1The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge, United States

District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-3952

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Joseph Baldwin Campbell, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota

T.J. Sletten and Ben Nibbe, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellees. *

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Submitted: June 15, 1999

 Filed: November 4, 1999

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Before HANSEN, MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and JONES1, District Judge.

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PER CURIAM.

Joseph Campbell brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Red

Wing Police Lieutenant T.J. Sletten and Goodhue County Deputy Sheriff Ben Nibbe

arrested him in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court2
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granted summary judgment in favor of Sletten and Nibbe on the basis of qualified

immunity. We affirm.

Campbell, an enrolled member of the Prairie Island Indian Community (“Prairie

Island”) in Minnesota, held a land assignment from Prairie Island. Prairie Island sought

to obtain Campbell’s land assignment to build an administrative building. In May

1993, Campbell entered into an agreement with Prairie Island to convey his land

assignment to Prairie Island in exchange for employment and a replacement land

assignment. Campbell believed Prairie Island breached the agreement and he refused

to move from his land assignment.

Sletten and Nibbe went to the property to serve Campbell with a trespass notice

from Prairie Island. When the officers served Campbell with the trespass notice, he

turned around to reenter his home on the land. The officers each grabbed one of

Campbell’s arms. Campbell jerked away, causing the officers to fall to the ground.

Campbell also ordered his dog to defend him, which the dog did by barking and

approaching the officers, but not biting the officers. The officers arrested Campbell for

trespass and obstructing legal process under Minnesota law. 

To withstand a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified

immunity, 

a civil rights plaintiff must (1) assert a violation of a constitutional right;

(2) demonstrate that the alleged right is clearly established; and (3) raise

a genuine issue of fact as to whether the official would have known that

his alleged conduct would have violated [the] plaintiff’s clearly

established right. 

Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011

(1996). A person has “a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment not to

be arrested unless there [is] probable cause for [the] arrest.” Id. In the context of

deciding whether the law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the
3Minnesota law provides that it is illegal to intentionally “trespass[] on the

premises of another and, without claim of right, refuses to depart from the premises on

demand of the lawful possessor.” Minn. Stat. § 609.605(b). Minnesota’s criminal law

is enforceable on the Prairie Island Indian Community. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); State

v. LaRose, 543 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).

4Minnesota law provides that a person obstructs legal process and is subject to

criminal penalties when he “obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while

the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties.” Minn. Stat. § 609.50.

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issue “is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause.” Myers v. Morris,

810 F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). The question for

immunity purposes thus becomes “whether the officer should have known that the

arrest violated plaintiff’s clearly established right.” Habiger, 80 F.3d at 295. The

qualified immunity defense protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). If an officer

had probable cause to arrest an individual for committing a certain crime it is

immaterial that the officer thought, even mistakenly, that he had probable cause to

arrest the individual for a second crime. Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 914

F.2d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 1990).

We conclude Sletten and Nibbe had arguable probable cause to arrest Campbell

for criminal trespass.3 Sletten and Nibbe separately investigated the situation and relied

upon a facially valid trespass notice. After Sletten and Nibbe served Campbell with the

trespass notice and requested that he vacate the premises, Campbell refused to leave

the property. Moreover, Sletten and Nibbe had probable cause to arrest Campbell for

obstruction of legal process under Minnesota law4 when he pulled away from the

officers causing them to fall to the ground and ordered his dog to defend him after the

officers instructed Campbell to vacate the premises. We agree with the district court’s

conclusion that Sletten and Nibbe are entitled to qualified immunity in this action.
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The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

 ATTEST:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.