Ballistic Missile 

Threats:

Is the United States 

prepared?

Background and perspective on important national security and defense policy issues. 

Written and produced by House Armed Services Committee Chairman,

Volume 4, Issue 3 September 2000

National Missile Defense:

Countering the ballistic missile threat.

BACKGROUND

BRIEF

BACKGROUND

BRIEF

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NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

FROM THE

CHAIRMAN

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After 71⁄2 years of opposing the deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) to 

protect Americans against the growing 

threat of ballistic missile attack, President Clinton has now decided to leave 

a deployment decision to his successor. 

This decision will increase the risk to 

Americans and postpone by at least 

another year the day when all Americans will be protected against the growing threat of ballistic missile attack.

For the past five years the Congress 

has sought to move the Clinton Administration toward support for NMD deployment. Congress has added funds to the 

Administrationís NMD budget request 

each year since 1995. Many in Congress, 

myself included, decried the Administrationís misuse of a fatally flawed 1995 

intelligence estimate to argue that the 

United States would not face a longrange ballistic missile threat from rogue 

states for 15 years. This faulty estimate 

led the Congress, in the fiscal year 1997 

National Defense Authorization Act, to 

mandate creation of the so-called ìRumsfeld Commission,î which was tasked 

with providing an independent and bipartisan assessment of the ballistic missile 

threat. The Rumsfeld Commissionís 

unanimous conclusions were sobering ñ 

it found the threat to be ìbroader, more 

mature and evolving more rapidlyî than 

On September 1, 2000, President 

Clinton announced that he would 

not go forward with plans to deploy 

a National Missile Defense (NMD) system 

capable of defending the United States 

against a limited ballistic missile attack. 

The President stated his view that more 

time was needed to develop the NMD technology and to work with other countries 

to enlist their support for NMD. He also 

expressed his concern that NMD, ìwould 

require us either to adjust the [1972 U.S. ñ 

Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)] Treaty 

or to withdraw from itî ñ a treaty that the 

Clinton Administration has long considered 

ìa cornerstone of strategic stability.î

In the eyes of some analysts, this continuing commitment to the ABM Treaty ñ 

a document that codified U.S. vulnerability 

to ballistic missile attack under the rubric 

of ìmutual assured destructionî ñ is the 

largest impediment to the development and 

deployment of an effective national missile 

defense against an accidental, unauthorized, 

or rogue state ballistic missile launch.

Why National Missile Defense?

The issue of defending the United States 

against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the weapons 

of mass destruction they carry remains controversial more than 17 years after former President Ronald Reagan unveiled his ìStrategic 

Defense Initiative.î With the dissolution of the 

Soviet Union, and the use of ballistic missiles 

against U.S. forces and allies during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the focus of U.S. missile defense efforts shifted away from defending the country against the prospect of a deliberate and massive nuclear attack on the United 

States, and toward developing defenses against 

shorter-range ballistic missiles that threaten 

U.S. forces and allies overseas. However, 

according to the U.S. intelligence community, 

longer-range and more sophisticated ballistic 

missile threats from rogue states like North 

Korea, Iran, and Iraq are expected to emerge, 

and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons technologies continue to proliferate. The 

behavior of these regimes has also increased 

concern that traditional Cold War concepts of 

nuclear deterrence may not apply in the postCold War world.

Contrary to popular belief, the United States 

today has no defense against a ballistic missile launched against U.S. territory. This is 

thought by many to be a key reason why ballistic missiles are becoming weapons of choice 

for those states unable to challenge the United 

States with conventional forces. 

