemy antiaircraft fire in 

the sector was exceedingly detlse, active, and accurate. Pilots of the 

group were adept at evading antiaircraft fire after a month on the 

sector. During the Seichperey action infantry contact patrols were 

attempted. They were unsuccessful, partly because of the 

inexperience of the teams undertaking them, principally because of 

the incomplete training of the troops, who showed no panels when 

airplanes called for the staking of the line. 

division commander. By individual arrangement between artillery 

commanders and observers of the group panel, exercises for the 

instruction of +e radio and panel details of artillery battalions were 

frequently undertaken and carried to a successful issue. Upon one 

occasion, during infantry maneuvers in the rear areas of the division 

sector, airplane cooperation was called for. The line was staked 

successfully upon the call of the airplane observer and messages were 

dropped at the division posts of command at frequent intervals. The 

experience was, perhaps, of some value to the troops but taught the 

personnel of the group nothing not thoroughly understood previously. 

No definite training program &ith the troops was laid down by the 
Corps 

Observation 

183 

War conditions were conspicuously lacking. The exercise presented 

no difficulties and was executed on the part of the Air Service with 

entire ease. 

Comment. 

nothing of prime importance to operations. Its presence was chefly 

valuable to other arms because of the negative information it furnished 

the command with regard to the enemy activity. The constant watch 

maintained along the lines by airplanes of the group rendered any 

secret preparations by the enemy for attack on a large scale extremely 

difficult. Detection of increased enemy transport, artillery, dumps, and 

cantonments was virtually certain. 

invaluable. The group organization there evolved proved in the main 

successful and efficient and has served as a type for the formation of 

all succeeding corps observation groups. Minor changes have from 

time to time developed in meeting varying situations, but the basic 

principles of observation group organization were established at 

Ourches and have stood the test of time. 

during the campaigns of the summer and fall the experience in matters 

of routine and the confidence gained by the flying personnel at 

Ourches stood in good stead. No essential to a liberal flying training 

was lacking, with the possible exception of actual combat work against 

armed pursuit. 

A criticism of the liaison maintained by the group with the division, 

to the effect that it was neither complete nor effective, might be added. 

It is true that liaison, as it later came to be understood, was here 

practically non-existent. No close personal understanding based on 

good general tactical principles between staff and Air Service ever 

existed. The activities of the Air Service were unfamiliar to the staff. 

The activities of the staff and the units it controlled were unfamiliar to 

the Air Service. As a precautionary measure, in case of increased 

activity, full liaison and complete tactical understanding should have 

been established. On the other hand, the situation at the time 

demanded no such intimacy between Air Service and line as later 

became indispensable. Lacking the incentive of urgency neither staff 

nor Air Service realized the gap that remained to be bridged. The later 

operations of the group at Chateau-Thierry were handicapped by lack 

of liaison experience. 

During the stay at Ourches the 1st Corps group contributed 

To the group itself the period spent on the Toul sector was 

In the more arduous work of corps observation which followed 

111. The 19th A~RO SquaBKon 

in the Baccarzat Iiecto~. 

185 

Introduction. 

During the first week of June the 12th Aero Squadron received 

notice that orders would shortly issue for its movement overland to 

Vathemenil, in the Baccarat sector, to the southeast of Luneville. 

Accordingly, an advance party of several officers and a considerable 

detachment of men were sent forward to prepare the airdrome and 

buildings for the arrival of the squadron. The fact that the location 

assigned for the airdrome messed little else than some newly 

erected hangars necessitated a great amount of labor by this advance 

party in the preparation of the landing field, offices, and quarters for 

both enlisted and commissioned personnel. A construction squadron 

had not been available for thm work; the utilization of squadron 

officers and men in the advance party and in addition the necessity for 

utilizing a large proportion of the squadron in this work after its arrival 

interfered with active operations for a period of four days. However, 

the tactical situation in that sector at the time was not such that this 

delay could result seriously, the observation work during this time 

being carried out by the French squadron which the 12th was to 

relieve. On the other hand, much benefit was derived by the squadron 

in its earnest and strenuous endeavors to complete the airdrome 

installation necessary to the conduct of active operations over the 

front; a unit spirit of teamwork was developed which proved invaluable 

in the months to come. 

During its first week in this sector, the squadron gave up its 

equipment of A. R. airplanes and received 18 Salmson twoseater 

observation airplanes equipped with the radial Salmson engine of 260 

horsepower. This airplane proved most satisfactory in every respect; 

no observation airplane used upon the western front up to the 

conclusion of the armistice gave greater all-around satisfaction. 

The Tactical Situation. 

The Baccarat sector was a typical “stabilized” or “quiet” sector. The 

enemy was strongly entrenched in positions which had been in 

existence for many months. Barbed-wire entanglements and machinegun strong points reinforced the lines of trench work. To the rear he 

was supported by the usual complement of field and heavy artillery. 

In the air his forces were considerably more numerous than was the 

case in the Toul sector. A rather active observation service was 

supplemented by a pursuit force which carried out daily patrols of the 

sector. The latter, although not equipped with the latest types of 

enemy pursuit airplanes, was active and aggressive. Bombardment 

squadrons operated on practically all clear nights against various posts 

of command in the sector, allied airdromes, and the towns and villages 
186 U.S. Air Service 

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adjoining the lines. Farther to the rear the enemy had a considerable 

amount of pursuit aviation which devoted its energies to the attack of 

allied day bombardment squadrons which were then carrying out longdistance raids into Germany throughout that area. 

The sector of the 42d Division, United States Army, to which the 

12th Squadron was assigned, extended approximately from 

Badenviller to Blamont, some 12 kilometers. As in the Toul sector, the 

positions of the infantry were strongly organized by means of trench 

systems, barbed-wire entanglements, and machine-gun 

emplacements. The infantry was reinforced by the divisional artillery 

which consisted of two regiments of field and one regiment of heavy 

artillery. The division operated under the command of the 6th Corps 

of the 8th French Army. The command of all aviation forces in the 

Baccarat sector operating for the 6th Corps, 8th French Army, was 

vested in the “commandant of the sector aeronautique,” whose 

headquarters were located at Luneville. This officer corresponds to 

the present corps chief of Air Service in the American Air Service. 

In addition to the 12th Aero Squadron, the aviation forces of the 

sector consisted for the most part of observation squadrons operating 

in conjunction with the divisions to the right and left of the 42d 

Division, United States Army. These squadrons carried out 

observation work for their divisions of the same nature as that to be 

performed for the 42d Division, United States Army. In addition, there 

operated one observation squadron which did the work of the Army 

corps. There was no regularly assigned pursuit aviation patrolling that 

section of the front. As a consequence the observation airplanes there 

operating had to rely solely upon their own armament as a means of 

defense against hostile aircraft. 

Mission of the 12th Aero Squadron. 

was: 

The mission devolving upon the 12th Aero Squadron in this sector 

1. Reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy. 

(a) Visual. 

(b) Photographic. 

2. Adjustment of artillery fire. 

3. Cooperation with the infantry should a situation arise requiring 

the dispatch of an infantry-contact patrol to locate the position of the 

front lines. 

(a) Terrain exercises for practice in marking out the front lines. 

(b) Panel exercises, e.g., simulated adjustments of artillery fire. 

4. Training with the infantry and artillery. 

5. Coordination and completion of training of flying and ground 

personnel under actual war conditions. 
Corps 

Observation 

187 

Plans Made to Fulfill Mission. 

addition to the organization of the squadron, as described under that 

heading in the chapter on the operations in the Toul sector, was to 

place in active operation the squadron radio equipment, to install a 

photographic section, and to assign for duty at the squadron a branch 

intelligence officer. Under the direction of the squadron commander, 

the work over the lines was to be distributed by the operations officer 

and assistant operations officer according to a roster of the flying 

personnel, exceptions to be made occasionally in cases where certain 

pilots and observers were particularly well qualified to carry out some 

special mission. In general, the routine operations of the squadron 

were carried out in accordance with the methods prescribed in the 

Toul sector. 

To operate as an individual squadron all that was required in 
188 US. Air Service 

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Post Security and Defense. 

The defense of the airdrome was organized along the same lines as 

those described in the chapter on the Toul sector. Carefully prepared 

plans for the defense and, if necessary, the withdrawal of the squadron 

in case of hostile attack were received from the commandant of the 

secteur aeronautique, 6th Corps, 8th French Army. These plans were 

given careful study and all necessary steps were taken to carry them 

into execution in case the need arose. 

Communication and Liaison. 

1. Interior communications.-Telephone lines were constructed 

connecting the various offices, barracks, and hangars. 

2. Telephonic.-Long-distance telephone lines to tactical posts of 

command in the division and Higher Air Service headquarters were 

maintained through regional switchboards. 

3. Radio.-The squadron radio section insured, in this stabilized 

sector, the sending and receipt of radio messages between all points in 

the divisional area. In addition, it made possible the receipt and record 

of all messages sent by the squadron airplane in their work over the 

front. 

4. Airplane.-(a) Radio, from the airplane to the ground. 

(b) Visual signals, from airplane to ground, e.g., rockets. 

(c) Dropped written messages, from airplane to ground. 

(d) Visual signals, ground to airplane, e.g., rockets, bengal flares, 

5. Motor-cycle dispatch service. 

6. Personal.-Frequent visits by the commanding officer, pilots, 

signal panels. 

and observers of the squadron to the posts of command of the 

division. 

Operations Undertaken. 

In the actual fulfillment of the missions assigned to the pilots and 

observers of the squadron in this sector the same general methods 

were pursued as those described as being the routine methods for the 

execution of the various types of missions carried out by corps 

observation units in the chapter on operations in the Toul sector. For 

the most part, the missions performed were confined to those of 

artillery adjustment and visual and photographic reconnaissance. On 

only one occasion were infantry contact patrols attempted. That 

occurred during a raid the enemy carried out against the American 

troops at the time of the relief of the 42d Division by the 77th Division, 

United States Army.' The raid took place during the night, and on the 

following morning the 12th Aero Squadron was requested to locate 

the friendly front line. In attempting to carry out the request, the 
Corps 

Observation 

189 

observer in the first airplane dispatched returned with a serious wound 

caused by antiaircraft artillery fire. The second observer, when the 

infantry failed repeatedly to respond to his signals calling upon them to 

mark out the first line by means of panels or bengal flares, flew so low 

that he was able to distinguish the uniforms of such men as exposed 

themselves to view, and was thus able to give a rough idea as to the 

position of the friendly infantry. Unfortunately, he was wounded by 

machine-gun fire from the ground before he had fully satisfied himself 

as to the location of our first-line troops. The third airplane dispatched 

encountered no better fortune than the first two in receiving a 

response from the infantry, but he was finally able to report briefly 

upon the position of the latter by means of observations made at 

extremely low altitude. 

For the most part, aside from the visual reconnaissance missions 

performed at dawn and twilight of each day, and a certain number of 

photographic missions requested by the division and the commandant 

of the secteur aeronautique, practically all of the work undertaken was 

that solicited by the squadron commander and the observers. It being 

realized that the plan of operations in this sector was one of training, 

every effort was made to arrange and perform as many adjustments of 

artillery as were possible. The only limitation placed upon this type of 

work was that which resulted from a shortage of artillery ammunition, 

the artillery regiments being allotted only a fixed amount for their per 

diem allowance. 

Great stress was laid upon the matter of exercises. Under the 

direction of the squadron commander, and with the advice of the 

commandant of the regional secteur aeronautique and that of a 

captain observer from one of the nearby French observation 

squadrons, a large number of exercises was carried out with the 

infantry and the artillery. The infantry exercises took the form of 

training the infantry in the proper use of their panels and bengal flares 

marking out the line at the call of the aerial observer. These exercises, 

for the most part, took place with reserve battalions in the second or 

third lines. With the artillery, exercises were arranged frequently for 

the practice of a method for rapid adjustment of specially designated 

batteries against fugitive targets located by the observer in the enemy 

lines and reported to the battery by means of dropped written 

messages. This method of adjustment was designed especially for use 

in a war of movement. It had been adopted by the French observation 

squadrons of that sector after a long and thorough study of enemy and 

allied methods in the major operations of the preceding spring. The 

“shoots” were conducted over the actual lines; the targets were 

chosen by the observer after taking the air. Usually they were points in 

enemy territory assumed to be fugitive targets. Too much value can 

not be given to the results of this form of exercise to both the artillery 
190 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. 1 

and the observers of the squadron. Considerable success marked the 

efforts of both the artillery and the observers, and the experience 

gained later proved of value to both. 

Considerable advance was made on the part of the observers of the 

squadron in gaining a knowledge of the importance of close personal 

liaison with the officers of the divisional artillery and infantry posts of 

command. Various incidents arose which taught the observers that 

few of the American troops entering the lines for the first time would 

have even a working knowledge of the elements which are so 

necessary to bring about some measure of success in the cooperation 

of the observation air service with the divisional ground troops. It was 

brought most forcibly home to all the squadron observers that great 

and prolonged effort would be necessary on their part to fit the ground 

troops to properly fulfill their part in working with the Air Service 

during the execution of artillery fire adjustments or infantry contact 

patrols. Questions connected with the execution of artillery fire 

adjustments were mainly those of proper operation of the artillery 

radio stations and the functioning of the crews assigned to them for 

the operation of panel strips used to signal the airplane observer. As 

regards the infantry, the main difficulties may be briefly stated to have 

been: 

(a) To insure the proper supply and distribution to the first-line 

(b) To instruct the individual infantryman in their proper use. 

(c) To train the individual infantryman to respond by signal to the 

infantry of infantry signal panels and bengal flares. 

requests of the airplane observer for the marking out of the line 

as automatically and readily as a soldier responds to fire 

discipline. 

During the three weeks operations by the 12th Aero Squadron in 

the Baccarat sector much valuable advice and aid were given by the 

corps observation air service commander-the commandant secteur 

aeronautique, 6th Corps, 8th French Army-and by the experienced 

observer whom he placed at the disposal of the squadron commander. 

execution of the missions assigned to them, considerable experience 

was gained by some three or four tours of pilots and observers of the 

squadron in aerial combat. 

Comment. 

In the main the actual operations conducted by the 12th Aero 

Squadron in the Baccarat sector were only a continuation and 

development of those carried out previously in the Toul sector. The 

conduct of visual and photographic reconnaissance missions, 

prearranged artillery fire adjustments, and infantry contact patrols was 

similar in every way to that of like operations in the Toul sector. In a 

As the result of attacks from hostile pursuit forces during the 
Corps 

Observation 

191 

few instances visual reconnaissance missions were dispatched under 

orders from the secteur aeronautique of the 6th French Corps to 

procure certain specific information in well-defined areas of the enemy 

positions, but on the whole reconnaissance missions covered the 

entire divisional sector under standing orders to observe and report 

upon all forms of enemy activity. In the course of the squadron’s stay 

in the Baccarat sector it was learned that a general visual 

reconnaissance of the sector produced very little in the way of 

valuable results except when performed at dawn or just before 

darkness; reconnaissance missions performed during the daytime 

scarcely ever realized success sufficient to justify their dispatch and 

execution. This fact is easy of comprehension when it is remembered 

that the sector had long been stabilized and that no active operations 

were in course. Enemy and friendly activity was almost entirely 

confined to the hours of darkness. 

Undoubtedly the most valuable lessons of the period at Baccarat 

were those learned concerning the scope of personal liaison in 

preparation of successful cnoperation between the squadron and the 

divisional ground troops. In addition, the experience derived in the 

execution of the exercises with the artillery, which had as their 

purpose the rapid adjustment of fire of specially designated batteries 

upon fugitive targets in a war of movement, although not of great 

extent, was sufficient to acquaint the observers of the squadron with 

the general principles of this form of aerial work and to impress them 

with the importance of developing it in the future. 

From the point of view of the squadron alone it had undoubtedly 

proved of great value for the unit to be thrown entirely upon its own 

resources during the period of its operations in this sector. A 

considerable training was acquired by the officers of the squadron 

while it thus operated as an isolated Air Service unit, which they would 

not have received operating as one squadron in a group during the 

same length of time. As a tactical matter, this fact proved of great 

value during the American Air Service operations on the Marne, for at 

that time the need immediately arose for a much larger number of 

observers trained in the principles of liaison with ground troops and 

the conduct of group and squadron operations than had been 

necessary or were available at any previous time. 

IV. The Thi~a Flight OF the 99th 

SquaZmoa in the Vosges. 

193 

Introductory. 

Toward the middle of July, 1918, the 5th Division (United States), 

holding a sector in the Vosges Mountains to the southwest of the 

towns of Celles and Frapelle, was ordered to advance and capture the 

last-named place. To assist the 5th Division in the operation the 3d 

Flight of the 99th Aero Squadron was brought forward from the 

station of the squadron at Luxouil-les-Bains and took station on the 

airdrome at Dogneville near Epinal. The flight was assigned to the 33d 

French Corps observation group operating at Dogneville. Seven 

Salmson airplanes, with a corresponding number of pilots and 

observers and adequate mechanic personnel in charge of the flight 

commander, composed the flight. Armament and radio sections were 

attached. To all intents and purposes the flight was organized as a selfcontained unit and was administered along similar lines to those 

obtaining in the French squadrons of the group. 

Tactical Situation. 

The 5th Division occupied a mountainous, wooded sector. The 

defenses of the friendly sector were of the stabilized warfare type, 

consisting of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, dugouts, and 

carefully prepared and camouflaged artillery positions. The infantry 

was supported by the usual complement of light and heavy artillery. 

The enemy was strongly organized for defense at Frapelle. The 

town lay within a salient conforming to the course of a small creek 

which ran through a mountainous defile. 

The operations in view contemplated cutting off the enemy salient 

and forcing the abandonment of the town of Frapelle, which 

constituted an important rail head and road junction. 

Mission of the Air Service. 

The mission of the 3d Flit, 99th Squadron, in view of the tactical 

(a) To photograph the enemy defenses previous to the attack. 

(b) To insure effective surveillance of the enemy positions previous 

to and during the attack carefully noting and reporting any 

indication of counterdensive or local reactions in preparation. 

(c) To adjust the friendly divisional artillery on sensitive points 

within the enemy Iines. 

(d) To report the location of and adjust fire on enemy batteries in 

action. 

situation and plan of attack, was as follows 
194 U.S. Air Service 

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(e) To maintain contact, by means of infantry contact patrols, 

between the command and the front line during the offensive 

operations. 

(f) To photograph the friendly positions at the close of the 

operation contemplated. 

Plans for Accomplishment of Mission. 

established by officers of the 3d Flight with the divisional command 

and commanders of divisional artillery and infantry units. Means and 

methods of airplane cooperation with the troops were discussed and 

definite lines of procedure arranged by mutual agreement. 

Telegraphic, telephonic, radio, and courier communication was 

established. The commanding officer of the French group lent valuable 

advice and assistance in perfecting the plan of liaison and of 

operations. 

infantry contact patrols, terrain exercises were carried out with the 

9th and 10th Infantry Brigades of the 5th Division. 

Immediately upon arriving in the sector personal liaison was 

In order to assure cooperation of the troops with the airplane during 

An aerial view of trenches taken during 

photo reconnaissance. 
Corps 

Observation 

195 

Operations. 

Prior to the attack airplanes of the 3d Flight successfully carried out, 

by prearrangement, adjustments with the divisional artillery on enemy 

battery positions and strong points. Photographic missions 

reconnoitered enemy territory to a depth of 40 kilometers, securing 

photographs of considerable tactical value to the command. It is 

worthy of note in this connection that heretofore no corps squadron 

had ever photographed enemy territory in this sector deeper than 10 

kilometers. Careful visual reconnaissance of enemy territory was 

carried out at frequent intervals and the command assured of the 

absence of any abnormal activity on the part of the opposing forces. 

On August 17, following a heavy artillery preparation, the 9th 

Brigade took the offensive at daybreak. Two airplanes of the 3d Flight 

were over the lines when the attack began, one of these being an 

infantry contact airplane ad the other an artillery airplane charged 

with the mission of detecting and reporting indications of enemy 

counter-attacks in pre airplanes were replaced at 

frequent intervals duri the successful issue of the 

operation. 

In spite of the terrain exercises carried out by the infantry in 

preparation for the attack, calls of infantry contact airplanes for the 

line were conslatently dkegarded. The line was never staked by 

means of panels. The approximate location of the friendly advance 

elements was, however, determined and reported to the command at 

frequent intervals, contact patrols beins carried out at altitudes as low 

as to permit distinguishing and identifying the uniforms of troops on 

the ground. In the course of these missions the friendly airplanes were 

submitted to heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from hostile forces at 

close range. In many instances airplanes of the 3d Flight on infantry 

contact patrol took active part in the combat on the ground, attacking 

and silencing enemy machine guns and scattering with their fire 

groups of German soldiers caught in the open and on the roads. It is a 

matter of record that several machine-gun nests were completely put 

out of action in combat with corps observation airplanes of the 3d 

Flight. 

new front line of defense, the airplanes of the 3d Flight were 

dispatched and successfully photographed the friendly front line. 

Enemy aerial activity at Frapelle was negligible, the work of the 

airplanes seldom being hindered by hostile pursuit. 

Upon the successful issue of the attack and the establishment of a 

V, The 1st COKPS A~K Serzuice 

at Chateau-TbieKKg, 

1 97 

Introduction. 

carried the enemy forces as far as the Marne was virtually arrested by 

the first week in June. It had resulted in a huge V-shaped salient, the 

mouth stretching between Soissons and Rheims and the tip resting on 

the Mame at Chateau-Thierry. During the last week of June, plans 

were announced for the commencement of operations by the 1st 

American Army Corps on the western side of the salient, in a sector 

commencing at the village of Vaux, immediately to the west of 

Chateau-Thierry, and extending approximately as far as Courchamps. 

The first week of July saw the installation of the 1st Corps 

headquarters at La Ferte-sous Jouarre. 

The Chateau-Thierry campaign may be divided into two main 

actions; the first, an allied defensive; the second, an allied offensive. 

During the operations of the 1st American Army Corps on this front 

there were three phases. The first was marked by preparations of the 

enemy for a renewed offensive and preparations by the Allies of a 

defense to meet the impending attack. The second was the period of 

enemy offensive and successful allied resistance. The third saw the 

execution of a determined and successful allied offensive. Therefore 

the history of the Corps Air Service on the Marne can best be treated 

in three parts dealing with the Air Service operations during each of 

these three phases. 

The German offensive which began May 26 on the Aisne and 

The Corps Chief of Air Service. 

During the first week of July, the office of the chief of Air Service, 

1st American Army Corps, was established at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.2 

Here for the first time the chief of Air Service assumed active tactical 

control of the units making up the Corps Air Service. These units 

consisted of the observation squadrons comprising the 1st Corps 

group, and the balloon companies operating with the corps troops. 

Note.-In the tactical control of the corps balloon companies, the 

chief of Air Service was represented at all times by a trained balloon 

officer, known as the corps balloon wing commander, who assumed 

direct charge of all operations conducted by the balloon units. At no 

time were the detailed operations of the balloon units controlled from 

the office of the chief of Air Service. This work was performed by the 

corps balloon wing commander and staff, with offices located in 

proximity to the various balloon companies? 
198 U.S. Air Service 

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Organization and Functions of 

the Chief of Air Service. 

The office of the chief of Air Service, as it operated on the Marne in 

July and August, 1918, was organized as follows: 

Corps chief of Air Service. 

Adjutant. 

Information officer. 

Operations officer. 

Liaison officer. 

The duties of the corps chief of Air Service were defined in General 

Orders No. 81, H. A. E. F., dated May 29, 1918: 

PAR. 5. The duties of the chief of Air Service of an Army Corps are as follows: 

1. In each Army Corps there will be a chief of Air Service, who will command the corps aeronautical 

2. He is the adviser of the corps cder and the Corps General Staff in all that pertains to the Air 

units. 

Service. He will keep the corps Commander informed in regard to aeronautical matters and will make 

such recommendations as he considers necessary regarding aeronautical personnel, material, and 

methods. In accordance with the general plan of operations and in cooperation with G-3 of the corps, he 

prepares the general plans of action for all the air units of the corps. He insures the coordination of the 

aeronautical plans of divisions and supenrises the employment of all air units throughout the corps in 

accordance with the approved plaiis. He prepares the detailed plans for the air units under his direct 

orders. 

3. Under the authority of the corps commander the chief of Air Service is charged with the imtruction 

and inspection of all air units assigned or attached to the corps, the collection, dissemination, and 

utiliiation of aeronautical information within the corps and the necessary liaison with the artillew and the 

Air Service of the Army and of neighboring corps. 

prepares timely requisitions for aeronauticgl supplies. 

4. He apportions the aeronautical supplies and material placed at the disposal of the corps and 

The units under the command of the corps chief of Air Service 

were: 

1st Aero Squadron. 

12th Aero Squadron. 

1 French squadron, replaced July 6 by the 88th Aero 

Squadron. 

These three squadrons comprised the 1st Corps observation group, 

which retained the same organization established in the Toul sector in 

the month of May. 

The relation of the Chief of Air Service to the corps commander and 

staff was chiefly advisory. The Air Service being a comparatively new 

arm of the service, the corps chief of Air Service had to bear in mind 

that few of those higher in command were acquainted with its actual 

possibdities and limitations. 

The relation of the chief of Air Service to the units of his command was both administrative and tactical. With him rested responsibility to 

the corps commander that all orders of the corps were properly 

executed. He prepared all general plans of action for the Air Service of 
Corps 

Observation 

199 

the corps in accordance with the orders of the corps commander. He 

supervised the maintenance of all liaison between the units of his 

command and the corps ground troops. He supervised the instruction 

of the units of his command and took all necessary steps to insure 

close cooperation with the line units to which the Air Service units 

were assigned. He provided for the replacement of material and 

personnel and reported to the proper authorities any lack in training of 

personnel. 

The function of the chief of Air Service in his relation to the line units 

was to insure for them thorough cooperation by the units under his 

command and to act in an instructive and advisory capacity. It was his 

duty to assign the Air Service units to line units and supervise in detail 

the work performed. It was his function to initiate measures for the 

instruction of the infantry and artillery in the proper employment of 

and efficient cooperatjon with the Air Service units. 

The duties of the adjutant to the chief of Air Service dealt entirely 

with the administration of the units which comprised the Corps Air 

Service. 

It was the duty of the information officer to keep the chief of Air 

Service and Air Service units supplied with the latest tactical and 

technical information, including maps, photographs, tactical orders, 

technical air service information and general air service information. 

He was responsible for the Consolidated Intelligence Report of the 

Corps Air Service, published nightly. 

The operations officer was responsible, under the direction of the 

chief of Air Service, for the proper coordination and execution of all 

operations of the Corps Air Service units. He prepared and forwarded 

all orders concerning operations and supervised their execution. It 

was his duty to prepare the daily Corps Air Service Operations 

Report. 

maintain a close personal liaison with the following: 

It was the duty of the liaison officer to establish and constantly 

1. Commanding officers and operations officers of- 

(a) Observation group of the Corps Air Service. 

(b) Individual squadrons of the group. 

2. Commanding officers, G-2’s and G-3’s of- 

(a) The Army Corps. 

(b) Chief of artillery of corps. 

(c) Corps heavy artillery. 

(d) The divisions of the corps- 

(1) Infantry. 

(2) Artillery. 

(e) Subordinate posts of command of all above line commands. 
200 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

It was his duty to inform himself concerning all matters connected 

with the corps units necessary to the conduct of operations by the 

squadrons; to carefully study the information so secured and transmit 

same to the operations departments of the group and squadrons; to 

ascertain the amount of training previously acquired by the artillery 

and infantry units, and the methods, rules, and principles under which 

the training was carried out. Together with the information officer, he 

was responsible to insure that the group secured all maps, 

photographs, and other information from the corps troops necessary 

for operations. It was his duty to arrange with the corps chief signal 

officer for the establishment of all necessary telephone and radio 

liaison between the Chief of Air Service, observation group, corps 

staff, and line posts of command, and in general to supervise the 
corps 

Observation 

201 

establishment of all other necessary forms of liaison between the 

Corps Air Service and other corps troops. It was his duty to supervise 

the work of collecting and forwarding the following information to the 

Chief of Air Service, the group, and squadrons: 

1. Location of all posts of command. 

2. Names of commanders. 

3. Telephone and radio connections therewith. 

4. Locations of panel and “dropped message” stations. 

5. Radio calls. 

6. Panel numbers, i.e., the particular panel assigned to each post of 

7. Radio, telephone, and panel codes in use betweencommand. 

(a) Ground stations. 

(b) Airplane and ground. 

(c) Ground and airplane. 

(a) Location of guns. 

(b) Number of guns. 

(c) Caliber and type. 

(d) Fields of fire. 

8. If artillery: 

It was his duty to arrange definite plans for: 

1. War of movement artillery adjustments by means of airplane. 

(a) Exercises looking toward proficiency in such type of 

adjustment. 

2. Designation and use of certain batteries for fire on fugitive targets 

3. Exercises with the infantry looking toward proficiency in 

The plan of communications drawn up by the chief of Air Service 

Direct telephonic communication with the group and squadrons. 

Telephonic communication, through the corps headquarters 

switchboard, with all other corps units, and through regional 

switchboards with Higher Air Service headquarters. 

Telegraphic liaison through corps telegraph off ice. 

Radio liaison with the group and all corps units by means of a radio 

Personal liaison through visits made by the Chief of Air Service and 

Motor cycle courier service between group and Chief of Air Service, 

upon call from observer. 

cooperation with the infantry airplane. 

was as follows: 

station established at the Chief of Air Service headquarters. 

his staff to the group, corps headquarters, and all corps units. 

motor cycle dispatch service, to corps and divisional posts of 

command. 
202 U.S. Air Service 

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VOl. I 

The 1st Corps observation group was organized technically, 

tactically, and for the purposes of administration and supply along the 

same lines that had been followed in its original organization at the 

Ourches airdrome. 

The third American squadron to join the 1st Corps group did not 

arrive until July 6. July 7 saw the completion of the organization and 

installation of the headquarters of the Corps Air Service and the 

beginnihg of operations of the Corps Air Service entire. Previous to 

this date certain operations had been carried out and a digression will 

be made at this point to describe them. 

Effectives and Station. 

During the last week of June orders were received for the 1st Corps 

observation group headquarters and the 1st and 12th,Aero Squadrons 

to proceed from their respective stations to the Marne sector. The 

movement by motor truck commenced June 28. By noon of the 29th 

all the airplanes of both squadrons had been flown overland from the 

Ourches and Vathemenil airdromes to the new location at Saints, 

some 5 kilometers to the south of Couloumiers. Advance parties from 

each squadron had arrived by automobile and perfected all 

arrangements for the billeting of officers and men. By the night of June 

29 the main body of both units had arrived and been installed on the 

airdrome. One French squadron temporarily assigned to the group 

was already installed on the airdrome. 

The airdrome was situated on a large level wheat field which had but 

recently been harvested. The hangars had already been erected by 

French Air Service construction units; they were the standard type of 

large Bessoneaux canvas shelters; all of them were well camouflaged. 

The enlisted personnel, for the most part, were billeted in a group of 

farm buildings which bordered the flying field, the overflow being 

quartered in squadron tentage. The commissioned personnel were 

billeted in the near-by villages of Saints and Mauperthuis. 

Chateau-Thierry to Courchamps, a distance of 15 kilometers. 

55 kilometers. 

the front lines was a tactical necessity, considering the impending 

enemy offensive in the direction of Paris. 

The sector of the front to be covered extended approximately from 

The distance of the front lines from the airdrome varied from 40 to 

The location of the observation group at such a great distance from 

Tactical Situation. I 

Corps (United States). The 2d Division was holding a sector of the 

At this time there were two divisions operating under the 1st Army 
Corps 

Observation 

203 

front which extended from a short distance west of Chateau-Thierry 

to Torcy, and the 167th French Division occupied the front from 

Torcy to Courchamps. The front lines consisted of shallow, hastily 

constructed trenches, by no means a continuous system. These were 

strengthened to a certain extent by barbed-wire entanglements. 

Machine-gun emplacements, located at all strong points, made up for 

the most part the immediate defenses of the first lines. These two 

divisions were supported by the usual complement of divisional 

artillery, two regiments of 75’s and one of 155’s. In addition, there were 

several reserve batteries of 75’s. The corps artillery consisted of 

motorized regiments of 155 G.P.F. and older model French guns of 

the same caliber. 

consisted of the 1st and 12th Aero Squadrons and one French 

squadron. Under orders of the Army Air Service commander, 6th 

French Army, there operated the 1st American Pursuit Group of four 

squadrons and several French squadrons which performed the work 

of night and day reconnaissance for the Army. Until the middle of July 

there were no allied bombardment squadrons operating in this sector. 

The situation of the enemy ground troops was much similar to that 

of the two divisions of the 1st American Army Corps which opposed 

them. Their first lines consisted for the most part of a series of strong 

points organized for machine-gun defense. Shallow trenches, fox 

holes, and organized shell craters completed the lines between strong 

points. Behind the infantry positions was a large amount of field 

artillery, and farther to the rear the enemy had massed, even at this 

time, the formidable array of heavy artillery with which he executed 

the artillery preparation of his offensive of July 15. Along the entire 

sector the enemy had a remarkably well-organized anti-aircraft 

defense consisting of machine guns and artillery. 

At Chateau-Thierry the enemy had a powerful aggregation of 

pursuit squadrons. In addition, there were many squadrons which 

carried out the work of observation, army day and night 

reconnaissance, and bombardment. Here, for the first time in the 

history of the observation squadrons of the 1st Corps group, it 

became a daily occurrence to encounter enemy pursuit patrols in 

numbers varying from 7 to 20 in a single patrol. These hostile pursuit 

forces were equipped with the latest types of fast scout airplanes, and 

among the squadrons there encountered by the Americans were some 

of the best of the German pursuit aviation. 

Preliminary Operations. 

On June 30 the major portion of the pilots and observers of the 1st 

and 12th Aero Squadrons carried out flights over the front lines which 

Until the 6th of July, the Air Service of the 1st Corps (United States) 
204 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

sufficed to orient and accustom them to the new sector. On the 

afternoon of July 1 occurred the attack by the 2d Division (United 

States) against the village of Vaux. At this time airplanes from both 

squadrons were in the air performing the work of idantry contact. 

Others executed command missions of surveillance for both the 

infantry and artillery posts of command. All other available pilots and 

observers were sent out as auxiliary surveillance teams, whose 

function, in the main, was to assure allied domination of the air with 

the secondary purpose of giving these teams the benefit to be derived 

from a first-hand participation in the attack. The operations of this and 

the previous day were conducted as a matter of emergency, before 

comprehensive plans had been drafted assigning squadrons to specific 

work with the various corps units. 

During the next five days the 1st and 12th Squadrons perfected 

their interior organization on the airdrome, established their lines of 

supply, received and placed in good running order a number of new 

airplanes and in general prepared for their work in the new sector. A 

considerable amount of personal liaison work was effected by the 

operations officers and the observers for the purpose of making 

specific arrangements and securing all data and information necessary 

to the conduct of operations. Missions of visual reconnaissance were 

executed at dawn and twilight daily. Numerous flights were made by 

the flying personnel for the purpose of becoming thoroughly oriented 

to the sector. Several photographic missions were performed over 

portions of enemy territory designated by G-2 of the corps staff. A few 

artillery adjustments were accomplished, but the relief of the 2d 

Division by the 26th Division (United States) prevented the 

performance of other adjustments which had been arranged. 

This relief took place on the 5th of July. On the same date the group 

was ordered to move to the airdrome at Francheville, a small village to 

the northwest of Couloumiers. The move was executed without 

incident that day. On July 6 the French squadron of the group was 

relieved by the 88th Aero Squadron (United States) which had 

proceeded overland from the Ourches airdrome. Operations by the 

Corps Air Service as a complete organization began on July 7. 

Aside from the relief of the 2d Division (United States) by the 26th 

Division (United States), the tactical situation remained the same as 

described above. 

The Mission of the Corps Air Service. 

The mission of the Corps Air Service was to keep the command 

informed, by means of visual and photographic reconnaissance, of the 

situation within the enemy lines to the depth of 8 kilometers opposite 
Corps 

Observation 

205 

the corps front; to adjust the fire of the corps and divisional artillery; 

and to hold itself in readiness to perform corps and divisional 

command missions and infantry contact patrols whenever such should 

become necessary. If the situation permitted, it was to furnish the 

means of further training our ground troops in the use of the 

observation airplane. 

Tactical and Technical Installation. 

The tactical and technical installation of the 1st Corps observation 

group at Francheville was essentially as when the group was originally 

organized at the Ourches airdrome. 

Assignment of Tactical Duties by Squadron. 

The tactical work contemplated was assigned as follows: 

To the 1st Aero Squadron: 

(a) Corps command missions. 

(b) Adjustment of corps heavy artillery fire. 

(c) Surveillance of hostile artillery and location of enemy 

(d) Visual reconnaissance of the corps sector. 

To the 12th Aero Squadron: 

All missions of the 26th Division (United States). 

To the 88th Aero Squadron: 

All missions of the 167th French Division. 

The work of a division squadron consisted of: 

(a) Command missions. 

(b) Adjustment of divisional artillery fire. 

(c) Visual reconnaissance of divisional sector. 

(d) Divisional infantry contact patrols. 

batteries. 

The 1st and 12th Squadrons being equipped with the Salmson, an 

airplane much better adapted to the work of photography in an active 

sector than the Sopwith, all missions of photography were equally 

divided between these two squadrons. 

The manner of carrying on the day’s routine operations in the group 

and squadrons remained essentially the same as that described in the 

chapter on the Toul sector. However, due to the intensive nature of 

the work to be performed, the practice of assigning flights to “duty,” 

“alert,” and “off duty” was here abandoned. 

it had been in the Toul sector except that the group was not here 

equipped with courier pigeons. 

The group plan of communication and liaison remained the same as 
206 U.S. Air Service 

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Operations Undertaken. 

From July 7 to 15 the actual operations undertaken had as their 

main purpose a thorough reconnaissance and surveillance of the 

corps sector in order to keep the corps and divisional command 

informed constantly as to the situation and developments in the 

enemy territory. In addition, it was desired to regulate the fire of the 

artillery against sensitive points not visible from balloons and 

terrestrial observatories and against hostile battery positions, and to 

perform registrations according to the plans drawn up to cope with the 

impending enemy offensive. Accordingly, a thorough visual 

reconnaissance at the entire corps sector took place at dawn and 

twilight daily. Other visual reconnaissance missions were dispatched 

throughout the day according to the tactical situation. All such 

missions were much more definite in scope than had been the 

reconnaissance missions executed daily in the Toul sector. The 

attention of the observers was especially directed to the location of the 

enemy’s battery positions, the movement on roads and railways, the 

location of any evidence of new works, trenches, stores, munitions, 

and troop concentrations. 

A nightly meeting was held in the G-2 section of the Corps General 

Staff for the purpose of discussing the developments of the day, all 

new information concerning the general situation, and all new plans, or 

changes in existing plans. The Corps Air Service was represented at 

this meeting by the chief of Air Service, or a member of his staff, by the 

group branch intelligence officer, and as often as possible by the group 

and squadron commanders. At this time all photographic missions 

were assigned to the group by the Corps G-2 section, and instructions 

were given as to the particular information to be sought by the 

observers during the next day’s visual reconnaissance missions. 

On account of the great distance of the group airdrome from the 

front lines, it was thought expedient to establish an advance landing 

field at Morass farm, a few kilometers east of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 

On this field were stationed two airplanes from each of the group 

squadrons, which proceeded there soon after daylight on all days 

when the weather permitted aerial operations. Supplies for the 

operation of the airplanes were transported by motor truck from the 

Francheville airdrome. A radio station was established at this field for 

the purpose of communication with the group and the corps and 

divisional posts of command. A direct telephone line connected the 

field with the off ice of the chief of Air Service and the corps 

switchboard. The duty of the pilots and observers making up the 

crews of the airplanes stationed daily at Morass farm was to hold 

themselves in readiness to perform immediately any mission assigned 
corps 

Observation 

207 

to them from the office of the chief of Air Service. These crews were 

equipped for the execution of all types of missions except those of 

photography. 

action took place before July 15 which required the execution of 

infantry contact patrols. A few exercises took place behind the lines 

for the purpose of training the infantry in the marking out of the line. 

The unstable state of the sector made it imperative that frequent 

photographs be secured of the first-line positions and of the enemy 

territory farther to the rear. As often as the weather permitted, 

missions of this nature were dispatched from the two squadrons 

assigned to the work. Great difficulty was experienced in carrying out 

these missions, due to frequent and persistent attacks of hostile 

pursuit patrols. Attempts made to carry out such missions 

accompanied by pursuit patrols to act as protection were seldom 

completely successful. Such work placed the friendly pursuit airplanes 

at great disadvantage during enemy attacks, leaving them practically 

at the mercy of the hostile pursuit patrols attacking from above unless 

they left the formation. In the latter case, they immediately ceased to 

be of value as direct protection for the observation airplane occupied 

with the taking of photographs. Aside from the general impracticability 

of pursuit protection during attacks by hostile airplanes, great 

difficulty was encountered in effecting a rendezvous with friendly 

pursuit forces before proceeding to the lines. The result was a gradual 

adoption of a policy of sending a number of observation airplanes 

upon each photographic mission, the leading airplane of the formation 

being equipped for the photographic work contemplated and the 

others acting as biplace protection. However, due to the element of 

confidence undoubtedly induced by the presence of pursuit airplanes 

during a photographic mission, pursuit protection was not abandoned, 

and as frequently as possible arrangements were perfected to have 

them accompany the photographic airplane. 

Fire adjustments were carried out for the artillery of the corps and 

the divisions. All those conducted were prearranged by the observer 

in liaison with the posts of command concerned. None of them 

attempted more than the regulation Qf fire upon certain points, 

crossroads, and positions. No destruction shoots were effected. Work 

with the artillery was seriously interfered with on account of the small 

amount of preliminary training in such work given the corps and 

divisional artillery before it took up active operations. The battalion 

radio crews possessed little if any experience in receiving and 

transmitting to the batteries the messages sent by wireless from the 

artillery airplane. The panel crews were untrained in the proper choice 

of locations for the display of panels and in panel manipulation, with 

With the exception of the attack on Vaux, July 1, no enemy or allied 
208 US. Air Service 

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the result that the airplane observer experienced the greatest difficulty 

in locating and reading the ground signals necessary to the proper, 

execution of the adjustment. In many instances battalions lacked the 

necessary material to place their radio stations in working order. This 

was true in particular of the corps artillery, the regulation of which by 

means of aerial observation was more imperative than in the case of 

the divisional artillery. Due to the great distance separating the 

squadrons from the artillery posts of command, intercommunication 

by all usual means employed in a stabilized sector was practically 

impossible. As a result much valuable time was lost, many failures 

went uncorrected, and many misunderstandings arose. The main 

reliance of the Air Service in attempting to improve its cooperation 

with the artillery came to be personal liaison. To perform liaison of this 

nature sufficient to meet the need of instructing the artillery in the 

proper use of the artillery airplane proved impossible with the group so 

far removed from the artillery posts of command. Again, the artillery 

was so constantly occupied in its routine operations, and in perfecting 

its preparations to defend the sector in the event of a renewed enemy 

offensive of large scale, that it was virtually impossible to devote 

sufficient attention to the details and training necessary to improve 

work conducted by means of aerial observation. On the part of the Air 

Service, certain failures in attempted artillery adjustments arose on 

account of persistent attacks made by hostile patrols. Others were 

due to inability to notify the artillery post of command in cases where it 

was impossible to dispatch the airplane at the prearranged hour, either 

as the result of failures in material or unfavorable weather. Many of the 

airplane replacements received were marked “Not inspected” and it 

was found necessary to completely overhaul such airplanes before 

their use in operations over the lines. Others were completely lacking 

in radio equipment, and much difficulty was experienced during July in 

keeping airplanes available to depart on missions of artillery 

adjustment at a fixed hour. None of the failures which occurred were 

due to insufficient training on the part of observer personnel. All the 

observers assigned to artillery missions were officers who were 

admirably well fitted for this work, both through training and actual 

experience with French squadrons in operations over the front. 

During the first two weeks of operations in the Chateau-Thierry 

sector the need of a carefully organized personal liaison system 

became apparent. The operations carried out in that period gave rise 

to incidents which indicated that only by means of such liaison could 

the full measure of cooperation between the observation squadrons 

and the corps grounds troops be realized. As the days passed, it 

became increasingly apparent that great effort would be required on 

the part of the Chief of Air Service staff and the officers of the group 

and squadrons to guard against failures in Air Service operations likely 
Corps 

Observation 

209 

The Breguet huo-seater was usedfor artillery 

spatting. 

to result from insufficient training on the part of corps ground troops 

in the proper use of the Air Service arm. As a consequence, an 

intensive system of personal liaison was inaugurated between the 

office of the Chief of Air Service, the group and squadrons, and the 

posts of command of the corps line organizations. As an initial effort in 

this direction, an experienced observer was detailed from each of the 

divisional squadrons and arrangements were made for these officers 

to take station at the headquarters of the divisions to which the 

squadrons were assigned for operations. It was the duty of the liaison 

officer to investigate all matters connected with the proposed 

divisional operations and to forward without delay to his squadron all 

information, plans, and data necessary for complete Air Service 
210 US. Air Service 

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VOl. I 

cooperation in such operations. In addition, the liaison officer of the 

Chief of Air Service made daily visits to the headquarters of the corps 

chief of artillery, the post of command of the corps artillery 

commander, and the post of command of each division, where he 

interviewed the officers in charge of the G-2 and G-3 sections, and, if 

necessary, the Chief of Staff concerning operations for the ensuing 

day. As it became increasingly difficult to send messages between the 

divisions and the group, the custom developed of sending one officer 

from each squadron to each division and the post of command of the 

corps artillery commander each day for the purpose of returning with 

all new information, plans, and requests for missions, and to transmit 

all details concerning the results obtained or difficulties encountered in 

the performance of the missions of the previous day. 

The inauguration of the above personal liaison system did much to 

improve the cooperation of the Air Service with the line organizations, 

but it could not surmount the obstacles in the way of insufficient 

preliminary training on the part of the ground troops in the proper use 

of the Corps Observation Air Service, which constantly arose to 

prevent the effective conduct of aerial operations. 

The main value of the operations of the 1st Corps Air Service on the 

Marne before the opening of the enemy offensive of July 15 was the 

results accomplished in the supply of information concerning the 

activities of the enemy by means of visual and photographic 

reconnaissance. The results accomplished in the regulation of the fire 

of artillery were of comparatively little value. On the other hand, to the 

Chief of Air Service and staff, the group, and the squadrons, the 

experience gained in the course of these operations was invaluable. It 

gave them a basis upon which to plan the carrying out of all future 

operations in this sector. During this period the 1st and 12th 

Squadrons had become accustomed to the use and care of the 

Salmson airplane. The pilots and observers of all three squadrons had 

become thoroughly oriented to the new sector. The frequent combats 

engaged in during missions over the lines had prepared the flying 

personnel to carry out their missions, relying in the main upon their 

own guns and skill for proper defense. A considerable knowledge had 

been gained of the steps necessary to be taken along the lines of 

personal liaison to insure a certain measure of success in future aerial 

operations. The past two weeks had shown conclusively that small 

reliance could be placed upon the telephone as a means of liaison 

under the conditions obtaining in this sector. From the point of view of 

the Corps Air Service the experience of the past two weeks was of 

great value. In the main, the Air Service was well fitted and ready to 

take up the difficult tasks which confronted it. 

The second phase of the Marne campaign extended from July 15 to 

18. During these three days the last enemy offensive was launched, 

spent its full force, and was completely checked by the allied defense. 
Corps 

Observation 

21 1 

Plans for meeting this proposed drive of the enemy against Paris had 

been prepared in detail. The plan of employment of the Corps Air 

Service dealt with the proposed execution of the various types of 

missions to cope with whatever tactical situation might arise. 

Complete plans for the orderly withdrawal of the group from 

Francheville to an airdrome, some 20 kilometers farther to the rear, 

were ready for execution should the need arise. 

Throughout the enemy offensive corps and divisional command 

airplanes and surveillance airplanes operating for the infantry and 

artillery, were in the air during the hours of daylight. Here, again, the 

Corps Air Service proved of value chiefly in the results it accomplished 

as a source of information for the command. The execution of infantry 

contact patrols for the purpose of taking the line did not prove 

necessary in the sector of the 1st Corps. The duration of the entire 

enemy offensive was so short that no real developments resulted from 

the point of view of Corps Air Service tactics. 

counteroffensive which opened July 18 were received. Immediately 

personal liaison was effected by the Air Service with all corps and 

divisional posts of command. Arrangements were made to have 

infantry contact patrols take the line as marked out by the Infantry at 

stated intervals during the next day. The work of corps and divisional 

command airplanes was planned in such manner that there would be a 

continuous surveillance over the corps and divisional fronts during the 

hours of daylight. Arrangement was made to station a squadron liaison 

officer at the cprps artillery headquarters. The area of fire of the corps 

artillery was plotted on a special map. The area was divided into 

zones, each zone to be covered by one group of the corps artillery in 

the work of neutralizing the artillery of the enemy. Copies of this map 

were prepared for the use of the squadron observers in the work of 

surveillance. This plan permitted the location of an enemy battery in 

action by the observer. He could then signal this information to the 

corps artillery group concerned which would immediately take it 

under fire. If, in the course of his further surveillance, the observer 

noted that the artillery fire was not properly directed he would then 

signal to the group the necessary corrections. Certain batteries of 

each brigade of divisional artillery had been specially designated to 

care for the work of firing upon fugitive targets located by observers 

and signaled to the battalion radio stations. Although attempts had 

been made daily during the course of the preceding two weeks to fix 

plans for the rapid adjustment of roving batteries against targets 

signaled from the airplane, no success had been attained. The result 

was that there was no real provision made to cope with a situation of 

mobile warfare should such result from the next day’s allied 

counteroffensive. Cooperation by the Air Service would then have to 

During the late afternoon of July 17, the plans for the allied 
212 U.S. Air Service 

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/’ 

depend upon the transmission to the squadrons of information as to 

the new locations of the artillery and the availability of certain batteries 

for the work of adjusting on fugitive targets, a situation latent with 

possibilities of failure. 

The third and last phase of the Marne campaign commenced on the 

morning of July 18 with the opening of the allied counteroffensive 

between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry. A treatment of the work of 

the 1st Corps Air Service from this time until August 12, when the 1st 

Corps was relieved by the 3d Corps (United States), and the Air 

Service of the 1st Corps was withdrawn from the sector, can best be 

made by describing the work undertaken from the point of view of 

each type of mission common to the operations of a Corps Air 

Service. 

frequent infantry contact patrols in order to inform the command of 

the location of the advancing infantry became a matter of the day’s 

routine. There were two methods of requesting such missions. At first 

the division commander notified the Chief of Air Service during the 

previous day that he desired such patrols to be performed at certain 

stated hours on the following day. This custom had two serious 

disadvantages. In the first place, there are only certain circumstances 

during which an infantry contact patrol is likely to attain the desired 

success. Such patrols are best executed shortly after the first or later 

stages of an infantry attack, when the troops are momentarily resting 

and are free, in a measure, to devote their attention to what is going on 

in the air above them. At such times they will more than likely see and 

recognize their “infantry airplane” and note the signaled request for 

them to mark out the line. On the other hand, if they are in the midst 

of active combat conditions, they naturally have little time or 

inclination to give attention to the air above them, and in all likelihood 

the signals of the infantry airplane will go unheeded. The second 

disadvantage is that no division commander knows the day before 

what situation will obtain on the following day. As a result, when it is 

impossible to send notice to the Air Service that the location of the 

front lines is already known to the command and that there is no need 

for the execution of the prearranged infantry contact patrol, the 

infantry airplane will proceed to accomplish its task all to no purpose. 

The second method of requesting such missions was to send word to 

the squadron direct, or through the office of the Chief of Air Service, 

some one or two hours beforehand. From most points of view this is 

the ideal method, but it depends solely upon the available modes for 

rapidly transmitting messages to the squadron concerned. Within two 

days after the successful launching of the allied offensive, it became 

impossible to rely upon telephone, telegraph, or radio for liaison 

During the advance of the 1st Corps to the Vesle, the execution of 
corps 

Observation 

21 3 

between the various divisional posts of command and the Air Service. 

As a consequence, the hours for the execution of infantry contact 

patrols were necessarily fixed the day before and these, together with 

all information as to the probable location of the infantry at such 

hours, were sent to the squadron by means of the liaison officer, who 

daily made the trip from the office of the Chief of Air Service or the 

squadron to the post of command concerned. 

