Filed 6/30/23 P. v. Miller CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GERALD LEE MILLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B323209

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA037989)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Dismissed.

A. William Bartz, under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION 

Appellant Gerald Lee Miller is currently serving a prison 

sentence that includes four one-year prison prior enhancements 

imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 rendered legally 

invalid all section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements not 

imposed for prior convictions for sexually violent offenses. 

Section 1172.75 also established a procedure to ensure 

resentencing of all individuals subject to invalidated 

enhancements; under this procedure, the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is obligated to identify 

eligible inmates, and the superior court is obligated to resentence 

them. Notwithstanding the statutory procedure, appellant filed a 

motion and three petitions for writ of habeas corpus in superior 

court, seeking resentencing under section 1172.75 and various 

other statutory provisions. He also filed objections to an order 

taking his matter off calendar. The superior court denied relief 

in a single order, concluding that appellant’s request for 

resentencing under section 1172.75 was premature in light of the 

statutory procedure and that his other claims had been addressed 

in previous rulings.

Appellant appealed from the court’s order. His appointed 

counsel filed a brief identifying no issues and requesting that this 

court follow the procedures set forth in People v. Serrano (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 496 (Serrano). Appellant filed a supplemental 

brief.

We dismiss the appeal. Generally, once judgment in a 

criminal case is rendered and execution of a sentence begins, trial 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

courts lack jurisdiction to vacate or modify a sentence. (People v. 

King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634 (King).) To the extent 

appellant filed motions seeking to modify his sentence, the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction over those motions, and we lack 

jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the court’s ruling. To the 

extent appellant filed and the trial court denied petitions for writ 

of habeas corpus, the order is not appealable. (Briggs v. Brown

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 836.) None of the contentions in appellant’s 

supplemental brief alters this conclusion or entitles him to relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Conviction and Direct Appeal

In 1998, a jury convicted appellant of 11 felonies and found 

true related enhancements.2 The superior court sentenced 

appellant to a total determinate term of 42 years. On count 1, 

attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), the court sentenced appellant to 

a total of 22 years: the upper term of nine years for attempted 

murder (§ 664, subd. (a)), plus 10 years for personal use of a 

firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and three years for the infliction of 

great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). On count 3, the court 

imposed a consecutive sentence totaling three years, four months 

for robbery (§ 211), a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), 

and an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a)). The court imposed consecutive sentences of two years, 

four months on each of counts 6, 7, and 8, for robbery (§ 211) and 

related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). On count 

13, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of three years, eight 

months for attempted murder (§§ 187, 664) and a related firearm 

enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Consecutive to the collective 

2 The 11 counts are numbered 1 through 13; counts 4 and 9 

were dismissed. 
4

consecutive term of 36 years, the court imposed one year for each 

of six prison priors, none of which was served for a sexually 

violent offense. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The court imposed and stayed 

sentences on count 2, attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664, 12022.5, 

subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)), count 5, assault with a firearm (§§ 

245, subd. (a)(2), 12022.7, subd. (a)), and counts 10, 11, and 12, 

felon in possession (former § 12021, subd. (a)), pursuant to 

section 654. 

Appellant appealed his convictions and sentence. A 

different panel of this court affirmed his convictions but ordered 

his sentence modified. Pursuant to a remittitur issued June 27, 

2000, the superior court struck two of the six one-year prison 

priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a great bodily injury enhancement 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on stayed count 5, and reduced appellant’s 

restitution fine from $1,000 to $200. After these modifications, 

appellant was left with a total sentence of 40 years, including 

four one-year prison priors (reduced from the original six). 

