MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 29 Docket: Ken

- 17

- 75 Argued : October	11,	2017 Decided: March	1,	2018
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J., * and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , and HUMPHREY, JJ.

SAD	3	EDUCATION	ASSOCIATION

v. RSU	3	BOARD	OF	DIRECTORS	et	al.

HUMPHREY ,	J. [¶1] S chool A dministrative D istrict 3	Education	Association MEA/NEA (the	 Association) appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	 (Kennebec County, Murphy,	J. ) on	consolidated	Rule	80C	appeals from	the decision	of	the Maine	Labor	Relations	Board (MLRB) on the	Association’s prohibited	practice complaint

. 1 The	Association	argues	that	the	M LRB	erred	when	it	held	that	the
120

- day notice	provision	in 26	M.R.S.	§	965 (1) (2017 ) applies	to the	request	for impact	bargaining in	this	case

. We	disagree	and	affirm	the	judgment.

* Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Chief	Justice	Saufley	participated	in	the	development of	this	opinion. See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)	( Tower 2016)	(“A	qualified	justice	may	participate	in	a	decision even	though	not	present at	oral	argument.”), replaced	with M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(2)	(effective	for	appeals commenced	on	or	after	Sept.	1,	2017).

1 Both	the	MLRB	and	the	Rural	School	Unit	3	Board	of	Directors	are	appellees	in	this	matter.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ] Regional	 School	 Unit 3	 (RSU	 3) is	 a	 rural	 school	 district	 serving towns	 that	 span	 a	 large	 geographic	 area in	 Waldo	 County .	 	 The	 Board	 of Directors	 of	 RSU	 3	 (the	 School	 Board)	 is	 a	 public	 employer as	 defin ed	 in
26 M.R.S.	§	962(7)	(2017 )

. The	Association is	the	recognized	bargaining	age nt within	the	meaning	of 26	M.R.S.	§ 962(2) (2017 ) for	employees	of	the	School Board ,	including	classroom	teachers

. [¶3 ] At	the	beginning	of	the	2012

- 2013	school	year,	RSU	3	transitioned from	a system	of double	bus run s to	transport	the	students	in	the school	district

to	a system	of	single	bus	runs .		This	cost

- saving	measure	resulted	in	students	at the	 outlying	 elementary	 schools	 being	 dropped	 off	 at	 school	 earlier in	 the morning and	 picked	 up	later in	 the	 afternoon than	 they	 had been under	 the prior	sys tem.		 In	order	 to	accommod ate	 t his	change,	 teachers	at the	outlying schools	had	to	work	longer	hours	than	their	colleagues	at	other	schools	in	the district.		The	School	Board	and	the	Association	agreed	to	discuss	the	effects	of the	change	after	the system of single	bus runs was	implemented. [¶4 ] In	early	January	2013,	the	Association	informed	the	School	Board	of its	demand	to	enter	into	“impact	bargaining” 2 regarding	the	change	in	working

2 The Municipal Public	Employees	Labor	Relations	Law	(MPELRL)	requires	that	public	employers and	bargaining	agents	bargain	collectively	on	certain	mandatory	subjects,	including	wages,	hours,3 conditions	due	to	the	transition	to	the system	of single	bus	run s . 3 The School Board	 and	 the	Association	 engaged	in	impact	 bargaining	 over	 the	 change	in working	conditions for	 the	affected	 teachers	 on	 three	 occasions	in	February, March,	and	April	2013. During	these	bargaining	sessions,	the	Association and the	 School Board	 discussed	 compensation for	 the	 affected teachers, but	 the School	 Board	 opposed that	 approach

. 4 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 third	 meeting,	 the parties	had	yet	to	come	to	an	agreement. [¶5 ] After	the	start	of	the	new	school	year,	the Association submitted	a proposal	 to	 the	 School	 Board that included a	 request	 for $1,500	 in

and	 working	 conditions. 26 M.R.S	 §§ 964

- 65 (2017)

