Q. Did you tell Mr. Matthews that you needed help?

A. ...I don’t know that I did. I don’t know that I didn’t.

Q. Did you suggest --

A. I felt that’s what I was asking him for, whether I verbally said it or not. But I don’t know if I verbally said it or not.

Q. Well, did you verbally tell him that you were -- did you tell him that you were in therapy, that you were being treated?

A. No....

Q. ...My specific question is, for whatever reason, okay, did you tell Mr. Matthews that either your psychologist or your psychiatrist had told you that you couldn’t do your job because of your illness?

A. No, sir.

The next day, Taylor sent Matthews an electronic mail (“E-Mail”) message dated April 15, 1993, in which he stated:

I THOUGHT AND WORRIED ABOUT OUR CONVERSATION ALL THE WAY HOME LAST NIGHT AND SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME IN MEDITATION AND TRYING TO REALISTICALLY THINK OF WHAT THIS AGENCY CAN DO THIS YEAR.

BRUCE, I HAVE BEEN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY NEGATIVE; I GUESS THAT I HAVE ALLOWED THE ECONOMY AND THE LAST FEW MONTHS TO COLOR MY PERSPECTIVE.

AND I MUST ADMIT THAT WHAT I GAVE YOU WERE LOW AND WHEN THE MASK COMES OFF, I GUESS I WAS HOPING TO NEGOTIATE, EVEN THOUGH I SAID I WASN’T. IT GOT ME INTO A HECK OF A CORNER.

BRUCE, I BELIEVE THAT WE (THE EL PASO AGENCY AND ME) CAN HAVE A POSITIVE

WOULD RECRUIT 7 PEOPLE THIS YEAR BEFORE JUNE 30.

YOU GAVE ME UNTIL JUNE 30TH TO PROVE TO YOU SOME THINGS THAT I AM GOING TO DO AND BRUCE, I AM GOING TO TAKE YOU UP ON THAT I CAN RECRUIT GOOD PEOPLE FOR THIS AREA DOWN HERE AND THAT THINGS ARE STARTING TO GO OUR WAY.

On June 24-25, 1993, Matthews met with Taylor in El Paso. Matthews offered Taylor a voluntary severance package to be accepted at Taylor’s choice. Matthews did not tell Taylor that he was required to accept the severance package, or that he was

terminated. In a subsequent telephone conversation, Taylor notified Matthews that Taylor had not decided whether he would sign the severance agreement.

On July 1, 1993, Taylor received from Matthews a letter of understanding

the letter stated the following:

I wish to share with you the standards which must be met by year end

in the agency for the 1993 are unsatisfactory.

These key performance results must be met by December 31, 1993 for you to continue as agency manager:

* Personally recruit at least three additional 01 agents, for a total of seven in 1993 (those recruited by Gilbert Garcia do not count).

* One of the 01 agents must end the year at Agency Club level and have been a 713 agent for six months.

* Two of the 01 agents must end the year at Level I and have been 713 agents for four months.

* Total production from the 01 class must exceed $43,000 ICCs.

* Total agency production must exceed 4290,000 ICCs.

* Unit cost must be at or lower than 72 (Excludes agency manager’s compensation and BDA payments.)

We will look at the progress you are making at the end of the third quarter, 1993. If there is little chance of reaching these requirements by 12/31/93; we reserve the right to make a management change sooner than 12/31/93.

You have the talent to not only meet these requirements, but exceed them. We stand ready to help in any way appropriate.42 U.S.C. § 12112. “Unless expressly stated otherwise, the standards applied

§ 504, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794).

In Diagle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co. , we set forth the elements of, and the standard of proof in, ADA cases:

A plaintiff may establish a claim of disability discrimination by presenting direct evidence of discrimination. Alternatively, the indirect method of proof set for Title VII actions in

93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), may also be utilized.

or she is qualified for the job; (3) he or she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) he or she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees.

Diagle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co. , 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).

Taylor argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues

words to invoke the employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation. Taylor argues that, through the following statements which he made to Matthews on April 14, 1993, “it is undisputed” that Taylor disclosed to Principal Mutual that he suffered from

bipolar disorder:

1. “I asked Mr. Matthews, specifically, for help.”

2. “What I’d ask you to do is to talk to the doctors in the Principal,

about it.”

3. “I asked for a reduction in my objectives.”

4. “I asked for a lessening of the pressure.”

Taylor argues that his statements to Matthews raise a genuine fact issue as to whether Taylor asked for a reasonable accommodation.

Taylor additionally argues that once he revealed his disability to Matthews,

that a reasonable accommodation is not possible in a particular situation. Taylor says that Principal Mutual presented no such evidence. Taylor argues that we should reverse the district court’s order of summary judgment and remand this case for jury trial.

Principal Mutual argues that Taylor’s statements to Matthews did not put

fact, “all right.” Principal Mutual argues that the claimed physical or mental limitations of an employee’s disability must be made known to the employer before an obligation to accommodate arises. Principal Mutual argues that “it is not the illness which

the employer must accommodate, but rather any limitations or restrictions caused by the illness.” Principal Mutual argues that Taylor

that it gave Taylor an accommodation in the form of additional time to meet his

Principal Mutual asserts that, “having reasonably accommodated Taylor, Principal Mutual was not required to do more.”

The ultimate issue presented to this Court is whether Taylor presented

42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq , by not making reasonable accommodations to a physical

prima facie case of ADA discrimination. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Failure to Identify Limitation

Under the ADA, an actionable disability means, in relevant part, a physical

show that the employer knew, or should have known, of such employee’s substantialan employee’s disabilities, limitations, and possible accommodations. 9 In the instant case, Taylor offered no such evidence.

that Taylor failed to adduce summary judgment evidence which would allow a reasonable

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered by the district court is AFFIRMED.