II. Recent Changes in the Law

A. Senate Bill No. 620

In 2017, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–

2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 620). SB 620 amended sections 12022.5 and 

12022.53 to give the superior court discretion to strike or dismiss 

firearm enhancements imposed under those sections in the 

interest of justice. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1 & 2; §§ 12022.5, 

subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h); see People v. Baltazar (2020) 57 

Cal.App.5th 334, 337.) “[T]he authority to strike or dismiss a 

firearm enhancement applies only to nonfinal judgments or to 

final judgments where the defendant is being resentenced under 

some other law.” (People v. Baltazar, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 

341.) 
5

B. Senate Bill Nos. 136

Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2018-2019 

Reg. Sess.) (SB 136) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

regarding prior prison term enhancements. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 

590.) Former section 667.5, subdivision (b) imposed an additional 

one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail 

felony term, except under specified circumstances. However, as 

amended by SB 136, section 667.5, subdivision (b) now imposes 

an additional one-year term only for prior prison terms served for 

convictions of sexually violent offenses. (See § 667.5, subd. (b).) 

SB 136 rendered prison priors imposed for non-sexually violent 

offenses legally invalid, but applied retroactively only to cases not 

yet final on January 1, 2020. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).) 

C. Senate Bill No. 483

In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-

2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 483). This bill made the changes 

implemented by SB 136 retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it 

is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply . . . Senate 

Bill 136 of the 2019-20 Regular Session to all persons currently 

serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed 

sentence enhancements”].) SB 483 took effect on January 1, 

2022, and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to 

the Penal Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 

12.)

Section 1172.75 provides, “Any sentence enhancement that 

was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) 

of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior 

conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision 

(b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally 

invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) “The statute further establishes 

a mechanism to provide affected defendants a remedy for those 
6

legally invalid enhancements.” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 380.) That mechanism is section 1172.75, subdivision (b), 

which requires the Secretary of the Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify all persons in custody to 

whom the provision applies and provide their information to the 

courts that sentenced them “[b]y March 1, 2022, for individuals 

who have served their base term and any other enhancements 

and are currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement,”

and “[b]y July 1, 2022, for all other individuals.” (§ 1172.75, 

subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2).) For purposes of the statute, “all other 

enhancements shall be considered to have been served first.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (b)(1).) Sentencing courts are required to 

resentence persons in the March 1, 2022 group by October 1, 

2022, and the July 1, 2022 group by December 31, 2023. 

(§ 1172.75, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2).)

D. Senate Bill No. 81

Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 

Reg. Sess.) (SB 81) amended section 1385 to require the superior 

court to dismiss sentencing enhancements “if it is in the 

furtherance of justice to do so” and would not endanger public 

safety. (See § 1385, subd. (c).) SB 81 also added to section 1385 a 

list of mitigating circumstances for the court to consider when 

exercising its discretion to dismiss enhancements. (See § 1385, 

subd. (c).) Those circumstances include “[a]pplication of the 

enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact as 

described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 745,”

“[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case,” “[t]he 

application of an enhancement could result in a sentence over 20 

years,” “[t]he current offense is not a violent felony as defined in 

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5,” and “[t]he enhancement is based 

on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subds. 

(c)(2)(A), (B), (C), (F), (H).) The changes effected by SB 81 “apply 
7

to all sentencings occurring after January 1, 2022.” (§ 1385, subd. 

(c)(7).) 

E. Assembly Bill No. 1540

Prior to January 1, 2022, “[f]ormer section 1170 [, 

subdivision] (d)(1) authorized a trial court, at any time upon the 

recommendation of the Secretary [of the CDCR], to ‘recall the 

sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the 

defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been 

sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than 

the initial sentence.’” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 

1035, 1040 (McMurray).) Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 

Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7) (AB 1540) moved the 

recall and resentencing provisions from section 1170, subdivision 

(d)(1) to former section 1170.03, which has since been 

renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.1. (See 

Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) 

Section 1172.1 retained the recall and resentencing 

language of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). It also added several 

requirements to the superior court’s consideration of a recall and 

resentencing recommendation made by CDCR or other entities,

not a defendant himself or herself. (See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) 

These include appointing counsel for the defendant and holding a 

status conference within 30 days of the resentencing request. (§ 

1172.1. subd. (b)(1).) 

III. Appellant’s Filings 

A. Request for Judicial Notice 

On November 19, 2021, appellant requested that the 

superior court take judicial notice of SB 483 and SB 81. 