. Section	 965(1)	 provides	 tha t	 parties participating	in	collective	bargaining	must	meet	at	reasonable	times	and	within	ten	days	after	receipt of	a	request	for	collective	bargaining. 26	M.R.S.	§ 965(1) .		We	have	recognized	that	the	requirements for	negotiations	under	section	965(1)	ap ply	not	only	to	negotiations	for	contracts	directly	addressing wages,	 hours,	 and	 working	 conditions,	 but	 also	 to	 other	 decisions	 or	 events	 that	 are	 not	 by themselves	subject	to	bargaining	but	would	affect	those	mandatory	subjects	of bargaining. See City o f	Bangor	v.	AFSCME,	Council	74 ,	449	A.2d	1129,	1134

- 35 (Me.	1982)

. This	process	is	referred	to	as “impact	bargaining”	or	“effects	bargaining.” See AFSCME	Council	93	v.	Penobscot	Cty.	Comm’rs ,	No. 15

- 14	at 11	(Me.	Labor	Relations	Bd.	Jan.	5,	2016) ; Mt.	Ab ram	Teachers	Ass’n	v.	MSAD	No.	58 ,	No.	15

- 09 at 23	(Me.	Labor	Relations	Bd.	July	29,	2015)

.
3 The	MLRB	made	a	finding	that	“[i]n	the	beginning	of	January	of	2013,	the	Association	informed the	School	Board	of	its	demand	 to	enter	into	impact	bargaining regarding	the	change	in	working conditions	due	to	the shift	to	the	single	bus	run,	which	resulted	in	an	increase	to	the	teacher	workday for	teachers	in	certain	schools	in	the	district.” Representatives	of	the	Association	and	of	the	School Board	testified to	the	contents	of	this	January	2013 letter from	the	Association ,	but	it	is	not	in	the record.

4 The	 Association	 and	 the	 School	 Board	 also	 discussed	 other	 options	 to	 provide	 the	 affected teachers	with	relief,	including	assigning	educational	techni cians	t o	supervise	the	students ,	additional break	time	for	the	teachers	during	the	lunch period ,	a	change	in	the	bus	schedule ,	and	a	change	in	the central	complex	hours	to	increase	professional	development	time	for	the	affected	teachers.4 compensation	for	each	of	the	affected	teachers. T he	School	Board	rejected the Association’s	proposal , and t he	Association	filed	a	request	for	mediation	with the	MLRB in	December	2013

. [¶6 ] Before	 the	 mediation took	 place ,	 the	 Association	 requested	 to collectively	 bargain	 a	 successor	 contract	 between	 it	 and	 the	 School	 Board because	the parties’ existing	contract	was	set	to	expire	in	August	2014 .		During the	 negotiations	 for	 the	 successo r	 contract,	 the	 parties	 agreed	 on	 uniform working	 hours	 for	 teachers	 throughout	 the	 district,	 taking	 into	 account	 the different	 schedules	 that	 resulted	 from	 the system	 of single	 bus	 run s . The

successor	 contract ,	 which	 covered	 the	 period	 from	 September	 1, 2014 , to August	31,	2017, was	signed	on	April	1,	2014. [¶7 ] The	 parties	 engaged	 in	 mediation	 sessions regarding the	 impact bargaining	 matter	 on	 April	 8	 and	 May	 7,	 2014,	 but	 failed	 to	 come	 to	 an agreement.		On	July	3,	2014,	the	Association	filed	a request	for	fact

- finding with the	MLRB	and	the	School	Board. T he	Executive	Director	of	the	MLRB requested that	the	parties select	their	representa tives	for	a	fact

- finding	panel,	but only	the Association	 responded to	 this	 request .	 	 In	 October	 2014,	 the	 Sch ool	 Board communicated	 to the	 Association	 and	 the	 MLRB that	 it was	 unwilling	 to participate	in	fact

- finding	for	the	impact	bargaining	matter.		In	January	2015,5 the	 Executive	Director	 of	 the	MLRB	informed	 the	 parties	 that,	in	light	 of	 the School	Board’s	Oct ober	letter,	he	would	not	schedule	a	fact

