IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 24, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TYSHON BOOKER

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 108568 G. Scott Green, Judge

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No. E2018-01439-CCA-R3-CD

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During a botched robbery, sixteen-year-old Tyshon Booker, the Defendant-Appellant,

shot and killed the victim, G’Metrick Caldwell. Following extensive hearings in juvenile 

court, the Defendant was transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult. 1 At trial, 

the Defendant admitted that he shot the victim several times in the back while seated in 

the backseat of the victim’s car; however, he claimed self-defense. A Knox County jury 

convicted the Defendant of two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of 

especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life

imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our 

review: (1) whether the process of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after a finding 

of three statutory factors by the juvenile court judge violates the Defendant’s rights under 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) whether the State’s suppression of 

alleged eyewitness identifications prior to the juvenile transfer hearing constitutes a 

Brady violation, requiring remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing; (3) whether the 

juvenile court erred in transferring the Defendant to criminal court given defense expert 

testimony that the Defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 

was amenable to treatment; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant 

was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the offense and in instructing the jury that 

the Defendant had a duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense; (5) whether an 

improper argument by the State in closing arguments constitutes prosecutorial 

misconduct requiring a new trial; (6) whether evidence of juror misconduct warrants a 

new trial and whether the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena an additional juror; and 

 

1 On February 19, 2016, the juvenile court severed the Defendant’s case from co defendant

Bradley Robinson for purposes of the transfer hearing. While the record contains lengthy discussions 

regarding the codefendant, including his statement implicating the Defendant in this crime, the 

codefendant did not testify at the Defendant’s trial. The disposition of the codefendant’s case is not 

reflected in the record.

04/08/2020
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(7) whether a sentence of life imprisonment for a Tennessee juvenile violates the United 

States and Tennessee Constitutions.

2

 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.

HOLLOWAY, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Mark E. Stevens, District Public Defender, and Jonathan Harwell (at trial and on appeal) 

and Chloe Akers (at trial), Assistant Public Defenders, for the Defendant-Appellant, 

Tyshon Booker.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme Allen, District Attorney General; and Takisha M. Fitzgerald

and Phillip Morton, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

Juvenile Court Proceedings

Two days after the offense, November 17, 2015, the Knox County Juvenile Court 

ordered the Defendant’s “fingerprint card” to be released to the Knoxville Police 

Department (KPD) for use in the investigation of the victim’s death. On the same day, 

the juvenile court signed an order for attachment after finding probable cause that the 

Defendant committed the delinquent and unruly offense of first-degree murder. On 

November 18, 2015, a juvenile court magistrate signed an attachment for the Defendant. 

On November 23, 2015, a probable cause hearing was conducted in Knox County 

Juvenile Court. Based on the testimony of Detective Clayton Madison of the KPD 

Violent Crimes Unit, the juvenile court determined there was probable cause as to the 

Defendant and the co defendant. On November 19, 2015, the State filed a motion to 

transfer the Defendant to Knox County Criminal Court to be tried as an adult. The 

Defendant filed a motion in opposition to this motion on January 4, 2016, arguing that 

“[t]ransfer would expose him, upon conviction, to an automatic life sentence of at least 

fifty-one years[,]” which he asserted was unconstitutional.

The Defendant’s transfer hearing occurred on February 26, 2016, and June 9-10, 

2016. Linda M. Hatch testified that she lived next door to the Defendant and that he went 

to school with her daughters. Sometime prior to the offense, Hatch picked up the 

 

2 We have reordered the Defendant’s issues for clarity.
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Defendant as he was “walking up the road and needed a ride.” From that point on, the 

Defendant came over to her house “almost daily.” She called the Defendant “son” and 

treated him like “one of [her] kids.” She was aware that the Defendant had a Facebook 

account. At some point during “the week of November the 6th,” Hatch observed the 

Defendant in possession of his brother’s pistol, and she admonished him. Although the 

Defendant returned his brother’s gun, the Defendant had another gun, a nine millimeter, 

“[w]ithin days.” Hatch observed the Defendant shooting the gun on her back porch 

“several times,” and she believed the Defendant had only a few bullets left. Prior to the

offense, Hatch had set up a camera on her kitchen table to record the Defendant and his 

friends because she had become suspicious that they were stealing money from her 

daughter. The camera captured the Defendant with a nine millimeter gun as well as 

codefendant Robinson, whom Hatch knew as “Savvy,” with a .32 caliber gun. The State 

played the video recording for the juvenile court, which was admitted as an exhibit to the 

hearing.

On the day of the offense, the Defendant texted Hatch at 3 p.m., and again at 6:11 

p.m., stating, “Hey, please come get me right now from where you dropped us off.” She 

understood this to be the place where she dropped off the Defendant and the codefendant

the previous Friday. By the time Hatch responded to the Defendant, he was no longer at 

the location. The next morning, the Defendant came to her house “very upset, very 

nervous.” Hatch said the Defendant wanted to talk to her, and she asked, “Ty, what’s 

wrong?” The Defendant replied, “Mom, I f----- up[,]” and “Mom, I killed a man.” The 

Defendant told Hatch he “shot him with that gun.” “[The Defendant] said that [the 

codefendant] had it planned to rob this guy, and he didn’t even know him. And he said 

that it just went wrong.” The Defendant also told her that they were going to get him for 

“overkill,” and he “shot him a lot.” The Defendant said, “when the [victim] was fighting

to try to get away from [the codefendant],” [the codefendant] told him to shoot, and he 

“just kept shooting.” The Defendant told Hatch that he shot the victim four or five times, 

and he saw the victim “laying there dead.” The Defendant also told her that he threw the 

gun away. 

Hatch testified that the Defendant came back to her house the following morning, 

and he “wasn’t so upset.” She said the Defendant told her, “They don’t even have the 

right descriptions. They have no clue it was us.” She said the Defendant was “back to 

kind of being his cool, sweet, charming self.” 

On cross-examination, Hatch testified that the first time she met the Defendant, he 

was walking down the street with a ripped trash bag, and she stopped and asked him if he 

needed a ride. She said the Defendant was upset because he had just gotten in a fight with 

his mother, and she had told him to get out of the car. Hatch told the Defendant that he 

could text her anytime, and she would give him a ride or bring him food. She primarily 
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communicated with the Defendant through Facebook Messenger because he could use it 

through Wi-Fi. She described the Defendant as “very intelligent and so, so sweet,” and 

she said that the Defendant wanted to be a rapper. She described her love for the 

Defendant as that of a mother to a child. She lectured the Defendant “many a times” on 

staying away from “doing drugs or robbing people or being involved in any of that 

behavior[.]” Hatch testified that “it all went downhill” when the Defendant started 

hanging out with the codefendant, who was on the run for a violation of probation. Hatch 

also described the day that the Defendant was arrested in her home. After the police 

arrested the Defendant and left Hatch’s house, she left to pick up the codefendant and 

informed the police, who showed up to arrest him. A few days later, Hatch went to the 

police station to give her statement. 

A series of Facebook messages between the Defendant and Hatch were also 

admitted into evidence. Several of these messages included references to the Defendant 

selling drugs, but Hatch testified that she was trying to figure out what the Defendant had 

so she could tell her husband. She said that she did not report this to the police. Hatch 

also sent the Defendant pictures of marijuana and wrote “Yummy” under one of the 

pictures. In another set of messages, the Defendant wrote, “I need some weed[,]” to 

which Hatch responded, “You want to go in half?” She explained that she was asking 

this on behalf of the codefendant. She also messaged the Defendant, “Flower man just 

called taking orders[,]” which she explained was the man down the street asking if 

anyone wanted to buy marijuana. In another message, Hatch sent the Defendant a link to 

a picture of breasts, which she said was in reference to an exotic cake that she made. She 

denied a sexual relationship with the Defendant. Hatch admitted taking several “sexy 

pictures” of the Defendant but explained that the Defendant asked her to take those 

pictures. Hatch testified that she did not get paid for her testimony. 

KPD Officer James Wilson testified that he was working patrol on the day of the 

offense when he received a call of a shooting on Linden Avenue. Upon arrival, he 

observed the victim, “laying partially in the car and partially out of the car.” Officer 

Wilson noticed that the victim had been shot and called for medical attention. Officer 

Wilson then secured the area where he observed shell casings and canvassed the 

neighborhood. The State introduced several photographs of the victim’s car, one of 

which depicted a handgun in the driver’s side floorboard. 

Timothy Schade, a KPD crime scene technician and certified latent print 

examiner, testified that he also responded to the shooting call and took several

photographs of the crime scene, most of which showed cartridge casings. Schade also 

recovered four casings from inside the car and one from outside, and he processed several 

items from inside the car for fingerprints. The victim’s car was towed to the KPD’s 

Forensic Unit garage, and Schade processed the car for fingerprints with magnetic 
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powder. One set of prints matched Kevaugh “Lil Kill” Henry, but the other seven sets 

did not appear in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). Schade 

eventually fingerprinted the Defendant, and he was able to match the Defendant’s prints 

to six identifications “on or around the passenger side door” of the victim’s car. He 

found “three finger or palm prints on the exterior of the car that matched [the 

Defendant]” and one from the interior of the car near the armrest matching the 

Defendant. He also found five sets of prints matching the codefendant that were located 

on or around the exterior door on the front passenger side of the victim’s car.

On cross-examination, Schade explained that the first casing was recovered on the 

street outside the rear passenger side of the car. The second casing was recovered from 

“the little section on the passenger side rear door that you would use to grab the door to 

shut it.” The third casing was found in the floorboard of the front passenger seat. The 

fourth casing was recovered from the floorboard of the front driver’s seat, and the fifth 

was recovered from the floor of the rear driver’s side. A sixth shell casing was never 

recovered.

Schade further explained that people do not always leave fingerprints behind when 

they touch a surface. He matched prints taken from a Powerade bottle recovered from the 

victim’s car to the victim, but he was unable to match the prints recovered from a Coke 

bottle or the gun to anyone. Schade testified that there are variables that determine why 

one fingerprint might be lighter and another might be darker. He said that he “couldn’t 

scientifically say whether a print was left today or yesterday or last week.” On redirect 

examination, Schade testified that Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry’s prints were lighter than 

the other prints on the car. 

Dr. Phillip Axtell, a licensed psychologist, testified that he received a court order 

to evaluate the Defendant. He was told not to ask the Defendant about his arrest or the 

events on the day of the crime, which limited his evaluation to treatment 

recommendations. He conducted a psychosocial evaluation of the Defendant based on a 

sixty to ninety-minute clinical interview. He recommended “[t]reatment and counseling, 

primarily to deal with stress, benefit from counseling or therapy to help [the Defendant] 

cope with memories from previous traumatic events, individual and/or group therapy, 

therapy to give him extra coping skills.” He said these services could be provided “in a 

detention facility, in-patient, or as an outpatient basis.” He said that PTSD was a possible 

diagnosis, and his report was admitted as an exhibit to the hearing.

Justin Campbell, the Court Division Coordinator for first-time offenders in 

juvenile court, supervised the Defendant for offenses including disorderly conduct, false 

report, curfew violation, and an active runaway petition. Although the Defendant was 
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“very well[-]mannered and respectful,” he did not follow through on his probation 

requirements.

Dr. Keith Cruise, an Associate Professor of Psychology at Fordham University, 

evaluated the Defendant regarding his “current mental health functioning,” “exposure to 

traumatic events and possible current traumatic stress reactions,” and “possible 

rehabilitation.” Dr. Cruise conducted evaluations of the Defendant in January and May 

2016. As part of his first evaluation, Dr. Cruise met with the Defendant at the detention 

center for six hours. He described this as a “structured interview” in which he reviewed 

mental health symptoms. He also interviewed members of the Defendant’s family. He 

conducted the second evaluation to “provide additional information about possible 

rehabilitation services and an update to any opinions from [his] initial report.” Dr. Cruise 

also reviewed the Defendant’s Department of Children’s Services (DCS) school records, 

his arrest report, his juvenile social file, the petition from this case, Dr. Axtell’s report, 

and a letter from Natchez Trace. Dr. Cruise described significant events from the 

Defendant’s life, including the loss of his father before he was born, growing up in what 

he called a “war zone,” witnessing family violence, being shot at, and experiencing the 

deaths of his aunt and his grandfather. 

Dr. Cruise diagnosed the Defendant with three disorders: PTSD, Moderate 

Cannabis Use Disorder, and Conduct Disorder. He described the death of the Defendant’s 

grandfather as the “turning point” for his PTSD. Dr. Cruise opined that an adult 

correctional facility would be “ill-equipped” to respond to the Defendant’s mental health 

needs. The Defendant was accepted into Natchez Trace youth facility, which Dr. Cruise 

stated would have appropriate treatment options for the Defendant. Dr. Cruise believed 

that the Defendant was amenable to treatment, and he noted that the Defendant was 

willing to participate in trauma-based treatment. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Cruise acknowledged the Defendant’s school 

suspensions beginning in 2011 through 2015, noting that the Defendant’s school 

suspensions decreased after his grandfather’s death. Dr. Cruise also noted that the 

Defendant was a member of “The Chain Gang,” which he concluded was not a real gang. 

Dr. Cruise stated that he did not look at the Defendant’s Facebook page as part of his 

evaluation, and he opined that the Defendant was truthful throughout his interviews. 

In determining whether to transfer the Defendant to criminal court, the juvenile 

court considered the factors as outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-

134(a)(4). In regard to part (A), whether there was probable cause to believe that the 

child committed the delinquent act as alleged, the juvenile court reasoned, in pertinent 

part, as follows:
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I’ve heard a lot of people in my lifetime try to define what 

reasonable grounds means. I’ve heard it called probable cause. I’ve heard 

it called a balancing test. I heard [defense counsel]--I listened very 

carefully to her--refer to it as a preponderance of the evidence. We know 

that it does not approach the level of moral certainty. It doesn’t get there. 

I tend to try to break things down simply. What it means to me is []

it reasonable for me to believe based on the evidence that I heard that [the 

Defendant] was there and took the victim’s life. Is it reasonable for me to 

believe that.

I don’t have to be certain. I don’t have to be sure. I don’t have to 

ultimately know the answer, but is it reasonable to believe. And in 

examining whether it’s reasonable for me to believe I must look at 

possibilities. 