The Ballistic Missile Threat to 

the United States

Debate over the nature and magnitude of 

the missile threat confronting the United 
2 NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

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States was fueled by a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that concluded, ìIn 

the next 15 years no country other than the 

major declared nuclear powers will develop 

a ballistic missile that could threaten the 

contiguous 48 states or Canada.î The 

NIE downplayed North Koreaís ability to 

threaten the continental United States with 

an intercontinental-range ballistic missile 

(ICBM) and asserted that the intelligence 

community would be able to predict with 

ìhigh confidenceî the indigenous development of a long-range ballistic missile by 

rogue states ìmany years before deployment.î

The controversial findings of the 1995 

NIE and criticism of its analytical methodology led Congress, in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, 

to establish an independent and bipartisan 

ìCommission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.î The commission, chaired by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, unanimously concluded in its report to Congress on July 15, 

1998 that ìThe threat to the U.S. posed byÖ 

emerging [ICBM] capabilities is broader, 

more mature and evolving more rapidly 

than has been reported in estimates and 

reports by the intelligence community.î 

The commission also concluded that ìthe 

intelligence communityís ability to provide 

timely and accurate estimates of ballistic 

missile threats to the U.S. is erodingî and 

warned that the United States may have 

ìlittle or no warningî of a ballistic missile 

threat before it materializes. 

The Rumsfeld Commissionís findings had 

a major influence on the national missile 

defense debate. The public release of the 

commissionís report was followed in short 

order by the launch of a long-range ballistic missile by North Korea and the test 

launch of a medium-range ballistic missile 

by Iran. In particular, the capabilities of 

the North Korean missile were unanticipated by the intelligence community. These 

events prompted the intelligence community to reassess its earlier estimates of the 

ballistic missile threat. In September 1999, 

a new and more sobering NIE was produced that concluded, ìDuring the next 15 

years the United States most likely will 

face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and 

North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.î Recent press reports note 

that a subsequent NIE, produced in July 

2000, reinforces this judgment. In light of 

these developments, the Administration is 

now supporting actions that could lead to 

the deployment of a limited ground-based 

NMD system by 2005.

According to published reports, the new 

NIE echoes the findings of previous estimates that indicate North Korea poses the 

most serious new missile threat to the United 

States in the next 15 years. Despite the 

recent summit meeting between the leaders 

of the two Koreas and hopes for rapprochement, the North Korean leadership continues to exhibit signs that it will press ahead 

with development of its ballistic missile 

capabilities. According to North Korean 

leader Kim Jong-Il, his reported offer to 

scrap North Koreaís ballistic missile program in exchange for U.S. assistance in 

launching satellites, was made ìlaughinglyî 

during a meeting with Russian President 

Vladimir Putin in July 2000. Kim reportedly told a group of business executives 

that ìwe are selling rockets to Syria and 

Iranî and that North Korea would continue 

its missile development program.

National Missile Defense 

Technology

The Administrationís approach to 

National Missile Defense relies on the use 

of ground-based interceptors and radars, 

with space-based sensors providing early 

warning and missile tracking support. The 

Administrationís plan has been criticized 

by both NMD opponents who see it as 

ineffective and possibly destabilizing, and 

NMD supporters who see it as insufficiently 

robust to counter more significant emerging ballistic missile threats. 

The technology for a limited groundbased defense has advanced significantly. 

On October 2, 1999, the United States conducted a successful ìhit-to-killî intercept 

of a simulated ICBM target warhead, correctly distinguishing it from a decoy target. 

This test represented a major milestone and 

has been described as ìhitting a bullet with 

a bullet.î A second intercept test on January 18, 2000 failed to intercept the target 

because of a minor cooling problem with 

the interceptorís sensor. A third system test 

on July 8, 2000 also failed when the ìkill 

vehicleî did not separate from the booster.

Some critics have pointed to the last two 

unsuccessful tests as evidence that a missile 

defense is technologically infeasible. However, although not accomplishing all of their 

objectives, the tests to date have demonstrated a significant level of technological 

maturity for systems that may one day comprise the essential elements of an initial 

national missile defense. Moreover, the 

problems that prevented actual intercepts in 

the last two tests involved basic technologies 

already well-understood and not new or unusually sophisticated cutting-edge technologies. 

Therefore, they are not considered ìshowstoppersî to an effective missile defense.