- finding	proceeding. [¶8 ] Pursuant	 to	 the	M unicipal Public	Employees	Labor	Relations	Law (MPELRL),	t he	Association	filed	a	prohibited practice	complaint with	the	MLRB against	the	School	Board, see 26	M.R.S.	§	968 (5)	(2017 ) ,	alleging	that	the	School Board	violated 26	M.R.S.	§	964(1)(E)	(2017 ) and § 965(1) when	it	refused to participate	in	mediation	and	fact

- finding	procedures with	respect	to	the effect of	 the	 new	 bus	 system .	 	 In	 its	 answer,	 the	 School	 Board	 raised a	 number	 of defenses , including	that	the	Associatio n	failed	to	provide the	School	Board	with notice	“ at	least 120 days	before	the	conclusion	of	the	current	fiscal	operating budget ” that	 it	 intended	 to	 negotiate	 matters	 involving	 the	 appropriation	 of
money during	 the	 impact bargaining	 sessions , as	 required	 by 26 M.R.S. § 965(1)

. [¶9 ] In	 its	 decision,	 t he	 MLRB	 rejected	 all of	 the	 Scho ol	 Board’s affirmative	 defenses except	 for	 the alleged	 violation	 of	 the 120

- day	 notice provision. The	MLRB	determined	that	the	Association	failed	to	comply	with the
120

- day	 requirement because	 aspects of	 the impact	 bargaining	 involved potential	appropriations	of	money ,	and concluded	that the	School	Board	was	not	legally	obligated	to	bargain	over	matt ers requiring	 the	 appropriation	 of	 money.	 	 The	 failure	 of	 the6 Association	to	provide	the	120

- day	notice	had	no	impact,	however, on	the	School	Board’s	legal	obligation	to	continue	bargaining	over non - monetary	issues.		Consequently,	to	the	extent	that	the	Sc hool Board	has	refused	to	participate	in	fact	finding	over	non

- monetary issues,	it	has	violated	§965(1) (E). 5 [¶1 0 ] Both	 parties appealed	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court p ursuant	 to	 M.R.
Civ. P. 80C	and 26	M.R.S.	§ 968(5)(F)	(2017 ) .		The	School	Board	challenged the
MLRB ’s conclusion that	it	violated 26	M.R.S.	§ 964(1)(E) and § 965(1) by	failing to	participate	in	fact

- finding	concerning	the	impact	of	the	new	busing	system. The	Association challenged the	MLRB’s determination that	it	was	required	to provide	a	120

- d ay	notice ,	arguing	that	the	120

- day	notice	provision in	section 965(1) does	not	apply	to	impact	bargaining

. [¶1 1 ] The	 Superior	 Court consolidated	 the	 appeals	 and affirmed	 the decision	of	the	MLRB. The	Association	timely	appealed to	this	Court	the	MLRB ’s determination	 that	 it	 was	 required	 to	 provide	 the	 120

- day	 notice

. 6 M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3)	(Tower	2016); 7 M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C(n).

5 As	 a	 remedy	 for	 the	 Sc hool	 Board’s	 having	 refused	 to	 participate	 in	 fact

- finding	 over nonmonetary	issues,	the	MLRB separately ordered	that	“[t]he	Association	will	have	30	days	from	the date	of	this	order	to	provide	the	School	Board	with	a	written	request	to	initiate	fact	findin g,	shoul d	it choose	to	do	so.”

6 T he	 School	 Board	 did	 not	 appeal the	 MLRB’s	 determ ination	 that	 it	 had	 violated	 26 M.R.S. § 964(1)(E)	and	§	965(1)

.
7 This	appeal	was	commenced	before	September	1,	2017,	and	therefore	the	restyled	Maine	Rules of	Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply. See M.R.	App.	P.	1.7 II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 2 ] The focus	of	this	appeal is whether	t he	120

- day	notice	requirement
in 26	 M.R.S.	 §	 965(1) applies	 to	 impact	 bargaining where	 the association’s request	require s additional	appropriations	by	the	municipality	or	county .		If	we conclude	 that	 the	120