I think the fingerprints through all that confusion and all of the 

testimony and all of the slides and the breakdown--all the fingerprints really 

tell us is that at some point at sometime he was at or in that car. We know 

that. No doubt.

Then we look at the testimony of Ms. Hatch. And for the record, I 

find parts of her testimony despicable. That’s the nicest thing I can say 

about my feelings about her relationship with this young man. Despicable.

I believe in my heart Ms. Hatch is one of the reasons that we’re 

sitting here today. I believe he was allowed to be at Ms. Hatch’s when he 

didn’t need to be there. I believe he was into bad things with Ms. Hatch. I 

believe he and the other young men were in an enterprise with Ms. Hatch 

and were running wild.

I was offended, disturbed, creeped out by Ms. Hatch. But I also 

believe he told her, “Mama, I ‘effed’ up. I killed a man.” I believe he said 

that. I believe she heard that. Despite the improper nature of their 

relationship, despite the obvious enterprise that they were in, despite the 

fact she creeps me out, I believe that this young man told her that. I believe 

those were his fingerprints on the car that day. From those two things I find 

reasonable grounds to believe that he committed the delinquent act. 
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The juvenile court observed that part (B) of the statute was not in dispute in the 

Defendant’s case and stated that there was “reasonable grounds to believe that [the 

Defendant] is not committable to an institution for the developmentally disable or 

mentally ill.” Regarding part (C), whether there was probable cause to believe that the 

interests of the community required that the child be put under legal restraint or 

discipline, the juvenile court stated that it agreed with both mental health experts 

“completely” and that it “[did not] doubt for a minute that the adverse childhood 

experiences [the Defendant] suffered could have led to [PTSD].” The juvenile court also 

agreed that the Defendant suffered from Cannabis Use Disorder and Conduct Disorder. 

The juvenile court then engaged in an extensive analysis of each of the six factors 

under section 37-1-134(b), and concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:

The extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency records. They 

don’t tell us a whole lot here. There’s not a whole lot of history here from 

delinquency. 

If I looked at the ACS records, if I listened to the reports and the 

information that the psychologists had been given -- although I have to 

weigh their opinion by what they’ve not been told -- I think they were both 

at a very unfair disadvantage. They were not allowed to question the child 

about the acts or the things that lead up to the acts, because the defense was 

attempting to put on a defense to the reasonable grounds to believe that it 

happened. So they’re not going to let their experts ask questions about the 

facts leading up to that day. And I think that made it tougher for them to do 

their job.

But I think the extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency 

records is not of great importance here, because he just had his first brush 

with the court system and wasn’t – I don’t think there’s a lot there that’s 

going to change and help me make my decision one way or the other as to 

whether the interests of the community require that the child be put under 

legal restraint and discipline. 

“The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child’s 

response thereto.” Well, there hasn’t been much – hasn’t been any, and 

what little he was tried to be given here he didn’t play. He was off running 

wild at Ms. Hatch’s and smoking dope and selling dope and playing on the 
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Internet and shooting guns off the back porch of the house with her 

watching. 

. . . .

“Whether the offense was against a person or property with greater 

weight in favor of the transfer given to an offense against a person.” This 

was murder. A person died, and his life meant something. And what the 

statute is talking about here is when you hurt someone or you take 

someone’s life, there’s a greater weight in favor of transfer. Not much any 

defense team can do with that except point out that’s pretty much the case 

in all murders. 

I think the important question here --now, let me talk about (6) first 

before I get to (5), which I think may be the more important factor in this 

case. “Would the child’s conduct be a criminal gang offense.” 

. . . .

I don’t know if five people in a “Chain Gang” makes it a gang or 

not, but I’m not too worried about it one way or the other in this case. It’s a 

factor, and it’s an important factor in Knoxville, particularly with the level 

of organization we seem to have out there. I can’t tell in this particular case 

whether it makes a whole lot of difference or not. 

I think what’s more important is the people that were there that day 

acted in concert. I don’t have any idea if they’re officially in a gang. I

don’t have any idea where to draw that line; if five people make a gang, if it 

takes 20. No one has ever told me. But there’s certainly some argument 

each way on factor number (6) whether this was a gang offense. And I can 

understand the defense’s position that it was just a group of kids hanging 

out together. I don’t know where you draw that line.

But again, I think the possible rehabilitation of the child is what this 

case comes down to in my mind. And the General hinted at it in her 

argument twice, that he’s 17 years and three months old. He has 21 months 

left. What’s available out there to rehabilitate someone to make them a 

productive citizen that I would feel safe about putting out in the 

community? What’s available out there to do that in 21 months? Because 

if I keep him here when he’s 19, he walks. He does whatever he wants to. 

So 21 months? How can I take a person whose conscience has been so 
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killed that the taking of a human life has so little value, how can he be 

rehabilitated in 21 months with the time I got left? 

Based on the testimony I’ve heard, I must conclude that he can’t. 

The decision will be to transfer him and try him as an adult. 

Accordingly, on June 10, 2016, the juvenile court entered an order for the 

Defendant to be transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult.

Criminal Court Proceedings

On July 27, 2016, a Knox County grand jury indicted the Defendant for two 

counts of first-degree felony murder (counts 1 and 2) and two counts of especially 

aggravated robbery (counts 3 and 4). On September 23, 2016, the Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, arguing that, if the Defendant was 

convicted on these counts, he would face an automatic life sentence of at least fifty-one 

years. The Defendant argued, “Such an automatic sentence, imposed without 

consideration of [the Defendant’s] unique characteristics or the general nature of juvenile 

development, and without regard to whether he himself intended to kill, would be 

unconstitutional.”

Trial. On January 22, 2018, the Defendant’s eight-day jury trial began. Phyllis 

Caldwell, the victim’s mother, testified that she last saw her son alive on Sunday, 

November 15, 2015, when he left for work. She communicated regularly with her son by 

his cell phone, which was 865-216-[xxxx]. She continued to text the victim, but he 

stopped responding. She informed the police that the victim had an Apple cell phone, but 

she never saw that phone again. She continued to pay the victim’s phone bill for several 

months after his death to assist the police investigation. Michael Mays, an employee of 

Knox County Emergency Communications District, explained that two 911 calls were 

made on the day of the offense, a recording of which was admitted into evidence and 

played for the jury. A computer aided dispatch (CAD) report, which generates all 

activity pertaining to 911 calls, was also admitted into evidence. The first call from 

Alneshia Allison was received at 5:23 p.m. She reported that someone had been shot and 

was hanging out of his car. Allison testified at trial and confirmed the substance of the 

911 call. The second call was received from Ralph Hunter, who also testified at trial. On 

the day of the offense, Hunter was sitting on his front porch on Linden Avenue and heard 

gunshots. When he looked up the street, he saw “two young men running from a maroon 

car that was parked on the opposite side of the street.” Hunter initially heard two 

gunshots and then “a few more” soon thereafter. On cross-examination, Hunter 
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explained that he heard a total of six or seven gunshots with only “a matter of seconds” 

between the first two shots and the second four shots.

Sergio Rosles lived on Linden Avenue and had two dogs. He also had several 

video cameras set up around the outside of his house. Rosles testified that on the day of 

the offense he “suddenly heard about three gunshots.” He looked outside his front 

window and saw “two or three” people running on the right side of a car. Rosles later 

reviewed the video surveillance from his home camera system and provided it to the 

police. The State introduced this video into evidence and played it for the jury. The 

parties agreed that, although the time stamps on Rosles’s videos were not accurate, they 

were useful for computing the correct times for when events occurred. Rosles explained 

that, at an hour, seven minutes, and seventeen seconds into the video, the video shows a 

red car and “two people running to the yellow house.” He stated that the police arrived 

five to ten minutes later.

The video also shows four camera angles around Rosles’s house. One of the 

camera angles shows Rosles’s front porch, and his dog can be seen sitting on the porch. 

Three of the cameras show the streets around Rosles’s house. At 6:52:26, a car can be 

seen pulling over and stopping on Linden Avenue near Rosles’s house. At 6:54:00, 

Rosles’s dog jumps. The parties agreed that this was the moment that the first shots were 

fired. People can be seen running from the car, but they are unidentifiable. A police 

cruiser, which was later determined to be KPD Officer Jimmy Wilson’s vehicle, arrives 

on the scene at 7:00:06. 

KPD Officer Jimmy Wilson, the first officer to arrive at the scene on Linden 

Avenue, testified that he was less than half a mile from the crime scene when he received 

the shots fired call. He then activated his emergency recording equipment and responded 

to the scene. Officer Wilson explained that his police cruiser was in “full record mode” 

with both audio and video at that time. The video reflects that he received the call at 5:24 

p.m. Upon arrival, Officer Wilson secured the scene and determined that the victim did 

not have a pulse. He observed shell casings inside the victim’s car as well as a firearm 

laying inside the car. He never saw or heard a cell phone from inside the car while he 

was at the crime scene. He explained that the victim “had his feet and from about his hips 

down to his feet inside the car,” and “his shoulders and his head [were] resting on the 

ground outside the car as if he was in the driver’s seat and had just simply fallen out on 

his body facing westbound.” Officer Wilson also assisted in canvassing the neighborhood 

for information and searching for the suspects with his K-9 partner. The State introduced 

the full cruiser recording, which shows Officer Wilson arriving at the victim’s car at 

17:25:30 or 5:25:30 p.m. The parties agreed that Officer Wilson’s cruiser video had an 

accurate time stamp. The State also introduced screen shots showing when Officer 

Wilson activated his camera into full record mode and when he left the crime scene. 
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KPD Sergeant Jeremy Maupin assisted at the crime scene and spoke to witnesses 

in the area, one of whom heard gunshots and the other who saw the suspects fleeing from 

the victim’s car. He also observed a surveillance video from the Thumbs Up Market, 

which showed two individuals in dark clothing running westbound through the alley, but 

he was not able to recover this footage.

Timothy Schade, an expert in the field of a latent fingerprint examination,

described the different processes for obtaining latent prints and the variables involved 

with leaving a fingerprint behind. Schade also responded to the scene on Linden Avenue

and took hundreds of photographs of the crime scene and the evidence collected. The first 

set of photographs depicted the victim’s car at the crime scene. Several of the exhibits 

showed cartridge casings, a gun on the front driver’s side floorboard, a t-shirt and a glove 

on the front passenger’s side floorboard, a Coca-Cola bottle, a Powerade bottle, and a 

phone charger. Schade did not recover a cell phone from the car. A set of photographs 

showing the evidence after Schade collected the items from the victim’s car, a set of 

photographs showing the victim’s car after it was taken to KPD’s garage, and a set of 

photographs showing the fingerprints left on the victim’s car were also admitted into 

evidence. Schade recovered five spent shell casings from the crime scene. He also 

recovered a plastic container holding several pills. Schade explained that he used 

magnetic powder to recover fingerprints from the victim’s car.

Schade went to the Defendant’s house and took pictures which showed rounds of 

ammunition recovered from a headboard in the front bedroom of the Defendant’s house 

and two cell phone covers. Schade also took pictures of the items taken from the 

codefendant after he was arrested, which included a backpack, a gun, cartridges, and a 

cell phone. Schade also went to the Medical Examiner’s office, fingerprinted the victim, 

performed a gunshot residue kit on the victim, and collected all the evidence from the 

victim, which included the following: clothing, six spent rounds collected from his body, 

a package of Swisher Sweet Cigarillos, a baggie of marijuana, and $835 in cash. Four 

spent cartridge casings, a nine millimeter, two Lugers, and an FC nine millimeter, were 

also admitted into evidence. The gun that was recovered from the victim’s car, a SCCY 

nine millimeter was also admitted into evidence, and Schade noted that he took buccal 

swabs from the Defendant and the codefendant. 

Schade recovered three sets of prints from the outside of the victim’s car which 

belonged to Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry, the codefendant, and the Defendant. He 

specifically compared the fingerprints of J’Andre Hunt to the latent prints from the items 

recovered from the scene, which were not a match. Schade fingerprinted the Defendant 

following his arrest, and these print cards were entered into evidence. Schade matched 

the Defendant’s fingerprints to the following areas of the victim’s car: “above the wheel 
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well on the passenger side and behind the rear door going towards the back of the car[,]” 

the passenger side armrest on the interior side of the door, and the exterior side of the rear 

passenger door. Schade confirmed that these prints belonged to the Defendant.

On cross-examination, Schade testified that, when he arrived on the scene, the

front doors of the victim’s car were open, and the rear doors were closed. Schade did not 

move the gun found in the front driver’s side floorboard before photographing it, but he 

could not say whether someone else had moved it. The gun had nine rounds in the 

magazine and one in the chamber, and there were no usable prints obtained from the gun. 

Schade could not opine when each set of fingerprints was left on the victim’s car. He

focused mainly on taking prints from the passenger side of the car. He did not dust the 

driver’s side of the car for fingerprints, and he did not test any of the items found in the 

trunk of the victim’s car.

KPD Officer Edward Johnson, another latent print examiner, testified that he 

verified Schade’s fingerprint examinations and reached the same result. Officer Johnson 

also personally collected the fingerprints of J’Andre Hunt and determined that they did 

not match any of the latent prints taken from the victim’s car. 

J’Andre Hunt testified that he met the victim through Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry, 

one of his older friends whom he knew as “Kill.” Hunt did not know the Defendant at the 

time, and he did not recognize the Defendant at trial. He also did not know the 

codefendant. Hunt denied being in the victim’s car on the day of the offense, and he 

testified that he did not shoot the victim or try to rob him. He confirmed that he went to 

the police station on the night of the offense and provided them with a statement, 

fingerprints, and a buccal swab. On cross-examination, he agreed that he had been in the 

victim’s car several different times, and he acknowledged that he told the police during 

his interview that they would find his fingerprints in the victim’s car. Hunt stated that the 

victim would come over to his house twice a week, and they would “chill in the 

driveway” and smoke weed. He was not aware that the victim was selling pills or drugs, 

and he communicated with the victim primarily through Facebook.

Alex Brodhag, an expert in firearm identification and examination with the 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), performed a “muzzle to gun and distance 

determination” on a jacket worn by the victim to determine the distance from the muzzle 

of the gun when it was fired to the victim’s clothing. Brodhag was only able to determine 

that there was gun powder residue in five out of eight holes in the victim’s jacket. The 

presence of gunpowder indicated that the gun was shot within six feet of the victim, and 

his report reflecting such was admitted into evidence. On cross-examination, Brodhag 

could not explain why some of the holes did not have gunpowder residue around them.

He agreed one explanation was that the gunpowder residue could have fallen off prior to 
- 14 -

it being tested. He also stated that, without the suspect firearm, he could not determine 

the distance from which the shots were fired at the victim.

KPD crime technician Stephanie Housewright went to the home of Linda Hatch on 

November 20, 2015, and took several photographs, which were entered into evidence.

The photographs showed the back of the house, the back porch, and two nine millimeter 

shell casings, which she collected as evidence.

Kim Lowe, a forensic biologist for the TBI, testified that she created DNA profiles 

for the victim, the Defendant, and the codefendant, and her report was admitted as an 

exhibit. She matched the t-shirt and the glove found in the victim’s car to the 

codefendant. The Powerade bottle contained only the DNA of the victim and an 

unknown female. The victim’s jacket tested positive for the DNA of the victim, but the 

results as to the major contributor were inconclusive. Agent Lowe also tested the swabs 

from the rear and front passenger headrests, which were inconclusive. On crossexamination, Agent Lowe confirmed that none of the items that she tested were positive 

for the Defendant’s DNA. She also established that the victim’s jacket was transported 

multiple times from the inception of the case based on the chain of custody records.

Linda Hatch provided testimony at trial which was consistent with her testimony 

from the juvenile transfer hearing. Additionally, Hatch testified that when the Defendant 

came to her house the morning after the offense, the following occurred:

And when I had my children to leave the room, he had his head bowed in 

his hands and he was crying a little bit. And I said “Ty, honey, what’s 

wrong?” And he said, “momma, I f--ked up.” And I said, “what? Baby, 

what? What, Ty fly, what’s wrong?” And he was trying to talk. And I said 

“it’s okay. Is it you and mom? Is it you and your mom? Is it you and your 

brother?” “No, momma. I’ve f--ked my life up.” And I said “what have 

you done, Ty? What did you do?” And he said “momma, I killed a man.” 

And I said “what, Ty? What? No you didn’t.” And he said “yes, I did, 

momma. We killed him.” And I said “you killed who?”

And I thought my mind was totally in denial because my Ty 

wouldn’t do that. And he said “momma, momma, I shot a man and I killed 

him and I didn’t mean to. And I’m sorry.”. . . And I said “what do you 

mean you killed someone, Ty?” And he said, “momma, it went so wrong. 

We were just supposed to meet the man, get some weed, take his money. 

We wasn’t supposed to hurt him. Savvy said we would just take his drugs 

and money.” 
- 15 -

. . . 

And I said “let’s slow down and go back.” “Ty, did you take that 

gun and shoot--did you kill somebody with that gun?” He said, “yeah.” 

“But I didn’t mean to, mom.” He said, “Savvy called the boy up and set it 

up. Said he would meet us and we would just get it, you know, get his 

money. Get the weed. And we would go. But it went bad.” And I said, 

“like what happened? What happened, Ty? What happened?” And he said 

when he got there it happened so fast, momma. It happened so fast. He 

said he pulled up. We got--we was just going to, you know, get in and he 

said Savvy grabbed him and was going to hold him and I was just going to 

grab, you know, was going to grab the money, grab the weed, and we were 

gonna go. And he fought and he broke loose. Savvy couldn’t hold him. 

And momma, Savvy said shoot him. Shoot him, Ty. And Ty said, “I 

pulled the trigger and when I pulled it, I couldn’t stop. It just kept shooting. 

And when I stopped--when I let go--when I realized what was going, I had 

emptied all the bullets.” And I said “how do you know you killed him? 

You could have wounded him. You could have scared him. That don’t 

mean [sic] you killed him, Ty.” And he said, “momma, he was dead. That 

n---er, we left him dangling dead and we took off running. He was dead.” 

The Defendant also told Hatch that he threw the gun away and took off running 

after he shot the victim. He said his brother bought him a clip of hollow point bullets, and 

that he “blew [the victim’s] chest out[.]” Hatch saw the Defendant the following day and 

described his demeanor as “very proud, happy, almost very swag cool” that morning. 

The Defendant told Hatch that the news had the wrong description of the suspects. He 

also told Hatch that he had shot the victim in the back.

The next day, the Defendant was arrested at Hatch’s home, and shortly thereafter,

the codefendant was arrested. Hatch subsequently provided the police with the video of 

the Defendant, the codefendant, and another friend, “Ears Tate,” walking around her 

house, which was entered into evidence. The video showed Ears Tate with the 

Defendant’s gun “stuck down his pants.” Ears Tate pointed the gun at the codefendant

and said “boom, boom, boom, boom,” and the Defendant said, “give me back my gun.”

Hatch also provided the State with copies of Facebook messages between her and 

the Defendant, which were admitted as an exhibit. Hatch could not recall when she gave 

these messages to the State. The Defendant’s name on Facebook was “Ty Hellabands 

Booker.” In these messages, Hatch and the Defendant talked about tattoos, the 

Defendant’s gun, and drugs. The parties stipulated that “Hatch first provided the State of 
- 16 -

Tennessee with a set of Facebook messages previously introduced into this record at trial 

in August of 2017.” 

On cross-examination, Hatch testified that she thought of the Defendant as one of 

her children. She asked the Defendant what kind of drugs he had so that she could tell 

her husband what the Defendant was bringing into her home. Hatch denied asking the 

Defendant if he wanted to “go in half” on buying “weed[,]” but explained that her niece 

had sent these messages from her phone. Hatch also sent the Defendant pictures of 

marijuana and told him that the “flower man” was “taking orders.” She explained that 

this referred to one of the Defendant’s friends selling marijuana. Hatch also sent the 

Defendant a link to an image of a woman’s breasts, which she explained was to get the 

Defendant’s opinion on a cake that she was making. Hatch also took what she described 

as “sexy” photographs of the Defendant and sent them to him. Hatch said she never 

smoked weed with the Defendant and that her relationship with the Defendant was 

“absolutely not” sexual.

A custodian of records for Sprint, Tom Koch, testified and authenticated four call 

detail records associated with the victim’s phone number, (865) 216-[xxxx], which were 

denoted in central standard time. The first three calls were made to the same number,

(865) 227-[xxxx], later determined to belong to the Defendant’s girlfriend, Jada Mostella. 

These calls occurred at the following times: (1) 16:03:33 and ended at 16:04:04; 

(2)16:10:32 and ended at 16:11:04; and (3) 16:18:08 and ended at 16:18:45. The fourth 

call was made to (865) 577-[xxxx], later determined to belong to the Defendant’s friend, 

Shanterra Washington, and occurred at 16:18:57 and ended at 16:19:58. There were no 

further outbound calls made from this number. Koch agreed that the “non-entries” would 

indicate that the phone was off or outside the range of cell service. Jada Mostella 

testified and confirmed her phone number, as reflected in the first three calls on the 

victim’s cell phone. At the time of the offense, Mostella was dating the Defendant. She 

also knew the codefendant, but she did not know the victim, Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry

or J’Andre Hunt. Shanterra Washington testified and confirmed her home phone number, 

as reflected in the fourth call on the victim’s cell phone. She said the Defendant was her 

best friend and that she knew the codefendant. She did not know the victim or Kevaughn 

“Lil Kill” Henry, and that she was familiar with J’Andre Hunt. 

Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry testified that he knew the Defendant and the victim, 

and that he had been in the victim’s car prior to his death. Henry had viewed the 

Defendant’s Snapchat account in the summer of 2015, and observed the Defendant 

shooting a gun that “looked like a 9 mm[,]” from someone’s back porch. Henry believed 

that the codefendant was with the Defendant in the video. Henry explained that Snapchat 

videos disappear within 24 hours after being uploaded, and he did not save this video. He 

said he informed the State of the video “somewhere pretty early in [the Defendant’s] 
- 17 -

case.” Henry also provided a statement to the police after the victim was killed. Henry 

testified that he was good friends with the victim, and that he was not involved in the 

victim’s death. On cross-examination, Henry agreed that his fingerprints were found on 

the victim’s car and that he was initially a suspect.

Tiffany Springer lived in South Knoxville with Linda and Heath Hatch and her 

little brother. She met the Defendant at school and described him as an older brother. 

She testified that he came to her house every day after he met Linda Hatch. Springer also 

knew the codefendant and Ears Tate, and she acknowledged that they referred to 

themselves as the “Chain Gang.” Prior to the offense, Springer observed the Defendant

and the codefendant in possession of a gun, but she never saw them shoot a gun. On the 

morning after the offense, the Defendant came to Springer’s home to speak to Hatch. 

Springer overheard the Defendant say, “‘I f’ed up my life.’” She also heard him say, “‘I 

didn’t know what to do, I panicked so I just--I kept going. I kept pulling it.’” Springer 

stated that when the Defendant came back to her house the next morning, he “wasn’t 

acting the same as he did on Monday.” On cross-examination, Springer stated that she 

had discussed the Defendant’s arrest and the events surrounding it many times with her 

mother. Springer saw the Defendant smoking marijuana, but she never saw her mother 

smoking with the Defendant. Springer had a Facebook account in November 2015, but 

she never communicated with the Defendant via Facebook Messenger. She was aware 

that her mother communicated with the Defendant through Facebook Messenger, but she 

never used Hatch’s Facebook Messenger to communicate with the Defendant about 

drugs.

Heath Hatch, Linda Hatch’s husband, was a maintenance technician and worked a 

6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift. He saw the Defendant and the codefendant in his home 

multiple times, and he observed the Defendant with a “black 9 mm.” The Defendant told 

Heath that the gun was not working properly, and Heath inspected the gun and tried to 

disable it, but he was unable to do so. Heath never saw the Defendant fire the gun, but he 

did observe several shell casings in his backyard. Heath testified on cross-examination 

that he was not aware of his wife smoking marijuana with the Defendant.

Detective Thomas Thurman with the KPD Violent Crimes Unit responded to the 

scene of the offense the following morning and identified two public information press 

releases regarding the crime and the suspects, which were admitted as exhibits. Detective 

Thurman also participated in the interviews of J’Andre Hunt and Kevaughn “Lil Kill” 

Henry. Detective Thurman received information regarding the Facebook accounts of the 

Defendant and the codefendant, and he used their fingerprints to apply for arrest 

warrants. Although Detective Thurman executed a search warrant of the Defendant’s 

residence, it did not produce anything of value to the investigation. Detective Thurman 

also interviewed Hatch, retrieved a video from her laptop, and unsuccessfully attempted 
- 18 -

to locate the victim’s cell phone. Detective Thurman also confirmed that the murder 

weapon was never recovered. In regard to Hatch, Detective Thurman said that she told 

him to “write [her] check bigger,” during an interview, that he told her they were 

“working on getting [her] processed” as an informant, and that she was never officially 

an informant. Hatch also wanted KPD to pay her for her son’s basketball that was 

destroyed when the police arrested the Defendant. 

Christine Fitzgerald, the Employee Benefits and Risk Management Director for 

the City of Knoxville, testified that Detective Thurman filed a claim for damaged 

property belonging to Linda Hatch, which was approved for $30. Hatch signed a release 

of claims liability. KPD Sergeant Andrew Boatman testified that Hatch had not acted as 

a controlled informant for the KPD in the past or at the time of the Defendant’s trial. 

Neither Heath Hatch nor Springer served as confidential informants for the KPD. On 

cross-examination, Sergeant Boatman testified that the KPD does not keep records of 

every person who “raises the possibility of acting as a confidential informant with anyone 

in the police department.” Sergeant Boatman was also qualified as an expert in narcotics 

distribution and investigation, and he testified that the victim had “Roxicodone 30s” in 

his car on the night that he was killed. He stated that it was possible, based on the items 

recovered from the victim and his car, that the victim was engaged in the “distribution or 

possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances.” 

Patricia Resig, an expert in the field of firearms, examined the following from the 

crime scene: a nine millimeter Luger caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s right 

shoulder; a fired nine millimeter caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s right chest 

wall; a fired nine millimeter caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s right chest cavity; 

a fired nine millimeter caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s left chest wall; a fired 

nine millimeter caliber bullet recovered from the victim’s stomach; and a fired nine 

millimeter caliber bullet recovered from the left sleeve of the victim’s jacket. The bullet 

recovered from the victim’s right chest cavity was a hollow point bullet, indicating that it 

was Federal ammunition, and the other bullets were consistent with Winchester 

ammunition. Resig determined that the six bullets “display[ed] consistent class 

characteristics,” and that there was “[s]ome agreement of the individual characteristics

[which] could have been fired through the same unknown barrel.” 

In regard to the five shell casings recovered from the crime scene, Resig 

determined that there was “a lack of sufficient matching individual characteristics[,]” but 

opined that “all the casings could have been fired in the same unknown gun.” Four of 

the casings recovered from the crime scene were nine millimeter Luger caliber 

Winchester cartridge casings, and one was a nine millimeter Luger caliber Federal 

cartridge case. Resig also examined the cartridges recovered from Hatch’s back porch, 

and she determined that both were nine millimeter Luger caliber Federal cartridge cases. 
- 19 -

She determined that these two cartridge cases and one cartridge case recovered from the 

crime scene were fired from the same unknown firearm. She determined that the other 

four cartridge casings recovered from the scene could have been fired from the same 

firearm. Resig also examined the nine millimeter SCCY semi-automatic handgun

recovered from the victim’s car, and she determined that none of the cartridge casings 

recovered from the crime scene were fired from that gun. Lastly, Resig examined a .32 

caliber handgun which was previously identified and introduced as the gun that was 

confiscated from the codefendant when he was arrested. She testified that this gun would 

not fire nine millimeter ammunition; therefore, it did not fire any of the casings recovered 

from the crime scene or from Hatch’s back porch. Resig’s report of her findings was 

admitted as an exhibit at trial.

The parties entered a stipulation and agreed that “[i]n June [] 2015 Tyshon Booker 

and [the codefendant] were observed in each other’s company.” 

Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan, the Chief Medical Examiner for Knox County, 

testified as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan performed the autopsy 

on the victim and confirmed that he had four gunshot wounds to the back of his body. 

She also found “a lot of money” on the victim’s body. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan examined 

the jacket that the victim was wearing, and she testified that there were several holes in 

the jacket that matched up to the victim’s gunshot wounds. She used a mannequin to 

demonstrate the trajectory of the bullets. The toxicology report revealed that the victim 

had a marijuana metabolite in his system when he died. The victim’s manner of death 

was homicide, and his cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. 

The Defendant testified that he was in the victim’s car on November 15, 2015, 

along with the codefendant. However, the Defendant said that he did not intend to rob 

the victim. The Defendant insisted that he shot the victim because he thought the victim 

was going to shoot him or the codefendant. The Defendant described his background at 

trial. He grew up with his mother and four brothers. His father was killed two weeks 

before he was born. He described his relationship with his mother as “rocky,” and he 

stated that he would get kicked out of the house when he argued with his mother. The 

Defendant had a close relationship with his grandfather, who was stabbed to death. The 

Defendant grew up in East Knoxville, but his family moved to South Knoxville prior to 

the offense. The Defendant attended South Doyle High School, went to school “from 

time to time,” and regularly smoked marijuana with his friends.

The Defendant met Linda Hatch on July 29, 2015, after his mother kicked him out 

of the car and Hatch offered him a ride. He got in Hatch’s car, and she told him that she 

was his neighbor and her daughter was always talking about him. The Defendant stated 

that he and Hatch smoked marijuana while he was in her car. After that, the Defendant 
- 20 -

began going to Hatch’s house daily. He spent the night at Hatch’s house, and she gave 

him tattoos and bought him things. They smoked marijuana and drank alcohol together. 

The Defendant communicated with Hatch through Facebook Messenger, and he 

described several of the messages sent between them. He did not communicate with her 

daughter, Springer, through Hatch’s Facebook account. The Defendant sold crack 

cocaine, and Hatch helped him find buyers. The Defendant also described two sexual 

encounters that he had with Hatch. The Defendant testified that he had a nine millimeter

gun in November 2015, and that he shot it at Hatch’s house. He said the codefendant

also had a gun, but it did not function correctly.

The Defendant described the events leading up to the death of the victim as 

follows. The codefendant showed the Defendant a Snapchat video from the victim

inviting him to smoke marijuana, and the victim eventually picked them up in his car. 

The codefendant sat in the front-passenger seat, and the Defendant sat in the backpassenger seat. The Defendant stated that he had never seen the victim or his car prior to 

the day of the offense. The Defendant could not recall when the victim picked them up,

and he did not know how long they were in the victim’s car. He said his gun was hidden 

under his shirt on his right hip, so the victim would not have known that he had a gun. 

The victim asked them if they knew where to buy marijuana, and he offered them 

Oxycodone pills. They each took two pills, and the victim drove them to a different 

house and gave the codefendant money to buy marijuana. The Defendant and the victim 

waited in the car and listened to music while the codefendant went inside to get the 

marijuana. The victim then drove to a gas station and bought cigars to smoke the 

marijuana. 

The Defendant stated that he planned to meet his girlfriend, Jada Mostella, later 

that day, and he used the victim’s cell phone to call her. He also planned to stop by his 

grandfather’s house on Linden Avenue, and he asked the victim to take him there. The 

Defendant, the victim, and the codefendant rode around in the victim’s car “smoking and 

listening to music[,]” and the Defendant tried to call Mostella again. He also tried to call 

his friend, Shanterra Washington. The Defendant stated that he was trying to call again 

when they pulled up to his grandfather’s house on Linden, and he saw the victim reach 

over to the codefendant’s pockets. The Defendant had the victim’s phone in his right 

hand when the codefendant and the victim began to fight. The codefendant said, “F—k,” 

and hit the victim. The codefendant told the Defendant that the victim had a gun, and they 

continued to wrestle for the gun. The Defendant said the victim was holding the 

codefendant with his right arm while “bobbing and weaving,” and the codefendant was 

swinging at the victim. “[The victim] started mushing [the codefendant] while reaching 

underneath his seat.” The Defendant said he “felt the need to help [the codefendant],” 

and the codefendant “put [his] hands up like [he] was gonna swing on [the victim].” The 

victim said, “So you all are going to gang me[,]” and reached for his gun. Asked if there 
- 21 -

was anything preventing the Defendant from getting out of the car at that point, the 

Defendant replied, “Yeah, my friend that’s preventing--I’m not about to leave [the 

codefendant], we came here together, we’re gonna leave together.” The Defendant pulled 

out his gun as he saw the victim turn towards him with a gun. The Defendant said he was 

scared, and he thought the victim was going to shoot him or the codefendant, so he shot 

the victim. The Defendant said the victim “didn’t stop” so the Defendant shot him 

several more times. Eventually, the victim “stopped coming for [them][,]” dropped his 

gun, opened his door, and fell out. The Defendant and the codefendant then got out of 

the car and ran. As the Defendant was running, he threw away the gun and the victim’s 

cell phone. He had not realized he still had possession of the victim’s phone until he was 

running from the car. When he was unable to reach Hatch, he called his mother to get a 

ride home. The next morning, the Defendant went to Hatch’s house and told her that he 

shot someone. He denied telling her that he had tried to rob the victim, and he insisted 

that he told her the same thing that he was telling the jury. 

On cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that it “made sense” that fingerprints 

belonging to him and the codefendant were found on the victim’s car. The Defendant 

also stated that he did not know Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry and that neither Kevaughn 

“Lil Kill” Henry nor J’Andre Hunt were in the victim’s car with them on the day of the 

offense. The Defendant had the gun in his right hand and the victim’s cell phone in his 

pocket when he got out of the car. The Defendant was unaware that the victim had cash 

in his right pocket, and he did not see where the victim had the pills. The State introduced 

one of the Defendant’s Facebook posts, which said, “I been thru it all...robbed n---as, got 

robbed, shot at, shot back, couple n---az got whacxed [sic]. I done been thru it all.” The 

Defendant explained that these were rap lyrics, and the defense played the song for the 

jury. On redirect examination, the Defendant stated that he never intended to steal the 

victim’s cell phone, and that he did not know he had it until after the fight.

Following submission of the above proof, the jury found the Defendant guilty as 

charged, and upon merging count two into count one, the trial court imposed a sentence

of life imprisonment. On March 16, 2018, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing 

during which several of the victim’s family members gave statements about the impact of 

the victim’s death on their lives. A psychological evaluation and follow-up examination 

conducted by Dr. Keith Cruise was also admitted as an exhibit to the hearing. Following 

merger of counts three and four, the trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence to be 

served concurrently to count one, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment. 

On May 29, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and 

New Trial Based on the Jury’s Misconduct and Exposure to Extraneous Information.” In 

an accompanying affidavit, defense counsel averred that, following the verdict, the Knox 

County Public Defender’s Office sent letters to the petit jury asking to discuss certain 
- 22 -

aspects of the Defendant’s case. Defense counsel subsequently spoke to juror Lambert, 

who told them that the jury looked up information regarding the number of years the 

Defendant would serve for a life sentence in Tennessee during deliberations. Following 

this discussion, defense counsel attempted to contact the other jurors. Investigator Gerald 

Witt of the Knox County Public Defender’s Office also provided an affidavit stating that 

he contacted juror Lambert, and she told him that the jurors looked up “terminology” 

relevant to the Defendant’s case and shared that information with the entire jury. The 

State subsequently filed a “Motion to Prohibit Inquiry into Validity of Verdict.” At a 

hearing held on June 1, 2018, the trial court agreed to subpoena juror Lambert to testify at 

the Defendant’s motion for new trial regarding potential juror misconduct during 

deliberations.

On June 12, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion to Subpoena Additional Juror to 

Testify at Evidentiary Hearing on Jury Misconduct.” Defense counsel asserted that they 

had received information from a second juror, who stated that “several jurors had been 

using Google to look up terms during deliberations.” Investigator Witt provided another 

affidavit stating that this juror told him that jurors had looked up the “Webster meaning” 

of certain words that it was unclear about. At a June 22, 2018 hearing, the Defendant 

argued that it was necessary for the court to subpoena a second juror to testify as well, but 

the trial court denied the Defendant’s request.

On July 2, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant’s motion for 

new trial. Juror Lambert testified that she was one of twelve jurors who heard and 

decided the Defendant’s case. Lambert testified that the jury looked up the definition of

terms on the internet during deliberations. She testified, in relevant part, as follows:

The only thing that we looked up was the life sentence and how 

many years it involved, whether it was a 20[-]year sentence or--but we 

figured out--found out in the State of Tennessee it’s 51 years automatic.

. . . 

As far--and then the only other thing was-- that we looked up was 

terminology and it’s been so long that I honestly could not tell you what the 

exact words were, but it was just a definition. I do know that. It was a 

definition and it had to--it was a medical word was one of them.

. . . 
- 23 -

I don’t recall what the word was, but it was a medical word that 

someone didn’t understand, so we just Googled the word to find out what 

the definition was. 

Juror Lambert explained that this occurred in the jury room and that “somebody 

got on their phone and looked this up[.]” Although only one person used his or her phone 

to look up this information, all of the jurors heard it. She could not recall the medical 

term that the jury looked up, but she stated, “It was a term that had come up in trial.” 

Lambert asserted that the jury did not look up anything concerning the Defendant or the 

facts surrounding his case. She said both terms were looked up during the jury’s 

deliberations, but she believed that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions during 

deliberations and in rendering its verdict. The Defendant argued for the need to subpoena 

the second juror to determine what other possible terms the jury looked up during 

deliberations, which was denied by the trial court.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for new trial by written order on 

July 24, 2018. On August 8, 2018, the Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this 

case is now properly before this court for our review. 

ANALYSIS

I. Apprendi Violation. As an issue of first impression in Tennessee,3the 

Defendant contends that the juvenile transfer hearing process as outlined in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(4), violates the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of 

a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348. This concept applies to any fact that will “expose the 

defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 494,

120 S.Ct. 2348; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 253, 

(2004) (clarifying that for purposes of Apprendi, the “statutory maximum” is the 

maximum term of imprisonment a court may impose “solely on the basis of the facts 

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”). The Defendant argues, based 

 

3 But see Brandon Mobley v. State, No. E2010-00379-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3652535, at *19 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 397 S.W.3d 70 (Tenn. 2013) (concluding 

that counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge juvenile transfer hearing based on Apprendi)(citing 

Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1110-13 (10th Cir. 2008)).
- 24 -

on the principles espoused in Apprendi, that the findings of the juvenile court judge at the 

transfer hearing exposed him to “the possibility of vastly increased punishment, from 

incarceration until age nineteen to life imprisonment.” As such, the Defendant insists this 

is a “straightforward” violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the 

Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

response, the State contends that Tennessee’s juvenile transfer procedure does not violate 

Apprendi. The State relies on the historic role of Tennessee juvenile courts and the 

majority view of other jurisdictions that have rejected Apprendi’s application to juvenile 

transfer proceedings. Based on the following reasoning and analysis, we agree with the 

State, and conclude that the Tennessee juvenile hearing transfer statute does not fall 

within the scope of Apprendi.

We review issues of constitutional law de novo with no presumption of 

correctness attaching to the legal conclusions reached by the courts below. State v.

Davis, 266 S.W.3d 896, 901 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Burns, 205 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tenn.

2006). “Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” 

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (applying various due process rights to juvenile 

proceedings including notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and 

cross-examination, and privilege against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 

(1970) (proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard applies to delinquency proceedings);

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)(holding that the [adjudication] “hearing 

must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment”); Breed v. Jones, 421 

U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy protection applies to delinquency proceedings); but see

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion holding that a 

trial by jury is not constitutionally required for juvenile court adjudications). 

Juvenile courts in Tennessee have exclusive original jurisdiction over children 

alleged to be delinquent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(a)(1) (2011); State v. Hale, 833 

S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tenn. 1992). A juvenile court may transfer a child to be dealt with as an 

adult in the criminal court of competent jurisdiction after a petition has been filed 

alleging delinquency based on conduct that is designated a crime and before hearing the 

petition on the merits. Tenn. Code Ann. §37-1-134(a) (2014). The disposition of the 

child shall be as if the child were an adult if the child is sixteen years old or more at the 

time of the alleged conduct and the charged offense is, inter alia, first degree murder. Id. 

(emphasis added). At the time of the instant offense, in determining whether to transfer 

the child to criminal court, the juvenile court was required to find “reasonable grounds to 

believe” that (A) the “child committed the delinquent act as alleged;” (B) the “child is not 

committable to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill;” and (C) 

the “interests of the community require that the child be put under legal restraint or 

discipline.” Id., §37-1-134(a)(1), (4)(A)-(C). Additionally, in determining whether to 
- 25 -

treat a juvenile as an adult as outlined in section (a)(1), the court must also consider, 

among other matters, the following:

(1) The extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency records;

(2) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child’s 

response thereto;

(3) Whether the offense was against person or property, with greater 

weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;

(4) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated 

manner;

(5) The possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services 

and facilities currently available to the court in this state; and

(6) Whether the child’s conduct would be a criminal gang offense...if 

committed by an adult.

Id., 37-1-134(b). Hearings pursuant to this part shall be conducted by the court without a 

jury, in an informal but orderly manner, separate from other proceedings not included in 

§ 37-1-103, and pursuant to Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 37-1-124 (a) (emphasis added). A transfer to criminal court pursuant to this 

section “terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the child with respect to the 

delinquent acts alleged.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(c). Moreover, regardless of the 

seriousness of the offense, any child shall be released from a juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

upon the child’s nineteenth birthday. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-103 (4)(A)(b)-(c), (B)-

(D)(2011).

In Burns, 205 S.W.3d at 417, the Tennessee Supreme Court cited favorably the

reasoning of McKeiver and concluded that article I, section 8 of the Tennessee 

Constitution does not provide a juvenile defendant with a jury trial upon appeal of a 

determination by juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction to criminal court. In Burns, the 

Tennessee Supreme Court characterized the juvenile court system as follows:

“[T]he system for dealing with juvenile offenders as juveniles is separate 

and distinct from the criminal justice system. On those occasions when a 
- 26 -

juvenile is transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult, he or she is 

afforded the full panoply of constitutional rights accorded to criminal 

defendants, including jury trials. Defendant in this case is not, however, 

being tried as an adult. He is being tried within the context of a system that 

was designed to avoid much of the trauma and stigma of a criminal trial.