The most serious difficulties encountered in the performance of 

infantry contact patrols were those which were the direct result of the 

lack of training of the infantry in carrying out their part in response' to 

the signals of the airplane observer. Both the 26th and the 42d 

Divisions (the latter relieved the 26th Division on July 25) had been 

given a certain amount of training in conjunction with the Air Service. 

It was by no means sufficient to insure a uniform success in keeping 

the command informed as to the location of the infantry by means of 

the infantry airplane. To begin with, there arose many cases where 

infantry units were not equipped with the proper supply of individual 

panels and flares for marking out the lines. After this condition was 

remedied, the infantry had apparently forgotten their proper use for 

marking out the line at the call of the observer. The result was that in 

the majority of infantry contact patrols the observer was forced to 

descend to altitudes varying from 300 to 50 meters, face the galling 

machine-gun and rifle fie that invariably met him when flying at such 

low height, and locate the front lines of the friendly troops by 

distinguishing their uniforms. As time passed, the efforts of Air 

Service liaison officers met with some success in improvement of the 

results of infantry contact patrols by means of attempts to 

instruct the infantry in marking out the line, but at no time during 

the Marne offensive did such missions accomplish the results that 

would have been possible had the infantry been given a thorough 

course of training in the use of the Air Service before they took up 

active operations on the front. 

During the first two weeks of the offensive the advance was so rapid 

that it became impossible to take photographs of all the territory in 

the line of the advance. The photographic missions undertaken were 

therefore directed to the work of procuring photographs of certain 

areas chosen by the G-2 section of the corps staff. Weather conditions 

frequently hampered the execution of these missions, but on the 

whole valuable results were obtained. At about this time the taking 

of oblique views at low altitudes, varying from 400 to 800 meters, 

became customary, for such photographs prove invaluable to the 

command in the planning of future operations. Until this date, all 

photography had been vertical. 

and twilight of each day. Other missions of a like nature were 

Visual reconnaissance missions were carried out regularly at dawn 
214 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

dispatched whenever the tactical situation made it necessary to secure 

particular information as to enemy activity. Much visual 

reconnaissance was carried out by artillery surveillance airplanes 

during periods of inactivity on the part of the enemy artillery. The 

routine procedure was to signal all information to the appropriate post 

of command by radio, later confirming it by dropped written 

messages. 

surveillance airplanes met with considerable success in their work of 

signaling reports on the activity of hostile batteries. This was done in 

pursuance to the plan made July 17 and described above. However, 

after movement on the part of the corps artillery regiments began, and 

as it became increasingly difficult to keep up communication between 

the Air Service and the front-line troops, this plan had to be 

abandoned, for it was impossible to keep the Air Service informed of 

the location of the corps artillery units. The best substitute for the plan 

then proved to be to signal the post of command of the corps artillery 

by radio and transmit all information to this one station. The corps 

artillery commander was then enabled to assign whatever battery he 

had available for the delivery of fire. The serious drawback of this 

method was the fact that the observer was not able to signal 

corrections for the fire if it proved inaccurate, for, not knowing the 

location of the battery firing, he could not judge the errors of fire with 

reference to the line battery target. His only recourse was to give 

corrections with reference to north, south, east, and west. This 

method was never satisfactorily employed by the American Air 

Service. 

The work of surveillance carried out in a similar manner to that 

described in the last paragraph was, in the main, about all the 

divisional artillery airplanes were ever able to do during this same 

period. After the first day of the offensive, the divisional artillery was 

moved forward almost daily. The failure of all ordinary means of liaison 

made it impossible to carry out scheduled adjustments, for it was 

seldom possible to transmit to the Air Service the location of the 

batteries before another move occurred. Once the divisional artillery 

took up the advance, it likewise became impossible to have regularly 

assigned batteries for the conduct of fire on fugitive targets. This 

system is admirable in a stabilized sector, or m comparatively mobde 

warfare when the system of liaison permits of the speedy transmission 

of messages from the line units to the Air Service. But under 

conditions like those obtaining on the Marne from July 18 until the halt 

at the Vesle, with the Air Service located on airdromes from 40 to 60 

kilometers behind the front of attack, and the artillery of the division 

changing position daily, it was obviously a complete failure. The net 

During the opening days of the offensive, the corps artillery 
Corps 

Observation 

21 5 

result was that the Air Service cooperation with the artillery consisted 

mainly in its work as an information agent. In a few instances the 

observer was successful in securing the fire of a battery on a fugitive 

target; at such times valuable results were obtained. But for the most 

part it was impossible to notify the observer, before his departure, of 

the location of the batteries or battalions, and attempts made by the 

observer to locate them while in the air by means of repeated wireless 

calls and a prolonged search for the radio station panel were usually 

unavailing. In addition, the same difficulties here arose as had been 

prevalent before the 18th of July, viz, those due to the inexperience of 

the artillery radio stations, panel crews, and the general lack of 

knowledge on the part of the artillery units in the use of airplane 

observation as a means of adjustment. 

In establishing for the first time the custom of detaching a trained 

observer from his squadron and assigning him to act as Air Service 

liaison officer at the posts of command of the corps artillery 

commander and at the headquarters of each division, the corps chief 

of Air Service sought to ameliorate the general unsatisfactory 

condition which resulted from the breakdown of all ordinary means of 

Messages received from aircraft for 

transmission to artillery units. 
21 6 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 

liaison during the advance to the Vesle. In addition, it was hoped that 

by this means the artillery and infantry could be instructed somewhat 

in the proper use and limitations of the Air Service. 

The great distance to be covered between the line organizationiand 

the Air Service, together with the conditions which resulted through 

the rapid advance of the ground troops, was the cause of a complete 

breakdown in telephonic communication. After the 19th of July it was 

practically impossible to procure a connection between the divisions 

and the squadrons. The same state of affairs existed as to telephonic 

communication with the corps headquarters after it had moved 

forward from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre to Buire. 

It was nearly always possible to send messages by means of 

telegraph, but pressure of business was such that the service required 

from two to four hours from corps headquarters to the group and 

squadrons, and still longer was required to send a message from the 

divisions to the divisional squadron. 

Radio, the form of liaison which is ideal for use in war of movement, 

was never developed to a point where it could be relied upon. 

Messages were successfully interchanged between the group and the 

various posts of command in the corps area from time to time, but for 

the most part, due to insufficiently trained radio personnel and 

occasional shortages in material, reliance could not be placed upon 

this form of liaison. 

It therefore became the duty of the liaison officer stationed at the 

posts of command of the diiins and the corps artillery, working in 

conjunction with other liaiin officers who made daily trips from the 

group and squadrons to these posts of command, to supply the chief 

of Air Service, group, and squadrons, with all information necessary 

for the conduct of Air Service operations which in ordinpry 

circumstances had been transmitted by rtleans of the telephone, 

telegraph, or radio system; From the point of view of dispatch, this 

system had its obvious drawbacks, but resulted in a situation 

considerably ktter than that obtaining before its institution. In 

addition, it produced some good results in establishing a closer 

understanding on the part of the line organizations as to the proper 

use and limitations of the Air Service. Many difficulties and 

misunderstandings which had arisen previously on account of failures 

to properly distribute the various codes used in operations by the Air 

Service with both artillery and ihfantry ceased, due to the efforts of 

these Air Service liiison officers. Much valuable instruction in Air 

Service matters was given by them to the officers of the line 

organizations with a resulting improvement in operations later 

conducted. 
corps 

Observation 

217 

At about the time of the relief of the 26th Division by the 42d 

Division (United States), the corps sector was narrowed to a one 

division front and the 167th French Division ceased operations under 

the 1st Army Corps (United States). These changes occurred about 

the 25th of July. On July 22, the 1st and 12th Aero Squadrons were 

moved from the airdrome at Francheville to that at Morass farm to the 

east of La Ferte-sousJouarre. On the 20th of July the Sopwith 

airplanes of the 88th Aero Squadron were replaced with the Salmson. 

The 88th Aero Squadron continued operations from Francheville until 

July 25, when the 167th French Division was withdrawn from the 

corps sector, at which time the 88th Squadron was assigned to the 3d 

Corps. From July 25 until August 12, all corps command missions, 

photography missions, and divisional work was carried out by the 1st 

and 12th Aero Squadrons. To a French squadron, which was at this 

time assigned to the 1st Corps group, was given the work of adjusting 

the fire of the corps artillery. Early in August the 42d Division was 

relieved by the 4th Division (United States). 

On account of the large number of enemy pursuit squadrons 

operating in this sector there were numerous losses in carrying out the 

work of corps observation. The replacement of pilots and observers 

was slow and far from satisfactory. In addition great difficulty was 

experienced in procuring replacements in airplanes. As a result it 

became increasingly difficult to carry out the work at hand and it was 

not infrequent that a flying personnel of from six to eight pilots and 

observers in each squadron executed the missions scheduled for the 

day. This necessitated the execution of two or three missions per team 

per day. 

On August 2 the group moved to the airdrome at Mayen-Multien 

(just north of the Meaux), for although the flying field was even farther 

from the lines than that of Morass farm the latter location was needed 

for the establishment of the Air Service of an Army Corps. On August 

10 the group was again moved, this time to Coincy, to the southwest 

of Fere-en-Tardenois. On August 12 the 1st Corps Air Service was 

relieved from duty in the sector and was sent to Chailly-en-Brie to 

await orders to proceed to another sector. 

Comment. 

In taking up active operations on the Marne the Air Service of the 

1st American Army Corps was well fitted from the point of view of 

organization, equipment, personnel, and training to cope successfully 

with the work before it. Whii it is true that it had never engaged in 

operations during a war of movement, it had had a training and 

experience which permitted it to meet new situations and problems 

with every prospect of success. 
21 8 U.S. Air Service 

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Vol. I 

At the time that it arrived in the Marne area the tactical situation 

was such that it was of necessity located at a considerable distance 

from the front lines. Shortages in airdrome equipment and available 

labor troops to prepare new airdromes during the advance of the 

ground troops proved a great handicap in the carrying out of 

operations when the danger of a successful enemy offensive had 

passed and the advance toward the Vesle had commenced. 

great amount of labor, which detracted from the routine preparation 

of material for operations over the lines. Lack of replacements in 

airplanes and flying personnel at certain times proved a great handicap 

in carrying out the work at hand. 

The failure of pursuit protection as a means of safeguarding the 

success of missions at times when enemy pursuit aviation completely 

dominated the air was counteracted in a measure by the dispatch of 

two or three observation airplanes in formation. The availability of 

biplace protection during the operations in this sector would have 

The condition in which airplane replacements arrived necessitated a 

1 

\' 

7 added materially to the success of the 1st Corps Air Service. Ir 

7q The principal value of the work of the 1st Corps Air Service during 

all the operation on the Marne was in its results as an information 

agent for the staffs of the corps and divisions by means of the 

execution of visual and photographic reconnaissance command 

missions, infantry contact patrols, and missions of surveillance of the 

enemy artillery. As a factor in aiding the artillery to adjust its fire, the 

Corps Air Service was of comparatively small value. 

The Marne campaign demonstrated beyond doubt the necessity of 

developing to the highest possible degree a system of liaison by radio 

between the various corps and divisional posts of command and the 

Air Service. It proved that in a rapid advance small reliance could be 

placed upon the telephone and telegraph. Lack of training on the part 

of the radio station personnel was without doubt the main reason for 

the failure of radio liaison between ground stations. The same was true 

with regard to most failures which occurred in attempted adjustments 

of artillery fire after an initial communication with the battalion radio 

station had been established. The lack of training of panel crews was 

equally apparent and was usually productive of as poor results in the 

attempted cooperation between the Air Service and the artillery. 

The method of dealing with the distribution of codes and the 

assignment of call letters and panel numbers as established by the 

corps was productive of great confusion, misunderstandings, and 

failures during the first few weeks of the operations on the Marne. 

Toward the latter part of July the placing of all such matters under the 

jurisdiction of one staff officer did much to do away with the difficulties 

which had formerly arisen. 
Corps 

Observation 

219 

Probably the most valuable lesson of the entire campaign was the 

knowledge that neither the artillery nor the infantry of the United 

States divisions here engaged had a sufficient knowledge or 

experience in the proper use and limitations of the observation Air 

Service of the corps. With one exception these divisions were among 

the oldest in France, and this knowledge concerning their lack of 

proper training in the use of the Air Service arm forewarned the Corps 

Air Service as to what to expect in the future and to devote the major 

portion of its efforts to the work of instructing both infantry and 

artillery in the employment of aerial observation before it could hope 

to realize the full measure of success in operations to be undertaken in 

the future. 

221 

Introductory. 

By the opening of the first week in August, 1918, the 6th French 

Army had advanced to the River Vesle. The 3d American Army 

Corps, attached to the 6th French Army, held a sector along the river 

extending approximately from Bazoches to Courlandon. To second 

the operations of the 3d Corps in the accomplishment of its tactical 

mission, an Air Service group was placed at the disposal of the corps 

commander. 

Organization of the Air Service, 

3d American Army Corps. 

The Air Service assigned to the 3d Corps was composed of three 

squadrons operating under the immediate command of an Air Service 

officer designated as chief of Air Service to the corps.4 No group 

commander or headquarters was assigned. The chief of Air Service 

took station, with his office and staff, at the airdrome, and there 

exercised the dual function of corps and group commander. 

The Organization of the office of the chief of Air Service was 

essentially as outlined in the chapter on operations of the 1st Corps 

Air Service at Chateau-Thierry. This organization adapted itself 

admirably to the routine of administration and direction of operations 

of the 3d Corps group. A French Aviation Officer was detailed to 

assist the chief of Air Service in directing the work of French units 

assigned to the group. 

The following squadrons comprised the 3d Corps groups: 

88th Aero Squadron (United States) (Salmson biplace). 

284th French Squadron (Spad biplace). 

237th French Sqbadron (Breguet biplace). 

The Airdrome Location Installation Defense. 

The airdrome of the 3d Corps group at the opening of operations on 

the Vesle was situated at the Ferme des Greves, on the heights 

overlooking the left bank of the Marne River, about 10 kilometers east 

from Chateau-Thierry. The front lines were roughly 30 kilometers 

distant. Preparation had been made for reception of the group by the 

technical services of the 6th Army. Hangar accommodations, for the 

most part of the individual tat type, were adequate for housing the 38 

airplanes of the three squadrons. Huts and billets provided ample 

shelter for the various headquarters and for the commissioned and 

enlisted personnel. The airdrome had no defenses against air raids 

other than the regional antiaircraft artillery. Shelter from bombs 

existed in the form of abandoned trenches and dugouts constructed 

by the troops which had recently fought over the ground. 
222 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

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Group Supply. 

Routine supply was assured from near-by corps railheads. Technical 

supplies were drawn from the 4th American Mobile Air Park, situated 

near Couloumiers, and, in special urgent cases, from the base depots 

at Paris, by motor transport. 

The Tactical Situation. 

The 3d Corps was organized for attack with two divisions in the line 

and one in reserve. The usual complement of artillery supported the 

forward divisions. In addition, the corps possessed a powerful 

concentration of heavy artillery, caliber 155. The mission of the corps 

was to seize a favorable opportunity for forcing the passages of the 

Vesle and to exploit success as far as the River Aisne. 

In the air the friendly situation was weak. One French pursuit group 

was charged with patrolling the entire front of the 6th Army. The 

pursuit defense was inadequate. Corps on the right and left of the 3d 

Corps had three or more squadrons each, for the accomplishment of 

observation missions. The aerial observation units at the disposal of 

the 3d Corps were adequate. All squadrons were experienced. 

Opposite the front of the 3d Corps the enemy was strongly 

organized for defense along the heights to the north of the Vesle. He 

was strongly supported by heavy concentrations of artillery and 

machine guns. It was presumed that he would confine his operations 

to those of a purely defensive nature. No immediate aggressive action 

on his part was foreseen. 

In the air the enemy was strong. A defense concentration of pursuit 

squadrons opposite this sector furnished constant patrols from 

daylight to dark. The personnel of these squadrons was aggressive, 

experienced, and determined to prevent observation of enemy activity 

.at all costs. The enemy completely dominated the air. His observation 

eff ectives were apparently inconsiderable. 

Mission of the 3d Corps Air Service. 

The mission of the 3d Corps Air Service was as follows: 

1. To establish an effective surveillance of the enemy and report to 

corps and division all negative and positive observations of his activity, 

rendering certain the detection of either a retreat or an attack in 

preparation. 

2. To effect such photographic reconnaissance of enemy defenses 

opposite the front of the 3d Corps as the command might from time to 

time require. 
corps 

Observation 

223 

3. To locate, by flash, enemy batteries in action and assist reaction 

4. To adjust the fire of our own artillery. 

5. To inform the command of the location of our own advance 

6. To advance the training of our own troops in the use of the aerial 

by our own artillery. 

elements during aggressive action (contact patrols). 

arm during active infantry or artillery operations. 

Plan for Effecting Mission. 

In order to carry out effectively the mission of the Air Service, as 

above outlined, the following assignment of squadrons was directed by 

the Chief of Air Service: 

Assignment of Squadrons. 

command missions), the 88th Squadron. 

sector reconnaissance, contact patrols), the 88th Squadron. 

sector reconnaissance, contact patrols), the 284th Squadron. 

in action, adjustment of corps heavy artillery), the 237th Squadron. 

Communications. 

units of the group through a central switchboard, were at once 

established. 

Telephone. 

By special arrangement with the chief sip1 officer of the corps a 

direct copper telephone circuit was strung from the group to corps, 

headquarters. The permanent maintenance of this very rapid and 

essential means of communication with the command was made 

possible by the comparatively stable situation which followed the 

arrest of the allied advance at the Vesle. 

possible. 

Radio. 

communication with the corps and divisions. Operators were kept at 

the receivers 24 hours daily. 

To the 3d Corps (photographs, corps visual reconnaissance 

To the division on the right (divisional artillery, adjustments, division 

To the division on the left (divisional artillery adjustments, divisions 

To the corps artillery (surveillance and locating of enemy batteries 

The usual intergroup telephone communications, connecting all 

Communication with the divisions through the corps central was 

The radio section of the 88th Squadron assured wireless 
224 U.S. Air Service 

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Motor Cycle Dispatch Service. 

Motor cycle dispatch service, one run daily, was assured by the 

office of the Chief of Air Service between corps and army 

headquarters. Dkrisional dispatches were forwarded by the divisional 

courier services through the corps message center. 

Liaison. 

Under the direction of the Chief of Air Service a very complete and 

effective system of personal liaison was worked out and put into 

immediate effect. One observer from the 88th Squadron was stationed 

at the corps message center. This observer was instructed to keep in 

touch by personal contact at frequent intervals, with the staff. It was 

his function to keep the group informed from time to time during the 

course of each day of the tactical situation and the needs of the staff 

and line. He acted as advisor to the commanding general and the staff, 

speaking for and in the absence of the Chief of Air Service. He 

received by telephone all requests, complaints, and information from 

the divisions and transmitted these to the Chief of Air Service or his 

representatives at the airdrome. He transmitted messages from the 

airdrome to the corps and divisional staffs and units. 

In addition, the Chief of Air Service made daily visits to the corps 

and, in conference with staff and representatives of corps artillery and 

divisional units, worked out the solution of air service problems having 

a bearing on the operations in course. 

By direction of the Chief of Air Service, observers of the various 

squadrons were designated from time to time to visit and confer with 

the divisional and artillery staffs and unit commanders. 

It was arranged that all corps field orders, operations orders, plans 

of liaison, summaries of intelligence, liaison and intelligence bulletins 

should be forwarded by courier with the least possible delay to the 

office of the Chief of Air Service at the airdrome. All situation reports 

and maps, both artillery and infantry, were furnished by the services 

concerned in like manner. Codes and keys were furnished the Air 

Service by the G-2 sector of the corps staff. Radio plans and diagrams 

' were furnished the group radio section by the corps radio officer. 

Air Service tactical and technical orders and bulletins emanating 

from the Air Service of the 6th French Army were,forwarded to the 

group daily by motor dispatch. 

In this way a very complete file of tactical and technical data was 

secured and kept up to date. All data directly affecting the operations 

of the group flying and technical personnel was conveniently posted 

and labeled, by class, in the group operations room. Complete 

' 

' 
Corps 

Observation 

225 

information on the tactical situation, both friendly and enemy, was 

thus maintained within easy reach of officers. 

Orders-By Whom Issued. 

was prescribed that all requests for the accomplishment of special 

missions for the corps should emanate from the G-2 section of the 

staff. Orders having their source in the divisions were communicated 

direct by telephone, radio, or motor cycle dispatch service from the 

divisional headquarters to the Chief of Air Service or his 

representative, who directed their execution by the squadron 

concerned. Prearranged missions were communicated on the day 

preceding their execution to the operations officer of the Chief of Air 

Service. These were incorporated in the operations order for the next 

day, issued to the group by the Chief of Air Service. 

Tactical Reports. 

of the Chief of Air Service received the reports of the operations 

officers of each squadron and prepared a consolidated operations 

report for the group. The group operations report was transmitted 

daily to the various higher commands concerned. 

Upon the basis of individual observers’ reports and the group 

operations report, the branch intelligence officer, assigned by G-2 to 

the group, prepared nightly an Air Service Intelligence Report for 

submission to the G-2 section of the corps and the divisions. 

In addition to the usual method of reporting, elsewhere described 

(see History of the 1st Corps Group at Ourches), observers of the 3d 

Corps group returning from infantry contact and reconnaissance 

missions were required, by direction of the Chief of Air Service, to 

report by dropped message to the headquarters of the divisions 

concerned and to the corps the results, whether positive or negative, 

of their missions. Teams were instructed not to return to the airdrome 

at the close of a mission until messages had been dropped giving full 

and complete account of the observations effected. 

Tactical Operations Undertaken. 

During the first week in August, 1918, the 3d Corps Air Service 

commenced active operations along the Vesle. Each day’s work was 

carefully planned by the Chief of Air Service and his assistants on the 

basis of the tactical situation as communicated by corps and divisional 

headquarters through the various channels of liaison above outlined. 

After conference and by arrangement with the Chief of Air Service it 

Upon the conclusion of each day’s operations the operations officer 
226 U.S. Air Service 

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At no time was an attack on a large scale projected or launched by 

the troops of the 6th Army. The operations partook of the nature of 

harassing infantry and artillery assaults upon the enemy’s positions 

with the object of weakening his morale and wearing down his strength 

and resources. Frequent short advances across the river into his lines 

were carried out, but until the opening days of September the passage 

of the Vesle was not permanently affected by troops of the 3d Corps. 

It developed upon the Corps Air Service to maintain a constant 

‘ watch upon the enemy to detect any preparations for attack or retreat 

upon his part. To this end morning and evening reconnaissances were 

established as a matter of daily routine. These reconnaissances 

covered the entire corps sector. The divisional sectors were, as a rule, 

closely reconnoitered at least once daily by the divisional squadrons. 

Too much stress can not be laid upon the importance to the command 

of the negative information regarding the enemy’s activity gathered by 

these reconnaissances. The command was at all times assured that, 

unless otherwise advised by the Air Service, no untoward events were 

impending. Plans for the completion of our own lines of defense and 

orders for the undertaking of any local aggressive operations could 

thus be issued with a relative degree of certitude that all contingencies 

having to do with enemy reaction had been foreseen and guarded 

against upon the basis of an unchanged situation. 

While realizing the importance of the communication of negative 

information, the Air Service spared no effort to gather as much 

positive data as the situation permitted. The morning and evening 

reconnaissances were particularly effective in locating in the half light 

the flashes of enemy batteries in action. No source was more fertile 

than the Air Service in information regarding the situation of hostile 

batteries. A ruse, developed in the 88th Squadron, for trapping enemy 

guns into exposing their locations is worth noting. The airplane 

seeking to locate batteries first flew boldly up to the lines and remained 

at close range for some little time, preserving an altitude of about 700 

meters. If, as was usually the case, the enemy guns ceased fire in 

presence of hostile observation, and no battery flashes were observed, 

the airplane retreated some 10 kilometers into its own territory and 

dropped to an altitude of, roughly, 200 meters. After an interval it 

returned at this altitude to the lines. It was rare that the observer, 

under these conditions, failed to pick out two, three, or more batteries 

which had resumed fire upon noting the absence of observation. 

Vertical aerial photographs secured by the group were a valuable 

source of positive information. During the six weeks spent by the 3d 

Corps group on the Vesle the entire sector opposite the corps front 

was photographed to a depth of 12 kilometers. This work was 

accomplished by formations of three or five airplanes. Numerous 
Corps 

Observation 

227 

missions failed because of the active resistance of enemy pursuit, 

which attacked in vastly superior numbers. The average altitude was 

3,000 meters. Upon one or two occasions close pursuit protection was 

secured from the neighboring French pursuit group 22. Ordinarily, 

pursuit protection was not available owing to the insufficient effectives 

of group 22, which was responsible alone for the protection of the 

entire Army front. It was found also that the delays encountered in 

meeting protecting airplanes were responsible for the failure of 

missions which started during perfect weather and ran into fog or 

clouds before the protection could be obtained and the lines reached. 

A complete assemblage of oblique views of the Vesle front was 

secured. These photographs, remarkable for their clearness and 

sharpness of detail, were taken by the group photographic officer, 

using a 50-centimeter camera mounted on a support of his own 

devising which was fixed to the observer’s machine-gun turret. They 

Insignia of the 88th Aero Squadron 
228 U.S. Air Service 

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.. were of great tactical interest in familiarizing the staff and commanders 

of combatant units with the features of the enemy terrain immediately 

opposite the corps front. 

Special missions were from time to time dispatched, by order of the 

corps commander, to reconnoiter the passages of the Vesle. Airplanes 

detailed for these missions flew at a low altitude along the river. The 

observer noted accurately the location and number of bridges and 

footbridges intact. 

All reconnaissance missions reported upon the density and location 

of shell falling in our own and enemy territory. 

Upon each of the several occasions when the forcing of the 

passages of the Vesle was attempted, airplanes of the group were 

dispatched to stake the line of the division fronts. These missions met 

with small success. Our troops appeared ignorant of the use of panels 

in communicating their location upon the call of the airplane. In any 

case panels were rarely shown and the covered nature of the terrain 

made the distinguishing of individual men extremely difficult, even 

when observations were carried out at the minimum altitude. 

Adjustments with divisional and corps artillery were vigorously 

encouraged. A considerable proportion of these were arranged only 

after solicitation by the Air Service. Ordinarily, in the prearranged 

adjustment, the observer detailed for the mission visited the battery on 

the day previous to undertaking the work. In conference with the 

battalion radio officer and the battery commander the details of the 

shoot and the method of adjustment were determined in advance and 

thoroughly understood by all participants. Even where careful 

preliminary liaison of this sort was undertaken before attempting work 

with the artillery, failure, rather than success, was the rule. The 

difficulty in most cases was traced to the improper functioning of the 

artillery radio station. Artillery radio personnel was found to be 

consistently inexpert and inexperienced. Particular care was 

exercised by the group to assure the proper functioning of the radio 

equipment aboard airplanes. Observers tested their radio before 

leaving the field. Wherever possible the group radio section followed 

the calls of the airplanes after its arrival at the battery. Instances 

occurred where airplane wireless was charged with faulty functioning 

and where an accurate log of all calls sent by the airplane during an 

unsuccessful adjustment had been filed by the operators at the group 

set, proving efficient functioning of the airplane’s equipment and 

failure on the part of the battalion station to receive effectively. 

Every effort was made by the personnel of the group to clear up, by 

personal liaison, the difficulties encountered in radio signaling. 

Observers and radio officer made frequent trips to artillery units. The 

problem of airplane radio was discussed on the ground in a majority of 
Corps 

Observation 

229 

cases where adjustments had failed. Repeated panel exercises, 

executed with a view to training artillery radio personnel, were 

scheduled and successfully accomplished: Better results were finally 

obtained, although adjustments were never accomplished with that 

average of success which was sought. 

During the closing days of August the advance of the entire allied 

line to the west of the 6th French Army made it evident that the 

enemy’s position on the heights of the Vesle was threatened from the 

left bank and must soon become untenable. His retreat across the 

Aisne was considered imminent. Accordingly, the Air Service of the 3d 

Corps was instructed to seek and carefully report all indications of the 

expected withdrawal. In this connection the Air Service furnished the 

following information: 

(a) Noticeable increase and added aggressiveness of enemy pursuit 

aviation over the sector, rendering observation difficult. 

(b) Sudden decrease of enemy antiaircraft artillery. 

(c) Sudden absence of enemy balloons opposite our front. 

(d) Increase of fires in villages along the presumed line of 

(e) Explosions of artillery dumps. 

Observations of this nature became so frequent and convincing by 

September 1 that the Chief of Air Service of the corps felt warranted in 

stating definitely on that date that the enemy retreat was in full course. 

On September 3 the conclusion drawn by the Air Service was proved 

correct. The enemy had completely evacuated the left half of the corps 

sector and retreated across the Aisne, The 77th Division (United 

States), holding the left of the 3d Corps sector on that date, crossed 

the plateau between the Vede and the Aisne without encountering 

resistance other than enemy harassing fire delivered from flanking 

artillery. 

Move of the 88th Squadron to Advance 

Airdrome at Goussancourt. 

In view of the expected enemy retreat, to be followed by a 

corresponding advance of the 3d Corps units and headquarters, 

preparations were made for the forward movement of the 3d Corps 

Air Service. The forward movement was dictated by the necessity for 

close liaison. An airdrome was selected at Goussancourt and hangar 

accommodations for one squadron assured by the technical services 

of the 6th French Army. It was planned to station the 83th Squadron 

at Goussancourt immediately upon completion of the field, leaving the 

two French squadrons of the group temporarily at the Ferme des 

Greves. The office of the Chief of Air Service prepared to take station 

at Goussancourt. The use of Goussancourt as an advance airdrome 

withdrawal. 
230 U.S. Air Service 

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and gas station was not contemplated in view of the practical 

difficulties developed by the experience of the 1st Corps group at the 

Ferme Morasse. It was judged that better results could be obtained by 

moving a squadron of 18 airplanes entire to the advance field and 

thence conducting operations normally. The comparative mobility of a 

single squadron assured its easy retreat in case of an enemy advance 

which might threaten its security. In practice the experiment proved 

successful. 

About August 25 the office of the Chief of Air Service and the 88th 

Squadron moved to the advance field and took permanent station. 

Huts, hangars, and billeting accommodations were adequate. A direct 

telephone circuit to the corps switchboard had been prepared, 

assuring communication with the corps and its units and with the field 

at Ferme des Greves through the corps central and thence by direct 

circuit. The usual lines of liaison and courier services were 

immediately set in operation. The move was so planned that no break 

in operations was involved, one half the 88th Squadron flying to the 

advance field early in the day, while the other half assured operations, 

the remaining airplanes flying to the advance field later in the day, 

while operations were resumed by those which had already arrived at 

Goussancourt. 

In order to reduce liaison difficulties and to coordinate effectively 

the work of squadrons on separate fields, a routine scheme for the 

operations of the 237th and 284th French squadrons was devised and 

put into effect. These squadrons were made responsible for all 

surveillance of the corps sector and for reconnaissance of the left 

divisional front. No special orders or instructions were required for the 

accomplishment of this work, which involved a set procedure. 

Airplanes of the French squadrons returning from surveillance 

missions were required to drop reports of their missions at a prepared 

dropping ground established adjacent to the office of the Chief of Air 

Service. This obviated landing, with its attendant dangers and - 

difficulties, and furnished at the same time a sufficient check on the 

work accomplished. The 88th Squadron continued to assure the 

accomplishment of corps missions, photographic reconnaissances, 

and missions for the right division. Heavy artillery adjustments were 

accomplished as usual by the 237th Squadron, in personal liaison with 

the corps artillery. The 284th Squadron similarly carried on the 

artillery work for the division on the left. Complete telephonic 

summaries of the day’s work were received each evening from the 

French squadrons by the Chief of Air Service. 

In general, the scheme of coordinating the work of the group 

operating from a rear and an advance field was successful. 

Communication was adequately provided for, useless liaison was 
Corps 

Observation 

231 

obviated, full control was retained by the Chief of Air Service. When 

the advance of the 77th Division to the Aisne Canal was followed by a 

forward movement of all corps elements, close-up liaison between the 

office of the Chief of Air Service, the corps squadron, and the 

elements and posts of command of the corps was already established 

and operations were not impeded by the change in situation. 

During the second week of September the 3d Corps was relieved 

and proceeded overland by rail and motor transport to the Verdun 

area. The 88th Squadron was likewise relieved and proceeded for a 

period of rest to the Ferme des Greves. The 237th and 284th 

Squadrons assured the Air Service missions for the units relieving the 

3d Corps. 

On September 11 the 88th Squadron was temporarily attached to 

the 5th Corps (United States) and ordered to the 5th Corps group 

with station on the airdrome at Souilly. The move to Souilly is 

noteworthy in that the movement order was not received by the 

squadron until 9 p.m. of the 11th. The squadron moved by road and 

air to the Verdun area on the following day, the flight of 200 kilometers 

being made in the rain under low-hanging clouds. Upon arrival at 

Souilly no gas or oil was available for refilling the tanks of the airplanes. 

With the gas and oil remaining after the flight from Ferme des Greves, 

airplanes of the 88th Squadron operated over the lines at St. Mihiel on 

the afternoon of the 12th. 

Training Operations of the 

3d Corps Group on the Vesle. 

With a view to instructing the infantry in the details of contact patrol 

and staking of the front line by airplane, the Chief of Air Service 

established an infantry contact school for troops of the division in line. 

The duration of the course was three days for each division. Troops to 

the number of 200 were drawn from the rifle companies, machine-gun 

battalions, and headquarters detachments of each division and sent by 

motor transport, fully rationed and equipped for three days, to the 

airdrome at Ferme des Greves. Three or more officers were in charge 

of each detail of 200. The details brought with them sets of ground 

panels for use in signaling from posts of command to airplanes, signal 

rockets and pistols, bengal flares, and individual panels for each 

infantryman. The details of transport, rations, and equipment were a 

function of the training section of Corps G-3. 

The course consisted of lectures to officers and men on the use of 

airplane observation generally. Particular stress was laid upon the 

importance to the individual soldier as well as to the command of 

infantry contact patrols in determining the position of advance 

elements during an attack or retreat. Practical terrain maneuvers, in 



235 

The Tactical Situation. 

into two periods: 

The St. Mihiel offensive of the 1st American Army may be divided 

The period of preparation, August 10 to September 11. 

The period of attack, September 12 to 16. 

On August 10 the situation of the front lines in the St. Mihiel sector 

was the same as that described when treating of the same sector in the 

chapter on corps observation activities from April to July, 1918. From 

Pont-sur-Seille to C hatillon-sous-les-Cotes the front lines remained 

practically the same as they had been for the past three and a half 

years. Commencing August 10, the American preparation for the St. 

Mihiel offensive began, and from then on until the first week in 

September the bringing up of new units and reserves, supplies and 

material, stores and munitions took place. The Army sector was held 

by four Army Corps. From left to right the line of battle included the 

5th Corps (United States), the 2d Corps (French colonial corps), the 

4th Corps (United States), and the 1st Corps (United States). 

On August 26, 1918, the headquarters of the 1st Army Air Service 

commander was established at Ligny-en-Barrois.5 Under his command 

was the French Aerial Division, which consisted of a large number of 

pursuit and daybombardment squadrons. In addition, there was one 

other French pursuit group and three American pursuit groups-one 

American day-bombardment group-the 1st Army observation, and 

one French Army artillery group for the adjustment of long-range 

artillery fire. Eight night-bombardment squadrons of the British 

R. A. F. were to cooperate with the Air Service of the 1st Army 

whenever the tactical situation made such action expedient. 

The Corps Air Service of each corps operating under the 1st 

American Army was made up of one squadron for each division and 

one squadron for the corps. The Air Service of the 2d Colonial Corps 

consisted entirely of French squadrons. The 1st Corps observation 

group was made up of the lst, 12th, and 50th American Squadrons 

and two French squadrons. In the 4th Corps group were the 8th, 

135th, and 90th American Squadrons and one French squadron. The 

5th Corps group consisted of the 88th, 99th, and 104th American 

Squadrons.6 

approximately the same as that described in the chapter on the Toul 

sector. The sector of the front from St. Mihiel north to Chatillon-sousles-Cotes was organized in approximately the same manner as the 

Toul or St. Mihiel sector. The enemy was favored by the terrain, which 

offered many natural positions of great strength. These positions had 

been well organized for a prolonged defense. Some intimation of an 

impending allied offensive in this sector had reached the enemy, and 

The situation of the enemy in the St. Mihiel sector was 
236 U.S. Air Service 

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immediately preceding the attack of September 12 he commenced a 

redistribution of his available forces, especially with a view to 

echeloning them in depth. As far as was known at the time, the enemy 

strength in the sector remained about the same as it had been 

throughout the summer months. 

In the air the strength of the enemy continued the same as it had 

been since the previous spring. A few pursuit patrols of Fokker 

airplanes were reported as operating in this sector, but it was quite 

probable that these were new airplanes received as replacements for 

the Albatross and Pfalz type formerly in use. Individual observation 

and photograph airplanes operated over the sector, but no unusual 

number of hostile aircraft was at any time encountered or reported 

before the opening of the St. Mihiel offensive. 

The observation air service of each corps was organized along the 

same lines as those described in the foregoing chapters on the 

organization of the 1st and 3d Corps groups. In the 1st and 4th Corps, 

the officers of the corps chief of Air Service were located at corps 

headquarters. In the 5th Corps, due to the fact that the group had 

been assembled for the first time and was made up of three squadrons, 
Corps 

Observation 

237 

only one of which had had a considerable experience in active frontline operations, the corps chief of Air Service and staff remained at the 

location of the group. 

The 1st Corps group was located in the vicinity of Toul on two 

airdromes. The 1st and 12th Squadrons were stationed at the 

airdrome just east of Toul, which had formerly been occupied by the 

1st Pursuit Group in the spring of 1918. The 50th and 211th (French) 

Squadrons occupied a newly constructed airdrome at Bicqueley, just 

south of Toul. The 4th Corps group entire occupied the airdrome at 

Ourches. The French squadrons of the Air Service of the 2d French 

Colonial Corps were located at Rumont, to the northeast of Bar-leDuc. The 5th Corps group occupied a flying field at Souilly. 

With the exception of the 5th Corps group, each Corps Air Service 

was established and ready for operations by the first week in 

September. The 5th Corps group was not completed until the day of 

the attack, when the 88th Squadron arrived from the Vesle. 

The one new squadron of the 1st Corps group, the 50th, had but 

recently arrived at the front. It was equipped with airplanes of the DH4 type with the new Liberty engine. Two of the three American 

squadrons of the 4th Corps group were also equipped with the DH-4 

Liberty; the 90th Squadron had Salmson airplanes. In the 5th Corps 

group all squadrons were equipped with the Salmson. 

The Corps Observation Wing Commander. 

About the 1st of September the wing commander of corps 

observation for the Air Service 1st Army was appointed and 

established his office at Toul.7 As this officer and staff were a part of 

the Army Air Service, in outlining his functions it will suffice to quote 

the Army order enumerating his duties. This order read as follows; 

The wing commander (under the chief of Air Service, 1st Army) is charged with the 

instruction and inspection of all observation squadrons or observation groups assigned to 

Army Corps. He coordinates their duty and exercises technical supervision over all Army 

Corps aviation units. This includes the method by which duty is donned. the supply and 

proper care of material, the supply and instruction of personnel; the location of airdromes; the 

handling and care of transportation; the state of the telephonic, radio, and other signaling 

appliances and methods, the photographic section; the operations officers; the preparation and 

forwarding of orders, reports, and messages; the maintenance of liaison with contiguous 

troops; and the reporting to the chief of Air Service of the Army any irregularities observed in 

methods of performing duty either tactical or technical. 

The corps observation wing commander and his staff were all 

officers who had been through the operations on the Marne with the 

Air Service of the 1st Army Corps. Their experience proved of great 

value in preparing the various Corps Air Services, many of which were 

made up in large part of newly formed squadrons for the St. Mihiel 

offensive. Profiting by the lessons learned on the Marne, measures 

were taken to guard, in so far as possible, against recurrence of the 

Observers insignio 
238 U.S. Air Service 

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conditions which had there hindered the work of the Corps Air 

Service. By means of bulletins prepared in the office of the wing 

commander and distributed to the Air Service of each corps, the steps 

necessary to be taken by the Air Service in the preparation for the 

coming offensive were explained with great care and detail. 

Plans for Accomplishment of Missions. 

The plans made by each Corps Air Service in preparation for the St. 

Mihiel offensive were, for the most part, essentially the same as those 

made to meet the tactical situation on the Marne and the Vesle. The 

Corps Air Service commander assigned the squadrons of his group to 

care for the corps and divisional work. Under his supervision, and 

under the direct guidance of the group commander, the tactical 

officers of the group and squadrons and the group branch intelligence 

officer, working in conjunction with the staff of the corps chief of Air 

Service, collected and compiled the data necessary for the coming 

operations. Particular attention was given to the assignment of liaison 

officers from each group to the corps post of command and the 

headquarters of each division. In addition, the flying officers of the 

squadrons and the operations officers of the group and squadrons 

made daily trips to the various posts of command of the corps and 

divisional troops in order to insure a thorough understanding on the 

part of all line officers of the essential elements necessary to bring 

about successful cooperation between the Corps Air Service and the 

corps ground troops. In so far as possible, in the time at their disposal, 

they carried out the work of instructing the infantry and artillery in the 

details of infantry contact patrols and artillery fire adjustments. 
Corps 

Observation 

239 

The plan of communications between the office of the wing 

commander, the various corps chiefs of Air Service, the corps 

observation groups, and the various post of command of each corps 

was the same as that described in the chapter on the Marne campaign. 

In addition to the custom there established of assigning an 

experienced observer to remain at the corps artillery post of 

command and the headquarters of each division as an Air Service 

liaison officer, an officer was sent from the 1st and 5th Corps Air 

Service to the headquarters of the Army Corps operating on either 

flank of the 1st American Army, and another liaison officer was sent 

from the 4th Corps Air Service to establish thorough liaison with the 

Air Service on the 2d French Colonial Corps. 

Operations During Period of Preparation. 

following types of missions were executed in each corps: 

In the operations undertaken during the period of preparation the 

Visual reconnaissance. 

Photographic reconnaissance. 

Artillery fire adjustment. 

Exercises with artillery and infantry. 

Visual reconnaissance of the corps and division sectors was carried 

out as a routine matter at dawn and twilight of each day. A few other 

special visual reconnaissance missions were dispatched to secure 

information of a particular nature in well-defined areas. The work of 

visual reconnaissance was valuable only in that it kept the command 

informed at all times of the situation in the enemy lines opposite each 

corps. The information secured in this manner was for the most part 

of a negative nature, due to the inactivity of the enemy at this period, 

but it served the purpose of assuring the staff of each corps that there 

were no new developments in the general tactical situation. 

Photographic reconnaissance, during the period of preparation, 

consisted for the most part of taking oblique views of the enemy 

territory immediately opposite the front lines of each corps. This type 

of photograph proved of great value in the preparation of detailed 

plans for the attack. 

No great amount of adjustment of artillery fire took place, due to the 

necessity of veiling all preparations for the offensive. The shoots 

executed were therefore merely those necessary to register the fire of 

a few batteries on certain points. 

Exercises were conducted as frequently as possible in each corps 

for the purpose of preparing the infantry and artillery to cooperate 

successfully with the airplane observer during the coming offensive. 

All operations were greatly hindered by the unfavorable weather 

which prevailed during the early days of September. 
240 UA. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

During the four days of the American offensive which cleared the St. 

Mihiel salient of the enemy, weather conditions, except on September 

14, were such as to greatly hinder the carrying out of aerial operations. 

Operations During the Period of Attack. 

On the morning of the 12th of September, when the attack was 

launched, a heavy mist, low-lying cloud banks, and intermittent rain 

combined to make all aerial observation extremely difficult. 

Notwithstanding this fact, command airplanes for the corps and 

divisions, infantry contact patrols, and artillery surveillance airplanes 

performed their respective missions throughout the hours of daylight. 

The command was thus kept informed of the general progress of the 

battle and at periodic intervals was given the first line of our advancing 

troops located by observers executing the missions of infantry 

contact. Missions operating in cooperation with the artillery were 

unable, on account of atmospheric conditions, to accompliih much 

work of value in the regulation of artillery fire on fugitive targets, but, 

taking advantage of momentary gaps in the clouds and mist, they were 

able to observe and report upon the location of such tarsets from time 

to time and to furnish other information of considerable value to the 

artillery. 

The work accomplished on September 13 was virtually a repetition 

of that of the 12th, for the same unfavorable weather conditions 

continued. September 14 was the one day during the offensive which 

was favorable for the conduct of aerial operations by the Corps Air 

Service. Missions of every type were dispatched, throughout the 

hours of daylight. Command airplanes, infantry contact patrols, and 

visual reconnaissance missions kept the command well informed as to 

the progress of the attackmg troops and of the situation within the 

enemy lines to a depth of 8 kilometers. Photographic missions were 

executed and resulted in a large number of successful photographs of 

the enemy’s front-liie positions. Artillery surveillance airplanes 

secured much valuable information which was immediately sent by 

radio to the artillery posts of command and later confirmed by both 

dropped messages and telephonic reports upon the return of the 

observer to the airdrome. Some successful adjustments of the fire of 

designated batteries upon fugitive targets located in the enemy lines 

were accomplished, but, due to a variety of causes, which will be 

discussed hereafter, this type of work did not produce the results 

which the tactical situation made possible. From early morning of the 

14th there was a very noticeable increase of hostile pursuit aviation. 

Some of the best enemy flights operated along the sector and 

observation airplanes were repeatedly attacked, but in the majority of 

cases successfully defended themselves and accomplished their 
Corps 

Observation 

241 

assigned missions. On September 15, unfavorable weather again 

greatly hindered aerial operations; the work done was similar to that 

accomplished during the first two days of the offensive. 

Comment. 

The short duration of the St. Mihiel offensive and the unfavorable 

weather which prevailed throughout three of the four days make it 

difficult to draw conclusions of value from a review of the work then 

done by the Air Service of the various corps engaged. 

In supplying information to the various staffs of the Army the corps, 

and the divisions the work of the command airplanes, artillery 

surveillance airplanes, and infantry contact patrols was of undoubted 

value. During all the hours of daylight such airplanes were in the air in 

numbers sufficient to follow the entire situation of the friendly troops 

and that of the enemy whenever atmospheric conditions made 

movement on the ground visible. The system of communications was 

such that the information thus procured was speedily transmitted to 

all concerned, except in certain cases to the more advanced posts of 

command of the artillery and infantry. All such information was first 

sent from the airplane by radio. It was later confirmed by written 

messages dropped at the location of the posts of command concerned 

and again at the corps post of command. A later telephonic message 

was sent forward by the group branch intelligence officer to the G-2 

section of the corps through the office of the corps Chief of Air 

Field radio stations received artillery 

adjustment information from obseruation 

aircraft. 
242 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Service. All information of value to the Army Air Service was 

forwarded through the office of the corps observation wing 

commander from the 1st and 4th Corps groups, and direct from the 

group headquarters of the 2d French Colonial Corps and the 5th 

corps. 

On the one day that it was possible to dispatch photographic 

missions the results attained were entirely satisfactory. 

As information agents the airplanes, operating in cooperation with 

the artillery of the corps and divisions, were all that could be desired. 

There were several causes which contributed to the lack of success in 

adjusting artillery fire on fugitive targets. 

There was a large number of new squadrons which took part in the 

St. Mihiel operation. Some of these squadrons had had a considerable 

experience working over quiet sectors but none of them had 

participated before in offensive operations conducted on a large scale. 

A considerable number of their pilots and observers were 

inexperienced in operations over the front. As a consequence there 

were some failures by the observers to report direct to artillery posts 

of command the fugitive targets which they located during missions 

over the lies. They noted and recorded the information and sent it to 

the corps post of command by radio, dropped messages, and later 

telephonic reports; but failed to realize that their first duty was to 

convey it to the proper artillery post of command, where it could be 

given immediate attention. In a few instances when repeated radio 

calls to artillery posts of command failed to elicit response in the shape 

of answering panels, the observer then failed to drop a written 

message. 

On the other hand, the artillery battalions, in particular those 

assigned to fugitive target work, failed repeatedly to respond to radio 

calls from the airplanes assigned to cooperate with them. The same 

conditions prevalent on the Marne again obtained in the St. Mihiel 

offensive with respect to the operation af artillery radio and panel 

stations. In some cases the trouble, was a matter of faulty installation 

but in the vast majority of such failures the cause was traced to the 

insufficient training and experience of the crews assigned to operate 

radio and panel stations. It was also found that dropped written 

messages were often lost because of the failure of details at the panel 

station to be on conswt lookout for airplanes seeking to 

communicate with the post of command. 

Many other failures of the artillery to respond to radio calls from the 

airplane were due to changes being made in the location of the 

batteries and battalion radio stations without notifying the Air Service. 

In one instance six adjustments had been prearranged for the next 

day; during the night all six batteries were moved and, although the 

fact was well known to the artillery that an Air Service liaison officer 
243 

was on duty at division headquarters, no notice of the change in 

location of these units was sent to the Air Service. In some cases 

where it was necessary to order the forward movement of batteries 

which had been designated to fire on fugitive targets upon call from the 

airplane the assignment of other batteries to replace them during their 

movement was neglected. It might well be asked why the Air Service 

liaison officer did not prevent such occurrences. The answer is that 

during an offensive of the sort then in progress no one man can attend 

to matters of this sort and that the real solution is attention by the 

artillery to forwarding such information to the Air Service as is 

necessary for its conduct of operations. Without such cooperation on 

the part of the artillery little success may be expected. 

One feature of this campaign may well be remarked. During all 

previous work on the part of the Corps Air Service few obstacles in 

the way of unfavorable weather had been encountered except in the 

taking of photographs. During the greater part of the time in which the 

various squadrons had operated over the front the weather had been 

excellent for aerial operations. In the short spells of poor weather 

which had occurred during the late spring and summer operations 

were seldom undertaken. Here for the first time missions were sent 

out irrespective of weather, an actual downpour or a thick fog being 

the only two conditions which were allowed to impede the conduct of 

operations. The flying personnel learned to carry out their work of 

reconnaissance and infantry contact at extremely low altitudes, 

trusting to occasional breaks in the clouds and mist to make objects 

on the ground momentarily visible. Furthermore, they achieved 

considerable success in securing general information as to the 

situation along the front of attack and also in locating the position of 

the friendly infantry lines under such conditions. The knowledge that 

some success could be achieved in this manner was utilized in great 

measure during the operations conducted from that time on. The lowflying infantry contact patrol and visual reconnaissance mission during 

unfavorable weather became an institution of corps observation 

during the St. Mihiel offensive. 

VIII. The COKPS Airz Serzuice in 

the Arzgonne-Mecrse Oqqensive. 

245 

Effectives and Station. 

Shortly after the conclusion of the St. Mihiel offensive a certain 

redistribution of units took place between the various Corps Air 

Services in preparation for the Argonne-Meuse offensive. The three 

American Army Corps which were to take part in the main offensive 

were the lst, 3d, and 5th. The 4th Corps was to be enlarged to include 

the former sector of the 1st Corps. The 4th Corps, the 2d French 

Colonial Corps, and the 33d French Corps were to remain in place 

and not take part in the main offensive. One American squadron was 

relieved from the Air Service of the 4th Corps, leaving the 8th and 

135th American Squadrons and one French squadron in the group at 

Ourches. The Air Service of the 2d French Colofiial Corps was 

composed of the same squadrons as had participated in the St. Mihiel 

offensive. The Air Service of the 33d French Corps was made up of 

French squadrons with headquarters at Beauzee. 

The observation group of the Air Service, 3d Army Corps, was 

located on the airdromes at Souilly, Vadelaincourt, and Beauzee. The 

group was comprised of the 88th and 90th American Squadrons and 

three French squadrons. 

The Air Service of the 5th Corps included the 99th and 164th 

American Squadrons and two French squadrons. The 5th Corps 

group was established on the airdrome at Foucaucourt. 

The 1st Corps observation group, located at Remicourt, was made 

up of three American squadrons, the lst, 12th, and 50th, and one 

French squadron. 

The Corps Chiefs of Air Service. 