- day	 notice	provision	applies,	we	must then determine whether	 the MLRB	erred	in	determining	 that	 the Association did	not	comply with that	requirement. [¶1 3 ] “In	 an	 appeal	 from	 a	 Superior	 Court	 judgment	 entered	 upon intermediate	 appellate	 review	 of	 a	 Board	 decision,	 we	 review the	 Board’s decision	directly	 for	error	of	law,	abuse	of	discretion,	or	clear	e rror.” City	of Augusta	v.	Me.	Labor	Relations	Bd. ,	2013	ME	63,	¶	14,	70	A.3d	268 (quotation marks	omitted). “We	accord	 the	Board	considerable	deference	in	construing the	MPELRL	because	 the	Board	is	charged	with	its	enforcement.” Minot	Sch.
Comm.	v. Minot	Educ.	Ass’n ,	1998	ME	211,	¶	6,	717	A.2d	372 (quotation	marks omitted). [¶1 4 ] Statutory	 interpretation	 is	 a	 question	 of	 law that we review de novo. Town	 of	 Eagle	 Lake	 v.	 Comm’r,	 Dep’t	 of	 Educ. ,	 2003	 ME	 37,	 ¶ 7,
818 A.2d	1034 .		 In	questions	of	stat utory	interpretation,	“ we	 first	look to	 the plain	language	of	the	provisions	to	determine	their	meaning.		If	the	language	is8 unambiguous, we	 interpret the	 provisions	 according	 to	 their	 unambiguous meaning	unless	the	result	is	illogical	or	absurd.		If	the	p lain	meaning	of	a	statute is	ambiguous

— that	is,	susceptible	of different	meanings

— we will	then	go	on	to consider	the	statute’s	meaning	in	light	of	its	legislative	history	and	other	indicia of	legislative	intent.” Mainetoday	Media,	Inc.	v.	State ,	2013	ME	1 00,	¶	6,	82	A.3d
104 (citations	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted). When	a	dispute	involves	a board	 or	 agency’s	 interpretation	 of	 a	 statute	 it	 administers,	 “the	 agency’s interpretation,	although	not	conclusive,	is	entitled	to	great	deference	and	will be	u pheld	unless	the	statute	plainly	compels	a	contrary	result.” Town	of	Eagle Lake ,	2003	ME	37,	¶	8,	818	A.2d	1034 (quotation	marks	omitted).
A. Interpretation	of	26	M.R.S.	§	965(1) [¶1 5 ] The	 Association	 argues	 that	 the	 MLRB’s	 determination	 that	 the
120

- day	 notice	 requirement	 applies	 to	 impact	 bargaining	 is	 contrary	 to	 the language	 of	 section	 965(1),	 public	 policy,	 and	 long

- established	 past	 practice and	 case	law.	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	 School	 Board	 and	 the	MLRB	 contend	 that	 the statutory	language	clearly	and	u nambiguously	requires	that	bargaining	agents comply	with	the	120

- day	notice	provision	whenever	appropriations	of	money are	 at	 issue,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 parties	 are	 engaging	 in	 impact bargaining	or	other	 types	of	collective	bargaining. We	agree	with the	School9 Board	and	the	MLRB	that	the	120

- day	notice	requirement	applies	whenever	the parties	engage	in	any	type	of	collective	bargaining,	including	impact	bargaining, when	the	subject	of	the	bargaining	involves	the	appropriation	of	money by the municipa lity. [¶1 6 ] The	first	step	in our analysis is	to	look	at	the	plain	language	of	the