Appellant asserted that he had been sentenced to six one-year

prison priors that were no longer valid in light of SB 483, and 

that the court was required “to take immediate action” to grant 

him relief. He further suggested that SB 81 prohibited the 
8

imposition of more than one enhancement for causing great 

bodily injury and multiple enhancements in a single case 

generally. 

B. April 21, 2022 Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus3

On April 21, 2022, appellant filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus that asserted two grounds for relief. The first 

asserted ground for relief was “based on senate bill 483 and 

amended senate bill 136 [sic].” Appellant requested that the 

superior court strike his six one-year prison priors pursuant to 

those bills. 

In the second asserted ground for relief, appellant 

contended that SB 620 and “Senate Bill 1385”

4 required the court 

to strike or dismiss certain of his enhancements. Despite not 

being sentenced under section 12022.53, appellant also invoked 

section 12022.53, subdivision (f), which limits the number of 

enhancements that may be imposed pursuant to that section and 

3 In this petition, appellant asserted that he filed a motion 

for resentencing pursuant to SB 483 and SB 81 on January 17, 

2022, and that the superior court “refused to hear the issue. 

And/Or respond to the motion for resentencing.” No such motion 

or ruling appears in the appellate record.

4 This court’s research has not uncovered a relevant Senate 

Bill with this number. It appears that appellant may have been 

referring to section 1385, or to Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 

Reg. Sess.) (SB 1393), which amended section 1385, subdivision 

(b)(1) to authorize courts to strike five-year prison prior 

enhancements imposed under section 667, subdivision (a) “in the 

furtherance of justice.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.) As a 

different panel of this court previously explained, SB 1393 is 

inapplicable here because appellant was not sentenced under 

section 667, subdivision (a). (See People v. Miller (Nov. 16, 2021, 

B310804) [nonpub. opn.].) 
9

certain others. (See § 12022.53, subd. (f).) Appellant requested 

that the court resentence him by “striking penal code section 

12022.7(a) [sic] from counts 1-2 and 5 for a total of 15 years and 

any other relief that this amendment privides [sic] for the 

appellant.”

C. April 27, 2022 Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus

Appellant filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the superior court on April 27, 2022. This petition sought relief 

on three grounds. First, appellant asserted that the CDCR 

violated his due process rights by refusing to accept jurisdiction 

over his “legally invalid sentence.” Appellant asserted that he 

attempted to file a complaint regarding SB 136 and SB 483 in the 

grievance office of the state prison, but the CDCR denied it based 

on a lack of jurisdiction. Appellant attached the response he 

received, which stated that his claim (which is not itself in the 

record) “does not involve a claim against the Department or 

departmental staff so it is outside the jurisdiction of the 

Department.” He requested that the court strike his six one-year 

prison priors pursuant to SB 136 and SB 483. 

In the second asserted ground for relief, appellant 

suggested that SB 81 required the court to strike unspecified 

enhancements from his sentence in the furtherance of justice. He 

asserted that mitigating circumstances present included “(a) 

Discriminatory racial Impact, (b) Multiple Enhancement alleged 

in a single case. (f) Current Offense is a Non-Violent offense 

defined by Penal Code sec.667.5(g)(1), and (h) Enhancement 

based on a prior conviction over five years old.” 

In the third asserted ground for relief, appellant reiterated 

the contentions regarding SB 620 and “Senate Bill 1385” that he 

made in the April 21, 2022 writ petition. He also requested 

counsel pursuant to AB 1540. 
10

D. May 3, 2022 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Appellant filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the superior court on May 3, 2022. This petition was 

substantively identical to the petition filed on April 27, 2022. 

E. July 19, 2022 Objections and July 20, 2022 

Declaration

On July 5, 2022, the superior court issued a minute order 

stating that the court had called the case “for habeas corpus 

petition.” The order stated, in relevant part: “Defendant is not 

present in court, and not represented by counsel[.] [¶] The court 

finds good cause to place this matter off calendar this date. 

Petition to be addressed in chambers.” The court sent a copy of 

the minute order to appellant. 

On July 19, 2022, appellant filed objections to the July 5, 

2022 minute order. He asserted that the “fair administration of 

justice” required appointment of counsel and his presence in 

court for a hearing. 

On July 20, 2022, appellant filed a declaration stating that 

he had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 17, 2022 

[sic] and had requested counsel. He further asserted that the 

court on June 27, 2022 had ordered counsel to be appointed by 

July 5, 2022; no such order appears in the appellate record. 

Appellant also stated that the court ordered the matter off 

calendar “and counsel not be appointed.”

IV. Superior Court Ruling

On July 20, 2022, the court issued a minute order 

addressing the filings summarized above. It stated that it had 

received and reviewed “all the above listed petitions pursuant to 

Penal Code 1171.1 [now section 1172.75] and SB483,” and also 

considered “issues raised pursuant to SB1393, SB136 and 

SB620.” The court summarily denied the petitions as a matter of 

law. It stated: “There is no provision within the statute which 
11

allows for an inmate to initiate the review process. [¶] Per Penal 

Code section 1171.1, the California Department of Corrections, 

[sic] and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is given the task of identifying 

inmates who have a now invalid enhancement as part of their 

sentence. The CDCR will provide the names of affected inmates 

within specified time limits. [¶] Petitioner’s request is premature 

given the process established by the Legislature. [¶] As to 

petitioner’s claims raised pursuant to SB1393, and SB620, all of 

these have been raised and ruled on in previous writs.[5][¶] For 

the foregoing reasons, the petitions, all five (5) of them, are 

denied without prejudice.”

V. Appeal 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant’s 

appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues and requesting 

that this court follow the procedures forth in Serrano, supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th 496. (See also People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 

216, 226, 231-232 (Delgadillo) [defendant not entitled to 

independent review of the record in appeal from denial of 

postconviction relief, and appeal may be dismissed as abandoned 

if no supplemental brief is filed].) The court notified appellant he 

had 30 days to file a supplemental brief and that his appeal may 

be dismissed as abandoned if he declined to do so. Appellant 

timely filed a supplemental brief. 

5 Indeed, a different panel of this court affirmed an earlier 

order denying appellant’s requests for relief under SB 1393 and 

SB 620. (See People v. Miller (Nov. 16, 2021, B310804) [nonpub. 

opn.].) Other panels of this court also have denied petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus substantively similar to those appellant 

filed below in this case. (See Miller v. Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County (Sept. 9, 2022, No. B322495) [nonpub. order]; In 

re Miller (March 24, 2022, No. B318764) [nonpub. order].) 
12

DISCUSSION 

We conclude this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal 

because neither the denial of appellant’s sentencing motions nor 

the denial of his petitions for writ of habeas corpus is an 

appealable order. 

Section 1237, subdivision (b) makes post-judgment orders 

affecting a criminal defendant’s substantial rights appealable. 

(§ 1237, subd. (b).) However, post-judgment orders denying 

motions to vacate or modify a sentence generally are not 

appealable under this statutory section.

“The general rule is that ‘once a judgment is rendered and 

execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have 

jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’ [Citations.]” (King, 

supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.) When the superior court does 

not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a 

sentence, an order denying such a motion cannot affect the 

defendant’s substantial rights. (Id. at p. 639.) The unauthorized 

sentence doctrine does not provide a jurisdictional loophole “for a 

trial court to rule on an incarcerated defendant’s motion to 

correct an alleged illegal sentence after the conviction is final and 

after the execution of the sentence has begun.” (Id. at pp. 641-

642.) 

There are limited exceptions to this general rule. For 

instance, the superior court retains jurisdiction to resentence a 

defendant where “specific statutory avenues” authorize 

defendants to seek resentencing. (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 637.) Although it provides a procedure for resentencing, 

section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to initiate a 

request for resentencing via motion or other means. “[A]ny 

review and verification by the court in advance of resentencing is 

only triggered by receipt of the necessary information from the 

CDCR Secretary or a county correctional administrator, not by 
13

any individual defendant.” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 

384.) The same is true of section 1172.1, which permits recall 

and resentencing only at the request of CDCR and other entities. 

(See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) SB 81 similarly does not authorize 

motions for relief by defendants sentenced prior to January 1, 

2022. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(7).) The superior court accordingly 

lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s motion for resentencing, and 

we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the denial of that 

motion. 

We note that once the statutory prerequisites have been 

complied with and the pertinent information is received from the

CDCR, appellant may, and likely will, be entitled to have his 

sentence recalled and be resentenced pursuant to section 

1172.75. At that time, he may be entitled to resentencing, and to 

the striking of one or more of the enhancements he challenges. 

However, as the superior court found, appellant is not entitled to 

initiate the section 1172.75 process and recall his sentence on his 

own motion, in advance of the process contemplated by statute. 

(See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 384.) Without a statutory 

or other avenue to recall the sentence, the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction to hear appellant’s motion, and we lack jurisdiction to 

hear the appeal.

We also lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial 

of appellant’s petitions for writ of habeas corpus. “A petitioner 

currently has no right to appeal from a superior court denial of 

habeas corpus relief. Instead, review is obtained by filing a new 

habeas corpus petition in a higher court.” (Briggs v. Brown, 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 836.) 

None of the contentions in appellant’s supplemental brief 

alters this conclusion or entitles him to relief. We address each 

in turn. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232.)
14

First, appellant contends his appellate counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. However, there is no constitutional right 

to effective assistance of counsel in state postconviction 

proceedings or proceedings to obtain collateral relief from a 

judgment of conviction. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226-

227.) Even if there were, appellant has not demonstrated that 

his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness or that he suffered prejudice as result. (See 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.)

Similarly, there is no indication that appellant had a right to 

counsel below or was prejudiced by the superior court’s failure to 

appoint counsel. 

Next, acknowledging the process for SB 483 relief set forth 

in section 1172.75, appellant contends that CDCR should have 

identified him as an eligible candidate for resentencing by March 

1, 2022, and that he should have been resentenced by October 1, 

2022. Appellant contends he falls within this group of inmates 

because he “has already served his base term of (19) years” and 

“is now only doing enhancement time.” 

Appellant misapprehends the calculation of “base terms” 

and “enhancement time” for the purposes of section 1172.75. For 

purposes of section 1172.75, “all other enhancements shall be 

considered to have been served first.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)(1).) 

This means that appellant will not be serving what he terms 

invalid “enhancement time”—no longer valid one-year prison 

priors imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b)—until 

he completes all other portions of his sentence. Appellant has not 

yet reached that milestone. His “base term” of non-stayed, 

unenhanced sentences for the actual crimes he committed totaled 

15 years, four months. His firearm and great bodily injury 

enhancements total an additional 20 years, 8 months. Only after 

that 36 years of time is served will appellant begin serving his 
15

four remaining one-year prison priors. Appellant was sentenced 

in 1998; he has thus served approximately 25 years and has 

provided no evidence that he is, for the purposes of section 

1172.75, serving a sentence based on any invalid section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancements. To the extent he may be eligible 

for relief under SB 483, appellant should be in the group of 

inmates who must be resentenced by December 31, 2023. To the 

extent he contends he should be resentenced now for the sake of 

efficiency, he impermissibly relies on an unpublished opinion that 

may not be cited or relied upon. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 

8.1115(a).) 

Appellant next contends that his sentence is unauthorized 

and therefore may be corrected at any time, specifically, by this 

court. He further asserts we are required to do so to ensure he 

receives speedy relief under habeas corpus principles. As noted 

above, the unauthorized sentence doctrine “does not itself create 

jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated defendant’s 

motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence.” (King, supra, 77 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 641-642.) Nor is the denial of appellant’s 

habeas petitions an appealable order. While appellant urges us 

to construe his appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we 

decline to do so. If appellant wishes to pursue habeas relief, he 

must do so in accordance with the procedures governing such 

petitions. 
16

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, ACTING, P.J.

MORI, J.