In the Argonne-Meuse operations the headquarters of the corps 

chief of Air Service of each corps was established at the corps 

headquarters. Although much can be said in favor of the plan of 

establishing the chief of Air Service headquarters near the group, it 

was thought best, in view of the conditions likely to obtain in the 

coming offensive, to locate each chief of Air Service at corps 

headquarters. The experience of the past had clearly demonstrated 

that the majority of difficulties encountered by the Corps Air Service 

were those connected in general with problems of liaison, the securing 

information necessary to operations, and the insufficient training 

possessed by the line organizations in the use and limitations of the Air 

Service arm. While as a matter of principle an intimate supervision by 

the chief of Air Service of the daily operations of the group and 

squadrons is much to be desired. Nevertheless, this consideration was 

here outweighed by the results possible to obtain by locating the chief 

of Air Service at corps headquarters. 

, 
246 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

The headquarters of the corps observation wing, 1st Army, was 

located at Chaumont-sur-Aire, where the 1st Pursuit Wing 

headquarters was also established. The headquarters of the chief of 

Air Service, 1st Army, was at Souilly. 

The organization of the office and staff of each corps chief of Air 

Service and the organization of each corps observation group was the 

same as that described heretofore. 

The Tactical Situation. 

The tactical situation faced at the opening of the Argonne-Meuse 

offensive was in many respects similar to that before the St. Mihiel 

offensive. The positions occupied by the ground troops of the three 

American corps which were to participate in the main attack were 

strongly organized by means of trench works, barbed-wire 

entanglements, and machine-gun emplacements. Beside the large 

amount of divisional and corps artillery immediately to the rear of the 

infantry positions, there was a formidable concentration of Army 

artillery located throughout the area to the west of Verdun. 

With the exception of the French Aerial Division, which had been 

relieved, the other branches of the Air Service, 1st Army, in addition 

to the Air Service of each corps, remained of approximately the same 

strength as that described under the chapter on the St. Mihiel 

offensive. 

The enemy occupied positions of great strength along the entire 

front of the 1st American Army. Intricate trench systems and well- 
Corps 

Observation 

247 

organized strong points, protected throughout the course of the front 

by barbed-wire entanglements, were occupied by the enemy infantry. 

Behind the lines of the latter was an artillery organization of formidable 

size and strength. Here, as in the St. Mihiel salient, the nature of the 

terrain was such that every advantage was given the enemy for a 

prolonged and successful resistance to attack. 

Since September 14, when the comparatively negligible hostile 

pursuit forces of the St. Mihii sector were augmented by the arrival of 

some of the best enemy squadrons, the Air Service of the enemy had 

been largely increased in the area opposite the Argonne-Meuse sector 

by the addition of many pursuit, observation, and bombardment units. 

The success of the allied offensives farther west had made it a matter 

of vital importance to the enemy that no advance be made by the allied 

armies in the Argonne-Meuse sector. As a consequence, a large 

number of his best Air Service units were sent to operate in the latter 

region. 

The Mission of Corps Observation. 

The mission of the Air Service of an Army Corps during offensive 

operations has been described in full in previous chapters. The 

necessity for complete secrecy during the preparation of the ArgonneMeuse offensive prevented all operations on the part of the corps 

observation units, brought into the sector to participate in the attack, 

before the day set for the beginning of the offensive. Only the French 

squadrons which had been working in the sector for a considerable 

time past were allowed to carry out the routine work of 

reconnaissance, photography, and artillery adjustment. 

Plans to Fulfill Mission. 

Detailed plans of employment of the Air Service under his command 

were accordingly prepared by the chief of Air Service of each corps to 

meet the tactical situations likely to obtain in a war of movement. 

Arrangements were made to allow the observers of the American 

squadron just arrived to fly with pilots of the French squadrons 

already operating on the front, so as to familiarize the observers with 

the new sector before the day of attack. Observers who were to act as 

Air Service liaison officers were sent to take station at the divisional 

posts of command of each corps. Other liaison officers were stationed 

with the corps to the right and left of the 1st Army. All measures were 

taken to procure in detail the information necessary to carry out each 

type of mission common to corps observation and to insure the future 

rapid transmission of such information to the Air Service of each corps 
240 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

after the opening of the offensive. Careful plans were drawn up of the 

precise methods to be employed in cooperating with the corps and 

divisional artillery, and these plans were discussed in detail with the 

artillery officers concerned in personal visits made by Corps Air 

Service officers to artillery posts of command. Particular attention was 

given the subject of training the infantry in marking out the first line by 

panels during the execution of infantry contact patrols. Personal visits 

were made to all radio stations by group or squadron radio officers to 

make necessary arrangements for insuring success in radio liaison 

between the Air Service and all other posts of command in the corps. 

Exercises were conducted whenever possible with artillery and 

infantry units before they entered the lines. 

Soon after the arrival of the two American squadrons of the 3d 

Corps group on the field at Souilly, an infantry contact school was 

here established to instruct detachments of infantry in the details of 

contact patrol and the marking out of the front line. This school was 

organized and operated under the same general plan as that described 

under “Training Operations of the 3d Corps Group on the Vesle” in a 

foregoing chapter. As soon as possible thereafter, other schools of the 

same nature were established at the airdromes of the 1st and 5th 

Corps groups. 

The plan of liaison of each Corps Air Service was drawn up in 

accordance with the plan of liaison of the corps. The details of this plan 

were in no way essentially different from the system of 

communications or plan of liaison of Corps Air Service operations 

described in foregoing chapters. Special steps were, however, taken to 

guard against repeated radio failures between the airplane and the 

ground stations. In agreement with the chief signal officer of each 

corps, it was arranged that in every case where an airplane, the radio 

set of which had been successfully tested over the field before 

departure by signals received and acknowledged at the group radio 

station, called and failed to receive a response from the radio stations 

of the corps of divisional posts of command, a written memorandum 

noting the instance should be forwarded to the office of the corps chief 

signal officer for proper action to prevent a reoccurrence. To make 

certain of speedy telephonic liaison between the office of the chief of 

Air Service and the group, a direct wire was obtained. Particular care 

was given by the chief of Air Service of each corps to assure good 

telephonic liaison between his office and that of the pursuit wing 

commander. On account of the great distance between the corps 

headquarters and the airdrome of the 1st Corps group, an advance 

landing field was established at the location of the corps headquarters. 

On this field were to be stationed throughout the day a certain number 

of “alert” airplanes to care for missions of great urgence. 
Corps 

Observation 

249 

In assigning the work of each corps to the squadrons of each group 

the same general plan was followed as has been heretofore described. 

It happened that in each group there was one French squadron of the 

type known as the Heavy Artillery Squadron; to the squadrons of this 

type was assigned the work of adjusting the fire of the corps artillery 

and conducting missions of artillery surveillance for the corps. Other 

corps missions and divisional work was evenly divided among the 

remaining squadrons of the group. 

Arrangements were made for the close protection of photographic 

missions by pursuit airplanes in cases where it was impracticable to 

furnish protection by means of observation airplanes from the group 

itself. The plan consisted of diverting a pursuit patrol from its routine 

barrage patrol at the hour desired. All detailed arrangements as to the 

exact time and place of rendezvous, the course to be pursued, and 

other matters of a like nature were left to the photographic and pursuit 

patrol leaders, who were to confer by telephone beforehand. 

Operations Conducted. 

In treating of the operations carried out by the corps observation 

Air Service during the Argonne-Meuse offensive each type of mission 

executed will be discussed separately. No attempt will be made to 

describe the work of each corps in turn. 

offensive continued the greater part of the time between September 26 

and November 11. There were occasional ideal flying days, but for the 

most part atthospheric conditions were poor to impossible and proved 

a great handicap in carrying out aerial operations. Haze and fog 

obscured the ground to a great extent in the early morning and late 

afternoon during the last four weeks of the offensive. In considering 

the work performed by the Corps Air Service these weather 

conditions must be kept in mind as an element which affected the 

execution of each type of mission. In the matter of reconnaissance and 

infantry contact patrol work they produced some radical departures 

from the methods ordinarily used. 

The photographic missions undertaken during the period from 

September 26 to November 11 were in almost every case confined to 

the taking of photographs of well-defined areas of particular interest to 

the G-2 section of the corps and Army staffs. Atmospheric conditions 

were so infrequently favorable to the taking of large numbers of 

photographs that those possible were necessarily directed to cover 

areas of the most immediate interest to the staff. Elaborate 

DreDarations were made in all corns air services to have aimlanes 

The unfavorable weather encountered during the St. Mihiel 

ieady to take off at the slightest prospect of success. All photographic 

missions were ordered by the G-2 section of the corpsstaff. They were I, 
250 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

carefully prepared by the squadron observers working in conjunction 

with the branch intelligence officer of the group, and at the first sign of 

the approach of favorable atmospheric conditions the mission left the 

airdrome. A considerable number of missions were devoted to the 

securing of oblique photographs, as had been the case during the 

preparation of the St. Mihiel offensive. Such photographs were of 

value particularly with respect to the preparation of plans for the 

advance of the divisional infantry. At other times, it became necessary 

to photograph certain sensitive points in the enemy territory. Such 

missions, which require the greatest care, were assigned to flying 

teams of long experience. To attain success in them it was necessary 

that both pilot and observer be thoroughly familiar with the exact 

locality to be photographed so that no mistake would be made in 

securing photographs of the exact points desired. Unfavorable 

weather prevailed, to such an extent that it was never practical to 

attempt to photograph all the area of the front lines as fast as the 

troops advanced. The most that could be hoped for was to procure 

photographs of the areas most important in view of the tactical 

situation. At certain times during the offensive, when the need for 

photographs became imperative, missions of this nature were 

dispatched when atmospheric conditions made their failure almost 

certain. This was done in the hope of seizing advantage of a 

momentary break in the clouds or fog after reaching the lines. It is 

interesting to note that considerable success met efforts of this nature. 

At times when the weather was comparatively favorable in the vicinity 

of the airdromes the sky was a mass of clouds over the front lines. At 

other times when fog and mist made it quite difficult to "take-off" at the 

airdrome, missions operating over the lines to a depth of 8 kilometers 

into enemy territory were able to secure a considerable number of 

successful photographs. 

In this offensive, as had been the case on the Marne, photographic 

missions were invariably given protection against attacking hostile 

pursuit aiplanes. The large number of enemy pursuit flights operating 

in the sector made it practically certain that a photographic mission 

would be attacked one or more times during the course of the flight. 

Protection by pursuit patrols from the nearest pursuit group was 

utilized to a large extent by photographic missions dispatched from 

the 3d Corps group, and with excellent results. On the other hand, the 

missions of a lie nature sent out from the 1st and 5th Corps groups 

employed for the most part biplace protection offered by airplanes 

from the groups themselves. This latter type of protection differed in 

no way, in methods employed, from those described in foregoing 

chapters. The pursuit protection, however, ceased to operate close in 

to the photographic airplane as in the Mame sectbr. It was found that 

better results could be obtained by flying a more or less erratic course 
corps 

Observation 

251 

some 500 meters above the photographic airplane. This method 

allowed the pursuit airplanes to retain the advantage of their 

maneuverability and at the sarne time to assure to the photographic 

mission considerable protection in the event of attack. The utilization 

of pursuit protection or biplace protection by means of other 

observation airplanes resulted in either case in some losses to the 

protecting airplanes in warding off the attacks of the enemy from the 

photographic airplane, but in the great majority of cases protection of 

either sort sufficed to insure the safe return of the photographic 

airplane with a mission successfully accomplished. Toward the latter 

part of the offensive, considerable advantage was taken of the 

diversion created by the dispatch of large combined bombing and 

pursuit formations over the lines to afford photographic missions 

incidental protection. The hours for such raids being known to the 

Corps Air Service, photographic teams were able to time their 

execution of the mission so as to take advantage of the protection 

offered by presence of the raiding airplanes. 

As in previous offensives, the most important work accomplished 

for the artillery of the corps and divisions was that of surveillance. 

Missions of this nature operated over the various corps sectors when 

it was at all possible to make out objects on the ground, and much 

valuable information was secured and sent by means of radio and 

dropped written messages to the various artillery posts of command. 

Particular attention was paid during these missions to locating and 

reporting the positions of hostile batteries. Considerable success in 

such work was obtained in following out plans similar to those 

described in the chapter on the Marne campaign, where special maps 

were prepared which allowed the observer to signal various artillery 

posts of command assigned to care for certain areas marked off on the 

map. 

With regard to work with assigned fugitive target batteries, a variety 

of conditions was encountered which combined to nullify the efforts of 

the Corps Air Service in this field. Frequent radio failures marked 

attempts to adjust fire of batteries. Despite every effort made by the 

radio officers and liaison officers of the Air Service to prevent such 

occurrences, the battalion radio stations of the artillery repeatedly 

failed to respond to calls from the airplane. Dropped written messages 

requesting artillery fire were seldom effective in accomplishing more 

than the transmittal of the information concerning the location of the 

fugitive target. The target usually disappeared during the lapse of time 

necessary to place the radio station in communication with the 

airplane observer. During rapid advances by our troops, the 

movement of artillery units made it impossible to assign special 

batteries or battalions to fugitive target work. Information as to the 

location of battery positions at such times was seldom available for 
252 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

communication to the Air Service before further movement became 

necessary. Every difficulty encountered on the Marne during attempts 

to conduct fugitive target work with specially designated batteries or 

battalions was here encountered anew despite the efforts of the Air 

Service. In addition, the generally unfavorable weather made all 

attempts to adjust the fire of artillery by airplane observation 

exceedingly difficult and uncertain of success. Conditions described 

above were equally true of Air Service cooperation with the artillery in 

the matter of prearranged fire adjustments. 

Missions of corps and divisional visual reconnaissances were carried 

out daily at dawn and twilight. Other missions of the same nature were 

executed throughout the day whenever necessitated by the tactical 

situation. Nothing short of heavy rain or complete fog was allowed to 

hinder this type of work. Airplanes left the airdrome when 

atmospheric conditions were most unfavorable, with the hope that 

upon reaching the front there would be occasional moments when 

observations could be conducted through the clouds and mist. Every 

possible effort was made to secure information concerning all enemy 

activity and the general situation in hostile territory. Remarkable 

results were achieved in this work. At times the information reported 

by aerial observers was the sole reliance of the command in following 

developments along the front lines and within the enemy territory. 

Reconnaissance missions kept under surveillance at all times, when it 

was possible to fly, the front lines along the entire Army front to a 

distance of 8 kilometers within the hostile rear areas. Many special 

missions were sent out to observe and report upon enemy activity at 

designated points and within certain areas of particular importance 

defined by the corps and individual staffs. 

With the establishment of infantry contact schools at the group 

airdrome of each Corps Air Service came a gradual betterment of the 

conditions which had obtained in the past in the performance of the 

- .I 
corps 

Observation 

253 

work of infantry contact patrols. While there were a large number 

of instances reported where the observer was forced to fly at 

extremely low altitudes and lacate the front lines by distinguishing 

the uniforms of the ground troops, on the whole the cooperation of 

the infantry in marking out the line was far greater than it had been 

in any previous campaign. As increased knowledge of the necessity 

for such patrols became spread throughout the rank and file of 

the infantry by means of the group schools and the distribution of 

short bulletins sent out by the Air Service for this purpose, it became 

possible to start upon the performance of a contact patrol with 

some assurance that the ground troops would respond to the 

signals of the airplane observer by panels or flares. 

Particular attention was given by the Air Service of each corps to 

developing a feeling of friendliness and confidence on the part of the 

infantry with respect to its Air Service. It was found that the enlisted 

personnel of many units still retained the impression that all American 

airplanes were to be recognized by a star painted on the bottom 

surface of the lower wings, an insignia which had been used on 

airplanes in the United States and which became widely known, 

whereas the.concentric circle insignia actually used on American 

airplanes at the front was practically unknown to new divisions. The 

result was that many failures on the part of the infantry to respond to 

airplane signals were directly due to an opinion on their part that such 

signals were not made by airplanes working in cooperation with them. 

Consequently, considerable effort had to be made by the Air Service 

to clear up the misunderstanding. This was done by means of the 

distribution of printed circulars on the subject dropped from 

observation airplanes, the circulation through all infantry units of short 

bulletins on the subject of the work of the infantry contact patrol, and 

by temporary adoption, in many squadrons, of the divisional insignia 

which was painted on the airplane in conspicuous places. The result of 

these efforts was a marked increase in the number of successful 

contact patrols carried out. As an additional means of bringing about 

closer cooperation, between the Corps Air Service and the infantry, 

the custom was inaugurated of sending observers from each squadron 

to remain with the infantry for periods of two or three days. Personal 

liaison visits were of great value to both the infantry and the Air 

Service in promoting mutual confidence and in gaining a knowledge 

concerning the activities of each arm so essential to successful 

cooperation. During the last four weeks of the offensive it became 

almost a daily custom for observation airplanes to carry cigarettes and 

newspapers during their missions over the lines to drop to the troops 

on the ground whenever opportunity presented itself. All such efforts 

on the part of the Air Service to promote a feeling of interest and 

friendship on the part of the ground troops were of undoubted value in 
254 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

obtaining success during the conduct of missions sent out to locate 

the front lines. 

In all reconnaissance and infantry contact patrol work the use of 

radio from the airdane as a means to transmit the information 

gathered to the various commands concerned was almost entirely 

abandoned. Although the past training of the observers had 

contemplated the use of this means of liaison between the airplane and 

the ground during the conduct of such work, it was found that the 

numerous radio failures which occurred made the use of dropped 

written messages much more satisfactory. 

Probably the most noticeable departure from methods employed in 

the past in the cooperation of the observation airplane with the 

infantry during attacks was the development during the ArgonneMeuse offensive of what became known as the cavalry reconnaissance 

patrol. Observation airplanes flying at low altitudes conducted close 

observation of the terrain immediately in advance of the friendly 

infantry, locating the position of machine-gun nests, strong points, and 

all other hostile defenses likely to retard the progress of the attack. All 

information of this nature, together with the location add strength of 

enemy rear guards, was then transmitted to the immediate front-line 

troops by means of dropped written messages. In this way the infantry 

was kept informed at short intervals of time of all developments in the 

area immediately ahead and were given information which proved of 

great value in aiding their advance. Although not within the scope of 

the Corps Observation Air Service, as a matter of principle, such 

cavalry reconnaissance patrols frequently used their machine guns to 

strafe hostile ground troops impeding the progress of the friendly 

infantry. 

Although large numbers of hostile pursuit airplanes operated in this 

sector throughout the offensive, they were ineffective in hindering to 

any degree the operations conducted by the Corps Air Service, due in 

great measure to the excellent work performed by the pursuit forces 

of the First Army in maintaining a constant pursuit barrage at varying 

altitudes along the course of the Army front. However, it was but 

natural that many combats between observation airplanes and hostile 

pursuit forces should occur during the long period of intense aerial 

activity which characterized the Argonne-Meuse offensive. 

Comparatively small losses were suffered by the corps observation 

squadrons during such combats. Observation airplanes, by the 

adoption of energetic and aggressive tactics, proved their ability to 

successfully defend themselves while continuing the execution of their 

assigned missions. Losses inflicted upon attacking enemy pursuit 

forces were considerably larger than those suffered by the Corps Air 

Service. One observation pilot, who had been assisted by various 

observers, was officially credited with the destruction of nine enemy 

aircraft during the course of the offensive.8 
Corps 

Observation 

255 

Throughout the offensive, corps observation airplanes operating 

over enemy territory distributed quantities of propaganda leaflets 

supplied by the second section of the General Staff. 

Comment. 

A review of the operations conducted by the Corps Air Service 

units during the Argonne-Meuse offensive shows a prevalence of 

conditions affecting the success of aerial operations much similar to 

those obtaining in the Marne and Vesle campaigns. Here, again, the 

greatest difficulties encountered arose through insufficient training on 

the part of the infantry and artillery in the use and limitations of the Air 

Service. Unfavorable weather throughout the greater part of the 

offensive proved a great hindrance in the execution of photography 

and artillery missions. 

The establishment of infantry contact schools and other steps taken 

to improve the cooperation of the Air Service with the infantry realized 

a marked improvement in the results attained during the later stages 

of the offensive. 

Except for the work of artillery surveillance, the results attained in 

cooperating with the artillery were unsatisfactory. In practically every 

case the cause of failures to adjust the fire of artillery was faulty radio 

liaison. 

The work of corps and divisional reconnaissance was carried out 

with consistent success; at all times when aerial operations were 

possible the staff was kept informed by complete and accurate reports 

of the situation along the front of the Army. 

The cavalry reconnaissance patrol as developed during this 

offensive rendered valuable aid to the advancing front-line ground 

troops. Patrols of this nature and infantry contact missions kept the 

command informed of the position of the first line throughout the 

offensive. 

The marked success attained in the development of lowflying 

patrols during adverse weather was the outstanding feature of the 

Corps Air Service operations during the Argonne-Meuse offensive. 

all demands made upon it during the offensive. No essential change 

was made in its organization in this period. 

Under conditions bound to obtain in the rapid organization of the 

Air Service of four Army corps from new and largely inexperienced 

units, the corps observation wing headquarters as it functioned during 

the St. Mihiel and Argonne-Meuse offensives justified its existence. On 

the other hand, it is believed that under normal conditions this 

headquarters would be unnecessary to the successful operation of the 

Corps Air Service organizations of an Army. 

The general organization of the Corps Air Service stood the test of 
256 
Parzt 3 

Tactical Histony OF 

Amy Obsenuation 
258 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

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Lt. George C. Kenney was associated with the 91st Aero 

Squadron during World War I. He became the Commanding 

General of the Far East Air Forces in World War 11. 
I, On the Toul Sectorz. 259 

During the inactive period on the Toul sector covering the late 

spring and summer of 1918 and up to the St. Mihiel offensive which 

commenced on September 12, army observation in the American Air 

Service was carried out by one unit, the 91st Aero Service Squadron. 

Previous to its assignment to the 1st Army on August 10,1918, this 

organization worked under orders of the Chef de I'Aeronautique of 

the 8th French Army. The formation of the 1st Army Observation 

Group on September 6,1918, with the 91st squadron as a nucleus, 

added to this branch of the observation service two other 

organizations, the 24th squadron and the 9th Night Reconnaissance 

Squadron, though neither of the latter did service flying previous to 

the St. Mihiel offensive. 

December 14, 1917, being stationed on the aviation field near Amanty, 

Department of the Meuse, for the purpose of receiving equipment and 

for carrying out a program of training before taking up active service 

flying at the front. At this time the personnel included no flying officers. 

During the first two months barracks, hangars, and other necessary 

buildings were erected, and tk field put in condition for flying. Pilots 

continued to arrive and on February 24,1918, the flying personnel 

consisted of twenty pilots, including the commanding officer, who took 

command on this date.' 

The squadron at this time had not received its equipment, and the 

pilots were given training in observation work by piloting students of 

the 1st Corps Observation Training Center at Gondrecourt, Meuse. 

This flying was done in French Avions Renault: which had been 

assigned to the First Corps Training Center. 

On April 24 the permanent equipment commenced to arrive. The 

planes were Salmsons type 2A2, equipped with the Salmson 260 HP 

radial motor. The armament consisted of fixed Vickers and twin Lewis 

guns of French manufacture. 

The pilots were trained in flying the new planes, and the mechanics 

were given courses of instruction in their upkeep at the Salmson 

motor factory. 

The full complement of airplanes having been received, and the 

personnel considered sufficiently well trained, orders were received to 

proceed to the front for active service over the lines, and on May 24, 

1918, the squadrw moved to the airdrome at Gondreville-sur-Moselle, 

Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. 

The airdrome at Gondreville was, at the beginning of operations, 

about 26 kilometers from the line, far enough to give reasonable 

security, thus allowing for a semi-permanent camp, and near enough 

to permit long distance reconnaissance to be carried out in spite of the 

handicaps of high altitude flying and limited fuel carrying capacity. The 

field itself was located to the south of the Toul-Nancy road, the 

The 91st Aero Squadron arrived in the Zone of Advance on 
260 U.S. Ak Service , 

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southern half being reserved for the 91st Squadron. The French 41st 

Squadron occupied the northern portion of the field. The terrain was 

we11 suited to flying, being level and well drained. There were four 

hangars of the Bessonnead type, well camouflaged. Three were used 

as flight hangars and the fourth to house surplus planes. Between 

them were located the supply, armament, photographic, and hospital 

tents, together with the engineering and repair shops. The enlisted 

men's quarters were somewhat south of the hangars, under the 

shelter of low hills. Squadron headquarters, observers' room, 

operations and intelligence offices, photographic laboratory and 

officers quarters and mess were located at some dWance from the 

field on the western side of the road. From the standpoint of security, 

this arrangement proved very effective since great concentration was 

avoided, and the danger of damage from aerial bombing raids cut 

down. Measures were taken for the defense and security of the post 

against attacks from the air. Machine guns were mounted at several 

points, and shelter trenches dug. 

The great disadvantage of the location of the airdrome was that it 

was located at the crossing of two main roads making it an easy target 

for bombers. However, though the enemy made several attempts to 

bomb the field during the summer, in no case did he succeed in 

causing any damage. 

Previous to the move from Amanty three observers had reported 

for duty. Immediately after the move to the front, the remaining 

observers commenced to arrive, fifteen having reported for duty by 

the 11th of June. All the observers had done a certain amount of 

service flying with French squadrons. A few of them had worked over 

the Toul sector. 

Service flying could not be started immediately, due principally to 

the inferior quality of the propellers furnished by the French air park. 

Although it was unwise to attempt service flying with these 

propellers, patrols were carried out along the lines, commencing June 

3, for the purpose of familiarizing the pilots and observers with the 

principal feature of the sector over which they were to work. In the 

course of three dys every flyer had been given the opportunity to fly 

along the lines. 

On the 5th of June the propeller difficulty was overcome by the 

receipt of a supply of another make. On the 6th the commanding 

officer reported that the squadron was ready for duty, and on the 

same day operations orders were received from the Chef de 

I'Aeronautique of the 8th French Army, through the Chief of Air 

Service, 1st Corps. Thii operations order directed that the squadron 

perform visual and photographic reconnaissances of the enemy's rear 

areas, together with adjustment of fire of the army artillery. Thii latter 

branch of the work was never actually carried out, as during the early 
Army 

Observation 

261 

part of the summer army artillery was rarely used. A later order limited 

the activities of the squadron to pure reconnaissance. The sector 

assigned was that of the 8th French Army and was bounded as 

follows: On the west, Cotes-de-Meuse, exclusive; on the north, the 

railroad Etain, Conflans, Metz; on the east, the highway from Metz to 

Nomeny. Maps were furnished showing the routes to be covered on 

visual and photographic missions, the order of their importance being 

indicated by number. The missions for June covered five visual and 

nine photographic routes to be reconnoitered as frequently and 

completely as possible. This method of assigning routine missions for 

each month was continued through July and August, and until the 

separation of the squadron from French jurisdiction. The limits of the 

sector were gradually extended to the east and north. As the attack of 

St. Mihiel grew imminent the northern boundary was entirely removed 

and missions carried out to an indefinite depth. 

Previous to June 6, there had been no definite study of the sector, 

as no definite theatre of operations had been assigned, nor had the 

exact nature of the work been defined. Upon receipt of the operations 

order of June 6, systematic study was commenced. Plans for an 

observers’ room had been made previously and the room itself 

furnished. Maps of the sector on a 1/20,000 scale were placed in the 

room. As many photographs as possible were procured of towns and 

military works in the enemy’s territory. Pilots and observers were 

instructed to study the sector carefully. For a few weeks this study 

Maj. John N. Reynolds, commander of the 

91st Aero Squadron, stands beside one of the 

sauadron’s Salmsons. 
262 U.S. Air Service 

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\ 

was carried out by each man independently, but the results were [not] 

entirely satisfactory. On the 21st of June a quiz was given for the 

purpose of determining just how much each man knew about the 

sector. The results of this examination showed that much more could 

be gained if future instruction were carried out in systematic form. A 

course of study was arranged, and examinations given at frequent 

intervals. These examinations were not for the purpose of grading the 

flyers, but merely to enable each man to determine wherein it was 

necessary that he make improvement. 

Several methods of study were used, the most effective being as 

follows: A skeleton map, that is one having one or two railroads 

stenciled on it and merely serving as reference points, was furnished to 

each man and he was requested to fill in all the railroads, roads, towns, 

woods, streams and other topographical features by reference to a 

map. As soon as this was completed, new skeleton maps were 

distributed, which were then completed from memory. This method 

fixed the features of the sector firmly in the men’s minds. In addition, 

each flight was requested to prepare a large scale military map, on 

which was shown by conventional symbols the location of enemy 

works, the information to be obtained from all available sources. The 

element of competition was brought in, and the best map turned in 

was placed in the observers room as the official map of the enemy 

works to which all new information was transferred. 

Familiarity with towns, dumps and airdromes was obtained by 

means of a course of study of aerial photographs posted on large 

cards, with the names of the various places shown under each. These 

card photographs were studied for several days, after which the 

captions were removed and the town dumps or airdromes named 

from memory. 

Another method of study was to mount maps of the sector on cards 

which were cut into pieces of uniform size and shape, after the fashion 

of a picture puzzle. The measure of the familiarity with the sector was 

the time taken to put the pieces together. 

The effect of this instruction was very apparent, not only in the 

amount and character of the information brought back by the 

observers, but in the work of the pilots as well. Photographic routes 

were covered more accurately, and the pilots themselves carried out 

independent observations and returned with very valuable reports. 

The initial visual reconnaissance over enemy territory was carried 

out b the late afternoon of June 7. A formation of four planes was 

accompanied by five pursuit planes from the 1st Pursuit Group as 

protection. Thii mission was carried out at an altitude of 3,000 meters. 

Very active and accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered, practically 

every plane having received some damage from fragments of high 
Amy 

Observation 

263 

explosive shells. In view of this, it was decided to carry out future 

missions at an altitude of 5,000 meters. 

from anti-aircraft fire, due to the difficulty in ranging. Second, more 

extended Visibility allowing 4 greater amount of territory to be 

reconnoitered for a given route, on both visual and photographic 

missions. Third, the Salmscm plane at this altitude was more than a 

match for any enemy single seater in the matter of speed and unless 

surprised, would successfulty give combat, due to having guns 

mounted both in front and in the rear. 

At first visual reconnaissances were, carried out between the hours 

of eight o’clock and sixteen o’clock. Experiente soon showed that this 

practice was worse than remaining on the ground, for it exposed men 

and material to great danger, without obtaining results commensurate 

with the risk. As the enemy made practically all his movements under 

cover of darkness, it was decided to carry out visual missions only 

during the early and late hars of the day. The early morning 

reconnaissance proved to be the most valuable for it was these 

missions which caught the tail movements of the night work. When 

the weather was at all suited to flying, the atmospheric conditions at 

early morning were usually advantageous. The air was free from haze, 

and though there was always a certain amount of mist in the valley of 

the Moselle, the remainder of the sector was so high that visibility was 

very good over practically the whole area. 

Formations of three and hur planes were sent out at daylight, but 

by the time proper altitude was reached it was too late to obtain 

information of value. It was necessary that the planes be over enemy 

territory as soon as it became light. Formation flying was impossible in 

the dark. Single planes were henceforth used, each covering an 

independent route and starting an hour before daybreak. This 

arrangement proved very satisfactory. The single planes gained their 

altitude and arrived over predetermined points far back in enemy 

territory just as it bec tight for observation. The sector 

would then be reconnoit the plane roll on its way home with 

the information before enemy planes could climb and give combat. 

The evening reconnaissance proved to be of very little value both on 

account of atmospheric conditions and because the enemy did not 

commence his activity until well after dark. On this sector there was 

always at evening a thick haze, which often reached a height of four 

thousand meters and greatly hindered observation, especially in the 

direction of the sun. There was, therefore, great danger of surprise 

attacks by enemy pursuit phmes. Conditions of visibility steadily 

became worse during those missions. Some movement of the enemy 

was picked up just as it became dark, but it was impossible to remain 

Flying at this height had several advantages. First, lessened damage 
264 US. Air Service 

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to obtain more information for the squadron had neither the 

equipment for nor the personnel trained in night flying. 

daylight hours, and formations were employed. In such cases it was 

found advantageous to divide their work among the observers, the 

observer in the leading plane observing the railroads primarily, 

another the ammunition and material dumps, and a third the roads 

and billets. One or more observers in each formation, the number 

depending on the known strength and aggressiveness of the enemy, 

would devote all their time to the air, watching for hostile aircraft. 

The operations order of June 6, 1918, gave specific instructions 

pertaining to the taking of aerial photographs. All photographs were to 

be taken with a camera of fifty two centimeters focal length, and at an 

altitude of fifty four hundred meters. In practice it was very seldom 

possible to climb to this altitude and the majority of photographic work 

was done at an average of five thousand meters. 

Since pursuit planes were not used for protection and all the 

photographic work was at long distances behind the enemy lines, 

formations of three or four planes were employed, only the leading 

plane at first being equipped with a camera. The other planes acted as 

protection, though endeavoring to pick up whatever information they 

could. 

This method had two disadvantages. First, if the leading plane 

developed motor trouble or could not accomplish its mission for any 

reason, the sortie was likely to be a complete failure. Second, because 

of the limited number of plates carried by one plane, the maximum 

being 48, the area photographed would be comparatively small. 

The use of two cameras in the formation was then tried. This has 

the advantage that if one plane was forced to leave the formation, the 

other photographic plane could complete the mission. Although 

greater reliability was assured by this method, it left mkh to be 

desired, as no greater amount of territory was covered, though the 

chances of obtaining good photographs was greater, in case both 

planes succeeded in covering the course. 

Later, two photographic planes flying a kilometer apart and 

protected by a formation above them was tried, but this loose 

formation proved unsuccessful, due to its vulnerability when attacked 

by the enemy. 

A plan was finally adopted for use on long photographic 

reconnaissances, which proved satisfactory. Every plane in the 

formation was equipped with a camera, carried a maximum number of 

plates, and had its own individual mission outlined. The flight 

commander would lead the formation over the lines and carry out this 

mission while the other planes afforded him protection. The leader 

would then drop out of first place while the next plane took his 

Occasionally special visual reconnaissances were carried out during 
Army 

Observation 

265 

position and covered its particular course, the former leader flying in 

the rear. This maneuver WBS repeated until the entire mission was 

completed. 

a certain 

n, and 

Also there 

might be 

broken during the changes in flying position at the end of each section 

of the mission. 

The method used by one flight was to equip each machine with a 

camera, and have the flight commander lead the formation throughout 

the entire course. photographed a certain portion of 

the course, and just of his route was reached, the 

observer in the next operate his camera. By this 

method the integrity n was reserved, and the continuity 

of the assemblage assured, while protection was given by the planes 

not actually engaged in taking photographs. 

These tactical methods were developed slowly as the result of 

painful experience. The weather interfered greatly with the work, 

army observation being impossible during about 60% of the time. 

There was no great amount of rain during the summer, and therefore 

the field was in such a condition that the most could be made of every 

clear day. Army observation required almost perfect weather 

conditions as a great deal of the work consisted of photography 

carried on at high altitude. 

At the beginning of operations the enemy’s aerial activity was very 

slight. This was probably due to the fact that the Toul sector had seen 

no real activity since the beginning of the war, and the great 

concentration of the Germ Air Force was then to the west in the 

region of Soissons. 

The pursuit planes encountered were mainly Pfalz and Albatros 

scouts in patrols of three or four. They rarely offered to attack a 

formation, but contented themselves with remaining in the distance 

taking shots at long range or following a flight, ready to attack any 

plane which became separated from the formation. The immunity 

from attack when in close formation was surprising. 

During the first three months the enemy patrolled his back areas 

very inadequately. Extended missions were often carried out to a 

considerable depth into the German back areas, without interference 

from, or even the presence of enemy aircraft. 

During the month of August the Fokker type D VII scout plane 

made its appearance. The pilots of these machines showed more 

energy in their work than did their predecessors. They were aided in 

their work by anti-aircraft artillery, a system of signals having 

apparently been arranged upon for the purpose of indicating the 
266 US. Air Service 

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position of alien planes. The work of the 91st Squadron called for the 

reconnaissance of identical areas several times a week. The enemy 

evidently knew that those missions would be carried out in the vicinity 

of Metz or Conflans. As soon as a fannation of the squadron planes 

crossed the lines, the fact would be signalled to the anti-aircraft 

batteries at the two above-mentioned places. The latter would fire a 

signal salvo and by the time the formation had arrived a patrol of 

enemy aircraft would be found waiting over the objective. 

Beginning on the 1st day of September, there was a noticeable 

increase in the enemy’s air forces in the sector. Whereas formerly 

combat had taken place only well in the German back areas, strong 

offensive patrols were now encountered when merely across the lines. 

Evidently the enemy suspected an attack, and was attempting to 

screen his preparations for defense. Observation indicated large troop 

movements, and a strengthening of defenses, especially the 

Hindenburg line, in the region of which high patrols of enemy pursuit 

planes constantly interfered with our observations. 

On August 23,1918, the 24th Aero Squadron, equipped with 

Salmson planes, moved to the northern portion of the Gondreville 

field, the French Squadron having vacated a few days before. The 24th 

Squadron had been designated for army observation. Additional 

hangars, tents, and barracks were erected to take care of the greater 

amount of equipment and increased personnel of an American 

squadron. 

On Sept 6,1918, the 1st Army Observation Group was formed, 

consisting of the 91st, 24th and 9th squadrons. The 9th SquadJon was 

at this time stationed at Amanty, Department of the Meuse, And was 

equipped for night reconnaissance, using French Breguets. Neither 

the 24th or the 9th Squadron commenced active operations until after 

the 12th of September. 

Comment. 

The greater part of the personnel of the 91st Aero Squadron had 

received no training or instruction in army observation work before 

being sent to the front. 

Nine of the observers were artillery officers who had been given 

instruction with a French squadron on repos4 behind the lines. They 

had received no systematic instruction, the work consisting of radio 

practice, one or two practice reghge5 with smoke bombs, and one 

mission for the purpose of photographing isolated objectives. They 

had then been given a course in aerial machine gunnery at the school 

at Cazaux, where very good instruction in ground shooting, and the 

mechanism of the Lewis gun was given. Unfortunately weather 

conditions gave little and in some cases, no opportunity for shooting in 
Army 

Observation 

267 

the air. This average amount of time in the air of any of these 

observers before being sent to the front was not over ten hours. 

The remainder of the observers, with one exception had attended 

the 1st Corps Observation Training Center at Gondrecourt, and had 

received a somewhat better training than those mentioned above. One 

observer had been through the observation school at Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma. 

squadrons. This policy was admirable in that the observers, in spite of 

inadequate schooling, worked under fire with experienced men who 

knew the flying game through and through. 

flying except the small amount of staff work done with student 

observers of the 1st Corps Training Center. They had absolutely no 

knowledge of aerial gunnery, except what little they were able to pick 

up for themselves. Four had been sent to Cazaux, but received no 

instruction there. 

Considerable difficulty was experienced with photographic plates, 

supplied by the French. Several lots received were found to have been 

exposed to light and a great many hazardous missions were flown 

without result. 

The airdrome itself was well located and entirely suited to the 

conditions of stationary warfare existing in the Toul sector during this 

period. It was well located from a sanitary standpoint, being on high 

ground, and not too near the village. The barracks were well built and 

comfortable. The entire camp was lighted by electricity, which was a 

decided advantage, as a great deal of night work and study was 

necessary. Especially was this of value in the photographic laboratory 

where the greater part of the work had to be done at night. 

All the observers had been first sent to the front with French 

In the case of the pilots they had received no training in observation 

The St. Mihiel offensive is chiefly remarkable in that it was the first 

all-American large scale operation. As far as the army observation is 

concerned, one new problem presented itself, that of making long 

distance reconnaissances under extremely unfavorable weather 

conditions. The 91st Squadron was now to be reinforced by two other 

army squadrons, the 24th Squadron and the 9th Night 

Reconnaissance Squadron, the three operating as a group. Due to the 

inexperience of the flying personnel, the 24th Squadron was unable to 

participate to any great extent. The 9th Squadron could not function 

at all because of lack of equipment and training. 

The order of operations issued by the Chief of Air Service, 1st 

Army, on September 10, made the 1st Army Observation Group 

responsible for the reconnaissance of the enemy’s back areas opposite 

the entire sector of attack, keeping the General Staff supplied with 

information concerning the disposition and movement of enemy 

forces. The order also statsd that the sector was to be under constant 

observation by planes of this group. 

The Chief of Staff, 1st Army, submitted a map on which were 

indicated the various artillery objectives, to be photographed just 

before and on every day during the attack until further notice. 

The method of employment of the group as formulated by the 

Commanding Officer was as follows: 

(a) Previous to the day of attack. The artillery objectives were to be 

photographed and complete reconnaissance both visual and 

photographic of the enemy’s lines of communication and billeting 

areas, in order to ascertain any troop movement or concentration. 

(b) During the attack. A continuous barrage of observation planes 

was to be maintained over enemy territory throughout the entire day. 

On the course . . . [for an?] attack the enemy must bring up his 

reserves during the hours of daylight. The success or failure of an 

operation often hinges on the General Staffs knowledge of the 

number and disposition of these reserves. 

Formations of three planes were scheduled to leave the airdrome at 

intervals of two hours, be&ning at daybreak, to reconnoiter the 

enemy’s rear areas. It was considered necessary to employ formations 

of at least three planes, as there was no pursuit protection available 

and the friendly pursuit patrols did not penetrate the enemy lines to 

the same depth that the army reconnaissance planes were required to 

go. It was certain that all these planes would be vigorously attacked by 

enemy aircraft. 

The artillery objectives to be photographed were divided into three 

different groups, each group to be taken by individual photographic 

planes. One of these missions included Metz-Sablon and the other 

Conflans, both of which points were far behind the enemy lines and 

were points especially well guarded by enemy pursuit planes, being 

1 

269 
270 U.S. Air Service 

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Allied bombing objectives. It was considered necessary to send as 

many protecting planes as possible with each of these photographic 

planes, so that the missions could be accomplished even in spite of 

enemy opposition. Formations of 6 planes were scheduled to take 

each of these first two missions. The objectives of the third mission 

lying within the zone that was to be patrolled by Allied pursuit planes, 

was to be carried out by only three planes. 

Certain planes fhat were unfit for service over the lines were to be 

kept in readiness to carry out all liaison missions between the 

airdrome and the 1st Army dropping ground, located near Ligny-enBarrois. 

the Chief of Staff, notifying the group commander that the attack 

would commence next morning at five o’clock, preceded by a four 

hour.artillery preparation. 

When dawn of September 12 arrived, heavy banks of dark rain 

clouds, fanned by a strong southwest wind, were racing across the sky 

at an altitude of about three hundred meters, and rain was falling in 

showers at frequent intervals. In spite of these adverse weather 

conditions two planes left the airdrome shortly after daybreak, to 

carry out a visual reconnaissance. One plane succeeded in finding a 

rift in the clouds through which it descended and gathered valuable 

information. The other plane was less fortunate and returned to the 

airdrome after an unsuccessful attempt at finding an opening in the 

clouds and fog. 

Owing to the prevailing adverse weather conditions, it was 

necessary to disregard the schedules that were prepared the 

preceding day as the low hanging clouds rendered formation flying 

impossible. Photography was out of the question. Single planes were 

dispatched whenever the weather permitted. The planes were 

required to fly at low altitudes, under the clouds but proved 

successful, in that they could climb into the clouds and to safety in 

case of the appearance of enemy aircraft, or when especially heavy 

and accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. 

On the evening of September 11, a memorandum was received from 
Army 

Observation 

271 

Flying at such a low altitude is extremely dangerous, not alone 

because of constant exposure to fire from machine guns, anti-aircraft 

artillery and attack by enemy aircraft who have the advantage in 

altitude, speed and maneuverability, but because of the danger of 

becoming lost far back of the lines, and consequent failure of the 

mission, especially when operating over such larger area as that 

assigned to an Army Reconnaissance Squadron. 

Both pilot and observer must know practically every foot of their 

sector, when flying under these conditions over a large area, for the 

visibility is necessarily limited, and the speed of the plane gives little 

time to orient oneself. When taking advantage of the shelter afforded 

by clouds, observation is intermittent, and unless the terrain be 

perfectly familiar, no observations of value can be made. 

over the terrain prior to the attack could be sent on missions. 

operations depended entirely upon the weather, but upon the opening 

of hostilities it was imperative that the enemy’s back areas be 

It was for this reason that only observers and pilots who had worked 

During the three months preceding the St. Mihiel attack, the 

Apilot’s view ofa bottle. 
272 U.S. Air Service 

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~~ 

reconnoitered in spite of disagreeable weather conditions and planes 

were dispatched whenever opportunities presented themselves. 

During the first day the enemy territory was successfully 

reconnoitered to a depth of 60 kilometers. Not one mission was 

carried out at an altitude exceeding 1,000 meters. This was 

accomplished without the loss of a single plane or even a single 

casualty. 

This success was due largely to the fact that during the three 

months preceding the attack, the pilots and observers had gained a 

thorough knowledge of the entire sector, both through actual 

experience and because of the extensive training given them during 

the earlier operations. 

Because of the excellent condition of the aviation field which the 

group occupied, it being well drained and covered with grass, it was 

possible for the planes to “take off without breaking the propeller in 

spite of the occasional heavy rainstorms. 

Because of the rapid increase in numbers of enemy pursuit planes 

as the battle progressed, the successful reconnoitering of the enemy 

back areas became extremely difficult. However, by the determination 

of the pilots and observers, the group was at all times able to furnish 

the Staff with complete and accurate information regarding the 

movement and disposition of the enemy forces. 

September 15 was marked by a decided change in the weather. The 

sky was perfectly clear and the visibility was excellent. The usual dawn 

reconnaissance was dispatched, although two planes were employed 

instead of one. Planes of the 24th Squadron accompanied several of 

the formation. 

During the late forenoon several photographic missions were 

dispatched but were only partially successful, because each formation 

was repeatedly attacked by superior numbers of enemy pursuit 

planes. These planes employed entirely different methods and 

attacked the Allied planes with a determination and persistency that 

had never been encountered in this particular sector. In the course of 

the afternoon several photographic missions were successfully 

accomplished, in spite of enemy opposition. 

The only enemy pursuit planes that were encountered in this sector 

prior to September 1, were Pfalz and Albatross scouts. At the high 

altitudes at which the 91st Squadron had worked, the Salmson plane 

had a decided advantage over these many planes, both in climbing and 

horizontal speed. 

The reinforcing enemy pursuit was largely equipped with the Fokker 

D VII scouts. This plane had a considerable advantage in climbing 

speed over the Salmson. However, the horizontal speed of the latter 

plane was greater at high altitudes, thereby enabling it to break off a 

combat at any desirable time. 
Amy 

Observation 

273 

September 16 saw the conclusion of the attack, reconnaissances 

were carried out through the day, but though there was a certain 

degree of enemy aerial oppgsition, no difficulty was experienced in 

carrying out any of the misrions. 

During the next three dayg, missions were dispatched only for the 

purpose of keeping up a general light surveillance of the sector. 

On September 20, orders were received directing the removal of the 

group, in accordance with the general plans of the transferral of the 

First Army to the sector west of Verdun. The new airdrome was 

located at Vavincourt, Mew. The advance echelon was sent out 

immediately on receipt of the order to move. On September 22, the 

move to the new station was completed. 

The effective work done and the comparatively small number of 

casualties suffered during the St. Miiel offensive, gave evidence of the 

excellent training and experience gained during the previous three 

months. 

The General Staff had been kept supplied at all times with 

information of the enemy in spite of almost impossible weather 

conditions. It is true that three of our planes were lost, but two of them 

were inexperienced teams of the 24th Squadron. As against this, the 

records show a total of five enemy planes destroyed by group flyers 

during this period. 

Comment. 

During the entire period of operations of the army observation on 

the front, there was a want of liaison between this organization and all 

other arms. The nature of the duties that were performed by this 

organization were such that it could work entirely independent from 

all other units but it is felt that if there had been closer relations 

between the various units better results might have been obtained, for 

example: throughout the St. Mihiel Offensive, which lasted only a 

short time, the army observation group had very little information 

regarding the progress of the ground troops, or in fact anything that 

was taking place except the information that was brought back by 

observers of their own organization and these observers did not 

concentrate their attention on points such as the location of the front 

line troops, etc. 

Also, the observers and pilots were in absolute ignorance as to the 

value of the information that they were obtaining. If lectures had been 

delivered to these observed and pilots at times by officers of the 

General Staff, it is belived that a keener interest would have been 

aroused and consequently geater efficiency would have been 

realized. 

111. The A~zgoaae-Meuse Opgensbe. 275 

The move of the 91st and 24th Squadrons of the 1st Army 

Observation Group, from the Toul Sector to that west of Verdun, 

took place on the 21st and 22nd of September. The new airdrome was 

located at Vavincourt, Department of the Meuse. No difficulty of any 

kind was experienced in making this move, the main echelon moving 

during one night a distance of almost 100 kilometers. Two days were 

required for the ferrying of the planes, due to a shortage of pilots. 

The group was now to operate as a whole from the same airdrome. 

The 9th squadron had arrived two days previously, and was equipped 

for night reconnaissance. Preparations were made for immediate 

active service flying, for it was known that an offensive by the 1st Army 

was imminent. The observers and pilots were given a special course of 

instructions on the principal features of the new sector, and patrols 

sent out along the lies for the purpose of familiarizing them with the 

terrain. Weather conditions were extremely unfortunate during this 

preliminary flying, and consequently very little knowledge of the sector 

was gained. 

The airdrome at Vavincourt left much to be desired. It was located 

at a prominent fork of , making it an easy target for night 

such a large air force to be provided for, ideal airdromes could not be 

expected. It is worthy of note that in spite of the constantly increasing 

distance to the lines, missions were performed without difficulty 

throughout the whole offensive. 

The order of operations, giving the duties to be performed by the 

group during the coming offensive, was issued by the Chief of Air 

Service on September 23. The sector assigned was bounded on the 

east by a line through Verdun and Longbey, and on the west by a line 

through Vouziers and Mezieres. Missions were to be carried out to an 

indeterminate depth. In practice, the eastern boundary did not exist 

for orders were constantly received for missions in the area of the 2nd 

Army. 

In general the order of operations made the group responsible for 

the reconnaissance, both by day and night, of the entire army sector. 

The artillery objectives for the first part of the offensive were 

indicated. They were to be photographed both before and after firing. 

Four planes, with pilots and observers, were to be stationed at army 

air service headquarters for the purpose of carrying out command 

missions on orders from the Chief of Air Service. 

formulated his plans for carrying them out. Four teams from the 9th 

Upon receipt of the above orders, the group commander 
276 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

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Squadron were immediately sent to army air service headquarters on 

command work. 

dispatched as frequently as necessary in order to keep the sector 

under constant surveillance from daylight to dusk. Artillery objectives 

were to be photographed, as well as the principal lines of 

communications, railroad centers, and other important points. These 

latter missions were to be carried out on special orders from the 

second section of the General Staff. 

from early evening until daylight. Bombs were to be carried on these 

night missions and used against convoys, troops and military works. 

Day reconnaissance was to be mainly visual, planes to be 

The night reconnaissance squadron was to conduct reconnaissance 
Army 

Observation 

277 

The attack commenced on the morning of September 26 with ideal 

weather conditions. On the four days previous low clouds and rain had 

prevented any effective work from being carried out. This had a 

decided effect on the first days work, due to lack of familiarity with the 

terrain. This fact, coupled with the activity of the hostile air forces, 

interfered greatly with the success of the photographing of the 

artillery objectives, and to some extent with the visual work. 

Weather conditions throughout the whole operations were 

extremely bad. Only ten days out of the whole period were suitable for 

army observation. The most was made of the small amount of good 

weather, and with two day squadrons operating an immense amount 

of work was accomplished. The last three days of October being 

perfect, gave opportunity for very important work to be accomplished 

in preparation for the attack, which commenced on November 1st. 

The areas opposite the American front were reconnoitered and 

photographed thoroughly, but the work was done in the face of 

intense opposition by hostile aircraft. 

One of the most valuable pieces of work carried out during the last 

three days of October was the photographing of the army artillery 

objectives at Montmedy, Longuyon, Spincourt, Dommary-Baroncourt 

and Conflans. The enemy had protected these points by intense antiaircraft barrages, and high patrols of pursuit planes, but in spite of 

these obstacles, the objectives were photographed both before and 

after registration fire, allowing the artillery to fire effectively during the 

attack. 