statute

. Section	965(1)	states	in	whole:
1. Negotiations. It	is	the	obligation	of	the	public	employer	and	the bargaining	 agent	 to	 bargain	 collectively. “ Collective bargaining ” means,	for	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	their	mutual	obligation:
A. To	meet	at	reasonable	times;
B. To	meet	within	10	days	after	receipt	of	written	notice	from the	 other	 party	 requesting	 a	 meeting	 for	 collective bargaining	 purposes,	 as	 long as	 the	 parties	 have	 not otherwise	agreed in	a	prior	written	contract.	This	obligation is	 suspended	 during	 the	 period	 between	 a	 referendum approving	 a	 new	 regional	 school	 unit	 and	 the	 operational date	of	the	regional	school	unit,	as	long	as	the	parties	mee t	at reasonable	times	during	that	period;
C. To	 confer	 and	 negotiate	 in	 good	 faith	 with	 respect	 to wages,	 hours,	 working	 conditions	 and	 contract	 grievance arbitration,	except	that	by	such	obligation	neither	party	may be	compelled	to	agree	to	a	proposal	o r	be	required	to	make	a concession	 and	 except	 that	 public	 employers	 of	 teachers shall	 meet	 and	 consult	 but	 not	 negotiate	 with	 respect	 to educational	 policies;	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paragraph, educational	policies	may	not	include	wages,	hours,	working con ditions	or	contract	grievance	arbitration;10

D. To	execute	in	writing	any	agreements	arrived	at,	the	term of	any	such	agreement	to	be	subject	to	negotiation	but	may not	exceed	3	years;	and
E. To	participate	in	good	faith	in	the	mediation,	fact

- finding an d	arbitration	procedures	required	by	this	section

. Whenever	 wages,	 rates	 of	 pay	 or	 any	 other	 matter	 requiring appropriation	of	money	by	any	municipality	or	county	are	included as	 a	 matter	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 conducted	 pursuant	 to	 this chapter,	it	is the	obligation	of	the	bargaining	agent	to	serve	written notice	of	request	for	collective	bargaining	on	the	public	employer	at least	120	days	before	the	conclusion	of	the	current	fiscal	operating budget ,	except	that	this	requirement	is	waived	in	the	event that	a bargaining	agent	of	a	newly	formed	bargaining	unit	is	recognized or	certified	during	the	period	not	more	than	120	days	nor	less	than 30	days	prior	 to	 the	end	 of	 the	 fiscal	period.	The	120

- day	 notice requirement	is	also	waived	with	 respect	 to	 regiona l	 school	units formed	pursuant	to	Title	20

- A,	chapter	103

- A,	subchapter	2	prior to	their	first	year	of	operation. 26	M.R.S.	§	965(1) (emphasis	added)

. [¶1 7 ] We have previously held	 that	impact	bargaining is	governed	by section	965(1 ) (A)

- (E ) , acknowledging ,	in	a	case involving an alleged unlawful discharge	of union	employee s , that “[t]he effects of	a	discharge have	been	held to	be	a	subject	of	mandatory	bargaining”	even	though	the	discharge itself	would not	be	subject	to	collective	bargaining	u nder	section	965(1). 8 See City	of	Bangor

8 The	MLRB	has also	 reach ed this	same	conclusion.		For	example,	 the	MLRB	determined	 that, “[d]espite	the	fact	that	.	.	.	the	Employer	was	not	obligated	to	negotiate	the	substance	thereof,	Section 965(1)(C)	requires	that,	upon	receipt	of	a	t imely	request	therefor ,	the	Employer	must	n egotiate	over the impact of	the	implementation	of	such	[policy]	upon	the	mandatory	subjects	of bargaining.” Saco11 v.	 AFSCME,	 Council	 74 ,	 449	 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Me.	 1982) (emphasis	 added) (quotation	marks	omitted); see	also City	of	Bangor	v.	Me.	Labor	Relations	Bd. , 658 A.2d	 669,	 671	 (Me.	 1995) (“It	is	well	 established	 that	 26	M.R.S.A.	 §	 965 requires	public	employers	 to	bargain	over	 the impact of	even	non

- negotiable changes	on	mandatory	subj ects	of	collective bargaining.”). [¶1 8 ] Because	 the	 requirements	 in subsections	 (A)	 through	 (E)	 of
26 M.R.S.	 §	 965(1) apply	 to	 impact	 bargaining,	 we	 conclude	 that the final paragraph	of	that	section,	which establishes the	120

- day	notice	requirement, also	 applies	 to	 impact	 bargaining when	 the	 appropriation	 of	 money	 by	 the municipality	or	the	county	may	be	r equired

. There	is	nothing	in	the statute’s plain	 language	 that	 would	 exclude	 only	 the	 120

- day	 notice	 requirement of section	 965(1) from	 being	 applied	 to	 impact	 bargaining when	 the	 impact bargaining	may	involve	the	appropriation	of	money

. 9

Valley	Teacher	Ass’n	v.	Me.	Sch.	Admin.	Dist	#6 ,	Nos.	85

- 07	and	85

- 09	at 16	(Me.	Labor	Relations	Bd. March	14,	1985) (emphasis	added).