Critics have suggested that the limited 

ground-based system envisioned by the 

According to the Rumsfeld Commission, the threat posed by emerging ballistic missile 

capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than anticipated.
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Administration could be easily overwhelmed by countermeasures, which Russia 

and China have threatened to deploy. However, Lieutenant General John Costello, 

the head of the Armyís Space and Missile 

Defense Command, stated in May 2000, 

ìI amÖ confident we have the technology 

to make the system adaptable to countermeasures.î Moreover, the development of 

countermeasures may involve significant 

complexities for developing countries. The 

Department of Defense has long been aware 

of the countermeasures issue and is working 

on ensuring the effectiveness of a national 

missile defense system against some two 

dozen types of countermeasures.

Some analysts have suggested that the 

national missile defense task could be performed better and more cost-effectively by 

basing interceptors at sea on Aegis ships. 

This sea-based option is being developed 

primarily for a theater missile defense role, 

but could be upgraded to serve a national 

missile defense function. Some critics of 

NMD, as well as some former senior Administration officials, have advocated deployment of a ìboost-phaseî or ìascent-phaseî 

defense against enemy missiles, effectively 

destroying them soon after launch as they 

rise over hostile territory, rather than waiting until they approach U.S. targets. Russian President Putin also appeared to support this concept in principle when he stated 

before meeting with President Clinton at 

the June 2000 Moscow summit that, ìwe 

could jointly put up these umbrellas above 

potential areas of threat [and]Ö jointly protect all of Europe.î

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

In the eyes of NMD supporters, the constraints of the ABM Treaty stand in the 

way of timely deployment of any effective 

national missile defense. The treaty, long 

considered by arms control advocates to 

be the ìjewel in the crownî of arms control, was negotiated during the height of 

the Cold War and premised on the belief 

that both sides should remain vulnerable to 

a devastating nuclear attack by the other 

ñ in this way neither side would have an 

incentive to strike first and strategic stability 

would be preserved. While the concept of 

mutual vulnerability may have enjoyed some 

legitimacy in an era of superpower nuclear 

standoff, it has increasingly been called into 

question as a result of the demise of the 

Soviet Union, the proliferation of ballistic 

missile and weapons of mass destruction 

technologies, and the emergence of other 

ballistic missile threats to the United States. 

The ABM treaty prohibits the development or deployment of ABM systems that 

are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or 

mobile land-based. This precludes the 

promising Aegis-based system being advocated by a wide range of missile defense 

experts, as well as space-based interceptors. 

A 1974 protocol to the treaty also prohibits 

the parties from deploying more than one 

ground-based interceptor site. Although 

the United States decommissioned its sole 

ABM site in 1975, the Soviet Union continued to modernize and upgrade its ABM 

capabilities. Today, Russia maintains the 

worldís only operational ABM site.

Despite this asymmetry, Russia strongly 

opposes any U.S. action that would undercut American adherence to the ABM Treaty 

in its present form, and has threatened 

to respond to a U.S. NMD deployment 

by abandoning its other arms control and 

nonproliferation commitments. Although 

the treaty allows a party to withdraw if 

its ìsupreme national interestsî are jeopardized, several legal analyses have concluded that the treaty is no longer legally 

binding on the United States, as the United 

Statesí treaty partner ñ the Soviet Union ñ 

has ceased to exist.

Arms control advocates see continued U.S. 

compliance with the ABM Treaty as necessary 

to assure Russia that the United States does 

not seek unilateral military advantage. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental dichotomy 

between a policy that seeks to protect Americans from the real and growing threat of ballistic missile attack and a policy that seeks to 

perpetuate Americaís vulnerability to missile 

attack as a means of assuring ìstabilityî in the 

U.S.-Russia strategic relationship.

Clinton Administration Policy 

and Congressional Actions

Since 1995, the Congress has pressed the 

Clinton Administration to accelerate the development and deployment of a national missile 

defense. Although Congress has increased 

NMD funding each year since 1995, the 

Administration has consistently refused to 

commit to a policy of NMD deployment. 

In May 1999, the Congress overwhelmingly 

passed the ìNational Missile Defense Act of 

1999,î declaring it to be U.S. policy to deploy 

an effective national missile defense ìas soon 

as is technologically possible.î The bill was 

signed into law by President Clinton on July 

23, 1999. In signing the Act, the President 

stated that any decision to deploy NMD would 

be based on other factors in addition to technological readiness, including the status of discussions with Russia on possible amendments 

to the ABM Treaty. 

This summer, the Department of Defense 

conducted a formal Deployment Readiness 

Review to assess the results of the previous 

NMD system tests and determine whether the 

ground-based NMD technology is sufficiently 

mature to warrant an affirmative deployment 

decision.

On September 1, 2000, President Clinton 

announced that the United States would not 

proceed with actions necessary to support 

NMD deployment, and that the decision 

whether to deploy would be left to his successor. In a speech at Georgetown University, the 

President conceded that, ìthe ballistic missile 

threat... is real and growing,î but he stated, 

ìwe need more tests against more challenging 

targets... we should use this time to ensure that 

NMD - if deployed - would actually enhance 

our overall national security.î As a consequence of the Presidentís decision, the 2005 

target date for NMD deployment will be postponed by at least one year.

Foreign Reactions

A number of U.S. European allies have suggested that U.S. deployment of NMD might 

lead to a ìFortress Americaî mentality among 

Americans. The European Unionís foreign 

policy head, Javier Solana, stated on May 1, 

2000, ìIf we were not to be defended by the 

United States, that may risk the beginning of 

ëdecouplingí.î However, others note that the 

United States would be more likely to shoulder the risks of defending its allies if U.S. territory were relatively secure from ballistic missile threats. This view may not be fully appreciated by Americaís European allies, but it 

has apparently not been lost on potential U.S. 

adversaries. For example, although a Chinese 

military officialís 1995 comment that Americans ìcare a lot more about Los Angeles than 

Taipeiî was interpreted by many analysts as a 

not-so-veiled nuclear threat against the United 

States, it also seemed to reflect a recognition 

by China that as long as the United States feels 

vulnerable to missile threats, its freedom of 
FROM THE CHAIRMAN

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The National Security Report is archived on the House Armed Services Committee website (http://www.house.gov/hasc). 

Additional background information may be obtained from the committee staff (x54151).

4 NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

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the intelligence community had predicted 

and warned that future ballistic missile 

threats to the United States could emerge 

with ìlittle or no warning.î

Despite this warning, the United States 

today lacks the ability to defend Americans against even a single ballistic missile launched in our direction. A key 

reason for this is the Administrationís 

refusal to commit to a policy of NMD 

deployment. Instead, the Clinton Administration continues to be guided by the 

desire to preserve the 28-year old AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ñ a treaty 

signed with a country that no longer 

exists, in a Cold War strategic environment, and which was designed to perpetuate Americaís vulnerability to ballistic 

missile attack. 

Last year, the Congress acted to change 

that. In passing ìThe National Missile 

action in defense of friends and allies will be 

compromised. Without a missile defense, the 

United States may be deterred from acting in 

its own interest. This, NMD advocates argue, 

is one of the most salient arguments in favor 

of a national missile defense. 

European concern is also heightened by the 

fact that current missile defense technologies 

are focused on defending against short- and 

long-range missile threats, rather than emerging intermediate-range missile threats that may 

pose the most significant challenges to European security. President Clinton has indicated 

the United States would be willing to share 

missile defense technology with ìcivilizedî 

countries. However, developing defenses 

designed specifically to counter the kind of 

intermediate-range missile threats U.S. European allies are expected to confront would 

be prohibited by the so-called ìdemarcationî agreement on theater missile defenses, 

negotiated by the Clinton Administration in 

1997. 

The importance of allied support for any 

NMD deployment was emphasized by Secretary of Defense Cohen, who stated in July 

2000 that ìwithout their supportÖ it will be 

impossible to have an effective NMD system, 

because you need forward-deployed radars.î 

Without these radars, he stated, ìyou canít see 

the missiles coming.î

In July 2000, the intelligence community 

completed a National Intelligence Estimate 

on foreign reactions to a U.S. NMD deployment. In an unusual development, intelligence officials briefed the press on the main 

findings of the classified NIE weeks before 

it was completed. Press accounts subsequently reported the NIEís conclusion that a 

U.S. NMD system could strain U.S. relations 

with allies, lead Russia and China to pursue 

countermeasures, and spur other countries 

like India and Pakistan to step up their arms 

race. Both China and Russia, in a joint 

statement issued July 18, 2000, warned of 

ìthe most grave adverse consequencesî if 

the United States deploys a national missile 

defense. 

Critics contend that the NIE presents an 

incomplete and one-sided assessment of the 

impact of NMD and suggest that the unorthodox way its classified findings were publicized is designed to undercut support for a 

national missile defense. China is already 

modernizing its nuclear arsenal, they argue, 

and Russiaís economic situation cannot support NMD system being envisioned would 

not nullify Russiaís strategic deterrent ñ a 

point emphasized to Russian officials in April 

during an unusually detailed briefing in the 

Pentagonís secure conference room known as 

ìthe tank.î 

The ìGrand Bargainî

Because the single site deployment allowed 

by the ABM Treaty at Grand Forks would not 

be optimal for defending against ballistic missile threats from North Korea, the Administration is developing plans to base an initial NMD 

deployment in Alaska, and to augment it if 

necessary with additional ground-based sites. 

The Administration has also been discussing 

with Russia possible treaty amendments to 

allow an Alaska deployment. Although President Putin has indicated his support for joint 

cooperation with the United States on theater 

missile defenses, he made it clear that Russia 

remains opposed to the kinds of ABM Treaty 

modifications the Clinton Administration is 

proposing. Nevertheless, some observers 

believe that modifications to the ABM Treaty 

can be successfully negotiated with Russia, 

and oppose any unilateral U.S. action to move 

beyond the original treatyís limitations without Russian concurrence. Others believe that 

conditioning a decision to deploy NMD on the 

progress and expected outcome of the talks 

grants Russia a virtual veto over NMD deployment. 

Administration critics have expressed concern that, in the waning days of his administration, President Clinton would accelerate 

his efforts to obtain Russiaís agreement to 

a ìgrand bargainî involving Russian acceptance of modest ABM Treaty amendments 

in exchange for U.S. agreement to reduce 

strategic offensive arms significantly below 

the levels established by the second Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). In their 

eyes, such a ìgrand bargainî would jeopardize U.S. security by mandating imprudent 

reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, locking the United States into an inflexible NMD architecture that could not be augmented to deal with more robust ballistic missile threats as they emerge, and re-sanctifying 

the ABM Treaty. The Presidentís decision not 

to authorize deployment of a national missile 

defense decreases the likelihood that Russia 

will agree to ABM Treaty modifications in the 

short run.

Defense Act of 1999,î we established a 

policy to deploy national missile defenses 

ìas soon as is technologically possible.î 

The President has now decided to disregard the language of the law he signed.

Americans should not continue to 

remain hostage to missile threats emanating from other countries. A policy 

that sanctions such an outcome would be 

morally bankrupt and logically unsupportable. The ballistic missile threat is 

real, and the Presidentís decision guarantees that Americans will be increasingly 

at risk from this growing threat. 

Although the technology for national missile defense has advanced significantly over 

the past two decades, the Presidentís NMD 

decision will further delay the time when a 

national missile defense can be deployed. In 

the meantime, the ballistic missile threat to the 

United States can be expected to increase as 

a result of the diffusion of missile technology 

and the desire of potentially hostile states to 

obtain ballistic missile capability. The Presidentís decision will likely fuel the debate over 

how well the United States will be able to 

defend its people and its interests in the future 

from the threat of ballistic missile attack.