Li. Everett R. Cook, Commanding Wficer of 

the 91st Aero Squadron. 
278 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

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The command teams which had been stationed at Air Service 

Headquarters did very effective work. The pilots and observers were 

quartered at headquarters, and remained in readiness to carry out any 

mission during the hours of daylight. The missions assigned varied in 

character; from verifying reports as to the location of the front lines, to 

the seeking out of enemy reserves at points where counter-attacks 

were expected. This work was carried out by skgle planes flying at 

extremely low altitudes. The command planes sometimes penetrated 

hostile territory to a depth of 15 kilometers, and were constantly 

exposed to heavy machine gun and anti-aircraft artillery fire. They 

were especially liable to attack by pursuit planes which had every 

advantage of speed, maneuverability, and position. The strain of flying 

under these conditions coupled with the necessarily close confinement 

while awaiting orders, made it necessary that the teams be changed 

every ten days, and personnel from each of the squadrons in the group 

were sent out on this wprk successfully. 

The history of army observation would be incomplete without 

reference to the work of night reconnaissance. This work promised to 

bring in valuable information, since most military movements of 

importance are made at night. In order that it may be performed 

successfully, perfect conditions of visibility and a highly trained 

personnel are necessary. 

The 9th Squadron was the only night reconnaissance unit in the 

American Air Service. The poor weather conditions throughout the 

Argonne-Meuse operation gave little opportunity for the squadron to 

work. In addition, only a very few of the flyers had been trained for 

night work. In spite of these handicaps it is only fair to say that on the 

few nights suitable for observation, information of value was obtained, 

and considerable damage done to the enemy by bombing. 

Comment. 

The army observation group was operating under difficulties 

throughout the entire offensive, the field being situated such a long 

distance from the lines and lack of liaison with the zone of operations 

made it difficult for the group commander to make the proper 

disposition of the effectives under his command. Sometimes the 

atmospheric condition in the vicinity of the airdromes was such that a 

plane could not even attempt to leave the ground and at the front, a 

distance of about 100 kilometers, it was perfectly clear. But because of 

this lack of liaison and communication these conditions were not 

known to the group commander. 

The new French-52 centimeter automatic camera proved to be very 

unreliable. These cameras were first received in September and were 

mounted and tested, working fairly well at first but later when an 
Army 

Observation 

279 

attempt was made to use them on missions they were continually 

jamming. When the plates did not jam they were either unexposed or 

unevenly exposed. After giving them a fair trial they were discarded. 

The Chief of Staff of the 1st Army practiced the transmission of 

orders for the group commander through the branch of intelligence 

officer and the Chief of Air Service transmitted his orders direct to the 

group commander. Having orders come through two separate 

chaqnels from different authority there was a constant confliction of 

orders until the group commander made complaint to higher authority 

when it was decided that it would be best to transmit orders through 

one defined channel. Orders came direct from the Chief of Air 

Service, 1st Army thereafter. 

Parst 4 

Tactical H~SCOK~ OF 

Purrsuit Auiation 

I. The Toul Secton 283 

The First Pursuit Organization and Training Center was established 

at Villeneuve-les-Vertus, Marne, South of Epernay, on January 16, 

1918. The 96th Aero Squadron arrived on February 18,1918, the 94th 

Aero Squadron on March 4, and on March 15, American pursuit 

pilots, American trained and: from squadrons organized with American 

enlisted personnel, made their first patrol of the front. 

The patrols carried out by the 94th and 95th Aero Squadrons’ pilots 

at Villeneuve-les-Vertus were composed as a rule of two or three 

American pilots flying Nieuport type 28 airplanes, unarmed, and one 

French pilot of the Escadre No. 1, which was under the command of 

Commandant Menard. The French pilot had a Spad. 

the Marne River from Epemay to Chalons against enemy long 

distance photographic airplanes. These enemy machines flew singly 

and at extraordinary altitudes-over 5,000 meters. The fact that the 

American airplanes had no machine guns was due to the shortage of 

these guns that prevailed on the West Front at that time, but the fact 

that the area in which they worked was so far back of the lines as to 

make the danger of enemy attack negligible, coupled with the fact that 

the moral effect of their presence was in all probability sufficient to 

insure the retreat of an isolated enemy photographic airplane, 

rendered this experience a valuable one. Only eight patrols of this 

character were carried out from the Villeneuve airdrome, for on 

March 31 the headquarters and both the squadrons moved from 

Vileneuve-les-Vertw to Epiez. 

This move was necessitated by the enemy attack of March 21 

against the 5th British Army. Escadre No. 1 left Villeneuve on March 

27 and the American squadrons had to evacuate the airdrome 

immediately thereafter in order to make room for French and British 

forces of night bombardment’aviation. 

Sixteen of the original pilots who had been with the 95th Aero 

Squadron had been sent from training schools to the front without 

aerial gunnery training. Thee officers were sent to Cazaux on March 

24, so that on April 9 when the Gengoult airdrome,’ four kilometers 

northeast of Toul, became available for American use, it was the 94th 

Aero Squadron that proceeded there with eighteen pilots trained in 

aerial gunnery. Machine guns for one squadron were procured, some 

from French parks in the vicinity, and some from our own supply 

department. However, a week was required to tune up airplanes and 

to get everything in condition for the start of operations. On the 

evening of April 13 the squadron was ready to operate and the Army 

Air Service Commander, 8th French Army, issued orders that evening 

making the American Air Service responsible for the sector from St. 

Mihiel on the west to Pont-a-Mousson on the east. 

The mission of these patrals was the maintenance of a barrage over 
284 US. Air Service 

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The Toul sector, as this came to be called, was in many respects an 

ideal one in which to break in new pilots over the front. The enemy 

pursuit aviation was neither aggressive, numerous, nor equipped with 

the best types of machines. The liaison with the front was 

extraordinarily good-probably better than on any other sector of the 

front. The terrain, however, was difficult in cases of forced landings. 

A special mention is necessary of the liaison with the front in the 

Toul sector. The anti-aircraft artillery has as one of its main functions 

acting as sentinels for pursuit aviation. Its trained observers were 

always on the watch for enemy aircraft. They were highly expert at 

distinguishing the various types. The various antiaircraft guns, 

sections, and batteries were connected direct by telephone to three 

centers of control, from west to east, Commercy, Lironville and 

Disulouard, each of these in turn were connected by telephone to the 

observation post at Mt. St. Michel, whence a direct wire led to the 

operations office of the 1st Pursuit Group on the Toul airdrome. 

Messages relative to enemy aerial activity had priority on the wires, 

and as an average it took less than four minutes for a report relative to 

activity of enemy aircraft, giving the number, type, altitude and 

direction of flight, to be received in the group operations office. 

One of the advantages of this situation was exemplified on April 14, 

the first day of operations by the 94th Aero Squadron. Three pilots 

were off on patrol, while two others were awaiting on alert, Lieut. 

Douglas Campbell and Lieut. Alan F. Winslow. An alert was received 

from Lironville of two enemy single-seated aircraft headed south. 

Within four minutes after the enemy planes had first been sighted by 

the anti-aircraft post, Lieutenants Campbell and Winslow were in the 

air and in another four minutes both enemy planes had been brought 

down. They crashed on the airdrome. Lieutenant Campbell brought his adversary down in flames. Both enemy pilots were taken prisoners. 

Naturally the moral effect of such a victory on the very first day of 

operations was a lasting one. The factors which contributed to it were 

the skill and ability of our pilots, the correct disposition taken by the 

squadron commander, the rapid transmission of information from 

the front, the fact that the rotary Gnome engine of the model 28 

Nieuport could be started like a flash, and the inexpertness of the 

enemy fliers, who became lost in the lowhanging clouds and high 

winds which were prevailing. The fact that the enemy pilots had 

blundered could not, in all probability, have been turned to advantage 

had our liaison with the front been less perfect or had the squadron 

been equipped with an airplane driven by a water cooled engine. 

Another advantage which resulted from direct telephonic liaison 

with the front was that the moral effect of our air service operations on 

our own ground troops was excellent. The small numbers of the 

enemy opposed to us made the utilization of very small formations 
Pursuit Aviation 285 

possible to us and consequently it rarely occurred that the infantry 

caught sight of an enemy plane without a couple of ours putting in an 

appearance in a few minutes. 

This liaison with the front was possible because the front was a 

stabilized one. The line of battle had scarcely moved for three and onehalf years, and throughout that time work on the telephonic 

communications had been progressing. 

On May 4 the 95th Aero Squadron moved up to Toul from Epiez, 

and the 1st Pursuit Group was organized under Maj. B. M. Atkinson. 

From that time on until the end of June the 1st Pursuit Group 

gradually got broken into work over the lines. This work was greatly 

facilitated for the 94th and 95th Aero Squadrons by the fact that some 

officers of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were experienced men, were 

assigned to the new squadrons.2 The presence of these officers who 

had all had experience at the front, assisted greatly in taking the other 

pilots across the big transition from school flying to fighting. It was 

found in the spring and smmer of 1918, that no amount of training at 

the rear, even though the instructors were French pilots who had 

served at the front, would give the pupils the atmosphere and point of 

view of a fighting pilot. Four of the principal things which a pursuit pilot 

has to learn, are, in the order of their importance, vision of the air, 

aerial gunnery, formation @ins and acrobacy. To an average pupil at 

school the order of importance appeared to have been reversed. It 

was extremely difficult at fist, and it was always difficult, for new pilots 

to appreciate the vital importance and extreme difficulty of seeing 

enemy aircraft before being seen by them, so that advantage could be 

taken of the sun and altitude in making the actual attack. 

The importance of formation flying and especially formation fighting 

was taught the American pilots after they reached the front. The first 

American pursuit pilots were trained under French instructors. They 

were trained by men of long experience at the front. There was no 

word spoken to them in training that would lead to any other 

conclusion than that the action in war flying was individual. A 

protective patrol was mentioned as remaining above in attack. The 

leader opened the attack, but from there on, the individual acted as he 

thought best. In consequence team work had to be learned after they 

joined at the front. 

On May 31,1918, the 27th Aero Squadron under Maj. H. E. Hartney 

and the 147th Aero Squadron3 under Maj. G. H. Bonnell, both officers 

who had flown with the Royal Flying Corps, joined the 1st Pursuit 

Group and on the following day started in upon their routine work. 

assign for their patrols the lie of allied balloons as a line not to be 

crossed except in combat, and in addition a pilot of one of the older 

For breaking in new squadrons the practice was for several days to 
286 US. Air Service 

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squadrons took out the first few patrols, acting as patrol leader so that 

the new pilots could get accustomed to the sector. Even with these 

precautions it was found that a large percentage of new pilots on their 

first few flights at the front had a tendency to get lost. This was no 

doubt due in a large measure to the fact that in their cross-country 

flying at flying schools pupils were free to devote their entire time to 

watching the ground while as soon as they got near the lines they had 

to devote all their attention to watching the air for enemy planes. 

During the month of June the 1st Pursuit Group did some work in 

cooperation with British day bombardment airplanes of the 

Independent Royal Air Force. Thii force was carrying out almost daily 

raids on Mannheim, Coblenz, or other Rhine towns. The 1st Pursuit 

Group operations office was informed by telephone message from the 

Independent R.A.F. of the probable hours, altitude, route of return, 

and number of airplanes. On several occasions it was found that the 

British bombers were being trailed homeward by enemy pursuit 

airplanes which lay several hundred yards in the rear of the bombing 

formation, shooting at long range. Our pursuit airplanes knowing the 

probable route of return of the bombers and their altitude generally 

were able to possess the advantages of superior altitude and with the 

sun at their backs could with excellent results die into the midst of 

the rather straggling enemy pursuit formation whose attention was 

centered upon their efforts to attack the bombing planes. 

Comments. 

Considering the fact that the American pursuit squadrons operating 

in the Toul area in April, May, and June were completely new to 

operations on the front, excellent results were achieved. 

All information of the enemy was received from the 8th French 

Army, and it is felt that the French system of publishing a daily Air 

Service bulletin of intelligence is one that might well be adapted in our 

own service. This policy giving information as to the strength of the 

enemy, location of his airdromes, and the possibility of 

reenforcements as well as the regular army summaries of intelligence 

were most valuable in that they served to bring home to the pilots an 

appreciation of the part that they were playing in the general scheme 

of war. Because the Toul sector was a quiet sector, the liaison with the 

front was superior to that which obtained in any other sector on the 

whole line of battle. Frequent maps and diagrams giving the latest 

information of the enemy served to make the French Air Service 

summaries of information and the French Army summaries of 

intelligence more easily understood. 

position where it might easily have been attacked by enemy 

bombardment machines, but during the months of April, May, and 

The airdrome on which the group was'located was one that was in a 

288 U.S. Air Service 

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June, no enemy bombardment airplanes operated in the Toul sector. 

The fact that no enemy bombardment planes could be used against 

the group was known to the French authorities, and, therefore, the 

placing of the group on the Toul airdrome could not be criticized from 

this standpoint. 

The security provided in the air by the machines themselves was 

in the art of combat which our pilots, being 

they were at Toul. It is felt that 

h degree of teamwork was 

operated from the Toul sector. 

received from the 8th French Army were 

left to the group commander the 

responsibility and opportunity to handle his group to the best 

advantage. As a matter of fact, the only orders which were received 

from the 8th French Army were orders in which the sector for which 

the group was responsible was at first laid down and later extended. 

The altitude, strength, and method of employment of the elements 

was left entirely to the judgement of the group command. 

The aggressive spirit, which is a keystone of pursuit aviation, was 

Pursuit Group, which 

the group had been 

ere later encountered, 

or in the operations 

west of the Meuse River, numerous grave short comings would have 

Fortunately, it did not have to face any of these 

that the group was not in a position to meet the 

of inexperience alone, and the training and practice which all ranks 

received while operating from the Toul airdrome rendered them fit to 

meet these problems when they developed later in the fight of July and 

the following months. 

The 103d Aero 0% 

February 20 to 1918. 

The enlisted personnel of the 103rd Aero Squadron began to take 

over their duties from the French enlisted personnel of the Lafayette 

Escadrille (Spad 124) at the La Noblette airdrome on February 20, 

1918. The Lafayette Escadrilk’s flying personnel was composed of 

Americans who originally entered the French service and were later 

transferred to the United States Any. At La Noblette the 103rd Aero 

Squadron formed a part of the 21st French Pursuit Group under the 

N French Army and engaged in patrols of the sector Rheims-St. 
Pursuit Aviation 289 

Menehould. The sector was comparatively quiet and patrols of three 

planes were occasionally employed though the flight of five or six was 

more often used. In addition the squadron was sometimes called upon 

to answer alerts of enemy aircraft entering the defended area 

surrounding Paris. No enemy aircraft, however, were encountered on 

any of these latter missions. 

About April 1, the 103rd Aero Squadron was detached from the IV 

French Army and proceeded to the VI French Army area, being 

stationed on the airdrome at Bon Maison about one kilometer south of 

Fismes. Throughout the month of April the 103rd Aero Squadron 

comprised all the pursuit aviation at the disposal of the VI French 

Army, and it was responsible for the sector Noyon-Rheims. The 

feature of work in this sector, which at the time was very quiet, was to 

be found in the excellent results which were obtained in answering 

alerts transmitted by wireless in Spad airplanes with their water-cooled 

HispanoSuiza engines. Excellent liaison was maintained with the antiaircraft artillery posts and the radiogoniometric stations by wireless, 

and as the airdrome was only fifteen kilometers from the line of battle, 

excellent results were achmed. 

The Noyon-Rheims sector was considered so quiet about May 1 

that the 103rd Aero Squadron was relieved from duty with the VI 

French Army and sent to Flanders for duty with the French 

Detachment des Armees du Nord which went to defend the hopeless 

position at Kemmel Hill, south of Ypres. 

Conditions in this sector were extremely difficult as the enemy paid 

no attention to the sector for days at a time and then would mass 

formations of thirty and forty pursuit airplanes on the lines to gain 

temporary air superiority for a few hours. While operating from 

Dunkirk the 103rd Squadron put in an unusually high percentage of 

hours without gaining contact with the enemy while at other times the 

air would appear to be simply filled with enemy planes. 

On July 3 the Detachment des Armees du Nord was disbanded and 

103rd Aero Squadron moved to Toul to form a part of the 2nd Pursuit 

Group. A few weeks later when the 3rd Pursuit Group was formed at 

Vaucouleurs the 103rd Aero Squadron was used as the nucleus. 

291 

The move from Toul to ChateauThierry area by the 1st Pursuit 

Group might almost be considered a model. The group commander 

had reconnoitered the airdrome, which was bounded by the four small 

villws of Ormeaux, Touquin, Pezarches and Rigny. He personally 

accompanied the advance party to the field. This party comprised a 

sufficient personnel from each squadron to care for the arriving 

airplanes, to install the necessary telephonic liaison and to arrange for 

billeting the enlisted and commissioned personnel. The alteration of 

conditions from those met with at Toul, where the group had been 

installed on what had been an airdrome before the war, and the 

personnel lived in compactJy built stone barracks, to those met on an 

airdrome that had been created within two weeks by the French, from 

a field with growing crops, and where some of the personnel was 

billeted at distances of three or four kilometers from the airdrome, was 

extreme. Nevertheless, on June 23, fifty-four airplanes left Toul; fiftytwo arrived at Ormeaux and were in condition to fly on June 29. By 

that time telephones had been installed, and the French 6th Army had 

supplied a wireless telegraph receiving station for the maintenance of 

liaison with the front. 

The Ormeaux airdrome was in many respects an ideal terrain for an 

airdrome. It was large and smooth, and while standing wheat,.which 

covered a part of it, at first interfered by damaging many propellers, 

the landing field was the best from which the 1st Pursuit ever 

operated. But it was located about 45 kilometers from the nearest 

point of the lines, where the Toul airdrome had been less than 20. In 

addition, as Ormeaux was located almost directly south of the point of 

the salient, the sector which the 1st Pursuit Group was called upon to 

cover was at some point 55 kilometers from the airdrome. This 

distance from the front added to the fact that the lines had not 

crystalized, made telep 

liaison by radio imper 

liaison with the front ve 

patrol leaders, the grou 

of what the enemy ai 

In order to give a proper perspective of the situation, which 

compelled placing the 1st Pursuit Group 45 kilometers from the 

nearest point of the lines, it is necessary to understand the infantry 

and artillery situation as to reserves. 

By July 1, the 6th French Army was beginning to expect that 

another German attack might occur in the salient at any time within a 

couple of days. At that time, very few of the American divisions, which 

afterwards took part in repulsing the German attack of July 15 and in 

the successful counter-attack of the 18th, which resulted in pinching 

out the salient and starting the ball rolling toward final victory, had 

arrived on the scene. The possibility of a further enemy advance 

on with the front impossible, and 

time in this operation was wireless . Except for the reports of returning 

rked practically in ignorance 
292 U.S. Air Service 

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~~__ ~~ ~ 

necessitated the location of our airdrome far to the rear, and this 

necessity was emphasized because the French armies had suffered 

almost crippling losses in Bessonneaux and other material during the 

German advances earlier in the year. 

From the point of view of tactical operations over the lines, the sizes 

of formations employed and methods of employing them required 

almost as radical a change of methods by our pilots as was required by 

the big jump which all pilots had to make from the trainiig schools to 

the front. At Toul our pilots had been opposed by two squadrons of 

enemy pursuit equipped with a rather inferior type of single-seated 

planes-Albatrosses. At Chateau-Thierry the enemy had a large 

concentration of Fokker D-7 airplanes, whose crews showed a 

tenacity, aggressiveness, teamwork, and persistency wholly new to 

our experience. 

While at Toul our pilots had been able to achieve a remarkable 

success in attacks upon the enemy two-seaters, and our corps 

observation aviation acted practically without interference. On the 

other hand, at Chateau-Thierry our pursuit was engaged practically 

daily with formations of the enemy as large in numbers as thirty and 

more and averaging about fifteen. In the Toul sector a single pursuit 

plane with a skilful pilot, if not very effective, was at least practically 

safe, and formations of between three and six did excellent and 

effective work. At Chateau-Thierry no formations were employed, 

except on very rare occasions, of less than one squadron. This 

squadron was as a rule echeloned by flights and the preferred method 

of attack against enemy pursuit formations, which were usually 

following a single leader in one great big V, was for one flight to attack, 

throw the enemy formation into confusion, and leave the other two 

flights to attack and bring down enemy planes which became 

separated from the big formation. 

Flights in squadron formation had been practiced at Toul. From the 

first day at Chateau-Thierry they became the only method of 

operations employed. In brief, the main objects of pursuit aviation at 

this period of operations were threefold, in order of importance, (a) to 

allow our corps observation aviation to work freely and so help the 

artillery and the infantry, (b) to interfere with enemy observation by 

airplane and balloon, and (c) to cause such other casualties and inflict 

such other material damage on the enemy as may be possible. 

For the work of protecting our corps observation aviation it became 

necessary above all else to drive back the enemy pursuit whenever it 

was encountered. Close protection, i.e., surrounding our corps 

airplanes with pursuit planes, is rarely successful, It is work for which 

pursuit airplanes, at least of the single seated type, are unfit, for they 

cannot fire except to the front, and for them to turn and fight to the 

rear, and so make use of their superior maneuverability to attack the 
Pursuit Aviation 293 

enemy leaves the two seated airplanes alone and unprotected. In 

addition, the leading of a cbse protection patrol is extremely difficult 

owing to the difference of speed in the different types of airplanessingle-seaters and two-seaters. But such close protections are of great 

moral value. Many losses occurred in the Chateau-Thierry fighting 

when pursuit protection, assigned to accompany photographic 

airplanes working at less than 4,000 meters, were attacked by large 

formation of the enemy. Denied the possibility of utilizing their 

maneuverability, speed or guns, they were easy prey. 

The attack of enemy observation airplanes in a sector where such 

overwhelming numbers of enemy pursuit planes are encountered, as 

were encountered at Chateau-Thierry, is costly, dangerous, and 

difficult, but it is nearly the most important function of pursuit. 

Operating against enemy twoeaters means operating at about 3,500 

meters. This gives to hostile pursuit patrols at a greater altitude every 

advantage, for whichever patrol has greater altitude can select the 

methods and conditions of combat. Intermediate patrols of this 

character accomplished much in the way of results, but in carrying 

them out our pilots were frequently attacked from above by superior 

numbers of the enemy. As a consequence, the policy was adopted of 

covering every intermediate patrol with a protection of a flight or 

more, always on the watch for enemy planes at great altitude. The 

protection would dive and warn the leader of the large formation when 

danger threatened. 

To the last function of pursuit aviation, the attack of ground 

objectives, only minor importance was attached to Chateau-Thierry. 

The Commandant d’Aeronautique of the 6th French Army had a 

sufficient background and experience to appreciate that the function 

of pursuit aviation was operations of the army by fighting in 

the air, and while on a 

objectives were cert to offer themselves, “ground 

straffing” was ordered, 

On June 29 a few 

30, so that by July 1 the phts had all become more or less oriented to 

the new sector, which ran &om Faverolles on the west to Dormans on 

the east. The afternoon of July 1 saw the operations of the 2d Division 

against the village of Vaux. 

At this time Groupe de Combat 17 was operating under the orders 

of the 6th French Army as well as the 1st Pursuit Group. Early in the 

morning our 75 batteries began to take up advance positions close to 

the lines, unhidden throughout the day, and in the evening, when the 

infantry went forward, they found themselves perfectly covered by 

Abed airplanes. Briefly, the steps in the ladder included infantry liaison 

planes, at approximately 2,500,3,500, and 4,500 meters altitude 

respectively, the whole ladder leaning as it were into the German lines, 
294 U.S. Air Service 

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so that the planes at 4,500 meters altitude were working from twelve to 

seventeen kilometers over enemy territory. The work of the 1st 

Pursuit Group that date brought further written congratulations from 

the Chief of Air Service of the 6th French Army. 

It may be stated here that despite the fact that the enemy opposite 

the 6th French Army had at his disposal, and used, a much larger 

quantity of pursuit aviation than the 6th French Army could call upon, 

the line of contact with the enemy pursuit, was, as a rule, from 5 to 15 

kilometers inside the enemy lines. The very large majority of our 

casualties occurred over the enemy lines, and almost all the enemy 

planes that were destroyed fell in his lines. It was no rare thing for our 

pilots to make three full patrols of two hours duration in the course of 

a day, and on one occasion, when the tension was at its highest, three 

of our pilots made five patrols each in the course of a single day. 

- I. 
Pursuit Aviation 295 

From July 1 the anticipation of an attack by the enemy became daily 

more and more acute, and the signs that an attack was coming 

became more and more evident. In this connection, it should be stated 

that the intelligence furnished to the 1st Pursuit Group when it was 

acting under order from both the 6th and 8th French Armies, left 

nothing to be desired. Not only were the army summaries of 

intelligence furnished to the group, but these summaries contained 

lucid studies of the military situation, weighing the various possible 

operations of the enemy. Such studies were of inestimable value in 

working up the spirit of teamwork and operation of the combined 

arms among men who live many kilometers away from the line of the 

battle, and who have little time to think about the part the other arms 

are playing. And not only were these army summaries of intelligence 

furnished by the 6th French Army, but a special aeronautic summary 

of intelligence covering all the latest information of the enemy air 

service and anti-aircraft service was published daily. This summary 

contained not only maps showing the location crf enemy airdromes, 

balloons, and anti-aircraft artillery units, but also valuable information 

on the enemy’s methods of fighting, of observing, and of protecting his 

ground troops by machine guns, etc. 

At midnight of July 14/15 the enemy guns opened; at dawn his 

attack commenced. The artillery demonstrations covered the entire 

front of the 4th, 5th and 6th French Armies, from Faverolles-about 

half way between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry-on the west to the 

Argonne Forest on the east, but the infantry action was entirely east of 

Chateau-Thierry. The enemy crossed the Marne and established 

some bridgeheads on the south bank and on the east flank of the 

salient he made considerable progress towards Epernay, but on the 

whole the attack broke down. 

In the afternoon of July 17th the 6th French Army sent the 

information that orders for July 18th would be late in arriving. 

Throughout that day and those that followed it for two weeks, our 

pilots set a new standard for the amount of work a pursuit group could 

do. The group was changing types of machines, abandoning the 

Nieuport Model 28, and adopting the Spad XIII. The latter, while 

possessing many advantages, is a far more difficult machine to keep in 

commission. The Hispano-Suiza motor with which it is equipped is far 

more difficult to make minor adjustments or major repairs upon than 

the 160 H.P. Gnome of the Plieuport. In addition the squadron 

mechanics were without e 

the planes. Actually on Ju 

working, because its machines were all new, none of them having been 

tuned up. But for every pilot who had a plane in commission, the days 

from July 14 on were days when they worked as pursuit pilots had 

rarely worked before in this war. 

ience in handling either the motor or , one squadron, the 94th) was not 
296 U.S. Air Service 

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While the line receded daily, and the enemy’s withdrawal gave an 

added spur to their energies, this fact from the standpoint of the 

fighting pilot was not unalloyed joy. When the enemy came to a 

temporary halt on the Vesle River, the 1st Pursuit Group found itself 

75 kilometers from the front. Flying planes good for a patrol of but an 

hour and three-quarters at the most, and which could only be counted 

upon for an hour and one-half, most of their time was spent in 

monotonous formation flying up to the lines and back again to the 

airdrome. Early in August an advanced landing field was established at 

Coincy, with mechanics and gasoline. From every view point, this was 

unsatisfactory, as compared with a suitable airdrome. The additional 

number of landings entailed was responsible for a great deal of minor 

damage, suffiiient to put machines temporarily out of commissiondamage such as broken tail-skids, etc. At this time it is impossible to 

recall a single occasion when a patrol of a dozen planes left the 

airdrome at Saints, stopped at Coincy to refill with gasoline and 

returned to Saints without at least one airplane incurring damage of a 

more or less serious nature at either Saints or Coincy. The most 

nearly satisfactory method of handling the situation was found to be to 

have the formations leave Saints and go up to the lines, fly there as 

long as possible and then stop at Coincy to refill on the return trip. 

Comments. 

When the 1st Pursuit Group arrived at the Chateau-Thierry area, it 

found itself operating under new and very different circumstances and 

conditions than those which had been met with in the Toul sector. The 

line of battle was not crystallized, and no telephonic liaison with the 

front existed. In fact, telephonic liaison throughout the entire 

operations at Chateau-Thierry could hardly be depended upon. 

The location of the group’s airdromes, first at Ormeaux, and later at 

Saints, was so far from the line of battle that it was in a different 

telephone region from that of the Headquarters of the 6th Army under 

which the group was operating. This resulted in difficult connections, 

which invariably took considerable time to secure. For the liaison with 

the front, the group was depending upon a wireless net whose 

reliability was questionable. Occasionally it was out of commission, 

and often when it would work the information which it brought was 

not sufficiently explicit to permit of the formation of definite plans of 

action. Personal liaison with units in the forward areas, the corps air 

service, and with the 6th Army headquarters, was maintained, but did 

not reach the perfection which experience later proved to be 

extremely valuable. On the other hand, the information of the enemy, 

which was received from the 6th Army, might well be taken as a 

model. Precise and explicit information of the disposition of all the 

enemy forces, both of his Air Service and of his ground troops, was 

298 US. Air Service 

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hrnished and kept up to date. Tactical studies of the opportunities 

which the situation presented to him were carefully studied, and the 

results of these studies were promptly circulated. 

Despite the fact that the 1st Pursuit Group airdrome was never 

closer than 45 kilometers from the lines, the 6th French Army 

appreciated the possibilities of a further withdrawal very acutely. 

Hardly had the group arrived and been installed before the group 

commander was ordered to reconnoiter airdromes in the rear, and a 

site in the vicinity of Melun was picked out to retreat to in case a 

retreat became necessary. Having just moved from the Toul airdrome 

to the Chateau-Thierry area, the group was well provided with 

transportation, and in case of retreat had been necessary, in all 

probability nothing would have been lost. The airdromes which were 

actually occupied by the group were excellently laid ovt, and it is 

improbable that any large percentage of the material of the group 

could have been destroyed by enemy bombardment. 

of the German attack of July 15, the plan 

of employment of purs s of the 6th Army contemplated the 

maintenance of a doub barrage, one tier at intermediate, and the 

other at high altitude, uninterruptedly from daylight to dark every day. 

The fact that for a large part of the time the 1st Pursuit Group suffered 

from having a large part of its machines out of commission rendered it 

impossible for the group to maintain both intermediate and high 

patrols of suffiiient strength throughout the area allotted to it, The 

unity of flights had to be interfered with as frequently a flight did not 

have more than two or three planes available for duty. The mistake 

was, therefore, made for a short time of utilizing squadron formations 

not echeloned by flights. These proved to be 

into confusion by the enemy, unable to be co 

leader, and the more or less inexperienced pilots frequently became 

separated from them. They ako had the disadvantage that they were 

forced to operate without top protection, and, therefore, were 

frequently attacked by the enemy when he possessed the advantage of 

numbers, altitude, and an advantageous position in relation to the sun. 

Later on, this mistake w rrected, the echeloning of every 

squadron by its separ ts was put in practice, and the rule was 

established that no patrol was to be sent out at intermediate altitude 

except when accompanied by another patrol at high altitude, which 

could come to its assistance if it was attacked from above. Throughout 

the Chateau-Thierry operations, the enemy possessed superior 

numbers of pursuit airplanes; in fact the 6th French Army estimated at 

one time that the proportion of enemy aviation was to the American as 

4 to 1. The enemy was extremely persistent and aggressive in fighting, 

and rarely broke off a combat as long as our planes remained over the 

hostile lines. Nevertheless, it is a noteworthy fact that the great 

From the commencem 
Pursuit Aviation 299 

enemy side of the line. W true that several of our balloons were 

Group carried the fighting into enemy territory; that our corps air 

service, despite its losses, was always able to do its work, even the 

hat enemy attempts at photography 

seriously interfered with. The 

lished, and the secrecy of the 

-attack was maintained. In this 

connection, it may be pointed out that a determined and aggressive 

pilot and observer will always be able to execute an isolated 

reconnaissance, or a dash across our lines for the destruction of one 

of our balbns if he is favored by weather conditions. Such 

reconnaissances are seldom productive of valuable information, and 

numbers of enemy planes. 

301 

On August 26,1918, the 1st Army Air Service headquarters was 

established at Ligny-en-Barrois. This marks the first concentration of 

American air forces under its own commander, and it is interesting to 

note conditions prevailing at this time. 

The front of the 1st Army, extending from Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes 

to Pont-surSeille, insofar as aviation was concerned, had'been very 

quiet for some time. The enemy performed his photographic 

reconnaissances with single machines, flying at high altitudes, and his 

pursuit patrols were small and infrequent. Pursuit units of the enemy 

continued to use in this sector Albatros and Pfalz machines, but it was 

observed that some of these organizations were gradually being 

transferred into Fokker flights. In the matter of airdromes, the enemy 

was better off than the 1st American Army, and possessed many small 

fields within access of any part of the front line. Several airdromes 

were unoccupied, and were in such condition that they could be 

utilized quickly by reinforcements, their barracks and hangars being 

more or less serviceable. 

The 1st American Army was less favored in this respect. While the 

Verdun sector had been the scene of great French aerial activity in 

1916, very few airdromes were available, and those on hand were not 

the best for pursuit aviation. Almost every available field had been 

taken up and they were short in hangars and billet space, so that by 

the time the allocation of aviation pursuit had been made to the 1st 

Army, the problems of locathg and housing the units was a serious 

one. Two American pursuit groups were in process of organization for 

the establishment of the 1st Pursuit Wing. These were already located 

at Tour and Vaucouleurs. 

The sector of the 1st American Army at this time, insofar as pursuit 

nce divided into two sections, that on 

the 1st and 7th American Corps, and 

that on the west of the Meusa, allocated to the 2nd French Colonial 

Corps and the 5th American Corps. Great secrecy prevailed as to the 

location of the units. Especially with regard to those located on the 

Western side of the salient where the line extended north and south, 

and where American units were operating for the first time. Like other 

arms of the service, American units in this section were moving in 

quietly and at night, and being concealed throughout the day in the 

woods and other places of cover. 

All these conditions prevailed when the following allotments of 

pursuit aviation were made to the 1st Army: 

French Air Division consisting of the 2nd French Pursuit Escadre 

with headquarters at Ochey, and three groups of French pursuit, 

forming a second escadre, with headquarters at Rancourt. The 

headquarters of the division itself were located at Tannois. 
302 U.S. Air Service 

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All of the American pursuit in existence, with the exception of the 

17th and 148th Squadrons, which were operating with the British, 

were concentrated in the 1st Pursuit Wing, with headquarters at Toul, 

and the 1st Pursuit Group, with headquarters at Rembercourt. The 

1st Pursuit Wing consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groups; the 2nd 

Pursuit Group composed of the 13th, 22nd, 49th and 139th US. 

squadrons, and the 3rd Pursuit Group consisted of the 28th, 93rd, 

103rd, and 213th US. squadrons. The 1st Pursuit Group consisted of 

the 27th, 94th, 95th, and 147th Aero Squadrons. One French Group 

(G.C.16) was allocated to the 1st American Pursuit Wing commander 

for duty in connection with the offensive. 

With these units at his disposal, and with the general conditions of 

the air program for the offensive in mind, the Chief of Air Service, 1st 

Army, made certain plans for the pursuit units for the attack. He 

decided to utilize the American pursuit all along the front for the 

purpose of protective barrage at all altitudes, with incidental duties as 

occasion arose, of a more combative nature, such as ground straffing, 

balloon destruction, and offensive patrols. Conforming with the plan of 

operations of the whole army, the pursuit operations consisting of four 

phases: 

” 1. Preparation until the day of attack. 

2. During artillery preparation. 

3. During the attack as far as first combined army objective. 

4. Exploitation of attack so far as 2nd combined army objective. 

Certain general principles, strategical and tactical, were laid down 

which formed the basis of all pursuit aviation in operations. They were 

based on the fundamental fact that pursuit aviation has a double 

mission to perform, and it is well at this point to consider these. They 

were divided as follows: 

(a) Offensive. 

(b) Protective. 

Offensive patrols cross the enemy line in sufficient strength to cruise 

over his rear area, search out enemy aircraft, and attack them, with 

the object of causing maximum casualties and inflicting the greatest 

possible damage to his air service, and with the further object of 

obtaining definite moral superiority. They work at all altitudes, but 

generally it is advantageous to fly as high as possible, as altitude gives 

one greater advantage when contact with the enemy is made. To such 

an extent is this true, that protection must be assured low patrols. 

Protective patrols have a double mission to perform: 

(a) To place corps observation aviation in a position where it 

(b) To protect ground troops from the results of enemy artillery 

will be, and will feel that it is protected. 

adjustments, reconnaissances and photographic airplanes. 

&I 

@ 
Pursuit Aviation 303 

Protective patrols are not to be considered as defensive in 

character. All pursuit aviation is offensive in character, but they are 

diitinguished from offensive patrols by the limitation in area and duties 

imposed upon them, in that they must insure the safe return of all 

reconnaissance machines which cross the lines. While, on the other 

hand, offensive machines attack and destroy any enemy aircraft, in the 

discretion of the patrol leader, wherever found. The performance of 

the double role of protective patrols cannot be accomplished by the 

maintenance of a permanent barrage of a sector. Such a procedure is 

fatiguing for the pilots and expensive in material in comparison with 

the results obtained and using up of resources in machines, rendering 

it impossible for us to have concentrations in force for offensive 

expeditions when required. Consequently, a permanent barrage will 

only be resorted to in times of intense action, when enemy machines 

must not be permitted to penetrate to the rear areas. It is to be noted 

that barrage patrols can only afford protection to army corps air 

service when acting over a liited breadth of front, which as a rule, 

should not exceed 15 kilometers. The size and altitude of the 

protective patrols wiU dependon the general activity of the sector, and 

the strength and degree of aggressiveness of enemy aviation. Two 

tiers at least should be estabkhed when possible, owing to the inability 

of machines to locate enemy planes that are more than 3,000 feet 

below, and when this is impossible, it is well to have a patrol during its 

tour of duty fly at diierent altitudes. The patrols need not penetrate 

beyond five kilometers and must religiously stick to their sector when 

on duty. When a rigid system of protective patrols is impractical or 

unnecessary, there will be substituted a system which will comprise 

patrols especially directed against enemy army corps aviation, plus a 

number of machines on alert, ready to take off for duty with any 

situation which may arise due to increased ground activity or 

preparation. The size of the alert or mobile reserve will differ daily, and 

will be used according to the exigencies of the moment supporting or 

reinforcing our aviation when necessary. 

While the offensive or protective patrol, or protective barrage was 

to be the first function of American pursuit aviation, it was in addition 

to perform four types of special missions: 

(a) Close protection of corps airplanes. 

(b) Cooperation with day bombardment planes. 

(c) Attack on balloons. 

(d) Attack qn ground troops with bombs and machineguns. 

Close cooperation between these units when operating together 

should exist. Cooperation of day bombardment was to be utilized 

especially for the purpose of obtaining contact with enemy pursuit 

airplanes, but was not to afford covering protection. The bombing 
304 U.S. Air Service 

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expedition itself was to be of sufficient size to allow it to rely on its own 

armament. 

Attacks on balloons were to be made only when specially requested, 

this being a very dangerous and difficult undertaking but when it was 

ordered, necessary protection was to be furnished, and it was 

intended that concentrated attacks should be made on the enemy 

when most favorable. Attacks on ground objectives were to be 

indulged in, using machine guns and bombs for the purpose of 

demoralizing retreating forces, straffing enemy reserves and 

reinforcements, and were to be carried out in force so as to produce 

the maximum moral effect, but neither machines nor bombs were to 

be used to any extent except in an active area. 

Certain routine procedures were mapped out for the pursuit units 

and were as follows: 

The 1st Pursuit Wing and the 1st Pursuit Group were each attached 

respectively to the 1st Army, and were to receive all their orders from 

the Chief of the Air Service for that Army. 

The tactical unit of the aviation was to be normally a flight of five or 

six machines, but, at times groups of flights, were to be used. A 

formation of five or six machines being a tactical unit, every effort was 

made to bring it, during the days of preparation, to the highest tactical 

efficiency. Pilots of a flight were quartered and lived together on the 

ground as much as possible, and worked together in the air at all 

times. When a flight was considered too weak to carry out a given 

mission effectively, it was to have the support of one or several other 

flights, with which it was to cooperate. The flights of 5 or 6 machines 

bdng a fighting unit, the power and control of the leader was enhanced 

so that all pilots were subservient to his wishes. He was made 

responsible for the proper carrying out of all orders, and to enable him 

to do this, he had to insure that his flight was capable of taking off in 

formation, maneuvering in formation, cooperating with other similar 

flights, reforming quickly when dispersed, attacking at the proper 

time. The responsibility of the flight commander, therefore increased 

greatly and necessitated during these days of preparation, hard work 

and personal appliance to the tasks and problems which confronted 

him. 

The limitations of the Spad airplane were fully realized, and this 

called for efficiency in the enlisted personnel of the squadrons. Flight. 

commanders were responsible that methods of specialization were 

introduced, and that his unit was organized to produce the greatest 

results and embued with the right spirit that conquers all. In the 2nd 

and 3rd Pursuit Groups, which were just formed, the enlisted 

personnel, while enthusiastic, were what might be classed as “fresh 

troops,” and were inexperienced, and had to receive the necessary 
Pursuit Aviation 305 

experiences on the particular motor and machine in use in order to 

keep the greatest number possible in commission. 

During the period preparatory to the attack, from August 29 to 

September 12, the 1st Pursuit Wing, working on the front between the 

Meuse and the Moselle Rivers, maintained patrols sufficient to prevent 

any reconnaissance, visual or photographic, of the area Lionville, 

Beuconville, Domeurs, Francheville, Becq and Gironville. The Wing 

commander divided the sector for this purpose into two areas, the 

western running from St. Mihiil to Essey, both inclusive, and the 

eastern, Seicheprey to Pont-sur-Seille, both inclusive, and gave orders 

that a double tier barrage should be maintained from daylight to dark 

over these sectors. The low patrol, acting at from 2,500 to 3,500 

meters, and the higher patrol at from 3,500 to 5,500 meters. Each 

patrol overlapped by 15 minutes, and were not permitted to penetrate 

over the enemy lines more than five kilometers. By the 5th of 

September, the wing had made an area approximately 5 kilometers 

over the enemy’s lines practically safe for corps observation machines 

to operate. Some close protection work was ordered to act in 

cooperation with the army reconnaissance squadron, and one 

particularly dangerous balloon near Mont Sec was attacked 

repeatedly. 

To the west of the Meuse, the 1st Pursuit Group moved in quietly to 

urt airdrome, and took up duties similar to those of the 1st 

g, consistent with secrecy as to their location, and with few 

prevented reconnaissance of the 5th Corps area, and 

photographic machines of the 2nd French Colonial and . The presence of American troops on this side of the 

salient was concealed very effectively. On the airdrome of the 1st 

Pursuit Group itself, hangars and billets were carefully concealed, and 

machines kept under cover as much as possible. One machine was 

kept over the airdrome at all times for the purpose of diverting enemy 

photographic missions that mi@ attempt the location of the group, 

and it was interesting to note that not a single photograph was 

obtained of this airdrome by the enemy after the group moved in. 

Owing to the surface of the field, it is believed that the enemy never 

suspected the presence of a pursuit group of 100 machines in such a 

place. 

This group, although it displayed a feeble front, spent most of the 

time preceding the attack in perfecting liaison with the anti-aircraft 

service, radio service, corps observation service, army observation 

group, balloons and the 2nd French Army to the north, that by the day 

of the attack, very satisfactory liaison had been established together 

with plans for extension of the same during the progress of the attack. 

Pilots of this group acquainted themselves with the new sector and 
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several advance landing fields were spotted as available during the 

operations. Replacement machines which up to this time had been 

almost impossible to obtain were secured and made ready for action. 

All new pilots were instructed in the general principles and tactics in 

fighting in accordance with the experience gained on the ChateauThierry front. 

On September 10 Groupe-de-Combat 16, commanded by Captain 

Meni of the French Army, reported to the 1st Pursuit Wing 

commander for duty. This placed a total of approximately 275 pursuit 

airplanes at the disposal of the wing commander on the east of the 

Meuse, and 100 machines at the disposal of the 1st Pursuit Group 

commander on the west of the Meuse. Over the whole front 

approximately 65 percent of the machines could be kept in 

commission, but, owing to the nature of the motor, and in some cases 

the inexperience of mechanics, it was impossible to keep a larger 

percentage than this available for any period of time. 

unfavorable for aviation. High winds, low clouds, and intermittent 

rains prevailed at all times. Both the 1st Wing and the 1st Pursuit 

Group performed valuable individual machine reconnaissance as deep 

as Etain, Vigneulles, and Thiacourt, determining upon orders from the 

army, the facts that the enemy was preparing to withdraw from the 

salient, but that he had not already done so. These flights made in the 

face of the most adverse weather conditions imaginable, and at an 

altitude of 400 meters or less, in spite of heavy anti-aircraft and 

machine gun fire, deserve special mention, not only on account of the 

danger entailed, but also on account of the value of the information 

The atmospheric conditions on September 10,11, and 12 were most 
Pursuit Aviation 307 

On September 12th, at 5 H 00 the 1st Army commenced the wiping 

out of the St. Mihiel salient. Throughout the day there were high 

winds, and rain fell intermittently. The usual functions of the pursuit 

aviation could not be performed, but the pursuit planes were used to 

secure valuable information and to harass by machinegun and bombs 

the retreating enemy. Many favorable objectives presented 

themselves, especially over the Vigneville-Chambley and the 

VigneullesSt. Benoit roads. The 3rd Pursuit Group, equipped its 

machines with bombs, and an these roads, together with assistance of 

the machine guns of the 2nd and 1st Pursuit Groups, constantly threw 

into confusion the retreating German forces. 

Simultaneously with our army’s attack on Septwber 12, the enemy 

concentrated his air service m force on our front. Before September 

12, enemy pursuit patrols of more than six planes were but rarely 

encountered, and when encountered, they were almost invariably 

alert machines attacking our day bombardment airplanes deep in the 

enemy lines, but with thig enemy concentration, large enemy 

formations appeared and consequently our patrols had to be 

increased in strength. Owing to weather conditions on the opening 

day, few large patrols were used, and many individual reconnaissances 

were made by pursuit pilots of the lst, 2nd and 3d Group. Often single 

machines determined and reported the advance of our front line, 

actually flying down to 50 meters, and co-operating with the troops on 

the ground. 

By September 13, shortly after midnight, infantry patrols from the 

south and those from the west met near Vigneulles. Still the enemy 

was in retreat. The Chambley, Mars-la-Tour road was jammed with his 

reinforcements coming up and his wagons in retreat. In one day the 3d 

Pursuit Group made five expeditions bombing and harassing with 

machine guns, protected by elements of the 2nd Pursuit Group. The 

1st Pursuit Group on its sector harassed the infantry, maintaining 

protective patrols above at different altitudes. But, it was not until 

September 14, when the weather cleared, that pursuit aviation was 

able to operate at its normal altitude. 

The coming of good weather marked the commencement of great 

activity in the air, especially to the east of the Meuse. Large 

concentrations of enemy pursuit machines of the latest type were met 

and bitter combats ensued. It became necessary for the 1st Pursuit 

Wing to increase the size of its patrols, and often more than one 

squadron was employed on one mission by this unit. While the activity 

was not so great on the front of the 1st Pursuit Group, the enemy was 

encountered, and many victorious combats occurred, and some 

balloons were shot down. Perhaps the striking feature of the days of 

exploitation was the utilization of the Spad machine for low flying for 

the purpose of combatting enemy balloons and low flying battle 
308 U.S. Air Service 

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planes, and also for purposes of observation and reconnaissance, 

when weather conditions prevented its use in the normal way. 

Comments. 

While the American pursuit aviation accomplished excellent results 

in the St. Mihiel offensive, it is well to consider whether or not the 

fundamental principles were adhered to, and consider what might 

have been the result had conditions such as weather, enemy sttength, 

terrain, and strategical disposition of our own forces been otherwise. 

From the first day of preparation, the strength of the enemy, the 

location of his airdromes, and the possibility of reinforcements were 

well known to the higher command. Facilities in the way of liaison, 

were established by all units in order that during the progress of the 

attack, touch could be kept with the enemy disposition, strength, and 

reinforcement. Up to the day of the attack there was no room for 

improvement in this respect. The French P.C’s of anti-aircraft were 

not a little adverse to moving with the rapidity demanded by the 

progress of the attack; the result was that for some time our pursuit 

units in touch with them were handicapped considerably. This was not 

the case with American anti-aircraft batteries, who were very mobile 

and followed up closely the advance of the infantry. The liaison 

between units was very good on the west of the sector. The 1st Pursuit 

Group was in close touch by telephone and personal liaison with the 

French and American corps, and co-operated often with the Second 

French Army to the north. The liaison with the balloons, too, was 

excellent, and pilots on this sector were quite familiar with each step, 

and able to carry out intelligently the missions allotted to them. The 

liaison on the eastern side of the salient partially broke down when the 

attack commenced. Liaison between air service units remained 

excellent through out all stages of the battle. 

In criticizing an operation such as this, it is well to consider as a 

matter of general principle whether proper provision was made for the 

security of our own pursuit aviation. Security embraces all these 

measures taken by a command to protect itself from observation, 

annoyance, or surprise by the enemy. In pursuit aviation, it will be well 

to consider first whether or not these precautions were taken with 

respect to the units themselves, and second whether everything 

possible in this respect was done by the actual machines themselves 

on the line. It is felt that the precautions taken by the 1st Pursuit Wing 

were quite adequate under the circumstances. A very large quantity of 

aviation, a pursuit group and three squadrons of corps observation, 

making a total of about 175 airplanes, were placed on the Toul 

airdrome. It is not without the range of possibility that the enemy on a 

clear night two or three days before the attack might have attacked 

this airdrome in force, as indeed they did on several occasions on the 
Pursuit Aviation 309 

British front in the spring and summer of 1917, when all the units on 

that field would have been put out of action for the day of attack. This 

particular field is very easy to locate at night because of the lack of 

camouflage, and the natural landmarks surrounding it, and it is felt 

that an aggressive attack at the proper time would have had disastrous 

results. Thii however was a chance taken as a result of necessity. The 

3rd Pursuit Group at Vaucouleurs on the other hand was more 

carefully concealed from observation, annoyance, or surprise, and the 

hangars more scattered and less liable to damage of this nature. The 

1st Pursuit Group on the west of the salient was very perfectly 

concealed, and well spread out over the airdrome, and not liable to be 

put out of action by one attack. 

It is felt that the pursuit units of the 1st Army were not sufficiently 

protected from surprise in that they were all short of transportation. 

Aviation units placed so far behind the line can keep a large 

establishment of transportation on hand without danger of crowding 

roads or blqking traffic in the case of a push. In the event of an 

enforced retreat, millions of dollars of valuable property and material 

that cannot easily be replaced can be rapidly withdrawn in the back 

areas without inconvenience to the troops on the front. Economy in 

air service transportation is false and units should at no time, on 

general principle, be allowed to operate without their full complement 

of transportation. Under the heading of security, the matter of 

concealment should be considered. The fact that the enemy did not 

secure one photograph of the 1st Pursuit Group airdrome is worthy of 

notice. Thii was due not only to the camouflage and to the care of the 

personnel, but also the fact that one single seater machine was kept 

over the airdrome at all times, and on two occasions enemy 

photographic machines were diverted from their course as they 

neared this point, and the enemy were never enlightened as to the 

occupants, and in all probability never suspected the presence of 100 

machines there, an airdrome which would under normal conditions be 

considered unfit for pursuit aviation. 

The security provided in the air by the machines themselves was 

adequate for all purposes. This is inherent in the echelon formation of 

flights, which provides for a tactical disposition comparable to the 

advance body, support and reserve used by ground troops. It is felt 

that commanding officers saw to it in every case that good internal 

security was maintained by all formation. The fact that individual 

machines were permitted to go out on active sectors was justified first, 

by the extreme importance of the missions, and second, by the fact 

that no clouds prevented surprise. 

The art of giving proper instruction and orders to troops is one of 

the most important features in the exercise of command. It is believed 

that the wing, groups and squadrons of American pursuit aviation at 
31 0 US. Air Service 

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the time of the St. Mihiel fight were on the whole in this respect equal 

to other air services, but at the same time there were shortcomings. 

Too much reliance was placed on the telephone, and orders were 

often given over the telephone that should have been transmitted by 

special courier. The plan of action for pursuit on the salient is 

considered to have been the best. 

considered wise in that the troops on the ground soon become 

acquainted with the fact, and it proved to raise their morale. At times, 

close protection was afforded to observation machines. It is felt that 

this was not necessary. On the east of the salient, where this 

protection was indulged in, several corps observation machines were 

lost; on the west only one was destroyed. It would be better to 

advance “no man’s land” of the air service five miles beyond the 

trenches, and leave the intervening space clear for our own machines 

to work. 

pursuit aviation on the whole was vigorous and offensive, as it should 

be, and met and coped with every situation that arose. Balloons were 

attacked with determination, and massed enemy troops withdrawn on 

September 12, 13, and 14 were harassed and repestedly thrown into 

confusion. Large enemy formations when they appeared were fought 

gallantly even by inferior members, and every opportunity of making 

observations from pursuit planes was seized with eagerness. The 

principle of economy of forces might have been applied to great 

advantage during the strenuous times of bad weather. Instead of 

sending out many small missions, it would have been better to send 

out as few as possible of these and conserve the machines for 

concentration purposes in the intervals of good weather. It was well 

known that our total pursuit strength greatly exceeded that of the 

enemy, and when he was not using his pursuit in bad weather, our 

resources in pursuit should have been drained as little as possible, and 

diverted for purposes of observation, which is not in the line of pursuit 

work, on as few occasions as possible, so as to insure a predomination 

in the fine weather. Perhaps only one criticism can be made of the 

fighting of the pilots themselves, and this is due probably to the nature 

of the machine. The pilots never attempted to make deflection shots, 

and always relied on getting on the tail of the enemy and shooting him 

down from this position. They should make it a practice to seize every 

opportunity of firing deflection bursts, as it has been proved by pilots 

of other nations that surprising results can be obtained in this way. In 

this connection, it is pointed out that pilots were a little too much 

inclined when out-numbered, to dive away, relying on the superior 

The use of American pursuit aviation for protective barrage is 

In spite of the fact that some observation machines were lost, 

b+CII.- hrning balloon shot down by an aircraft 
, Pursuit Aviation 31 1 

speed of the Spad to get them out of the difficulty. The best principle is 

to fight it out, relying on maneuverability for defense. The 

development of the low flying in this offensive and the work of balloon 

destruction is worthy of special attention. The eyes of the enemy 

were literally blinded in that his balloons were all destroyed, and 

planes on which he had counted for flying low and harassing our 

troops, were in most cases destroyed. It was felt that the American 

air concentration here had supreme command of the air, and this 

undoubtedly accounts for the fact that the enemy soon brought to this 

front some of his best pursuit units and filled pursuit airdromes to 

their capacity. 

Another feature worthy of particular notice is the development of 

the flight as a fighting unit in the action. There is no doubt that pursuit 

from the very nature of its work should be employed tactically by units 

or flights. This enhances the responsibility of the flight commander, 

and necessitates extreme care in the selection of those pilots. They 

must have had a great deal of experience and must maintain at all 

times, more than in any sporting team, the respect and implicit 

confidence of each pilot in the flight. Each flight should be a unit 

composed of pilots, one and all prepared to stick by their flight 

commander at all costs, and ready if necessary to fall rather than have 

their chain of responsibility in the flight broken. While there were not 

many opportunities, owing to the bad weather conditions, of showing 

the extent to which this had been perfected in the American pursuit 

units, it is felt that the work of the new units of the 1st Pursuit Wing in 

the early days of the attack is worthy of special mention in this respect. 

Under the circumstances, they stuck well together, and with flight 

commanders of slightly more experience, nothing could stand up 

against them. 

So much depends on the type of machine in pursuit work that one 

cannot express an opinion on pursuit operations without considering 

s probably the fastest on 

as all pursuit work is 

pled with the all important 

feature of maneuvera capable of zooming at high 

is felt that from the stan 

all the more praiseworthy under these circumstances. The number of 

machines in commission is probably as important a consideration as 

any in the operations of our pursuit units. It was impossible for our 

mechanics to keep more than 65% serviceable, and pilots were not 

often able to do more than one mission each day, owing to the fact 

that the Hispano-Suiza motor, with reduction gear, was very difficult 

to keep in condition. 
31 2 U.S. Air Service 

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“Balloon Buster” Frank Luke, Jr., pilot of the 27th Aero Squadron, shot down 14 enemy 

balloons ond 4 aircraft between 12and.B September 1918. He won the Medal of Honorfor 

his heroic action on the Bth, when he force-landed in enemy territory andfought off a score 

of enemy troops who surrounded him before he fell dead from a wound in his chest. 
IV. Arzgonne-Meuse Oggensive. 31 3 

Between September 14 and September 26, the 1st American Army 

conducted one of the most important staff operations of the war in 

transferring the bulk of the divisions from the sector northeast of St. 

Mihiel to the line west of the Meuse River. The role of pursuit aviation 

during this preparatory period had for its object the prevention of long 

distance reconnaissance of the new American area. At the same time, 

it was important that no display of aerial strength should be shown 

over the new sector, as such display of strength would be an indication 

to the enemy of the transfer of troops that was going on. The enemy 

air service was largely concentrated in the Conflans-Briey area, and 

the period between September 14 and 25 was marked by severe and 

repeated combats. Between September 20 and 23, the 2nd, and 3rd 

Pursuit Groups of the 1st Pursuit Wing changed station, but this 

changing station was not allowed to interfere with operations which 

were still carried on over the frbnt created by the St. Mihiel battle. The 

1st Pursuit Group remained on its airdrome at Rembercourt but it too 

confined its operations to the sector east of the Meuse. G.C. 16 of the 

French Army was relieved from duty with the 1st Pursuit Wing. The 

wing headquarters moved from Toul to Chaumont-sur-Aire; the 2nd 

Pursuit Group moved from Toul airdrome to the Belrain airdrome, 

and the 3rd Pursuit Group moved from the Vaucouleurs airdrome to 

the Lisle-en-Barrois airdrome. The wing headquarters and its groups 

immediately perfected liaison with the corps air service, the army 

observation group, and the armies to the right and left of the 1st Army. 

For the Argonne-Meuse offensive, the 1st Pursuit Group was 

allotted the rather new task of combatting enemy battle flights and of 

destroying balloons. In other words, all of its operations were confined 

to extremely low altitudes. The plans drawn up by the group 

commander and approved by the C.A.S. of the 1st Army were 

followed throughout the offensive. The following are the plans drawn 

up by the Commanding Officer, 1st Pursuit Group. 

“LOW FLYING lN THE OFFENSIVE” 

(Without infantry strating) 

The 1st Pursuit has been entrusted with the important and rather 

unique mission shown below in the offensive, and officers and men are 

enjoined to cooperate with the commanding officer in making it a 

success. 

1. PROGRAM. 

a) Strategical. The 27th and the 95th squadrons will each detach 

and operate a flit at their respective advanced field, Verdun and 

Froides. Daily disposition will be made of the remainder of the group 

over the sector for which we are responsible, viz: Aisne to Chatillonsous-les-Cotes. 
31 4 US. Air Service 

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b) Date of Attack. Dawn balloon attack by patrols of three on 

squadron sector: Dawn to 8 h 00 continuous patrol of squadron 

sectors and close liaison with advanced landing field, one airplane only 

from each patrol landing at the advanced field. 8 h 00 to 15 h 30, no 

schedule, planes being dispatched according to exigencies of 

operations. 15 h 30 to dark, continuous offensive patrol helping 

infantry and working close touch with them doing a certain amount of 

liaison work to report progress of attack. Dusk of evening, balloon 

attack, pilots landing by flares on own airdrome. 

c) Days of Exploitation (2nd, 3rd and 4th days). Dawn to 8 h 00 

and 15 h 30 to dusk, continuous offensive low patrols. Concentrated 

day and evening balloon attacks, according to requirements. 

d) Detached flights will operate independently, making short, 

snappy, frequent sorties as the occasion demands. 

2. METHODS OF BALLOON STRAFFING. 

a) Dawn: The pilots on this attack having carefully checked up the 

balloon emplacements the night before, will be dispatched in the 

darkness individually, but three to each balloon, two having balloon 

guns, and will make one concentrated attack all along the lines at a 

given minute, all watches having been previously synchronized. 

b) Daylight: Daylight balloon straffing missions will only be 

dispatched in the case of troublesome balloons. A pilot will attack the 

balloon at a given minute, and be reinforced immediately by three 

formations of at least four machines each on a pre-arranged balloon 

emplacement and no other. 

c) Dusk of Euening: Pilots will go out in groups of three and two will 

do the attacking on given balloon emplacements and no other, 

returning and landing on the field by flares, using the same recognition 

signals as night bombers. 

3. Low-flying Day Patrols: 

a) These will consist of two echelons of three machines each. One 

echelon must patrol a given beat at a given height and at a given time, 

so as to be over given points at definite times, thus insuring contact 

with all advancing troops and lessen the liklihood of attack by large 

formations. 

4. Field is being prepared for night flying, and parachute and Holt 

landing flares4 will be attached to each plane. 

The plan of employment drawn up by the Commanding Officer, 1st 

Pursuit Wing in order to get the maximum results from its pursuit 

aviation laid emphasis on the employment of large forces for offensive , 

measures. While the necessity for utilization of pursuit airplanes for 

shock action had been constantly growing more apparent, the peculiar 

conditions of the St. Mihiel battle had provided its employment in this 

manner at an earlier date. The plan of employment of the units of the 
Pursuit Aviation 31 5 

1st Pursuit Wing was as follows: 

“PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT OF PURSUIT, AND DAY 

BOMBARDMEhT UNITS-1ST PURSUIT WING.” 

1. The operations will cover four phases. 

i) Preparation until day of attack. 

ii) During artillery preparation. 

iii) During attack, as far as first combined army objective. 

iv) Exploitation of attack as far as second combined army 

While the areas and objectives will be altered from time to time, the 

plan of employment of pursuit aviation in the last three stages of attack 

will follow the same generat principles. 

2. (a) Preparation until day of attack: In order that secrecy may 

be obtained no airplanes from this wing will operate west of Chatillonsous-les-Cotes until after H hour. 

(b) The normal activity of the sector between Chatillon and Pont. 

surSeille will be maintained, and the groups will operate over the 

sector of the last operations. 

(a) Pursuit aviation at the disposal of the 1st Pursuit Wing 

comprises the 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groups. The sector of the 1st 

Pursuit Wing is from Pont-sur-Seille on the east to La Harazee on the 

west. The sector of attack is from the Meuse River on the east to La 

Harazee on the west. 

(b) In order to maintain a proper superiority over the enemy air 

service it will be necessary for our air service, not only to maintain 

protective patrols within the enemy’s lies for the defense of our army 

corps air service and to attack enemy reconnaissance planes, but it 

will also be necessary from time to time to take the offensive with a 

display of dominating force, sending out powerful expeditions so as to 

cover intermediate and high altitudes and to sweep the air clear of 

enemy aviation up to a depth, 10 or 12 kilometers inside the lines. 

(c) One gioup will protect the front, daily, from dawn to 12 h 30 

and the other from 12 h 30 till dark. In the protection of the front 

patrols of one flight will operate over the sector, Chatillon-sous-lesCotes, Pont-sur-Seille, patrols of two flihts will be maintained 

throughout the period assigned over the sector Chatillon-sous-les 

Cotes, ---->La Harazee. 

In view of the fact that it is believed that most of the enemy aviation 

is concentrated in the region of Metz, especial attention will be paid to 

the sector between the Meuse and Chatillon. 

(d) Special Missions of Pursuit Aviation: By requiring one group 

to do its barrage work in the morning, its squadrons will be available 

objective. 

3. Pursuit Aviation after H hour: 

Y 
31 6 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

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for an offensive operation in the afternoon, and vice-versa. The group 

assigned to patrol in fhe afternoon will be on the alert in the morning to 

carry out an offensive operation, in which the entire group may be 

called upon to participate at medium and high altitudes, penetrating 

about 12 kilometers beyond our advancing lines to clean the air of 

enemy aviation. A similar expedition may be sent out in the afternoon 

from the group that has done patrolling in the morning. The hours at 

which these offensive missions are carried out will be constantly varied 

and an effort will be made to order offensive missions at hours when 

intelligence received from the anti-aircraft artillery indicates maximum 

activity. The strength and frequency of attacks on ground objectives 

will depend upon the strength of enemy aerial activity encountered. 

In special circumstances, pursuit reconnaissance will be ordered. 

While it is not anticipated that such missions will be ordered, group 

commanders will see that their pilots are familiar with infantry ground 

panels. 

Close protection for Corps Obseruation: Photographic missions 

when they are required, will be provided by the squadron assigned to 

barrage patrol. The Corps Observation Wing will be informed of the 

hours at which the different groups will be responsible for the barrage 

patrol the night before. When observation squadrons cannot provide 

their own protection, they will notify the Corps Observation Wing 

Commander, who is authorized to adjust this protection directly with 

the group that is responsible, at the hour in question, for the barrage 

patrol. The group operations officer will inform the patrol leader of the 

squadron going out on barrage patrol, that its mission has been altered 

from that of barrage patrol to one of close protection, and the patrol 

leader in question will get into immediate telephonic liaison with the 

pilot who is responsible for the photographic missions. 

4. Day Bombardment Aviation: The 1st Pursuit Wing comprises 

the 1st Day Bombardment Group. In principle, this group will be used 

to attack from high.altitudes, large objectives such as towns and 

railroad stations from which traffic is radiating. 

concentrations along the valley of the Meuse, Romagne, St. Juvin, 

Grandpre. 

Special Missions of Bombardment: In emergencies when 

intelligence received that specially favorable targets are presenting 

themselves within 6 or 8 kilometers of our front lines, this group will be 

ordered to attack such targets at low altitude in order to cause 

confusion and material damage to enemy elements arriving as 

reinforcements or retreating. 

The low work of the 1st Pursuit Group justified its introduction on 

the first day of the Argonne-Meuse attack, September 26. Ten enemy 

In the first stages of attack, it will operate against enemy 

318 U.S. Air Service 

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~~ 

balloons were shot down in flames on that date. The constant 

destruction and harassing of the enemy’s balloons by the group 

resulted in the enemy detailing a certain force at all times for their 

protection, and he made many ingenious attempts to trap our pilots 

who were attacking his balloons. This resulted in counter schemes 

being employed in which not only were attacks on balloons carried 

out, but a number of enemy airplanes were brought down by the 

group. While many successful balloon attacks were made in the early 

morning and throughout the day, the most successful attacks were 

those carried on in the dusk of the evening. The 1st Pursuit Group in 

addition to its attacks on enemy balloons and its defensive work in 

destroying German battle-planes, was enabled to use shock action at 

low altitudes by means of a concentrated patrol of all squadrons which 

was made about three o’clock every afternoon. , 

The policy employed with respect to the 1st Pursuit Wing of using 

large forces for shock action6 deep in the enemy’s side of the lines, 

justified itself on the first day of the American attack in the Argonne 

Meuse area, September 26. The first group sortie was made by the 

2nd Pursuit Group at dawn of September 26 and resulted in the 

destruction of 8 enemy airplanes. A similar sortie by the 3rd Pursuit 

Group on the afternoon of September 26 resulted in the destruction of 

3 more enemy planes. One of the most successful shock operations 

carried out by the 1st Pursuit Wing was carried out on October 18th in 

which two squadrons of the 2nd Pursuit Group, equipped with bombs 

and machineguns for the purpose of harassing group objectives flying 

at an extremely low altitude, two squadrons of the 3rd Pursuit Group 

at between 2,000 and 3,000 meters, all four squadrons of the Day 

Bombardment Group at 4,000 meters, and two more squadrons of the 

3rd Pursuit Group, flying at 4,500 meters, met at the previously 

appointed rendezvous of Bayonville at 3:30 in the afternoon. The 

enemy appeared in force, some 30 or 40 enemy planes being seen by 

our pilots. Their formation was broken up, at least nine of them were 

destroyed, and the others forced to return to their airdromes. It is not 

to be forgotten that throughout the Argonne-Meuse operations both 

the 2nd Pursuit Group and the 3rd Pursuit Group were equipped with 

bombs for use in attacking ground objectives. 

During the Argonne-Meuse offensive, a night pursuit squadron was 

added to the 1st Pursuit Group for the purpose of attacking enemy 

bombers. The details connected with the organization of this service 

presented a whole series of new and difficult problems which were 

satisfactorily solved. After the introduction of the night pursuit 

squadron, very few night bombardment attacks were undertaken by 

the enemy. In a few cases our night pursuit pilots were able to come 

within range of the enemy raiders. The night pursuit squadron 

combined offensive tactics with its defense against enemy bombers, 
Pursuit Aviation 319 

and on several occasions crossed the enemy lines and dropped small 

bombs on enemy posts of command and concentration of troops. 

In addition to its offensive shock patrols, the 1st Pursuit Wing 

carried on the more conventional protective patrols for which 

provision was made in the plan of employment, and also afforded a 

certain amount of close protection to the army corps observation 

planes. The imperative necessity of extremely close liaison with the 

corps air services in the carrying out of these missions was 

emphasized, and the policy was adopted in October of having the 

corps observation planes which were to receive close protection from 

pursuit planes, land on the airdrome of the pursuit group assigned to 

give protection, so that the observation airplane crew and the pursuit 

patrol leader could come to a definite understanding of the work to be 

done and the methods of doing it. 

Comments. 

At the beginning of the ArgonneMeuse offensive, American pursuit 

aviation had reached that stage in numbers and efficiency where it 

ranked with the pursuit units of the other nations. It consisted of three 

groups of highly organized squadrons with pilots of the very first 

order. Taught by the experiences of the French and the British, they 

had at this stage the greatest efficiency in personnel. It was known that 

the enemy had brought to the Conflans area his best units of pursuit, 

and it was known too that battleflights, a creation of the German air 

strategists, would be employed by them should occasion arise. By this 

time the American Army was beginning to appreciate the morale effect 

of aviation, and it was felt that the necessity of supremacy of the air 

was needed more by American arms in these operations than perhaps 

ever before, to produce the greatest results. It needed the moral 

supremacy, so easily enhanced by a predominance of ground troops, 

of low-flying airplanes to carry Americans over the awful terrain of the 

Meuse under trying weather conditions. Bearing this is mind, the Chief 

of Air Service, 1st Army, with the acquiescence of the French advisors 

on aviation, decided that it would be well to utilize a portion of the 

pursuit, namely, the 1st Pursuit Group, under his command, for 

combatting enemy battle planes and for the destruction of enemy 

balloons. Thii step made the withdrawal from the higher altitudes of a 

large percentage of the resources in pursuit machines, but in the 

opinion of the Chief of Air Service, 1st Army, it was more important 

that enemy aviation including balloons and airplanes, low and in full 

sight of the advancing troops, should be destroyed at all costs. His 

judgment was right, the results obtained fully justifying the 

expenditure, and it is believed that this innovation was one that caught 

the Germans by surprise, and to a certain extent upset his plans. Very 

few German balloons were able to work, especially those on the east 
320 U.S. Air Service 

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of the Meuse, which, if allowed to operate, would have been able 

without doubt to direct enfilading fire so successfully that the advance 

of our troops would have been hampered even more than it was, and 

our huge concentrations in that area would have been located and 

probably disastrous results have followed. 

No greater provision was made for the security of the operating 

units than in the St. Mihiel offensive. The 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groups 

were without adequate transportation, and it is felt that the existence 

of the American pursuit units were jeopardized at all times for want of 

it. The airdromes at Belrain, Rembercourt, and Lisle-en-Barrois were 

well laid out and well concealed. The enemy knew undoubtedly that a 

great deal of pursuit aviation was located at Belrain, because of the 

fact that this was an old field, but he was never advised, and probably 

never was suspicious about Rembercourt or Lisle-en-Barrois. The 

danger of night bombing was minimized by the introduction of night 

pursuit so that the danger from this source was partially removed. 

With regard to the security of the units in the air little comment can 

be made, save that formations were well kept, and plans were made 

for the protection of patrols. Those of the 2nd, and 3rd Pursuit Groups 

working at high altitudes, were properly echeloned, and worked well 

together. So-called scouring patrols7 used by the 1st Pursuit Group 

where one formation acted as a pivot, with two squadrons 

cooperating, were very effective, and produced wonderful results 

besides insuring the protection of themselves. 

Maj. Harold E. Hartney, who hadflown with 

the Royal Flying Corps and had been shot 

down by Richtofen, commanded the 1st 

Pursuit Wing from September to November 

1918. 
Pursuit Aviation 321 

The employment of large concentrations of pursuit, consisting of 

several formations echeloned andxooperating, developed to a great 

extent in the Argonne-Meuse offensive, and, thanks to the skillful 

disposition of same by the commanding officer of the 1st Pursuit Wing, 

excellent results were obtained with a minimum expenditure of 

machines and personnel. Concentrations of this nature are effective in 

that they employ the principle of economy of forces. Seldom does the 

weather in the months of October and November in France permit 

constant patrol at high altitude throughout the day. Commanders, 

therefore, figuratively speaking, can pile up their resources in machines and pilots until the bright intervals, when they are able to send 

out the whole in a well regulated and disciplined mass, and sweep 

the sky under the direction of a competent flight leader, and applying 

the general principles of aerial tactics. In this connection, it is well to 

develop the competitive spirit in flight leaders, as was done in the 

Argonne-Meuse off ensiy. For excellent work leaders were chosen 

and given command of a brmation, and permitted to maneuver it as 

they chose, and some skillful aerial maneuvers with successful 

encounters were produced. It is safe to say that had the operations 

continued, by next spring the good patrol leader would be the most 

sought out pilot in pursuit work. 

The security of balloon attackers, endangered as it was more than 

ever by machinations of the enemy, was properly looked after by the 

arrival of supporting formations from different directions immediately 

following the balloon attack. When the element of surprise cannot be 

utilized for day balloon attack, and when it is essential that a balloon 

be destroyed, even though protected by enemy aviation, this probably 

is the best and surest way of bringing about its destruction, and originality of this scheme can be’ credited to the American aviation. At 

first sight criticism might be directed to the fact that individual 

machines and small formations were allowed to operate, but this can 

be met by the statement that such was not the case, except when 

weather conditions or the nature of the work itself permitted this 

action. Some too, may criticize the fact that pursuit squadrons were 

allowed to work at low altitude in that they were not suitable from the 

nature of their construction, and danger from forced landing in 

devastated country. It is felt, however, that the use of the Spad 

machine for this purpose was quite justified under the circumstances, 

and that no violation of the principle of security of either personnel or 

material was affected thereby, especially when one considers the 

losses in machines and personnel, which were extremely low. 

Little can be said with regard to the orders of the different 

commanders. Experience had taught the army, wing, group and 

squadron commanders the best principles in this regard. In every case 

plans were made, policies outlined, and daily orders issued in 
322 U.S. Air Service 

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. accordance therewith, throughout the operations. In some cases, the 

orders were a little slow in forthcoming. Units should be advised of 

their work as Ions before as possible, and in this connection it might be 

well for higher commands to issue orders of a general nature and alter 

them later by telephone or special courier in accordance with the 

exigencies of the moment, relying in full on the judgment of the 

subordinates, who are on the ground and know the conditions, and 

need only to be told the general scheme and wishes to produce the 

desired results. It is necessary to note, too, that the principle of 

economy of forces, of husbanding resources in bad weather to use 

them in good. In considering the subject of orders, it is well to call 

attention to the fact that flight leaders kept their formations well in 

hand, conferences were always held before the missions, and the 

general scheme in detail worked out, so that actual signals from the 

patrol leader reduced possibility of confusion to a minimum. The 

principle of having squadron operations officers work in close touch 

with the group operations officer is good, and less confusion of orders 

is apt to arise when harmony prevails, as it did in all the groups during 

these operations. 

An inspection of the pursuit work in this offensive would not be 

complete without considering the individual combative tactics of the 

pilots. In bad flying weather, such as existed during these operations, 

the tendency is towards smaller formation and individual effort. 

Commanders, in permitting pilots to go out in low-flying cloud 

weather, knowing the possibility of surprise by the enemy, must be 

careful that this is not overdone. He and his pilots should ever be alert 

to the possibility of the sudden return to good weather and normal 

pursuit activities, and sufficient reserve should be available at all times 

to reinforce patrols when occasion demands.* Conversely, his pilots 

should on the other hand be ready to make use of the fact that the 

enemy is inclined to work singly and seize every opportunity of 

meeting him in force and destroying completely. Pilots during the 

Argonne-Meuse offensive were a little too apt to rely on the diving 

qualities of their machine, rather than maneuverability. It is felt that 

the true pursuit machine of the future must rely on nothing but 

offensive action, coupled with maneuverability. In this way, one of the 

elementary principles of tactics, the offensive, is maintained. To dive is 

to run away; to maneuver is to stand up and fight. No matter what the 

development of aviation, it will be a very long time before a quickly 

maneuvering ship is easily shot down; a diving target is the easiest, and 

can be conquered by simply catching up and shooting dead-on. 

Probably the best way to convince pilots of these facts, and all general 

principles, is to send them up to the front line as often as opportunity 

affords, and let them see the general activities for themselves. It is 

found that commanders of pursuit groups did in practice employ this 
Pursuit Aviation 323 

principle, and pilots who were not on duty spent a great deal of time up 

near the front, co-operating with other units, and gaining tips for use 

the next day. This proved valuable, not only as a physical, but as a 

mental diversion and exercise, and pilots who kept themselves keen 

and interested with their work were found to be less subject to 

nervous breakdowns or temporary setbacks. 

A survey of pursuit tactics in the Argonne-Meuse would not be 

complete without considering the work of the night pursuit introduced 

at this period. At first sight critics might be inclined to underestimate 

the value of this unit, but a careful study of their work, and their 

general strategical value soon emphasizes the value of this unit on the 

front at this time. It must be remembered that the Germans did very 

little day bombing, and that all indications led the higher command to 

believe that they intended increasing their night bombing activities 

during the winter months. The concentrations of large bodies of 

American troops between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse after the 

advance over the shell-torn low-laying water-filled shell areas, meant 

increased immobility on the part of our troops, and offered 

exceptional targets for the enemy. Night bombers, of their very 

nature, were slow and cumbersome, and no match at all for pursuit 

planes, and once located by the latter in the beam of a searchlight or 

moonlight, it was felt that night pursuit could handle the situation 

satisfactorily, if, indeed, not completely destroy the twin night 

bomber’s effectiveness. The units assigned this duty, though 

handicapped by supplies of spare parts and even properly trained 

pilots, made themselves feit, and besides preventing the deep 

penetration by night bombers, frequently bombed on their patrols 

enemy concentrations, dumps, etc., and proved that American pursuit 

could harass the enemy night and day in good weather. 

The institution of night pursuit, which is perhaps the highest 

development of aviation, undoubtedly gave the enemy the impression 

that the American Air Service was fully alive to its possibilities and to 

the resources at their disposal, and would, if the German aviation was 

to continue, have to adopt counter-measures on this as in the day 

work, to retain its place in the military aeronautical world. The 

development of night pursuit will probably in the future be considered 

by students of aviation one of the successes of American aviation, in 

that only one other nation in the war attempted this new function of 

pursuit, so replete with pwibilities and potentialities. 

325 

On March 17, certain American pilots were posted to British 

squadrons in the field. From that date to the end of the war, American 

pilots saw service on the front with the Royal Air Force. These pilots 

were placed under the command of the British squadron 

commanders, and possessed the same status as British pilots, and 

were used precisely the same as if they were British subjects. On June 

20 the 17th Aero Squadron was formed, equipped with Sopwith Camel 

airplanes, using 9 pilots as a nucleus, who had seen about three 

months service in British squadrons. On July 1, the 148th Aero 

Squadron was formed on the same principle and with similar 

equipment. These two squadrons operated under British wings 

exactly as if they had been British squadrons. A number of American 

pilots remained with British squadrons. Americans participated, 

therefore, in all the operations explained in the following report. These 

operations were all directed by British command, but American pilots 

had a great deal to do with carrying them out. The work of Americans 

on the British front is so enveloped within the work of the Royal Air 

Force, that a tactical history of American operations on the British 

front can only be told by a tactical history of operations of the Royal 

Air Force. 

On March 31, the Germans began their Picardy drive, which 

culminated in their establishing the line as far west as Montdidier, 

Villers-Bretonneux and Albert. The stopping of this advance can be 

attributed as much to the work of the Royal Air Force as to any other 

single factor. 

supremacy of the air. The S.E.-5 and the Sopwith Camel were so far 

superior to the Albatross, Pfalz, and Fokker tri-plane, that all fighting 

took place far over the enemy side of the lines, if there was fighting at 

all. The enemy was unable to fight unless he had advantage of position 

and numbers, but a formation of S.E.-5s or Sopwith Camels would 

never refuse an opportunity to attack two or more times their number. 

Besides having the superior type of machines, the British had a 

greater number available than the enemy, which made the situation 

doubly hard for him to cope with. The enemy was compelled to 

concentrate his force during certain periods of the day, granting the 

British absolute air supremacy during certain hours, and contesting 

their supremacy during others. 

where there were plenty of airdromes. The push was, however, so 

rapid, that many airdromes were taken, and machines unserviceable 

at the time had to be burned. Those squadrons which were in the 

sector of the push were forced to make several moves. In this case the 

mobility of the Royal Air Force was its saving factor. Each squadron 

possessed sufficient transportation to move its necessary supplies. 

For months previous to this drive, the British held absolute 

During the Picardy drive, the British were pushed back into country 
326 U.S. Air Service 

in W orld War I 

VOl. I 

Moreover, there existed a reserve lorry park, which had a certain 

number of squadrons to provide moving facilities for. The reserve 

lorry parks were kept very busy. The Royal Air Force also possessed 

plenty of temporary hangars, which were easily set up ready for use. 

The supply of airdromes, therefore, depended merely upon the supply 

of airdrome sites. 

A great many squadrons were moved back of the sector of the 

push, and once back of that sector, every squadron held itself in 

readiness for a move at a few hours notice. 

The problem which confronted the Royal Air Force was to assist in 

the stopping of the push. The R.A.F. was, therefore, to do more than 

carry out artillery adjustment and do reconnaissance. Bombers had to 

work overtime, and pursuit machines had to be used for ground 

straffing as well as for patrol work. 

Ground straffing was not an entirely new use for pursuit machines 

but more of it was done during the last week of March and the first 

week of April than had ever been done before. The enemy was 

bringing up large formations of troops, which offered splendid targets 

for aircraft. All pursuit machines available were used to harass these 

enemy reserves, and not only were pursuit machines used but two 

seaters, too, joined in the battle on the ground. 

Ground straffing was not carried on systematically. The method of 

conducting a ground strafe was for squadrons to send over flights of 

six machines at half hour intervals, after getting about five miles over 

the line, the flight split up, and each pilot went independently, found a 

ground target, machine gunned it, bombed it, and got back the best 

way he could. This method was discontinued in about a week. Pilots 

were then sent out in twos, with 15 minute intervals between pairs. 

However, different wings used different methods, but none really had 

a successful system. The enemy did no ground straffing on our troops, 

their machines had a hard time even getting up to the line. 

To protect our ground straffing machines and to keep all enemy 

machines away from the lines, the usual patrols were necessary. 

Patrols of our machines were of one flight or two flights of machines, 

very rarely of three flights. Two flights of machines were very effective 

because of the superiority of our types. All fighting in the air was far 

over the enemy’s side of the line. 

The enemy in the Picardy drive frequently appeared with masses of 

aviation as large as 50 or 75 machines, working in a large drove with 

no apparent formation. They were forced to use a large formation due 

to the inferiority of their machines. Small formations of enemy 

machines always working some distance behind their lines took 

advantage of low clouds to attack our ground straffing machines. 

As a result of the work of the R.A.F. in March, development was 

made in ground straffing and in the patrol. Ground straffing prevented 
327 Pursuit Aviation 

reserves from reaching the line except at night without being 

harassed. Losses, however, were heavy, due to lack of cooperation 

between protecting machines and those doing ground straffing. There 

seemed to be no cooperation whatever. Weather conditions were 

not taken advantage - of and in fact did not seem to affect operations 

in the least. 

This offensive developed a large patrol. A G.H.Q. Wing was formed 

for the purpose of having a large mobile reserve of pursuit aviation. In 

it were one S.E.-5 squadron, one Clerget Camel squadron, and one Le 

Rhone Camel squadron.9 Later the number of squadrons was 

increased. Patrols were to be made up of 12 Camels, with 6 S.E.-5s 

above, or 24 Camels with 12 S.E.-5s above. The formation of three 

flights, or six flights, was quite adequate to deal with enemy formations 

of any size that were likely to be met. The large formation had its birth 

in this offensive, and with it came the development of the art of patrol 

leading. The squadron, or three flight patrol, was not common 

however, until about three months later. 
328 U.S. Air Service 

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Although some machines were lost in this offensive, due to 

airdromes being taken by the enemy, a great deal of credit is due the 

British system of making squadrons mobile. It was here proved that 

each squadron must possess sufficient transportation to move the 

supplies and equipment of a squadron. The motor lorry reserve parks 

proved most efficient. Temporary hangars were far more useful than 

large permanent hangars, which took some time to construct. If 

British squadrons had not been on a mobile basis, the loss of supplies 

and machines in this push would have been immense, but as the 

situation was handled, the work of a squadron was not interfered with 

by a move. Squadrons even the day a move was carried out 

conducted patrols as usual. 

The push was made by the Germans between Ypres and La Bassee, 

which began April 12, was not so important in its effect upon aviation 

as the Picardy drive. The push was much shorter in duration, and due 

to bad weather conditions, aerial activity was not extensive, except for 

the first two days of the offensive. 

It seemed that there was very little preparation for the push in the 

way of putting a great many squadrons on that front. It was possible 

for a squadron working between Ypres and Nieuport to do patrols on 

the front of the push. Some other squadrons, which had been working 

in the push at Albert, were able to patrol the Ypres-La Bassee front 

without moving their airdromes. The enemy captured a few 

airdromes, but only one squadron lost its machines. There was no 

shortage in the supply of airdromes. The enemy had a great many 

machines on this front, but not so many as the British. Previous to the 

push, the British held absolute air supremacy. 

During the push, ground straffing was done to some extent, but not 

as much as in the March drive. The need was not so great. Patrols on 

this front were of larger formations that had been in use previously. 

The General Headquarters Wing had an opportunity to try out the 

three and six flight patrols. On these patrols the S.E.-5s served as a 

protecting flight for the Camels which worked below. The combination 

proved a great success. The superiority of the air possessed by the 

British previous to this offensive was maintained. All fighting that took 

place was 10 to 15 miles back of the enemy’s line. The enemy were 

unable to keep balloons up to any great extent. The enemy two-seater 

machines accomplished very little work. Our balloons were up in great 

numbers constantly, and our twoseaters worked from morning until 

night. 

The German drive between Noyon and Montdidier began about 

June 7, and lasted for something like a week. Although this front was a 

French front, the R.A.F. practically carried on the war in the air. 

About four days previous to the push, the 9th Brigade was moved to 

the vicinity of Beauvais. It is not known to American pilots how many 

The unit markings, triangle (abowj and 

dumbbell W), displayed by the 148th and 

17th Sqdronsfrorn July to October, 1918, 

we assigned by the RAF. 
Pursuit Aviation 329 

squadrons the French had on this front. It seemed that the French 

supplied their own planes for observation and the British supplied the 

machines for bombardment and pursuit. 

Upon first moving to that sector, few enemy machines were seen. 

They scarcely made their appearance until the day of the push. They 

evidently had plenty available, for when the offensive began, the 

enemy put as many machines on the front as the Allies had there. 

It was then that the Fokker bi-plane made its appearance. At first 

they were mixed with Fokker tri-planes, and a few days later some 

purely Fokker bi-plane formations made their appearance. The 

Fokker bi-planes, however, did not create such a sensation then as 

they did later. The machine was probably not as good at first, and the 

pilots did not seem to be able to get all that was possible out of the 

machines. 

For three days prior to the push, bombing raids were made on all 

important centers from 8 to 15 miles back of the enemy lines, and 

three-flight patrols were carried out. When the push began, the 9th 

Brigade had at least half its machines on ground straffing all the time. 

Those squadrons which were detailed to do ground straffing carried 

out four missions each day for three days, bombing and 

machinegunning reserves. When the weather was clear, four 

machines would go out together-two to protect, and the other two to 

do ground straffing. This plan seemed to work fairly well, but it is not 

thought to be the proper method of conducting a ground attack. 

When weather was bad, two machines would go out together, both 

carrying bombs, and both doing ground straffing work. Protecting 

patrols were supposed to bout whenever lowflying was ordered. 

Enemy patrols were large on this front. The enemy would 

concentrate on certain hours of the day, when they would put all of 

their two-seaters and pursuit planes in the air together. All British 

squadrons patrolled with three flihts of machines. Fighting was 

always on the enemy’s side of the line. 

The enemy seldom tried to get balloons up on this front, while the 

French had their balloons up from daylight until dark, and they were 

seldom molested. Whenever enemy balloons were reported up, an 

organized balloon straffing formation was sent out. 

As a result of this push, the three-flight patrol was proved most 

effective. Previous to this offensive, the three-flight patrol was used 

only by a few squadrons, but here all patrols that were sent out 

consisted of three or six flights. Ground straffing was not yet 

systematically conducted. There was no cooperation between the 

protecting patrols and the low-flying machines. Those doing the 

ground straffing practically had to depend upon themselves, not upon ~~~

their protectors. Two protecting machines served as a protection only the snow owl 

\ 

were 

because the enemy would attack them first, and give the lower later selected by the Squadrons. 
330 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

machines a chance to get back. Two machines were not offensively 

strong enough to be of any use. 

In this offensive ground straffing served a great benefit in checking 

the enemy’s advance because so much of it was done. The liaison 

between French observation machines and the British pursuit 

machines was very poor. The plan, however, seemed to be to keep up 

a constant barrage of pursuit planes, permitting Allied two-seaters to 

work at all times. This plan did not call for the liaison between pursuit 

and two-seater machines that is required where two-seaters are to 

work only during certain hours of the day. 

extending from July to the end of the war. The offensives with which 

Americans are familiar, due to participation in them, were the drives 

from Montdidier and Villers-Bretonneux east in August, and the 

drive from Albert east through Bapaume, Cambrai, and Le Cateau in 

August, September, and October. At this time there were a great 

number of Americans working on the British front. The two American 

squadrons, 148th and 17th, were participating in the Allied drives in 

these places, and their work there was no small factor in contributing 

to the success of the R.A.F. 

Bretonneux carried the line forward to Bray, Rosiers and a point 

four miles west of Roye. Previous to this push, the R.A.F. held 

absolute air supremacy. They had operating on this front more 

machines than the enemy had, but at the time of the offensive, the 

enemy increased the number of machines. The only type of pursuit 

machine used by the enemy was the Fokker bi-plane, and it there 

proved to be the best pursuit machine in operation. There were in this 

sector a few of the enemy’s best squadrons, but also some very poor 

squadrons. There were sufficient good squadrons, however, to prove 

the superiority of the Fokker over the S.E.-5 and the Camel. The 

enemy had one handicap, however, which was purely a moral one. 

The British had held the air supremacy for so long that the morale of 

the German flying corps was low, while ours was high. 

The British had plenty of airdromes in this vicinity to meet the 

emergency, although hangars and billets were crowded. Some 

squadrons used advanced landing grounds in the sector of the 

offensive, rather than moving to that area, due to the fact that those 

particular squadrons would be needed in offensives on other fronts in 

a short time, so that a permanent move would not have been worth 

while. Many enemy airdromes were captured with a few machines. 

an extensive scale. Not only were pursuit machines used to harass 

enemy reserves as far back as 5 or 8 miles, but they were used to 

bomb the bridges over the Somme in the vicinity of Peronne from low 

Subsequent to the German drives, came the Allied drives, 

The first stage of the drive from Montdidier and VillersIn the first days of this offensive, ground straffing was carried out on 
Pursuit Aviation 331 

altitude. The weather was very bad for ground straffing, due to very 

low clouds, which condition caused many of our machines to be shot 

down by ground fire. The wdather conditions also prevented 

cooperation between machines with the mission of ground straffing 

and protecting machines. In fact, protecting machines could not be 

used. The organization of work, however, was much better than in 

previous drives. 

Pursuit machines here took on a work which had never before been 

done, mainly that of working in conjunction with tanks. The airplane 

was to fly low over the tanks and put out of action any antitank guns, 

and to assist in destroying enemy machinegun nests. On the day of the 

push the machines of one squadron were detailed for this purpose. 

Patrolling on this front was always with at least three flights of 

machines. The enemy often used larger patrols, but as a rule, its 

patrols consisted of 12 or 18 machines. On the day of the push, 

patrolling was taken care of by machines loaned from another brigade, 

which worked on an adjoining front, while the machines which 

operated ordinarily in the sector of the push took care of the special 

work such as ground straffig, low protective patrols, and work with 

tanks. On the days followin the push, when no ground straffing was 

push, carried out the patrols without the machines of the other 

brigade. The enemy here, as usual, followed the policy of 

concentrating all his force at certain periods of the day, rather than 

trying to carry out work at all hours of the day, as the R.A.F. did. 

The second stage of the drive from the line established at Bray, 

Rosieres and near Roye, came about August 20. The conditions 

existing in respect to the machines of both the Allied and the enemy 

were practically the same as in the first stage with the exception of 

possibly a small decrease in number on both sides. 

The plans for the work of various squadrons were very complete in 

detail. The weather permitted the working out of definite systems. The 

day before the offensive, each squadron was informed of what its work 

was to be and what every other squadron on the front would be doing 

at the same time. Certain squadrons were detailed to work with tanks; 

certain others to do ground straffing; others to carry out in low 

protective patrols, and others from another brigade to do high patrols. 

The cooperation between the protecting machines and those doing 

ground straffing was better than it had ever been before. Those 

machines which were to do ground straffing were informed the day 

before the attack of the zone in whrch they were to work. Two hours 

after H-hour, another designated zone was to be the area of their 

attacks with bombs and machine guns. After a certain length of time 

attacks were to be directed on another designated area. In short, all 

squadrons had complete information on what our ground troops were 

being done, the machines w a ich ordinarily worked on the sector of the 
332 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

doing, and what they were working, thereby giving great certainty to 

pilots in carrying out their work. It was also a wonderful help to pilots 

to know just what work every other squadron on that front was to do. 

Air supremacy was at all times in this push kept by the Allies. This 

was really the first time when definite systems in regard to ground 

straffing had been worked out. The results were more effective work 

with fewer casualties then previously. 

As the offensive in this sector advanced, the situation with respect 

to airdromes became rather acute. The ground over which troops had 

advanced was riddled with shell holes, and an airdrome could not be 

made in a short time. It was, therefore, necessary for squadrons to 

patrol too far away from their own airdromes to put in their full 

amount of time on the line. Too much time was consumed in going to 

and returning from the lines, thereby lessening the strength of the 

R.A.F. a considerable amount. 

About the 1st of September the scene of greatest activity was 

transferred from the Roye front to the sector immediately north of it, 

however, as the line advanced east from Peronne and Saint Quentin, 

this front remained active, though not as active as in the first days of 

the offensive. During the last days of August, the 148th Squadron and 

17th Squadron were put on the front between Arras and Albert, and 

operated on that front as the line moved east until the 1st of 

November. A tactical history, therefore, had best be given of 

operations on the front where the two American squadrons were 

working. 

About the 25th of August the British began a drive towards 

Bapaume. The developments in the air in this offensive were very far 

reaching. The drive may be divided into three parts, the first ending 

with the taking of Bapaume; the second with the crossing of the Canal 

du Nor4 the third with the taking of Cambrai and Le Cateau. 

For this push, the British had few squadrons available besides those 

which ordinarily took care of that front, but the number of machines 

available for the British during the first few days of the offensive was 

greater than the number of machines available for the enemy. 

During the first two days of the push, ground straffing was carried 

on very extensively, and the organization of protection patrols above 

and the sending out of ground straffing machines was systematically 

conducted. Enough squadrons were detailed to ground strafe, so that 

about six machines were kept over the lines on that mission all the 

time. Incidentally, they were a protection to our corps machines. They 

patrolled low at about 4,000 feet.10 There was also a high patrol of two 

or three flights of machines working practically all day. The 

arrangement worked splendidly for the first few days, during which 

time the weather was clear. During the following few days weather was 

bad and low clouds prevailed. Ground straffing machines were still 

, 
Pursuit Aviation 333 

sent out but not with adequate protection, for by that time the enemy 

had put more squadrons on the front. Some days when clouds should 

have prohibited a ground strafe, machines were called upon to 

perform missions six and ei&t miles beyond the line. Protecting 

patrols were supposed to be above the clouds, but there was no 

cooperation with the low-flying machines. Occasionally, however, 

when weather permitted, a well organized scheme would be arranged, 

putting over within an hour’s time all machines of two squadrons to 

bomb and machinegun troops. At the same time about six flights of 

machines would be used to protect them . . . [as well as some] twoseaters, which had work to carry out at the same time. This plan was 

really a departure from the British plan of not concentrating during 

certain periods of the day, as the enemy always did. The plan worked 

splendidly, but due to the shortage of squadrons, it could not be 

followed during many periods of the day without using up too many 

machines to carry on work during other periods. 

As a result of the ground straffing, the enemy ceased moving 

transport or troops in large bodies. One could seldom see over three 

motor trucks or horse drawn wagons together. A space of about a 

quarter of a mile would usually be left between them. Movement of 

troops in the daytime within five miles of the line practically ceased, 

while on our side transport and troops packed the roads until within a 

short distance of the line. The low bombing in this push forced the 

enemy to build numerous underground passages and shelters in all 

places extensively occupied. 

Due to the intensive activity on the ground, and the extensive 

operations of two-seaters and our lowflying pursuit planes, all 

patrolling was brought down lower than usual. Then the enemy 

pursuit planes most of the time flew low to combat our ground 

straffing machines. Few patrols were made above 14,000 feet. Most 

aerial activity was under 10,OOO feet. Lowering patrols in this manner 

gave the British better use of their available squadrons for ground 

straffing. During the first stage of this drive the enemy patrols were as 

a rule small for the purpose of combatting our low straffing machines, 

but some large formations of 30 or more machines made their 

appearance occasionally. 

During this stage of the push, the British held absolute air 

supremacy at all periods of every day. Our balloon line remained intact 

all the time, and our two-seaters worked from morning until night. The 

enemy could scarcely keep a balloon up, and their two-seaters seldom 

got within two miles of the line. 

During the second stage of the push, the time from the taking of 

Bapaume until the crossing of the Canal du Nord, aerial activity was as 

great, if not greater, than ever before. The enemy squadrons which 

moved in were exceedingly good. The 2nd Bavarian Pursuit Group 
334 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

was known to be there. The reason for the great enemy aerial activity 

on this front was that the Canal du Nord was a very important line for 

the enemy to hold. The R.A.F. was unable to put many more 

squadrons on this front than in the previous stage of the push, due to 

the fact that the Allies were carrying out an offensive on every part of 

their line. 

airdromes of the Allies were so far behind the lines that the time a 

machine could spend on the line was decreased from 45 to 30 minutes. 

This fact amounted to a decrease in the air force of 15 or 20 percent. 

The country was so riddled with shell holes that there were few sites 

for airdromes which did not require some time to put in shape for use. 

The country over which our machines had to fly in approaching and 

returning from the lines was in such a condition that a forced landing 

meant a crashed machine. 

During this stage of the push practically no ground straffing was 

carried out. The need was not so great; moreover, pursuit machines 

were necessary for regular patrol work to hold supremacy of the air. 

Patrols used in this stage were always of a large number of 

machines. The enemy always flew in large formation, still using his 

policy of concentration on certain hours of the day. The R.A.F. always 

had four or six flights working under one patrol leader. Less than four 

flights were useless. Then working in four or six flights, the bottom 

flight patrolled at a height between 12,000 and 14,000 feet, which 

placed the top flight about 18,000 feet. Other lower patrols of a 

strength of two or three flights would take care of work under 10,OOO 

feet. Occasionally, it was prescribed that the bottom flight of a six 

flight patrol would work at six or eight thousand feet. The British 

policy here was to keep two-seaters over the line at all hours of the 

day, and therefore, to keep pursuit patrols up at all hours of the day. 

The enemy policy was that of concentration. 

During this stage of the push, the British kept air supremacy more 

than half the time, but there were times when the enemy possessed 

supremacy. During these hours when the enemy concentrated his 

forces, twoseaters got over the line; however, not without difficulty. 

Many times an inferior number of our machines by maneuvering, and 

by staying off a fight, kept enemy two-seaters back when a superior 

number of enemy pursuit machines were present. During other 

periods of the day, our two-seaters were permitted to carry on their 

work uninterrupted. Our two-seaters accomplished many times the 

work accomplished by the enemy. Enemy balloons were able to carry 

on more work than previously, but nothing like as much work as ours 

carried on. Some British balloons were brought down, due to the 

advantage taken by the enemy of a salient in the line, and the wind 

direction. 

The enemy seemed to have plenty of airdromes, while the 
Pursuit Aviation 335 

It was a tactical error on the part of the R.A.F. to send out a large 

patrol of from four to six flights and prescribe that the bottom flight 

work at 6,000 or 8,000 feet. To do this threw the top flight too low to 

make it immune from attack. The top flight, or protecting flight, must 

always be in a position where attack on it is impossible. It would have 

been a better plan, where only four or six flights were available, to take 

care of the front at a given time. To order the bottom two or three 

flights to work between 6,000 and 10,000 feet, and the top two or three 

flights to work between 15,000 and 18,000 feet. The distance between 

patrols is too great for close cooperation, but better air supremacy can 

be kept than by having a larger unit more compact but with the top 

machines too low. 

The war in the air, which was fought while the battle line was at the 

Canal du Nord, during the latter part of the month of September, was 

probably the hardest that has ever been fought. The enemy made a 

good bid for air supremacy. He did not get it. His morale, however, did 

strengthen greatly during September. The Fokker bi-plane was better 

than any pursuit machine on the front, and to that fact can be 

attributed the enemy’s aggressiveness. Patrol leading became the 

most important factor in determining air supremacy. The enemy 

patrol leaders showed skill and ability in handling patrols of several 

flights. The superiority of the British patrol leaders, however, was 

responsible more than any other factor for keeping air supremacy. 

In that stage of the drive which extended from September 27 until 

the last of October, which dates include the taking of Cambrai and La 

Cateau, the war in the air was not on such a large scale as during the 

previous period. The enemy had few good squadrons of pursuit 

machines on the front. The British kept there practically the same 

number that had been there in the previous stage. 

On the day of the crossing of the Canal du Nord, and for a few days 

following, some effective ground straffing was done. The method 

emdoved was to have certain squadrons detailed to work all day from 
336 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

advanced landing grounds, in order to bomb and machine gun any 

good targets reported by observation machines. Later, when the line 

had advanced to Cambrai, machines were ordered to carry bombs 

and strafe ground targets from a low altitude, and then carry on with a 

patrol, patrols usually consisting of five or six flights, the bottom three 

to carry bombs and the top flights to serve as their escort. As a slight 

departure from this plan, after moving ground targets became difficult 

to find, low straffing was ordered to be carried out on cities used as 

concentration centers, as far back of the line as eight miles. However, 

pilots would not go low when 8 miles inland. Towns four or five miles 

back of the lines were bombed from 2,000 and 3,000 feet, but those 8 

miles back were bombed from 6,000 to 8,000 feet. 

The size of the enemy patrols remained large in this stage of the 

push, but the enemy did not seem to have enough machines to carry 

out work many hours of the day. The enemy could not keep balloons 

up, and two-seaters could not get near the line. Our corps machines 

carried on work almost without interruption from daylight until dark, 

and our balloon line was always thick with balloons. Whenever an 

enemy balloon was put up, it was forced to work under 2,000 feet. The 

R.A.F. possessed absolute air supremacy at all times during this stage 

of the push. 

From a tactical standpoint, the R.A.F. squadrons were not well 

managed by the staff during this push in all cases. The policy of having 

squadrons on advanced landing grounds to do ground strafing on 

targets reported by other machines is good. The policy of sending 

out a strong patrol and requiring the bottom flights to do ground 

straffing is bad. The effectiveness of the patrol is ruined. If the lower 

machines cross the lines at a low altitude, the protecting patrol must 

come to the line at a low altitude. Effective ground straffing can be 

carried out, but the patrol is ruined. Following this plan, the patrol 

must get its height on the lines, which means that there will never be 

an enemy formation below it, or in a position to be attacked by it. The 

policy of directing low bombing on concentration centers deserves 

approval, but it is questionable whether the damage done at the time 

was worth wasting a strong pursuit patrol for. It seems that 

bombardment machines may have been used to better advantage for 

destruction, and the pursuit machines used to better advantage by 

properly arranged patrols. 

In addition to tactics employed during an offensive, there are certain 

other tactics of aerial warfare carried on by the R.A.F. with which 

Americans who worked with the British are familiar. The operations 

may have been carried out in an offensive, but were also carried out on 

practically all fronts at all times. Wireless interception, balloon 

straffing, anti-aircraft use, and escorting of bombers deserve some 

mention. 
Pursuit Aviation 337 

By wireless interception is meant the interception of messages of 

enemy observation machines at two different stations, and thereby 

pin-pointing the location of the enemy twoseater. Immediately the 

information as to the location of the enemy machine is sent to a 

squadron which is operating close to the lie, and two or three 

machines which had been standing by for the message were 

immediately dispatched. Machines used for this purpose were always 

rotary motored because of their ability to leave the ground without 

warming up. Thii practice was exceedingly successful. As a rule, the 

enemy machine would be found at the designated spot. If the enemy 

machine were not destroyed, its work would at least be broken off. 

The methods of the R.A.F. employed in keeping down enemy 

balloons do not deserve a great amount of mention, because it was not 

as a rule organized effort. Enemy balloons, however, did little work. 

The R.A.F. held such air supremacy that the single machine was 

usually safe from enemy aircraft in attacking a balloon. During 

offensives some organized balloon straffs were carried out. A method 

commonly employed was to have two machines detailed to straff the 

balloons, both machines carrying incendiary ammunition. These two 

machines would have sufficient protection to make them safe from 

enemy aircraft. Sometimes the number of flights would be three, 

sometimes six, depending upon the conditions. Another method 

employed was to have certain machines of a low patrol carry 

ammunition for balloons with orders to carry on an ordinary patrol 

and attack balloons, if up. S.E.-5s were capable of doing better balloon 

strafing than any other machines on the British front because of their 

superior speed and zoom. One method of carrying out a balloon straff, 

with lessened risk from ground fire, was to have a number of machines 

carry bombs and drop them in the vicinity of the winch or the sources 

of ground fire. The ground fire was too effective by the enemy in the 

last part of the war, that it was very important to diminish it if possible. 

Anti-aircraft batteries on the British front did not cooperate with 

machines in the air in an effective way. The enemy seemed to have 

quite a good system of signals. The answer may be given that 

practically all flying was on the enemy’s side of the lines. This is true 

but the greatest effectiveness of anti-aircraft does not lie in the actual 

destruction of machines, but in a means of signals to airplanes. The 

principle was recognized by the enemy, but seemingly not by the 

British. British machines on patrol were most of the time in a position 

to be signalled to by anti-aircraft batteries, but there was practically no 

cooperation. 

American squadrons and Americans with R.A.F. squadrons 

performed a great deal of work escorting bombers. Most British 

pursuit squadrons did not attempt to escort bombers to their 

destination. The pursuit machines would follow the bombers over the 
338 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

lines about 15 miles, at 2,000 or 3,000 feet above, and leave them, and 

probably not see them again until the bombers arrived back at the line. 

The 148th and 17th Aero Squadrons, however, performed some very 

good escorts, going right over to the objective to be bombed, flying 

right with or a little above the machines they were escorting. This was 

made possible due to the personal relationship of the pilots of the 

pursuit and bombing squadrons. 

The pursuit machines being used for escort were the Sopwith 

Camel, S.E.-5s, and, during October, the Sopwith Snipe. The Camel 

was a slower machine than the bombers, and did not have the gliding 

angle. 

The difficulty in pursuit machines escorting bombers was that once 

in a fight, the bombers would put their noses down for home, and 

leave the pursuit machines to fight too far on the enemy side of the 

lines. If the two-seater machines would stay to fight, the situation 

would have been simple. The speed and gliding angle of the bombers 

allowed them to pull right away from a Sopwith Camel or an other 

machine which turned back to fight. Most pursuit pilots would, 

therefore, dislike to escort bombing planes to their destination. 

If the speed of the pursuit machine is as great as the speed of the 

bombing planes and of the enemy pursuit, they may escort bombers 

successfully to their destination. It is necessary, however, to secure 

perfect cooperation between the escort and the escorted. If in a fight, 

both must fight. The two-seaters can protect the single-seaters from 

attack from above, and the single-seaters can protect the two-seaters 

from attack from below. 

The British have been criticized in their extensive use of ground 

straffing with pursuit machines on the grounds that their work is 

merely combat work. Ground straffing came into use by necessity in 

the March drive, and it there proved to be worth far more than its use 

cost. Its effects in the enemy drive at Noyon cannot be overestimated. 

Reserves were broken up, and transport columns were dispersed. In 

allied pushes, straffing was not so necessary, but its work was equally 

effective. Ground straffing is important because of the actual 

destruction done, but is more important because of its moral effect on 

the enemy. Whether or not an Air Service can do ground strafing 

depends upon the state of air supremacy held. If absolute air 

supremacy is held by an air force, pursuit machines may be spared to 

do ground strafing, and that air supremacy still be held. However, if 

absolute air supremacy is not possessed, machines cannot be spared 

to do ground straffing because their primary purpose is to gain air ‘ 

supremacy. 

A criticism, however, that can be made of the management of 

R.A.F. pursuit squadrons is on the policy of making squadrons “stand 

by” for patrols or ground strafes. Operations were made easier for the 
Pursuit Aviation 339 

Wing management by this, but it detracted from the efficiency of the 

pilots. Many times pilots were kept on alert for hours, and for no 

apparent reason. During great offensives, it may be necessary to keep 

squadrons standing by, but every effort should be made on the part of 

the command to avoid this at all times possible, and if pilots must be 

kept on alert, the command should be careful to relieve them from 

duty at the first possible moment. By this means and by others, the 

command should always endeavor to keep pilots in the best fighting 

condition. 

Throughout the period in which Americans worked with the British, 

it will have been observed that the British always held supremacy of 

the air. This is due to the fact that the R.A.F. recognized the principle 

that an Air Force to be of assistance to ground troops must be 

offensive. The war in the air must be carried to the enemy’s side of the 

line. The line of equal safety for machines of both sides should be a line 

that distance behind the enemy line where the corps observation 

machines can do their most effective work. The R.A.F. recognized this 

principle, and succeeded in establishing that line. 

attributed to a combination of many factors, but the most important 

factor was the early development in the R.A.F. of formation fighting. 

The R.A.F. first made the formation a unit as a departure from the 

principle of a single machine being independent. The tactical unit was 

recognized to be the flight, composed of five or six machines. That 

was considered to be the largest number of machines capable of being 

handled as one body under one leader. In the latter days of the war, 

when patrols of six flights were placed under one leader, the flight of 

five or six machines remained the tactical unit, and the development 

was one of co-operation between units. 

American Air Service because the Americans who operated there are 

familiar only with the use of those tactics. The methods of the R.A.F. 

were the methods of the 148th squadron and the 17th squadron, and 

of various American pilots who did all their work in R.A.F. squadrons. 

The tactical history of American Air Service pursuit units on the 

British front is brought out by the tactical history of the Royal Air 

Force in operations in which American pilots and squadrons 

participated. 

The success in establishment of this air supremacy can be 

This tactical history of the Royal Air Force is important to the 

341 

On October 12, the 2nd Army Air Service came into existence with 

Headquarters at Toul. It was not until October 25, however, that the 

first units of pursuit were developed. This consisted of the 4th Pursuit 

Group, located at the Toul airdrome, composed of one squadron, the 

141st, which had started operations on October 23. Subsequently, 

three more squadrons, the 25th, 17th and lath, joined the group, and 

preparations for the proposed offensive of November 10,ll were 

formulated. Airplanes were very hard to get, and these units were not 

able to operate to their greatest efficiency as a result. Pursuit work, 

therefore, was confined to the activities of the 141st squadron, which 

carried out a number of patrols of the sector, and several patrols for 

the protection of photographic and reconnaissance machines. During 

these patrols the squadron engaged in thirteen combats, and shot 

down two enemy airplanes, without loss. 

The 141st and 25th squadrons, carefully trained, and working with 

the experienced 17th and 148th from the British front, would have in 

all probability, under the experienced group staff, produced excellent 

results on the front, and the commanding officers, benefitting by the 

experience of the first three groups, worked hard to prepare this 

group for its introduction as one of the pursuit groups of the Second 

Army. 

Insignia of the 25th Aero Squadron 

(top) and of the 141st Aero Squadron 

(Bottom). Maj. Reed G. Landis 

(right), commanding the 25th. shot 

down 1 I enemy aircraft. 

343 

Appendix A. 

Headquarters, Air Service, First Army, 

American Expeditionary Forces. 

September llth, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 1. 

1. The enemy is losing ground, personnel and material at all points of the 

front on which the allied armies are attacking. On the front of the first Army 

he is holding the line Pont-sur-Seille-St. Mihiel-Fresnes-en-WoevreChatillon-sous-les-Cotes in his old positions. His Air Service is estimated at 

150 pursuits, 120 reconnaissance and 25 battle air planes, whiih is being 

reinforced. The strength of his ground troops is estimated at about seven 

divisions, with from three to five divisions in reserve. The strength and morale 

of these divisions is reported low. There are signs that he intends to withdraw 

from his first lines and make his main resistance at some point further to 

the rear. 

2. The First Army attacks on the whole front on 12 September, 1918. The 

hour of the attack will be 5 H, 12 September, 1918. The 1st and 4th Corps will 

attack at H hour. The 5th Corps will attack at H hour plus three hours. The 

Second French Colonial Corps will attack as follows: 

bombardment will commence as follows: 

1st and 4th Corps H minus four hours. 5th Corps H minus four hours. The 

Second Colonial Corps will attack at H minus four hours. 

3. OUR AIR SERVICE WILL TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AT ALL POINTS 

WITH THE OBJECT OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S AIR SERVICE, 

ATTACKING HIS TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND PROTECTING OUR 

OWN AIR AND GROUND TROOPS. 

4. (a) The Corps Sectors of reconnaissance are as announced in Annex #3, 

Field Orders #9, Appendix #4, dated September 7, 1918. Particular attention is 

to be paid to minute reconnaissance of the enemy lines to determine whether 

he has been reinforced or has changed his dispositions. Important information 

involving immediate action obtained by Corps Air Services will be sent by 

telephone, radio or courier airplane to the C.A.S., 1st Army, or to the nearest 

brigade of the French Air Divisiin.*1 

(b) The 1st Army Observation Group (Reynolds) will execute the 

reconnaissances and surveillance as ordered in the plan of reconnaissance, 

Annex #3, Field Orders #9, Appendix #4, dated September 7th, 1918. Particular 

attention is to be paid to minute reconnaissance of the enemy lines to 

determine whether he has been reinforced or has changed his dispositions. 

Important information involving immedlate action obtained by our Air Services 

The attack west of the 4th Corps at H plus one hour. 

The attack south of the 5th Corps at H plus four hours. The artillery 
344 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

will be sent by telephone, radio or courier plane to the C.A.S., 1st Army, or to 

the nearest brigade of the French Air Division. Three airplanes will be held 

ready to execute any special reconnaissance ordered. 

(c) The Army Artillery Group12 (Block) will execute the observation 

ordered for the Artillery to which it is attached. Important information involving 

immediate action obtained by Air Services will be sent by telephone, radio or courier airplane to the C.A.S., 1st Army or to the nearest brigade of the French 

Air Division. 

(d) The First Pursuit Wing, (Atkinson) will cover the front Pont-surSeille-St. Mihiel, inclusive. An absolute barrage13 will be established against 

enemy aviation, our own observation aviation will be protected and an attack 

against all balloons exposing themselves on this front will be made early in 

the morning. After 900 A.M., one pursuit group loaded with bombs will be 

held in reserve to be used for the purpose of attack of hostile troops or 

convoys on the ground, so as to be ready to leave the ground 15 minutes after 

the receipt of the order. 

The First Bombardment Group will attack the hostile division and corps 

posts of command and such enemy positions as present a suitable target. 

The right flank of the 1st Pursuit Wing will be protected by the First Brigade 

(French) Aerial Division and the Aerial defenses of the 8th French Army. Close 

liaison will be maintained by the 1st Pursuit Wing (Atkinson) with both of these 

and with the Army Corps so as to keep close track of the advance of the 

troops. 

les Cotes-St. Mihiel, inclusive. A barrage will be maintained against hostile 

aviation, observation aviation will be protected and hostile balloons will be 

attacked opposite the front of the 5th Corps. 

with which close liaison will be maintained. Close liaison will also be kept with 

the Corps Air Services so as to keep track of the advance of the troops. 

(f) The Army Night Bombing and Reconnaissance Wing,’4 (Major 

Villome) will execute the night reconnaissance directed as provided for. 

Railroad Centers and airdromes will be bombed systematically as provided for 

in the plan of employment. Particular attention will be paid to the German 

Night Bombing Airdromes. 

the enemy’s aviation and troops on the ground. The brigades will execute 

successive attacks, passing over both sides of the St. Mihiel salient. On the 

right (east) of the area opposite the front of the 1st and 4th Army Corps and on 

the left (west) opposite the front of the Fifth Army Corps and on the left of the 

Second Colonial Corps the meeting point of these two axes approximately the area Jonville-Hadenville-Chambley. The principle being to operate along the axes indicated so as to take the enemy aviation in reverse and force it towards our lines. Attacks will be made against the ground troops of the enemy when 

occasion offers. 

The bombardment aviation will attack the objects on the ground which show 

themselves to be the most dangerous as operations develop. 

Provision will be made for guarding the 1st Army’s right flank against hostile 

air attack. Close liaison will be maintained by radio and courier planes with the 

Corps Air Services so as to insure the air division’s cooperation in the attack. 

(e) The First Pursuit Group, (Hartney) will cover the front Chatillon sous 

The left flank will be protected by the aerial defenses of the 2nd French Army 

(9) The French Air Division (Vaulgremant) will take the offensive against 
Pursuit Aviation 345 

5. The Equipment Section will hold itself ready to insure the supply and 

movement of any units required. 

6. The Army Dropping Ground for messages from airplanes is a point two 

and one-half kilometers southeast of Ligny-en-Barrois. The Army Landing Field 

is Maulan, six kilometers east of Ligny-en-Barrois. The 1st Day Bombardment 

Group will provide a detail of four command airplanes to take station at 

Maulan, beginning at 7:00 A.M. September 12th. 

7. Reports will reach the Chief of Air Service at Headquarters Air Service, 

First Army, Ligny-en-Barrois. 

A liaison officer from each Corps Air Service, each Wing or independent 

group of the Army Air Service, and the French Aerial Division will report at the 

Headquarters, C.A.S., 1st Army, at 21-00H each day to receive orders. 

A liaison officer for the Night Bombardment Group, (Villome) will report at 

the Headquarters, C.A.S., 1st Corps at 14-OOH each day to receive orders. 

William Mitchell. 

Read and explained to assembled 

Corps Air Service Commanders, 

Group Commanders, 

Wing Commanders, 

Chief of Staff of the Air Division, 

Staff of the C.A.S., 1st Army at 15-30, September 11, 1918, without giving H 

hour. 
346 

/ 

US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Appendix B. 

Headquarters 1st Pursuit Wing 

Operations Office 

October 31st, 1918 

Operations Order 

No. 61 for Nov. lst, 1918. 

1. Information of the enemy: It is reported by the Intelligence that the 

Pursuit Air Service of the enemy in our immediate front has been greatly 

increased. This is evident from the number of planes seen and encountered 

during the last few days. There were known to be a total of 48 flights, all 

branches, before this increase. 

The greater portion of the enemy ground reserves for the sector, 

GRANDPRE-MEUSE RIVER, are reported to be bivouaced in the BOIS DE LA 

FOLIE, BOlS DE BARRICOURT and the BOlS DANDREVANNE. 

2. Plan of Operations: The First Army will attack on the front, GRANDPREAINCREVILLE at H hour. Artillery preparation will begin at H-2 hour. 

The line held by the First Army is as follows: 

Northern edge of GRANDPRE to southern edge of BOlS DES LOGES, 

through CHAMPIGNEULLE, through ST. GEORGES, just south of 

LANDRES-ST. GEORGE, around northern edges of BOIS DE 

BANTHEVILLE to northern edge of AINCREVILLE, along southern edge of 

BOlS DE BABIEMONT, northern edge of CLERY-LE-CRAND, through 

As soon after the launching of this attack as possible, this wing will bomb the 

three woods mentioned in Paragraph 1, this order, with its entire strength of 

Day Bombers and Pursuit, less one squadron of Pursuit which will be held out 

for the protection of the front on the return of this mission. The First Pursuit 

Group will cooperate with this expedition. 

3. (a) The Second firsuit Group: One Squadron will be held to maintain 

the barrage of the front immediately after the return of the expedition ordered 

in the above paragraph. Three squadrons will bomb the northern edge of the 

BOIS DE BARRICOURT as accurately as this can be done from 3OOO meters. 

After bombs are dropped they will meet and accompany the day bombers to 

the line, and then take up the patrol of the attacking front (GRANDPREAINCREVILLE), between 2500 and 4OOO meters to the limit of their gas. 

45, and will be on alert after 13 h 00. 

from low altitude; squadrons will arrive at their respective areas at “H” hour. 

One squadron will bomb and ground-straff the road BAYOMIILLEBARRICOURT. It is reported that there are eight occupied hangars along this 

road. One squadron will bomb and ground-straff the area REMONVILLECLERY -LE-PETIT. 

Bombs should be released at “H hour minus ten minutes. 

This Group will have the protection of the front during the morning until 11 h 

(b) The Third Pursuit Group: This Group will bomb and ground-straff 
Pursuit Aviation 347 

ANDREVANNE and any targets that may be presented in edge of the woods 

immediately north of that road. One squadron will bomb and ground-straff the 

area ANDEVILLE-LES-TUILERIES. All of these squadrons will return over the 

route IMECOURT-BEFFU-GRANDPRE. 

The Group will remain on alert after return from this mission until 11 h 15 

and will maintain the prescribed patrols over the sector from 11 h 15 until dark. 

FOLIE at “H” hour from 3000 meters. 

from the point where that road enters the BOIS DE LA FOLIE to where this 

road turns sharply northeast toward NOUART. 

through the BOIS DE LA FOLIE. This road leaves the BUZANCY-NOUART 

road at a point 800 meters west of the sharp bend to the northeast. 

4. 7he First Pursuit Group: Will furnish protection to the Third Pursuit 

Group, flying at about 900 to lo00 meters over the area which the Third Group 

is covering. 

(c) 7he First Day Bombardment Group: Will bomb the BOIS DE LA 

One squadron will bomb along the road running due east from BUZANCY, 

Two squadrons will bomb the unimproved road which runs northeast 

By order of Lt. Col. Atkinson: 

John Wentworth, 

Captain, Air Service, 

Assistant Operations Officer15 

Copies by Courier to: 

1st P. G. 

2nd P. G. 

3rd P. G. 

1st Day B. G. 
348 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Appendix C. 

First Pursuit Group 

Operations Office 

October 22nd, 1918 

Operations Order 

Number 41. 

1. The 185th squadron will stand on alert to protect our back areas against 

all hostile bombing planes which may cross the lines along the eastern zone or 

the northern zone. 

Time 

18h30 to 19h20 

19h30 to 20h30 

2oh30 to 21h30 

21h30 to 223130 

22h30 to 23h30 

23h30to Oh30 

lh30to 2h30 

Squadron 

185th 

185th 

185th 

185th 

185th 

185th 

185th 

SCHEDULE “B 

On Alert 

2 planes 

2 planes 

2 planes 

2 planes 

2 planes 

2 planes 

2 planes 

1. A plane will be dispatched from the 147th Squadron to destroy the enemy 

balloon at MONTIGNY. This plane will arrive at the balloon location at dawn. 

Twenty (20) minutes before the plane leaves the ground the 147th Squadron 

operations will notify the power plant as to the time of departure. 

Leave at 520 Dawn 6hOO 

SCHEDULE “C” 

SquadTime ron 

6h00to 8hOO 94 

7h00to 9hOO 147 

8hOOto lOhOO 27 

9hOOtollhOO 95 

lOhOO to 12hOO 147 

llhOO to 13hOO 95 

llh00 to 13h00 27 

No. 

Planes Route To Patrol Alt . 3 Grande Pre Champigneulles 600 m 

3 Brieuliss Bantheville 600m 

6 Consenveye Beaumont to 600m 

3 Sommerance Landres St. George 600 m 

6 St. Juvin Champigneulles 600 m 

3 Cunel Bantheville 600m 

6 ON ALERT 

to Beaumont 

to Beaumont 

C hampigneulles 

to Brieulles 

to Beaumont 

to Beaumont 
Pursuit Aviation 349 

Squad- No. 

Time ron Planes Route To Patrol Alt. 

12hOO to 13hOO 95 6 ON ALERT 

12hOOto 14hOO 94 3 Chatel- Champigneulles 600m 

13hOOto 15hOO 94 3 Charny Beaumont to 600m 

14hOO to l6hOO 94 3 Apremont St. Juvin to 600m 

15h30 to Dusk 94 3 Sommerance Landres St. George 600 m 

St. Juvin 600m 

Chehery to Beaumont 

Bantheville 

Landres St. George 

SCHEDULE "D 

1. A concentrated patrol of the 147th, 95th and 27th squadrons will be flown 

(a) At 15 h OO all available planes of the 147th Squadron will proceed to 

(b) At 15 h 05 all available planes of the 27th Squadron will proceed to the 

(c) At 15 h 10 all available planes of the 95th Squadron will proceed to the 

at 15 h 00. 

the lines by the way CORNAY and MARCQ to CUNEL, at 600 meters. 

lines by way of CONSENVOYE AND DANNEVOUX to CUNEL at 600 

meters. 

lines direct to CUNEL at 600 meters. 

2. The three squadron formations will rendezvous over CUNEL at 15 h 35 

and will proceed to scour the BJWS from BEAUMONT to 

CHAMPIGNEULLES. The 95th Squadron will acts as the pivot squadron. The 

147th and 27th squadrons will conform with and keep in touch with the 95th 

Squadron. 

SCHEDULE "E 

1. At 16 h 20 the 94th and 95th Squadrons will plan to dispatch one balloon 

straffer each for balloon locations which will be given later in the day. 

By order of Major Hartney 

Arthur L. Cunningham 

1st Lt. A.S.U.S.A. 

Group Operations Officer 

Copies to: 27,94,95, 147. 

C.A.S. 1st Army. 

C.O. First Pursuit Wing. 
350 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Appendix D. 

Percentage of Casualties; killed, wounded missing; 

to average number of available Pursuit 

Pilots at Front. 

Month Pilots Casualties Percentage 

April 20 0 0 

May 34 8 23.5 

June 77 5 6.5 

July 128 23 17.9 

August 147 15 10.2 

September 265 37 13.9 

October 270 34 13.6 

November 222 29* 13.1* 

*Prorated. 

Source: Group and Squadron Operations Report, 1918. 
Pursuit Aviation 351 

Appendix E. 

ENEMY AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN BY lST, 2ND, & 3RD 

PURSUIT COMPARED WITH AMERICAN PURSUIT CASUALTIES 

600‘ 

400. 

200. 

0. 

MAR APR k 

/ 

/ / 

- ’ JUN JUL AUG 8EP OCT NOV 

00 12 37 60 114 159 332 520 574 

(E) 0 4 16 21 60 81 208 718 419 

(C) 1 1 8 14 37 52 89 123 133 

(A) AlrenR ole1m.d. (9) Alffinft wnflrmed. (C) American punult ce~ueltiea. 
352 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Appendix F. 

ENEMY PLANES BROUGHT DOWN 

BY AMERICAN PURSUIT 

COMPARED WITH AMERICAN PURSUIT CASUALTIES 

RATIO OF 

CONFIRMED VICTORIES 

TO CASUALTIES BY GROUP 

I I 

4th Punult Has 2 Vlctorlar I0 Casu#tios 

0 250 I 

Victorlor W. Crs~taltlrs 166 

" 201 " 73 

'' 131 " 34 

" 87 " 26 

" 123 " 33 

1 760 
Pursuit Aviation 353 

Appendix G. 

Planes on Hand, Planes Available for Duty, and 

Pilots Available, First Second, and Third 

Pursuit Groups, A.E.k.* 

Plapes S e rvi c a b I e 

Date on I-$and Planes 

17/4-2314 19 15 

24/4-3014 20 17 

v5-7/5 19 15 

8/5-14/5 44 32 

1515-21/5 40 29 

22/5-28/5 34 26 

2915-416 50 44 

516-11/6 85 53 

12/6-18/6 67 56 

19/6-2516 716 70 

26/6-2/7 78 70 

3/7-9/7 do 37 

1017-16/7 129 71 

17/7-2317 148 * 92 

110 

105 

24/7-3017 w 

31/7-6/8 177 

7~8-i3~a 2x3 105 

14/a-20/8 241 106 

21/8-2718 252 131 

28/8-3/9 282 157 

419-1019 294 183 

lY9- 1719 3@ 221 

18/9-24/9 369 246 

251% 11 10 377 245 

2/10-8/10 36D 240 

91 10- 151 10 366 257 

16/10-22/10 29P 189 

23110-29/10 277 161 

30110-5/11 28’l 161 

6/11-11/11 285 166 

Source: Group Operations Reports, 1918. 

Available 

Pilots 

20 

20 

20 

35 

35 

33 

75 

75 

80 

80 

85 

95 

132 

143 

141 

130 

142 

139 

178 

229 

235 

286 

293 

285 

293 

317 

240 

230 

222 

223 

L 
354 
PURt 5 

Tactical Historzy OF 

Day Bornbanament- 

I. Frzom the Beginning to 

the St. Mihiel Oggensiue. 

357 

Day bombardment had its beginning May 18, when the 96th Aero 

Squadron, the first unit of day bombardment was established on the 

Amanty airdrome to begin active operations against the enemy. The 

airdrome proper has an immense field which was leveled and rolled by 

an American construction squadron. When the field was finished 

eighteen to twenty planes could assemble on the ground and takeoff in 

formation. The surrounding country is semi-mountainous, and is 

notable for large tracts of forest, which afford very few fields suitable 

for forced landings. That portion of the front between the Meuse and 

the Moselle rivers, and known as the Toul sector, had been quiet for 

more than three years, and afforded excellent opportunities for 

perfecting precision bombing and training pilots and observers. 

The lines of the sector had assumed the shape of a gigantic V with 

the point at St. Mihiel, the left arm extending north along the Meuse 

beyond Verdun, and the right arm crossing the Moselle at Pont-aMousson. The objectives chosen for attack were situated at the 

opening of this V. By crossing the lines at either arm of the V, 

depending upon the direction of the wind, and recrossing at the other 

arm, the minimum amount of time spend over hostile territory. The 

railroad centers in the heart of the V were extremely important in the 

enemy’s network system of communication and supply. The Briey iron 

mines, which furnished the bulk of Germany’s munition material, were 

situated at the opening of the V. To tap their ore supply the Germans 

had built a double and four track railway system with centers at 

Conflans, Longuyon, Dommary -Baroncourt and Audun-IeRoman. 

These four railroad centers were chosen as the primary objectives of 

the 96th squadron. Railroads, munitions depots, detraining points, 

command posts, and such dstributing points as Yhiacourt, Vigneulles, 

and Mars-la-Tour were secondary objectives, to be attacked if the 

important targets were ubscured by clouds. 

When bombing operations began in the Toul sector there was very 

little opposition from hositile aircraft. The principal airdromes were 

clustered around Metz, Mars-la-Tour, Longuyon, Conflans, and Briey. 

The V shape of the salient, though favorable for rapid bombing raids, 

made it possible for enemy pursuit airplanes from either flank of the 

sector to join in the attack on the bombers. Pilots and observers often 

watched enemy airplanes leave their airdromes to engage the 

formation Ln combat. The speed and climbing ability of the Fokker and 

Pfalz enabled enemy pilots to wait until a raiding formation had 

crossed the lines before taking to the air. This advantage gave them 

the maximum time for combat before exhausting their fuel. Their plan 

was to gain altitude, attack from the sun or some favorable position, 

then continue to harass the bombers until the lines were recrossed. 

The anti-aircraft defenses at the lines and around the principal 

objectives were excellent. Barely were the lines crossed without 

4 
358 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

~~~ ~- ~~~~~ ~~ 

running a fierce barrage of shell fire. The batteries at Conflans and 

Metz were the most accurate and persistent in the sector. The enemy 

also used his anti-aircraft batteries as a means to warn his pursuit 

airplanes of the presence of a raiding formation. A line of bursts 

pointed toward the formation of bombers would invariably call the 

enemy patrols to combat. 

The French squadrons, operating in this sector, had reported a gap 

in the chain of anti-aircraft batteries before Verdun and St. Mihiel, but 

every attempt by the bombers to find it drew a barrage of shrapnel and 

high explosive. 

The flying equipment of the 96th Squadron consisted of ten 

bombing airplanes, type Breguet 14 B 2, equipped with 300 

horsepower type 12 F. E. V. Renault motors,' which had been 

transferred from the 7th Aviation Instruction Center. These airplanes 

had been used at the school for instruction purposes for seven 

months, and were in constant need of major repairs. It was impossible 

to get spare parts. The squadron mechanics, when ordered to get the 

Breguets ready for duty over the lines, were forced to utilize worn out 

farm machinery discarded by the peasants in the vicinity of the 

airdrome. Parts of an old harvester were used for tail posts, wagon 

tires were cut up to make tail skids, and pieces of an ox-cart tongue 

were employed to reinforce the wing spars. One of the bombers 

carried brace wires which had once served on the telenhone line of 

communications. Due to the ingenuity of the mechanics the squadron 

was ready for operations long before spare parts became available. 

The Breguet bomber can carry 500 pounds of bombs to 4,000 

meters in thirty-five minutes. The bombs are attached to a bomb 

dropping device in the lower wings, which is operated by an oil 

pressure gear. The gear is adjusted, by calculating the ground speed of 

the airplane, to make a trail of bursts 120 meters in length. In 

operations against the enemy the bombs used for destruction of 

material were the Michelin 155 mm. and the 115 mm. long and short.* 

These were fragmentation and penetration bombs, and were 

exploded by delayed fuses. Incendiary bombs were used against 

buildings. The 90 mm. personnel bombs, both steel and cast steel, 

exploded on contact, and were used against troops. For some 

objectives an assortment of sizes and types was carried on each 

airplane. The Michelin improved bomb sight was used for aiming at the 

target? The aiming was done by the leading observer, who pulled his 

bomb dropping lever at the right instant, and the other pilots or 

observers released their bombs immediately afterward. 

For armament the observer on the Breguet carried a pair of Lewis 

machine guns, stripped of the cooling devices, and mounted on a 

tourelle.4 A Vickers gun, synchronized to shoot through the propeller 
Day 

Bombardment 

359 

was the pilot’s weapon. Later a fixed tunnel gun was mounted in the 

fuselage to shoot under the tail, as the enemy’s favorite point of attack 

was the blind spot where he was screened from the observer’s tourelle 

gun by the stabilizer. 

The personnel of the 96th Squadron consisted of American trained 

pilots and observers, and mechanics, who had received instruction at 

the 7th Aviation Instruction Center, Clermont-Ferrand. Several 

teams, including the flight leeders and leading observers, had been 

sent to French bombing squadrons to acquire experience over the 

lines. While the squadron was waiting for equipment further 

instruction was given the personnel by fliers from the British 55th 

Squadron, Independent Air Force. 

Before the St. Mihiel cipergtions orders were received from the 

Chief of the Air Service, 1st Army Corps, with headquarters at Toul. 

Objectives were designated by the chief of the group of French armies. 

An operations office was established at the airdrome with full 

information, maps, and photographs of the sector. Telephonic liaison 

was effected between this office and headquarters. 

In a quiet sector day bombardment has a threefold object, the 

destruction of material, reconnaissance, and observation of enemy 

tactics in combat. Except during an offensive there is but little 

opportunity to attack massd troops. The principal mission during 

such a period is to destroy the enemy’s transport lines by which 

supplii and personnel are delivered to the front, or by which ore and 

other products of military importance are delivered to the rear. The 

most favorable targets ate the railroad centers where the traffic 

arteries converge. The railrdad yards at Conflans was an easy target 

to hit, and so arranged that a trail of bombs placed across the neck of 

the tracks would interrupt the traffic. It was observed that closing the 

Conflans yards even for a day would cause a congestion of cars in the 

railroad yards at Dommary-Baroncourt. The latter target would then 

be attacked, causing even further diversion of the traffic. Conflans 

would be again attacked with similar results. Munition depots and 

stores of material also offered favorable targets, but were not attacked 

unless for some reason the bombers could not reach a railroad center. 

The long distance raids proved wonderful opportunities for deep 

reconnaissance especially of enemy railroad movements. Any 

pronounced current of railroad traffic, going in one direction, or 

converging at one point, would be reported by every observer making 

that particular raid. Further confirmation was unnecessary, for the 

observers were obliged to submit their written raid reports without 

consulting each other. Photographs of the bursts often revealed troop 

and construction activity at the objectives, and were subject to careful 

interpretation. In preparing for the St. Mihiel offensive the pilots and 

observers watched closely the enemy tactics in combat, noting 

Day 

Bombardment 

361 

especially his methods of attacking formations of bi-place airplanes. 

The lessons learned proved of immense value in the succeeding 

offensives. 

Many types of formations were tried before the one most suitable 

for the Breguet was adopted. Upon the advice of the British the V 

formation of six airplanes was tried. The second and third airplane flew 

fifty meters above and behind the leader, the last three fifty meters 

below. It was found, however, that the construction of the Breguet 

would not permit a formation of this type. The pilot has insufficient 

visibility to the front to hold his position in relation to the other 

airplanes. The French open V, stepped up from the leader, was also 

tried, but did not afford enough self protection unless carried out in 

echelons of three flights. A V formation of seven airplanes, with the 

seventh closing the V at the rear, was found best in consideration of 

the limited supply of airplanes. The formation was compact and 

mobile. The pilots flew at fifty meters distance from each other until 

preparing a bomb, when they closed in to thirty meters, and in case of 

attack to twenty meters. 

The first bombing mission carried out by the 96th Squadron was on 

June 12, when railroad yards at Dommary-Baroncourt were 

successfully attacked by a formation of six Breguets. Nearly a ton of 

bombs were dropped, making a trail of explosions across the yards, 

and some hitting a warehouse beside the tracks. Enemy airplanes 

were encountered but no losses occurred. The raid required nearly 

four hours. Later raids to the same objective were made in two hours, 

showing the improvement made in the methods of reaching the 

objective. The dficulty af carrying out missions in adverse weather 

conditions was realized July 10, when a formation of six Breguets was 

forced to land in hostile territory. All day the weather had been 

extremely unfavorable, but the clouds seemed to lift late in the 

afternoon. The squadron was eager to carry out missions, and for that 

reason attempted the hazardous raid. An hour later after the 

formation had left the field the clouds closed down to 100 meters of the 

ground, and rain set in far the night. The formation was carried into 

Germany by a high southwest wind. After an hour of flying above the 

clouds the leader shook his ailerons to signify that he was lost. It was 

impossible to return by compass before the gasoline was exhausted. 

The six airplanes landed near Coblentz? 

The acute shortage of flying equipment, and the loss of a whole 

flight, left the squadron with only one airplane available for duty during 

the rest of July. The single Breguet was used for bombing practice, 

and shooting at the T.6 By August 1 eleven new Breguets were ferried 

from Colombey les Belles, and operations were resumed. 

Replacements arrived in the flying personnel, and two flights were 

organized. Due to the lack of .airplanes it was found inadvisable to 
362 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

carry out a mission with two flits, and the large formation was 

adopted. During the fourteen flying days of August, the 96th Squadron 

made twenty raids, and dropped 21.1 tons of bombs on the main 

objectives. The average number of airplanes available was ten. Most of 

the raids were very gratitjiig in their results. In a raid on Conflans, 

August 20, the bombs destroyed forty German airplanes in the box 

cars, and killed fiiy workmen and soldiers. Reports from the French 

intelligence bureau told of the terror spread in the enemy rear areas by 

the American bombers. Day bombing was feared by the enemy troops 

to such an extent that their dugouts would be filled long before the 

bombers reached the objective. If the enemy airplanes did not attack 

over the objective the observers would empty several drums into the 

barracks of the cantonments. 

Comments. 

Considering the limited supply and worn out condition of its flying 

equipment, and the inexperience of its flying personnel in duties over 

the lines, the bombing operations of the 96th squadron during this 

period were carried out with success. As this squadron was for nearly 

four months the only American day bombardment unit operating 

against the enemy it had to establish its own precedents to meet 

particular situations, without advantageous conferences with other 

units similarly engaged. 

The location, security, shelter and nature of the soil of the Amanty 

airdrome were all that could be desired for a day bombardment unit. 

The immense flying field was leveled and rolled to permit assembling in 

large formations on the ground. When a formation is assembled before 

the take-off it can proceed direct to the objective, whereas the delay 

resulting from assembling in the air often causes the formation to 

arrive at the objective too late to achieve the desired results. 

The excellence of the liaison, when the sector was quiet and the 

lines of communication well established, was not fully appreciated until 

the offensive began. During this quiet period the 96th squadron 

received full information of the disposition and strength of the enemy’s 

air forces. By studying the maps placed at their disposal the pilots and 

observers knew exactly the location of every enemy airdrome and 

anti-aircraft battery in the sector. This intimacy with the enemy’s air 

defense enabled them to choose the safest routes to their objectives. 

Later the rapid shifting of our own and enemy units to meet the needs 

of the offensives made it difficult to obtain such information. 

The raids made during this period were on distant objectives, and 

were made at the greatest altitude possible for the loaded Breguets. 

The high altitudes attained by the formations reduced the dangers 
Day 

Bombardment 

363 

from enemy anti-aircraft batteries. There was but little hostile aircraft 

opposition in the sector until just before the St. Mihiel offensive. The 

experience gained by the squadron while in the sector proved to be of 

immense value when the activities of the offensive began. New 

squadrons should be allowed to operate in quiet sectors when 

possible, to prepare the pilots and observers for the exigencies of the 

offensives. 

It is thought that insufficient responsibility is rested in the group 

commander as to whether or not a raid should be made. The group 

commander is fully acquainted with the possibilities of his command to 

carry out particular raids under given conditions of weather and 

strength in flying personnel and equipment. It is suggested that the 

question of departure on raids be left entirely to the discretion of the 

group commander. 

measures should be taken to insure adequate replacements in 

equipment. It was the experience of the 96th Squadron that many 

pilots and observers were unable to participate in flying.because of the 

lack of airplanes and spare parts. The failure to supply replacements 

lowers the efficiency of any unit. The mechanics of the 96th squadron 

met conditions at the front which were not anticipated in their training 

schools. It was necessary to exercise great ingenuity to make major 

repairs on airplanes with bits of discarded farm machinery, and 

without the aid of machine shops. 

Before a squadron is sent to the front to operate against the enemy, 

II. The St. Mibid Oggensiue. 365 

To avoid arousing the enemy’s suspicions preceding the offensive, 

orders were issued to carry out the usual raids with the least possible 

exhibition of increased strength. The usual air patrols were made by 

the pursuit squadrons, while the air forces which were to constitute 

the aviation of the 1st Army were concentrated in the sector, Three 

groups of French day bombardment and four groups of French 

pursuit were moved into the sector to cooperate with the American 

units. The enemy also began to concentrate pursuit squadrons behind 

the point of expected attack. 

The 1st Day Bombardment Group was formed two days before the 

offensive opened, and included the llth, 20th, and 96th Squadrons. 

The 11th ancf20th Squadrons had not completed their squadron 

organization. Some of their pilots and observers had seen action with 

the French squadrons, but most of them made their first flights over 

the lines during this offensive. The two new squadrons operated De 

Haviland 4 airplanes, with Liberty motors. The armament was the 

same as that of the Breguet, save that the pilot had two Marlin 

machine guns, synchronized to shoot through the propeller. The De 

Haviland 4 carried the British Wimperis bomb sight attached to the 

outside of the fuselage? This sight permitted the observer to aim at the 

target while standing, a position which kept him in readiness to fight off 

an attack by hostile aircraft. 

hostile troops concentrations immediately behind the enemy’s lines as 

primary objectives, and raids to railroads centers which were 

congested with troops and supplies as secondary objectives. To 

interfere with traffic of reinforcements and supplies from the sector 

east of the Moselle river it was found expedient to send bombing 

expeditions against the bridges, and bridgeheads, between Pont-aMousson and Metz. The main object of day bombardment during the 

offensive was to throw into confusion and destroy enemy troops 

marching into, or retreating from battle. During the days of 

exploitation the bombers continued to hamper as much as possible 

the enemy’s withdrawal of personnel and material. 

September 12 was marked by the worst kind of weather for flying. A 

terrific southwest wind made formation flying extremely hazardous, 

and a low ceiling of fast moving clouds reduced the visibility to two or 

three kilometers. The heavy rains of the previous week had made the 

Amanty airdrome so muddy that the propellers of fifty percent of the 

airplanes were broken while taking off. This constant breakage of 

propellers, by the mud slung from the wheels, was a primary cause of 

the heavy casualties. Formations of ample strength were scheduled to 

carry out the missions, but it was rare that half the airplanes left the 

ground. In spite of the terrible weather conditions, and the 

Bombing operations during the offensive were directed against 
366 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

discouraging losses in personnel, the pilots and observers of the group 

were ready and eager for the most hazardous missions. 

For the first two days of the offensive the 11th and 20th squadrons 

were assigned to fly barrage patrol with the 2nd Pursuit Group. Two 

teams from each squadron were ordered to Army Headquarters for 

command work. Later both squadrons operated with the 96th 

Squadron in carrying out bombing missions. 

Late at night, September 11, orders were received to hold the %th 

Squadron on the alert early in the morning, to bomb and machine gun 

hostile troops in front of our advancing infantry. To carry out these 

orders the twelve available Breguets were divided into flights of four 

each. The plan was to send the flights over to attack at 30 minute 

intervals, and thus keep up the enemy troops under a continuous 

bombardment. The first order to raid was received at 10 A.M. The 

objective was troop concentration at Buxieres, in the town and along 

the roads radiating from it. Because of the strong wind and the low 

cloud ceiling it was considered impracticable to attempt even these 

small formation flights. Consequently, that the order be obeyed, the 

leading team of the first flight volunteered to attempt the mission 

alone, and to determine, if possible, the best method of conducting 

troop bombing under the existing unfavorable conditions. The team 

did not return. It was later learned that the Breguet came down in 

flames south of Commercy, while returning to the airdrome. The 

mission had been accomplished. After this first loss of the offensive it 

was decided to send all the airplanes on single missions, and not 

dissipate the strength of the squadron in small formations. 

The second mission was successful. Eight Breguets bombed the 

enemy troops at Buxerulles. The formation passed over St. Mihiel 

proper at 500 meters, which is very low for a bombing formation but it 

did not draw a single anti-aircraft shell. The withdrawal from the point 

of the salient had already begun. Upon the return of this mission 

another formation attempted to take off, but three fourths of the 

propellers were broken by the mud. A fifth mission left the airdrome at 

635 P.M. to bomb the troops at Vigneulles. Orders for the mission 

were received too late for the formation to reach the objective before 

night had fallen, in spite of which the raid was carried out successfully. 

The formation returned to the night flying, and though landing flares 

were put out four out of the five planes crashed on the field. One pilot 

was killed in attempting to land. During the day the 96th Squadron lost 

four of its flying personnel and had eight airplanes lost or put out of 

commission. Four and one-half tons of bombs were dropped on 

enemy troops, and every mission designated in orders was carried out. 

Weather and field conditions prevented bombing operations in the 

morning of the second day. In the late afternoon orders were received 

to attack a congestion of retreating enemy troops in Chambley, and 

__.. _-_.. __ _.._.=, ~Y,,,,,.V,,U,,, V,,,LS, ", the 20rh Aero Sauadron, next to one of the 

squadron DH-4 aircraft. 

368 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

on the road leading from Chambley to Gorze. Seven Breguets were 

assigned to the mission, but the usual toll of broken propellers allowed 

only three to reach and bomb the objective. The low clouds forced the 

formation down to below 1,OOO meters in approaching Chambley. 

Wile engaged in bombing and observing the results of the bursts the 

three Breguets were attacked from the clouds by fifteen enemy pursuit 

airplanes. Two of the bombers, and one of the enemy, were shot down 

in the combat. 

On the third day of the offensive the whole group took part in the 

bombing operations. Conflans, Dommary-Baroncourt, Vittonville, 

Etain, and Arnaville were successfully bombed. Ten Breguets started 

Throughout the entire offensive the weather had been extremely 

unfavorable for formation flying. Due to shortage of airplanes, and the 

muddy condition of the field, the formations which crossed the lines 

were too small to cope with the fierce and persistent enemy aircraft 

formation of fourteen or sixteen bombers is 

rdinary attacks. A formation of six bi-plane 

ent armament to withstand the organized 

formations would leave 

off combat with Allied pursuit in order to attack the bombers. The 

enemy pilots put forth every effort to wipe out the bombing units. 

Day bombardment, by operating deep over the enemy’s air 

defenses, keep large forces of his pursuit aviation away from the 

immediate front, and thus indirectly protected our army and army 
Day 

Bombardment 

369 

corps observation airplanes. It was observed that when the bombers 

engaged large numbers of enemy pursuit airplanes well behind the 

battle lines the observation airplanes were able,to carry out their work 

with much less interruption by hostile aircraft. Thus, aside from the 

material damage inflicted on the enemy, and the incalculable effects of 

the shattering his morale, day bombardment contributed greatly to a 

desired dispersion of the enemy’s aviation strength. 

The casualties of the bombers were heavy. The 96th Squadron lost 

sixteen pilots and observers during the first four days of the attack, 

which is a high percentage of loss even in a day bombardment unit. 

The 11th Squadron lost twelve of its flying personnel, and the 20th 

Squadron three. The total casualties of the group for the offensive 

numbered thirty-one. 

Comments. 

The work done by day bombardment during the St. Mihiel offensive 

is worthy of praise. The terrific weather made formation flying, upon 

which bombing depends, almost impossible. The muddy flying field 

caused so many broken propellers that the formations which crossed 

the lines were never large enough for self-protection. The main lesson 

learned from this offensive was that large formations must be 

employed by day bombardment when the enemy aircraft opposition is 

strong and persistent. As it was impossible to obtain sufficient 

replacements in airplanes and spare parts the formations were small 

and the losses heavy. 

It is thought inadvisable to send day bombardment to a greater 

depth than fifteen kilometers behind the enemy’s lines during the 

attack. This offensive showed that the damage done on long distan 

raids was not commensurate with the losses sustained. Objectives 

during an offensive should also be chosen with careful consideration 

the enemy’s concentrations of aircraft. 

Pilots arrived at the front without having flown heavily loaded 

airplanes. It was found that most replacement pilots could hold 

formation with an airplane which had excess power and maneuver6 

easily but were unable at first, to fly tight formation with an unwielc 

bomber which used all its available power. The observers were 

instructed in the use of a single gun at the training school, but th 

double gun was always used over the lines. The result was that s 

111. The Arzganne-Meuse Oggensbe 371 

In preparing for the Arsnne-Meuse operations the 1st Day 

Bombardment Group was ordered to carry out bombing expeditions 

to objectives east of the Moselle river. The object was to convey the 

impression of an impending attack on Metz, and thus avert the 

enemy’s attention from the real point of attack. The enemy air forces 

were concentrated in the region around Metz, where aerial 

encounters were exceptionally severe and persistent. On September 

23 the group was movkd to the Maulan airdrome, near Ligny-enBarrois. The flying field was situated on a narrow ridge on each side of 

which were deep, treacherous valleys. It was necessary for the 

airplanes to take off one at a time. If a strong wind was blowing at right 

angles to the ridge the pilots when landing had to exercise extreme 

caution to avoid crashhg in the valley beyond the T. The airplanes left 

the field according to position in formation, and assembled over LignyenSarrois. This neceqsary maneuver caused considerable delay in 

reaching the objectives. The hangar space was so limited that twothirds of the airplanes had to stand out in the weather causing the 

wings to warp, and the braces to sag. Constant adjustment in 

alignment was%ecessary to keep the maximum numbers of airplanes 

available for duty. 

The 166th Squadron, equipped with De Haviland 4 airplanes, was 

added to the group, brut did not get ready to operate before the third 

week in October. Improvement in flying equipment included armored 

seats for the pilots, tunnel guns for the observers, and detachable fuel 

tanks for the Breguetq, which were released in case of fire from enemy 

incendiary bullets. 

The heavy casualties incurred by small formations during the St. 

Mihiel offensive led to a conference, of the group commander with the 

flight leaders, to determine the best means of insuring a maximum 

number of airplanes in formation when crossing the lines. The 96th 

Squadron had a full complement of Brequets, but lacked pilots and 

observers. It was decided, therefore, pending the arrival of 

replacements to supplement the personnel of the 96th Squadron with 

enough teams from the other squadrons to make one large Breguet 

formation. The remaining teams of the 11th and 20th squadrons made 

up the personnel of one large De Haviland 4 formation. In this way the 

group secured greater safety, and the early missions of the offensive 

were successfully carried out by the formations of twelve to eighteen 

airplanes. 

The objectives were similar to those of the St. Mihiel offensive. The 

group was used to attack, from high altitudes where possible, such 

towns as Romagne, St. Juvin, Grandpre, Bantheville, and Dun-surMeuse, and railroad centers from which traffic was radiating. Early in 

the offensive missions were carried out against troop concentrations 

between the Meuse River and the Argonne forest. When intelligence 
372 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

was received of favorable targets within six or eight kilometers of the 

lines, the group was ordered to attack such objectives at low altitude 

to cause the maximum amount of confusion and damage to the enemy 

elements as reinforcements for retreating before our infantry. 

With the increase of formation strength, and improvement in skill of 

the bombing personnel, the group wrought telling havoc on the 

objectives of the Argonne-Meuse. Fires were frequently started with 

incendiary bombs. Due to the incessant cloudy weather most of the 

early raids were made at an altitude of 1,500 to 2,500 meters. The antiaircraft fire of the enemy was so accurate that the flight leaders found 

it necessary to fly at least 500 meters below the background of clouds. 

Dun-sur-Meuse was the objective of the first group operations 

September 26, the day which opened the Argonne-Meuse offensive. 

Four and one-half tons of bombs were dropped in the town and 

railroad yards. As the squadrons approached the objectives they were 

in turn attacked by relays of enemy pursuit airplanes, numbering as 

many as twenty in each. Six of the enemy were seen to go down out of 

control. The 20th Squadron lost five De Havilands 4s of which three 

went down in flames. One observer of the %th Squadron and one of 

the 20th Squadron were killed in the combat. The airplanes of all three 

squadrons suffered severely in the day’s fighting. 

On September 29 two and a half tons of bombs were dropped on 

Grandpre and Marcq. The railroad tracks were cut, and fires started 

in the munition dumps. This raid was remarkable for the excellent 

protection afforded by fourteen pursuit airplanes which escorted the 

bombers all the way to the objective. Bantheville received a ton and a 

half of bombs on October 1. Three fires were started in the town, and 

great damage done to the railroad tracks and stores of material. On 

the following day two tons of bombs were dropped on St. Juvin, and a 

ton and a half on Corny, but the visibility was so bad that accurate 

observations of the results could not be made. These raids continued 

to be successful, and the losses were minimized by employing large 

formations, and cooperating with our pursuit. 

October 4 was a very successful day for the bombers. Dun-surMeuse was hit with a ton and a half of bombs, and Landres St. 

Georges with a like amount. The combats of the day were severe. In 

each attack the enemy numbered about thirty Fokkers and Pfalz. The 

clouds were low and afforded many Iurking pockets for the enemy 

pursuit. In the last flight the 96th Squadron was attacked by the full 

formation of enemy airplanes. The bombing squadron tightened up 

and kept the pursuers at bay until the 26th Squadron and 11th 

Squadron attacked the Fokkers and Pfalz in the rear. Two of the 

enemy were seen to go down. When the combat was the hottest thirty 

Spads from the 2nd Pursuit Group arrived on schedule time and 

joined in the general fight. The enemy was in a trap and could not 
Day 

Bombardment 

373 

escape combat with all our forces. The Spads brought down eleven of 

the enemy, bringing the total of victories of the fight up to thirteen. 

Another highly successful raid was the shock attack on Bayonville, 

October 18, on whikh the group dropped four tons of bombs. The 

bombs burst in the middle of the town. It was later learned that on this 

single raid 250 of the enemy troops were killed by our bombs and 750 

wounded. According to instructions from headquarters the bombing 

squadrons returned by way of St. Juvin to encourage our infantry. A 

successful raid was made by the group on Montmedy, November 4. 

Numerous fires were started and great damage done to buildings and 

warehouses. The hottest combat of the offensive was fought on 

returning from this mission. Two airplanes of the 11th Squadron went 

down in flames. Six of the enemy were shot down, two in flames. The 

last mission of the offensive was a raid on Mousson, on which good 

hits were made. On this last raid the 20th Squadron lost three planes. 

Four of the enemy went down in flames or out of control. 

During the Argonne-Meuse operations the 1st Day Bombardment 

Group was distinguished for success in precision bombing. Enemy 

troops were attacked, material was destroyed, and the morale of the 

enemy so shaken that formations of bombers became the source of 

constant dread. Statistics of the air service show that two thirds of the 

enemy airplanes brought down, during the offensive, were brought 

down by, or in conjunction with day bombardment. 

Comments. 

The transfer of the 1st Day Bombardment Group from Amanty to 

Maulan, just before the opening of this offensive, gave no advantage to 

the group save slightly better telephonic liaison with headquarters of 

the Air Service, 1st Army. From the standpoint of flying field and 

quarters the change was for the worse. The airdome at Maulan is 

bisected by a ravine through which runs a highway. Either one of the 

two landing fields is too small for the needs of a group. The prevailing 

winds in the sector made it necessary for pilots to land across wind, or 
374 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. 1 

run the risk of crossing the highway to crash into the ravine. On many 

occasions excellent pilots would make a perfect landing on the ridge, 

but the receding slope would increpse their momentum, and cause 

their airptanes to roll down the ravine. It might be said that this flying 

field has a slit advantage over the Amanty field in drainage and 

nature of the soil. This advantage, however, was offset by the faulty 

location of the hangars, and the inadequacy of shelter for both 

material and personnel. 

A criticism might here be made of lack of definite understanding 

regarding the occupation of the airdrome. When the group arrived at 

Maulbn fifty percent of the men’s quarters were occupied by Italian 

laborers in the empky of the French. Although repeated promises 

were made to evacuate the Italians they remained in possession of the 

barracks for nearly six weeks. This necessitated the use of hangars for 

the shelter of our enlisted men, who were compelled to sleep on the 

ground in the most inclement weather. Furthermore, some of the 

barracks occupied by the Italians constituted the quarters allotted to 

the pilots and observers. It is well to state the necessity of providing 

not only sufficient, but comfortable quarters for the flying personnel. 

The pilots and observers of day bombardment fly long hours at great 

altitudes. The observers who stand up in the wind especially suffer 

from the cold, often returning from raids with frostbitten cheeks. 

When not in the air they spend most of their time studying maps and 

photographs in preparation for the next raid. There are days when 

they have to remain on the alert from daylight until almost dark, ready 

to take off at a moments notice. If their quarters are such that they are 

cold and miserable when leaving the ground it is impossible for them to 

do their best work over the lis. 

From the standpoint of security it was well that this airdrome was 

situated at considerable distance from the lines. Transportation was 

so scarce that if the enemy had made a rapid advance only about one 

fourth of the troops material could have been moved. The four 

squadrons were forced to operate with transportation facilities which 

are usually assigned to one squadron. There were times when every 

motor vehicle had to be used to transport materials needed in 

operations, with the result that the camp had to get along without 

wood or water. This shortage lowered the efficiency of the group. 

The group profited by the lessons learned during the St. Mihiel 

offensive. With the experience d the other squadrons for guidance, 

at a new squadron could operate 

es. The formation used by all the 

s of formation found most 

boding was developed so 

that four squadrons instead of one attacked single objectives. This 
Day 

Bombardment 

375 

change in tactics marked the greatest progress in day bombardment 

not only in group protection, but in the amount of damage inflicted 

upon the enemy. It was found however, that the employment of 

airplanes of different speeds, such as the Breguet, and De Haviland 4, 

prevented group bombing from attaining its maximum efficiency. 

Cooperation between day bombardment and pursuit units was 

perfected during this offensive, and accounted somewhat for the 

reduction of losses. 

aerial gunnery instructions in the training schools. When the 

observers were unskilled with tfieir guns the enemy attacked the 

bombing formations at close quarters. Constant shooting practice at 

ground targets was given to the observers to develop precision in fire. 

At the end of the offensive the accuracy and concentration of the 

observer’s fire usually kept the enemy at considerable distance from 

the bombing formations. 

was impossible to get replacements in flying personnel. Airplanes, 

equipped and loaded for the raids, would often remain idle at the 

airdrome for the want of pilots and observers. Repeated requests for 

pilots and observers did not bring adequate replacements until a few 

days before the armistice was signed. 

It is thought that careful consideration should be given to the 

possibilities of equipping bombing airplanes with armor which will 

partially protect the observers from machine gun fire. The observers 

had no protection save that which they maintained by fire superiority. 

Protection, no matter how slight, gives an advantage which often 

decides the outcome of an aerial combat. 

Many pilots and observers who had been trained at American 

instruction centers, and sent to the front with French and British 

bombing squadrons were recalled for service with American units 

during the Argonne-Meuse offensive. Some served as replacements in 

the squadrons of the 1st Day Bombardment Group; but the greater 

number were transferred to the squadrons which formed the nucleus 

of the 2nd Day Bombardment Group. This second group was ready to 

This offensive also showed the necessity of placing more stress on 

Although replacements in airplanes was all that could be desired, it 

-~ operate against the enemy November 6, but the rainy weather, which 

continued until the armistice was sisned. prevented operations. 
376 
Tactical H~s~oK~ 

OF Amerzican 

Obsenuation Balloons 

I. In the Toul Secto~ 379 

On February 26,1918; the 2nd Balloon Company moved into 

position near Royamieux, northwest of Toul, relieving a French 

Company. It was assigned to the 1st Division, 1st Corps, for work. 

On April 12, 1918, the 4th Balloon Company arrived at Lahayieux, 

in the area of the 2nd Division. The 1st Company took station near 

Baccarat on April 15, and worked with the 22nd Division. All three of 

these companies were under the control of the Balloon Group, 1st 

Corps, with headquarters at Toul. These three companies were the 

only ones at the front until the latter part of July. 

The plan of putting cochpanies at the front at this early date was for 

the purpose of training irl quiet sectors. They relieved French balloon 

companies and were assisted in their early training by French 

Commissioned and non-commissioned specialits. French personnel 

was retained until American specialists were competent to carry on 

the work alone, -usuallq a very short time. This practice was 

continued until sufficient ,American companies had become proficient 

came to the front. 

the enemy lines by day, arid to 

all times, weather permitting, 

The Toul sector was a? almost perfect sector for training, except 

ison consisted of lines to 

and neighboring artillery 

as it was at all times 

though th number of night flights was always limited. 

that artillery activity was not great. Perfect telephonic liaison was 

necessary to instruct the other branches of the service as to the use, 

possibilities, and limitations of the balloons. 

Liaison with pursuit add observation aviation was not all that could 

be desired. This was never developed to any great degree of 

perfection during any of the operations. In the Toul sector, however, 

liaison with pursuit group w8s established and by means of 

conference between pilofis and balloon observers, improvements in 

methods of attack and defense were made. 

381 

When the American participation in the Chateau-Thierry offensive 

commenced, there were but three American Balloons at the front. 

These were the lst, 2nd, and 4th Companies, the 1st near Baccarat, 

the 2nd and 4th north of To&. 

The 2nd Company had been at the front since the latter part of 

February; the 1st and 4th since the early part of April. All three of 

these companies were trained and in condition to face all conditions of 

warfare. 

In the Chateau-Thierry salient the enemy was equipped with their 

usual high percentage of balloons and in addition they had a very large 

airplane concentration. 

The 2nd Company received orders about the 1st of July to proceed 

to the Chateau-Thierry sector. This company was packed and on the 

road in less than six hours and made excellent move to the new sector 

in less than forty-eight hours. Upon its arrival in the new sector, it was 

assigned immediately to 4he 1st Division, 1st Corps, and proceeded to 

work with that division arid with the corps artillery, 1st Corps, until the 

corps was relieved fro 

carat with its truck train just after 

the middle of July and ariived m the area of the 2nd Division about 

July 18, 1918. 

The 4th Company left its position near Royaumiex near Toul, about 

the second or third of August and got into the fight before the Vesle 

was reached. It was assi e 3d Division and worked with that 

division until relieved in t 

The balloons followed line of the advancing infantry at a 

The 1st Balloon Com 

The weather was generallp poor, which hindered efficient work. 

Despite all adverse condition$, the balloons rendered valuable service 

which was commented upon in official reports. 

As a result of operations in the Chateau-Thierry offensive, eight 

balloons were burned, and one damaged by enemy shell fire. Twelve 

descents were made in parachutes. Considering the number of 

balloons engaged, the number of artillery adjustments completed and 

the amount of information transmitted was exceptionally high. 

111, la the St, Mihiel Battle. 383 

Under the American command, fifteen American balloon 

companies and six French companies took part in this offensive, 

making twenty-one balloons in all. 

There were approximately twelve enemy balloons opposite the 

American sector. 

The weather conditions of the 12th and 13th of September were 

such as to prevent Balloon observation. High winds caused damage to 

the balloons which nevertheless were in ascension. 

Direct line measurement gives a total of 202 kilometers travelled by 

companies with inflated balloons following our attacking infantry. The 

actual distance travelled was much greater. 

Regulation of artillery fire and infantry liaison work was carried on 

very successfully when weather permitted, many targets being 

destroyed, and front line positions being determined. 

Positions of advance and retreat were thoroughly worked out 

before the attack started. Definite itineraries of advance were planned 

and the positions beyond the lines were so determined that each 

balloon maintained, approximately, its place in the axis of its sector. 

promptly and accurately. 

Liaison was well established and maintained. Reports were rendered 

An observer with a telephone 

set in a balloon basket. 

385 

Thirteen American balloons and two French balloons were utilized 

by the 1st Army in its offensive operations between September 26 and 

November 11. The two French balloons did little or no work due to 

sickness of personnel. 

were not inflated until the night of September 25, 1918. Captured 

documents proved that the enemy was unaware of their presence. 

The 7th Balloon Company took over the position of a French 

company, and, with French cocardsl on the balloon, ascended on 

September 24th and 25th. 

All of these companies except the two French companies moved 

with the general advance, keeping between 5 and 6 kilometers behind 

the front line. They occupied successive positions, establishing 

telephonic liaison at each stage of the advance. 

Straight line measurements show a total of advance of 425 

kilometers by the American balloon companies. For many miles the 

balloons were maneuvered forward by hand. In one day the 8th 

Balloon Company maneuvered forward 32 kilometers by hand. This is 

believed to be a world’s record. 

Twenty-one balloons were lost between September 26th and 

November llth, fifteen of these were burned by attacks of enemy 

planes, and six destroyed by shell fire. It is believed that the enemy lost 

fifty balloons during the same period opposite the sector of the 1st 

Army. 

Company bringing down two enemy planes within 24 hours. 

All the American balloons, except that of the 7th Balloon Company, 

Balloon anti-aircraft defense drove off many attacks, the 6th Balloon 

V. Miscellaneous. 387 

~~ 

It has been found by experience in quiet sectors and during 

offensives that the balloon observers and company commanders had 

been thoroughly trained in the importance of maintaining liaison with 

the artillery. There is another phase of the observers work which has 

not been greatly emphasized and which developed great importance in 

the war of 1918, -that is, liaison with the divisions. The practice of 

having a corps balloon for the purpose of working with corps artillery 

and also for giving information to both the intelligence and operations 

section of the corps worked well. The work of this balloon is less 

important than the work of the divisional balloon in the matter of 

intelligence and operations. The corps headquarters is usually situated 

too far in the rear and the means of communication are far too 

uncertain for information which is sent back, either to the intelligence 

or operations section of the corps staff, to be of great benefit. This is 

especially true of reports made during the heat of action because by 

the time such reports get back over crowded telephone lines or by 

courier, it is too late to take any action upon them. The contrary, 

however, is true of the division. A divisional balloon, not only should 

work with the artillery of the division and with whatever artillery units 

are near it, but it should be done of the intelligence centers for the 

division. Its telephonic connections make it more valuable for this 

work, than an airplane, especially when intelligence of points 

immediately in advance of the line of battle is sought. Constant liaison 

should be maintained between every divisional balloon and the 

divisional G-2 and G-3. 

It has been found that dvision staffs are always trying to get more 

information about what is going on at the front and every effort 

possible should be made to have balloon observers trained to assist 

them. Observers can carry on artillery adjustments at the same time 

that they are undertaking general surveillance of the sector, and there 

are always some special points which balloon observation can clear up 

for the staff. 

As far as panel identification of the infantry front line is concerned, it 

is too uncertain to be counted upon. If the panels are displayed just 

right and if atmospheric conditions are just so, it will be successful. If, 

however, all conditions are not favorable then it will not be successful. 

If the Division staff is relying on its balloon to give information which is 

gotten from panel liaison, they are often very likely to be disappointed. 

The work can be better handled by airplanes and should normally be 

cared for by them. 

On days of even fair visibility during action, the front line can be 

pretty well traced out by grenade smoke and similar signs. Enemy 

convoys can be picked up moving either to or from the front, 

explosions of various nature tell their story. In fact, there are many 

ways, -some of which come only once and are never repeated, -by 
388 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

which the intelligence section and operations section of divisions can 

greatly profit by liaison with divisional balloons. 

commanders and company commanders with reference to liaison 

work with division, and, to a certain extent, with corps. 

There should be a course of instruction for balloon group 
AppenMces 389 

Appendix A 

Directive for “Final Report” 

PARIS DEC 12 1918 

AIR SERVICE TOURS 

NO 2534 D HAVE CREATED IN PARIS UNDER COLONEL 

GORRELL WHO HAS BEEN APPOINTED ASSISTANT CHIEF OF 

STAFF AIR SERVICE AND HAS THEREBY AUTHORITY TO GIVE 

ORDERS IN MY NAME FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE DESIRED 

WORK COMMA A STAFF DIRECTLY UNDER MY PERSONAL 

SUPERVISION CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 

FORMULATING FOR ME MY FINAL REPORT ON ALL PHASES 

OF AMERICAN AIR Sl%VICEACTlVlTlES IN EUROPE PERIOD I 

DESIRE THIS REPORT TO BE SUBSTANTIATED BY ALL 

POSSIBLE APPENDED DATA AND IT MUST COVER AIR 

SERVICE ACTIVITIES FROM VIEWPOINTS OF HISTORICAL 

COMMA STATISTICAL COMMA TECHNICAL COMMA AND 

TACTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS PERIOD FUNDAMENTAL 

IDEA IS TO SHOW WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AT EVERY AIR 

SERVICE POINT AND WHY IT WAS DONE PERIOD FINAL 

REPORT MUST PUT INTO WRITING THE KNOWLEDGE GAINED 

BY ALL OF US IN EUROPE IN ORDER THAT EXPERIENCE OF 

EVERY MAN MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE USE 

BEFORE MEN RETURN TO CIVIL LIFE PERIOD YOU WILL 

REPORT NO ONE UNDER YOUR ORDERS AS AVAILABLE TO BE 

RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES UNTIL YOU ARE 

CERTAIN THAT HE HAS FURNISHED IN WRITING TO COLONEL 

GORRELL ANY INFORMATION OF VALUE WHICH HE POSSESS 

AND WHICH HE HAS ACQUIRED WHILE INTHEAMERICANAIR 

SERVICE PERIOD MAKE CERTAIN THAT SO FAR AS YOU AND 

THE MEN UNDER YOU ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS WORK IS 

THOROUGHLY DONE PERIOD YOU CAN EASILY VISUALIZE 

THE MAIN AIR SERVICE POINTS THAT MAY HAVE 

BEWILDERED YOU WHEN AMERICA FIRST ENTERED THE WAR 

AND ALSO THEQUESTIONSTHATTHOSE IN AUTHORITY MAY 

INVESTIGATE CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF OUR AIR 

SERVICE PERIOD AN$WERS TO ALL OF THESE POINTS 

DESIRED PERIOD CREATE IF NECESSARY A FORCE UNDER 

YOU TO HANDLE THESE QUESTIONS FOR YOU PERIOD MY 

REPORT SHOULD BE FINISHED IN THIRTY DAYS PERIOD 

THEREFORE YOUR REPORT SHOULD REACH ME IN PARIS 
390 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

ATTENTION COLONEL GORRELL BEFORE DECEMBER 31ST 

1918 PERIOD FROM TIME TO TIME QUESTIONS WILL BE SENT 

YOU CONCERNING FURTHER INFORMATION THAT MAY BE 

DESIRED PERIOD AM DEPENDING ON YOU TO SUBMIT 

QUICKEST POSSIBLE REPLY IN EACH CASE PERIOD YOU 

SHOULD NOT AWAIT ARRIVAL OF THESE QUESTIONS BUT 

AUTOMATICALLY FURNISH ME WITH EVERY PIECE OF 

INFORMATION WHICH YOU CAN ANTICIPATE WILL HELP ME 

IN COMPILING THIS REPORT PERIOD AS SUPPORTING DATA 

TO INFORMATION YOU FURNISH ALSO WHENEVER POSSIBLE 

FORWARD ALL BOOKS PAMPHLETS MAPS PHOTOGRAPHS 

CHARTS GRAPHS FORMS ET CETERA THAT YOU ARE ABLE 

TO OBTAIN PERIOD YOUR EARNEST ASSISTANCE QUICKLY 

DESIRED WITH A VIEW TO WINDING UP ONCE AND FOR ALL 

THE FURNISHING TO ME OF THE INFORMATION THAT IS 

NECESSARY AND WHICH IN THE PAST HAS NEITHER BEEN 

SUCCESSFULLY RAPIDLY NOR COMPLETELY FURNISHED 

PERIOD WHENEVER POSSIBLE ALWAYS EMPHASIZE THE 

REASONS WHY THINGS WERE SO DONE PERIOD IN ADDITION 

COMMA I DESIRE FROM YOU PERSONALLY COMMA AND 

FROM YOUR SECTION CHIEFS THROUGH YOU COMMA A 

FRANK STATEMENT OF WHAT YOU AND YOUR PRINCIPAL 

ASSISTANTS REGARD AS THE MOST IMPORTANT AIR 

SERVICE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN 

PRESENT WAR PERIOD THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN SENT BY 

ME PERSONALLY PERIOD YOUR REPLIES SHOULD BE 

ADDRESSED TO CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE PARIS ATTENTION 

COLONEL GORRELL PERIOD ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT 

TELEGRAM PERIOD. 

PATRICK 
Append ices 391 

Appendix B 

AIR SERVICE, AEF 

OUTLINE OF TACTICAL ORGANIZATION 

11 November 1918 

First Army Air Service 

1st Pursuit Wing 

2d Pursuit Group 

13th Aero Squadron 

22d Aero Squadron 

49th Aero Squadron 

139th Aero Squadron 

28th Aero Squadron 

93d Aero Squadron 

103d Aero Squadron 

213th Aero Squadron 

1 lth Aero Squadron 

20th Aero Squadron 

96th Aero Squadron 

166th Aero Squadron 

155th Aero Squadron 

27th Aero Squadron 

94th Aero Squadron 

95th Aero Squadron 

147th Aero Squadron 

185th Aero Squadron 

9th Aero Squadron 

24th Aero Squadron 

91 st Aero Squadron 

186th Aero Squadron 

First Army Balloon Wing 

11 th Balloon Company 

43d Balloon Company 

3d Pursuit Group 

1st Day Bombardment Group 

1st Pursuit Group 

First Army Observation Group 

Corps Observation Wing 

I Corps Air Service 

I Corps Observation Group 

1st Aero Squadron 

12th Aero Squadron 

50th Aero Suadron 

I Corps Balloon Group 

1st Balloon Company 

2d Balloon Company 

5th Balloon Company 

Ill Corps Air Service 

Ill Corps Observation Group 

88th Aero Squadron 

90th Aero Squadron 

Ill Corps Balloon Group 

3d Balloon Company 

4th Balloon Company 

9th Balloon Company 

42d Balloon Company 

V Corps Observation Group 

V Corps Air Service 

99th Aero Squadron 

104th Aero Squadron 

V Corps Balloon Group 

6th Balloon Company 

7th Balloon Company 

8th Balloon Company 

12th Balloon Company 
392 U.S. Air Service 

in World War 1 

Vol. I 

Second Army Air Service 

17th Aero Squadron 

25th Aero Squadron 

141st Aero Squadron 

148th Aero Squadron 

41st Aero Squadron 

138th Aero Squadron 

638th Aero Squadron 

100th Aero Squadron 

163d Aero Squadron 

IV Corps Observation Group 

4th Pursuit Group 

5th Pursuit Group 

2d Day Bombardment Group 

IV Corps Air Service 

85th Aero Squadron 

135th Aero Squadron 

168th Aero Squadron 

258th Aero Squadron 

278th Aero Squadron 

IV Corps Balloon Group 

15th Balloon Company 

16th Balloon Company 

69th Balloon Company 

VI Corps Observation Group 

VI Corps Air Service 

8th Aero Squadron 

354th Aero Squadron 

VI Corps Balloon Group 

10th Balloon Company 

Units ordered to front from SOS for Second Army 

13th Balloon Company 

14th Balloon Company 

24th Balloon Company 

25th Balloon Company 

26th Balloon Company 

44th Balloon Company 
Abbrzerriatioas List 393 

AASC 

ACAS 

AEF 

AFSHRC 

AG 

AR 

AS 

AS1 

ASSC 

BEF 

CAS 

CG 

cm 

co c/s 

DH-4 

DFC 

div 

DSC 

E-3 

FEV 

GHQAEF 

GO 

GPF 

HAEF 

hist 

hP 

hq 

no 

OCAS 

OPS 

para 

RAF 

Army Air Service Commander 

Assistaht Chief of Air Service 

American Expeditionary Force 

Albert P. Simpson Historical 

Research Center, 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama 

Adjutaqt General 

French aircraft built by the 

Avion Renault company 

Air Service 

Aerospace Studies Institute, 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama 

Air Section, Signal Corps 

British expeditionary Force 

Chief of Air Service 

commanding general 

centimeter 

commanding officer 

chief of staff 

De Haviland biplace aircraft 

distinguished flying cross 

division 

distinguished service cross 

Germarl monoplane fighter 

built by Fokker 

French engine series 

designqtion for Vee-type 

engine (actually Fe Vee) 

Genera( Headquarters 

American Expeditionary 

Force 

general order 

high-powered (grande 

puissance) Filloux rifle 

Headquarters American 

Expeditionary Force 

history 

horsepower 

headquarters 

number 

Office of Chief of Air Service 

operations 

paragraph 

Royal Air Force 

rsch 

sec 

ser 

SIA 

SORC 

sos 

USAF 

vo I 

YMCA 

WDOO 

Z of A 

SE-5 

research 

Royal Flying Corps scouting 

experimental aircraft 

section 

series 

Italian Air Service 

Signal Officers Reserve Corps 

Services of Supply 

United States Air Force 

volume 

Young Men's Christian 

Association 

War Department 

General Order 

zone of advance 

n 

31 

hifarm insignia of the US. Air Service for all enlisted men 

except aviation mechanics and enlisted aviators (above). 

The one for enlisted aviators appears below. 

Notes 395 

INTRODUCTION 

1. WDGO 1, 1905, and 24,1912; Field service Regulations, para 

35, 1914. 

2. For the development of the Army’s historical program before 

and during World War I, see: Elizabeth B. Drewry, Historical Units 

of Agencies of the First World War, Bulletins of the National 

Archives, No 4, July 1942; Joseph Mills Hanson, “The Historical 

Section, Army War College,” Journal of the American Military 

History Foundation, Vol I, No 2 (Summer 1937), pp70-74; Waldo G. 

Leland and Newton D. Mereness, lntroduction to American Official 

Sources for the Ecohomic and Social History of the World War 

(New Haven, 1926), pp 50-93, especially 61-69; National Archives, 

Handbook of Federai World War Agencies and Their Records, 

7977-7927 (Washington, 1943). 

3. AG, Hq SOS, Memo for Chiefs of Staff Departments, 9 May 18, 

in “History of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces” 

(hereafter cited as “Gorrell’s History”), Ser M, Vol 16 (hereafter 

cited as M-16). 

4. Photocopy of Eskridge’s note in the Albert F. Simpson 

Historical Research Center, file 106-83 (location of documents in 

the Center will hereafter be given as AFSHRC plus file number). 

The introductory paragraphs relating to the historical program of 

the Air Service, AEF, are based largely on materials in “Gorrell’s 

History,” especially [Capt. Ernest L. Jones,] “History of the History 

of the Air Service,” in M-16, and [Capt. Ernest L. Jones,] “History of 

the Information Section,” in L-4. Other sources included Ernest L. 

Jones, “Chronology of Aviation,” sub 9 May 1918, in AFSHRC 

168.6501, and miscellaneous papers in AFSHRC 106-83. 

5. Ernest L. Jones, Personal Data, and related papers, in 

AFSHRC administrative file HO/”J.” 

6. Sec of Hist Records, Hq SOS, Type of Facts for Report of June 

1st 1918, in “Gorrell’s History,” M-16. 

7. [Jones,] “History of the Information Section.” 

8. [Jones,] Air Service History, Outline of Type of Facts Desired, 

in “Gorrell’s History,” M-16. 

,9. [Jones,] “History of the Information Section.” 

10. Ltr, C/S, AS, AEF to Photo Sec, ca. 11 Nov 18, quoted in 

Photo Sec, Brief Review of Work, Sec J, in “Gorrell’s History,”G-5. 

11. GHQ AEF, Telegram No 1252, 19 Nov 18, in “Gorrell’s 

History,” M-16. 

12. Ltr, Capt. Ernest L. Jones to CO’s, subj: Air Service History, 

18 Nov 18, in AFSHRC 106-83. 

13. OCAS, AEF, Office Memo 88,4 Dec 18, in “Gorrell’s History,” 

A-9; OCAS, AEF, GO 6, 4 Dec 18, in “Gorrell’s History,” M-16. 
396 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

14. TAGO, Official Army Register, 1918 (Washington, 1918), p 

692; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of Officers and 

Graduates of the United States Military Academy,#5049; Who’s 

Who in America, Vol 23 (Chicago, 1944), p 303; USAF Historical 

Study 98, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 

(USAF Hist Div, Air University, 1958), pp 137, 139, 150, 167-168, 

170,194. The statement concerning Arnold is from his book, Global 

Mission (New York, 1949), p 48. 

15. Ltr, C/S, AS, lst,Army toCG, 1st Army, subj: Air Service, 1st 

Army, 25 Nov 18, in “Gorrell’s History,” C-3. 

16. Ltr, CAS, AEF to AASC, 1st Army, subj: Historical Operations 

Report, 11 Dec 18, and 2d Ind, Capt. Philip J. Roosevelt to CAS, 

AEF, undated, in “Gorrell’s History,” C-1. 

17. TAGO, Official Army Register, 1918, p 144; Cullum, 

Biographical Register, #4855; Association of Graduates of the 

United States Military Academy, Sixtieth Annual Report (1929), pp 

18. Telegram No 2534D, signed Patrick, to Air Service, Tours, 12 

Dec 18, in “Gorrell’s History,” M-10; see Appendix A. 

19. James Norman Hall, Charles Bernard Nordhoff, and Edgar 

G. Hamilton (eds.), The Lafayette Flying Corps (Boston, 1920),Vol 

I, p 367. 

20. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, “Early History of the Strategical 

Section,” in “Gorrell’s History,” B-6; USAF Historical Study 89, The 

Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 

(USAF Hist Div, Air University, 1955), pp 10-12; Robert Frank 

Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine; A History of Basic Thinking in 

the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (ASI, Air University, 1971), 

31 3-31 5. 

pp 22-25. 

21. Vol II, No 180. 15 Feb 21. 

22. (Washington, 1948), Vol 15, pp. 225-290. 

23. Vol I, No 75, 12 Jun 20. 

24. The figure given for the number of volumes in each series is 

the editor’s count on 30 October 1974 rather than the one given in 

the index volume of “Gorrell’s History.” 

25. Edgar S. Gorrell, The Measure of America’s World War 

AeronauticalEffort, lecture at Norwich University, Vermont, 26 Nov 

40, Norwieh Univ Pub No 6, p v. 

26. CAS, Annual Report, 1921, p. 22; ibid., 1922, p 18. 

27. Gorrell, Measure, p v. 

28. Copies of the film may be purchased from the Publications 

Sales Branch (NATS), National Archives (GSA), Washington, DC 

20408, the price, as of 1 November 1974, being $12.00 a roll. For 

some unknown reason, the second volume in Series K was not 
Final Report 397 

microfilmed with the other volumes, but in late 1974 the National 

Archives was planning to film the volume and add it to T-619. 

29. Jones, Personal Data. 

30. Association of Graduates, Sixtieth Annual Report, pp 

31. James Norman Hall, My Island Home; An Autobiography 

(Boston, 1952), pp 2P8-229, 232-234, 238-239. The Lafayette 

Flying Corps (2 volumes) was pulished in Boston in 1920. 

32. Gorrell, Measure, passim; Gorrell, “What! No Airplanes?” 

address at Convention of National Association of State Aviation 

Officials, Louisville, 17 Oct 40, in AFSHRC 168.604-34; Gorrell, 

“The Counsel of Errors-World War I Twenty Years After,“ address 

at Virginia Military Institute, 13 Feb 41, in AFSHRC 168.604-35. 

31 3-315. 

FINAL REPORT 

Chapter 1. 

1. An “Editor’s Note” prefacing the 1921 edition of the “Final 

Report” said, “The report is quoted verbatim with the exception of 

the fact that all statistics included herein have been revised to 

date.” The figure for pilots was changed from 744 to 767, and for 

observers from 454 to 481. 

2. Original report: 753 enemy airplanes. Changes are still being 

made in U.S. Air Service credits for the destruction of enemy 

aircraft. See Maurer Maurer, “Another Victory for Rickenbacker,” 

The Airpower Historian, Apr 1960, pp 117-124. For a list of credits 

compiled by the U.S. Air Force’s Historical Research Division in the 

late 1960s, see USAF Historical Study 133, US. Air Service Victory 

Credits, World War l (Hist Rsch Oiv, Air University, 1969). 

3. Original report: 71 balloons. 

4. Original report: 357 planes and 35 balloons. 

5. Original report: I‘. . , 35 of them were burned during such 

attacks and 9 others were destroyed by shell fire. Our observers 

Chapter II. 

1. In a raid on 20 April 1918, German troops captured 

Seicheprey, a village east of St. Mihiel that had been garrisoned by 

the U.S. 26th Division. The Germans held the village about 12 hours 

before being driven out by American and French forces. 

2. The 12th Aero Squadron. 

3. The first U.S. pursuit unit to enter combat was the 103d Aero 

Squadron, which began operations on 18 February 1918 while 

attached to a French army. 

.... 
398 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

4. These victories were credited to 2d Lt. Alan F. Winslow and 1st 

Lt. Douglas Campbell. For earlier victories credited to members of 

the U.S. Air Service, see USAF Historical Study 133, p 63. 

5. The 27th, 95th, and 147th Aero Squadrons. 

6. The 4th Balloon Company in the Toul Sector, and the 1st 

Batloon Company near Baccarat. 

7. The lst, 2d, and 4th Balloon Companies. 

Chapter I II. 

1. Army observation: 91st Aero Squadron; corps observation: 

lst, 12th, 90th, 9Qth, 104th, and 135th Aero Squadrons, with the 

135th being the DH-4 Liberty squadron; day bombardment: 96th 

Aero Squadron; pursuit: 13th, 14th, 17th, 22d, 27th, 49th, 88th, 93d, 

94th, 95th, 103d, 139th, 148th, and 213th Aero Squadrons, the 17th 

and 148th being with the British. 

2. Col. William Mitchell. 

3. The 9th, 24th, and 91st Aero Squadrons, the 9th being 

assigned night operations. 

4. The 1st Pursuit Group: 27th, 94th, 95th, and 147th Aero 

Squadrons: the 2d Pursuit Group: 13th, 22d, 49th, and 139th Aero 

Squadrons; the 3d Pursuit Group: 28th, 93d, 103d, and 213th Aero 

Squadrons. 

5. The 185th Aero Squadron. 

6. The 1st Day Bombardment Group: llth, 20th, 96th and 166th 

Aero Squadrons. 

7. The description of this “remarkable concentration,” which 

was accomplished by the French rather than by the U.S. Air 

Service, was copied, with minor editorial changes but without 

substantive alteration, from Ops Rpt No 40, AS 1st Army, 9 Oct 18. 

Section 3(d) of the report briefly describes bombing expeditions 

launched by two squadrons of the Day Bombardment Groupof the 

First Army Air Service shortly after noon. This is followed by an 

Annex, which begins: “Details were received at a late hour 

concerning a very important and remarkable bombing expedition, 

which was launched in the late afternoon by a great number of 

planes of the French Aerial Division, which were co-operating with 

the Air Service of the First American Army, in the Argonne Sector.” 

8. Original report: Enemy casualties, 198; American casualties, 

80; superiority, 2% to 1. 

9. The date given is for the formation of a company that provided 

enlisted personnel for the squadron when it was organized on 16 

June 1917. See Maurer Maurer (ed.), Combat Squadrons of the Air 

Force, World War I/ (Washington, 1969), pp 94-96. 

I The Annex continues with the details given in the “Final Report.” 
Final Report 399 

10. Original report: 25 casualties. 

11. Original report: “Finally, with the 17th . . . .” 

12. Original report: 65 confirmed. 

m *t$? ; 

~,Q,/.I 

- ‘.,I 13. Maj.-Gen. John Maitland Salmond. 

14. Original report: 466 individuals. 

15. Original report: Total decorations and citations, 530. 

16. This sentence was not in the original report. The award 

mentioned was made in 1919 to 2d Lt. Frank Luke, Jr. The Medal of 

Honor was later awarded to other members of the Air Service for 

actions during World War I. 

17. Original report: “The American D.S.C. was awarded to 288 

individuals, of which number 30 also received one Oak-leaf, 2 two, 

the 228 individuals receiving 52 Oak-leaves.’’ 

18. Original report: One DSC and 17 DFC. 

19. Original report: “Three persons were awarded the French 

Legion of Honor, one the Medaille Militaire, 70 the Croixde Guerre 

and, of these, 8 individuals becameentitled to wearthe Fourragere, 

and 149 Americans (4 of whom twice received this honor) were 

awarded French citations.” 

&?q c’ *+yi ’ - II -\ +). -b’{ 

1 three, 2 four, and 1 seven Oak-leaves, thus giving a total of 36 of Croix de Guerre 

20. Original report: One received the silver medal. 

21. This sentence was not in the original report. 

Chapter IV. 

1. Original report: 7,726 officers. 

2. Original report: 756 officers. 

3. Original report: 16 training schools. 

4. Date was not in original report. 

5. Maj. William Mitchell was the observer; Capt. Carleton G. 

Chapman was in London. 1st Lts. Joseph E. Carberry, Millard F. 

Harmon, Jr., and Davenport Johnson were the flying students. 

6. Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing. 

7. The Army officers were Capts. Virginius E. Clark and Edgar S. 

Gorrell. 

8. Maj. William Thaw, 3d Pursuit Group; Maj. Charles Biddle, 4th 

Group; Capt. Dudley L. Hill, 5th Group. 

9. This section was headed successively by Capt. Edgar S. 

Gorrell, Col. Halsey Dunwoody, Maj. Robert Marsh, Jr., Lt. Col. E.J. 

Hall, and Maj. A.D. Butterfield. 

10. The chiefs of the section were Capt. R.D. Skinner and later 

Maj. E.L. Gros. 

11. Paragraph continues in original report. 
400 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Chapter V. 

Service headquarters remained until October 1918. 

1. The Chief of Air Service also moved to Tours, where Air 

2. The chief of the section was Col. Charles deF. Chandler. 

* 

Chapter VI. 

1. The chief was Lt. Col. Harry M. Toulmin. 

2. The chief was Col. Warwick Greene. 

3. The chiefs included Maj. Robert Glendinning, Lt. Col. 

Theodore A. Baldwin, Lt. Col. W.H.H. Hutton, Col. Hiram Bingham, 

and Maj. George W. DeArmond. 

4. The chiefs were 1st Lt. Quilla C. Duke, Maj. George W. 

DeArmond, Maj. Robert E. O’Brien, and Maj. James E. Chaney. 

5. The chief was Capt. Ernest L. Jones. 

0. This statement reflects Gorrell’s interpretation of Patrick’s 

order (ACAS, AEF, Office Memo 88, 4 Dec 18) making Gorrell 

responsible for “the preparation and compilation of the historical, 

statistical, technical and tactical records of the Air Service, 

American Expeditionary Forces.” 

Chapter VI I. 

1. Air Service headquarters were with Headquarters, AEF in 

Paris from mid-June 1917 until 1 September 1917 and at Chaumont-en-Bassigny from 1 September 1917 until mid-February 

1918. The office of the Chief of Air Service, AEF then was situated at 

Tours until October 1918, when Patrick moved his office to General 

Headquarters, AEF at Chaumont. 

2. The assistant chief at Headquarters, Services of Supply, at 

Tours was Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois; at Paris, Col. Halsey 

Dunwoody. 

3. The representative in London was Col. Clarence R. Day; in 

Italy, Maj. Robert Glendinning. 

4. A Services of Supply organization. 

5. In the U.S. Air Service during World War I a “service” unit was 

one with a tactical, or combat, function (e.g., observation, pursuit, 

bombardment) rather than, as in more recent times, one that 

provided supporting (e.g., supply, maintenance) services for other 

units. 

6. In the AEF, each army (e.g., First Army) and corps (e.g., IV 

Corps) to which Air Service units were assigned or attached for 

combat had an aviation officer who was both a staff officer on the 

staff of the commanding general and the commander of the Air 

Service units so assigned or attached. In his staff capacity, the 

aviation officer had the title Chief of Air Service; in his command 
Final Report 401 

role his title was Army [or Corm) Air Service Commander. These 7 

titles, however, were often used interchangeably. 

Chapter IX. 

1. See Chapter Ill, note 13. 

2. Original report: 628 airplanes. 

Chapter X. 

1. The chiefs of the section were Lt. Col. Joseph E. Carberry, Lt. 

Col. Thomas Dew. Milling, Col. Henry C. Smither, and Col. Walter 

G. Kilner. 

2. Original report: 121 graduated. 

3. In the original report, this was the beginning of a new chapter, 

4. Original report: 831 graduated. 

5. Original report: 199 pilots and observers killed; 159 students; 

6. Spin; tail spin. 

7. Original report: 1,230 pilots and 749 observers. 

8. Original report: 199 fatalities. 

9. Original report: 2,941 airplanes and 149,889 hours. 

10. Original report: 11 schools. 

XI, “Training (Con’td).” 

40 instructors, testers, and transfer pilots. 

Chapter XI. 

1. The chiefs were Lt. Col. Townsend F. Dodd and later Col. 

Halsey Dunwoody. 

2. In this chapter, the original “S.O.S.” was transcribed “Source 

(or Sources) of Supply” in the 1921 edition. The present editor has 

corrected this to “Services of Supply.” 

3. The paragraph continues in the original report. 

4. Theoriginal report gave theyear as 1917, which obviously was 

wrong. 

Chapter XII. 

1. See Chapter IV, note 9. 

2. The Division of Technical History and Research was 

established on 22 October 1918, its historical function being 

detailed lat6r by Gorrell. 

Chapter XIII. 

1. The chief was Col. Charles deF. Chandler. 

2. In the original report the sentence read: “Thirty-five of our 
402 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

balloons were burned in this way, and nineweredestroyed by shell 

fire.” 

3. Original report: 37 burned. 

4. Original report: 5 destroyed. 

Chapter XIV. 

1. The chief was Lt. Col. Harry J. Malony. 

2. The preceding eleven words (to meet the delivery of foreign3. Original report: May 18, 1918. 

built airplanes as well as) were not in the original report. 

Chapter XV. 

1. The section was headed by Maj. James Barnes, Lt. Col. Shelby 

C. Leasure, and Maj. Edward J. Steichen. 

2. Eastman Kodak Company. 

3. This camera had been invented by Lt. G. de Ram of the French 

Air Service, who had offered it to the French government and had 

been turned down. Gorrell heard about it while Chief of the 

Techical Section and had it investigated by a group of officers, 

after which it was adopted by the US. Air Service. It was a large, 

heavy camera which was mounted in the fuselage of an airplane. It 

carried 50 plates, 18 x 24 cm., and could be operated by either the 

pilot or observer. When the operator pressed the release, an 

exposure was made, after which the plate was changed and the 

shutter set automatically so that the camera was ready for the next 

exposure. 

Chapter XVI. 

John G. Thornell. 

that time. 

1. The section was headed by Capt. F.N. Shumaker and Maj. 

2. Capt. Edgar S. Gorrell was Chief of the Technical Section at 

Chapter XVII. 

1. The Medical Consultant was Col. Thomas R. Boggs. 
Tactical History 403 

TACTICAL HISTORY 

Part Two: Tactlcal History of Corps Observatlon 

1. The 77th Division relieved the 42d on 21 June 1918. A German 

raid on 24 June was repulsed after a sharp fight. 

2. Maj. Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the 1st Corps 

Observation Group, succeeded Col. William Mitchell as Chief of Air 

Service, I Corps in late June 1918. His successors as Chief of Air 

Service, I Corps were Maj. Melvin A. Hall on 2 September, and Capt. 

Oliver P. Echols on 1 November 1918. 

3. The Corps Balloon Wing Commander was Maj. (later Lt. Col.) 

John A. Paegelow, who became Army Balloon Wing Commander 

when the First Army was formed in August 1918. With the formation 

of the army wing, a lettered company of the wing headquarters was 

assigned to each corgs as the corps balloon headquarters. Later 

the lettered companiles were replaced by corps balloon group 

headquarters. See Appendix B. 

4. The Chief of Air Service, Ill Corps at the beginning of August 

1918 was Maj. Joseph T. McNarney, his successors being Maj. 

Melvin A. Hall on 8 August, Capt. Kenneth P. Littauer (acting 

commander) on 31 August, Col. Joseph C. Morrow on 20 

September, and Capt, Littauer on 22 October. 

5. The Army Air Service Commander, First Army was Col. 

William Mitchell, who was succeeded in October by Col. Thomas 

Dew. Milling. 

6. The Chief of Air Service, IV Corps was Maj. Harry B. 

Anderson; V Corps, Lt. Col. Arthur R. Christie until 28 October 

1918; then Maj. Martin F. Scanlon. 

7. The CorpsObseWatlon Wing Commander was Maj. Lewis H. 

Brereton until 23 October 1918, then Maj. Melvin A. Hall. 

8. 1st Lt. William P. Erwin of the 1st Aero Squadron. See USAF 

Historical Study 133, p. 20. 

Part Three: Tactical Hktory of Army Observation 

1. The commander was Maj. John N. Reynolds. 

2. The aircraft were French A.R.s, with Renault engines. A list of 

abbreviations compilgd by the Information Section, Air Service, 

AEF indicated that A.R. meant Army Corps (Corps d’Armee) type 

aircraft with Renault engines. (Bull of Info Sec, AS, AEF, Vol V, No 

205 (29 Jul 18.) It also has been said to stand for Aeronautique, 

referring to the builder, the French government’s Section Technique de I’Aeronautique. W.M. Lamberton, comp., Reconnais- 
404 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

sance &BomberAircraftofthe 1914-1918 War (Los Angeles, 1962), 

p 74. 

3. A French hangar made of a frame covered with canvas, with a 

canvas d raw-cu rtai n covering the front. 

4. Rest. 

5. Adjustments. 

Part Four: Tactlcal History of Pursult Avlation 

1. This name does not appear on any of the World War I station 

lists, or any of the World War I or more recent maps, seen by the 

editor. The reference evidently is to the field commonly referred to 

in the Air Service, AEF, as the“Toul”airdrome, northeast of Toul on 

the Toul-Dieulouard road. 

2. Those who had transferred from the French to the American 

Air Service included Maj. John Huffer, Commanding Officer of the 

94th Aero Squadron; Capt. Kenneth Marr, Flight Commander and 

later Commanding Officer, 94th Aero Squadron; Capt. David 

McKelvy Peterson, Flight Commander of the 94th and later 

Commanding Officer of the 95th Aero Squadron; Maj. Raoul 

Lufbery, the famous “ace” of the Lafayette Escadrille; and 2d Lt. 

Alan F. Winslow, credited with the 94th Aero Squadron’s first 

victory in aerial combat. 

3. The squadron numbers, which obviously were wrong in the 

original copy, have been changed from 28 to 27 and from 167 to 

147. 

4. The Holt flare, made by the Yorkshire Steel Co. of London, 

was mounted on the underside of the wing of an airplane to light the 

ground when landing at night. 

5. There is a blank, indicated by eight hyphens, in the original 

COPY. 

6. Key officers of the Air Service, AEF, and particularly those 

concerned with directing pursuit and bombardment operations, 

repeatedly stated that the ultimate objective of warfare was to 

destroy the enemy’s will to fight, the objective of military aviation 

thus being the destruction of the morale of the enemy. The shock 

actions referred to were directed toward that end. 

7. A “scouring patrol” was an offensive operation against enemy 

aircraft. It was carried out by a “chain” of three flights of three or 

more aircraft. The lead flight (pivot) flew an erratic course on a predesignated general heading with the other two flights doing the 

same at a distance but with each in constant touch with the other 

two. Thus a trap was set for enemy planes that might observe the 

feeble front presented by one flight and attack, at which time the 

other two would join the battle. 
Tactical History 405 

Part Five: Tactical History of Day Bombardment 

1. A V-12 motor. 

2. The Michelin brothers, Andre and Edouard, not only 

manufactured automobile tires and published guide books for 

travelers but also made bombs, bomb racks, bomb sights, and 

other war materiel during World War I. 

3. This sight had settings for ground speed and altitude, the 

latter being obtained from the plane’saltimeter. Ground speed was 

obtained just before the bomb run by timing, with a stop watch, a 

flight of 600 meters in the same direction as the bomb run. 

4. A tourelle was a ring, or Scarff, mount, which enabled the 

gunner to swing his gun in different directions. 

5. Maj. Harry M. Brown, the squadron’s commander, was one of 

the 12 who became prisoners of war. 

6. The “target” was the landing T, which was placed on the field 

to indicate the direction for takeoff and landing. One of the duties 

of the airdrome officer was to place the T in the proper position. So 

far as practicable, he was to keep it headed into the wind, but pilots 

were under orders to takeoff and land “with the T” regardless of the 

direction of the wind. 

7. This high-altitude bomb sight, which was developed by Lt. 

Comdr. Wimperis of the Royal Naval Air Service, did not require the 

use of astop watch and thus did not require holding level flight for a 

considerable period in which the aircraft was especially vulnerable 

to antiaircraft fire. With the Wimperis sight, a plane could coast 

down from high altitude and quickly release the bomb after only a 

few seconds of level flight. 

Part Six: Tactical History of American Observation 

Balloons. 

1. French insignia. 
406 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

The U.!3. Air Service 

in World War I, 

VOl. I 

Accidents in training: 27, 110-12 

Adjutants: 172-73, 199 

Administration operations and SyStWfIS: 73-7476 

Administration Section, Air Service: 65 

Aincreville: 346 

Air Depot, 1st: 55,78,117,128,132 

Air parks: 79, 117-19. See also Airfields 

Air Sewice (see also Aviation Section, Signal Corps) 

activation: 52 

casuailties: 27 

command and control, concept of: 79 

discipline in: 90, 113 

expansion program: 71-74 

first concentration under own commander: 301 

headquarters moves: 69 

histoiy projects: 1-14, 74, 134, 154-55, 389-90 

inactivation procedures: 91-92 

insignia: 243, 393 

Italy, representative in: 76,91 

London, representative in: 76, 86,91, 124 

morale: 49,89-90,94, 11 2-1 3, 185,304-305 

orgariization and reorganization: 62-63,65,75-80 

Paris, representative in: 69, 76,86 

prewar strength: 51 

prisoners of war: 27,361,368 

roles and missions, view of: 47, 79 

Services of Supply, representatives at: 76 

stations in Services of Supply: 26,73, 77 

support by services: 90 

202-squadron program: 71-72,117 

tribute to personnel: 163 

wartime strength, periodic: 37,51,72 

Zone of Advance stations: 2-3,62 
Index 407 

Air Service Production Center No. 2. See Romorantin 

Air supremacy, achievement: 319,328,330,332-39 

Air units (see also Groups; Squadrons; Wings) 

202-squadron program: 71-72,117 

air supremacy, achievement: 319,328,330,332-39 

alerts, proper use: 338-39 

British, attachments to and from: 32,37,235, 302,325-39,375 

command and control: 38,42,47,172,186,197-202,225,275, 

enemy strength: 34, 172, 185, 203, 222, 236, 247, 292, 298, 307, 

escort missions: 337-38,343-49 

French, attachments to and from: 34,37,40-41, 198, 202-203, 

ground troops, relations with: 253-54 

missions, typical: 176-81, 186-90,193-95,205, 222-23, 261-62, 

mobility: 230, 291 

strength: 310 

tactical reports: 225 

tactics. See Tactics 

tanks, cooperation with: 331 

Armament. See Armament; also by type 

armor plate protection: 375 

balloons. See Balloons 

capabilities and limitations: 38-39, 185,263, 272,311,322,325- 

identification, friend or foe: 253, 284 

insignia on: 253 

largest concentration: 37 

losses. See Aircraft losses 

maintenance and repair: 175-76,358,362-63,369 

number needed, estimate of: 51-52 

number, prewar: 51 

number received, all sources: 66,88 

number in service, periodic: 17,25,353,362 

number in training programs: 112 

production and procurement. See Aircraft production and proreplacement program: 21 7-1 8,306,361 -63,368-69,375 

serviceable percentage: 31 1 

types in use, number: 114 

279,283, 288,301,304,309-10,321-22,325,363 

326,329, 333,336, 343, 346, 363,372 

217, 221, 235,245,249,259-67, 283,288-89, 301-1 1,359, 365, 

375 

278,294,302-304,359-61 

Aircraft 

26,330,357-58,361,375 

curement 
408 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Aircraft Acceptance Park No. 1. See Orly 

Aircraft Armament Section, Air Service: 76,90, 145-49 

AircralR losses 

American: 17,31,39,44-46,87,126,254,273,296,310,331,351- 

British: 327-28,330 

enerny: 17,31-32,42,44-46,254,273,284,318,341,351-52,362, 

52,361,366,368,372-73 

368,372-73,385 

Aircraft Production Board: 51-53,131,140, 145 

Aircraft production and procurement 

American production: 17,59-61,72,81,83,108,117,122,146 

assembling, equipping and maintenance: 17,49,62,69,117, 

basis for U.S. production: 51-52 

British production: 127-28 

delivery system and flow: 118-19, 145,341 

design, trends and improvements in: 81-82,132-34 

French production and delivery: 53-54,65,69-70,72,76,81-82, 

Gerrnan production and design: 81 

industry, coordination of: 65 

initiedive, importance in: 82 

inspection, testing and acceptance: 76,78-79,88, 122-23, 128, 

matetrials, procurement and distribution: 59,61,65,69,72, 78, 

problems in: 81-82 

royalties on: 52, 54 

salvage operations: 79,92, 11 3-14, 1 17, 126-28 

standardization programs: 54, 61, 114 

surplus at Armistice: 119 

Aircraft types 

Albatros: 236,265, 272,292, 301, 325 

A.R. (Avion Renault). See Renault below 

Avro: 110 

Breguet: 108,147,209,221,266,356,358,360-61,366,366,371, 

37!5 

Bristol: 61, 82 

Caproni: 87,101 

Caudron: 101 

Clerget: 327,330 

122,126-28 

85-87,91,97, 11 7,122-24 

131-34,149,208 

81,83,127 

De Havilland: 37,59-61,82,88, 108,117, 120-27,132-34, 149, 

23'7,364-65,368,371-72,375 
Index 409 

Dolphin: 110 

Farman: 82,101 

Fokker: 33,43,81, 236,265,272, 290,292,301,325,329-30,335, 

357,368,372 

Handley-Page: 76, 84-86, 108, 149, 15P 

Junkers: 81 

Le Pere: 147 

Le Rhone: 327,330 

Nieuport: 101,114,132-33,283-84,295 

Pfalz: 43, 81, 236, 265, 272, 301, 325, 357, 372 

Renault: 82,171,185,236,259 

Salmson: 132, 147, 153,155,185, 193,205,210,217,221,237, 

259,263,266,272 

S.E. (Scouting Experimental): 128,325,327-28,330,337-38 

S.I.A. (Italian Air Service): 87, 101 

Siemens-Schuckert: 81 

Sopwith: 82,85,101,110,116,171,205,217,324-25,338 

Spad: 44, 60-61, 110, 123, 147, 171, 221, 283, 288-89, 295, 304, 

trainers: 94, 110 

types recommended: 59-61 

acreage required: 117 

construction and maintenance: 37,85-86,93,97, 117-19, 126, 

185,218,334,357,362 

defense of. See Security operations and systems 

deficiencies in: 296,801,334,373-74 

enemy facilities: 301,334 

enemy seizures: 328 

equipment shortages: 218 

layout for schools: 115 

number in service: 22 

seizures from enemy: 330 

sites and their sellection: 23,55,76, 128 

transfer to France: 92 

307,311, 321, 372-73 

Airfields 

Air-ground coordination and communication: 33-35,40,47,55, 

81, 186, 188-91,194-95,199,208-19,223-33,238-43,253,273, 

303-304,307,337,3a3,385,387-88 

Airplane Division, Technical Section: 132 

Airplane Instrument Division, Technical Section: 133 

Airplane and Motor Division, Supply Section: 122-23 

Aisne Canal: 231 
41 0 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Aisne-Ivlarne offensive: 17,32-34,81,140,191,197-219,238 

Aisne River: 33, 222, 229,313 

Albert: 46,325,328,330,332 

Alerts, proper use: 338-39 

Allemont: 368 

Amant!(: 31,55,105,259-60,266,357,362,365,373-74 

Ambulence Corps: 94 

American Expedition Forces 

expansion program: 71-72,105 

headquarters activated: 55 

American Red Cross: 90 

Ammunition 

caliber differences: 148 

incendiaries: 337 

shortages: 189 

supply and expenditure: 109, 148, 176 

Andmon, Major Harry B.: 234 

Andeville: 347 

Andreuanne: 347 

Antiaircraft defense 

American: 31 , 41,175,221,284,308,385 

by balloons: 385 

British: 337 

enemy: 172,182,189,195,203,213,229,262-63,265-66,277, 

308,357-58,372 

Antipersonnel bombs: 358 

Apremont: 171 

Argonrie Forest: 295,323,371 

Argonrie - Meuse offensive. See Meuse - Argonne offensive 

Armament 

deficiencies in: 109, 146-48 

depalt established: 149 

maintenance and repair: 176 

salvage operations: 148 

standardization programs: 147 
Index 41 1 

supply, control and installation: 17, 117, 119, 126, 145, 148-49, 

typical systems: 35849,365 

Armies (see also Army Air Service) 

First: 269-70, 273,275-79,301,304-11,313-23,343-44,346,385 

Second: 45,85,124,137,152,275 

263 

Armistice proclaimed: 17 

Armor plate 

design and development: 146 

protection by: 375 

Armorers, training: 1G-46 

Army Air Service 

First: 4-5,37-38,124,137-38,148,152,154,235-43,246,301-11, 

Second: 341 -44,386 

345,365-69,373,391-92 

Army Observation Group, 1st: 154,259,266,269-73,343 

Arnaville: 368 

Arnold, Colonel Henry H.: 4 

Arras: 332 

Artillery fire adjustmerH: 17,29,32-33,35,37-38,40-41,102,137- 

38, 158,172,176, 178,181-82,186,188-91,193-95,201,204-19, 

223-33,235-43,249-S5,260-67,379,381,383,387-88 

Artillery fire support 

American: 171,186,193-94,203,222,246,270,277,343,346 

enemy: 203,222,247,302 

Atkinson, Major Bert M.: 285,287 

Audun-le-Roman: 357 

Aulnat: 92 

Austria, operations against: 46,87 

Automobiles. See Motor vehicles; Transportation 

Auxi-le-ChBteau: 45 

Aviation Acceptance Park No. 1. See Orly 

Aviation cadets, training: 93-95,97,103 
41 2 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Aviation Instruction Centers 

2d: 159 

3d: 161 

7th: ‘157,358-59 

Aviation medicine. See Medical Research Board 

Aviation Section, Signal Corps: 51-52 

Avord: 55,100-101 

Baccarat sector: 30,32, 185-91,379,381 

Badenviller: 186 

Baker, Newton D.: 95 

Balloon companies 

arrivals and departures: 137 

ascensions, duration and number: 17,138 

command and control: 76 

dedication of troops: 140 

French attachments: 138-40 

mobility: 381,383,385 

number needed, estimate of: 52 

operations by: 35,40,44, 138-40, 197,379-88 

organization and assignment: 137 

personnel strength and shortages: 17,51,137,140 

pilots: 137-38 

reconnaissance reports, summary of: 138 

training programs: 32, 137-38,379,381,387-88 

1st: ‘138, 379, 381 

3d: 140 

4th: :35,140,379,381 

6th: :385 

7th: :385 

8th: :385 

10th. 386 

2d: 137-40,379,381 

Balloon Section, Air Service: 65, 70,76, 137-43 

Balloon Squadron, 24: 137 

Balloons 

antiaircraft defense by: 385 

assembling and meintaining: 17 

attacks against enemy aircraft: 304,307,310-1 1,313-14,317-18, 

321,328-29,337,344,348-49 
Jndex 463 

barrages, experience wlth: 142 

British uses and losges: 328-39 

Caquoat type: 382 

centers in France: 136 

company requirements: 143 

enemy attacks agairlst: 17, 138 

enemy losses. 17,39,42,316-18,385 

enemy use: 40,42, 229,328-29,333-34,336, 381, 383 

French production and equipment: 40,70,140 

French uses and losees: 329,379,383,385 

inspection, maintengnce and repair: 142 

losses: 17,35,138-40,299,381,385 

number in service: 17,20,22,137,381-85 

R type: 140,143 

supply system: 70,140-41,143 

transportation facilities: 142 

Banthevilte: 372 

Bapaume: 330,332 

Barbed-wire obstructions: 171-72, 185-86, 193, 203, 246-47 

Bar-le-Duc: 237 

Barracks construction: 126 

Base depots: 123 

Bayonville: 42, 44, 318,373 

Bazoches: 221 

Beaumont: 349 

Beauvais: 328 

BeauzBe: 245 

Becq: 305 

Beff u: 347 

Behonne: 146 

Belrain: 313,320 

Bessonneaux hangars: 202,260,292 

Beuconville: 305 
41 4 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

- 

Bicqueley: 237 

Blamont: 186 

Blueprints, production: 134, 146 

Bois d'lrndrevanne: 346 

Bois de Babiemont: 346 

Bois de Bantheville: 346 

Bois de Barricourt: 346 

Bois de la Folie: 346-47 

Bois des Loges: 346 

Bolling, Colonel Raynal C.: 4, 53,55, 61,65,87 

Bomb sights 

Michelin: 358 

Wimperis: 365 

numtler trained: 112 

trainiing programs: 58,93, 97-98, 101, 103-04, 108 

Bom basdiers 

Bombardment squadrons, revised program: 71 

Bombing operations (see also Stratetic air support; Tactical air 

support) 

British operations: 32,d9, 286,326,329-30,332-33,336 

command and control: 76 

enemy morale, effect on: 32,34,49,307,362,369, 373 

enemy operations: 40,42,123,185-86,203,260,288,320 

first missions: 31, 3$1 

French operations: 39-40 

general operations: 39,43,46,48-49,82,85-87,278,303-304, 

Italian operations: 39 

missions, typical: 359-61 

night operations: 39,320,323,366 

number of raids: 17 

volume of drops: 17,19,21,44,362,372-73 

antipersonnel: 358 

design and development: 146-48 

incendiaries: 358, 372 

load capacities: 358 

307,316-18,344,346-47,357-63,365-69,371-75 

Bombs 
Index 415 

loading and release systems: 14548,358, 367, 370 

smoke types: 266 

varied types: 266,358,372 

Bon Maison: 289 

Bonnell, Major G. H.: 285 

Bordeaux: 124 

Bray: 330-31 

Brereton, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis H.: 196 

Brest: 124 

Bridges and bridgeheads, strikes against: 365,368 

Briey: 40,313,357 

Brigades, 9th and 10th: 194-95 

British air force. See Royal Flying Corps 

British Air Ministry: 128 

British Army ( see also Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom) 

antiaircraft defenses: 337 

staff practice: 336 

Third Army: 45 

Fourth Army: 46 

Fifth Army: 283 

9th Brigade: 328-29 

British Expenditionary Forces: 37, 158 

Bron: 99 

Buire: 216 

Buxerulles: 366 

Buxieres: 366 

Buzancy: 347 

Buzancy - Nouart road: 347 

Cable Section, Air Service: 74 

Cadets. See Aviation cadets 

Cambrai: 45-46,330,335-36 
41 6 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Cameras 

deficiencies in: 267,278-79 

De Ram model: 9,154-55 

French models: 278-79 

on guns: 109, 152 

mouinting systems: 132, 153, 155 

Camouflage operations: 119, 133, 175,193,202,260 

Campbell, Lieutenant Douglas: 30, 284 

Canada, training in: 85, 103 

Canal du Nord: 46,332-35 

Cannon, aircraft: 146 

Cappeille: 45 

Caquot balloon: 382 

Caquot winch: 35,140 

Castor oil. See Petroleum, oil and lubricants 

Casual ties 

Air Smvice: 27 

enemy, from air attack: 44 

ferry pilots: 119, 126 

hours flown per loss: 110 

observers: 110,217,369 

pilots: 217,350,366,369,371-72 

in training: 27, 110-12 

Caustic soda: 70 

Cavalry reconnaissance patrol: 254-55 

Cazaux: 100-1 01,106,109,26667,283 

Celles: 193 

Chailly-en-Brie: 21 7 

Chalons: 283 

Chambers, Lieutenant Reed: 281 

Chambley: 39,344,366,368 

Chambley-Mars-la-Tour road 

Champigneulle: 346,349 
Index 41 7 

Chandler, Colonel Charles De F.: 377 

Ch&eauroux: 100 

Chiteau-Thierry counteroffensive: 5,33-35,138,183,212-19,221, 

ChAtenay: 123 

Ch~tillon-sous-les-C8tes: 37,100,105,109, 146,235,301,313, 

315,343-44 

Chaumont-sur-Aire: 246,313 

Chaumont-en-Bassigny: 55 

Chemical Division, Technical Section: 133 

Chief of Air Service, AEF. See Patrick, Major General Mason M. 

Chief of Ordnance. See Ordnance Department 

China, decorations awarded by: 47 

Christie, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur R.: 234 

Citroen Works: 133 

Cities, attacks on: 336 

Clerks: 62 

Clermont-Ferrand: 58,97,100,108-109,146,157,359 

CIBry-le-Grand: 346 

Cl6ry-le-Petit: 346 

Clichy: 119, 123 

Coblenz: 286,361 

Codes, issue and use: 21 6,218,224 

CoOtquidan: 100, 105 

Coincy: 217, 296 

Colombey-les-Belles: 55, 117, 119, 128, 146,361 

288,290-99,306 

Combat operations: 19 

first commitments: 29-30 

ground conditions: 285 

mobility, trend to: 47-48 

time engaged: 17,24 
418 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Command and control 

aerial photography: 76 

Air Service concept: 79 

air units: 38,42,47, 172, 186, 197, 198-202,225, 275,279, 283, 

ballclon companies: 76 

bombing operations: 76 

radio operations: 76,90, 158 

Supply depots: 11 9 

Commercy: 284,366 

Communications operations and systems: 37,41,44,62,143,176- 

55,278,284,289,2glI 296,322,343-44,387-88. See also by type. 

288,301,304,309-10,321-22,325,363 

79,188,190,194-95,200-201,2O5-19,223,225,230,239-43,248- 

Concentration, principle of: 38 

Conflans: 39-41,261,266,269,277,313,319,357-59,362,368 

Conner, Brigadier General Fox: 10 

Consenvoye: 349 

Construction programs (see also Maintenance and repair) ' airfitrlds: 37,85-86, 93,97, 117-19, 136, 185, 218,334,357,362 

barracks: 126 

general: 55,61-62,69,71,76,83,90,93,97,123,126,128,149, 

259,260 

railway facilities: 93, 114, 126 

roads: 97,123, 126 

Contact patrols. See Air-ground coordination; Tactical air support 

Cook, Lieutenant Everett R.: 277 

Coordination Staff, Air Service: 73 

Cornay: 349, 372 

Corning, Merv: 36,300 

Corps 

I: 30 I, 343-44 

IV: 343-44 

v: 3413-44 

VII: 301 

I: 29,33,37,137-38,172,197-219,235-43,245-55,345,359 

Ill: 34, 212-19, 221-33,235-43, 245-55 

Corps Air Service 
Index 419 

IV: 37,235-43,245,343 

V: 37,231,235-43,24565,301,305 

organization: 198-202,221,235-37,2454,255 

staff systems: 199,221,246 

Corps Artillery, I: 381 

Corps Balloon Group, I: 379 

Corps Observation Group, I: 21,33,171-83,197-219 

Corps Observation Training Center, I: 259,267 

C6tes-de-Merree: 261 

Couloumihres: 202,204, 222 

Courbevoie: 145 

Courchamps: 33,197,202-203 

Courier service: 37,177,194,201,224-25,230,322,343-44 

Courlandon: 221 

Critiques: 232. See also Lessons learned 

Cross-training: 41 

Cunel: 349 

Cuperly: 137 

Damvillers: 44 

Dannevoux: 349 

Decorations and awards: 46 

De Ram camera: 9,154-55 

Designs and Projects Section, Air Service: 76 

Director of Construction and Forestry: 76,90, 128 

Disbursing and Legal Division, Supply Section: 124-25 

Disbursing requirements: 1 24-25 

Discipline, in Air Service: 90, 113 

Disulouard: 284 

Distinguished Service Cross awards: 46 

Distinguished Flying Cross (British) awards: 46 
420 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Distinguished Service Cross (British) awards: 46 

Divisioris 

1 st: 3,2, 35, 379, 381 

2d: 35,202-19,293,379,381 

3d: 35,381 

4th: 217 

5th: 193-95 

26th: 171-72,204-205,213-17 

42d: ‘186,213-19 

77th: 188, 229 

Dodd, Major Townsend F.: 52 

Dogneville: 193 

Domeurs: 305 

Dommary-Baroncourt: 31,41,277,357,359-61,368 

Dope, standardizing: 133 

Dormans: 293 

Douellens: 45 

Drafting Division, Technical Section: 134 

Drawings, production: 134 

Dunkirk: 45, 289 

Dun-su r-Meuse: 43,371 -72 

Dunsworth, Major James L.: 370 

Economy of force, principle of 310,321-22 

Ellingtan Field: 108 

Engine Division, Technical Section: 132 

Engineer officers, training: 114 

Enginelering Branch, Aircraft Armament Section, Air Service: 146, 

148 

Engines 

American production: 81 

assembling and repairing: 17,114, 126-28 

design and improvement: 133 

Gnome: 6061,133,284,295 
Index 421 

Hispano-Suiza: 60-181,171,289,295,311 

inspection, testing and accdptance: 76,78-79,88,131,134 

Liberty: 17,37,60-$1,82,88,108,127, 130, 133,237,365 

metals specifications: 133 

number needed and delivered: 51-52,127 

production and pracurement: 54,76 

Renault: 171,358 

Rhone: I71 

Rolls-Royce Eagle: 59-60 

Salmson: 185,259 

Salvage operations: 1 17,126 

standardization programs: 88 

supply system: 119 

England, See British Army Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom 

Epernay: 283,295 

Epiez: 283,285 

Epinal: 193 

Equipment Branch, Aircraft Armament Section: 148-49 

Equipment tables: 147, 149, 151 

Escort missions. See Pursuit operations 

Eskridge, Colonel Oliver S.: 1 

Esprit de corps. See Morale 

Essey: 305 

Etain: 261,306,368 

Examining boards: 94 

Executive Section, Air Service: 8,73 

Fabrics, standardizing: 133 

Favorolles: 293,295 

F6re-en-Tardenois: 217 

Ferme des Greves: 221,229-31 

Ferme Morasse: 206,217,230 

Ferrosilicon, supply of: 70, 142 

Ferry pilots: 11 9, 126-27 
422 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Fighter groups. See Groups 

Fighter operations. See Pursuit operations 

Fismes: 289 

Flares 

design and development: 147-48 

tactical use: 188-89,213,231,253,366 

Flash spotting: 223,226 

Flirey: 171 

Fog, effect of. See Weather, effect on operations 

Foggia-Renatico: 46,87,99-101 

Ford Junction, England: 100, 108, 158 

Formation flying: 30-31,34,43,218, 263-64, 269-70,285, 292,296, 

Fort Sill: 267 

Foucaucourt: 245 

Foulois, Brigadier General Benjamin D.: 1,65 

Fragmentation bombs: 358 

France 

298,309, 327-28, 334-35,339,361,365,368-69,371,374-75 

aircraft production and delivery: 53-54,65, 69-70, 72,76, 81-82, 

airfields transfer to: 92 

arrivals in: 86 

attachments to and from: 34,37,40-41,59, 198,202-203, 217, 

balloon centers in: 136 

balloons, attachments from: 13840 

balloons, production and equipment: 40,70, 140 

balloons, uses and losses: 329, 379,383,385 

bom bi ng ope rat ions by: 39-40 

camera models: 278-79 

decoirations awarded by: 46 

production agreements with: 54 

pursuit operations by: 227 

recorinaissance operations by: 247 

tactics: 361 

training programs by: 58-59,85,95,99-101,105,108 

tribute to: 163 

85-87,91,97,117,122-24 

221,235,245,249,259-67,283,288-89,301-11,359,365,375 

I 
Index 423 

Second Army: 37,305,308,344 

Fourth Army: 288-89,295 

Fifth Army: 295 

Sixth Army: 34,203,221 -33,289,291 -99 

Eighth Army: 37,186-91,259-67,283-89,344 

Tenth Army: 35 

II Colonial Corps: 37,235-43,245,301,305,343-44 

VI Corps: 186-91 

XXXl I I Corps: 193-95,245 

XXXVll Corps: 29 

167th Division: 203,205,217 

16th Pursuit Group: 302,306,313 

17th Pursuit Group: 293 

21st Pursuit Group: 288-89 

22d Pursuit Group: 227 

1st Squadron: 283 

2d Squadron: 301 

41st muadron: 260 

50th Squadron: 237-43 

21 1 th Squadron: 237-43 

237th Squadron: 221,223,230-33 

284th Squadron: 221,223,230-33 

Francheville: 204-206,211 , 217,305 

Frapelle: 30, 193, 195 t 

Fresne-en-Woevre: 343 

Froides: 313 

Fuel tanks: 132,133,371 

Furbara: 100-1 01 

Gas (balloon), supply of 70 

Gasoline pump, Selden: 132-33 

Gasoline tanks: 132-3$, 371 

General Staff, AEF: 74 

General Staff, War Department: 52 

Generators, deficiencies in: 152 

Gengoult: 283 

Germany 

Air Service stations in: 26 
424 . U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

aircraft production and design: 81 

2d Pursuit Group: 333-34 

Gironville: 305 

Glue, analyzing: 134 

Gondrocourt: 259,267 

Gond rcwi I le-su r-Mosel le: 259, 266 

Gorrell, Colonel Edgar S.: 4-7,9, 12-14,74 

Gorze: 368 

Goussancourt: 229-31 

Grandpr6: 316, 346-47,371-72 

Great E3ritain. See British Army; Royal Flying Corps; United KingGround-air coordination. See Air-ground coordination 

Ground combat troops 

dom 

air coordination with: 33-35,40,47,55,81,186,188-91,194-95, 

attacks on. See Tacttical air support 

enemy strength: 343 - 

relations with: 253-64 

training with: 182-813, 189-90, 195,200, 205,207, 210, 213, 216, 

1913, 208-19,223-33,238-43, 273,303-304,307,337,383,385, 

387-88 

1 

21!3, 223, 231-32,230,248 

Ground crews, training: 171 

Groups (see also Air units) 

commanders: 172-73,363 

headquarters stations: 23 

organization: 172-74,183, 202 

staff!, and staff officers: 172-74 

1st Eiombardment: 316-18.344-45.347.365-69.371-75 

1st Pursuit: 31,34,89,203,‘262,28&89,’291-99,302-11,344,346- 

49.351-53 

2d Bombardment: 375 

2d Pursuit: 44,289,302-1 1,313-23,346,351-53,366,372 

3d Pursuit: 39,289,302-11,313-23,346-47,351-53 

4th Pursuit: 341-44 

Gun mounts design and development: 146-47 
Index 425 

Gunners 

importance: 109 

number in service: 17 

number trained: 112 

training programs: 30,43,93,97-98, 101, 103-104, 106, 108-109, 

266-67,283,375 

Hadenville: 344 

Hall, James Norman: 13 

Hangar Division, Supply Section: 125 

Hangars 

Bessonneaux type: 202,260,292 

British: 326, 328 

facilities: 125-26, 221,371 

use as quarters: 374 

Hartney, Major Harold E.: 285,320 

Harville: 368 

Hindenburg Line: 266 

History projects: 1-14, 134, 154-55,389-90 

History and Research Division, Technical Section: 134 

Hydrogen, supply and consumption: 70, 140-43 

Identification, friend or foe: 253,284 

Ignition systems, tests of: 133 

Imecourt: 347 

Incendiary ammunition: 337 

Incendiary bombs: 358,372 

Industry, coordination with: 65 

Infantry, support of. See Air-ground cooperation; Tactical air 

Information Division, Supply Section: 125-26 

Information officers: 199 

Information Section, Air Service: 1-3, 7,12, 74 

support 
426 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Insignia 

Air Service: 243,393 

aircraft: 253 

airplane pilot: 196 

aviation mechanic: 132 

balloon pilot: 142,393 

obsctrver: 237 

Royal Flying Corps: 320 

1st Eiombardment Group: 370 

9th Squadron: 268 

12th Squadron: 184 

17th Squadron: 32&29 

25th Squadron: 341 

88th Squadron: 227 

91st Squadron: 258 

94th Squadron: 281 

95th Squadron: 291 

96th Squadron: 291,317 

99th Squadron: 192 

14184 Squadron: 341 

148th Squadron: 328-29 

Inspection Section, Air Service: 93 

Inspector General’s Department: 89 

Instructors 

as examples to students: 1 12-1 3 

number trained: 112 

qualifications: 115 

intrahlng accidents: 110 

training programs: 44,85,93, 103, 108, 152 

design and tests: 133 

procluction and repair: 126 

Instruments 

Intelligence officers: 172-73,187,225,236,241,250,279 

Intelligence operatians and reports: 40,43,199,218,225,241-42, 

Intelligence Section, Air Service: 74,93 

Inter-Allied Aircraft Board: 55, 61 

Interplreters: 62 

Issouclun: 58,65,71-72,92-94,97,99-100,106,109,113-15,161 

255,269,273,286,295-97,306,316,346,362,371-72 
427 

Is-sur-Tille: 123, 142 

Italy 

Air Service representative in: 76,91 

attachments to: 46,87 

bombing operations by: 39 

decorations awarded by: 46,87 

training programs in: 51,58,87,99-101 

tribute to: 163 

Jezainville: 386 

Joffre, Marshal Joseph: 65 

Joint Army-Navy Aircraft Committee: 65 

Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board: 52,65 

Jones, Captain Ernest L.: 1-4,7, 10, 12-13 

Jonville: 344 

Jouett, Major John H.: 382 

Kelly Field: 44-45 

Kemmel Hill: 289 

Kenly, Colonel William L.: 55 

Kenney, Lieutenant George C.: 258 

Kindley, Captain Field E.: 45 

La Bassee: 328 

La HarazBe: 315 

La Noblette: 288 

La Pallice: 124 

La Fert6-sous-Jouarre: 37, 197,206,216-17 

La Wavrille: 44 

Laboratories 

medical research: 161 

photographic: 152 

Lafayette Escadrille: 31,58,285, 288 

Lahayieux: 379 
428 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Lahm, Colonel Ffank P.: 377,386 

Landis, Major Reed Q.: 341 

Landres St. Georges: 43,346,372 

Language barrier, overcoming: 62,74 

Le Bourget: 123 

Le Cateau: 46,330,332,335 

Le Crotoy: 100-101 

Le Hav re: 124 

Le Quesnoy: 46 

Le Valclahon: 100, 105 

Legal and Disbursing Division, Air Service: 91 

Legion of Honor awards: 46 

Lenses, photographic: 151 

Les Tuileries: 347 

Lessons learned: 219,237-38,369,374-75,387-88 

Liaison 

with Allies: 52, 76, 188,194,221,305,308, 329-30 

deficiencies in: 273, 278,296,331,333 

practices and systems: 29,31,34,41,44,74, 124, 132, 134, 145, 

141'-48,154,177-78,183,190-91,194-95,199,201,204-19, 

224-33,238-43,245-55,270,284-06,289,305,308,313-23, 

338,344,359-63,373,375,479,383,387-88 

Liaison officers: 199,209-10, 213, 21 5-16,238-39,242-43, 247-48, 

Liaison Section, Air Service: 59 

Liggett, Lieutenant General Hunter: 4 

Lightinsg facilities: 123 

Ligny-en-Barrois: 37, 235, 270,301,345,371 

Lines of communication: 62,69,362 

Lines of communication, enemy: 357 

Link belts, design and development: 146 

251,345 
Index 429 

Lionville: 305 

Liquidation Board: 91 

Lironville: 284 

Lisle-en-Barrois: 313,320 

London 

Air Service representative in: 76,86,91, 124 

Supply Section branch at: 127 

Technical Section branch at: 134 

Longbey: 275 

Longuyon: 39,277,357,368 

Longwy: 41 

Lubricants. See Petroleum, oil and lubricants 

Luke, Lieutenant Frank, Jr.: 36,312 

Lumber shortage: 126 

Lun6ville: 185 

Luxouil-les-Bains: 193 

MacCalmont, Lieutenant W. A.: 7 

Machine guns 

American employment: 186,203,246,304 

Browning: 147 

cameras on: 109,152 

design and development: 146 

enemy employment: 185,203,222,278,295,306 

Lewis: 147,259,266,324,358 

Marlin: 134, 146-47,365 

Scharf mounting: 144 

shortages: 283 

testing and adoption: 132, 149 

tunnel guns: 371 

Vickers: 147-48,259,358-59 

Machine shops. See Maintenance and repair 

Maintenance and repair: 55,79,86,97-99,113-14,117,126-27, 

146. See also Construction programs. 

aircraft: 175-76,356,36243,369 

armament: 176 
430 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Mannheim: 286 

MaDS 

compilation and distribution: 74,224,251,261-62,269,286,295, 

362 

Photomaps: 153,262,264-65 

Marcq: 349,372 

Marne battles. See Aisne - Marne offensive 

Marne River: 221,283,295 

Marseillls: 124 

Mars-la-Tour: 39,357 

Material Section, Supply Section: 93, 117 

Materiel Division, Supply Section: 123-24 

Maulan: 345,371,373 

Mauperl huis: 202 

Maxwell Air Force Base: 13 

Mayen-fdulthien: 21 7 

McNarney, Major Joseph T.: 220 

McVicketr, Charles: 312 

Meaux: :217 

Mechanics 

dedication of: 114 

ingenuity: 358,363 , 

insigniia: 132 

number needed, estimate of: 61 

in production force: 54,65,72 

training programs: 58-50, 76,85,99, 171,259 

Medal of Honor awards: 46,312 

Medical Research Board: 90,125,161 

Melun: 2!98 

Menard, Commandant (French Army): 283 

Meni, Ciaptain (French Army): 306 
Index 431 

Messages 

drops: 37,41,174,177, 188-89,214,225,230,24042,251,253- 

54,270,345 

interception: 337 

Metallurgy Division, Technical Section: 133 

Meucon: 100,105 

Metz: 37,39,261,266,a69,315,357-58,365,371 

Meuse - Argonne offeneive: 5, 17,37-49, 138-40, 152, 154, 245-55, 

275-79,313-23,371-75,385 

Meuse River: 288,301, $0597,313,315-16,319-20,323,346,357, 

371 

Mexican Punitive Expedition: 93 

Mkzibres: 275 

Michelin bombs and sights: 358 

Milling, Colonel Thomas De W.: 5 

Missions 

Aeronautical: 53-54 

Allied: 51,65 

Missions, typical combat 

bombing operations: 35961 

observation: 179,181,180-90 

photographic: 181 

pursuit: 176-81,186-90, 193-95,205,222-23,261-62,278,294, 

302-304,359-61 

Mitchell, Brigadier General William: 6, 196,52-55, 196 

Mobile Air Park, 4th: 222 

Mobility 

air units: 230, 291 

balloon companies: 381,383,385 

of Royal Flying Corps: 325-26,328 

trend of combat to: 47-48 

Mont St. Michel: 284 

Mont Sec: 305 

Montdidier: 325,328,330 

Montenegro, decorations awarded by: 47 
432 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

Montigny: 348 

MontmQdy: 41,277,373 

Morale 

of Air Service persoinnel: 49,89-90,94,112-13,185,304-305 

enemy fluctuations: 32,34,49,307,330,335,338,362,369,373 

friendly forces, effect of operations on: 32,34,49 

Morass farm. See Ferme Morasse 

Mosaic photographs. See Photomaps 

Moselle River: 263,305,357,365,368,371 

Motor 1 ransport Coqps: 90,124 

Motorcycle courier service: 177, 188,201,224-25 

Motor-vehicle losses, enemy: 39 

Motors. See Engines 

Mowry, Major R. I.: 8 

National Archives: 12 

National Defense, Council of: 51 

Navigators, training: 103 

Neufchiiteau: 37 

Nieuport: 46,328 

Night Bombardment Section, Air Service: 76,86 

Night operations 

bombardment: 39,320,323,366 

navigation by radio: 157-58 

pursuit: 42,48-49,76,82,85-86,191,318-19,321,323 

reconnaissance: 48,81,203,266,276,278,314,344,379 

NomBny: 261 

Nordhoff, Lieutenant Charles B.: 6-8,13 

Nouart: 347 

Noyon: 328,338 

Noyon-Rheims sector: 289 

Observation. See Reconnaissance, aerial 
Index 433 

Observation squadrons (see also Balloon units; Balloons) 

headquarters stations: 23 

number expanded: 71 

Observers (see also Pilots) 

casualties: 110, 217,369 

combat experience and efficiency: 29,242,260,267,271-73,369 

insignia: 237 

mission routine, typital: 129, 181, 188-90 

number in service: lY, 51 

number trained and gssigned: 112 

replacement system: 375 

shortages: 71,105-106 

training programs: 46,47,51,58,83,90,93,97-98,103-105,137- 

38,143, 152,172, 191,266-67,272,357,387-88 

Ochey: 301 

Offensive, principle of: 29,47-48,339 

Oil. See Petroleum, oil and lubricants 

Oldham, England: 157 

Operations centers: 174-75 

Operations officers: 172-73, 187, 199,322 

Order and Acceptance Division, Technical Section: 91, 133 

Orders 

issuance and transmission. See Command and control 

typical for mission: 343-49 

Ordnance Department: 76,90,145 

Ordnance officers: 146 

Organization and reorganization 

for air program: 52 

of Air Service: 62-63,65,75-80 

balloon companies: 137 

combat planning: 30,37 

corps air service: 198-202,221,205-37,245-46,255 

expandon programs: 54-55 

First Army Air Service: 391-92 

groups: 172-74, 183,202 

problems in: 48 

squadrons: 175-76,204 

Organization Section, Air Service: 65 
434 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Orly: 71,78-79,92, 117-19,122-23,131,134, 145-46,149 

Ormeaux: 291,296 

Ourches: 88,171-83,202,204,237,245 

Oxford, England: 103 

Oxygen Equipment Division, Supply Section: 125 

Packing cases, use in construction: 126 

Paegelow, Lieutenant Colonel John A.: 143 

Paints, analyzing: 134 

Panels, tactical use: 172, 182, 186, 188-90, 195,207,213,218,228- 

Paper, photographic: 151 

Parachutes, design and descents by: 17,32,35,70, 110, 138,141, 

Paris 

29,231-33,242,248,253,316,387 

143,381 

Air Service representative in: 69,76,86 

enemy drive on. Se8 Alsne-Marne offensive 

ordnance depot at: 148,222 

Parks. See Airfields 

Patrick, Major General Mason M.: 10,62,75-76, 145 

Allies, tribute to: 163 

heads Air Service: 71 

history project directive: 3-4,6,9-10,389-90 

Patrols, ground: 41 

Pay and allowances, pilots: 89 

Penetration bombs: 358 

PQronne: 330,332 

Pershing, General John J.: 1,52 

Personnel 

arrivals and departures, periodic: 67-68,71-72 

assignment and movement: 73,78 

shortages in: 65,72,82-83,99 

Personnel Section, Air Service: 65,73-74,93 

Petroleum, oil and lubricants: 90, 128, 133-34 
Index 435 

PBxarches: 291 

Photographic officers: 172-73,181 

Photographic Section, Air Service: 151-55 

Photographic units: 3, 8 

accomplishments: 151 

assignment: 154 

dedication of personnel: 154 

number in service: 22 

personnel strength and training: 151 

transportation facilities: 152 

Allied cooperation in: 154-55 

enemy operations: 34,236,283,299,301-302,309 

equipment procurement and distribution: 151, 175 

general operations: 3Q, 33-34,38,41-42,152,176-78,181-82, 

importance: 239,250 

interpretation: 153,181 

mission routine, typieal: 181 

supervision of: 76 

tactics in: 250-51,26365,269-70 

training programs: 152 

volume of production: 17, 154 

Photography, aerial 

186-87,189,193-95,204-19,222-33,239-43,249-55,260-67, 

269-73,275-79,299,316,341-44,359,368 

Photography, historical: 3, 155 

Photomaps: 153,262,264-65 

Picardy campaign: 325-39 

Pigeons, communication by: 143, 177 

Pilots 

Allies, training by: 58-59,72,85,88,95,99-101, 103, 105, 108 

balloon companies: 137-38 

balloon pilot insignia: 142,393 

behavior, criticism of: 89 

casualties: 217,350,366,369,371-72 

combat experience and efficiency: 17,29,31-32,34,38,42,171, 

commissioning procedures: 94-95 

daily routine schedule: 178 

enevy combat experience and efficiency: 33,222,242, 265-66, 

237-38,269,271,283,299,319,359,362,365 

272-73,284-85,288,298-99,304,310,321,335,369,372 
436 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

from enlisted grades: 96 

ferry pilots: 119, 12627 

ground crews, relations with: 90 

insignia: 196 

leaves and rest pro ram: 161 

medical responsibil (1 ty for: 161 

number needed, esllimate of: 51 

number trained and! assigned: 112 

number prewar: 93 

number in service, periodic: 17,51,353 

pay aind allowances: 89 

procurement and aqsignment: 78 

qualifications needed: 285,311,374 

rating system: 89 

replacement system: 199,217-18,276,361,375 

romantic image of: 10495 

test pilots: 11 2 

training programs: 31,39-40,44-46,51,58,71,76,82-83,85-88, 

93435,98-101, 103-106,108,112,152,171-72,166,191,207, 

259,261-62,266-67,272,275,278,285-86,306,341,357,361 

Plans and Progress Division, Air Service: 73 

Policy Section, Air Service: 65 

Pont-Mlousson: 283,357,365,373 

Pont-sur-Seille: 37,235,301,305,315,343-44 

Port facilities: 119,12$-24 

Postal services: 74 

Prisoners of war, Air Service: 27,361,368 

Produdion and Maintenance Division, Supply Section: 126-27 

Projects; and Designs Divlslon, Supply Section: 128 

Propaganda operations: 142,255,368 

Propellers 

damage to: 365-66,368-69 

deficiencies in: 260 

number handled: 127 

protection methods: 132 

Publications, compilation and issue: 74,125-26, 132,134, 148 

Purchaciing Division, Supply Section: 91,124 
Index 437 

Purchasing systems: 117,122-24 

Pursuit operations 

British actions: 32649 

effect on friendly trwp: 284-85 

enemy actions: 39,43-44,203,207-208,221-27,229,233,240, 

368,372 

first action: 31 

formation flying: 30-31,34,43,218,263-64,269-70,285,2,92, 

French actions: 227 

general actions: 31-B2,34,38,41-42,44,207,222,249,283-89, 

night actions: 42,48,318-19,321,323 

protection failures in: 218,233,292-93 

tactics: 292-93,302t304,309-11,318,321-23 

tactical orders, typical: 343-49 

250,254,265-66,269-70,272-73,277,284,286,289,298,301, 

296,298,309,327*28,334-3§,339,361,365,368-69,371,3741 

75 

301-11,313-23,343-44,372 

Pursuit Organization and Training Center, 1st: 283 

Pyrotechnics. See Flares 

Quartermaster Corps! 90,128 

R type balloon: 140,143 

Radio 

in artillery fire adjugtmsnt: 158-59,172,218,228 

communications by. See Communications systems 

deficiencies in: 41,228,233, 242,248,251,254-55 

equipment development and distribution: 157,175,187 

experiments and tests: 134 

field stations: 241 -42,248,251 

interplane communicstion: 157 

messages, interception: 337 

night navigation by: 157-58 

operations, supervlsion of: 76,90, 158 

training programs: 15849,218 

Radio officers: 172, 174,228,251 

Radio Section, Air Service: 157-59 

Railway systems 

I plans and diagramB: 224 

construction: 93,114,126 

enemy, attacks on: 357,359-61,365,368,371-72 
438 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vot. I 

Rancourt: 301 

Reconnaissance, aeriat 

by balloons: 379-88 

British operations: 328-39 

cavalry reconnaissrrnco patrol: 254-55 

enemy operations: $3-34,38,203, 222, 236, 265,299,302,329, 

French operations: Q47 

general operations: 29-30,33-34,37-38,41-42,88,172,176, ?78- 

331 

82, 186,188-91, 193-@S, 203-19,222-33,239-43,247-55,259- 

67, 269-73,275-79,307,3?0,314-23,341-44,347,359,365, 

38849,379 

importance: 104-105,226,239 

night operations: 48,81,203,266,276,278,314,344,379 

tactics: 250-51,263-65,269-70 

Records Section, Air Service: 93 

Records systems: 123 

Recruiting programs: 74 

Rembercourt: 302,305,313,320 

Remicourt: 245 

Remonville: 346 

Rental charges: 92 

Repairs. See Maintenance and repair 

Requisitions and manifests handled: 117, 123, 128 

Reports, tactical: 225 

Research projects: 131,134,147 

Reynolds, Major John N.: 261 

Rheims: 197,288 

Rhine River area: 286 

Rickenblacker, Captain Edward V.: 281 

Riggers, training: 58-59 

Rigny: 4!91 

Road construction: 97,123, 126 
439 

Rochester School of Aerial Photography: 151,153 

Rocket signals: 188,232 

Roles and missions, Air Service view: 47,79 

Romagne: 316,371 

Romorantin: 69,71,78-79,91,117,119,122-23,125-27,129,134, 

142,14546,149 

Roosevett, Captain Philip J.: 5 

Roosevelt, Lieutenant Quentin: 297 

Rosieres: 330-31 

Roumania, decorations awarded by: 47 

Royal Flying Corps 

aircraft losses: 327-28,330 

attachments to and from: 32,37,44-46,81,85,103,108,235, 

balloons, uses and losses: 328-39 

bombing operations: 132,39,286,326,329-30,332-33,336 

hangars: 326,328 

insignia: 320 

mobility: 325-26,328 

night navigation by radio: 157-58 

pursuit operations: 326-39 

reconnaissance opergtians: 326-39 

tactical air support: 326-39 

tactics: 326-29,331-3@, 33536,361 

transportation facilities: 325-26,328 

3d Brigade: 45 

General Headquarters Wing: 327-39 

55th Squadron: 359 

Royalties on aircraft: 52,54 

Royaumieux: 379,381 

Roye: 46,330-32 

Rumont: 237 

Ruses: 226,371 

302,325-39,375 

Sablons: 39,269 

St. Benoit: 39 
440 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

St. Georges: 346 

St. Jean-de-Monts: 9$?, 97-100,106, 109,146 

St. Juvin: 316,371-73 

St. Maixent: 73,78,94 

St. Menehould: 288-89 

St. Mihiel: 231,283,3105,313,343-44,357-58,366 

St. Mihiel offensive: 5,17,29,31,37-49,138,235-43,245,261,269- 

St. Nazaire: 124 

St. Quentin: 332 

Saints: 202,296 

Salvage operations: 79,92, 113-14, 117, 126-28, 148 

San Diego aviation school: 93 

Saumur: 100 

School of Aerial Photography: 151,153 

Schools system: 51,55-58,72,76,82-83,93-94,97,99,103-104, 

Seats, armored: 132,371 

Secretary of War. See Baker, Newton D. 

Security operations and systems: 40,74, 119,175, 186,221,247, 

Seicheprey: 29,305 

73,288,314,357-6$, 365-69,383 

111-12,115,137,146,156 

250,260,267,288,299,301,305,308-309,315,320-21,374,385 

Selden gasoline pump: 132-33 

Sellers, Captain Cecil G.: 367 

Serbia, decorations awarded by: 47 

Service Geographique: 151 

Service squadrons: 79 

Services of Supply: 1-2,7,10 

Air Service representatives at: 76 

flow of supplies through: 119 

stations in: 26,73,77 
441 

Shelling reports: 228 

Sherman, Lieutenant Colonel William C.: 5-8, 10, 13 

Sights, deslgn and development: 146,148 

Signal Corps 

communications supervision by: 156-59 

separation from: 52 

Signalling systems: 188;231,233,322,337 

Signalling systems, enemy: 265-66 

Simpson Historical Research Center: 13 

Smoke bombs: 266 

Soissons, battle of 33,35,197,212-19,265 

Somme River: 330 

Souge: 100,105,109,137,142 

Souilly: 231,237,24548,248 

Southampton, England: 99 

Spain, contracts with: 91 

Spare parts (see a/so Maintenance and repair) 

flow of supply: 120, 123 

ratio: 117 

Spare Parts Depot No. 2. See RomoraRtin 

Spark plugs, tests of 133 

Specialists. See Mechanics; Technicians 

Spincourt: 41,277 

Squadrons (see also Air units) 

arrivals in France: 86 

assignment and movement: 78 

number needed, estidate of: 52 

number in service: 17-18,22,117 

headquarters stations: 23 

organization: 175-76,204 

revised program: 71 

1st observation: 6,29,33,58, 171-83, 198-219,235-43,345-55 

8th Observation: 23543,245 

9th Observation: 37,26947,269-73,275 
442 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

11th Bombardment: 44,364-69,371-75 

12th Observation: 29,33,171-83,185-91,198-219,235-43,245- 

13th Pursuit: 302-1 1 

17th Pursuit: 44-46,85, 103,302,325-39,341-44,352 

20th Bombardment: 44,365-69,371-75 

22d Pursuit: 302-1 1 

24th Observation: 37,259-67,269-73,275-79 

25th Pursuit: 341 

27th Pursuit: 285-89,302-11,313-23,349 

28th Pursuit: 302-11 

49th Pursuit: 302 

50th Observation: 23543,245-55 

88th Observation: 29,33-34,171-83,198-219,221-33,235-43, 

90th Observation: 23543,245-55 

91st Observation: 30,37,259-67,269-73,275-79 

93rd Pursuit: 302-1 1 

94th Pursuit: 31, 283-89,295,302-11 

95th Pursuit: 285-8$, 302-11,313-23,349 

96th Bombardment: 31,43,283-89,356-63,365-69 

99th Observation: 30,193-95,235-43,245-55 

103d Pursuit: 288-M, 302-1 1 

104th Observation: 235-43,245-55 

135th Observation: 88,235-43,245 

139th Pursuit: 302 

141st Pursuit: 341-44 

147th Pursuit: 285-@9,302-1 1,348-49 

148th Pursuit: 44-46,86,103,302,325-39,344-48,352 

166th Bombardment: 371-75 

185th Pursuit: 348-49 

213th Pursuit: 302-1 1 

and control 

British practice: 336 

corps air service: 109,221,246 

group: 172-74 

for history project: 3,7-8 

Standardization programs 

aircraft: 54,61, 114 

armament: 147 

engines: 88 

in training programs: 83 

55 

245-55 

Staffs and staff officers: 49,62,65,73-80,367. See also Command 
Index 443 

Stevens, Captain Albert W.: 155 

Storage facilities: 61-62, 117,123 

Strafing. See Tactical air support 

Strategic air support: 344,346-47,357-63,365-69,371-75 

Summersett, Captain James A., Jr.: 317 

Supply Branch, Aircraft Armament Section: 149 

Supply depots: 17,55,62,72,76,79,83,91,113,117,123,126,128 

command and control1 119 

strikes against: 371-73 

Supply officers: 62, 146, 172-73 

Supply operations and systems: 73,76,77-79,83,91, 109,206, 

222,345. See also Services of Supply 

ammunition: 109, 148, 176 

armament: 17,117,11$,126,145,148-49,263 

balloon gas: 70 

for balloons: 70,140-41,143 

disbursing requirements: 124-25 

distribution system: 119-21, 129 

enemy operations: 357 

engines: 119 

flow through Services of Supply: 119 

hydrogen: 70, 140-43 

personnel strength: 117, 119 

photo equipment: 151,175 

priority schedules: 123 

purchasing system: 117,122-24 

records system: 123 

requisitions and manifests handled: 117, 123, 128 

shortages: 231 

space required: 11 7,126 

spare parts: 120,123 

time intervals in: 123-24 

tonnage volumes: 117,124 

transportation in: 119 

Supply Section, Air Service: 65,69,90, 117-28, 145 

Support by services: 90 

Surprise, principle of: 321 

Surveillance operations. See Reconnaissance, aerial 
444 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

\ Switzerland, contracts with: 91 

Synchronizing mechanisms: 146-47 

Tactical air support 

British operations: 326-39 

enemy actions: 299 

enemy morale, effect on: 49,338 

friendly morale, eflect on: 310,319 

general operations: 17,39,43,46,49,172,176-78,181-83,186, 

188-90,194-95,201,203-19,223-33,238-43,248,252-54,293- 

94,304,307,310,314,344,346-47,357-63,365-69,371 

Tactical officers: 238 

Tactics: 34,42-43 

British: 326-29,331-32,335-36,361 

changes and trends in: 81 

enemy: 318,326,383,357,354-61 

formation flying: 30-31,34,43,218,263-64,268-70,285,292, 

formation flying, enemy: 326 

formulation and adoption: 55 

French: 361 

in photographic and reconnaissance missions: 250-51,263-65, 

in pursuit operations: 292-93,302-304,309-11,318,321-23 

296,298,309,32?-28,334-35,339,361,365,368-69,371,374- 

75 

269-70 

Tanks, cooperation with: 331 

Tannois: 301 

Technical Data Division, Technical Section: 134 

Technical Section, Air Service: 8,59,62,65, 76, 131-34, 145, 157- 

Technicians, procurement and training: 62,93, 104 

Telegraph facilities and communications: 194, 201, 212,215-16, 

Telephone facilities and communications: 44,123,177,188,194, 

200-201,206,210,~12,216,218,223-25,230,240-41,248-49, 

284-85,291,296,308,310,322,343~13591373,379,383,385, 

387 

58 

218 

Terrain exercises: 186, 195,231-32, 239-40, 248 
Index 445 

Test pilots: 112 

Thayer, Lieutenant Lucien H.: 2-3 

Thiacourt: 306,357 

Tools, production and procurement: 54,69 

Torcy: 203 

Toul sector: 29-34,46,171-83,206,235,237,259-67,275,283-89, 

Toul-Nancy road: 259 

Touquin: 291 

Tours: 58,69, 74,92, 94,97, 100, 105, 109, 123-24, 153 

Training aids, lack of: 58 

Training centers: 11 1 

Training films production: 152 

Training manuals: 125-26. See also Publications 

Training programs: 17,29,31,40-41,47,51-52,54-58,65,71-72, 

291-92,296,298,301-302,308,313,341,357,359,379,381 

82-83,93-115 

accidents and casualties in: 27, 11 0-1 2 

accomplishments: 112 

in aerial photography: 152 

armorers: 145-46 

in artillery-fire adjustwents: 102, 105, 208 

aviation cadets: 93-95,97, 103 

balloon companies: 39,137-38,379,381,387-88 

bombardiers: 58,93,9Y-98,101,103-104,108 

by British: 58,72, 85, $8,9!5, 99-100, 103, 108 

in Canada: 85,103 

cross-training: 41 

deficiencies in: 218-19,228,242,245,255 

delays and purposelessnees, effect of: 113 

by French: 58-59,85,95,99-101, 105,108 

ground crews: 171 

with ground troops: 1812-83,189-90,195,200,205,207,210,213, 

gunnery: 30,43,93,97-98,101,103-104,106,108-109,266-67, 

hours flown in: 98, 112 

hours flown per fatality: 110 

industrial aspects: 113-14 

216,219,223,231-32,239,248 

283,375 

, 
446 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. I 

instructors: 44,85,93,103, 108,152 

by Italy: 51, 58, 87,99-101 

mechanics: 58-59,76,85,99,171, 259 

navigators: 103 

observers: 40,47,51,58,83,90,93,97-98,103-105,137-138,143, 

pilots: 31,39-40,44-46,51,58,71,76,82-83,85-88,93-95,98- 

problems in: 109 

in radio communiaations: 158-59,218 

riggers: 58-59 

schools, inclusive dates at: 100 

standardizing: 83 

students eliminated: 112 

undesirables, eliminating: 113 

in United States: 103-104,109 

152,172,191,2616-87,272,357,387-88 

101,103-106,108,112,152,171-72,186,191,207,259,261-62, 

266-67,272,275,278,285-86,306,341,357,361 

Training Section, Air Service: 58,65,78,93,97,108 

Transportation 

balloon companies 142 

British facilities: 315-28, 328 

deficiencies in: 47-48,83,97,309,320,374 

in flow of supplies: 119 

liaison by air service: 124 

photographic units: 162 

problems in: 55-58 

tactical systems: 177-78 

Transportation Division, Supply Section: 124 

Transportation officers: 172-73 

Trench systems: 171-72,185-86,192-94,203,246 

Trucks. See Motor vehicles; Transportation 

Tunnel guns: 371 

United Kingdom (see also British Army; Royal Flying Corps) 

aircraft production: 127-28 

assignments to: 59 

decorations awardled by: 46,85 

training programs by: 58,72,85,88,95,99-100,103,108 

tribute to: 163 

United States Navy: 76,87 
Index 447 

Vadelaincourt: 245 

Vadenay: 137 

Varnish, analyzing: 134 

Vathemenil: 185,202 

Vaucouleurs: 289,301,309,313 

Vaux: 33,197,204,207,293 

Vavincourt: 273,275 

Vendome: 100,103 

Verdun sector: 231,246,273,275,313,357-58 

Very pistol: 182 

Vesle River: 32-35,212-16,218,221-33., 23758,296,381 

Vigneulles: 39,306907,357,366 

Vigneulles-St. Benoit road: 307 

Vigneville-Chambley road: 307 

Vil leneuve-les-Vertus: 2$3 

Villers-Bretonneux: 325,330 

Vinets: 123,146 

Vittonville: 368 

Vosges sector: 30,193-95 

Voutiers: 275 

Voves: 100 

Warning systems, enemy: 358 

Water analysis and supply: 123, 133-34,374 

Weather, effect on operations: 31,38-42,213,240-41,243,249-50, 

252,255,263,265-67,~69-70,275,277-78,306-307,310-11,321- 

22,328-29,~1-32,361, we, s869,372,375,3ai, 383 

Welfare agencies: 90-91 

Wheat, Lieutenant C. I.: 7 

Whitehead, Colonel Henry C.: 3-5 
448 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. I 

Wimperis bomb sight: 365 

Wing commanders: 237-38 

Wing, 1st Pursuit: 246,301-11,313-23,344,346-47 

Wings (airplane), number delivered: 127 

Winslow, Lieutenant Alan F.: 30,284 

Wireless communications: 223,289,291,296 

Wright, Liehenant Burdette S.: 5 

Young Men’s Christian Association: 90-91 

Ypres: 46,289,328 

Zone of Advance: 2-3,62 

Air Service stations in: 26, 73 

early work in: 55 

in organization scheme: 62 

personnel shortages: 72 

pilot assignments: 78 

t U. S. GOVERNMENT PRMTMG OFFICE : 1878 0 - 576-998