9 The Association	argues	that	the language	of	the 120

- day	notice	provision

— triggered	only	by matters “requiring	appropriation	of	money	by	a ny municipality or county ”

— limits it s	application to collective	bargaining	and	not	impact	bargaining. See 26	M.R.S.	§ 965(1) (emphasis	added)

. According to	the	Association,	the	Legislature	would	have	used	the	broader	term	“public	employer”	if	it	intended the	provision	to apply to	impact	bargaining	matters ,	because most	impact	bargaining	matters	can	be resolved	by	 the	pub lic	employer	and	 the	bargaining	agent	without	 requiring	 the	appropriation	 of money	by	the	municipality. This	argument	is	unpersuasive

. Issues	subject	to impact	bargaining are no	less	likely	to	require appropriation s of	money	by	a	municipality than	are	co ntract	issues

.12 B. Application	o f	the	120

- Day	Notice	Requirement	to	This	Case [¶1 9 ] Having concluded that	the	120

- day	notice	requirement of	section 965(1) applies	to the impact	bargaining in	this	case ,	we	must	decide whether the MLRB	 erred	 in	 determining	 that Association failed	 to compl y with	 that requirement

. [¶20 ] In	its	decision,	the	MLRB	made	a	finding	that	the	“Association	did not	 provide	 the	 School	 Board	 with	 120	 days’	 notice,	 pursuant	 to	 Title	 26, §965(1).” The	 MLRB’s “ findings	 on	 questions	 of	 fact	 are	 final	 unless	 clearly erroneous.” Minot Sch.	 Comm. ,	 1998	 ME	 211,	 ¶	 6,	 717	 A.2d	 372 (quotation marks	omitted).		Pursuant	to	the	clear	error	standard, [ a ] n	 appellate	 court	 can	 reverse	 a	 finding	 of	 fact	 only	where	 (1) there is	no	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	it,	or	(2)	it is	 based	 upon	 a	 clear	 misapprehension	 by	 the	 trial	 court	 of	 the meaning	of	the	evidence,	or	(3)	the	force	and	effect	of	the	evidence, taken	as	a	total	entity,	rationally	persuades	to	a	certain ty	that	the finding	 is	 so	 against	 the	 great	 preponderance	 of	 the	 believable evidence	that	it	does	not	represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.
Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 2 1] The	parties agree that	the	Association	provided	the	Board	with	a
writt en	request	to	impact	bargain	the	new	bus	system	in	early	January	2 013. Although the	Association’s	request	was in	writing and timely ,	the	MLRB	found the	notice	to	be	deficient .		According	to	the	MLRB ,	“it	was	not	the	timing	that13 was	 the	 problem,	 it	 was	 the fact	 that	 the	 January	 2013	 impact	 bargaining request did	not	satisfy	the	120

- day	notice	requirement	because	there	was	no reference	to	bargaining	over	matters	requiring	the	appropriation	of	money.” [¶22 ] Whether	the	120

- day	notice	provisi on	requires	spe cific	content	is

a question of	 statutory	interpretation.		We	conclude	 that	 the	language	is not ambiguous in	this	regard

. See Dickau	v.	Vt.	Mut.	Ins.	Co. ,	2014	ME	158,	¶¶ 19

- 21 , 107	A.3d	621

. [¶23 ] “ T he purpose	of	the	120

- day	rule	is	to	prevent	the	unbalancing	of municipal	budgets	by	increases	in	costs	 that	were	not	foreseen	and	provided for	at	the	time	the	tax	rate	was	determined.” Council	74,	AFSCME	v.	Inhabitants of	 the	 Town	 of	 Brunswick ,	 No.	 85