We agree with the United States Supreme Court that “one cannot say that in 

our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.” 

A jury’s “necessity” is further attenuated in the context of juvenile 

delinquency proceedings, which are aimed not at punishing the youthful 

offender, but at rehabilitating him. We are also persuaded that the 

McKeiver decision is correct in its concern for the juvenile court’s “ability 

to function in a unique manner” in the absence of a jury. Finally, we agree 

with Justice Blackmun’s observation that, “[i]f the formalities of the 

criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile 

court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that 

ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are 

disinclined to give impetus to it.”

Burns, 205 S.W.3d at 417 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Finally, we 

are mindful that juvenile proceedings are not “criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 418 (citing 

Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643, 644 (1915) (recognizing that 

“proceedings before a juvenile court do not amount to a trial of the child for any criminal

offense” and that “the proceedings in a juvenile court are entirely distinct from 

proceedings in the courts ordained to try persons for crime”)); see also Breed v. Jones, 

421 U.S. at 535 (recognizing that juvenile transfer statutes represent an attempt to impart 

to the juvenile-court system the flexibility needed to deal with youthful offenders who 

cannot benefit from the specialized guidance and treatment contemplated by the system).

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the adult defendant fired several .22-caliber bullets 

into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously 

all-white neighborhood. 530 U.S. at 469-71. The defendant was subsequently arrested,

admitted that he was the shooter, and upon further questioning, admitted that “even 

though he did not know the occupants of the house personally, ‘because they are black in 

color he [did] not want them in the neighborhood.’” Id. Although he was later indicted 

on multiple counts, none of the counts referred to the hate crime statute, and none alleged 

that the defendant acted with a racially biased purpose. Id. The parties entered into a 

plea agreement, and the State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher 

“enhanced” sentence on the ground that the shooting offense was committed with a 

biased purpose, as described in the hate crime statute. The defendant, correspondingly, 

reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it 

violated the United States Constitution. Id. The trial court accepted the plea agreement. 
- 27 -

Following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the defendant’s “purpose” for the 

shooting, the trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence based on the hate crime statute 

upon finding “that the crime was motivated by racial bias” and that the defendant’s 

actions were taken “with a purpose to intimidate” as provided by the statute. The 

defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Due Process Clause of the United States 

Constitution required that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was 

based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The United States

Supreme Court agreed and reasoned due process of law guaranteed “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 

impartial jury,” which entitled a criminal defendant to “a jury determination that [he] is 

guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Under Apprendi, “Any fact that increases the 

penalty to which a defendant is exposed constitutes an element of a crime,” Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 483, n. 10, and “must be found by a jury, not a judge[.]” 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007); see also Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); and Jones v. United 

States, 574 U.S. 948 (2014).

The Defendant argues in effect that the findings of the juvenile court pursuant to 

the juvenile transfer statute, are equivalent to the sentencing enhancement that was struck 

down as unconstitutional in Apprendi. We respectfully disagree. State and federal courts 

across the nation facing challenges to juvenile transfer laws have repeatedly refused to 

apply the Apprendi rule to waiver hearings on the following grounds: (1) waiver hearings 

only determine a jurisdictional matter; (2) waiver hearings do not adjudicate guilt or 

culpability; (3) the unique nature of the juvenile-justice system warrants different 

constitutional requirements; (4) and the history of juvenile transfer shows judicial factfinding is constitutional. See MARK KIMBRELL, IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO WAIVE A

CHILD ... OR AT LEAST A JURY: APPLYING APPRENDI TO JUVENILE WAIVER HEARINGS IN 

OREGON, 52 Willamette L. Rev. 61, 91-92 (2015); but see Commonwealth v. Quincy Q,

434 Mass. 859, 864, 753 N.E.2d 781, 789 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Com. v. 

King, 445 Mass. 217, 834 N.E.2d 1175 (2005). Upon our review, we now join the 

majority and decline to apply Apprendi to the Tennessee juvenile transfer process.

4

 

4 United States v. Miguel, 338 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003) (Apprendi inapplicable because it 

does not create a per se increase of a defendant’s punishment; rather, it establishes jurisdiction only); 

Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1110-1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (comprehensive review of other 

jurisdictions’ analyses of Apprendi’s applicability to juvenile court transfer proceedings and noting that 

“forty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes allowing judges to transfer juveniles 

to adult court after making specified findings” and that “amenability and commitment findings have not 

traditionally been made by juries”); Morales v. United States, No. 09 CIV 5080 LAP, 2010 WL 3431650, 

at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010); Parks v. Sec’y, DOC, No. 311-CV-1213-J-39, 2014 WL 6610750, at *7

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2014) (holding, “with the twin considerations of historical practice and respect for 
- 28 -

As an initial matter, we conclude that Tennessee juvenile transfer hearings are 

dispositional, rather than adjudicatory. As noted in our principle authority, juvenile 

proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, and transfer determinations do not determine 

guilt or innocence. The transfer statute and the resulting findings of the juvenile court 

function only to determine the most appropriate forum to address the conduct for which 

the juvenile defendant is charged. We additionally conclude that even if Apprendi 

applied to the juvenile hearing transfer process, there can be no violation of the 

Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in this case. There is no question that

the juvenile transfer statute exposed the Defendant to greater punishment. The 

Defendant’s focus here however is misplaced because the statutory maximum sentence

for purposes of Apprendi is not release upon the Defendant’s nineteenth birthday as 

argued by the Defendant. The Apprendi rule applies only to statutes that enhance 

sentences beyond the prescribed statutory range for a given offense. See id. at 494 n.19 

(majority opinion); In re M.I., 989 N.E.2d 173, 191-92 (2013). In this case, the 

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, which, for juvenile 

offenders, is statutorily punishable by a maximum sentence of life without parole, see

Charles Everett Lowe-Kelley v. State, No. M2015-00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 

742180, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (noting that “Miller did not hold that a 

juvenile can never be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole” before upholding 

the juvenile defendant’s consecutive life sentences as constitutional), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. June 23, 2016)). Even applying the substance over form test to our analysis, as 

argued by the Defendant, we are not convinced Apprendi was intended to be so broadly 

 

state sovereignty, Apprendi and its progeny have not been extended by the United States Supreme Court 

to apply to a prosecutor’s pre-trial jurisdictional charging decision”); State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 

372-75 (Mo. 2010), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 25, 2011) (juvenile certification as an adult did 

not equate to sentence enhancement but instead determined jurisdiction); Kirkland v. State, 67 So. 3d 

1147, 1149-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)( explaining that the 6th Amendment right to a jury trial does not 

attach “to every state-law ‘entitlement’ to predicate findings,” “Apprendi and subsequent cases are based 

on the ‘historic jury function of deciding whether the State has proved each element of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt,” and that, so far, “the Court has not extended the Apprendi and Blakely [v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ] line of decisions beyond the offense-specific context that supplied the 

historic grounding for the decisions”); State v. Rudy B., 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726 (2010) (Apprendi

does not apply to the evidentiary hearing to determine whether a juvenile adjudicate as a youthful 

offender should be sentenced as a juvenile or as an adult); State v. Read, 397 N.J. Super. 598, 610, 938 

A.2d 953, 960 (App. Div. 2008) (recognizing that transferring a juvenile to criminal court “substantially 

increases his sentencing exposure,” but nonetheless holding that “the requirement of jury fact-finding 

based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to a pretrial determination such as whether to 

waive a complaint against a juvenile to adult court.”); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.3d 380, 388 

(Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445, 452-53 (Ky. 2004) (employing 

a rational basis test to determine that the classification of juveniles does not violate the state or federal 

equal protection clauses);Villalon v. State, 956 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
- 29 -

construed. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Defendant has failed to establish 

a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury, and he is not entitled to relief.

II. Juvenile Transfer Hearing. Although the Defendant concedes that “there was 

sufficient evidence to find probable cause that [he] had committed a crime,” he contends

that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to criminal court. Noting that the 

juvenile court “correctly” narrowed the issue at the hearing to “the possible rehabilitation 

of the child,” he argues that there was no evidence supporting the juvenile court’s 

“untutored intuition as to the futility of treatment,” especially in light of the defense 

expert’s opinion to the contrary. The State argues, and we agree, that there were 

reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant committed a juvenile act for which he 

could be tried as an adult. Accordingly, the juvenile court properly transferred the 

Defendant to criminal court to be tried as an adult.

This court reviews a juvenile court’s findings in determining whether reasonable 

grounds exist to establish the criteria in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (a) for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Kayln Marie Polochak, No. M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 

226566, at *38 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2015) (citations omitted). In making the 

determination of whether a juvenile court properly transferred a case, this Court has held:

The court is only required to find that there are “reasonable grounds” upon 

which to base a finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation.

The juvenile court, in its role of Parens patriae, is placed in a unique 

position with regard to the persons appearing before it. The juvenile judge 

is experienced in the evaluation of youthful offenders and is given a wide 

range of discretion in attempting to establish the most beneficial course of 

action in rehabilitating those offenders. In making a decision whether a 

juvenile is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation, the juvenile judge may 

consider many factors including testimony by expert witnesses, the type of 

facilities available, length of stay in these facilities, the seriousness of the 

alleged crime, and the attitude and demeanor of the juvenile.

State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d at 920; State v. Layne, 546 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1976); State v. Christopher Bell, No. W2014-00504-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 

1000172, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2015). “The court can in good faith rely on all 

or none of these factors as long as there are reasonable grounds supporting the decision.” 

Christopher Bell, 2015 WL 1000172, at *4. “This court has also stated that a defendant’s 

conduct surrounding the offenses and the serious nature of the offenses impact that 
- 30 -

defendant’s amenability for rehabilitation.” Id. (citing State v. Robert William Holmes,

No. 01C01-9303-CC-00090, 1994 WL 421306, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 1994).

The Defendant takes issue with the juvenile court’s finding that he could not be 

properly rehabilitated by the time he turned nineteen and was released from juvenile 

custody. The Defendant focuses solely on his expert witness’s testimony, and he asserts, 

“the State’s evaluating expert did not offer any testimony that would have supported the 

Juvenile Court’s conclusion that treatment would be inadequate.” Although the 

Defendant argues that the juvenile court limited its decision to (b)(5) based on the 

juvenile court’s comment that it was the “more important factor in this case,” we 

disagree. The record shows that the juvenile court conducted a thorough transfer hearing 

that spanned three days. Not only did the juvenile court order a psychological evaluation 

of the Defendant, which was performed by Dr. Axtell, the court also heard extensive 

testimony from the Defendant’s independent expert, Dr. Cruise. The juvenile court also 

heard testimony from the Defendant’s supervisor for the first offender program, who 

testified that the Defendant did not follow through on his probation requirements. The 

juvenile court considered Dr. Cruise’s testimony and agreed with both mental health 

experts “completely.” However, when the juvenile court considered Tenn. Code Ann. § 

37-1-134(b)(5), the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the juvenile court struggled 

with the amount of time left to rehabilitate the Defendant based on his age. After 

weighing the amount of time before it lost jurisdiction over the Defendant based on his 

age against the seriousness of the crime and the safety of the community, the juvenile 

court determined that the Defendant should be transferred to criminal court to be tried as 

an adult. Because the record shows the juvenile court had “reasonable grounds” to 

believe that the Defendant committed first degree felony murder and that the interests of 

the community required that the Defendant be put under legal restraint, the Defendant is 

not entitled to relief. 

III. Brady Violation in Juvenile Court. The Defendant contends the State 

withheld “evidence that the shooting was perpetrated by two individuals who were not 

[the Defendant]” until “well after” the Defendant’s juvenile transfer hearing. He asserts 

that this information was material to his transfer hearing and, by not providing the 

information, the State violated his right to a “fair transfer hearing.” He argues that the 

“relevant inquiry” is not whether this information was provided by or useful at his trial in 

criminal court, but “whether the information would have been useful at the transfer 

hearing.” He asserts that such information was both relevant and material because: (1) 

“the State’s inculpatory evidence consisted merely of fingerprint evidence and of Linda 

Hatch’s testimony[,]” and (2) “the decision to transfer was explicitly predicated on the 

Juvenile Court’s confidence that [the Defendant] was indeed guilty of murder as alleged 

by the State.” The Defendant maintains that Brady applies to juvenile transfer hearings 
- 31 -

and that the juvenile court ordered the State to turn over exculpatory material to the 

Defendant. The Defendant states that the Brady information was material because (1) it 

was third party culprit evidence, and (2) it could have been used to “cast doubt over the 

competence and thoroughness of the investigators.” 

In response, the State contends that Brady does not apply to juvenile transfer 

hearings. Alternatively, the State argues that even if Brady does apply to juvenile 

transfer hearings, the Defendant has failed to establish the materiality of the proof at 

issue. The State argues that the evidence presented at the juvenile transfer hearing was 

“more than enough to at least establish probable cause” and that the alleged Brady

material would have been “frail disputing proof.” The State also asserts that the 

Defendant had the “purported Brady proof” by the time of his trial in criminal court but 

that he was “no longer interested in this proof” at that time and instead he testified that he 

shot the victim in self-defense. 

Throughout the contentious proceedings and the numerous filings of the parties in 

this case, the juvenile court repeatedly stressed its concern to avoid “trial by ambush” 

and compared the transfer hearing to a “probable cause hearing on steroids[.]” In its

December 10, 2015 order, the juvenile court ordered the State to “provide the defense 

with copies of discovery that the State intend[ed] to use at the transfer hearing, as well as 

exculpatory discovery as defined under Brady, at least two (2) weeks prior to the transfer 

hearing.” At the same time, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation 

of Brady, arguing that the State failed to turn over information pertaining to Kevaughn 

“Lil Kill” Henry, whose fingerprints were also found on the victim’s car and who 

provided a recorded interview to police. The juvenile court determined that there had not 

been a Brady violation; however, it again ordered the State to “give [the Defendant] 

anything [it had] with regard to Mr. Henry.” Following transfer to criminal court to be 

tried as an adult, on November 23, 2016, the Defendant filed yet another motion to 

dismiss the indictment based on a Brady violation, arguing that “the State suppressed 

material exculpatory evidence . . . that an eyewitness identified two other people as the 

perpetrators--from the defense at the transfer hearing in Juvenile Court[.]” The trial 

court held a hearing on the Defendant’s motion on February 10, 2017.

Clayton Madison, a detective in the KPD Violent Crimes Unit, testified that

around 11:30 p.m. on the night of the offense, the victim’s brother received a call from 

someone named “Junkyard,” who told him that he saw J’Andre Hunt and Jaquez Hunt 

running from the victim’s car at the time of the offense. The victim’s brother notified 

KPD of this information the same night and sent them an email with two photographs 

showing Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry, J’Andre Hunt, and Jaquez Hunt. The photographs 

were admitted into evidence at the hearing. Within two days of the offense, Detective 

Madison conducted recorded interviews of J’Andre Hunt, Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry, 
- 32 -

and the codefendant, all of which were admitted into evidence. Kevaughn “Lil Kill” 

Henry denied involvement in the offense and explained that his fingerprints were on the 

victim’s car because the victim had picked him up from a restaurant a day or two before

the offense. J’Andre Hunt denied involvement in the offense and claimed he was at 

home watching football at the time, which was later confirmed by his mother. J’Andre 

Hunt further advised that his cousin, Jaquez Hunt, was at work at the time of the offense, 

which was later confirmed by independent investigation. Detective Mason also 

confirmed that there were no identifiable fingerprints of J’Andre Hunt and Jaquez Hunt at 

the crime scene. Detective Madison attempted to speak to “Junkyard,” but he refused to 

provide his real name and denied making any statements to the victim’s brother. Finally, 

the codefendant confirmed that he was in the victim’s car when the Defendant robbed the 

victim of his watch and phone and that the Defendant shot the victim in the process.

Detective Madison was pressed by defense counsel regarding when he provided 

the information confirming the identity of J’Andre Hunt and Jaquez Hunt as well as the 

photograph of them with Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry, but he could not recall the exact 

date. He “assume[d]” that the State had this information prior to the Defendant’s transfer 

hearing. The Defendant also introduced as exhibits to the hearing a discovery response 

filed by the State on September 21, 2016, in criminal court, a subsequent discovery 

response filed on September 30, 2016, a discovery request filed in juvenile court by the 

Defendant on November 23, 2015; an order from the juvenile court on December 10, 

2015, requiring that Brady information be turned over prior to the transfer hearing; and a 

set of emails sent between the prosecutor and defense counsel on September 27, 2016. 

Defense counsel explained to the trial court that the Brady violation concerned 

information that was not provided prior to the June 10, 2016 juvenile transfer hearing, 

which deprived the Defendant of a fair transfer hearing. On September 21, 2016, she was 

notified that the State had an “eyewitness who put two other people at the scene” and that 

they had interviewed J’Andre Hunt. Upon further requesting the information via email, 

she received it on September 30, 2016, four months after the transfer hearing. Defense 

counsel stressed that the juvenile court had previously ordered the State to provide the 

defense “anything you got with regard to Mr. Henry.” The defense vigorously argued 

that the photograph showing Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry with J’Andre and Jaquez Hunt 

was Brady material and that the State violated the juvenile court order by failing to 

produce it before the transfer hearing. 

In response, the State advised the trial court that they had provided the defense 

with Kevaughn “Lil Kill” Henry’s statement. She further explained that she did not 

consider the statement of J’Andre Hunt to be exculpatory because he denied fleeing from 

the scene and investigation subsequently confirmed that he had an alibi. Additionally, 

given the other evidence of the Defendant and the co defendant’s guilt, she did not 
- 33 -

believe information pertaining to J’Andre Hunt was exculpatory. She also insisted that 

prior to the transfer hearing she was unaware whether there was a true eyewitness to the 

“suspects fleeing the scene” information or whether this was an investigative technique 

employed by the officers. Upon later speaking with Officer Madison, she provided the 

information in discovery to the defense concerning “Junkyard’s” statements and then 

categorized it as Brady material. 

Although the trial court agreed that the information qualified as Brady material, it 

denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment reasoning as follows:

The question before this Court is, one, has there been a Brady

violation? And typically, folks, we’re always considering whether or not 

there’s been a Brady violation after a trial has occurred and whether or not 

that impacted a defendant’s right to a fair trial. That’s the standard. Just 

because the State may or may not have turned over some piece of 

information which may or may not have been exculpatory does not 

automatically, if that fact is proven, equate to having a new trial. 

I think it is significant that [the Juvenile Court] was not required to 

find proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the fact finder in Juvenile Court, 

he was required to find probable cause. He had to find the other criteria, as 

required by the statute, but he was required to find probable cause. So the 

question becomes, does the fact that the Defense did not have the 

information that they now have in preparation of their defense for [the 

Defendant] before the trier of fact in this court, the jury, does that equal and 

equate to their right to have this case dismissed at this juncture and sent 

back to Juvenile Court? This Court finds that it does not. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and the “Law of the Land” Clause of Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee 

Constitution afford all criminal defendants the right to a fair trial. In Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad 

faith of the prosecution.” Evidence that is “favorable to an accused” includes both 

“evidence deemed to be exculpatory in nature and evidence that could be used to impeach 

the state’s witnesses.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001). Favorable 

evidence has also been defined as “evidence which provides some significant aid to the 

defendant’s case, whether it furnishes corroboration of the defendant’s story, calls into 

question a material, although not indispensable, element of the prosecution’s version of 

the events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution witness.” Id. at 56-57 
- 34 -

(quoting Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 379 N.E.2d 560, 571 (1978)). This also 

includes “favorable information that would have enabled defense counsel to conduct 

further and possibly fruitful investigation regarding the fact that someone other than the 

appellant killed the victim.” Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Marshall,

845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 1992.)). In Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 

F.3d 345, 364 (6th Cir. 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

held,

Prosecutors are not necessarily required to disclose every stray lead and 

anonymous tip, but they must disclose the existence of “legitimate 

suspect[s],” D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008). 

“Withholding knowledge of a second suspect conflicts with the Supreme 

Court’s directive that ‘the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s 

private deliberations, [be preserved] as the chosen forum for ascertaining 

the truth about criminal accusations.’” United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 

1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 

U.S.419, 439 (1995)). 

Rule 206 of the Rules of Juvenile Practice and Procedure governs discovery 

issues in juvenile court and provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach juvenile court shall 

ensure that the parties in delinquent and unruly proceedings have access to any discovery 

materials consistent with Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Tenn. R. Juv. 

Prac. & Proc. 206(a). However, a “juvenile court transfer hearing ‘is the exact 

counterpart of the General Sessions preliminary hearing to the extent of the issue of 

probable cause.’” State v. Dennis Joe Hensley, No. E2005-01444-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 

WL 2252736, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2006) (citing State v. Womack, 591 

S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)). “[T]here is no provision for discovery, as such, 

as a part of a pre-trial ‘probable cause hearing,’” and “the reception of evidence at such a 

hearing should properly be confined to issues before the court at the time.” Womack, 

591 S.W.2d at 443. The Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 206 provides, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

[D]iscovery rules do not apply to preliminary examinations and hearings. 

Therefore, this rule would not apply to any probable cause hearing in 

juvenile court with the caveat that this rule is not the exclusive procedure 

for obtaining discovery. Please note that some discovery may be critical in 

a transfer hearing. The Court should use its discretion in granting access to 

information necessary to defend or prosecute a transfer case. The state 

must disclose any exculpatory evidence to the child’s attorney per Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
- 35 -

Tenn. R. Juv. Prac. & Proc. Rule 206 Advisory Comm’n Cmt. Rule 206 (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, it is within the discretion of the juvenile court to grant access to 

information necessary to defend or prosecute a transfer case, and obviously, the State 

must disclose any exculpatory evidence to the child’s attorney per Brady. This is 

consistent with our principle holdings above, concluding that a juvenile transfer hearing

is a critical stage in the proceedings which “must measure up to the essentials of due 

process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 560-62; see also State v.

Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292, 93 Ohio St. 3d 83, 92, 752 N.E.2d 937, 947 (Ohio 2001) 

(holding that the State is under a constitutional duty to “disclose to a juvenile respondent 

all evidence in the state’s possession favorable to the juvenile respondent and material 

either to guilt or punishment that is known at the time of a mandatory bindover hearing. . 

. and that may become known to the prosecuting attorney after the bindover”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendant was indeed entitled to Brady material at the 

transfer hearing. 

We must now determine if the evidence that was not disclosed at the transfer 

hearing constitutes Brady material and the effect, if any, the nondisclosure had on the 

determination of the juvenile court to transfer the Defendant to be tried as an adult. 

Evidence is considered material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 (citation omitted); State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 

(Tenn. 1995). As the United States Supreme Court explained, 

[The] touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a different 

result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the 

defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with 

the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood 

as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable 

probability” of a different result is accordingly shown when the 

government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.” 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). The 

burden of proving a Brady violation rests with the defendant, and the violation must be 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d at 389 (citing State v.

Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). In order to establish a Brady

violation, the defendant must show the existence of four elements: (1) that the defendant 

requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case 

the State is bound to release the information whether requested or not); (2) that the State 

withheld the information; (3) that the withheld information was favorable; and (4) that 

the withheld information was material. Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d at 56. 
- 36 -

The record clearly establishes that the Defendant requested the State to disclose 

Brady material in juvenile court prior to the transfer hearing, which was supported by the 

order of the juvenile court. Emails exchanged between defense counsel and the State 

establish that the Defendant did not know about two other potential suspects interviewed 

by the police or that they had photographs of these same individuals with Kevaughn “Lil 

Kill” Henry until September 27, 2016, well after the Defendant’s transfer to criminal 

court. Detective Madison confirmed that he received this information from the victim’s 

brother on the night of the offense. Although Detective Madison could not recall when 

he provided this information to the State, the evidence was in the possession of the police 

prior to the transfer hearing, and they failed to provide it to the defense. See State v.

Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 594 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Kyles 514 U.S. at 439; Johnson, 38 

S.W.3d at 56). Nevertheless, we conclude that the information concerning the other 

potential suspects was neither favorable nor material to the Defendant’s transfer hearing. 

Detective Madison testified that he interviewed J’Andre Hunt and Jaquez Hunt, both of 

whom were quickly eliminated as suspects based on their alibis and other information 

discovered by the police. These individuals did not appear to be legitimate suspects, but 

rather, stray leads that were dismissed early in the case. See Bagley, 527 F.3d at 499. 

Additionally, at the Defendant’s transfer hearing there was testimony that the Defendant 

had confessed to Hatch that he shot the victim in the back as a result of a robbery gone 

“bad.” The Defendant’s fingerprints were also found in several areas of the exterior and 

interior of the victim’s car, which was consistent with the Defendant’s confession to 

Hatch. This evidence was more than enough to support the juvenile court’s finding of 

probable cause, and we do not believe that the information about two potential suspects 

that were abandoned very early into the case would have impacted the decision to transfer

to criminal court to be tried as an adult. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to 

relief. 

IV. Defendant’s Duty to Retreat before Engaging in Self-Defense. The 

Defendant concedes that he was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the offense;

specifically, the possession of a weapon as a minor. He argues, however, that this

offense is “not the kind of illegal activity that is contemplated by the [self-defense] 

statute.” Although he acknowledges that State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388 (Tenn. 2017), 

declined to address the necessity of a causal nexus between the unlawful activity and the 

need to engage in self-defense, he insists that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 

that he had a duty to retreat because there was not a causal nexus between his status as a 

minor in possession of a firearm and the need for him to defend himself and codefendant 

Robinson. Based on the physical fight between the codefendant and the victim, the 

Defendant argues the jury should have been instructed that he had “no duty to retreat” 

before using force against the victim. He argues further that the error was not harmless 

because the State relied heavily on the Defendant’s duty to retreat before using force 
- 37 -

against the victim in its closing arguments. Lastly, the Defendant argues that allowing 

the trial court to make the factual finding of whether a defendant was engaged in 

unlawful activity under a clear and convincing standard, rather than allowing a jury to 

make this determination under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, violates his 

constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial.5 

In response, the State contends that the plain language of the self-defense statute 

does not require a causal nexus between a defendant’s unlawful activity and his need for 

self-defense. The State asserts that, even if this Court imposes a causal nexus 

requirement, the Defendant has not established a nexus here because the Defendant’s 

illegal possession of a firearm was connected to the “use of force,” and minors in 

possession of handguns are similar to felons in possession of handguns. Regardless, the 

State argues any error in the jury instruction was harmless because the evidence of the 

Defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. 

A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a correct and complete 

charge of the law. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v.

Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 

2001); State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). It follows then that trial 

courts have a duty in criminal cases to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts 

of a case. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 294-95 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v.

Thompson, 285 S.W.3d 840, 842 n.1 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 464 

(Tenn. 1999)). Whether jury instructions are sufficient is a question of law that this court 

reviews de novo with no presumption of correctness. Clark, 452 S.W.3d at 295 (citing 

State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tenn. 2013); Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 

347 S.W.3d 686, 699 (Tenn. 2011)). When reviewing challenged jury instructions, this 

court must “view the instruction in the context of the charge as a whole” in determining 

whether prejudicial error has occurred. Id. (citing State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 31 

(Tenn. 2008); State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997)). An instruction is 

prejudicially erroneous and requires reversal when “the instruction alone infected the 

entire trial and resulted in a conviction that violates due process,” see State v. James, 315 

S.W.3d 440, 446 (Tenn. 2010), or “when the judge’s charge, taken as a whole, failed to 

fairly submit the legal issues or misled the jury as to the applicable law,” see State v.

Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 864-65 (Tenn. 2010). Id. “[A] person is entitled to a jury 

 

5

The Defendant acknowledges that the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this issue in Perrier, 

which held that the trial court makes the determination of whether a defendant was engaged in unlawful 

activity such that the ‘no duty to retreat’ instruction would not apply. He has preserved this issue in the 

event of further litigation. As we are bound by Perrier, the Defendant is not entitled to relief as to this 

issue.
- 38 -

instruction that he or she did not have to retreat from an alleged attack only when the 

person was not engaged in unlawful activity and was in a place the person had a right to 

be.” Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 401 (footnote omitted). 

Tennessee’s self-defense statute provides as follows:

(b)(1) Notwithstanding §39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in 

unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no 

duty to retreat before threatening or using force against another person 

when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is 

immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of 

unlawful force.

(2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful 

activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to 

retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or 

serious bodily injury, if:

(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of 

death or serious bodily injury;

(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily 

injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and

(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611. The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions on self-defense 

provide, in relevant part, as follows:

Included in the defendant’s plea of not guilty is [his][her] plea of selfdefense.

If a defendant was in a place where he or she had a right to be, he or she 

would have a right to [threaten][use] force against the [deceased][alleged 

victim] when and to the degree the defendant reasonably believed the force 

was immediately necessary to protect against the alleged victim’s 

[use][attempted use] of unlawful force. [Remove this bracketed language 

if the trial court finds the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity 

after a hearing. See Comment Two: The defendant would also have no 

duty to retreat before [threatening][using] force.]
- 39 -

[If a defendant was in a place where he or she had a right to be, he or she 

would also have a right to [threaten][use] force intended or likely to cause 

[death][serious bodily injury] if the defendant had a reasonable belief that 

there was an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the danger 

creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury was real, or 

honestly believed to be real at the time, and the belief of danger was 

founded upon reasonable grounds. [Remove this bracketed language if 

the trial court finds the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity 

after a hearing. See Comment Two: The defendant would also have no 

duty to retreat before [threatening][using] force likely to cause 

[death][serious bodily injury]].]

7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.-Crim. 40.06(b) (emphasis in original). 

The trial court in the Defendant’s case removed the bracketed language from the 

Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction after finding that the Defendant was engaged in 

unlawful activity to wit: minor in possession of a firearm, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

1319, and, therefore, had a duty to retreat. It provided the following instruction to the 

jury:

Included in the defendant’s plea of not guilty is his plea of self-defense.

The defendant would have a right to threaten or use force against the 

deceased when and to the degree the defendant reasonably believed the 

force was immediately necessary to protect against the alleged victim’s use 

or attempted use of unlawful force.

The defendant would also have a right to threaten or use force 

intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the defendant 

had a reasonable belief that there was an imminent danger of death or 

serious bodily injury. The danger creating the belief of imminent death or 

serious bodily injury was real or honestly believed to be real at the time, 

and the belief of danger was founded upon reasonable grounds.

The law of self-defense requires that the defendant must have 

employed all means reasonably in his power, consistent with his own 

safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of taking another’s life. This

requirement includes the duty to retreat if, and to the extent, that it can be 

done in safety.
- 40 -

The statute at issue here, Tenn. Code Ann. Section 39-11-611(b), does not define 

“unlawful activity” and is therefore not unambiguous. Additionally, while the Perrier

court declined to address the causal nexus issue, in answering the question of whether the 

“unlawful activity” language modifies the entirety of the claim of self-defense or only 

applies to the no-duty-to-retreat qualification, it “examin[ed] the history and language of 

the statute because the statutory language is not clear and unambiguous.” Perrier, 536 

S.W.3d at 398 (emphasis added). In doing so, the Court observed that “[t]he 

abandonment of the duty to retreat was ‘[t]he primary distinction’ between the common 

law and the statutory law of self-defense.” Id. at 399 (citing 11 DAVID L. RAYBIN, 

TENNESSEE PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 28:36 Self-defense (Dec. 

2016 Update)). Based on State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704, (Tenn. 1995), the Perrier

court determined that the phrase, “is in a place where the person has a right to be,” was

related to the “true man” doctrine. “The ‘true man’ doctrine is simply another term for 

the no-duty-to-retreat rule, and it provides that one does not have to retreat from a 

threatened attack.”

[T]his doctrine applies only: (1) when the defendant is without fault in 

provoking the confrontation, and (2) when the defendant is in a place where 

he has a lawful right to be and is there placed in reasonably apparent danger 

of imminent bodily harm or death.

Perrier, at 399 (citations omitted). The Defendant argues that the “engaged in unlawful 

activity” phrase is “an elaboration of the ‘without fault in provoking the confrontation’

requirement from the true man doctrine.” He insists that the “without fault” language 

does not refer to fault in general, but rather, fault in causing the confrontation at issue. 

We agree.

At common law, the “true man” doctrine’s primary prerequisite was that only “one 

without fault” is permitted to use deadly force. R. CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL, 

UNLAWFUL/CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: THE ILL-DEFINED AND INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR A

“STAND YOUR GROUND” DEFENSE, 20 Barry L. Rev. 43, 55 (2014) (citing Beard, 158 

U.S. at 561). The common law cases to address the “without fault” requirement

acknowledge that “the party in the wrong must do the retreating. Our law is more 

favorable to the man who is in the right, and places a less burden upon him in homicide 

cases than upon the man who is in the wrong and produces the occasion.” Voight v.

State, 109 S.W. 268, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908)(emphasis added). Additionally, “[i]t is 

one of the fundamental principles of the law of homicide, whenever the doctrine of selfdefense arises, that the accused himself must always be reasonably free from fault, in 

having provoked or brought on the difficulty in which the killing was perpetrated.”

Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 336 (1882)(emphasis added).
- 41 -

To interpret the statute without a nexus between the “unlawful activity” and the 

duty to retreat would lead to absurd results. For example, if a defendant had failed to file 

her income taxes or failed to timely file her vehicle registration or failed to renew her gun 

license, then she would be unable to avail herself of Tennessee’s self-defense statute. As 

one court has explained, application of the self-defense statute without a nexus to the 

conviction offense would nullify virtually every claim of self-defense. See Mayes v.

State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ind. 2001) (citing Oregon v. Doris, 51 Or. 136, 94 P. 44, 53 

(1908) (“[T]o hold that the mere fact that a person accused of a homicide was armed at 

the time, and that because of the misdemeanor resulting therefrom [possession of a 

concealed weapon] he shall be deprived of any right of self-defense, would lead to the 

absurd and unjust consequence in practically all cases of depriving the accused of any 

defense....”); South Carolina v. Leaks, 114 S.C. 257, 103 S.E. 549, 551 (1920) (In a 

prosecution for homicide “[t]he causal connection between the unlawful act of gambling 

and the encounter arising during the progress of the game between the participants is too 

remote to destroy the right of self-defense.”); West Virginia v. Foley, 128 W.Va. 166, 35 

S.E.2d 854, 861 (1945) (“Whether [defendant] had a license to carry a pistol on the 

occasion he was armed is not relevant in the least to the common law right to arm for 

self-defense.”)). Accordingly, we conclude that a causal nexus between a defendant’s 

unlawful activity and his or her need to engage in self-defense is necessary before the 

trial court can instruct the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat. 

We must now determine whether there was a causal nexus between the 

Defendant’s unlawful activity and his need to engage in self-defense, and what effect, if 

any, it had in this case. Arguably, the Defendant’s status as a juvenile in possession of a 

handgun, a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1319, could be the cause of the 

confrontation at issue in this case. In other words, but for the Defendant’s illegal 

possession of the handgun as a minor, the victim would still be alive. However, status 

offenses such as this will rarely qualify as unlawful activity because a person’s status 

alone cannot provoke, cause, or produce a situation. Nevertheless, in our view, the proof 

here overwhelming established a causal connection between the Defendant’s robbery of 

the victim and the Defendant’s perceived need to engage in self-defense. Because the 

Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity, to wit robbery, at the time of the offense, he 

had a duty to retreat, and was therefore not entitled to the protection of the Tennessee 

self-defense statute. Accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury, and the 

Defendant is not entitled to relief.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct Based on False Statements in Closing Argument.

As we will explain in more detail below, the parties in this case relied heavily on the 

Rosles’ video footage, the dashcam footage from the patrol car, and the cell phone 
- 42 -

records to establish a timeline for the offense. At the core of the Defendant’s claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct is the State’s miscalculation of these times during closing 

argument. The Defendant specifically argues that the State misstated the evidence 

regarding the timing of the shooting and the timing of the four phone calls made to the 

Defendant’s girlfriends. In stating these times inaccurately, the State argued the 

Defendant made two calls on the victim’s phone after the shooting, which the Defendant 

argues directly contradicted his testimony and undercut his credibility. The Defendant 

acknowledges that he failed to object to the State’s closing argument and argues for 

plenary review given the unique circumstances of this case.

In response, the State contends that the Defendant waived this argument and that 

he is not entitled to plain error relief because defense counsel “made a conscious and 

considered strategic decision not to object to this argument because he did not believe 

that he had a good-faith basis for objection and had to ‘let it go.’” Additionally, the State 

asserts that the Defendant should have anticipated the use of the timing because of the 

lengths the State went to in order to establish it and because the Defendant presented his 

own theory of the timing during his closing argument. Alternatively, the State argues 

that, even if this Court was to review this issue under the plain error doctrine, the 

Defendant would nevertheless not be entitled to relief because “the [D]efendant presents 

no evidence whatsoever that the State intentionally miscalculated, intentionally misled 

the jury or the court, or intentionally misstated the evidence.” For the reasons that follow, 

we agree with the State, and conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, we have created the below timeline to 

illustrate the events on the day of the offense to better understand the position of the 

parties on this issue.

5:24:00 p.m.

Officer Wilson receives 

shots fired call on Linden 

5:25:30 p.m.

Officer Wilson arrives at the victim’s car.

I
- 43 -

As previously noted, the Rosles’s video did not have accurate time stamps. In an 

effort to ascertain the timing of events, the parties subtracted the time lapse between the 

arrival of Officer Wilson as shown on the Rosles’s video, 7:00:06, from the dog jump,

6:54:00, which was six minutes and six seconds (6:06). Officer Wilson’s arrival on the 

scene as accurately reflected on his dashcam, 5:25:30, minus the 6:06 time lapse from the 

Rosles’s video, reflects that the dog jumped at 5:19:24. The parties agreed that the first 

shot occurred when the dog jumped. At closing argument, however, the State deduced 

that the first shot occurred at “5:18 something[.]” The State specifically argued, and the 

Defendant now contests, the following excerpts from their closing argument:

So we say that puts the time of the first shot at 5:18, and here’s how we get 

there. Right there at the bottom you’ll see 5:25:30 is when Officer Wilson 

rolls up to -- to the scene.

And so if you look, and I urge you to do this, look at Mr. Rosles’s 

video and you’ll see Officer Wilson show up at 16:07:06. So that’s over 

six minutes after the first shot that Officer Wilson shows up, okay? So if he 

5:03:33-

5:04:04

1st call to 

Mostella.

5:10:32-

5:11:04

2nd call 

to 

Mostella5:18:08-

5:18:45

3rd call 

to

Mostella

5:17:50 p.m.

Victim’s car pulls 

over on Linden

5:18:57-

5:19:58

1st call to 

Washingto

n

5:19:24 p.m.

Rosles’s dog jumps, 

first shots fired.

5:22: 911 call by 

Alneisha shots fired

4 

11

I
- 44 -

shows up at 5:35 [sic], 5:19 plus a little bit more, 5:18 something is going 

to be the time that that first shot was made. And that’s very important.

The State capitalized further from its timeline and additionally argued the 

following:

We say the cell phone records, Mr. Cook [sic] told you a whole lot 

about, shows that this defendant used that cell phone twice after the killing. 

(emphasis added). And I say that because when you do the extrapolation, if 

I can call it that, when you match up these videos and go back over six 

minutes from the time Officer Wilson arrived, that gives you the time – the 

approximate time, within seconds I suggest to you, of when those first shots 

were fired Okay? And that rolls it back to 5:18 going on 5:19.

He calls his female friends and that phone was turned on and off 

again 28 times up through the end of these records through November 30th. 

And these are the four calls that are pertinent, and if you will see, and 

remember you’ve got to add an hour, but those last two outbound calls from 

that phone were to two different females. One at 5:18, almost 5:19, and 

one at a minute apart 5:19, almost 5:20.

Now, [the Defendant] would have you believe that he was done 

using that phone long before this skirmish broke out in the car. Well, think 

of it this way, if you add back the 97 seconds, before the five -- little over 

five minutes, six minutes, that’s at seven and a half minutes or there abouts, 

if that -- according to his testimony that phone would have no longer been 

used by him. And these records show that he is not telling the truth about 

that.

As an initial matter, the record reflects that the Defendant failed to object during 

closing argument. Technically, as argued by the State, the failure to make a 

contemporaneous objection at the time these comments were made resulted in waiver of 

these issues. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). It is well-recognized 

that a defendant’s failure to object to a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument 

rarely results in a reversal of the conviction:

Unobjected to closing arguments warrant reversal only in 

exceptional circumstances. United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 864 (8th 

Cir. 2007). Accordingly, like the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Circuit, “[w]e bear in mind that fleeting comments that passed 

without objection during the rough-and-tumble of closing argument in the 
- 45 -

trial court should not be unduly magnified when the printed transcript is 

subjected to painstaking review in the reflective quiet of an appellate 

judge’s chambers.” United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d at 758.

State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 132, n.30 (Tenn. 2008). We note that “where a 

prosecuting attorney makes allegedly objectionable remarks during closing argument, but 

no contemporaneous objection is made, the complaining defendant is not entitled to relief 

on appeal unless the remarks constitute ‘plain error.’” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 

413 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282

(Tenn. 2000)); see State v. Pack, 421 S.W.3d 629, 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013) (holding 

that because the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection during closing 

arguments, he not only had to establish that the comments were improper but also that 

they constituted plain error); State v. Gann, 251 S.W.3d 446, 458 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

2007) (concluding that the defendant’s failure to make a contemporaneous objection 

during the State’s closing argument waived plenary review and allowed for consideration 

under plain error review only). The Defendant relies on State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1 

(Tenn. 2017), and State v. Zackary James Earl Ponder, No. M2018-00998-CCA-R3-CD, 

2019 WL 3944008 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 5, 

2019), for the proposition that plenary review is appropriate in this case. However, those 

cases are readily distinguishable and generally involved the prosecutor’s use of 

information in closing argument that was objected to pre-trial, which sufficiently 

preserved the issue for appellate review. Accordingly, we review this issue under plain 

error only.

The plain error doctrine states that “[w]hen necessary to do substantial justice, an 

appellate court may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at 

any time, even though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial or assigned as 

error on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). In order for this court to find plain error, 

“(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a 

clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a 

substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the 

accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of 

the error is ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’” 

Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1994)). “It is the accused’s burden to persuade an appellate court that the trial 

court committed plain error.” State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2007) (citing 

U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). “[T]he presence of all five factors must be 

established by the record before this Court will recognize the existence of plain error, and 

complete consideration of all the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record 
- 46 -

that at least one of the factors cannot be established.” Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently held that “‘closing argument is a 

valuable privilege that should not be unduly restricted.’” State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 

320 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 425 (Tenn. 2001)); see State v.

Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 737 (Tenn. 1998). Closing argument gives each party an 

opportunity to persuade the jury of their theory of the case, see 11 DAVID L. RAYBIN, 

TENNESSEE PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 29.2, at 97 (2008), and to 

highlight the strengths and weaknesses in the proof for the jury. Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 

130 (citations omitted). “[P]rosecutors, no less than defense counsel, may use colorful 

and forceful language in their closing arguments, as long as they do not stray from the 

evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence or make 

derogatory remarks or appeal to the jurors’ prejudices.” Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 131 

(internal citations omitted). A prosecutor’s comments during closing argument must be 

“‘temperate, predicated on evidence introduced during the trial, relevant to the issues 

being tried, and not otherwise improper under the facts or law.’” State v. Johnson, 401 

S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 

1999)). 

In order to be entitled to relief on appeal, the defendant must “show that the 

argument of the prosecutor was so inflammatory or the conduct so improper that it 

affected the verdict to his detriment.” State v. Joseph L. Ware, No. M2018-01326-CCAR3-CD, 2019 WL 5837927, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing State v.

Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). This court must consider the 

following factors when determining whether the argument of the prosecutor was so 

inflammatory or improper to negatively affect the verdict:

(1) the conduct complained of viewed in the light of the facts and 

circumstances of the case; (2) the curative measures undertaken by the 

court and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the 

improper arguments; (4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and 

any other errors in the record; and (5) the relative strength and weakness of 

the case.

Joseph L. Ware, 2019 WL 5837927, at *10 (citing State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 917 

(Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted)).

We conclude that the Defendant has failed to establish that a substantial right of 

his was adversely affected. In review of this issue, we recognize that the parties were 

dealing with “extrapolations” and deductions to discern a timeframe, a process which 

naturally lends itself to imprecision. Nevertheless, there can be no question that the State 
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erroneously calculated the time of the first shot as 5:18, rather than 5:19:24. This is 

significant because it directly contradicted the Defendant’s version of events; specifically, 

his testimony that he used the victim’s phone to call his girlfriends before the shooting 

occurred. Based on the misstatement by the State, it is conceivable that the Defendant 

was deemed less credible by the jury, and the State argued this exact point in closing. 

While this misstatement of the evidence was indeed improper, we are not convinced that 

it impacted the verdict in this case so as to deprive the Defendant of his due process right 

to a fair trial. Our review of the State’s closing argument shows that the prosecutor 

mentioned the time of the shooting twice, which was fairly isolated compared to the 

length of the closing argument. When the prosecutor first mentioned how they calculated 

the first shot, she qualified the estimated time and encouraged the jury to look at the 

video and make the calculation for themselves. The bulk of the State’s closing argument 

focused not on the time of the first shot but on the proof at trial; namely, the Defendant’s 

confession to Hatch, fingerprint and DNA evidence inside and outside the victim’s car, 

and the multiple gunshot wounds inflicted to the back of the victim. Accordingly, even 

assuming that this case boiled down to a credibility contest between Hatch and the 

Defendant, the State’s error in misstating the time of the first shot by a minute and 

twenty-four seconds could not have tipped the credibility scale so much so to have 

changed the outcome of the trial. Having failed to establish plain error, the Defendant is 

not entitled to relief.

VI. Juror Misconduct. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for new trial because the jury received extraneous, prejudicial information 

when, during deliberations, it looked up the “meaning of a life sentence in Tennessee” 

and a “medical word.” He insists that “the mere fact that the jury sought this information 

out, in direct contravention of the judge’s instructions, is strong evidence that it played 

some part in the deliberations,” and that the State failed to carry its burden of showing 

that the exposure was harmless. The Defendant additionally argues that the trial court 

had an obligation to subpoena the second juror and conduct a hearing to ascertain what, if 

any, additional terms were looked up by the jury during deliberations. The Defendant 

requests de novo review of this issue and a remand of this case for a new trial or an 

evidentiary hearing at which the second juror, and possibly other jurors, would be called 

to testify. In response, the State agrees that the jury was exposed to extraneous 

information, but it argues that the jury’s exposure to extraneous information was 

harmless. The State argues that the standard of review for the trial court’s determination 

that the jury was not exposed to extraneous, prejudicial information is for an abuse of 

discretion. It further contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining 

to subpoena the second juror to testify at an evidentiary hearing because the Defendant 

failed to show that her testimony would have been “competent, material, and admissible.” 

We agree with the State.
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A defendant’s right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and by article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. 

Additionally, this court has said that every defendant is assured “‘a trial by a jury free of . 

. . disqualification on account of some bias or partiality toward one side or the other of 

the litigation.’” State v. Akins, 867 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting 

Toombs v. State, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn. 1954)). Moreover, “[j]urors must render 

their verdict based only upon the evidence introduced at trial, weighing the evidence in 

light of their own experience and knowledge.” State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 650

(Tenn. 2013) (citing Caldararo ex rel. Caldararo v. Vanderbilt Univ., 794 S.W.2d 738, 

743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)). If the jury has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial

information or subjected to an improper outside influence, the validity of the verdict is 

questionable and a new trial may be warranted. Id. (citing State v. Blackwell, 664 S.W.2d 

686, 688 (Tenn. 1984)). Whether the constitutional right to an impartial jury has been 

violated is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo, granting a 

presumption of correctness only to the trial court’s findings of fact. Id. at 656 (citing 

Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)).

“A party challenging the validity of a verdict must produce admissible evidence to 

make an initial showing that the jury was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information 

or subjected to an improper outside influence.” Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 651 (citing 

Caldararo, 794 S.W.2d at 740-41). Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) explains what 

types of evidence may be used to challenge a verdict: 

Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 

validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the 

effect of anything upon any juror’s mind or emotions as influencing that 

juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the 

juror’s mental processes, except that a juror may testify on the question of 

whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 

jury’s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to 

bear upon any juror, or whether the jurors agreed in advance to be bound by 

a quotient or gambling verdict without further discussion; nor may a juror’s

affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about 

which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these 

purposes.

Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). In short, Rule 606(b) “bars juror testimony and 

affidavits concerning jury deliberations but permits testimony and affidavits pertaining to 

extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, and agreed quotient verdicts.” 

Akins, 867 S.W.2d at 355 (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b)).
- 49 -

 

The threshold inquiry is whether or not the information is “extraneous” and, (2) if 

“extraneous, whether or not said information was prejudicial, and (3) finally, if both 

extraneous and prejudicial, whether said extraneous prejudicial information had an 

influence on the jury. Kelli Whiteside v. Michael A. Hedge, No. E2004-02598-COA-R3-

CV, 2005 WL 1248975, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2005) (citing Patton v. Rose, 892 

S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994); Cavalier Metal Corp. v. Johnson Metal Controls,

124 S.W.3d 122 (Tenn. Ct. App.2003)). “Extraneous information is information coming 

from a source outside the jury.” State v. Clayton, 131 S.W.3d 475, 480 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 2003) (citing State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tenn. 1987); NEIL P. COHEN ET 

AL., TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 6.06[4], at 6-51 (4th ed. 2000)). “[E]xtraneous 

prejudicial information is information in the form of either fact or opinion that was not 

admitted into evidence but nevertheless bears on a fact at issue in the case.” Adams, 405 

S.W.3d at 650 (citing Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir.2006); State v.

Blackwell, 664 S.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Tenn. 1984); see also 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 

ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6075 (2d ed.2012)). “[C]lear and 

convincing evidence of prejudice is required to meet the standards of Tennessee Rules of 

Evidence 606(b).” Id. 

When it is shown that a juror has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial 

information or an improper influence, a rebuttable presumption arises and the burden 

shifts to the State to explain the conduct or demonstrate that it was harmless. State v.

Smith, 418 S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 651; Walsh v.

State, 166 S.W.3d 641, 647 (Tenn. 2005)). Because of the potentially prejudicial effect 

of a juror’s receipt of extraneous information, the State bears the burden in criminal cases 

either to explain the conduct of the juror or the third party or to demonstrate how the 

conduct was harmless. Id. at 46. Error is harmless when “it appears beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id.

(quoting State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 434 (Tenn. 2010); Neder v. United States, 527 

U.S. 1, 15 (1999)). 

In State v. Adams, the Tennessee Supreme Court utilized the analysis in Walsh v.

State, 166 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2005) as well as “factor tests” employed by several federal 

circuit courts of appeals to provide the “proper framework for determining the probable, 

objective effect upon a verdict of a juror’s exposure to either extraneous prejudicial 

information or an improper outside influence.” 405 S.W.3d 641, 654 (Tenn. 2013). The 

Tennessee Supreme Court listed following factors to aid in the determination of whether 

the State has rebutted the presumption of prejudice: 

(1) the nature and content of the information or influence, including 

whether the content was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; (2) 
- 50 -

the number of jurors exposed to the information or influence; (3) the 

manner and timing of the exposure to the juror(s); and (4) the weight of the 

evidence adduced at trial. 

Id. “No single factor is dispositive. Instead, trial courts should consider all of the factors 

in light of the ultimate inquiry—whether there exists a reasonable possibility that the 

extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence altered the verdict.” Id.

(citing Walsh, 166 S.W.3d at 649). 

The State does not dispute that the testimony of juror Lambert established that the 

jury in the Defendant’s case was exposed to extraneous information. Based on the 

following analysis of the Adams factors, the trial court determined that this extraneous 

information was harmless:

When applying these factors to the conduct which occurred in this 

case this Court finds the same to be harmless and holds that this conduct 

did not alter the verdict returned by this jury. 

The nature and content of the information learned from extraneous 

sources did not impact the verdict in this case. The extraneous information 

consisted of learning the definition of certain medical terminology, and the 

jury’s receipt of the definition of a “life sentence” in Tennessee which 

equals a sentence wherein an offender must serve fifty-one (51) calendar 

years before becoming eligible for parole. Ms. Lambert was unable to 

specify what medical terms were “googled”, and it would be pure 

speculation to assume that some unknown medical term adversely affected 

the verdict. Likewise, this Court has carefully considered whether or not 

the information about the duration of a life sentence could impact the jury’s 

verdict and finds that within the context of this case, that this information 

did not impact the verdict. Most significantly, none of the extraneous 

information imparted was about [the Defendant].

Based upon the testimony received, it does not appear to be in 

dispute that all twelve (12) jurors learned about the extraneous information. 

Nor does there appear to be dispute that the information was acquired after 

deliberations began. 

When considering factor four, this Court finds that the evidence of 

[the Defendant’s] guilt is simply overwhelming, to wit: [the Defendant’s]

finger and palm prints were found upon multiple locations from both within 
- 51 -

and without the car where the homicide occurred; the victim was killed by 

multiple rounds from a 9 mm handgun where video evidence proved [the 

Defendant] possessed such a weapon within days preceding the homicide; 

the DNA of co-defendant (Bradley Robinson) was found on multiple items 

within the front seat of the vehicle; a 9 mm casing found within the crime 

scene matched a casing recovered from a location where [the Defendant]

fired his 9mm weapon; the cellular phone records from the victim’s phone 

prove the last usage of the phone prior to the victim’s death was the 

placement of calls to individuals connected to [the Defendant]; [the 

Defendant] testified and admitted to firing the shots that killed [the victim]

and to fleeing while in possession of the victim’s cell phone after firing the 

shots; [the Defendant] admitted to Linda Hatch that he shot [the victim] in 

the course of a robbery that “went bad”; and the victim was shot at least six 

(6) times with five (5) entry wounds within the victim’s back.

Upon our de novo review, State v. Smith, 418 S.W.3d at 48, we agree with the 

trial court, and conclude that the exposure to the extraneous information in this case was 

harmless. While it was highly improper for the jury to research this information in 

violation of the instruction of the trial court, the victim’s cause of death was not in 

dispute, and as such, medical terms did not play a significant role in this case. Similarly, 

the meaning of a life sentence in Tennessee did not bear on the guilt or innocence of the 

Defendant. Because this information was not prejudicial, the Defendant is not entitled to 

a new trial on this issue. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena the

second juror to testify, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that it was 

unnecessary to do so. The affidavit of the second juror did not reveal anything that 

would “add to or supplement” the testimony of juror Lambert. It stated generally that the 

jury used Google to look up terms and the Webster dictionary definition of certain words.

See e.g. State v. Keith Waggoner, No. E2018-01065-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4635589, 

at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2019) (internal citations omitted)(noting that inquiry 

into juror misconduct is not justified by potentially suspicious circumstances and that 

something more than unverified conjecture must be shown). Accordingly, we similarly 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not subpoenaing the second 

juror, and the Defendant is not entitled to a new evidentiary hearing on this matter. 

VII. Constitutionality of Automatic Life Sentence for Juvenile. The 

Defendant argues that “an automatic sentence of life imprisonment (with release no 

sooner than fifty-one years) is unconstitutional for a juvenile.” He invites this court to 

extend the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S 460 

(2012), to hold that automatic life sentences, even with the possibility of parole, are 

unconstitutional for juveniles. While we understand the Defendant’s argument, we must 
- 52 -

reject his invitation as we are bound by court precedent. See State v. Walter Collins, No. 

W2016-01819-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1876333, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 

2018), appeal denied (Aug. 8, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 649 (2018) (collection of 

cases rejecting claim that a juvenile’s mandatory life sentence in Tennessee, which 

requires service of fifty-one years before release, violates Miller and its progeny). 

Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above authority and analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

____________________________________

 CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE