Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3103 | June 26, 2019 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Ray Walton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 26, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3103

Appeal from the Shelby Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Trent Meltzer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

73C01-1610-F6-411

73C01-1708-F5-95

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3103 | June 26, 2019 Page 2 of 5

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael Ray Walton appeals his sentence following his convictions for failure 

to register as a sex offender, as a Level 5 felony, and failure of a sex or violent 

offender to possess identification, as a Level 6 felony, pursuant to a guilty plea. 

Walton presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. However, 

in his plea agreement, Walton waived his right to appeal his sentence. 

Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The State charged Walton with one count of failure of a sex or violent offender 

to possess identification, as a Level 6 felony, and with being a habitual offender. 

Thereafter, in a separate cause number, the State also charged Walton with one 

count of failure to register as a sex offender, as a Level 5 felony, and one count 

of failure to reside at a registered address, as a Level 6 felony. On August 21, 

2018, Walton entered into a joint plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, 

Walton agreed to plead guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, as a Level 

5 felony, and failure of a sex or violent offender to possess identification, as a 

Level 6 felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the 

other charges. The plea agreement left sentencing open to the trial court’s 

discretion, but the plea provided for a maximum executed sentence of fifty-four 

months. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3103 | June 26, 2019 Page 3 of 5

[3] The plea also included a series of additional provisions with boxes for check 

marks next to them. One of those provisions stated that Walton would waive 

any right to appellate review of his sentence, but the box next to that provision

was not checked. However, contemporaneous with his plea agreement, and 

submitted to the court with his agreement, Walton also signed an advisement of 

rights and waiver form. Pursuant to that form, Walton

hereby waive[d] the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the 

Court, under any standard of review, including but not limited 

to, an abuse of discretion standard and the appropriateness of the 

sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), so long as the Court 

sentences the defendant within the terms of the plea agreement. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 56. 

[4] The trial court held a hearing on Walton’s guilty plea. During that hearing, the 

trial court explained Walton’s rights and clarified the apparent ambiguity 

between the plea agreement and the waiver of rights form by expressly 

informing Walton that he “do[es] not have the right to appeal the sentences as 

long as the Court sentences [him] within the cap.” Tr. Vol. II at 15. Walton

orally stated that he understood. Thereafter, the trial court held a sentencing 

hearing during which the court accepted Walton’s guilty plea and entered 

judgment of conviction accordingly. The court then sentenced Walton to an 

aggregate term of fifty-four months executed. At the conclusion of the

sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that Walton “ha[s] the right to appeal 

this sentence imposed herein.” Id. at 43. This appeal ensued. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3103 | June 26, 2019 Page 4 of 5

Discussion and Decision

[5] Walton contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and his character. However, we do not reach the merits of his appeal 

because we agree with the State that Walton waived the right to appeal his 

sentence at his guilty plea hearing. 

[6] Our Supreme Court has held that defendants may waive their right to appeal a 

sentence as part of a guilty plea. Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008). 

Walton’s advisement of rights and waiver form, which Walton signed and 

submitted to the court along with his guilty plea,

1 included the following 

provision:

The defendant hereby waives the right to appeal any sentence 

imposed by the Court, under any standard of review, including 

but not limited to, an abuse of discretion standard and the 

appropriateness of the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B), so long as the Court sentences the defendant within the 

terms of the plea agreement. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 56.

[7] Walton first contends that he did not waive the right to appeal his sentence 

because the waiver was “ambiguous” despite the terms in the advisement of 

rights and waiver form because the plea agreement did not include a check 

mark next to the provision that indicated that Walton would waive the right to 

 

1

 The parties do not dispute that the advisement of rights and waiver form was submitted 

contemporaneously with the plea agreement and that it was to be considered along with the plea agreement. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3103 | June 26, 2019 Page 5 of 5

appeal his sentence. Reply Br. at 4. But insofar as his waiver of rights form 

conflicted with the precise terms of his guilty plea, at Walton’s guilty plea 

hearing the trial court disambiguated those two documents when it orally

informed Walton that he did not have the right to appeal his sentence as long as 

the court sentenced him within the terms of the plea agreement. Walton 

acknowledged that he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal his 

sentence and continued with his guilty plea. 

[8] Nonetheless, Walton also contends that he did not waive the right to appeal his 

sentence because the trial court informed him at his sentencing hearing that he 

had the right to appeal his sentence. But the trial court in Creech made the same 

mistake, and our Supreme Court held that it was of no moment. That Court 

observed that, “[b]y the time the trial court erroneously advised [the defendant] 

of the possibility of appeal, [he] had already pled guilty and received the benefit 

of his bargain. Being told at the close of the [sentencing] hearing that he could 

appeal presumably had no effect on that transaction.” Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 77. 

The same is true here. By the time the trial court erroneously advised Walton 

that he had the right to appeal his sentence, Walton had already pleaded guilty

and received the benefit of his bargain. Accordingly, Walton waived the right 

to appeal his sentence, and we dismiss his appeal. 

[9] Dismissed.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.