- 08	 at 5	 (Me.	 Labor	 Relations	 Bd.	 Apr.	 19, 1985) ; see also Me.	Teachers	Ass’n	v.	Saco	Sch.	Comm. ,	No.	84

- 10	at 3	(Me.	Labor Relations	Bd.	Mar.	9,	1984) (“The	obvious	intent	of	[the	120

- day	notice]	rule	is to	give	public	employers	adequate	notice	that	financial	items	will	be	brought	to the	bargaining	table	so	that	provision	for	these	items	can	be	made	in	the	next fiscal	 operating	 budget.”)

. Requiring tha t	 the written	 request	 to	 bargain be specific	enough	 to	provide	 notice	 that	 funds	may	need	 to	be	appropriated is consistent	 with	 the language	 and	 with	 the purpose	 of	 t he	 120

- day	 notice provision. See	Dickau ,	2014	ME	158,	¶	22,	107	A.3d	621	(explaining	that ,	when14 conducting	a	plain	language	analysis,	we	“examine	the	entirety	of	the	statute, giving	 due	 weight	 to	 design,	 structure,	 and	 purpose	 as	 wel l	 as	 to	 aggregate language.”		(q uotation	marks	omitted)). [¶24 ] Because	the	statute	unambiguously	requires	the bargaining	unit

— here,	 the	 Association

— to	 serve	 written	 notice	 referencing	 its	 request	 to bargain	over	matters	requiring	the	appropriation	of	money,	the	next	question is	whether	the	MLRB	erred	in	finding	that	no	such	notice	had	been	given. Even though	the actual	January	2013	letter	is	not	in	the	record,	there	is	evidence	to support	the	MLRB’s determination that	the letter	did	not	include	reference	to matters	 involving	 the	 appropriation	 of	 money. During	 the	 MLRB	 hearing,
RSU 3 ’s superintendent articulated her	 understanding	 of	 the	 120

- day	 notice requirement as	“a	notice	signifying	that	the	association	is	seeking	to	open	the contract	to	talk	about	salary	and	benefits	and	those	kinds	of	things”	before	she stated	 that	 the	 School	 Board	 did	 not	 receive	 a	 120

- day notice from	 the
Association for	the	impact	bargaining matter .		The	Association’s	representative also	testified	to	the content	of	the	January	2013	letter.		When	asked	if	it	was	the Association’s	“intention	to	ever	ask	for	money	for	the	teachers”	in	the	impa ct bargaining	 sessions,	 the	 Association’s	 representative	 responded	 in	 the negative. R epresentative s	 for both the	 Association and	 the	 School	 Board15 explained	that	the Association’s	January	2013	letter pertained	to the	length	of the	 teacher	 workday	 and	 that compensation	 was	 not	 raised	 until	 the	 two parties	met in	person to	impact	bargain. [¶25 ] Because	 there	 is	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record that the Association	did	not properly	notify	the School	Board in	writing of	its	intention to	bargain	over	matters	requiring	 the	appropriation	of	money ,	 the	MLRB	did not	 commit	 clear	 error when	 it	 found	 that	 the Association	 did	 not	 provide adequate	notice	to	satisfy 26	M.R.S.	§	965(1)

. See Minot	Sch.	Comm. ,	1998	ME 211,	¶	6,	7 17	A.2d	372

. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Andrew	 T.	 Mason,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Maine	 Education	 Association,	 Augusta,	 for appellant	SAD	3	Education	Association S.	 Campbell	 Badger,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 and	 Laurel	 A.V.	 McClead,	 Esq.,	 Drummond Woodsum	&	M acMahon,	PA,	Portland,	for	appellee	RSU	3	Board	of	Directors Lisa	 Copenhaver,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Maine	 Labor	 Relations	 Board,	 Augusta,	 for appellee Maine	Labor	Relations	Board

Kennebec	Superior	Court	docket	numbers	AP

- 2016

- 9	and	AP

- 2016

- 12 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY