THE

P

R

ESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON

BIO

E

THICS

the President’s Council on Bioethics

Washington, DC

July 2002

Human Cloning and Human Dignity

An Ethical Inquiry

www.bioethics.gov
HUMAN CLONING

AND 

HUMAN DIGNITY: 

An Ethical Inquiry 

THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

JULY 2002 

WWW.BIOETHICS.GOV
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iii

Contents 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT ix 

MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS xiii

COUNCIL STAFF AND CONSULTANTS xv

PREFACE xvii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xxi 

 Human Cloning: What Is at Stake? xxii 

 The Inquiry: Our Point of Departure xxii 

 Fair and Accurate Terminology xxiii 

 Scientific Background xxv 

 The Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children xxvii 

 The Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research xxx 

 A. The Moral Case for Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research xxx

 B. The Moral Case against Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research xxxii 

 Public Policy Options xxxiv 

 The Council’s Policy Recommendations xxxv 

 Majority Recommendation xxxv 

 Minority Recommendation xxxviii

1. THE MEANING OF HUMAN CLONING: AN OVERVIEW 1 

 Human Cloning in Context 4 

 Cloning and Human Procreation 6 

 Cloning and Biomedical Science 10 

 Cloning and Public Policy 14 

 The Report 17

2. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF CLONING 19 

 Scientific Milestones 19 

 Human Cloning from Popular Literature to Public Policy: From 

Brave New World to the Birth of Dolly 22 

 The Human Cloning Debate: From Dolly to the Present 28 

 Endnotes 33

3. ON TERMINOLOGY 37 

 Introduction: The Importance of Careful Use of Names 37 

 Tools of Analysis 40 

 Cloning: Toward an Appropriate Terminology 42 
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 Cloning-to-Produce-Children; Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 43 

 Cloned Human Embryo: The Product of SCNT 46 

 Conclusion 54 

 Endnotes 55

4. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 57 

 Introduction 57 

 Some Basic Facts about Human Cell Biology and Sexual 

Reproduction 58 

 Cloning (Asexual Reproduction) of Mammals 59 

 Epigenetic Modification and Reprogramming 62 

 Cloning-to-Produce-Children 64 

 Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine 65 

 Human Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 69 

 Parthenogenesis (Another Form of Asexual Reproduction) 71 

 Endnotes 71 

5. THE ETHICS OF CLONING-TO-PRODUCE-CHILDREN 75 

 I. The Case for Cloning-to-Produce-Children 78

 A. Purposes 78 

 1. To Produce Biologically Related Children 79 

 2. To Avoid Genetic Disease 79 

 3. To Obtain “Rejection-Proof” Transplants 79 

 4. To “Replicate” a Loved One 79 

 5. To Reproduce Individuals of Great Genius, Talent, or Beauty 80 

 B. Arguments 80 

 1. The Goodness of Human Freedom 80 

 2. The Goodness of Existence 81 

 3. The Goodness of Well-Being 82 

 C. Critique and Conclusion 83

 II. The Case against Cloning-To-Produce-Children 87 

 A. The Ethics of Human Experimentation 87 

 1. Problems of Safety 89 

 (a) Risks to the child 89 

 (b) Risks to the egg donor and the birth mother 90 

 (c) An abiding moral concern 91 

 2. A Special Problem of Consent 94 

 3. Problems of Exploitation of Women and Just Distribution of Risk 95 

 4. Conclusion 96

 B. The Human Context: Procreation and Child-Rearing 99 

 C. Identity, Manufacture, Eugenics, Family, and Society 101 

 1. Problems of Identity and Individuality 102 

 2. Concerns regarding Manufacture 104 

 3. Prospect of a New Eugenics 107 

 4. Troubled Family Relations 110 

 5. Effects on Society 112 
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 D. Conclusion 113 

 Endnotes 115

6. THE ETHICS OF CLONING-FOR-BIOMEDICAL-RESEARCH 117 

 I. The Manner and Spirit of This Inquiry 117

 II. The Human Meaning of Healing 123

 III. The Moral Case for Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 128 

 A. The Medical Promise of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 129 

 1. Cloning to Improve Understanding of Human Disease 130 

 2. Cloning to Devise New Treatments for Human Diseases 131 

 3. Cloning to Produce Immune-Compatible Tissues for Transplantation 132 

 4. Cloning to Assist in Gene Therapy 133 

 B. Possible Moral Dilemmas of Proceeding 133 

 1. Position Number One 133 

 (a) What is owed to the cloned embryo? 134 

 (i) The possibility of twinning 136 

 (ii) The moral significance of pregnancy and implantation 136 

 (iii) The significance of the developed human form 137 

 (iv) The meaning of “special respect” 138 

 (b) The problem of deliberate creation for use in research 140 

 (c) Development and use of cloned embryos beyond the earliest 

stages 142 

 (d) Exploitation of women who are egg donors 143 

 (e) The connection to cloning-to-produce-children 144 

 (f) Conclusion 146 

 2. Position Number Two 147 

 IV. The Moral Case against Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 150 

 A. What We Owe to the Embryo 152 

 B. What We Owe to Society 159 

 1. Asexual Reproduction and the Genetic Manipulation of Embryos 160 

 2. The Complete Instrumentalization of Nascent Human Life 161

 3. Opening the Door to Other Moral Hazards 163 

 4. Conclusion: What Prudence Requires 166 

 C. What We Owe to the Suffering 167 

 V. Conclusion 170 

 Endnotes 170

7. PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS 173 

 I. Science and Society 174

 II. Public Policy Options: General Considerations 177

 A. The Scope of Policy 177 

 B. A Legislative Complication 180 

 III. Public Policy Options: Specific Alternatives 182 

 A. Federal or State Jurisdiction? 183 

 B. Seven Basic Policy Options 185 
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 Policy Option 1: Professional self-regulation with no legislative action (“selfregulation”) 187 

 Policy Option 2: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with neither endorsement nor 

restriction of cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban plus silence”) 188

 Policy Option 3: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with regulation of the use of 

cloned embryos for biomedical research (“ban plus regulation”) 189 

 Policy Option 4: Governmental regulation, perhaps by a new federal agency, with no 

legislative prohibitions (“regulation of both”) 192 

 Policy Option 5: A ban on all human cloning, whether to produce children or for 

biomedical research (“ban on both”) 193 

 Policy Option 6: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with a moratorium, or temporary ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban plus moratorium”) 195 

 Policy Option 7: A moratorium, or temporary ban, on all human cloning, whether to 

produce children or for biomedical research (“moratorium on both”) 196

 Endnotes 198 

8. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 199 

 I. The Council’s Points of Departure in Formulating Policy 

Recommendations 200 

 II. First Proposal: Ban on Cloning-to-Produce-Children, 

Moratorium on Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research (Policy 

Option 6 of Chapter Seven) 205

 A. Strengths of the Proposal 206 

 1. Bans Cloning-to-Produce-Children 206 

 2. Provides a Highly Effective Means of Preventing Cloning-toProduce-Children 206 

 3. Calls for and Provides Time for Further Democratic Deliberation 207 

 (a) Seeking consensus on crossing a major moral boundary 207 

 (b) Gaining needed scientific evidence 208 

 (c) Promoting fuller and focused public debate, leading to a betterinformed decision 208 

 (d) Preserving a decent respect for the deep moral concerns of 

our fellow citizens 209 

 4. Provides Time and Incentive to Develop Adequate Regulation regarding 

Human Cloning 209 

 (a) Comprehensive scope 210 

 (b) Protections for egg donors 210 

 (c) Transparency and accountability 210 

 (d) Equal access to benefits 211 

 5. Calls for and Provides Time for a Comprehensive Review of the Entire 

Domain of Related Biotechnologies 211 

 6. Provides Time to Garner Long-Term Respect and Support for 

Biomedical Research and to Reaffirm the Social Contract between 

Science and Society 212 

 B. Some Specifics for the Legislation 213 

 1. Broad Coverage 213 

 2. Narrowly Drafted 213 
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 3. Temporary 213 

 C. Conclusion 214 

 III. Second Proposal: Ban on Cloning-to-Produce-Children, with 

Regulation of the Use of Cloned Embryos for Biomedical 

Research (Policy Option 3 of Chapter Seven) 218 

 A. Strengths of the Proposal 218 

 1. Bans Cloning-to-Produce-Children 218 

 2. Provides an Effective Means of Preventing Cloning-to-Produce-Children 219 

 3. Approves Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research and Permits It to Proceed 

without Substantial Delay 219 

 4. Establishes Necessary Protections against Possible Misuses and Abuses, 

Thus Paying the Respect Owed to Embryos Sacrificed in the Research 220 

 (a) Prevent cloned embryos from being used to initiate 

pregnancies 221 

 (b) Provide enforceable ethical guidelines for the use of cloned 

embryos for research 221 

 (c) Protect the adult participants in this research 222 

 (d) Promote equal access to the medical benefits that flow from this 

research. 222 

 5. Who Should Regulate This? 222 

 6. Calls for a Comprehensive Review of the Entire Domain of Embryo 

Research 222 

 B. Some Specifics for the Legislation 223 

 1. Broad Coverage 223

 2. Narrowly Drafted 223 

 C. Conclusion 223 

 IV. Recommendation 227

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 229 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 235 

APPENDIX: PERSONAL STATEMENTS 245 

 Elizabeth H. Blackburn 246

 Rebecca S. Dresser 249

 Daniel W. Foster 253 

 Michael S. Gazzaniga 255 

 Robert P. George (joined by Alfonso Gómez-Lobo) 258 

 William B. Hurlbut 267 

 Charles Krauthammer 277 

 Paul McHugh 286 

 William F. May 287 

 Gilbert C. Meilaender 288 

 Janet D. Rowley 292 

 Michael J. Sandel 294 

 James Q. Wilson 297
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THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS

Washington, D.C. 

July 10, 2002 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

I am pleased to present to you the first report of the President’s 

Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. The product of six months of discussion, research, reflection, and deliberation, we hope that it will prove a worthy 

contribution to public understanding of this momentous question. 

Man’s biotechnological powers are expanding in scope, at what 

seems an accelerating pace. Many of these powers are doubleedged, offering help for human suffering, yet threatening harm 

to human dignity. Human cloning, we are confident, is but a 

foretaste—the herald of many dazzling genetic and reproductive 

technologies that will raise profound moral questions well into 

the future. It is crucial that we try to understand its full human 

significance. 

We have tried to conduct our inquiry into human cloning unblinkered, with our eyes open not only to the benefits of the new 

biotechnologies but also to their challenges—moral, social, and 

political. We have not suppressed differences but sought rather 

to illuminate them, that all might better appreciate what is at 

stake. We have eschewed a thin utilitarian calculus of costs and 

benefits, or a narrow analysis based only on individual “rights.” 

Rather, we have tried to ground our reflections on the broader 

plane of human procreation and human healing, with their 

deeper meanings. Seen in this way, we find that the power to 

clone human beings is not just another in a series of powerful 

tools for overcoming unwanted infertility or treating disease. 
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Rather, cloning represents a turning point in human history—the 

crossing of an important line separating sexual from asexual procreation and the first step toward genetic control over the next 

generation. It thus carries with it a number of troubling consequences for children, family, and society. 

Although the Council is not unanimous, either in some of its 

ethical conclusions or its policy recommendations, we are 

unanimous in submitting the entire report as a fair and accurate 

reflection both of our views and of the state of the question. To 

summarize our findings briefly: 

First. The Council holds unanimously that cloning-to-producechildren is unethical, ought not to be attempted, and should be 

indefinitely banned by federal law, regardless of who performs 

the act or whether federal funds are involved. 

Second. On the related question of the ethics of cloning-forbiomedical research, the Council is of several minds and is divided in its policy preferences: 

• Seven Members (a minority), eager to see the research proceed, recommend permitting cloning-forbiomedical-research to go forward, but only under 

strict federal regulation. 

• Ten Members (a majority), convinced that no human 

cloning should be permitted at least for the time being, recommend instituting, by law, a four-year ban 

on cloning-for-biomedical-research, applicable to all 

researchers regardless of whether federal funds are 

involved. 

Third. The same ten-Member majority recommends a federal review of current and projected practices of human embryo research, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, genetic modification 

of human embryos and gametes, and related matters, with a view 

to recommending and shaping ethically sound policies for the 

entire field. A thorough federal review, during the moratorium, 
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could help to clarify the issues and foster a public consensus 

about how to proceed, not just on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch but on all the related reproductive and genetic technologies. We think this Council is well situated to initiate such a 

review, and we have already begun it. But we also stand ready to 

assist any other body that may be established to take up this 

large and complex subject. 

The extensive reasoning underlying these recommendations is 

given at length in the report and is well summarized in the Executive Summary, and so I shall not rehearse it here. 

On behalf of my Council colleagues, and our fine staff, allow me 

to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity you have given 

us to serve the nation on this weighty subject. 

Sincerely, 

LEON R. KASS, M.D. 

Chairman 
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Members of the President’s 

Council on Bioethics

LEON R. KASS, M.D., PH.D., Chairman. 

Addie Clark Harding Professor, The College and the Committee on 

Social Thought, University of Chicago. Hertog Fellow, American 

Enterprise Institute. 

ELIZABETH H. BLACKBURN, PH.D., D.SC. Professor, Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University 

of California-San Francisco. 

STEPHEN L. CARTER, J.D. 

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 

REBECCA S. DRESSER, J.D., M.S. 

Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University 

School of Law. Professor of Ethics in Medicine, Washington University School of Medicine. 

DANIEL W. FOSTER, M.D. 

Donald W. Seldin Distinguished Chair in Internal Medicine, Chairman of the Department of Internal Medicine, University of Texas 

Southwestern Medical School. 

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, PH.D. 

Bernard Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy, 

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns 

Hopkins University. 

MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, PH.D. 

David T. McLaughlin Distinguished Professor in Cognitive Neuroscience, Director, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth 

College. 
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ROBERT P. GEORGE, D.PHIL., J.D. 

McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Director of the James 

Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton 

University. 

MARY ANN GLENDON, J.D., M.COMP.L. 

Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard University. 

ALFONSO GÓMEZ-LOBO, PH.D. 

Ryan Family Professor of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy, 

Georgetown University. 

WILLIAM B. HURLBUT, M.D. 

Consulting Professor in Human Biology, Stanford University. 

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, M.D. 

Syndicated Columnist. 

WILLIAM F. MAY, PH.D. 

Cary M. Maguire Professor of Ethics Emeritus, Southern Methodist 

University. 

PAUL MCHUGH, M.D. 

Henry Phipps Professor of Psychiatry, Director of the Department 

of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Johns Hopkins University 

School of Medicine. Psychiatrist-in-chief, the Johns Hopkins Hospital. 

GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, PH.D. 

Richard & Phyllis Duesenberg Professor of Christian Ethics, Valparaiso University. 

JANET D. ROWLEY, M.D., D.SC. Blum-Riese Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine, Molecular 

Genetics and Cell Biology, and Human Genetics; Pritzker School of 

Medicine, University of Chicago. 

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, D.PHIL. Professor of Government, Harvard University. 

JAMES Q. WILSON, PH.D. 

James A. Collins Professor of Management and Public Policy 

Emeritus, University of California-Los Angeles. 
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Council Staff and Consultants 

Dean Clancy Executive Director 

Michelle R. Bell Receptionist/Staff Assistant 

Eric Cohen Senior Research Consultant 

Judith Crawford Administrative Director 

Diane M. Gianelli Director of Communications 

Emily Jones Executive Assistant 

Joshua Kleinfeld Research Analyst 

Gabriel Ledeen Intern 

Yuval Levin Senior Research Analyst 

Richard Roblin, Ph.D. Scientific Director 

Megan Suzann Steven Intern 

Brett Swearingen Intern 

Audrea R. Vann Staff Assistant 

Rachel Flick Wildavsky Director, Education Project 

Adam Wolfson Consultant 

Lee L. Zwanziger, Ph.D. Director of Research 
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Preface 

Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry is the first 

publication of the President’s Council on Bioethics, which was 

created by President George W. Bush on November 28, 2001, 

by means of Executive Order 13237. 

The Council’s purpose is to advise the President on bioethical issues related to advances in biomedical science and technology. 

In connection with its advisory role, the mission of the Council 

includes the following functions: 

• To undertake fundamental inquiry into the human and 

moral significance of developments in biomedical and 

behavioral science and technology. 

• To explore specific ethical and policy questions related to 

these developments. 

• To provide a forum for a national discussion of bioethical issues. 

• To facilitate a greater understanding of bioethical issues. 

• To explore possibilities for useful international collaboration on bioethical issues. 

President Bush left the Council free to establish its own priorities among the many issues encompassed within its charter, 

based on the urgency and gravity of those issues and the public 

need for practical guidance about them. 

The Council had little difficulty in choosing its first topic of inquiry. The ethics of human cloning has been the subject of intense discussion in the United States and throughout the world 

for more than five years, and it remains the subject of heated 

debate in Congress. On the surface, discussion has focused on 

the safety of cloning techniques, the hoped-for medical benefits 
xviii

of cloning research, and the morality of experimenting on human embryos. But driving the conversations are deeper concerns 

about where biotechnology may be taking us and what it might 

mean for human freedom, equality, and dignity. 

Human cloning, were it to succeed, would enable parents for the 

first time to determine the entire genetic makeup of their children. Bypassing sexual reproduction, it would move procreation 

increasingly under artful human control and in the direction of 

manufacture. Seen as a forerunner of possible future genetic engineering, it raises for many people concerns also about eugenics, the project to “improve” the human race. A world that practiced human cloning, we sense, could be a very different world, 

perhaps radically different, from the one we know. It is crucial 

that we try to understand, before it happens, whether, how, and 

why this may be so. 

Investigating human cloning also provides the Council an important opportunity to illustrate how bioethics can and should deal 

with those technological innovations that touch deeply our humanity. Here, as elsewhere, the most profound issues go beyond 

the commonplace and utilitarian concerns of feasibility, safety, 

and efficacy. In addition, on the policy side, cloning offers us a 

test case for considering whether public control of biotechnology is possible and desirable, and if so, by what means and at 

what cost. 

The Council commenced deliberations on the topic of human 

cloning at its first meeting in January 2002, and continued the 

discussion at its February, April, and June meetings, all held in 

Washington, D.C. We heard presentations on the recent cloning 

report of the National Academy of Sciences; on human stem cell 

research, embryonic and adult; on the ethics of embryo research; 

and on international systems of regulation of embryo research 

and assisted reproductive technologies. We received a great deal 

of public comment, oral and written. All told, we held twelve 

ninety-minute conversations on the subject. 
xix

Recognizing “the complex and often competing moral positions” on biomedical issues, President Bush specified in creating 

the Council that it need not be constrained by “an overriding 

concern to find consensus.” In this report we have chosen not 

to be so constrained. We have not suppressed disagreements in 

search of a single, watered-down position. Instead, we have presented clear arguments for the relevant moral and policy positions on multiple sides of these difficult questions, representing 

each as fairly and fully as we can. As a result, the reader will notice that, on some of the matters discussed in the report, Members of the Council are not all of one mind. Members are united, 

though, in endorsing the worthiness of the approach taken and 

the importance of the separate arguments made. Accordingly, 

the Council is unanimous in owning the entire report and in recommending all its discussions and arguments for serious consideration. 

Readers interested in delving further into this subject may wish 

to consult the Bibliography, which includes all of the documents 

referred to within the report, and also the verbatim transcripts of 

our meetings, posted at our website (www.bioethics.gov). 

It was in his remarks to the nation on federal funding of embryonic stem cell research, on August 9, 2001, that President Bush 

first declared his intention to create this Council. At the end of 

that speech, the President said: 

I will also name a President's council to monitor stem cell research, to recommend appropriate guidelines and regulations, and to consider all of the medical and ethical ramifications of biomedical innovation. . . . This 

council will keep us apprised of new developments and give our nation a forum to continue to discuss and evaluate these important 

issues. As we go forward, I hope we will always be guided by both intellect and heart, by 

both our capabilities and our conscience. 
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It has been our goal in these pages—and shall remain our goal in 

the future—to live up to the President’s high hopes and noble 

aspirations. 

LEON R. KASS, M.D. 

 Chairman 
xxi 

Executive Summary 

For the past five years, the prospect of human cloning has been 

the subject of considerable public attention and sharp moral debate, both in the United States and around the world. Since the 

announcement in February 1997 of the first successful cloning 

of a mammal (Dolly the sheep), several other species of mammals have been cloned. Although a cloned human child has yet 

to be born, and although the animal experiments have had low 

rates of success, the production of functioning mammalian 

cloned offspring suggests that the eventual cloning of humans 

must be considered a serious possibility. 

In November 2001, American researchers claimed to have produced the first cloned human embryos, though they reportedly 

reached only a six-cell stage before they stopped dividing and 

died. In addition, several fertility specialists, both here and 

abroad, have announced their intention to clone human beings. 

The United States Congress has twice taken up the matter, in 

1998 and again in 2001-2002, with the House of Representatives 

in July 2001 passing a strict ban on all human cloning, including 

the production of cloned human embryos. As of this writing, 

several cloning-related bills are under consideration in the Senate. Many other nations have banned human cloning, and the 

United Nations is considering an international convention on 

the subject. Finally, two major national reports have been issued 

on human reproductive cloning, one by the National Bioethics 

Advisory Commission (NBAC) in 1997, the other by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in January 2002. Both the 

NBAC and the NAS reports called for further consideration of 

the ethical and social questions raised by cloning. 

The debate over human cloning became further complicated in 

1998 when researchers were able, for the first time, to isolate 
xxii HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

human embryonic stem cells. Many scientists believe that these 

versatile cells, capable of becoming any type of cell in the body, 

hold great promise for understanding and treating many chronic 

diseases and conditions. Some scientists also believe that stem 

cells derived from cloned human embryos, produced explicitly for 

such research, might prove uniquely useful for studying many 

genetic diseases and devising novel therapies. Public reaction to 

the prospect of cloning-for-biomedical-research has been mixed: 

some Americans support it for its medical promise; others oppose it because it requires the exploitation and destruction of 

nascent human life, which would be created solely for research 

purposes. 

Human Cloning: What Is at Stake?

The intense attention given to human cloning in both its potential uses, for reproduction as well as for research, strongly suggests that people do not regard it as just another new technology. Instead, we see it as something quite different, something 

that touches fundamental aspects of our humanity. The notion 

of cloning raises issues about identity and individuality, the 

meaning of having children, the difference between procreation 

and manufacture, and the relationship between the generations. 

It also raises new questions about the manipulation of some 

human beings for the benefit of others, the freedom and value 

of biomedical inquiry, our obligation to heal the sick (and its limits), and the respect and protection owed to nascent human life. 

Finally, the legislative debates over human cloning raise large 

questions about the relationship between science and society, 

especially about whether society can or should exercise ethical 

and prudential control over biomedical technology and the conduct of biomedical research. Rarely has such a seemingly small 

innovation raised such big questions. 

The Inquiry: Our Point of Departure 

As Members of the President’s Council on Bioethics, we have 

taken up the larger ethical and social inquiry called for in the 
Executive Summary xxiii

NBAC and NAS reports, with the aim of advancing public understanding and informing public policy on the matter. We have 

attempted to consider human cloning (both for producing children and for biomedical research) within its larger human, technological, and ethical contexts, rather than to view it as an isolated technical development. We focus first on the broad human 

goods that it may serve as well as threaten, rather than on the 

immediate impact of the technique itself. By our broad approach, our starting on the plane of human goods, and our open 

spirit of inquiry, we hope to contribute to a richer and deeper 

understanding of what human cloning means, how we should 

think about it, and what we should do about it. 

On some matters discussed in this report, Members of the 

Council are not of one mind. Rather than bury these differences 

in search of a spurious consensus, we have sought to present all 

views fully and fairly, while recording our agreements as well as 

our genuine diversity of perspectives, including our differences 

on the final recommendations to be made. By this means, we 

hope to help policymakers and the general public appreciate 

more thoroughly the difficulty of the issues and the competing 

goods that are at stake. 

Fair and Accurate Terminology 

There is today much confusion about the terms used to discuss 

human cloning, regarding both the activity involved and the entities that result. The Council stresses the importance of striving 

not only for accuracy but also for fairness, especially because the 

choice of terms can decisively affect the way questions are 

posed, and hence how answers are given. We have sought terminology that most accurately conveys the descriptive reality of the 

matter, in order that the moral arguments can then proceed on 

the merits. We have resisted the temptation to solve the moral 

questions by artful redefinition or by denying to some morally 

crucial element a name that makes clear that there is a moral 

question to be faced. 
xxiv HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

On the basis of (1) a careful analysis of the act of cloning, and its 

relation to the means by which it is accomplished and the purposes it may serve, and (2) an extensive critical examination of 

alternative terminologies, the Council has adopted the following 

definitions for the most important terms in the matter of human 

cloning: 

• Cloning: A form of reproduction in which offspring result 

not from the chance union of egg and sperm (sexual reproduction) but from the deliberate replication of the 

genetic makeup of another single individual (asexual reproduction). 

• Human cloning: The asexual production of a new human 

organism that is, at all stages of development, genetically 

virtually identical to a currently existing or previously existing human being. It would be accomplished by introducing the nuclear material of a human somatic cell (donor) into an oocyte (egg) whose own nucleus has been 

removed or inactivated, yielding a product that has a 

human genetic constitution virtually identical to the donor of the somatic cell. (This procedure is known as 

“somatic cell nuclear transfer,” or SCNT). We have declined to use the terms “reproductive cloning” and 

“therapeutic cloning.” We have chosen instead to use the 

following designations: 

• Cloning-to-produce-children: Production of a cloned human 

embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of initiating 

a pregnancy, with the (ultimate) goal of producing a child 

who will be genetically virtually identical to a currently 

existing or previously existing individual. 

• Cloning-for-biomedical-research: Production of a cloned human embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of using it in research or for extracting its stem cells, with the 

(ultimate) goals of gaining scientific knowledge of normal and abnormal development and of developing cures 

for human diseases. 

• Cloned human embryo: (a) A human embryo resulting from 

the nuclear transfer process (as contrasted with a human 
Executive Summary xxv

embryo arising from the union of egg and sperm). (b) 

The immediate (and developing) product of the initial act 

of cloning, accomplished by successful SCNT, whether 

used subsequently in attempts to produce children or in 

biomedical research. 

Scientific Background 

Cloning research and stem cell research are being actively investigated and the state of the science is changing rapidly; significant 

new developments could change some of the interpretations in 

our report. At present, however, a few general points may be 

highlighted. 

• The technique of cloning. The following steps have been used 

to produce live offspring in the mammalian species that 

have been successfully cloned. Obtain an egg cell from a 

female of a mammalian species. Remove its nuclear 

DNA, to produce an enucleated egg. Insert the nucleus 

of a donor adult cell into the enucleated egg, to produce 

a reconstructed egg. Activate the reconstructed egg with 

chemicals or electric current, to stimulate it to commence cell division. Sustain development of the cloned 

embryo to a suitable stage in vitro, and then transfer it to 

the uterus of a female host that has been suitably prepared to receive it. Bring to live birth a cloned animal 

that is genetically virtually identical (except for the mitochondrial DNA) to the animal that donated the adult cell 

nucleus. 

• Animal cloning: low success rates, high morbidity. At least seven 

species of mammals (none of them primates) have been 

successfully cloned to produce live births. Yet the 

production of live cloned offspring is rare and the failure 

rate is high: more than 90 percent of attempts to initiate 

a clonal pregnancy do not result in successful live birth. 

Moreover, the live-born cloned animals suffer high rates 

of deformity and disability, both at birth and later on. 

Some biologists attribute these failures to errors or incompleteness of epigenetic reprogramming of the somatic cell nucleus. 
xxvi HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

• Attempts at human cloning. At this writing, it is uncertain 

whether anyone has attempted cloning-to-producechildren (although at least one physician is now claiming 

to have initiated several active clonal pregnancies, and 

others are reportedly working on it). We do not know 

whether a transferred cloned human embryo can progress all the way to live birth. 

• Stem cell research. Human embryonic stem cells have been 

isolated from embryos (produced by IVF) at the blastocyst stage or from the germinal tissue of fetuses. Human 

adult stem (or multipotent) cells have been isolated from 

a variety of tissues. Such cell populations can be 

differentiated in vitro into a number of different cell 

types, and are currently being studied intensely for their 

possible uses in regenerative medicine. Most scientists 

working in the field believe that stem cells (both 

embryonic and adult) hold great promise as routes 

toward cures and treatments for many human diseases 

and disabilities. All stem cell research is at a very early 

stage, and it is too soon to tell which approaches will 

prove most useful, and for which diseases. 

• The transplant rejection problem. To be effective as long-term 

treatments, cell transplantation therapies will have to 

overcome the immune rejection problem. Cells and tissues derived from adult stem cells and returned to the patient from whom they were taken would not be subject 

(at least in principle) to immune rejection. 

• Stem cells from cloned embryos. Human embryonic stem cell 

preparations could potentially be produced by using somatic cell nuclear transfer to produce a cloned human 

embryo, and then taking it apart at the blastocyst stage 

and isolating stem cells. These stem cells would be genetically virtually identical to cells from the nucleus donor, and thus could potentially be of great value in biomedical research. Very little work of this sort has been 

done to date in animals, and there are as yet no published

reports of cloned human embryos grown to the blastocyst 

stage. Although the promise of such research is at this 

time unknown, most researchers believe it will yield very 
Executive Summary xxvii

useful and important knowledge, pointing toward new 

therapies and offering one of several possible routes to 

circumvent the immune rejection problem. Although 

some experimental results in animals are indeed encouraging, they also demonstrate some tendency even of 

cloned stem cells to stimulate an immune response. 

• The fate of embryos used in research. All extractions of stem 

cells from human embryos, cloned or not, involve the 

destruction of these embryos. 

The Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 

Two separate national-level reports on human cloning (NBAC, 

1997; NAS, 2002) concluded that attempts to clone a human being would be unethical at this time due to safety concerns and 

the likelihood of harm to those involved. The Council concurs in 

this conclusion. But we have extended the work of these distinguished bodies by undertaking a broad ethical examination of 

the merits of, and difficulties with, cloning-to-produce-children. 

Cloning-to-produce-children might serve several purposes. It 

might allow infertile couples or others to have genetically-related 

children; permit couples at risk of conceiving a child with a genetic disease to avoid having an afflicted child; allow the bearing 

of a child who could become an ideal transplant donor for a particular patient in need; enable a parent to keep a living connection with a dead or dying child or spouse; or enable individuals 

or society to try to “replicate” individuals of great talent or 

beauty. These purposes have been defended by appeals to the 

goods of freedom, existence (as opposed to nonexistence), and 

well-being—all vitally important ideals. 

A major weakness in these arguments supporting cloning-toproduce-children is that they overemphasize the freedom, desires, and control of parents, and pay insufficient attention to the 

well-being of the cloned child-to-be. The Council holds that, 

once the child-to-be is carefully considered, these arguments are 

not sufficient to overcome the powerful case against engaging in 

cloning-to-produce-children. 
xxviii HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

First, cloning-to-produce-children would violate the principles of 

the ethics of human research. Given the high rates of morbidity 

and mortality in the cloning of other mammals, we believe that 

cloning-to-produce-children would be extremely unsafe, and that 

attempts to produce a cloned child would be highly unethical. 

Indeed, our moral analysis of this matter leads us to conclude 

that this is not, as is sometimes implied, a merely temporary objection, easily removed by the improvement of technique. We 

offer reasons for believing that the safety risks might be enduring, and offer arguments in support of a strong conclusion: that 

conducting experiments in an effort to make cloning-toproduce-children less dangerous would itself be an unacceptable 

violation of the norms of research ethics. There seems to be no ethical way to try to discover whether cloning-to-produce-children can become safe, 

now or in the future.

If carefully considered, the concerns about safety also begin to 

reveal the ethical principles that should guide a broader assessment of cloning-to-produce-children: the principles of freedom, 

equality, and human dignity. To appreciate the broader human 

significance of cloning-to-produce-children, one needs first to 

reflect on the meaning of having children; the meaning of asexual, as opposed to sexual, reproduction; the importance of origins and genetic endowment for identity and sense of self; the 

meaning of exercising greater human control over the processes 

and “products” of human reproduction; and the difference between begetting and making. Reflecting on these topics, the 

Council has identified five categories of concern regarding cloning-to-produce-children. (Different Council Members give varying moral weight to these different concerns.) 

• Problems of identity and individuality. Cloned children may 

experience serious problems of identity both because 

each will be genetically virtually identical to a human being who has already lived and because the expectations 

for their lives may be shadowed by constant comparisons to the life of the “original.” 

• Concerns regarding manufacture. Cloned children would be 

the first human beings whose entire genetic makeup is 
Executive Summary xxix

selected in advance. They might come to be considered 

more like products of a designed manufacturing process 

than “gifts” whom their parents are prepared to accept 

as they are. Such an attitude toward children could also 

contribute to increased commercialization and industrialization of human procreation. 

• The prospect of a new eugenics. Cloning, if successful, might 

serve the ends of privately pursued eugenic enhancement, either by avoiding the genetic defects that may 

arise when human reproduction is left to chance, or by 

preserving and perpetuating outstanding genetic traits, 

including the possibility, someday in the future, of using 

cloning to perpetuate genetically engineered enhancements. 

• Troubled family relations. By confounding and transgressing 

the natural boundaries between generations, cloning 

could strain the social ties between them. Fathers could 

become “twin brothers” to their “sons”; mothers could 

give birth to their genetic twins; and grandparents would 

also be the “genetic parents” of their grandchildren. 

Genetic relation to only one parent might produce special difficulties for family life. 

• Effects on society. Cloning-to-produce-children would affect not only the direct participants but also the entire 

society that allows or supports this activity. Even if practiced on a small scale, it could affect the way society 

looks at children and set a precedent for future 

nontherapeutic interventions into the human genetic endowment or novel forms of control by one generation 

over the next. In the absence of wisdom regarding these 

matters, prudence dictates caution and restraint. 

Conclusion: For some or all of these reasons, the Council is in full agreement 

that cloning-to-produce-children is not only unsafe but also morally unacceptable, and ought not to be attempted.
xxx HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

The Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research

Ethical assessment of cloning-for-biomedical-research is far 

more vexing. On the one hand, such research could lead to important knowledge about human embryological development 

and gene action, both normal and abnormal, ultimately resulting 

in treatments and cures for many dreaded illnesses and disabilities. On the other hand, the research is morally controversial because it involves the deliberate production, use, and ultimate destruction of cloned human embryos, and because the cloned 

embryos produced for research are no different from those that 

could be implanted in attempts to produce cloned children. The 

difficulty is compounded by what are, for now, unanswerable 

questions as to whether the research will in fact yield the benefits 

hoped for, and whether other promising and morally nonproblematic approaches might yield comparable benefits. The Council, reflecting the differences of opinion in American society, is 

divided regarding the ethics of research involving (cloned) embryos. Yet we agree that all parties to the debate have concerns vital to defend, vital not only to themselves but to all of us. No human being and no 

society can afford to be callous to the needs of suffering humanity, or cavalier 

about the treatment of nascent human life, or indifferent to the social effects 

of adopting one course of action rather than another. 

To make clear to all what is at stake in the decision, Council 

Members have presented, as strongly as possible, the competing 

ethical cases for and against cloning-for-biomedical-research in 

the form of first-person attempts at moral suasion. Each case 

has tried to address what is owed to suffering humanity, to the 

human embryo, and to the broader society. Within each case, 

supporters of the position in question speak only for themselves, 

and not for the Council as a whole. 

A. The Moral Case for Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 

The moral case for cloning-for-biomedical-research rests on our 

obligation to try to relieve human suffering, an obligation that 

falls most powerfully on medical practitioners and biomedical re-
Executive Summary xxxi

searchers. We who support cloning-for-biomedical-research all 

agree that it may offer uniquely useful ways of investigating and 

possibly treating many chronic debilitating diseases and disabilities, providing aid and relief to millions. We also believe that the 

moral objections to this research are outweighed by the great 

good that may come from it. Up to this point, we who support 

this research all agree. But we differ among ourselves regarding 

the weight of the moral objections, owing to differences about 

the moral status of the cloned embryo. These differences of 

opinion are sufficient to warrant distinguishing two different 

moral positions within the moral case for cloning-forbiomedical-research: 

Position Number One. Most Council Members who favor cloningfor-biomedical-research do so with serious moral concerns. 

Speaking only for ourselves, we acknowledge the following difficulties, but think that they can be addressed by setting proper 

boundaries. 

• Intermediate moral status. While we take seriously concerns 

about the treatment of nascent human life, we believe 

there are sound moral reasons for not regarding the embryo in its earliest stages as the moral equivalent of a 

human person. We believe the embryo has a developing 

and intermediate moral worth that commands our special 

respect, but that it is morally permissible to use earlystage cloned human embryos in important research under strict regulation. 

• Deliberate creation for use. We believe that concerns over 

the problem of deliberate creation of cloned embryos for 

use in research have merit, but when properly understood should not preclude cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. These embryos would not be “created for destruction,” but for use in the service of life and medicine. 

They would be destroyed in the service of a great good, 

and this should not be obscured. 

• Going too far. We acknowledge the concern that some researchers might seek to develop cloned embryos beyond 

the blastocyst stage, and for those of us who believe that 

the cloned embryo has a developing and intermediate 
xxxii HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

moral status, this is a very real worry. We approve, therefore, only of research on cloned embryos that is strictly 

limited to the first fourteen days of development—a 

point near when the primitive streak is formed and before organ differentiation occurs. 

• Other moral hazards. We believe that concerns about the 

exploitation of women and about the risk that cloningfor-biomedical-research could lead to cloning-toproduce-children can be adequately addressed by appropriate rules and regulations. These concerns need not 

frighten us into abandoning an important avenue of research. 

Position Number Two. A few Council Members who favor cloningfor-biomedical-research do not share all the ethical qualms expressed above. Speaking only for ourselves, we hold that this research, at least for the purposes presently contemplated, presents 

no special moral problems, and therefore should be endorsed 

with enthusiasm as a potential new means of gaining knowledge 

to serve humankind. Because we accord no special moral status 

to the early-stage cloned embryo and believe it should be treated 

essentially like all other human cells, we believe that the moral issues involved in this research are no different from those that 

accompany any biomedical research. What is required is the 

usual commitment to high standards for the quality of research, 

scientific integrity, and the need to obtain informed consent 

from donors of the eggs and somatic cells used in nuclear transfer. 

B. The Moral Case against Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 

The moral case against cloning-for-biomedical-research acknowledges the possibility—though purely speculative at the 

moment—that medical benefits might come from this particular 

avenue of experimentation. But we believe it is morally wrong 

to exploit and destroy developing human life, even for good reasons, and that it is unwise to open the door to the many undesirable consequences that are likely to result from this research. 

We find it disquieting, even somewhat ignoble, to treat what are 
Executive Summary xxxiii

in fact seeds of the next generation as mere raw material for satisfying the needs of our own. Only for very serious reasons 

should progress toward increased knowledge and medical advances be slowed. But we believe that in this case such reasons 

are apparent. 

• Moral status of the cloned embryo. We hold that the case for 

treating the early-stage embryo as simply the moral 

equivalent of all other human cells (Position Number 

Two, above) is simply mistaken: it denies the continuous 

history of human individuals from the embryonic to fetal 

to infant stages of existence; it misunderstands the meaning of potentiality; and it ignores the hazardous moral 

precedent that the routinized creation, use, and destruction of nascent human life would establish. We hold that 

the case for according the human embryo “intermediate 

and developing moral status” (Position Number One, 

above) is also unconvincing, for reasons both biological 

and moral. Attempts to ground the limited measure of 

respect owed to a maturing embryo in certain of its developmental features do not succeed, and the invoking 

of a “special respect” owed to nascent human life seems 

to have little or no operative meaning if cloned embryos 

may be created in bulk and used routinely with impunity. 

If from one perspective the view that the embryo seems 

to amount to little may invite a weakening of our respect, 

from another perspective its seeming insignificance 

should awaken in us a sense of shared humanity and a 

special obligation to protect it. 

• The exploitation of developing human life. To engage in cloning-for-biomedical-research requires the irreversible 

crossing of a very significant moral boundary: the creation of human life expressly and exclusively for the purpose of its use in research, research that necessarily involves its deliberate destruction. If we permit this research to proceed, we will effectively be endorsing the 

complete transformation of nascent human life into 

nothing more than a resource or a tool. Doing so would 

coarsen our moral sensibilities and make us a different 

society: one less humble toward that which we cannot 
xxxiv HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

fully understand, less willing to extend the boundaries of 

human respect ever outward, and more willing to transgress moral boundaries once it appears to be in our own 

interests to do so. 

• Moral harm to society. Even those who are uncertain about 

the precise moral status of the human embryo have 

sound ethical-prudential reasons to oppose cloning-forbiomedical-research. Giving moral approval to such research risks significant moral harm to our society by (1) 

crossing the boundary from sexual to asexual reproduction, thus approving in principle the genetic manipulation and control of nascent human life; (2) opening the 

door to other moral hazards, such as cloning-toproduce-children or research on later-stage human embryos and fetuses; and (3) potentially putting the federal 

government in the novel and unsavory position of mandating the destruction of nascent human life. Because we 

are concerned not only with the fate of the cloned embryos but also with where this research will lead our society, we think prudence requires us not to engage in this 

research. 

• What we owe the suffering. We are certainly not deaf to the 

voices of suffering patients; after all, each of us already 

shares or will share in the hardships of mortal life. We 

and our loved ones are all patients or potential patients. 

But we are not only patients, and easing suffering is not 

our only moral obligation. As much as we wish to alleviate suffering now and to leave our children a world 

where suffering can be more effectively relieved, we also 

want to leave them a world in which we and they want to 

live—a world that honors moral limits, that respects all 

life whether strong or weak, and that refuses to secure 

the good of some human beings by sacrificing the lives 

of others. 

Public Policy Options 

The Council recognizes the challenges and risks of moving from 

moral assessment to public policy. Reflections on the “social con-
Executive Summary xxxv

tract” between science and society highlight both the importance 

of scientific freedom and the need for boundaries. We note that 

other countries often treat human cloning in the context of a 

broad area of biomedical technology, at the intersection of reproductive technology, embryo research, and genetics, while the public policy debate in the United States has treated cloning largely on 

its own. We recognize the special difficulty in formulating sound 

public policy in this area, given that the two ethically distinct matters—cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedicalresearch—will be mutually affected or implicated in any attempts 

to legislate about either. Nevertheless, our ethical and policy analysis leads us to the conclusion that some deliberate public policy at 

the federal level is needed in the area of human cloning. 

We reviewed the following seven possible policy options and considered their relative strengths and weaknesses: (1) Professional 

self-regulation but no federal legislative action (“self-regulation”); 

(2) A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with neither endorsement nor restriction of cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban plus 

silence”); (3) A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with regulation of the use of cloned embryos for biomedical research (“ban 

plus regulation”); (4) Governmental regulation, with no legislative 

prohibitions (“regulation of both”); (5) A ban on all human cloning, whether to produce children or for biomedical research (“ban 

on both”); (6) A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with a moratorium or temporary ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban 

plus moratorium”); or (7) A moratorium or temporary ban on all 

human cloning, whether to produce children or for biomedical research (“moratorium on both”). 

The Council’s Policy Recommendations 

Having considered the benefits and drawbacks of each of these 

options, and taken into account our discussions and reflections 

throughout this report, the Council recommends two possible policy alternatives, each supported by a portion of the Members. 

Majority Recommendation: Ten Members of the Council recommend 

a ban on cloning-to-produce-children combined with a four-year moratorium on 
xxxvi HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

cloning-for-biomedical-research. We also call for a federal review of current and 

projected practices of human embryo research, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, genetic modification of human embryos and gametes, and related matters, 

with a view to recommending and shaping ethically sound policies for the entire 

field. Speaking only for ourselves, those of us who support this 

recommendation do so for some or all of the following reasons: 

• By permanently banning cloning-to-produce-children, this 

policy gives force to the strong ethical verdict against 

cloning-to-produce-children, unanimous in this Council 

(and in Congress) and widely supported by the American 

people. And by enacting a four-year moratorium on the 

creation of cloned embryos, it establishes an additional 

safeguard not afforded by policies that would allow the 

production of cloned embryos to proceed without delay. 

• It calls for and provides time for further democratic deliberation about cloning-for-biomedical research, a subject 

about which the nation is divided and where there remains 

great uncertainty. A national discourse on this subject has 

not yet taken place in full, and a moratorium, by making it 

impossible for either side to cling to the status-quo, would 

force both to make their full case before the public. By 

banning all cloning for a time, it allows us to seek moral 

consensus on whether or not we should cross a major 

moral boundary (creating nascent cloned human life solely 

for research) and prevents our crossing it without deliberate decision. It would afford time for scientific evidence, 

now sorely lacking, to be gathered—from animal models 

and other avenues of human research—that might give us 

a better sense of whether cloning-for-biomedical-research 

would work as promised, and whether other morally nonproblematic approaches might be available. It would promote a fuller and better-informed public debate. And it 

would show respect for the deep moral concerns of the 

large number of Americans who have serious ethical objections to this research. 

• Some of us hold that cloning-for-biomedical-research can 

never be ethically pursued, and endorse a moratorium to 

enable us to continue to make our case in a democratic 

way. Others of us support the moratorium because it 
Executive Summary xxxvii

would provide the time and incentive required to develop 

a system of national regulation that might come into use 

if, at the end of the four-year period, the moratorium were 

not reinstated or made permanent. Such a system could 

not be developed overnight, and therefore even those 

who support the research but want it regulated should see 

that at the very least a pause is required. In the absence of 

a moratorium, few proponents of the research would have 

much incentive to institute an effective regulatory system. 

Moreover, the very process of proposing such regulations 

would clarify the moral and prudential judgments involved 

in deciding whether and how to proceed with this research. 

• A moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research would 

enable us to consider this activity in the larger context of 

research and technology in the areas of developmental biology, embryo research, and genetics, and to pursue a 

more comprehensive federal regulatory system for setting 

and executing policy in the entire area. 

• Finally, we believe that a moratorium, rather than a lasting 

ban, signals a high regard for the value of biomedical research and an enduring concern for patients and families 

whose suffering such research may help alleviate. It would 

reaffirm the principle that science can progress while upholding the community’s moral norms, and would therefore reaffirm the community’s moral support for science 

and biomedical technology. 

The decision before us is of great importance. Creating cloned 

embryos for any purpose requires crossing a major moral boundary, with grave risks and likely harms, and once we cross it there 

will be no turning back. Our society should take the time to make 

a judgment that is well-informed and morally sound, respectful of 

strongly held views, and representative of the priorities and principles of the American people. We believe this ban-plus-moratorium 

proposal offers the best means of achieving these goals. 

 

This position is supported by Council Members Rebecca S. 

Dresser, Francis Fukuyama, Robert P. George, Mary Ann 
xxxviii HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Glendon, Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, William B. Hurlbut, Leon R. 

Kass, Charles Krauthammer, Paul McHugh, and Gilbert C. 

Meilaender. 

Minority Recommendation: Seven Members of the Council recommend a ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with regulation of the use of 

cloned embryos for biomedical research. Speaking only for ourselves, 

those of us who support this recommendation do so for some or 

all of the following reasons: 

• By permanently banning cloning-to-produce-children, this 

policy gives force to the strong ethical verdict against cloning-to-produce-children, unanimous in this Council (and in 

Congress) and widely supported by the American people. 

We believe that a ban on the transfer of cloned embryos to 

a woman’s uterus would be a sufficient and effective legal 

safeguard against the practice. 

• It approves cloning-for-biomedical-research and permits it to proceed 

without substantial delay. This is the most important advantage of this proposal. The research shows great promise, 

and its actual value can only be determined by allowing it 

to go forward now. Regardless of how much time we allow 

it, no amount of experimentation with animal models can 

provide the needed understanding of human diseases. The 

special benefits from working with stem cells from cloned

human embryos cannot be obtained using embryos obtained by IVF. We believe this research could provide relief to millions of Americans, and that the government 

should therefore support it, within sensible limits imposed 

by regulation. 

• It would establish, as a condition of proceeding, the necessary 

regulatory protections to avoid abuses and misuses of 

cloned embryos. These regulations might touch on the secure handling of embryos, licensing and prior review of research projects, the protection of egg donors, and the provision of equal access to benefits. 

• Some of us also believe that mechanisms to regulate cloning-for-biomedical-research should be part of a larger regulatory program governing all research involving human 

embryos, and that the federal government should initiate a 
Executive Summary xxxix

review of present and projected practices of human embryo research, with the aim of establishing reasonable policies on the matter. 

Permitting cloning-for-biomedical-research now, while governing 

it through a prudent and sensible regulatory regime, is the most 

appropriate way to allow important research to proceed while insuring that abuses are prevented. We believe that the legitimate 

concerns about human cloning expressed throughout this report 

are sufficiently addressed by this ban-plus-regulation proposal, and 

that the nation should affirm and support the responsible effort to 

find treatments and cures that might help many who are suffering. 

This position is supported by Council Members Elizabeth H. 

Blackburn, Daniel W. Foster, Michael S. Gazzaniga, William F. 

May, Janet D. Rowley, Michael J. Sandel, and James Q. Wilson. 

1 

Chapter One

The Meaning of Human Cloning: An 

Overview 

The prospect of human cloning* burst into the public consciousness in 1997, following the announcement of the successful cloning of Dolly the sheep. It has since captured much attention and generated great debate, both in the United States and 

around the world. Many are repelled by the idea of producing 

children who would be genetically virtually identical to preexisting individuals, and believe such a practice unethical. But 

some see in such cloning the possibility to do good for infertile 

couples and the broader society. Some want to outlaw it, and 

many nations have done so. Others believe the benefits outweigh the risks and the moral concerns, or they oppose legislative interference with science and technology in the name of 

freedom and progress. 

Complicating the national dialogue about human cloning is the 

isolation in 1998 of human embryonic stem cells, which many 

scientists believe to hold great promise for understanding and 

treating many chronic diseases and conditions. Some scientists 

also believe that stem cells derived from cloned human embryos, 

produced explicitly for such research, might prove to be 

uniquely useful for studying many genetic diseases and devising 

novel therapies. Public reaction to this prospect has been mixed, 

 

* The term “human cloning” is used in this chapter to refer to all human cloning: cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research. When 

only one particular use of human cloning is intended, we use the more specific term. A full discussion of our choice of terminology is provided in Chapter Three. 
2 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

with some Americans supporting it in the hope of advancing 

biomedical research and helping the sick and the suffering, while 

others are concerned about the instrumentalization or abuse of 

nascent human life and the resulting danger of moral insensitivity and degradation. 

In the United States, several attempts have been made to initiate 

a comprehensive public review of the significance of human 

cloning and to formulate appropriate policies. Most notably, the 

National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) released a report on the subject of cloning-to-produce-children in 1997.*

 

The Commission concluded that cloning-to-produce-children 

was, at least for the time being, unethical on safety grounds, and 

that the deeper and more permanent moral concerns surrounding the practice should be the subject of continuing deliberation 

“in order to further our understanding of the ethical and social 

implications of this technology and to enable society to produce 

appropriate long-term policies regarding this technology” (p. 

106). 

In this report, the President’s Council on Bioethics takes up this 

important charge, and considers the ethical and social implications of human cloning (both for producing children and for 

biomedical research) in their full scope, with the aim of informing public policy on the matter. 

Our work toward this end is guided by a number of explicit 

methodological choices about modes of approach, points of departure, and spirit of inquiry. We locate human cloning within its 

larger human and technological context, rather than consider it 

in isolation. We focus first on the broad human goods that it 

may serve or threaten, rather than on the immediate impact of 

the technique itself. And we present the strongest arguments for 

the relevant moral and policy positions, rather than frame the arguments in order to seek consensus. By our broad approach, our 

* Cloning Human Beings, Rockville, MD: National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1997. Human embryonic stem cells had not yet been isolated at the time 

of the NBAC report, so the Commission did not offer any recommendations 

on cloning-for-biomedical-research. 
Chapter One: Overview 3

starting on the plane of human goods, and our open spirit of inquiry, we hope to contribute to a richer and deeper understanding of what human cloning entails, how we should think about it, 

and what we should do about it. 

Two points of clarification before we proceed. First, all of our 

considerations and arguments assume that cloning techniques, 

both for producing children and for providing embryos useful in 

biomedical research, could succeed in human beings as they have 

with other mammals. Cloning-to-produce-children has never 

been successfully carried out in humans, and cloning embryos 

for biomedical research has not progressed beyond the earliest 

experiments. We consider it part of our task to judge whether 

even attempts at human cloning would be ethical or should be 

lawful. To conduct the analysis and assessment needed for such 

judgment, we necessarily proceed on the assumption, which we 

believe is supported by evidence from animal experiments, that 

human cloning is indeed a possibility—that sooner or later, if it 

were allowed and attempted, human cloning could be successfully carried out. Practically all public discussion of the ethics of 

human cloning has, whether expressly or not, proceeded on this 

same premise, and rightly so. 

Second, on some of the matters discussed in this report, Members of the Council are not of one mind. Given that competing 

goods are at stake, and different people regard them differently, 

this is not at all surprising. Rather than bury these differences in 

search of a spurious consensus, we have sought to present all 

views fairly and fully. Yet transcending these differences is a 

more fundamental agreement about the worthiness of the approach we have adopted and the arguments we have made. Accordingly, the Council is unanimous in owning the entire report 

and in recommending, to all, the report’s discussions and arguments for serious consideration. 

In the remainder of this overview, we describe the context of 

human cloning and the discussions it has generated. In the 

course of doing so, we identify the kinds of questions and concerns that would permit a full assessment of the meaning of hu-
4 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

man cloning. These questions and concerns will guide us 

throughout the report. 

Human Cloning in Context 

It is useful to begin by observing how it is that the question of 

human cloning has come before us. The prospect of cloning 

human beings confronts us now not as the result of a strong 

public demand or a long-standing need. Unlike sought-for medical therapies, it was not at the outset pursued as a cure for disease. Neither has it been sought explicitly as a tool for genetic 

control or “enhancement” of human offspring. Cloning has 

arisen not so much because it was actively sought for its own 

sake, but because it is a natural extension of certain biotechnological advances of the past several decades.*

For more than half a century, and at an accelerating pace, biomedical scientists have been gaining wondrous new knowledge 

of the workings of living beings, from small to great. Increasingly, they also are providing precise and sophisticated knowledge of the workings of the human body and mind. Such knowledge of how things work often leads to new technological powers to control or alter these workings, powers ordinarily sought 

in order to treat human disease and relieve suffering. 

Questions regarding the meaning of acquiring such powers—

both the promise and the peril—have attracted scholarly and 

public attention. For more than thirty years, ethical issues related 

to biomedical advance have occupied the growing field of bioethics. Increasingly, these ethical issues have spawned public discussion and debates. A growing number of people sense that 

something new and momentous is happening; that the accelerating waves of biotechnical advances touch deeply on our most 

human concerns; and that the centuries-old project for human 

* Chapter Two summarizes selected historical aspects of the emergence of 

cloning research and public reactions to the prospect of human cloning. 

Chapter Four summarizes selected aspects of the current state of the relevant 

science and technology. 
Chapter One: Overview 5

mastery of nature may now be, so to speak, coming home, giving 

humanity the power to alter and “master” itself. 

One important aspect of human life already affected by new biotechnologies is human reproduction. For several decades now, 

building on advances in genetics, cell biology, and developmental 

biology, and on technologies used first in animal husbandry, scientists around the world have been adapting techniques and developing tools to study, influence, and manipulate the origins of 

human life. Beginning with techniques of artificial insemination 

and progressing through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection, artificial aids to reproduction have 

come into standard medical use. 

Cloning is, in one sense, another step along this path. It developed as the result of research into mammalian reproduction and 

development, where it is desired also as a means of replicating 

animals especially useful to human beings. It is also proposed as 

an additional means to overcome infertility in humans. 

But the controversy surrounding human cloning, and the widespread sense of disquiet and concern with which the prospect 

has been received around the world, make it clear that cloning is 

not just another reproductive technology, to be easily assimilated 

into ordinary life. Nearly all participants in the public debate 

over human cloning appear to agree that the subject touches 

upon some of the most fundamental questions regarding the nature of our humanity and the character of our society. In addition, it raises questions about the aims of biomedical science and 

about the relation between science and society, including the 

possibility and desirability of exercising public control over the 

uses of biomedical technology and the conduct of biomedical research. It is because we sense these larger entailments that the 

subject of cloning matters so much to us. It is these considerations that give the present debate its force and prominence. Thus 

only through a serious reflection on these broader questions can 

the full meaning of human cloning be discovered. The prospect 

of human cloning may have been brought before us by the 

march of biotechnology, but now that it is here it is incumbent 
6 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

upon us to look well beyond its technical and medical aspects, if 

we are to appreciate its significance in full. 

Three areas of inquiry in particular seem essential to any understanding of the full meaning of human cloning: the nature and 

meaning of human procreation; the aims, ends, and means of 

biomedical science and technology; and the relation of science 

and technology to the larger society. 

Cloning and Human Procreation 

Human procreation provides the major context for considering 

the prospect of cloning, especially cloning-to-produce-children. 

Much of the time, most of us tend to take for granted this central aspect of human life, through which all of us come to be and 

through which we give birth to our posterity. But the prospect 

of creating children by cloning brings this subject sharply before 

us and compels us to examine the nature and meaning of human 

procreation. For cloning-to-produce-children, while it may be a 

potential aid to human reproduction, appears also to be a substitute for it, or at least for its natural, un-programmed, sexual 

character. Properly to assess the meaning of producing cloned 

children, one must first of all consider the meaning of human 

procreation in all its aspects and entailments.*

 

 

Human procreation, though seemingly an exclusively private act, 

has a profoundly public meaning. It determines the relations between one generation and the next, shapes identities, creates attachments, and sets up responsibilities for the care and rearing of 

children (and the care of aging parents or other needy kin). 

Thus, in considering proposals to clone children, we must ask 

ourselves what cloning would mean not only for the individual 

* In order to be sure that we explore fully the human meaning of cloning, we 

shall examine it in comparison with natural unaided human reproduction, 

rather than assisted reproduction, say, with in vitro fertilization. The established reproductive technologies do provide some useful points of comparison, but they cannot be taken as the most helpful baseline for understanding 

the significance of cloning. For that, normal sexual reproduction is the appropriate basis of comparison. 
Chapter One: Overview 7

parents and children involved, but also for the surrounding families and for all of society. Opinions on this subject will of course 

differ, sometimes widely, as they rest on possibly differing perceptions of human procreation and family life. Yet the following 

basic observations, concerns, and questions seem pertinent, 

notwithstanding possible differences of opinion among us about 

how much weight to give them. 

Among the important aspects of the topic are these: the meaning 

of having children; the meaning of sexual, as opposed to asexual, 

reproduction; the meaning of origins and genetic endowment for 

identity and sense of self; the meaning of exercising greater human control over the processes and “products” of human reproduction; and the difference between begetting and making. 

To understand what it would mean to clone a child, we do well 

to consider most generally what it means to bring a child into the 

world, and with what attitude we should regard his or her arrival 

and presence. Our children are, to begin with, our replacements, 

those who will one day stand in our place. They are, as Hans 

Jonas has remarked, “life’s own answer to mortality.” Though 

their conception is the fruit of our activity, and though we are 

responsible for saying “yes” to their arrival, we do not, in normal 

procreation, command their conception, control their makeup, 

or rule over their development and birth. They are, in an important sense, “given” to us. Though they are our children, they are 

not our property. Though they are our flesh and blood, and 

deeply kin, they are also independent “strangers” who arrive 

suddenly out of the darkness and whom we must struggle to get 

to know. Though we may seek to have them for our own selffulfillment, they exist also and especially for their own sakes. 

Though we seek to educate them, they are not like our other 

projects, determined strictly according to our plans and serving 

only our desires. 

If these observations are correct, certain things follow regarding 

the attitudes we should have toward our children. We treat them 

rightly when we treat them as gifts rather than as products, and 

when we treat them as independent beings whom we are duty-
8 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

bound to protect and nurture rather than as extensions of ourselves subject only to our wills and whims. Might these attitudes 

toward children be altered by cloning, and, if so, how? Would 

social attitudes toward children change, even if cloning were not 

practiced widely? What might these changes mean? 

To understand how the introduction of asexual reproduction 

might affect human life, we must first seek the intrinsic meaning 

of the sexual character of human reproduction and what it implies for individuals, for families, and for the relation between 

the generations. Once again, the following observations—while 

hardly exhaustive—seem pertinent and important. 

In sexual reproduction,* each child has two complementary biological progenitors. Each child thus stems from and unites exactly two lineages, lines that trace backward in similar branching 

fashion for ages. Moreover, the precise genetic endowment of 

each child is determined by a combination of nature and chance, 

not by human design: each human child naturally acquires and 

shares the common human species genotype, each child is genetically (equally) kin to each (both) parent(s), yet each child is 

also genetically unique.†

 Cloning-to-produce-children departs 

from this pattern. A cloned child has unilineal, not bilineal, descent; he or she is genetically kin to only one progenitor. What is 

more, the genetic kinship is near-total: the cloned child is not 

genetically unique, but shares almost completely the genetic endowment of the “original” progenitor. Finally, this endowment 

* The term “sexual reproduction” has two related meanings: the first refers to 

the act of sexual intercourse that initiates conception by introducing sperm 

into a woman’s generative tract; the second refers to the conception itself, the 

combination of genetic material from egg and sperm that results in a new organism with a unique genotype. Assisted reproduction techniques like IVF 

do not involve the former, but do involve the latter and are therefore still 

rightly considered sexual reproduction. (Likewise, children who are adopted 

are the fruit of sexual reproduction.) Cloning involves neither, and is therefore described as “asexual reproduction.” The second and more fundamental 

meaning of “sexual reproduction,” the union of egg and sperm that results in a 

new genetically unique organism, is the basis of our discussion in this section. 

† The apparent exception of identical twins is discussed in Chapter Five. 
Chapter One: Overview 9

comes to the cloned child not by chance but by human choice 

and decision. What do these differences mean for the cloned 

child, for family relations, and for relations across the generations? 

Origins and genetic endowment are significant aspects of who 

one is and how one regards oneself, of one’s “identity,” individuality, and place in the social order. The biological linkages 

and prospects implicit in sexual reproduction help to define us, 

though, it should go without saying, they do not define us completely. While we are more “what we choose to become” than 

we are “where we came from,” our human beginnings matter, 

biologically, psychically, and socially. Because of the way we are 

generated, each of us is at once (1) equally human, (2) equally 

marked by and from birth as mortal, (3) equally enmeshed in a 

particular familial nexus of origin, (4) equally individuated in our 

trajectory from the beginning to the end of our lives—and, if all 

goes well, (5) equally capable (despite our mortality) of 

participating with a complementary other in the very same renewal of human possibility through procreation. Our genetic 

identity—manifest, for instance, in our distinctive appearance by 

which we are recognized by others and in our immune system by 

which we maintain our integrity against “foreign invasions”—

also symbolizes and foreshadows exactly the unique, never-tobe-repeated character of each human life. In addition, human 

societies virtually everywhere have structured child-rearing 

responsibilities and systems of identity and relationships on the 

bases of these natural facts of begetting. Kinship is tied to 

origins, and identity, at least in part, is tied to kinship. It is 

against this background that we must consider the implications 

of clonal reproduction, and the alterations it might produce in 

how cloned children would regard themselves and how they 

would be regarded by others. What would cloning-to-producechildren mean for individual identity, for kinship, and for sense 

of self, not only for the cloned child but also for his or her 

family? 

Unaided sexual procreation is an activity at once natural, private, 

mysterious, unmediated, unpredictable, and undesigned. With 

the arrival of techniques such as IVF to assist procreation in the 
10 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

face of infertility, the process becomes less private and more 

mediated. But although technique is used, the basic structure of 

sexual reproduction—the combination of genetic material from 

father and mother resulting in a genetically unique child—is unaltered, the outcome is still unpredictable, and the genetic endowment of the child remains uncontrolled and undesigned. 

Cloning-to-produce-children would seem to bring procreation 

under human control and direction. What would this mean? 

What are the implications of allowing reproductive activities to 

become increasingly technological and commercialized? Cloning 

would be the first instance in which parents could select in advance the precise (or nearly precise) genetic makeup of their 

child, by selecting the donor to be cloned. It therefore forces us 

to ask what might be the difference between begetting and making, to wonder whether cloning somehow crosses the line between them, and, if so, to consider whether and why that should 

worry us. 

Though admittedly sketchy and incomplete, these preliminary reflections on the nature and meaning of human procreation 

should enable us to see cloning—and especially cloning-toproduce-children—in its most important human context and to 

understand its deepest implications for its practitioners and for 

society. 

Cloning and Biomedical Science 

Human procreation is not the only context for evaluating the 

prospect of human cloning. As a product of biotechnology, a 

potential means of assisted reproduction, and a possible source 

of cloned embryos for research and medical use, human cloning 

also points us to questions about the aims, ends, and means of 

biomedical science and technology. Ordinarily, we are not 

prompted to much reflection about what science is for and what 

goals technology should serve. Our society tacitly accepts the 

self-directing and self-augmenting character of these activities, 

and the vast majority of us support them because we esteem and 

benefit from their contributions to human understanding and 

human welfare. However, when developments such as cloning 
Chapter One: Overview 11

raise profound questions affecting fundamental moral values and 

social institutions, we are forced to consider the ends and means 

of science and technology, and to explore their standing in the 

scheme of human goods. 

To provide a context for assessing human cloning and its possible benefits, we do well to remember the goals of medicine and 

modern science: the great value and importance of treating disease and relieving suffering, including the sorrows of infertility; 

and the great value and importance of gaining knowledge about 

the workings of nature, our own nature emphatically included. 

No one can doubt the merit of these noble aims. Yet there has 

always been some disagreement about the lengths to which we 

should allow ourselves to go in serving them. Questions therefore arise about the need for limits on scientific pursuits and 

technological activities, and, conversely, about the meaning of 

such limits for the scientific and technological enterprises. 

To address these questions, we must appreciate the human good 

of biomedical science in its fullness, and we must ask about the 

necessary and sufficient conditions for its flourishing. We must 

recognize, among other things, the unpredictability of scientific 

discovery and technological innovation, and the importance, 

therefore, of keeping open lines of inquiry and experimentation 

regardless of current estimates of their likelihood of success. Although serendipity often favors the prepared mind, nature 

guards her secrets well, and even the best scientists are regularly 

surprised by where the keys to the locks are ultimately found. 

But precisely because so much of biomedical science is exploratory and experimental, scientific inquiry is not just thought but 

also action, action often involving research on living subjects, including human beings. And precisely because the use of technologies often has unintended or undesirable side effects, affecting many human goods in addition to health, safety, and the relief of suffering, large questions are necessarily raised when the 

goods promoted by technology come into conflict with others. 

For example, is the need to discover new cures for the sick a 

moral imperative that should trump all other goods and values? 
12 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

If not, then on what basis can it be limited? What moral boundaries should scientists and technologists respect as they continue 

their quests for knowledge and cures, whether or not they receive public funding? How can society establish and enforce 

such boundaries? And, on the other hand, how can science and 

technology be protected against unreasonable limitations imposed by excessively fearful legislators or overzealous regulators? 

To be sure, these large questions are hard to answer in the abstract. As a result, they do not recommend themselves for much 

deliberation. Yet they are very close to the surface of the current 

debate about human cloning. Moreover, implicit answers to 

these questions, seldom articulated and rarely defended save by 

mere assertion, at least color and may even determine what people think should be done about human cloning. A clearer and 

more thoughtful awareness of the aims of biomedical science 

could help us assess whether and how human cloning might 

serve the ends of science and medicine and could help us more 

fully consider its possible benefits and potential drawbacks. 

But we must consider not only the ends of science, but also the 

means it employs. Cloning, after all, is a technique, a means of 

reaching some desired end. Even if the purposes it might serve 

are worthy, it must still be evaluated as a means. Not every 

means employed in the pursuit of worthy ends can pass ethical 

muster. This truth is widely recognized in the establishment of 

canons of ethics regarding the use of human subjects in research. 

It is also recognized in the established practice of technology assessment, which seeks to find the least problematic and least 

dangerous means for achieving a desirable end. 

For instance, as a means of treating infertility or of providing a 

suitable source of compatible organs for transplantation, cloning 

raises difficulties having to do with human dignity and the costs 

of “manufacture” of the sort discussed earlier. Human cloning 

also raises questions about the ethics of research with human 

subjects, with risks of harm to the child-to-be, the egg donor, 

and the woman who would bring the cloned child to birth, questions that we shall take up in some detail in Chapter Five. Yet 
Chapter One: Overview 13

 

the most highly controverted moral argument about human 

cloning research involves a human subject not always considered 

when the ethics of research is discussed: the early human embryo. Because all cloning begins with the production of embryonic clones, and because such clones are potentially highly useful 

in biomedical research, questions of the ethics of means are absolutely central to the debate about the morality of cloning. 

Ethical questions regarding the use of human embryos in research are, of course, not unique to cloning. They have been 

central to the recent and continuing controversy about federal 

funding of research on human embryonic stem cells, because 

human embryos produced by IVF offer possibilities for medical 

advances, beyond their use in assisted reproduction. The use of 

embryos has aided research on early human development. These 

embryos are also the source of human embryonic stem cells, 

pluripotent cells*

 that may be induced to develop into all the tissues of the body. These stem cells thus may hold great promise 

for future treatment of chronic degenerative diseases and disabilities. 

The difficulty arises because the embryos put to use in these 

ways are themselves destroyed. This fact raises serious and troubling questions about the proper way to regard these nascent 

human organisms and the morally appropriate way to treat them. 

Cloning techniques might provide an even more useful source of 

embryos for biomedical research than current IVF techniques. 

Human cloning could yield numerous identical embryos, could 

provide for the study of stem cells derived from individuals 

known to possess genetic diseases, and might eventually yield 

transplantable tissues for regenerative medicine that would escape immune rejection. Human cloning-for-biomedical-research 

therefore brings the moral question of means before us with 

even greater force. It calls on us to think of the good of medical 

advances and the relief of human suffering while at the same 

time considering our responsibilities to nascent human life and 

* Pluripotent cells are those that can give rise to many different types of differentiated cells. See Glossary of Terms. 
14 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

the possible harms to ourselves and future generations that may 

result from coming to regard the beginning stages of human life 

as raw material for use and exploitation. 

While there is almost universal opposition to cloning-toproduce-children, the prospect of using cloned embryos in biomedical research has attracted significant support in the general 

public and among many scientists, patient advocacy groups, and 

policymakers. It therefore presents more complicated moral and 

policy challenges, and requires serious reflection on the duty of 

society to those of its members who are suffering, as well as its 

responsibility for nascent life. The precise character of both that 

duty and that responsibility is a subject of long-standing dispute, 

giving rise to a contentious but very important public debate. 

Cloning and Public Policy 

Beneath the current debate about human cloning lie major questions about the relation between science and technology and the 

larger society. Valuing freedom and innovation, our society allows scientists to inquire as they wish, to explore freely, and to 

develop techniques and technologies based on the knowledge 

they find, and on the whole we all benefit greatly as a result. We 

limit what scientists can do only in certain cases, as when their 

research requires the use of human subjects, in which case we 

erect rules and procedures to protect the health, safety, and dignity of the weak from possible encroachments by the strong. In 

more pervasive ways, we also shape what science does through 

public decisions about financial support and scientific education. 

With the uses of technology, we are sometimes more intrusive, 

establishing regulations to protect public health and safety or to 

preserve the environment. In rare cases, we even ban certain 

practices, such as the buying and selling of organs for transplantation. Yet, on the whole, the spirit of laissez-faire governs 

technological research, development, and use. 

But when innovations arise that appear to challenge basic goods 

that we hold dear, or when the desirability of scientific and technological progress runs up against concerns for the protection of 
Chapter One: Overview 15

human life and well-being, we are forced to consider the tacit 

social contract between science and technology and the larger 

society. The current public and political deliberation about 

whether and how to restrict or prohibit human cloning forces us 

to do so in a most powerful way. 

In addition, the current deliberation confronts us with the task 

of balancing important and commonly defended freedoms—the 

freedom of scientists to inquire, of technologists to invent, of 

individuals to reproduce, of entrepreneurs to invest and to 

profit—with the well-being of our society and its members. Circumstances in which otherwise beneficent freedoms can endanger paramount moral and social goods present serious challenges 

for free societies, and the prospect of cloning presents us with 

just such a challenge. 

This is not an altogether unfamiliar challenge. There are other 

circumstances in which the freedom to explore, inquire, research, and develop technologies has been constrained. Biomedical science, as we have said, is restricted in its use of human 

subjects for research, and scientists are required to obtain informed consent and take great care to secure research subjects 

from harm. Scientific work is also restricted from activities that 

might harm the health of the general public, and from producing 

products that may endanger consumers. For example, the federal Food and Drug Administration sits at the juncture between 

development and marketing of medical products, regulating their 

introduction and use according to criteria of safety and efficacy. 

Our society has come to a near-total agreement on the need for 

such an agency and the importance of its work. 

Human cloning, however, does not easily fall into any of the familiar classes of our experience with science. Nor do the ethical 

challenges it raises fit neatly into the categories of risks to health 

and safety that are ordinarily the basis of public oversight of science and technology. Raising ethical questions about ends as well 

as means, cloning is at once a potential human experiment, a 

possible aid to reproduction, an altogether new sort of procreative technique, a prospective means of human design, and a 
16 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

source of embryos and embryonic stem cells for research. It 

points back to familiar dilemmas of bioethics—including the 

ethics of human experimentation and embryo research—and it 

points forward to the sorts of challenges that will face us as biology gains greater technical prowess. It therefore invites us to 

think anew about the relationship between society and biomedical science and to evaluate the sufficiency of current institutions 

and practices that govern that relationship. 

The potential dangers we face do not result from ill intent or bad 

faith. Neither of the prevailing caricatures in the cloning debate—the mad scientist on a blind quest for an inhuman immortality or the puritanical Luddite seeking to keep the future at 

bay—is accurate, appropriate, helpful, or fair. The challenge we 

face is not as easy as that. The challenge we face involves the 

conflict of competing sets of concerns and priorities, each in the 

service of vital human goods, and each driven by a desire to improve the human condition and to protect essential principles. 

The widely shared desire to cure disease, relieve suffering, understand human biology, and provide humankind with new and 

more powerful means of control can conflict, in this case, with 

the widely shared desire to respect life, individual identity, the 

dignity of human procreation, and other institutions and principles that keep our society healthy and strong. The challenge for 

our society is to determine, through public deliberation and 

thoughtful reflection, how best to adjudicate between these two 

desires and to determine what form to give to the tacit agreement between society and science, by which society promises 

freedom within bounds, and science affords us innovation, 

knowledge, and power while respecting reasonable limits. 

The new and distinct challenges that confront us through cloning call upon us to consider the character of that tacit agreement, 

and to determine whether, and in what way, it might need to be 

amended and supplemented, especially in the face of the rapidly 

arriving new biomedical technologies that touch so directly upon 

our humanity. It is our hope in this report to contribute to just 

such a thoughtful consideration of the question. 
Chapter One: Overview 17

The Report 

In Chapter Two we present a brief history of human cloning. 

We summarize the scientific developments, the various public 

and political debates, and the actions of earlier panels and government bodies. 

In Chapter Three we discuss the terminology of the cloning debate. We analyze the controversy over cloning terms, state the 

terms we intend to use, and lay out the rationale behind our 

choice of terms. 

In Chapter Four we present a survey of the scientific aspects of 

human and animal cloning. We attempt to clarify what cloning 

is, where the science stands, and where it may be going. 

In Chapter Five we discuss the ethical arguments for and against 

human cloning-to-produce-children. We consider reasons to 

create cloned children, concerns over safety and consent, and a 

series of moral objections. 

In Chapter Six we discuss the ethical arguments for and against 

cloning-for-biomedical-research. We consider the likely medical 

benefits, the potential social and ethical difficulties, and the concern over the treatment of human embryos. 

In Chapter Seven we discuss the public policy alternatives. We 

consider various options for government action, and present arguments for and against each. 

In Chapter Eight, we present the Council’s conclusions and offer 

our recommendations. 
18 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
19 

Chapter Two

Historical Aspects of Cloning 

The previous chapter located human cloning in its larger human 

context. This chapter provides a brief history of human cloning, 

both as a scientific matter and as a subject of public discussion, 

debate, and legislation.1 Although we present only selected highlights, rather than a comprehensive account, we seek to enable 

the reader to place the present debate about cloning and this report into their proper historical setting. Until recently, all discussion of human cloning concentrated exclusively on the prospect 

of clonal reproduction, the production of individuals genetically 

virtually identical to previously existing ones. Our historical account here reflects that emphasis. Yet we will also consider the 

emerging interest in cloning-for-biomedical-research, a prospect 

connected to the recent isolation of embryonic stem cells and 

their potential for the understanding and treatment of human 

disease and disability. 

Scientific Milestones 

As a scientific and technical possibility, human cloning has 

emerged as an outgrowth of discoveries or innovations in developmental biology, genetics, assisted reproductive technologies, 

animal breeding, and, most recently, research on embryonic stem 

cells. Assisted reproductive techniques in humans accomplished 

the in vitro fertilization of a human egg, yielding a zygote and 

developing embryo that could be successfully implanted into a 

woman’s uterus to give rise to a live-born child. Animal breed-
20 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ers developed and refined these techniques with a view to perpetuating particularly valuable animals and maintaining laboriously identified genomes. Most recently, the isolation of embryonic stem cells and their subsequent in vitro differentiation into 

many different cell types have opened up possibilities for repairing and replacing diseased or nonfunctioning tissue, and thus 

possible research uses for cloned human embryos. 

The German embryologist Hans Spemann conducted what 

many consider to be the earliest “cloning” experiments on animals. Spemann was interested in answering a fundamental question of biological development: does each differentiated cell retain the full complement of genetic information present initially 

in the zygote? In the late 1920s, he tied off part of a cell 

containing the nucleus from a salamander embryo at the sixteencell stage and allowed the single cell to divide, showing that the 

nucleus of that early embryo could, in effect, “start over.” In a 

1938 book, Embryonic Development and Induction, Spemann wondered whether more completely differentiated cells had the same 

capacity and speculated about the possibility of transferring the 

nucleus from a differentiated cell—taken from either a laterstage embryo or an adult organism—into an enucleated egg. As 

he explained it: “Decisive information about this question may 

perhaps be afforded by an experiment which appears, at first 

sight, to be somewhat fantastical. This experiment might possibly show that even nuclei of differentiated cells can initiate normal development in the egg protoplasms.”2

 But Spemann did 

not know how to conduct such an experiment. 

Research with frogs fourteen years later encouraged progress 

toward the “fantastical experiment.” In 1952, the American embryologists Robert Briggs and Thomas J. King first successfully 

transferred nuclei from early embryonic cells of leopard frogs to 

enucleated leopard frog eggs. The “activated egg” began to divide and develop, became a multicellular embryo, and then became a tadpole.3

 Embryologists in other laboratories successfully repeated these initial experiments on different species of 

frogs. But additional experience also showed that the older and 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 21

 

more differentiated a donor cell becomes, the less likely it is that 

its nucleus would be able to direct development. 

In 1962, the British developmental biologist John Gurdon reported that he had produced sexually mature frogs by transferring nuclei from intestinal cells of tadpoles into enucleated frog 

eggs.

4

 The experiments had a low success rate and remained 

controversial. Gurdon continued this work in the 1970s, and he 

was able to produce tadpoles by transferring the nucleus of adult 

frog skin cells into enucleated frog eggs. Later experiments established that many factors in addition to the intact nucleus are 

crucial to success (see Chapter Four for further discussion). In 

retrospect, it is surprising that any of these earlier experiments 

produced positive results.5 But despite their low success rates, 

these experiments demonstrated that the nucleus retained its full 

complement of genetic information and encouraged later investigators to explore mammalian cloning. 

The birth of Louise Brown in 1978, the first baby conceived 

through in vitro fertilization (IVF), was also an important milestone, because it demonstrated that human birth was possible 

from eggs that were fertilized outside the body and then implanted into the womb. As for the possibility of cloning animals 

from adult cells—especially mammals—the work in the 

intervening years focused largely on the reprogramming of gene 

expression in somatic cells, the transfer of nuclei taken from embryos in mammals (beginning with mice in the 1980s), and finally 

the work of Ian Wilmut and his colleagues at the Roslin Institute 

with adult nuclei, which led to the birth of Dolly on July 5, 1996. 

Since then, similar success has been achieved in cloning other 

mammalian species, including cattle, goats, pigs, mice, cats, and 

rabbits (see Chapter Four). 

The animal cloners did not set out to develop techniques for 

cloning humans. Wilmut’s goal was to replicate or perpetuate 

animals carrying a valuable genome (for example, sheep that had 

been genetically modified to produce medically valuable proteins 

in their milk). Others, such as the cloners of the kitten CC, were 

interested in commercial ventures for the cloning of pets.6

 Yet 
22 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

the techniques developed in animals have encouraged a small 

number of infertility therapists to contemplate and explore efforts to clone human children. And, following the announcement in 1998 by James Thomson and his associates of their isolation of human embryonic stem cells, there emerged an interest 

in cloned human embryos, not for reproductive uses but as a 

powerful tool for research into the nature and treatment of human disease. 

Human Cloning from Popular Literature 

to Public Policy: From Brave New 

World to the Birth of Dolly

Technological novelties are often imagined and discussed in literature, especially in science fiction, before they are likely or 

even possible in practice. This has certainly been the case with 

human cloning, whose place in the popular imagination precedes 

the earliest successful animal cloning experiments. Perhaps the 

most famous early modern account of human cloning is Aldous 

Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), where natural human procreation has become a thing of the past, and where babies are produced in identical batches through “Bokanovsky’s Process.” As 

the novelist tells it: 

One egg, one embryo, one adult—normality. 

But a bokanovskified egg will bud, will proliferate, will divide . . . becoming anywhere from 

eight to ninety-six embryos—a prodigious improvement, you will agree, on nature. Identical 

twins—but not in piddling twos and threes . . . 

Standard men and women; in uniform batches.7

The relevance or irrelevance of Huxley’s vision to the dilemmas 

of the present is of course a matter of serious disagreement. 

Some believe that fears of a “Brave New World” are fantasy divorced from both the political realities of modern liberal democracy and the facts of science. Others believe the book remains a 

prescient warning of where biological self-manipulation could 

take us—which is to say, to a world where family is obsolete, life 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 23

 

 

is engineered to order in the laboratory, and human beings have 

reduced themselves to well-satisfied human animals. 

In the late 1960s, following John Gurdon’s successful cloning 

experiments, a more focused debate on both the likelihood and 

the ethical and social implications of human cloning began 

among scientists, theologians, and ethicists. At this time, the still 

hypothetical possibility of cloning humans was considered as a 

part of a broader eugenic project to improve the genetic stock of 

humans as a species. In a famous article published in The American Naturalist in 1966, entitled “Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution,” Nobel laureate biologist Joshua Lederberg described what he took to be the prospects of “clonal reproduction.” “Experimentally,” he wrote, “we know of successful nuclear transplantation from diploid somatic as well as germline 

cells into enucleated amphibian eggs. There is nothing to suggest any particular difficulty about accomplishing this in mammals or man, though it will rightly be admired as a technical 

tour-de-force when it is first implemented.” He also predicted 

“there will be little delay between demonstration and use.”8

While Lederberg concluded his essay by exhorting his readers 

not to “mistake comment for advocacy,” he clearly believed that 

clonal reproduction might offer a number of human benefits or 

improvements. “If a superior individual (and presumably then 

genotype) is identified, why not copy it directly, rather than suffer all the risks of recombinational disruption, including those of 

sex,” he asked. “The same solace is accorded the carrier of genetic disease: why not be sure of an exact copy of yourself rather 

than risk a homozygous segregant;* or at worst copy your spouse 

and allow some degree of biological parenthood.” He described 

other possibilities—such as “the free exchange of organ transplants with no concern for graft rejection” and more efficient 

communication between individuals in “stressed occupations.”9

* Homozygous segregant: an individual carrying two copies of the same mutant 

gene, one inherited from each parent, and thus destined to suffer from a genetic disease. 
24 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

In the end, Lederberg argued that “tempered clonality”—a mix 

of clonal and sexual reproduction—might, at least from a biological standpoint, “allow the best of both worlds—we would at 

least enjoy being able to observe the experiment of discovering 

whether a second Einstein would outdo the first one.” Nevertheless, he acknowledged the possibility for “social frictions” and 

ethical dilemmas that might result from clonal reproduction—

including whether “anyone could conscientiously risk the crucial 

experiment, the first attempt to clone a man.” He suggested that 

the “mingling of individual human chromosomes with other 

mammals assures a gradualistic enlargement of the field and lowers the threshold of optimism or arrogance, particularly if cloning in other mammals gives incompletely predictable results.” 

And he feared that social policy might become based on “the accidents of the first advertised examples” rather than “welldebated principles.”10

In 1970, the theologian and ethicist Paul Ramsey responded to 

Lederberg’s portrait of human cloning—and, more generally, to 

the prospects for human self-modification—in a book called 

Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control. He argued that human cloning would violate the ethical responsibilities of both 

science and parenthood: it would involve experiments on the 

child-to-be; it would transform parenthood into manufacture; 

and it would burden children with the genetic predisposition of 

their “maker” and so deny the cloned child a unique independence in the very act of bringing him or her to life. “[T]o attempt 

to soar so high above an eminently human parenthood,” Ramsey 

wrote, “is inevitably to fall far below—into a vast technological 

alienation of man .... The entire rationalization of procreation—

its replacement by replication—can only mean the abolition of 

man’s embodied personhood.”11

Ramsey believed that such a willingness to experiment on human 

life—or to create sub-humans—showed how the effort to perfect and improve humankind through genetic control leads in 

fact to ethical coarsening and to a disregard for actual human beings. “In the present age,” he wrote, “the attempt will be made 

to deprive us of our wits by comparing objections to schemes of 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 25

 

progressive genetic engineering or cloning men to earlier opposition to inoculations, blood transfusions, or the control of malaria. These things are by no means to be compared: the practice 

of medicine in the service of life is one thing; man’s unlimited 

self-modification of the genetic conditions of life would be quite 

another matter.”12

The debate over human cloning and genetic manipulation continued in the early 1970s. The Nobel laureate geneticist James 

D. Watson testified before Congress in 1971 on the subject of 

human cloning. He described the science that was taking us 

there, including John Gurdon’s success in cloning frogs and the 

work of R. G. Edwards and P. S. Steptoe “in working out the 

conditions for routine test-tube conception of human eggs.”13

“Human embryological development,” Watson observed, “need 

no longer be a process shrouded in secrecy. It can become instead an event wide-open to a variety of experimental manipulations.” Watson called for the creation of national and international committees to promote “wide-ranging discussion ... at the 

informal as well as formal legislative level, about the manifold 

problems which are bound to arise if test-tube conception becomes a common occurrence.”14 “This is a decision not for the 

scientists at all,” he said. “It is a decision of the general public—

do you want this or not?” and something that “if we do not 

think about it now, the possibility of our having a free choice 

will one day suddenly be gone.”15

In 1972, Willard Gaylin, a psychiatrist and co-founder of the 

newly formed Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences 

(later called the Hastings Center), made James Watson’s warnings about cloning even more dramatic—with a New York Times 

Magazine article titled “The Frankenstein Myth Becomes a Reality—We Have the Awful Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of 

Human Beings.” Gaylin hoped that the prospect of human cloning would awaken the public—and the scientific community—to 

the larger ethical implications of the life sciences.16 The same 

year, biologist and ethicist Leon R. Kass published an essay in 

The Public Interest called “Making Babies—The New Biology and 

the ‘Old’ Morality,” which addressed the prospect of both in vi-
26 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

tro fertilization and human cloning, and wondered whether “by 

tampering with and confounding [our] origins, we are involved 

in nothing less than creating a new conception of what it means 

to be human.”17 

In stark contrast to Gaylin and Kass, ethicist Joseph Fletcher argued that human cloning would not be dehumanizing at all, but 

would, in a number of circumstances, serve the good of both society and individuals. In his 1974 book The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette, he argued that “Good reasons in 

general for cloning are that it avoids genetic diseases, bypasses 

sterility, predetermines an individual’s gender, and preserves 

family likenesses. It wastes time to argue over whether we 

should do it or not; the real moral question is when and why.”18 

For Fletcher—unlike Ramsey, Gaylin, and Kass—genetic control would serve the human end of self-mastery and selfimprovement, it would improve the quality of life for individuals, 

and it would aid the progress of the human species. Gunther 

Stent, a molecular biologist at the University of California at 

Berkeley, echoed this view that human cloning would contribute 

to human perfection. As he wrote in a 1974 article in Nature: “To 

oppose human cloning . . . is to betray the Western dream of the 

City of God. All utopian visionaries, from Thomas More to Karl 

Marx, think of their perfect societies as being populated not by 

men but by angels that embody all of the best and none of the 

worst human attributes.”19 With cloning, he suggested, such a 

city might one day be possible. 

For several years, cloning remained a topic for fiction and philosophy, but fantasy had yet to turn into fact. In 1978, in a book 

titled In His Image: The Cloning of a Man, science writer David 

Rorvik claimed that he was involved in a secret project to clone a 

millionaire in Montana named “Max.”20 The book caused a flurry 

of reaction—ranging from horror to amusement to nearly universal skepticism and denunciation in the scientific community—and eventually led to hearings before Congress on May 31, 

1978. Robert Briggs, who with Thomas King cloned the first 

frog embryo from blastula frog cells in 1952, declared that the 

work in frogs demonstrated not that human cloning is now or 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 27

 

imminently possible, but that “cloning in man or any other animal is not just a technical problem to be solved soon but may, in 

fact, never occur.”21 James Watson, who just a few years earlier 

had urged a national conversation and possible legislation on 

human cloning because of the rapid advances in the science, declared that we would “certainly not [see the cloning of a man] in 

any of our lifetimes. I wouldn’t be able to predict when we might 

see the cloning of a mouse, much less a man.”22 Rorvik eventually admitted that the book was a hoax. 

In the years that followed, claims and counter-claims of scientific 

advances in mammalian cloning—including the controversy beginning in 1981 over whether any of several independent laboratories had actually cloned mice—prompted more public reaction 

and discussion about the issue. But there was no sustained or 

widespread public interest, and cloning lost its prominent place 

within the bioethics literature. The President’s Bioethics Commission, in its 1982 report Splicing Life, briefly discussed human 

cloning as well as IVF, but held that both were beyond the scope 

of that report because they could be considered reproductive 

technologies that did not necessarily involve modifying the genome (pp. 9-10). With regard to human cloning in particular, 

the report added that the possibility had received a good deal of 

public attention and it was therefore important to emphasize 

that even if it ever did become possible in humans, it would not 

result in an identical being.23

The National Institutes of Health Human Embryo Research 

Panel, which issued a report in 1994 on federal funding for research involving preimplantation human embryos, deemed research involving nuclear transplantation, without transfer of the 

resulting cloned embryo to a uterus, as one type of research that 

was acceptable for federal support. The report noted that the 

majority on this point was narrow, with nearly as many panel 

members concluding that the ethical implications of nuclear 

transplantation should be studied further before any such research could be acceptable for federal funding (Exec. Summ., p. 

xvii). In its discussion of cloning techniques, the panel noted 

that many different procedures are all called “cloning,” and said 
28 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

in a footnote, “Popular notions of cloning derive from science 

fiction books and films that have more to do with cultural fantasies than actual scientific experiments.”24

Of course, there had been, in the meantime, continued scientific 

work in nuclear transplantation in animals—including mammals. 

And with the 1997 announcement of the cloning of Dolly, the 

prospect of human cloning once again became a prominent issue 

in public discussion, debate, and public life. 

The Human Cloning Debate: 

From Dolly to the Present

In late February 1997, Ian Wilmut and his team at the Roslin Institute in Scotland announced that they had, by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer, successfully cloned the first mammal 

from an adult somatic cell—Dolly the sheep. President Bill 

Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair immediately denounced any attempts to clone a human being, and the President 

asked his National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to 

report within ninety days on the scientific, ethical, and legal 

questions surrounding the prospect of human cloning. Congress 

likewise held a series of hearings—the first one on March 12, 

1997. A widespread—though not universal—consensus 

emerged that attempts to clone a human being would at present 

be irresponsible and immoral. As Wilmut explained before 

Congress, “Our own experiments to clone sheep from adult 

mammary cells required us to produce 277 ‘reconstructed’ embryos. Of these, twenty-nine were implanted into recipient ewes, 

and only one developed into a live lamb. In previous work with 

cells from embryos, three out of five lambs died soon after birth 

and showed developmental abnormalities. Similar experiments 

with humans would be totally unacceptable.”25

Most ethicists agreed, though for different reasons. All agreed 

that cloning attempts on human beings “at this time” would be 

reckless experiments on the child-to-be and therefore totally unjustified. Many stressed, as Ramsey, Gaylin, and Kass had done 

in the 1970s, that human cloning would undermine the human 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 29

 

meaning of parenthood and identity; that it would mean a giant 

step toward genetic engineering, creating the first children whose 

genetic predisposition was known and selected in advance; and 

that it would turn procreation increasingly into a form of manufacture.26 In contrast, some bioethicists, including John Robertson and Ruth Macklin, believed that human cloning presented 

no inherent threat to public or private morality, that government 

had no legal authority or justification for banning clonal reproduction, and that it must be judged in terms of its particular uses, 

not dismissed outright.27

In June 1997, NBAC released its report Cloning Human Beings, 

which concluded that 

At present, the use of this technique to create 

a child would be a premature experiment that 

would expose the fetus and the developing 

child to unacceptable risks. This in itself 

might be sufficient to justify a prohibition on 

cloning human beings at this time, even if 

such efforts were to be characterized as the 

exercise of a fundamental right to attempt to 

procreate.28

NBAC also pointed to other moral concerns “beyond the issue 

of the safety of the procedure,” including “the potential psychological harms to children and effects on the moral, religious, and 

cultural values of society” that “merit further discussion.” 

NBAC recommended a three-to-five-year federal moratorium on 

human cloning—stating that the consensus came from the fact 

that the technique was not yet safe—to be revisited and reevaluated after that time. “Whether upon such further deliberation 

our nation will conclude that the use of cloning techniques to 

create children should be allowed or permanently banned is, for 

the moment, an open question.”29

In early 1998, the United States Senate considered legislation, 

proposed by Republican Senators Christopher Bond of Missouri, 

Bill Frist of Tennessee, and Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, to 
30 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ban all human cloning permanently. Nearly all senators denounced clonal reproduction, but many believed that the proposed ban, which would have made it illegal to create human 

embryos by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer, would undermine potentially valuable scientific research. Democratic 

Senators Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Tom Harkin of 

Iowa led the opposition, with the widespread support of patient 

advocacy groups, scientific and medical organizations, and the 

biotechnology industry. As Senator Kennedy put it: 

Every scientist in America understands the 

threat this legislation poses to critical medical 

research. Every American should understand 

it, too. . . . Congress can and should act to 

ban cloning of human beings during this session. But it should not act in haste, and it 

should not pass legislation that goes far beyond what the American people want or 

what the scientific and medical community 

understands is necessary or appropriate.30

The legislation died after heated debate, and the concern over 

human cloning temporarily lost urgency and subsided. 

In November 1998, a new scientific discovery was unveiled that 

would soon provoke a different public policy debate, one that 

would become entangled with the ethical and social questions 

surrounding human cloning. James Thomson and John 

Gearhart separately announced the isolation of human embryonic stem cells—multipotent cells (see Glossary of Terms) derived from human embryos that they believed hold great promise for curing or treating many diseases and injuries. The discovery led to another wave of hearings on, and interest in, the ethics 

of biological science. It also renewed debate over whether embryo research should be eligible for public funding (since 1996, 

Congress had prohibited federal funding of research involving 

the destruction of human embryos). One subject under consideration was the possible future use of cloned human embryos for 

stem cell research, which some scientists believed might be 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 31

 

 

uniquely useful for understanding embryological development 

and genetic disease and for possible use in stem cell therapies. 

In August 2000—after another NBAC study—President Clinton 

announced new guidelines that would have altered the ban on 

federal funding of embryo research. The new guidelines, proposed by the National Institutes of Health, stipulated that the 

agency would fund research on embryonic stem cells so long as 

public funds were not used to destroy the embryos, the embryos 

were left over from IVF clinics, and donors of the embryos consented to the research. 

In early 2001, President George W. Bush announced that he 

would review these guidelines rather than implement them immediately.*

 Around the same time, a number of pro-cloning 

groups and fertility doctors—including the Raelians, who believe 

that humans are the products of cloning by aliens—announced 

their intention to clone human beings by the end of the year. 

Other individuals and scientific organizations worked to protect 

possible cloning research from future restrictions, though some 

scientists (such as Rudolf Jaenisch and Ian Wilmut31) publicly argued against cloning-to-produce-children. A flurry of hearings 

on human cloning soon followed—the first one in the House of 

Representatives on March 28, 2001, and continuing in both the 

House and the Senate throughout the summer. The hearings addressed cloning-to-produce-children as well as issues related to 

cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

Two general approaches to banning human cloning emerged. 

The first approach, proposed in a bill sponsored by Republican 

Representative David Weldon of Florida and Democratic Representative Bart Stupak of Michigan in the House, and Republican 

Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas and Democratic Senator 

Mary Landrieu of Louisiana in the Senate, called for a ban on all 

human cloning, including the creation of cloned embryos for 

* On August 9, 2001, President Bush announced his new policy: federal funding would be made available for research using only those human embryonic 

stem cell lines that were already in existence (that is, lines that had been derived prior to that date). 
32 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

biomedical research. The second approach, proposed in a bill 

sponsored by Republican Senators Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and Orrin Hatch of Utah and Democratic Senators Diane 

Feinstein of California and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, 

sought to prohibit human reproductive cloning, while allowing 

the use of cloning technology to produce stem cells, by making it 

illegal to implant or attempt to implant cloned human embryos 

“into a uterus or the functional equivalent of a uterus.” 

On July 31, 2001, the House of Representatives passed the 

Weldon-Stupak bill (the ban on all human cloning) by a vote of 

265 to 162. In November 2001, scientists at Advanced Cell 

Technology, Inc., of Worcester, Massachusetts, one of the leading commercial advocates of cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

reported what they claimed were the first cloned human embryos. The announcement—along with continued debate on the 

possible use of cloned human embryos for stem cell research—

left the issue in the United States Senate, where it stands as of 

this writing. 

Meanwhile, the general public has consistently expressed the 

view that human cloning is wrong—most recently, a Gallup poll 

from May 2002 that showed opposition to cloning to produce a 

child at 90 percent, and opposition to “cloning of human embryos for use in medical research” at 61 percent. Asked about 

medical research using stem cells obtained from human embryos 

(with no mention of how the embryo was generated), 52 percent 

found it morally acceptable, while 51 percent found acceptable 

the “cloning of human cells from adults for use in medical research.”32 

In addition to activity at the federal level, many states have been 

active. As of this writing, twenty-two states have considered 

various policy alternatives on cloning, and six have passed legislation.*

 

* As of June 2002 three states (Iowa, Michigan, and Virginia) ban both cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research. Two states 

(Louisiana and Rhode Island) ban cloning-to-produce-children, but also have 

embryo-research laws that appear to prohibit cloning-for-biomedical-research. 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 33

 

 

Several nations, including Denmark, France, Norway, Spain, and 

Canada have passed or sought either partial or total bans. For 

example, in the United Kingdom, cloning-to-pro-duce-children 

is forbidden but cloned embryos up to fourteen days old may be 

used in biomedical research. In Germany, all human cloning is 

forbidden by law. There are also efforts now at the United Nations and other international organizations to pass a world-wide 

ban on human cloning—with many of the same disagreements 

internationally as there are nationally about what kind of ban to 

pass. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1 Since the birth of Dolly, several volumes on the history and significance of 

cloning have been published, including Kolata, G., Clone: The Road to Dolly and 

the Path Ahead, New York: Morrow and Company, 1998, and National Bioethics Advisory Commission [NBAC], Cloning Human Beings, Bethesda, MD: 

Government Printing Office, 1997. In addition, several valuable anthologies 

have been edited, including Kristol, W., and E. Cohen , The Future is Now, 

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, and Nussbaum, M., and C.R. 

Sunstein, Clones and Clones, New York: Norton, 1998. 

2 See Spemann, H., Embryonic Development and Induction (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1938). As quoted in Kolata, G., Clone: The Road to Dolly and 

the Path Ahead (New York: Morrow and Company, 1998), p. 61. 

3 Briggs, R., and T. J. King, “Transplantation of living nuclei from blastula 

cells into enucleated frog’s eggs,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

(USA) 38: 455-463, 1952. 

4 Gurdon, J. B., “The developmental capacity of nuclei taken from intestinal 

epithelium cells of feeding tadpoles,” Journal of Embryology and Experimental 

Morphology 10, 622-640, 1962. 

5 A fact also noted by NBAC in Cloning Human Beings, p. 18. 

One state (California) has banned cloning-to-produce-children, until Dec. 31, 

2002, but has no embryo-research law and thus effectively permits cloningfor-biomedical-research. 
34 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

6 Regalado, A., “Only Nine Lives for Kitty? Not if She Is Cloned,” Wall Street 

Journal, February 14, 2002, p. B1. Kluger, J., “Here Kitty Kitty!” Time, February 17, 2002. 

7 Huxley, Aldous., Brave New World (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), p. 6-

7. Originally published by Harper & Brothers, 1932. 

8 Lederberg, J., “Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution,” The American 

Naturalist, September-October 1966, Vol. 100, No. 915, pp. 527. 

9 Ibid, p. 531, 527, 528. 

10 Ibid, p. 528, 529, 531. 

11 Ramsey, P., Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control (New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 1970), p. 89. 

12 Ibid, p. 95. 

13 Watson, J., “Moving Toward the Clonal Man,” The Atlantic Monthly, May 

1971, p. 51. (This article is a slightly modified version of Watson’s congressional testimony.) 

14 Ibid, p. 51, 53. 

15 Proceedings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U. S. 

House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, January 26, 27, and 28, 

1971, p. 344. 

 

16 Gaylin, W., “The Frankenstein Myth Becomes a Reality—We Have the 

Awful Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of Human Beings,” The New York 

Times Magazine, March 5, 1972, p. 12ff. 

17 Kass, L., “Making Babies—the New Biology and the ‘Old’ Morality,” The 

Public Interest, Winter 1972, Number 26, p. 23. 

18 Fletcher, J., The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette (New 

York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 154. 

19 Stent, G., “Molecular Biology and Metaphysics,” Nature, Vol. 248, No. 

5451, April 26, 1974, p. 781. As quoted in Kolata op. cit., p. 92. 

20 Rorvik, D. M., In His Image: The Cloning of a Man (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1978). 

21 As quoted in Kolata, op. cit., p. 103. 
Chapter Two: Historical Aspects 35

 

22 Interview by C. P. Anderson, “In His Own Words: Nobel Laureate James 

Watson Calls Report of Cloning People ‘Science Fiction Silliness,’” People, 

April 17, 1978, pp. 93-95. As quoted in Kolata, op. cit., p. 104. 

23 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Splicing Life: A Report on the Social and 

Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings, November 1982. 

24 National Institutes of Health, Ad Hoc Group of Consultants to the Advisory Committee to the Director, Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel, 

September 1994, p. 28. 

25 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety of the 

Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, March 12, 

1997. p. 22. 

26 See, for example, Kass, L., “The Wisdom of Repugnance,” The New Republic, June 2, 1997, pp. 17-26, and “Preventing a Brave New World, The New Republic, May 21, 2001, pp. 30-39. 

27 Robertson, J.A., “A Ban on Cloning and Cloning Research Is Unjustified,” 

testimony before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, March 14, 

1997. Macklin, R., testimony before NBAC, March 14, 1997. 

28 NBAC, Cloning Human Beings, 1997, pp. ii-iii.

29 Ibid, p. iii. 

30 Congressional Record, February 9, 1998, pp. S513-514. 

31 Jaenisch, R., and I. Wilmut, “Don’t clone humans!” Science 291: 5513, March 

30, 2001. 

32 Saad, L. “Cloning Humans Is a Turn-Off to Most Americans” Gallup Poll 

Analyses, May 16, 2002. 
36 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
37

Chapter Three

On Terminology 

We begin our presentation of the important matter of terminology by listing the crucial terms used in this report: 

• Human cloning. 

• Cloning-to-produce-children. 

• Cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

• Cloned human embryo. 

The rest of this chapter will develop the meaning of these terms 

and provide the analysis and argumentation that have led us to 

these choices. Because there is much to be learned about the 

subject through the discussion of alternative terminologies, and 

because we believe strongly that the judicious use of language is 

necessary for sound moral choice, we present our discussion of 

this matter at some length. 

Introduction: The Importance of 

Careful Use of Names 

Fruitful discussion of the ethical and policy issues raised by the 

prospects of human cloning—as with any other matter—can proceed only if we can find appropriate and agreed-upon terms for 

describing the processes and products involved. Before we can 

get to possible moral or policy arguments or disagreements, we 

need to agree about what to call that about which we are arguing. 

As a contribution to public understanding, we emphasize that this 

is not an easy thing to do, and we indicate how and why we have 

gone about making our terminological choices. 
38 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

What exactly is meant by the term “cloning”? What criterion justifies naming an entity a “clone”? How is the term “cloning” related to what scientists call “somatic cell nuclear transfer 

(SCNT)” or “nuclear transplantation”? What should we call the 

single-cell entity that results from SCNT, and what should we call 

it once it starts to divide and develop? How, if at all, should our 

names for such activities or such entities be affected by the purposes we have for engaging in the activities or for using the entities? 

As these questions imply, there is much confusion today about 

the terms used in discussing human cloning. There is honest disagreement about what names should be used, and there are also 

attempts to select and use terms in order to gain advantage for a 

particular moral or policy position. One difficulty is the difference 

between the perspective of science and the perspective of lived 

human experience. People who look at the phenomena of human 

reproduction and development through the lens of science will 

see and describe things in terms that often differ widely from 

those in ordinary usage; moreover, when an ordinary term is used 

in scientific parlance, it sometimes is given a different meaning. 

Similar divergences are possible also for people who look at these 

matters through the lens of different cultural, philosophical, or religious beliefs. Yet at the same time, all of us—scientists or not, 

believers or not—encounter these same matters on the plane of 

lived human experience, for which the terms of everyday speech 

may well be more suitable. Because this same common (nonscientific) discourse is also the medium of discourse for the ethical and 

policy discussions, we shall strive to stay close to common 

speech, while at the same time making the best use we can of scientific findings to avoid mistakes and misconceptions. 

Advisers to decision makers should strive not only for accuracy, 

but also for fairness, especially because the choice of names can 

decisively affect the way questions are posed and, hence, how answers are given. The issue is not a matter of semantics; it is a matter of trying fairly to call things by names that correctly describe 

them, of trying to fit speech to fact as best one can. For the sake 

of clarity, we should at least stipulate clearly the meanings we in-
Chapter Three: On Terminology 39 

tend by our use of terms. But we should also try to choose terms 

that most accurately convey the descriptive reality of the matter at 

hand. If this is well done, the moral arguments can then proceed 

on the merits, without distortion by linguistic sloppiness or chicanery. 

Many of the terms that appear in the debate about cloning are confusing or are used in a confused manner. 

First, there are difficulties concerning the terms that seek to name 

the activity or activities involved: cloning, asexual reproduction, reproductive cloning, nonreproductive cloning, research cloning, 

therapeutic cloning, somatic cell nuclear transfer (or nuclear transplantation), nuclear transfer for stem cell research, nuclear transplantation to produce stem cells, nuclear transfer for regenerative 

medicine. At stake are such questions as whether all acts of SCNT 

should be called cloning. Some worry that the term “cloning” unfairly prejudices people against the activity when it is used to describe research activities. 

Second, there are difficulties concerning the terms that seek to 

name the entity or entities that result from human cloning (or human 

SCNT): cell, egg, activated cell, totipotent cell, clonote, reconstituted (or reconstructed) egg, zygote, clump of cells, embryo, human embryo, human organism, blastocyst, clonocyst, potential 

human being, human being, human clone, person. At stake here is 

the nature—and the possible moral status—of the entities that are 

involved in the subsequent manipulations, whether for producing 

a child or for use in biomedical research. Some worry that use of 

any term but “embryo” will unfairly prejudice people in favor of 

embryo-destructive activities by hiding from view the full import 

of the activity. 

Third, there are difficulties concerning the terms that seek to describe the relation between the cloned entity and the person whose 

somatic cell nucleus was transferred to produce the cloned entity: 

genetic copy, replica, genetically virtually identical, noncontemporary twin, delayed genetic twin, clone. 
40 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

Tools of Analysis 

As a prelude to examining the activity or the deed of cloning, some 

general analytical observations will be helpful. Although all aspects 

of an activity or action are relevant to understanding its full human 

meaning, when describing a deed it is sometimes useful to distinguish what it is from both how it is done and why it is done. The act 

itself (what) may be accomplished by a variety of means or techniques (how), and it may be undertaken for a variety of motives or 

purposes (why). To be sure, there is a danger of distortion in this 

disaggregating analysis of human activity, and there is disagreement about the degree to which the motives or purposes of the 

agent are to be reckoned in the description of the act itself. People 

argue, for example, whether “mercy killing” differs as an act from 

murdering a rival (or executing a murderer or killing someone in 

self-defense), or whether they are all equally acts of homicide (literally, “killing a human being”) whose moral meaning (“Is it justified or not?” “Is it wrong or not?”) we can then proceed to debate, 

if we wish, by attending not only to the bare act of taking a human 

life but also to the agent’s motive and purpose. Though we do not 

wish to beg this question, the very existence of this disagreement 

suggests that we do well not to ignore the naked act itself, for it 

may have a meaning independent of what moved the agent, a 

meaning relevant to subsequent moral assessment that we do not 

wish to overlook. 

To illustrate: in vitro fertilization (IVF: the merging of egg and 

sperm outside the human body [in vitro = “in glass”], yielding a zygote that is the beginning stage of a new living being) is the deed 

(what). It is an act of “fertilization,” of making fertile, of making 

the egg cell ready and able to develop into a human organism. This 

fertilization may be accomplished in at least two ways (how): by 

merely mixing egg and sperm, allowing the sperm to find and 

penetrate the egg, or by the technique of injecting individual sperm 

directly into the egg (a technique known as intracytoplasmic sperm 

injection, ICSI). And it may be done for the (proximate) purpose 

(why) of initiating a pregnancy, in turn for the (ultimate) purpose of 

providing a child for an infertile couple; or it may be done for the 

(proximate) purpose of providing living human embryos for basic 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 41 

 

research on normal and abnormal embryological development, in 

turn for the (ultimate) purposes of understanding human development or of discovering cures for diseases and producing tissues 

for regenerative medicine. Though the technique used or the purposes served may differ, in one crucial respect the deed (IVF) remains the same and bears a common intrinsic meaning: a human zygote, the first stage of a new human being, is intentionally produced outside the body and exists in human hands and subject to 

human manipulation. 

As it happens, this fact is more or less accurately reflected in the 

descriptive terminology used for IVF. Interestingly enough, unlike 

the situation with cloning, no one distinguishes between “reproductive IVF” and “therapeutic IVF” or “research IVF,” naming 

the activity or deed after the motive or purpose of the agent. This 

may reflect the historical fact that IVF was initiated by people who 

were interested in using it to produce live-born children for infertile couples; the research use of “surplus” embryos produced by 

IVF came only later. But it happens that this common name is also 

descriptively apt and remains so regardless of why IVF was done 

in a particular case: the deed is fertilization of egg by sperm, producing a living human zygote, the first stage of the development of 

a new human being. 

It should be noted that, although we began by trying to describe 

the deed rather than the product of the deed, the two aspects 

merged necessarily. The meaning of the act of “fertilization” falls 

forward onto the nature of the “object” that fertilization produces: 

the fertilized egg or zygote or earliest embryo.* (By contrast, there 

* A more careful analysis of the what of this activity would distinguish between 

the activity itself and the product that results from it. Unlike nonproductive 

activities, such as dancing (“How can we know the dancer from the dance?”), 

the work (activity) of making or producing results in separable objects or 

works (products). Although shoemaking completes itself in the production of 

a shoe, the shoe as result is distinct from the activity of shoemaking. Similarly, 

though fertilization is an activity that is intelligible only as issuing in a fertilized egg, the now-fertile egg as result or product stands apart from the deed of 

IVF. One reason that the word “fertilization” works so well in describing IVF 
42 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

is nothing in the name of the technique “intracytoplasmic sperm 

injection” that even hints at the immediate result or goal of the intended injection.) Similar attention to the nature of the product 

may turn out to be indispensable for a proper characterization of 

the activity of cloning. 

i

 

Cloning: Toward an Appropr ate Terminology

Though much of the terminological confusion and controversy 

concerns the way to describe the different kinds of cloning practices that are envisioned, the term “cloning” itself is not without its 

own ambiguities. A “clone” (noun, from the Greek klon, “twig”) 

refers to a group of genetically identical molecules, cells, or organisms descended from a single common ancestor, as well as to any 

one of the one or more individual organisms that have descended 

asexually from a common ancestor. Both the group and each of its 

members are “a clone.” “To clone” (verb) is to duplicate or produce a genetic duplicate or duplicates of a molecule, cell, or individual organism. The replication of DNA fragments in the laboratory is called “DNA cloning.” The physical isolation of a single cell 

and its subsequent multiplication in tissue culture into a population 

of descendants is referred to as “single cell cloning.” The laboratory culture of bacteria and the asexual propagation of plants by 

means of cuttings are instances of organismal cloning. Cloning of 

higher organisms is more complex: all cloning of vertebrate organisms must begin at the embryonic stages. Contrary to what some 

people imagine, cloning of amphibians or mammals (including 

human beings) is not the direct duplication (“photocopying”) of an 

adult organism. 

In the sense relevant here, “cloning” is a form of asexual reproduction (parthenogenesis*

 is another), the production of a new inis that it is a very rich term, pointing both to cause and effect, backward to 

the deed and forward to the future prospects of the product. 

* Parthenogenesis (see Glossary of Terms), the development of an organism 

directly from an unfertilized egg that has been artificially induced to undergo 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 43 

 

dividual not by the chance union of egg and sperm but by some 

form of replication of the genetic makeup of a single existing or 

previously existing individual. (In biological or functional terms, 

the core of sexual reproduction is not bodily intercourse but the 

fusion of male and female germ cells; thus IVF, though it takes place 

outside the body, is—biologically speaking—a form of sexual reproduction.) Cloning is the activity of producing a clone, an individual or group of individuals genetically virtually identical to the 

precursor that is being “replicated.”* 

Cloning-to-Produce-Children; Cloning-forBiomedical-Research 

In much of the current public discussion, we encounter a distinction between two sorts of cloning: “reproductive” and “therapeutic.” The distinction is based entirely on the differing goals of the 

cloners: in the first case, the goal is the production of a (cloned) 

child; in the second case, the development of treatments for diseases (suffered not by the clone, but by others). We recognize the 

development, is, in principle, another method of asexual reproduction. Although parthenogenetic reproduction has been successfully achieved in amphibians, in mammalian species there are as yet no reports of live births following parthenogenesis. Thus, there is at present little reason to believe that 

live-born human beings can be produced via parthenogenesis. It is therefore 

not the subject of this report, although many of the things said about cloning 

via somatic cell nuclear transfer would be applicable to asexual reproduction 

through parthenogenesis. 

* Although cloning, like fertilization, is responsible for bringing forth a new 

organism, the activities are named in very different ways, yet in each case emphasizing the fundamental intention of the activity. “Fertilization” describes 

the activity in terms of the capacitation of the egg, as a result of which development begins. “Cloning” describes the activity in terms of the relation between 

the progenitor and the product. In cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer, the egg, 

though it is activated as if it were fertilized, is not cloned; cloned rather is the 

donor from whom the nucleus was taken, and the resulting organism (at all 

stages of development) is a clone of the donor. The name of the activity, 

“cloning,” even more than “in vitro fertilization,” refers to the product of the 

activity, an identical (or nearly identical) entity. 
44 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

 

distinction and the need for terms to describe the difference. But 

the terms currently in vogue have their difficulties. Both terms 

have been criticized by partisans of several sides of the debate, and 

for understandable reasons. 

Some object to the term “reproductive cloning” used as a term of 

distinction, because they argue that all cloning is reproductive. 

Their reason: all human cloning intends and issues in the production of a cloned human embryo, a being distinct from the components used to generate it, a new human being in the earliest stage 

of development or “reproduction.” (This claim, we would suggest, 

is at this stage a descriptive point, not yet a normative one; it does 

not necessarily imply that such a being is fully human or “one of us,” hence deserving of the moral and social protection accorded “persons.”) The fact that 

only some of these embryonic cloned humans are wanted for 

baby-producing purposes does not, in the view of these critics, alter this fact about their being. In support of their claim that cloning occurs (only) at the beginning, they note that once the cloning 

act of nuclear transfer has occurred, all new influences that act 

upon the new human organism cease to be “genetic” (nature) and 

are now “environmental” (nurture). Instead of “reproductive cloning,” we shall speak of “cloning-to-produce-children.” 

Others object to the term “therapeutic cloning” for related reasons. The act of cloning embryos may be undertaken with healing 

motives. But it is not itself an act of healing or therapy.*

 The beneficiaries of any such acts of cloning are, at the moment, hypothetical and in the future. And if medical treatments do eventually result, the embryonic clone from which the treatment was derived 

will not itself be the beneficiary of any therapy. On the contrary, 

this sort of cloning actually takes apart (or destroys) the embryonic 

being that results from the act of cloning. 

* Compare, in this respect, what used to be called “therapeutic abortion,” an 

abortion undertaken in cases in which pregnancy threatened the life of the 

pregnant woman and where abortion was therefore intended to save the 

woman’s life. Similarly, we might call the removal of a cancerous kidney a 

“therapeutic nephrectomy”; we would never use the term to refer to the removal of a kidney for donation to another person in transplantation. 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 45 

 

To avoid the misleading implications of calling any cloning “therapeutic,” we prefer the terms “research cloning” or “cloning for research,” which also more accurately indicate the purpose of the activity. Yet some may find fault with this replacement. Because it 

appears to be a deliberate substitution for “therapeutic cloning,” it 

may seem to imply that the scientists have abandoned the pursuit 

of medical cure in favor of research as an end in itself. Believing 

that producing cloned embryos just for research would seem to be 

less justifiable than producing them with healing motives, these 

critics of the term “research cloning” want to avoid giving the impression that scientists want to experiment on new life just to satisfy their curiosity. We believe that this legitimate concern can be 

addressed by appending the adjective “biomedical” to make clear 

that the aim of the research is to seek cures and treatments for 

human diseases. We therefore opt to use the term “cloning-forbiomedical-research.” 

Some proponents of the activity called “therapeutic cloning” also 

now object to the term, but not because of the adjective. Though 

it was proponents who originally coined and used the term, some 

of them now want to shed the term “cloning,” fearing that the bad 

or distressing connotations of the latter will weigh against the activity itself. Cloning, they insist, should be reserved for the activity 

that produces live-born cloned babies; it should not apply to the 

initial act that starts the process, which they would rather call “somatic cell nuclear transfer” or “nuclear transplantation.”1

 The reason for such re-description is not wholly cosmetic and rhetorical; 

because the researchers are primarily interested in obtaining pluripotent*

 stem cells, their focus is on the somatic cell nucleus and 

what must be done to it (transfer or transplantation) in order for it 

to revert to the undifferentiated condition of the primordial stem 

cell stage. Nevertheless, such terminological substitution is problematic, for the following reasons. 

* Pluripotent cells are those that can give rise to many different types of differentiated cells. See Glossary of Terms. 
46 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

 

Although as a scientific matter “somatic cell nuclear transfer” or 

“nuclear transplantation” may accurately describe the technique that 

is used to produce the embryonic clone, these terms fail to convey 

the nature of the deed itself, and they hide its human significance. 

The deed, fully described, is the production of a living human entity (or “embryo” or “organism”; of the right name for the product, more later) that is genetically virtually identical to the donor 

organism, a fact or meaning not captured in the name for the technique or method, the transfer of a somatic cell nucleus (into an 

unfertilized egg whose own nucleus has been removed or inactivated).*

 As a name, SCNT is not a fully accurate description even 

of the technique itself. It makes no reference to the intended and 

direct result of the deed of nuclear transfer. It also omits mention 

of the fact that the recipient of the transferred nucleus is an (enucleated) egg cell (rather than another kind of cell), which then can 

be made to initiate cell division as if it were just like a zygote produced by fertilization. The further amendments, “somatic cell nuclear transfer for stem cell research” or “nuclear transplantation for regenerative medicine” or “nuclear transplantation to produce stem cells” 

only compound the difficulty, mixing in the purpose of the activity 

with its technique, thus further obscuring the immediate meaning 

of the act itself, the production of a living cloned human embryo. 

Cloned Human Embryo: The Product of SCNT 

What shall we call the product of SCNT? The technical description 

of the cloning method (that is, SCNT) omits all reference not only 

to cloning but also to the immediate product of the activity. This obscurity enables some to argue that the immediate product of 

SCNT is not an “embryo” but rather “an egg” or “an unfertilized 

egg” or “an activated cell,” and that the subsequent stages of development should not be called embryos but “clumps of cells” or 

“activated cells.” To be sure, there are genuine difficulties and perplexities regarding what names to use, for we are dealing with an 

entity new in our experience. Partly for this reason, some people 

recommend avoiding the effort to describe the nature of the prod-

* This reduction of an act to its mechanism is roughly analogous to describing 

walking as “sequential alternate leg advancement” (SALA). 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 47 

 

uct, preferring instead to allow the uses we human beings have for it to 

define its being, and hence its worth. But, for reasons of both truth 

and ethical conduct, we reject this approach as improper. We are 

all too familiar with instances in which some human beings have 

defined downward the status of other beings precisely to exploit 

them with impunity and with a clear conscience. Thus, despite the 

acknowledged difficulties in coming to know it accurately, we insist on making the effort to describe the product of SCNT as accurately and as fairly as we can. 

The initial product of SCNT is a single cell, but it is no ordinary 

cell. It is also an “egg” and a “reconstituted egg.” But even that is 

not the whole story. The “reconstituted” egg is more than reconstituted; it has been capacitated for development. Because the egg 

now has a diploid nucleus, it has become something beyond what 

it was before: it now contains in a single nucleus the full complement of genetic material necessary for producing a new organism.*

 

And being an egg cell, it uniquely offers the cytoplasmic environment that can support this development. The product of SCNT 

thus resembles and can be made to act like a fertilized egg, a cell 

that not only has the full complement of chromosomes but also is 

capable (in animals) or may be capable (in humans) of developing 

into a new organism. In other words, in terms of its future prospects, it is a “zygote-like entity” or a (cloned) “zygote equivalent.”†

 

* The original egg had a haploid nucleus, containing only half the chromosomes necessary for development. The diploid nucleus contains the full 

amount. See Chapter Four. 

† Technically, the term “zygote” (from a Greek root meaning “yoke”) refers 

to the primordial cell that forms from the union of egg and sperm and the fusion (the yoking together) of their nuclei as the first step in the development 

of a new life that has come from the joining of its two parents. It is for this 

reason technically inappropriate to call the product of an asexual initiation a 

“zygote,” though it may be its functional equivalent. The term “clonote” has 

been suggested as the strict analogue of “zygote,” identifying the primordial 

cell formed in cloning by its special origin: just as a zygote arises from the 

“yoking together” of two elements, so a “clonote” arises from the act of clonal 

propagation from a single, already existing organism. (Similarly, the term 

“parthenote” for the primary product of parthenogenesis would accurately 

indicate that it arises from the “virgin” [unfertilized] egg alone; parthenos, 
48 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

 

The initial product of SCNT is, to be sure, not just a cell but an active cell. (More precisely, it is a cell that can be activated by electric 

stimulation.) But “activated cell” is much too vague to describe the 

activity of which it is capable. For, once stimulated, the activity of 

this “cell” produced by SCNT is nothing other than human embryological development, initiated and directed by the cell itself. 

The processes of cellular growth, chromosomal replication, cell division, and (ultimately) differentiation into the tissues and organs 

of the organism are coordinated processes under the governance 

of the immanent developmental plan encoded in the cell’s genetic 

material. In other words, the product of SCNT is an organism in 

its germinal stage, and its activities are those of an integrated and 

self-developing whole.*

 

Another suggested name, better than “activated cell,” is “totipotent cell”—a cell that is “capable of all.” But this too is ambiguous. 

If what is meant is that it can (and will, should it be stimulated to 

do so) become “any and all” of the different kinds of cells in the 

body, then it is an insufficient meaning. For, as explained in the 

previous paragraph, this totipotent cell may also become the “all” 

that is the integrated whole (cloned) mature organism itself (along 

with a portion of the placenta that would give it nourishment). In 

this second and fuller meaning of “totipotent,” a totipotent cell is 

then just a functional synonym for the “zygote”: “zygote” etymologically reminds one of the cell’s origins in egg-joined-to-sperm; 

“totipotency” describes what it is capable of. A fertilized egg is 

precisely a “totipotent” cell; the product of human SCNT is, we 

assume, its equivalent. 

Greek for “virgin.”) The term “clonote” also has the merit of carrying the 

clonal character of the entity in its name. 

* For the reasons given in this paragraph, we reject the suggestion that the 

immediate product of SCNT and the cells it gives rise to should be considered “cells in tissue culture.” Unlike somatic cells grown in laboratory culture, 

the immediate product of SCNT, although (like cultured tissues) it grows in 

culture media outside the body, is the germ of a new organism, not merely of 

other cells just like itself. 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 49 

In some discussions, the next few stages of the developing cloned 

human entity have been described as “clumps of cells.” Yet, for 

reasons already given, this is only partially accurate. Viewed externally, under the microscope, the developing embryo will appear as 

two, then four, then eight cells “clumped” together, and the 100-

to-200-cell blastocyst stage will indeed appear as a “ball of cells.” 

Yet there is more here than meets the eye, for the “clump” is governed by an internal principle of development that shapes and directs its transformations. Thus, this ball or clump is not a mere 

heap or aggregate; it is a primordial and unfolding whole that functions as a whole and that is in the process of developing (or attempting to develop) into a mature whole being. Of course, if development is not pursued or not allowed to happen because of disruption, then the “clump of cells” description may be rendered accurate not just microscopically but also biologically. But as long as 

development continues and the developing entity is intact, that is 

not the case. 

It would seem, then, that—whatever the reason for producing it—

the initial product of somatic cell nuclear transfer is a living (onecelled) cloned human embryo. The immediate intention of transferring the nucleus is precisely to produce just such an entity: one 

that is alive (rather than nonliving), one that is human (rather than 

nonhuman or animal), and one that is an embryo, an entity capable 

of developing into an articulated organismic whole (rather than 

just a somatic cell capable only of replication into more of the 

same cell type). This is the intended primary product of performing SCNT, whether the ultimate motive or purpose is producing a 

live-born child from the cloned embryo or conducting scientific 

research on the cloned embryo. Also, the blastocyst stage that 

develops from this one-celled cloned embryo will be the same 

being, whether it is then transferred to a woman’s uterus to begin a 

pregnancy or is used as a source of stem cells for research and 

possible therapy for others. 

Yet, not surprisingly, objections have been raised to calling this 

cloned entity an “embryo,” objections having to do both with its 

origins and with the uncertainty about the extent of its developmental potential. There are also objections having to do not with 
50 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

the facts but with public connotations and perceptions: for some 

members of the public, the word “embryos” apparently conjures 

images of miniature babies. If “nuclear transplantation to produce 

stem cells” seems to some people to be unfairly morally neutered

terminology, “embryo” seems to other people to be unfairly morally loaded terminology, especially when used to describe an entity 

barely visible to the naked eye. We acknowledge this problem and 

recognize that, despite our best efforts, such difficulties in public 

perception probably cannot be simply corrected. But we do not 

regard this as sufficient reason to scrap the use of a term if it is in 

fact most appropriate. The other objections to calling the product 

of SCNT an “embryo” are not about rhetoric and politics, but 

about the thing itself. They should be addressed. 

First, “human embryo,” in the traditional scientific definition of 

this term, refers to the earliest stages of human development, from 

the zygote through roughly eight weeks of gestation, after which 

time it is called a fetus. Because the product of SCNT is technically 

not a zygote, not having come from egg and sperm, it is argued 

that it cannot therefore be an embryo. Second, it is said that it 

cannot be an embryo because it is an “artifact,” something produced entirely by human artifice, “made” rather than “begotten.” 

Third, we do not yet know for sure whether this entity can in fact 

develop into a baby; hence, we do not know whether it has the full 

developmental potential of a human embryo formed by fertilization. 

There are, however, good responses to these objections. The first 

product of SCNT is, on good biological grounds, quite properly 

regarded as the equivalent of a zygote, and its subsequent stages as 

embryonic stages in development. True, it is not technically “zygotic” in 

origin, and it owes its existence to human artifice. But these objections, dealing only with origins, ignore the organization and powers 

of this entity, and the crucially important fact of its capacity to undergo future embryological development—just like a sexually produced embryo. True, it originates as a result of human artifice, and 

it lacks the natural bi-parental (male-plus-female) precursors. But 

this particular “artifact” is alive and self-developing, and should it 

eventually give rise to a baby, that child would in its being and its 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 51 

 

capacities be indistinguishable from any other human being—

hardly an artifact—in the same way that Dolly is a sheep. True, regarding its developmental potential, we do not yet have incontrovertible proof that a cloned human embryo can in fact do what 

embryos are “supposed” to do and what animal cloned embryos 

have already done, namely, develop into all the later stages of the 

organism, up to its full maturity (à la Dolly). But if we do not assume this last possibility—an assumption based on the biological 

continuity of all mammals*—there would be nothing to talk about 

in this whole matter of human cloning. As we emphasized in the 

first chapter of this report, this entire inquiry assumes that cloned human 

embryos can someday be developed into live-born human beings. 

Once we make this assumption, neither its artificial nor its uniparental source alters the decisive point: the product of SCNT is 

an entity that is the first stage of a developing organism—of a determinate species (human), with a full genetic complement, and its 

own (albeit near-replicated) individual genetic identity. It hence deserves on functional grounds to be called an embryo. And that is the 

heart of the reason why we in this report shall call it an “embryo” 

(actually, for reasons soon to be discussed, a “cloned embryo”): because the decisive questions to be addressed in our moral reflections have to do not with the origin of the entity but with its developmental potential, its embryonic character must be kept centrally in 

mind. 

This decision, based on what we believe comes closest to the truth 

about the product of SCNT, is supported by other, more practical 

considerations. We are disinclined to introduce other words to describe the early product of human cloning that might deprive discussion of the ethics of human cloning of its humanly significant 

context. Despite the novelty of cloning and its products, their con-

* A recent press report indicates that as-yet-unpublished work in China by 

Sheng Huizhen involved insertion of human somatic cell nuclei into enucleated rabbit eggs, and that the resulting cloned embryos developed to a stage 

where human embryonic stem cells could be isolated.2 And, of course, in 

other mammals the product of SCNT has been grown all the way to live-born 

young that grow up to be able to produce young of their own. 
52 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

 

siderable kinship to elements of normal reproduction and development means that we enter upon the discussion equipped with 

existing and relevant terms and notions. We do not start in a terminological vacuum or with an empty dictionary. We observe that 

even people who prefer not to call the one-celled product of 

SCNT a zygote or embryo use terms like “blastocyst” and “embryo” to name the product a few cell divisions later.*

 We think 

that using or coining other words will be more confusing to members of the public as they try to follow and contribute to the ethical 

discussion. And we clearly assume, as already stated, that the product of human SCNT could someday be shown to be capable of 

developing into a later-stage embryo, fetus, or live human being, 

even though such capacity has yet to be documented. 

There are also very important ethical reasons that support our 

choice. We want to be very careful not to make matters easy for 

ourselves. We do not want to define away the moral questions of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research by denying to the morally crucial 

element a name that makes clear that there is a moral question to 

be faced. Yes, there is some ground for uncertainty about the being of the product of SCNT. Yet because something is ambiguous 

to us does not mean that it is ambiguous in itself. Where the moral 

stakes are high, we should not allow our uncertainty to lead us to 

* Thus, for example, the report on Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning, released by the National Academy of Sciences in January 2002, 

describes “nuclear transplantation to produce stem cells” as “a very different 

procedure” from what it calls “human reproductive cloning.” Nevertheless, 

the report falls quite naturally into our normal way of speaking, a way that 

recognizes that the cloned product is, indeed, a human embryo and that any 

stem cells obtained from it would be embryonic stem cells. Thus, for example, 

the authors of the report can write a sentence such as the following (p. 2-6): 

“The experimental procedures required to produce stem cells through nuclear 

transplantation would consist of the transfer of a somatic cell nucleus from a 

patient into an enucleated egg, the in vitro culture of the embryo to the blastocyst stage, and the derivation of a pluripotent ES cell line from the inner 

cell mass of this blastocyst.” Other scientists clearly insist that the primary 

product of SCNT is an embryo (see, for example, Dr. John Gearhart’s presentation to the Council on embryonic stem cells, April 25, 2002; transcript on 

the Council’s website, www.bioethics.gov). 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 53 

 

regard the subject in question as being anything less than it might 

truly be. 

The product of “SCNT” is not only an embryo; it is also a clone, 

genetically virtually identical to the individual that was the source 

of the transferred nucleus, hence an embryonic clone of the donor. 

There is, to be sure, much discussion about how close the genetic 

relation is between donor and embryonic clone, and about the 

phenotypic similarity of the clone to the donor.* Yet the goal in 

this process is in fact a blastocyst-stage cloned embryo (in the case 

of cloning-for-biomedical-research) or a child who is genetically 

virtually identical to the donor (in the case of cloning-to-producechildren); otherwise there would be no reason to produce a cloned 

embryo by SCNT rather than an (uncloned) embryo by ordinary 

IVF. A full and fitting name of the developing entity produced by 

human SCNT is “cloned human embryo,” a term that also allows 

us to remember that, thanks to its peculiar origins, this embryo is 

not in all respects identical to an embryo produced by fertilization 

of egg by sperm. 

As if things were not difficult enough, a further complication may 

soon arise, following reports of successful SCNT experiments in 

which human somatic cells were fused with animal oocytes, and the 

resulting product grown to the blastocyst stage of development. 

What are we to call the product of this kind of cloning? And what 

kind of species identity does it have? According to the advance reports (based on a presentation at a scientific meeting), the stem 

cells extracted from the blastocyst stage were demonstrated to be 

human stem cells (somewhat surprisingly, the mitochondria were 

also human in genotype). Is this, therefore, a cloned human em-

* The environment in which the donor came to be and lives surely differs 

from the one in which the cloned embryo may develop (if it does develop). 

There may be imprinting or epigenetic reprogramming differences in gene 

expression early on that may affect the physical and mental characteristics of 

the clone. There is also the matter of the mitochondrial genes (see Glossary 

of Terms), a small number of protein-producing genes out of a total of some 

30,000 to 60,000, which are inherited from the female source of the egg (the 

clone would be genetically identical only in those cases in which the same 

woman donated both egg and somatic cell nucleus, to produce an embryonic 

clone of herself). 
54 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

bryo? The only test that could settle the question—implantation 

into a woman’s uterus for attempted gestation to see if a human 

child results—cannot ethically even be contemplated without already assuming a positive answer. In the face of uncertainty, therefore, and lest we err by overconfidence, there is prima facie reason 

to include even these cross-species entities in the category of 

“cloned human embryos.” (When we come to the ethical issues of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research, we can consider whether this terminological judgment is matched by an ethical one.) 

Conclusion 

None of the terms available to us is entirely trouble-free. Yet the 

foregoing analysis leads us to the following conclusion regarding 

the terms best descriptive of the facts of the matter: 

Human cloning (what it is): The asexual production of a new human 

organism that is, at all stages of development, genetically virtually 

identical to a currently existing or previously existing human being. 

Human cloning (how it is done): It would be accomplished by introducing the nuclear material of a human somatic cell (donor) into 

an oocyte (egg) whose own nucleus has been removed or inactivated, yielding a product that has a human genetic constitution virtually identical to the donor of the somatic cell. This procedure is 

known as “somatic cell nuclear transfer” (SCNT). 

Human cloning (why it is done): This same activity may be undertaken 

for purposes of producing children or for purposes of scientific 

and medical investigation and use, a distinction represented in the 

popular discussion by the terms “reproductive cloning” and 

“therapeutic cloning.” We have chosen instead to use the following designations: 

Cloning-to-produce-children: Production of a cloned human embryo, 

formed for the (proximate) purpose of initiating a pregnancy, with 

the (ultimate) goal of producing a child who will be genetically virtually identical to a currently existing or previously existing individual. 
Chapter Three: On Terminology 55 

Cloning-for-biomedical-research: Production of a cloned human embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of using it in research or 

for extracting its stem cells, with the (ultimate) goals of gaining 

scientific knowledge of normal and abnormal development and of 

developing cures for human diseases. 

Cloned human embryo: (a) The immediate and developing product of 

the initial act of cloning, accomplished by SCNT. (b) A human 

embryo resulting from the somatic cell nuclear transfer process (as 

contrasted with a human embryo arising from the union of egg 

and sperm). 

ENDNOTES 

1 Vogelstein, B., et al., “Please don’t call it cloning!” Science, 295: 1237, 2002. 

2 Leggett, K. and A. Regalado, “China Stem Cell Research Surges as Western 

Nations Ponder Ethics” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2002, p. A1. 
56 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 
57 

Chapter Four

Scientific Background 

Introduction 

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background on basic 

scientific aspects of human cloning for readers of this report. 

Background on stem cell research is also included to enable 

readers to understand how cloned embryos might be useful in 

stem cell and other biomedical research. This limited treatment 

only summarizes and highlights basic aspects of these topics, in 

part because two major detailed reports, Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning1

 and Stem Cells and the Future of 

Regenerative Medicine,2 have been recently published. 

This review is based largely on scientific research papers published through June 2002, supplemented by references to several 

articles in the popular press. However, the research areas of 

cloning and stem cell research are being very actively investigated, and significant new developments are published frequently. Publication of new results could change some of the interpretations and emphases in this review. 

Use of unfamiliar technical terms has been avoided wherever 

possible. Scientific names and terms used are described and defined in the Glossary of Terms. 
58 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Some Basic Facts about Human Cell 

Biology and Sexual Reproduction 

We begin with some basic facts about human cells, germ cells 

(egg and sperm), and early embryonic development to provide 

the background for understanding the mechanism of cloning 

and the differences between sexual and asexual reproduction. 

Normal human cells with nuclei contain forty-six chromosomes, 

twenty-two pairs plus two X chromosomes if the individual is 

female, or twenty-two pairs plus one X and one Y chromosome 

if the individual is male. These chromosomes contain nearly all 

of the cell’s DNA and, therefore, the genes of the cell. During 

formation of sperm cells, a process of specialized cell division 

produces mature sperm cells containing twenty-three chromosomes (twenty-two unpaired chromosomes plus either X or Y). 

During the formation of eggs (oocytes), a process of specialized 

cell division produces a cell containing two pronuclei, each of 

which contains twenty-two unpaired chromosomes plus an X. 

During fertilization, a polar body containing one of these pronuclei is ejected from the egg. 

Fusion of egg and sperm cells and the subsequent fusion of their 

nuclei (the defining acts of all sexual reproduction) produce a 

zygote that again contains a nucleus with the adult cell complement of forty-six chromosomes, half from each parent [See Figure 1]. The zygote then begins the gradual process of cell division, growth, and differentiation. After four to five days, the developing embryo attains the 100-200 cell (blastocyst) stage. In 

normal reproduction, the blastocyst implants into the wall of the 

uterus, where, suitably nourished, it continues the process of coordinated cell, tissue, and organ differentiation that eventually 

produces the organized, articulated, and integrated whole that is 

the newborn infant. According to some estimates, about half of 

all early human embryos fail to implant, and are expelled with 

the menses during the next menstrual cycle. 

Not quite all the DNA of a human cell resides in its nucleus. All 

human cells, including eggs and sperm, contain small, energy-
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 59

 

producing organelles called mitochondria. Mitochondria contain 

a small piece of DNA that specifies the genetic instructions for 

making several essential mitochondrial proteins. When additional 

mitochondria are produced in the cell, the mitochondrial DNA 

is replicated, and a copy of it is passed along to the new mitochondria that are formed. During fertilization, sperm mitochondria are selectively degraded inside the zygote. Thus, the 

developing embryo inherits solely or principally mitochondria 

(and mitochondrial DNA) from the egg. 

Human reproduction has also been accomplished with the help 

of in vitro fertilization (IVF) of eggs by sperm, and the subsequent transfer of one or more early embryos to a woman for 

gestation and birth. Even though such union of egg and sperm 

requires laboratory assistance and takes place outside of the 

body, human reproduction using IVF is still sexual in the biological sense: the new human being arises from two biological 

parents through the union of egg and sperm. 

Egg and sperm cells combined in vitro have also been used to 

start the process of animal development. Transfer of the resulting blastocysts into the uterus of a female of the appropriate 

animal species is widely used in animal husbandry with resulting 

successful live births. 

Cloning (Asexual Reproduction) of Mammals

The startling announcement that Dolly the sheep had been produced by cloning3

 indicated that it was possible to produce live 

mammalian offspring via asexual reproduction through cloning 

with adult donor cell nuclei.* In outline form, the steps used to 

produce live offspring in the mammalian species that have been 

cloned so far are: 

* Previous experiments dating from the 1950s had shown that it was possible 

to clone amphibians. Earlier experiments had also produced clones of animals using embryonic donor cells. What made the report of Dolly’s birth stand 

out was the fact that a mammal had been cloned, and from cells taken from 

an adult. 
60 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

1. Obtain an egg cell from a female of a mammalian species. 

2. Remove the nuclear DNA from the egg cell, to produce 

an enucleated egg. 

3. Insert the nucleus of a donor adult cell into the enucleated egg, to produce a reconstructed egg. 

4. Activate the reconstructed egg with chemicals or electric 

current, to stimulate the reconstructed egg to commence 

cell division. 

5. Sustain development of the cloned embryo to a suitable 

stage in vitro, and then transfer the resulting cloned embryo to the uterus of a female host that has been suitably 

prepared to receive it. 

6. Bring to live birth a cloned animal that is genetically virtually identical (except for the mitochondrial DNA) to 

the animal that donated the adult cell nucleus. 

Cloning to produce live offspring carries with it several possibilities not available through sexual reproduction. Because 

the number of presumably identical donor cells is very large, 

this process could produce a very large number of genetically 

virtually identical individuals, limited only by the supply of 

eggs and female animals that could bear the young. In principle, any animal, male or female, newborn or adult, could be 

cloned, and in any quantity. Because mammalian cells can be 

frozen and stored for prolonged periods at low temperature 

and grown again for use as donor cells in cloning, one may 

even clone individuals who have died. In theory, a clone 

could be cloned again, on and on, without limit. In mice, 

such “cloning of clones” has extended out to six generations.4
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 61

Figure 1: Diagram of early stages of human fertilization, 

cloning, and parthenogenesis. 

[Modified from Rick Weiss and Patterson 

Clark, The Washington Post.]
62 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Since the report of the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep, attempts 

have been made to clone at least nine other mammalian species. 

As summarized in Table 1, live offspring have been produced in 

a low percentage of cloned embryo transfer experiments with 

sheep, cattle, goats, mice, pigs, cats5 and rabbits.6 According to a 

press report,7 attempts to clone rats, dogs, and primates using 

adult cell DNA have not yet yielded live offspring. In experiments to clone different mammalian species, many of the transferred cloned embryos fail to develop normally and abort spontaneously in utero. In addition, a variety of health problems 

have been reported in many of the cloned animals that survived 

to live birth.8 However, some surviving cloned cattle appear 

physiologically similar to their uncloned counterparts, and two 

cloned cows have given birth to their own offspring.9,10

Why is production of live cloned mammalian offspring a relatively rare event? Several factors may play a role. Enucleation of 

the egg may (variably from one attempt to the next) remove or 

damage its “epigenetic reprogramming” (see Glossary of Terms) 

capabilities. Isolating a nucleus from the donor cell and manipulating it to insert it into the egg is also a traumatic process that 

may damage the nucleus. An optimal in vitro nutritive environment for the development of cloned animal embryos may not 

yet have been determined. One interpretation11 attributes the 

early death of many cloned embryos to complete failure or incompleteness of epigenetic reprogramming. 

Epigenetic Modification 

and Reprogramming

Normal mammalian embryonic development results from selective expression of some genes and repression of others. Tissue 

differentiation depends upon several types of “epigenetic modifications” (see Glossary of Terms) of DNA structure and spatial 

organization that selectively turn genes on and off. The chromosomal DNAs of egg and sperm cells are modified during their 
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 63
64 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

maturation, so that at fertilization, both sets of DNA are ready 

for the complex pattern of gene expression required for normal 

embryonic development. In order for the DNA of a differentiated adult cell to direct embryonic development in cloning, it 

must be “epigenetically reprogrammed.” That is, the epigenetic 

modifications that allowed the cell to express genes appropriate 

for, for example, a differentiated skin cell must be reduced, and 

the gene expression program required for full embryonic development must be activated. 

During cloning, cytoplasmic factors in the egg cell reprogram the 

chromosomal DNA of the somatic cell. In rare cases, this reprogramming is sufficient to enable embryonic development to 

proceed all the way to the birth of a live animal (for examples, 

see Table 1). In many cloning experiments, epigenetic reprogramming probably fails or is abnormal, and the developing 

animal dies. Incomplete epigenetic reprogramming could also 

explain why some live-born cloned animals suffer from subtle 

defects that sometimes do not appear for years.12

The completeness of epigenetic reprogramming is crucial for 

successful cloning-to-produce-children. It will also be important 

to assess the impact of variation in epigenetic reprogramming on 

the biological properties of cloned stem cell preparations. If the 

extent of epigenetic reprogramming varies from one cloning 

event to the next, the protein expression pattern and thus the 

biological properties of cloned stem cell preparations may also 

vary. Thus, it may be necessary to produce and test multiple 

cloned stem cell preparations before preparations that are informative about human disease or useful in cellular transplantation therapies can be identified.

Cloning-to-Produce-Children

At this writing, it is uncertain whether anyone has attempted 

cloning-to-produce-children. Although claims of such attempts 

have been reported in the press,13,14 no credible evidence of any 

such experiments has been reported as of June 2002. Thus, it is 

not yet known whether a transferred cloned human embryo can 
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 65

progress all the way to live birth. However, the steps in such an 

experiment would probably be similar to those described for 

animal cloning [see above and references to Table 1]. After a 

thorough review of the data on animal cloning, the NAS panel, 

in its report Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Cloning [page 

ES-1], came to the following conclusion: “It [cloning-toproduce-children] is dangerous and likely to fail.” 

 

Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine

The subject of stem cell research is much too large to be covered 

extensively here. Yet the following information on stem cells and 

their possible uses in medical treatments should facilitate understanding of the relationships between cloning-for-biomedicalresearch and stem cells (see also the reports Scientific and Medical 

Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning and Stem Cells and the Future of 

Regenerative Medicine). 

Stem cells are undifferentiated multipotent precursor cells that 

are capable both of perpetuating themselves as stem cells and of 

undergoing differentiation into one or more specialized types of 

cells (for example, kidney, muscle). Human embryonic stem 

cells have been isolated from embryos at the blastocyst stage15 or 

from the germinal tissue of fetuses.16 Multipotent adult progenitor cells have been isolated from sources such as human17 and 

rodent18 bone marrow. Such cell populations can be differentiated in vitro into a number of different cell types, and thus are 

the subject of much current research into their possible uses in 

regenerative medicine. Cloned human embryonic stem cell 

preparations could be produced using somatic cell nuclear transfer to produce a cloned human embryo, and then taking it apart 

at the (100-200 cell) blastocyst stage and isolating stem cells (see 

Figure 2). These stem cells would be genetically virtually identical to cells from the nucleus donor. 

Scientists are pursuing the development of therapies based on 

transplantation of cells for several human diseases, including 

Parkinson’s disease and Type I diabetes. In Parkinson’s disease, 

particular brain cells that produce the essential neurotransmitter 
66 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

dopamine die selectively. Experimental clinical treatment involving transplantation of human fetal brain cell populations, in 

which a small fraction of the cells produce dopamine, has improved the condition of some Parkinson’s disease patients.19

Dopamine-producing neurons derived from mouse embryonic 

stem cells have been shown to function in an animal model of 

Parkinson’s disease.20 Thus, there is a possibility that transplantation of dopamine-producing neural cells derived from embryonic or adult stem cell populations might be a useful treatment 

for Parkinson’s disease in the future. 

However, to be effective as long-term treatments of Parkinson’s 

disease, Type I diabetes, and other diseases, cell transplantation 

therapies will have to overcome the immune rejection problem. 

Cells from one person transplanted into the body of another are 

usually recognized as foreign and killed by the immune system. 

If cells derived from stem cell preparations are to be broadly 

useful in transplantation therapies for human diseases, some way 

or ways around this problem will have to be found. For example, if the cells were isolated from a cloned human embryo at the 

blastocyst stage, in which the donor nucleus came from a patient 

with Parkinson’s disease, in theory these stem cells would produce the same proteins as the patient. The hope is that dopamine-producing cells derived from these “individualized” stem 

cell preparations would not be immunologically rejected upon 

transplantation back into the Parkinson’s disease patient. Alternatively, if dopamine-producing cells could be derived from the 

patient’s own adult stem cell or multipotent adult precursor cell 

populations, they could also be used in such therapies. Another 

possibility is mentioned in a press report21 about work with a 

single Parkinson’s disease patient, in which brain cells were removed from the patient, expanded by growth in vitro, stimulated 

to increase dopamine production, and transplanted back into the 

brain of the same patient with an observed reduction in disease 

symptoms. 

By combining specific gene modification and cloned stem cell 

procedures, Rideout et al.22 have provided a remarkable example 

of how some human genetic diseases might someday be treated. 
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 67

Starting with a mouse strain that was deficient in immune system 

function because of a gene mutation, these investigators (1) produced a cloned stem cell line carrying the gene mutation, (2) specifically repaired the gene mutation in vitro, (3) differentiated the 

repaired cloned stem cell preparation in vitro into bone marrow 

precursor cells, and (4) treated the mutant mice with the repaired 

bone marrow precursor cells and observed a restoration of immune cell function. 

Although remarkably successful, the experimental results included a caveat. The investigators also observed a tendency of 

even these cloned bone marrow precursor cells to be recognized 

as foreign by the recipient mice. Rideout et al. were led to conclude: “Our results raise the provocative possibility that even 

genetically matched cells derived by therapeutic cloning may still 

face barriers to effective transplantation for some disorders.” 

Lanza et al.23 have also evaluated the potential for immune rejection of cloned embryonic materials, while showing the potential 

therapeutic value of tissues taken from cloned fetuses. Cloned 

cattle embryos at the blastocyst stage were transferred to the 

uteri of surrogate mothers and allowed to develop for five to 

eight weeks. Fetal heart, kidney, and skeletal muscle tissues were 

isolated, and degradable polymer vehicles containing these 

cloned cells were then transplanted back into the animals that 

donated the nuclei for cloning. The investigators observed no rejection reaction to the transplanted cloned cells using two different immunological tests. More investigations with cloned stem 

cell materials involving different stem cell preparations of varying sizes, different sites of implantation, and sensitive tests to detect low levels of immunological rejection will be required for a 

complete assessment of the possibility of using cloned stem cell 

populations to solve the immune rejection problem. 
68 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Figure 2: Stages in the development, isolation, and 

transformation of embryonic stem cells. 

[Modified from Rick Weiss and Patterson 

Clark, The Washington Post.]
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 69

 

Human Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 

Producing cloned stem cell preparations for possible use in individual patients suffering from diseases like Parkinson’s disease 

and Type I diabetes is one reason to pursue cloning-forbiomedical-research.24 In vitro production of cloned human embryos could also be important to scientists interested in studying 

early human development. Stem cells derived from cloned human embryos at the blastocyst stage that were produced with 

nuclei from individuals with genetic diseases could be useful in 

the study of the critical events that lead to these diseases (for example, see Bahn et al.25). Specific genes could be introduced into 

developing human embryos to obtain information about the role 

or roles of these genes in early human development. 

One attempt at human cloning-for-biomedical-research has been 

published in the scientific literature by Cibelli et al.26 as of the 

end of June 2002.* It involved the following steps (see Figure 1): 

1. Obtain human eggs from informed and consenting female volunteers. 

2. Remove the nuclear DNA from the egg cell, to produce 

an enucleated egg. 

3. Insert the nucleus of a cell from an informed and consenting adult donor into the enucleated egg, to produce a 

reconstituted egg. 

* According to a press report (Hall, C.T., “UCSF Admits Human Clone Research: Work to Duplicate Embryos for Medical Purposes on Hold” San 

Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 2002, p. A1), other attempts to produce cloned 

human embryos for biomedical research were carried out at the University of 

California-San Francisco by Roger Pedersen and coworkers in 1999 and 2001. 

Another press report (Leggett K., and A., Regalado “China Stem Cell Research Surges as Western Nations Ponder Ethics,” Wall Street Journal, March 

6, 2002, p. A1) indicates that as-yet-unpublished work in China by Sheng 

Huizhen involved insertion of human somatic cell nuclei into enucleated rabbit eggs, and that the resulting cloned embryos developed to a stage where 

human embryonic stem cells could be isolated. 
70 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

4. Activate the reconstituted egg with chemicals or electricity to stimulate it to commence cell division in vitro, 

producing a cloned embryo. 

5. Use a microscope to follow the early cell divisions of the 

cloned embryo. 

In the experiments described by Cibelli et al., the stated intent 

was to create cloned human embryos that would progress to the 

100-200 cell stage, at which point the cloned embryo would be 

taken apart, stem cells would be isolated from the inner cell 

mass, and an attempt would be made to grow and preserve “individualized” human stem cells (see Figure 2) for the possible future medical benefit of the somatic cell donor. Because the 

cloned human embryos stopped dividing and died at the six-cell 

stage, no stem cells were isolated in these experiments. In light 

of results in other animal species and the variable completeness 

of “epigenetic reprogramming,” it is perhaps not surprising that 

sixteen of the nineteen cloned human embryos described by Cibelli et. al. did not undergo cell division and none of the other 

three divided beyond the six-cell stage. 

Although the steps these researchers followed in these experiments were the same as those that would be used by those attempting human cloning-to-produce-children, they distinguished 

their intent from such cloning by stating: “Strict guidelines for 

the conduct of this research have been established by Advanced 

Cell Technology’s independent Ethics Advisory Board (EAB). 

In order to prevent any possibility of reproductive cloning, the 

EAB requires careful accounting of all eggs and embryos used in 

the research. No embryo created by means of NT [nuclear 

transfer] technology may be maintained beyond 14 days of development.” 

Parthenogenesis (Another Form of 

Asexual Reproduction) 

Using chemical or electrical stimuli, it is also possible to stimulate human eggs to undergo several rounds of cell division, as if 
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 71

they had been fertilized (see Figure 1). In this case, the egg retains all forty-six egg cell chromosomes and egg cell mitochondria. In amphibians, this asexual reproduction process, known 

as parthenogenesis, has produced live offspring that contain the 

same nuclear DNA as the egg. These offspring are all necessarily female. Parthenogenesis in mammals has not led reproducibly 

to the production of live offspring.27

Cibelli et al.26 activated human eggs (obtained from informed and 

consenting donors) by parthenogenesis, and obtained multiple 

cell divisions up to the early embryo stage in six out of twentytwo attempts. Although there was no report that stem cells were 

isolated in these experiments, it is possible that parthenogenesis 

of human eggs could induce them to develop to a stage where 

parthenogenetic stem cells could be isolated. For example, Cibelli et al.28 derived a monkey parthenogenetic stem cell preparation from Macaca fasicularis eggs activated by parthenogenesis. 

Whether cloned stem cells resulting from parthenogenesis have 

been completely and correctly epigenetically reprogrammed remains to be determined. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1 National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human 

Reproductive Cloning, Washington, DC. National Academy Press, 2002. 

2 National Research Council/Institute of Medicine (NRC/IOM). Stem Cells 

and the Future of Regenerative Medicine. Washington DC. National Academy 

Press, 2001. 

3 Wilmut, I., et al. “Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian 

cells” Nature, 385: 810-813, 1997. 

4 Wakayama, T., et al. “Cloning of mice to six generations” Nature, 407: 318-

319, 2000. 

5 Shin, T., et al. “A cat cloned by nuclear transplantation” Nature, 415: 859, 

2002. 
72 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

6 Chesne, P., et al. “Cloned rabbits produced by nuclear transfer from adult 

somatic cells” Nature Biotechnology, 20: 366-369, 2002. 

7 Kolata, G. “In Cloning, Failure Far Exceeds Success” New York Times, December 11, 2001, page D1. 

8 See Table 2 in Reference 1. 

9 Lanza, R.P., et al. “Cloned cattle can be healthy and normal,” Science, 294: 

1893-1894, 2001. 

10 Cibelli, J.B., et al. “The health profile of cloned animals” Nature Biotechnology, 

20: 13-14, 2002. 

11 Rideout III, W.M., et al. “Nuclear cloning and epigenetic reprogramming of 

the genome” Science, 293: 1093-1098, 2001. 

12 Ogonuki, N., et al. “Early death of mice cloned from somatic cells” Nature 

Genetics, 30: 253-254, 2002. 

13 Weiss, R. “Human Cloning Bid Stirs Experts’ Anger; Problems in Animal 

Cases Noted” The Washington Post, April 11, 2001, page A1. 

14 Brown, D. “Human Clone’s Birth Predicted; Delivery Outside U.S. May 

Come By 2003, Researcher Says” The Washington Post, May 16, 2002, p. A8. 

15 Thomson, J.A., et al. “Embryonic stem cell lines derived from human blastocysts” Science, 282: 1145-1147, 1998. 

16 Shamblott, M.J., et al. “Derivation of pluripotent stem cells from cultured 

human primordial germ cells” Proc Nat Acad Sci U.S.A., 95: 13726-13731, 

1998. 

17 Reyes, M., et al. “Origin of endothelial progenitors in human postnatal 

bone marrow” Journal of Clinical Investigation, 109: 337-346, 2002. 

18 Jiang, Y., et al. “Pluripotency of mesenchymal stem cells derived from adult 

marrow,” Nature, 418: 41-49, 2002. 

19 Hagell, P., and P. Brundin, “Cell survival and clinical outcome following intrastriatal transplantation in Parkinson’s disease” J Neuropathol Exp Neurol, 60: 

741-752, 2001. 

20 Kim, J-H., et al. “Dopamine neurons derived from embryonic stem cells 

function in an animal model of Parkinson’s disease” Nature 418: 50-56, 2002. 
Chapter Four: Scientific Background 73

21 Weiss, R. “Stem Cell Transplant Works in Calif. Case, Parkinson’s Traits 

Largely Disappear,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2002, p. A8. 

22 Rideout III, W.M., et al. “Correction of a genetic defect by nuclear transplantation and combined cell and gene therapy” Cell, 109: 17-27, 2002. 

23 Lanza, R.P., et al. “Generation of histocompatible tissues using nuclear 

transplantation” Nature Biotechnology, 20: 689-696, 2002. 

24 Lanza, R.P., et al. “Human therapeutic cloning” Nature Medicine, 5: 975-977, 

1999. 

25 Bahn, S., et al. “Neuronal target genes of the neuron-restrictive silencer factor in neurospheres derived from fetuses with Down's syndrome: A gene expression study” The Lancet, 359: 310-315, 2002. 

26 Cibelli, J.B., et al. “Somatic cell nuclear transfer in humans: Pronuclear and 

early embryonic development” e-biomed: The Journal of Regenerative Medicine, 2: 

25-31, 2001. 

27 Rougier, N., and Z. Werb. “Minireview: Parthenogenesis in mammals” Mol 

Reprod Devel 59: 468-474, 2001. 

28 Cibelli, J.B., et al. “Parthenogenetic stem cells in nonhuman primates” Science, 295: 819, 2002. 
74 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
75 

Chapter Five

The Ethics of Cloning-to-ProduceChildren

Cloning-to-produce-children has been the subject of two major 

national reports in recent years—first by the National Bioethics 

Advisory Commission in June 1997,1 and more recently by the 

National Academy of Sciences in January 2002.2 Both reports 

concluded that attempts to clone a human being “at this time” 

would be unethical, owing to questions about the safety of the 

technique and the likelihood of physical harm to those involved. 

But both reports also concluded that the nation required much 

deeper reflection about the “ethical and social implications” of 

cloning-to-produce-children beyond the scientific and medical 

aspects of the procedure. As the National Academy of Sciences 

report stated: 

Our present opposition to human reproductive 

cloning is based on science and medicine, irrespective of broader considerations. The panel 

stresses, however, that a broad ethical debate 

must be encouraged so that the public can be 

prepared to make decisions if human reproductive 

cloning is some day considered medically safe for 

mothers and offspring.3 

In this chapter we attempt to take up this charge to engage in a 

broad ethical consideration of the merits of cloning-to-producechildren. 
76 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

The prospect of cloning-to-produce-children raises a host of 

moral questions, among them the following: Could the first attempts to clone a human child be made without violating accepted moral norms governing experimentation on human subjects? What harms might be inflicted on the cloned child as a 

consequence of having been made a clone? Is it significant that 

the cloned child would inherit a genetic identity lived in advance 

by another—and, in some cases, the genetic identity of the 

cloned child’s rearing parent? Is it significant that cloned children would be the first human beings whose genetic identity was 

entirely known and selected in advance? How might cloning-toproduce-children affect relationships within the cloning families? 

More generally, how might it affect the relationship between the 

generations? How might it affect the way society comes to view 

children? What other prospects would we be tacitly approving in 

advance by accepting this practice? What important human 

goods might be enhanced or sacrificed were we to approve cloning-to-produce-children? 

In what follows, we shall explicitly consider many of these questions. But as we do so, we shall not lose sight of the larger and 

fundamental human contexts discussed in Chapter One—

namely, the meaning of human procreation and care of children, 

the means and ends of biotechnology, and the relation between 

science and society. Indeed, overarching our entire discussion of 

the specific ethical issues is our concern for the human significance of procreation as a whole and our desire to protect what is 

valuable in it from erosion and degradation—not just from cloning but from other possible technological and nontechnological 

dangers. Readers of this report are encouraged to consider the 

discussion that follows in a similar light. 

We will begin by formulating the best moral case for cloning-toproduce-children—describing both the specific purposes it 

might serve and the philosophic and moral arguments made in 

its favor. From there we will move to the moral case against 

cloning-to-produce-children. Beginning with the safety objections that have dominated the debate thus far, we will show how 

these concerns ultimately point beyond themselves toward 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 77

broader ethical concerns. Chief among these is how cloning-toproduce-children would challenge the basic nature of human 

procreation and the meaning of having children. We shall also 

consider cloning’s effects on human identity, how it might move 

procreation toward a form of manufacture or toward eugenics, 

and how it could distort family relations and affect society as a 

whole. 

* * * 
78 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

I. The Case for Cloning-to-ProduceChildren

Arguments in defense of cloning-to-produce-children often address questions of reproduction, but they tend to focus on only a 

relatively narrow sliver of the goods and principles involved. 

This certainly does not mean that such arguments lack merit. Indeed, some of the arguments in favor of cloning-to-producechildren appeal to the deepest and most meaningful of our society’s shared values. 

A. Purposes 

In recent years, in anticipation of cloning-to-produce-children, 

proponents have articulated a variety of possible uses of a perfected technology: providing a “biologically related child” for an 

infertile couple; permitting reproduction for single individuals or 

same-sex couples; avoiding the risk of genetic disease; securing a 

genetically identical source of organs or tissues perfectly suitable 

for transplantation; “replacing” a loved spouse or child who is 

dying or has died; obtaining a child with a genotype of one’s own 

choosing (including one’s own genotype); replicating individuals 

of great genius, talent, or beauty, or individuals possessing traits 

that are for other reasons attractive to the cloners; and creating 

sets of genetically identical humans who might have special advantages in highly cooperative ventures in both war and peace.4

The desire to control or select the genomes of children-to-be 

through cloning has charmed more than a few prospective users, 

in the United States and around the world. 

Although we appreciate that a perfected technology, once introduced for one purpose, might then be used for any of these purposes, we shall examine further only those stated purposes that 

seem to us to merit serious consideration. 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 79

1. To Produce Biologically Related Children 

Human cloning would allow individuals or couples with fertility 

problems to have biologically related children. For example, if a 

man could not produce sperm, cloning would allow him to have 

a child who is “biologically related” to him. In addition, it would 

allow married couples with fertility problems to avoid using donor gametes, and therefore avoid raising children with genetic 

inheritances from outside the marriage. 

2. To Avoid Genetic Disease

Human cloning could allow couples at risk of generating children with genetic disease to have healthy children. For example, 

if both parents carried one copy of a recessive gene for the same 

heritable disorder, cloning might allow them to ensure that their 

child does not inherit the known genetic disease (without having 

to resort to using donor gametes or practicing preimplantation 

or prenatal genetic diagnosis and elimination of afflicted embryos or fetuses). 

3. To Obtain “Rejection-Proof” Transplants 

Human cloning could produce ideal transplant donors for people who are sick or dying. For example, if no genetic match 

could be found for a sick child needing a kidney or bone marrow 

transplant, and the parents had planned to have another child, 

cloning could potentially serve the human goods of beginning a 

new life and saving an existing one. 

4. To “Replicate” a Loved One 

Human cloning would allow parents to “replicate” a dead or dying child or relative. For example, one can imagine a case in 

which a family—mother, father, and child—is involved in a terrible car accident in which the father dies instantly and the child 

is critically injured. The mother, told that her child will soon die, 

decides that the best way to redeem the tragedy is to clone her 

dying child. This would allow her to preserve a connection with 
80 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

both her dead husband and her dying child, to create new life as 

a partial human answer to the grievous misfortune of her child’s 

untimely death, and to continue the name and biological lineage 

of her deceased husband. 

5. To Reproduce Individuals of Great Genius, Talent, or Beauty 

Human cloning would allow families or society to reproduce individuals of great genius, talent, or beauty, where these traits are 

presumed to be based on the individuals’ desirable or superior 

genetic makeups. For example, some admirers of great athletes, 

musicians, or mathematicians, believing that the admired attributes are the result of a superior genetic endowment, might want 

to clone these distinguished individuals. Just as the cloning of 

cattle is being promoted as a means of perpetuating champion 

milk- or meat-producing cows, so cloning-to-produce-children 

has been touted as a means of perpetuating certain “superior” 

human exemplars. 

B. Arguments 

The purposes or reasons for cloning-to-produce-children are, as 

they are stated, clearly intelligible on their face. When challenged, 

the defenders of these purposes often appeal to larger moral and 

political goods. These typically fall within the following three 

categories: human freedom, existence, and well-being. 

1. The Goodness of Human Freedom 

Strictly speaking, the appeal to human freedom is not so much a 

defense of cloning itself as it is of the right to practice it, asserted 

against those who seek to prohibit it. No one, we suspect, would 

say that he wanted to clone himself or any one else in order to 

be free or to vindicate the goodness of liberty. Nevertheless, 

human freedom is a defense often heard in support of a “right” 

to clone. 

Those who defend cloning-to-produce-children on the grounds 

of human freedom make two kinds of arguments. The first is 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 81

that because individuals in pluralistic societies have different 

definitions of the good life and of right and wrong, society must 

protect individual freedom to choose against the possible tyranny of the majority. This means securing and even expanding 

the rights of individuals to make choices so long as their choices 

do not directly infringe on the rights (and especially the physical 

safety) of other rights-bearing citizens. In Eisenstadt v. Baird

(1972), the United States Supreme Court enunciated what has 

been called a principle of reproductive freedom: “If the right to 

privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 

or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 

into matters so affecting a person as a decision whether to bear 

or beget a child.”5

 Defenders of cloning-to-produce-children argue that, in the event that the physical risks to mother and future 

child were shown to be ethically acceptable, the use of this new 

reproductive technology would fall under the protective umbrella of reproductive freedom. 

A second defense of human cloning on the grounds of freedom 

is the claim that human existence is by its very nature “openended,” “indeterminate,” and “unpredictable.” Human beings 

are always remaking themselves, their values, and their ways of 

interacting with one another. New technologies are central to 

this open-ended idea of human life, and to shut down such 

technologies simply because they change the “traditional” ways 

of doing things is unjustifiable. As constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has argued in reference to human cloning: “A society 

that bans acts of human creation that reflect unconventional sex 

roles or parenting models (surrogate motherhood, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and the like) for no better reason 

than that such acts dare to defy ‘nature’ and tradition (and to risk 

adding to life’s complexity) is a society that risks cutting itself off 

from vital experimentation and risks sterilizing a significant part 

of its capacity to grow.”6

2. The Goodness of Existence 

Like the appeal to freedom, the appeal to the goodness of existence is not an argument for cloning, but an argument against op-
82 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ponents who speak up in the name of protecting the cloned 

child-to-be against the harms connected with its risky and 

strange origins as a clone. This argument asserts that attempts to 

produce children through cloning, like any attempt to produce a 

child, will directly benefit the cloned-child-to-be, since without 

the act of cloning the child in question would not exist. Existence itself, it is argued, is the first “interest” that makes all other 

interests—including the interests of safety and well-being—

possible. Even taking into account the possibility of serious genetic or developmental disorders, this position holds that a 

cloned individual, once born, would prefer existence as a clone 

to no existence at all. There is also a serious corollary about how, 

in the absence of a principle that values existence as such, we will 

and should regard and treat people born with disabilities or deformities: opponents of cloning might appear in a position of intolerance—of saying to cloned individuals, “Better for us (and 

for you) had you never existed.” 

3. The Goodness of Well-Being 

The third moral argument for cloning-to-produce-children is 

that it would contribute in certain cases to the fulfillment of human goods that are widely honored and deeply rooted in modern 

democratic society. These human goods include the health of 

newborn and existing children, reproductive possibilities for infertile couples, and the possibility of having a biologically related 

child. In all these circumstances, human cloning could relieve existing suffering and sorrow or prevent them in the future. Those 

who take this position do not necessarily defend human cloningto-produce-children as such. Rather, they argue that a moral and 

practical line can be drawn between cloning-to-produce-children 

that serves the “therapeutic” aims of health (for the cloned 

child-to-be, for the infertile couple, or for an existing child) and 

the “eugenic” aims of producing or mass-producing superior 

people. 

Some people argue more broadly that an existing generation has 

a responsibility to ensure, to the extent possible, the genetic 

quality and fitness of the next generation. Human cloning, they 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 83

argue, offers a new method for human control and selfimprovement, by allowing families to have children free of specific genetic diseases or society to reproduce children with superior genetic endowments. It also provides a new means for gaining knowledge about the age-old question of nature versus nurture in contributing to human achievement and human flourishing, and to see how clones of great geniuses measure up against 

the “originals.” 

C. Critique and Conclusion 

While we as a Council acknowledge merit in some of the arguments made for cloning-to-produce-children, we are generally 

not persuaded by them. The fundamental weakness of the proponents’ case is found in their incomplete view of human procreation and families, and especially the place and well-being of 

children. Proponents of cloning tend to see procreation primarily as the free exercise of a parental right, namely, a right to satisfy parental desires for self-fulfillment or a right to have a child 

who is healthy or “superior.” Parents seek to overcome obstacles 

to reproduction, to keep their children free of genetic disease or 

disorder, and to provide them with the best possible genetic endowment. The principles guiding such prospective parents are 

freedom (for themselves), control (over their child), and wellbeing (both for themselves and what they imagine is best for 

their child). Even taken together, these principles provide at best 

only a partial understanding of the meaning and entailments of 

human procreation and child-rearing. In practice, they may 

prove to undermine the very goods that the proponents of cloning aim to serve, by undermining the unconditional acceptance 

of one’s offspring that is so central to parenthood. 

There are a number of objections—or at the very least limitations—to viewing cloning-to-produce-children through the 

prism of rights. Basic human rights are usually asserted on behalf 

of the human individual agent: for example, a meaningful right 

not to be prevented from bearing a child can be asserted for each individual against state-mandated sterilization programs. But the 

act of procreation is not an act involving a single individual. In-
84 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

deed, until human cloning arrives, it continues to be impossible 

for any one person to procreate alone. More important, there is a 

crucial third party involved: the child, whose centrality to the activity exposes the insufficiency of thinking about procreation in 

terms of rights. 

After all, rights are limited in the following crucial way: they cannot be ethically exercised at the expense of the rights of another. 

But the “right to reproduce” cannot be ethically exercised without at least considering the child that such exercise will bring 

into being and who is at risk of harm and injustice from the exercise. This obligation cannot be waived by an appeal to the absolutist argument of the goodness of existence. Yes, existence is 

a primary good, but that does not diminish the ethical significance of knowingly and willfully putting a child in grave physical 

danger in the very act of giving that child existence. It is certainly 

true that a life with even severe disability may well be judged 

worth living by its bearer: “It is better to have been born as I am 

than not to be here at all.” But if his or her disability was caused 

by behavior that could have been avoided by parents (for example, by not drinking or using drugs during pregnancy, or, arguably, by not cloning), many would argue that they should have 

avoided it. A post- facto affirmation of existence by the harmed 

child would not retroactively excuse the parental misconduct 

that caused the child’s disability, nor would it justify their failure 

to think of the child’s well-being as they went about exercising 

their “right to procreate.” Indeed, procreation is, by its very nature, a limitation of absolute rights, since it brings into existence 

another human being toward whom we have responsibilities and 

duties. 

In short, the right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child” 

does not include a right to have a child by whatever means. Nor can 

this right be said to imply a corollary—the right to decide what 

kind of child one is going to have. There are at least some circumstances where reproductive freedom must be limited to protect the good of the child (as, for instance, with the ban on incest). Our society’s commitment to freedom and parental authority by no means implies that all innovative procedures and 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 85

practices should be allowed or accepted, no matter how bizarre 

or dangerous. 

Proponents of cloning, when they do take into account the interests of the child, sometimes argue that this interest justifies 

and even requires thoroughgoing parental control over the procreative process. Yet this approach, even when well-intentioned, 

may undermine the good of the child more than it serves the 

child’s best interests. For one thing, cloning-to-produce-children 

of a desired or worthy sort overlooks the need to restrain the parental temptation to total mastery over children. It is especially 

morally dubious for this project to go forward when we know so 

little about the unforeseen and unintended consequences of exercising such genetic control. In trying by cloning to circumvent 

the risk of genetic disease or to promote particular traits, it is 

possible—perhaps likely—that new risks to the cloned child’s 

health and fitness would be inadvertently introduced (including 

the forgoing of genetic novelty, a known asset in the constant 

struggle against microbial and parasitic diseases). Parental control 

is a double-edged sword, and proponents seem not to acknowledge the harms, both physical and psychological, that may befall 

the child whose genetic identity is selected in advance. 

The case for cloning in the name of the child’s health and wellbeing is certainly the strongest and most compelling. The desire 

that one’s child be free from a given genetic disease is a worthy 

aspiration. We recognize there may be some unusual or extreme 

cases in which cloning might be the best means to serve this 

moral good, if other ethical obstacles could somehow be overcome. (A few of us also believe that the desire to give a child 

“improved” or “superior” genetic equipment is not necessarily 

to be condemned.) However, such aspirations could endanger 

the personal, familial, and societal goods supported by the character of human procreation. We are willing to grant that there 

may be exceptional cases in which cloning-to-produce-children 

is morally defensible; however, that being said, we would also argue that such cases do not justify the harmful experiments and 

social problems that might be entailed by engaging in human 

cloning. Hard cases are said to make bad law. The same would 
86 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

be true for succumbing to the rare, sentimentally appealing case 

in which cloning seems morally plausible.* 

Finally, proponents do not adequately face up to the difficulty of 

how “well-being” is to be defined. Generally, they argue that 

these matters are to be left up to the free choices of parents and 

doctors. But this means that the judgments of “proper” and 

“improper” will be made according to subjective criteria alone, 

and under such circumstances, it will be almost impossible to 

rule out certain “improvements” as unacceptable. 

In the sections that follow, we shall explain more fully why 

Members of the Council are not convinced by the arguments for 

cloning-to-produce-children, even in the most defensible cases. 

To see why this is so, we need to consider cloning-to-producechildren from the broadest possible moral perspective, beginning 

with ethical questions regarding experiments on human subjects. 

What we hope to show is that the frequently made safety arguments strike deeper than we usually realize, and that they point 

beyond themselves toward more fundamental moral objections 

to cloning-to-produce-children. 

* * * 

* Consider the following analogy: We would not allow a rare sympathetic case 

for brother-sister marriage—where, say, the two children were separated at 

birth and later fell in love, ignorant of their kinship—to overturn the taboo 

on incest. Whatever their merit, the goals of well-being and health do not 

outweigh the moral and social harms that cloning would entail. 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 87

 

II. The Case against Cloning-toProduce-Children 

A. The Ethics of Human Experimentation

 

We begin with concerns regarding the safety of the cloning procedure and the health of the participants. We do so for several 

reasons. First, these concerns are widely, indeed nearly unanimously, shared. Second, they lend themselves readily to familiar 

modes of ethical analysis—including concerns about harming 

the innocent, protecting human rights, and ensuring the consent 

of all research subjects. Finally, if carefully considered, these 

concerns begin to reveal the important ethical principles that 

must guide our broader assessment of cloning-to-producechildren. They suggest that human beings, unlike inanimate matter or even animals, are in some way inviolable, and therefore 

challenge us to reflect on what it is about human beings that 

makes them inviolable, and whether cloning-to-produce-children 

threatens these distinctly human goods. 

In initiating this analysis, there is perhaps no better place to start 

than the long-standing international practice of regulating experiments on human subjects. After all, the cloning of a human 

being, as well as all the research and trials required before such a 

procedure could be expected to succeed, would constitute experiments on the individuals involved—the egg donor, the birthing mother, and especially the child-to-be. It therefore makes 

sense to consider the safety and health concerns that arise from 

cloning-to-produce-children in light of the widely shared ethical 

principles that govern experimentation on human subjects. 

Since the Second World War, various codes for the ethical conduct of human experimentation have been adopted around the 

world. These codes and regulations were formulated in direct response to serious ethical lapses and violations committed by research scientists against the rights and dignity of individual human beings. Among the most important and widely accepted 
88 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

documents to emerge were the Nuremberg Code of 19477 and 

the Helsinki Declaration of 1964.8 Influential in the United 

States is also the Belmont Report, published in 1978 by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 

Biomedical and Behavioral Research.9 

The Nuremberg Code laid out ten principles for the ethical conduct of experiments, focusing especially on voluntary consent of 

research subjects, the principle that experiments should be conducted only with the aim of providing a concrete good for society that is unprocurable by other methods, and with the avoidance of physical or mental harm. The Helsinki Declaration 

stated, among other things, that research should be undertaken 

only when the prospective benefit clearly outweighs the expected 

risk, when the research subject has been fully informed of all 

risks, and when the research-subject population is itself likely to 

benefit from the results of the experiment. 

Finally, the Belmont Report proposed three basic ethical principles that were to guide the treatment of human subjects involved 

in scientific research. The first of these is respect for persons, which 

requires researchers to acknowledge the autonomy and individual rights of research subjects and to offer special protection to 

those with diminished autonomy and capacity. The second principle is beneficence. Scientific research must not only refrain from 

harming those involved but must also be aimed at helping them, 

or others, in concrete and important ways. The third principle is 

justice, which involves just distribution of potential benefits and 

harms and fair selection of research subjects. When applied, 

these general principles lead to both a requirement for informed 

consent of human research subjects and a requirement for a 

careful assessment of risks and benefits before proceeding with 

research. Safety, consent, and the rights of research subjects are 

thus given the highest priority. 

It would be a mistake to view these codes in narrow or procedural terms, when in fact they embody society’s profound sense 

that human beings are not to be treated as experimental guinea 

pigs for scientific research. Each of the codes was created to ad-
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 89

dress a specific disaster involving research science—whether the 

experiments conducted by Nazi doctors on concentration camp 

prisoners, or the Willowbrook scandal in which mentally retarded children were infected with hepatitis, or the Tuskegee 

scandal in which underprivileged African-American men suffering from syphilis were observed but not treated by medical researchers—and each of the codes was an attempt to defend the 

inviolability and dignity of all human beings in the face of such 

threats and abuses. More simply stated, the codes attempt to defend the weak against the strong and to uphold the equal dignity 

of all human beings. In taking up the application of these codes 

to the case of cloning-to-produce-children, we would suggest 

that the proper approach is not simply to discover specific places 

where human cloning violates this or that stipulation of this or 

that code, but to grapple with how such cloning offends the 

spirit of these codes and what they seek to defend. 

The ethics of research on human subjects suggest three sorts of 

problems that would arise in cloning-to-produce-children: (1) 

problems of safety; (2) a special problem of consent; and (3) 

problems of exploitation of women and the just distribution of 

risk. We shall consider each in turn. 

1. Problems of Safety 

First, cloning-to-produce-children is not now safe. Concerns 

about the safety of the individuals involved in a cloning procedure are shared by nearly everyone on all sides of the cloning 

debate. Even most proponents of cloning-to-produce-children 

generally qualify their support with a caveat about the safety of 

the procedure. Cloning experiments in other mammals strongly 

suggest that cloning-to-produce-children is, at least for now, far 

too risky to attempt.10 Safety concerns revolve around potential 

dangers to the cloned child, as well as to the egg donor and the 

woman who would carry the cloned child to birth. 

(a) Risks to the child. Risks to the cloned child-to-be must be 

taken especially seriously, both because they are most numerous 

and most serious and because—unlike the risks to the egg donor 
90 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

and birth mother—they cannot be accepted knowingly and 

freely by the person who will bear them. In animal experiments 

to date, only a small percentage of implanted clones have resulted in live births, and a substantial portion of those live-born 

clones have suffered complications that proved fatal fairly 

quickly. Some serious though nonfatal abnormalities in cloned 

animals have also been observed, including substantially increased birth-size, liver and brain defects, and lung, kidney, and 

cardiovascular problems.11 

Longer-term consequences are of course not known, as the oldest successfully cloned mammal is only six years of age. Mediumterm consequences, including premature aging, immune system 

failure, and sudden unexplained death, have already become apparent in some cloned mammals. Some researchers have also 

expressed concerns that a donor nucleus from an individual who 

has lived for some years may have accumulated genetic mutations that—if the nucleus were used in the cloning of a new human life—may predispose the new individual to certain sorts of 

cancer and other diseases.12 

(b) Risks to the egg donor and the birth mother. Accompanying the 

threats to the cloned child’s health and well-being are risks to the 

health of the egg donors. These include risks to her future reproductive health caused by the hormonal treatments required 

for egg retrieval and general health risks resulting from the necessary superovulation.13 

Animal studies also suggest the likelihood of health risks to the 

woman who carries the cloned fetus to term. The animal data 

suggest that late-term fetal losses and spontaneous abortions occur substantially more often with cloned fetuses than in natural 

pregnancies. In humans, such late-term fetal losses may lead to 

substantially increased maternal morbidity and mortality. In addition, animal studies have shown that many pregnancies involving 

cloned fetuses result in serious complications, including toxemia 

and excessive fluid accumulation in the uterus, both of which 

pose risks to the pregnant animal’s health.14 In one prominent 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 91

cattle cloning study, just under one-third of the pregnant cows 

died from complications late in pregnancy.15 

Reflecting on the dangers to birth mothers in animal cloning 

studies, the National Academy report concluded: 

Results of animal studies suggest that reproductive cloning of humans would similarly pose a 

high risk to the health of both fetus or infant and 

mother and lead to associated psychological risks 

for the mother as a consequence of late spontaneous abortions or the birth of a stillborn child 

or a child with severe health problems.16

(c) An abiding moral concern. Because of these risks, there is widespread agreement that, at least for now, attempts at cloning-toproduce-children would constitute unethical experimentation on 

human subjects and are therefore impermissible. These safety 

considerations were alone enough to lead the National Bioethics 

Advisory Commission in June 1997 to call for a temporary prohibition of human cloning-to-produce-children. Similar concerns, based on almost five more years of animal experimentation, convinced the panel of the National Academy of Sciences 

in January 2002 that the United States should ban such cloning 

for at least five years. 

Past discussions of this subject have often given the impression 

that the safety concern is a purely temporary one that can be allayed in the near future, as scientific advances and improvements 

in technique reduce the risks to an ethically acceptable level. But 

this impression is mistaken, for considerable safety risks are 

likely to be enduring, perhaps permanent. If so, there will be 

abiding ethical difficulties even with efforts aimed at making human 

cloning safe. 

The reason is clear: experiments to develop new reproductive 

technologies are necessarily intergenerational, undertaken to 

serve the reproductive desires of prospective parents but practiced also and always upon prospective children. Any such ex-
92 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

periment unavoidably involves risks to the child-to-be, a being 

who is both the product and also the most vulnerable human subject of the research. Exposed to risk during the extremely sensitive life-shaping processes of his or her embryological development, any child-to-be is a singularly vulnerable creature, one 

maximally deserving of protection against risk of experimental 

(and other) harm. If experiments to learn how to clone a child 

are ever to be ethical, the degree of risk to that child-to-be would 

have to be extremely low, arguably no greater than for childrento-be who are conceived from union of egg and sperm. It is extremely unlikely that this moral burden can be met, not for decades if at all. 

In multiple experiments involving six of the mammalian species 

cloned to date, more than 89 percent of the cloned embryos 

transferred to recipient females did not come to birth, and many 

of the live-born cloned animals are or become abnormal.17 If 

success means achieving normal and healthy development not 

just at birth but throughout the life span, there is even less reason for confidence. The oldest cloned mammal (Dolly) is only 

six years old and has exhibited unusually early arthritis. The reasons for failure in animal cloning are not well understood. Also, 

no nonhuman primates have been cloned. It will be decades (at 

least) before we could obtain positive evidence that cloned primates might live a normal healthy (primate) life. 

Even a high success rate in animals would not suffice by itself to 

make human trials morally acceptable. In addition to the usual 

uncertainties in jumping the gap from animal to human research, 

cloning is likely to present particularly difficult problems of interspecies difference. Animal experiments have already shown 

substantial differences in the reproductive success of identical 

cloning techniques used in different species.18 If these results 

represent species-specific differences in, for example, the ease of 

epigenetic reprogramming and imprinting of the donor DNA, 

the magnitude of the risks to the child-to-be of the first human 

cloning experiments would be unknown and potentially large, no 

matter how much success had been achieved in animals. There 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 93

 

can in principle be no direct experimental evidence sufficient for 

assessing the degree of such risk.*

Can a highly reduced risk of deformity, disease, and premature 

death in animal cloning, coupled with the inherently unpredictable risk of moving from animals to humans, ever be low 

enough to meet the ethically acceptable standard set by reproduction begun with egg and sperm? The answer, as a matter of 

necessity, can never be better than “Just possibly.” Given the severity of the possible harms involved in human cloning, and 

given that those harms fall on the very vulnerable child-to-be, 

such an answer would seem to be enduringly inadequate. 

Similar arguments, it is worth noting, were made before the first 

attempts at human in vitro fertilization. People suggested that it 

would be unethical experimentation even to try to determine 

whether IVF could be safely done. And then, of course, IVF was 

accomplished. Eventually, it became a common procedure, and 

today the moral argument about its safety seems to many people 

beside the point. Yet the fact of success in that case does not establish precedent in this one, nor does it mean that the first attempts at IVF were not in fact unethical experiments upon the 

unborn, despite the fortunate results.†

Be this as it may, the case of cloning is genuinely different. With 

IVF, assisted fertilization of egg by sperm immediately releases a 

* It is of course true that there is always uncertainty about moving from animal to human experimentation or therapy. But in the usual case, what justifies 

the assumption of this added unknown risk is that the experimental subject is 

a likely beneficiary of the research, either directly or indirectly. And where this 

is not the case, risk may be assumed if there is informed and voluntary consent. Neither of these conditions applies for the child-to-be in human cloning experiments. 

† Surprisingly, there has been very little systematic study of the offspring of in 

vitro fertilization. One recently published study has suggested that IVF (and 

especially intracytoplasmic sperm injection [ICSI]) may not be as benign as we 

had thought (Hansen, M., et al., “The Risk of Major Birth Defects after Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and In Vitro Fertilization,” New Eng. J. Med. 346: 

725-730, 2002). 
94 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

developmental process, linked to the sexual union of the two 

gametes, that nature has selected over millions of years for the 

entire mammalian line. But in cloning experiments to produce 

children, researchers would be transforming a sexual system into 

an asexual one, a change that requires major and “unnatural” reprogramming of donor DNA if there is to be any chance of success. They are neither enabling nor restoring a natural process, 

and the alterations involved are such that success in one species 

cannot be presumed to predict success in another. Moreover, 

any new somatic mutations in the donor cell’s chromosomal 

DNA would be passed along to the cloned child-to-be and its 

offspring. Here we can see even more the truly intergenerational 

character of cloning experimentation, and this should justify 

placing the highest moral burden of persuasion on those who 

would like to proceed with efforts to make cloning safe for producing children. (By reminding us of the need to protect the 

lives and well-being of our children and our children’s children, 

this broader analysis of the safety question points toward larger 

moral objections to producing cloned children, objections that 

we shall consider shortly.) 

It therefore appears to us that, given the dangers involved and 

the relatively limited goods to be gained from cloning-toproduce-children, conducting experiments in an effort to make 

cloning-to-produce-children safer would itself be an unacceptable violation of the norms of the ethics of research. There seems 

to be no ethical way to try to discover whether cloning-to-produce-children can 

become safe, now or in the future.

2. A Special Problem of Consent

A further concern relating to the ethics of human research revolves around the question of consent. Consent from the cloned 

child-to-be is of course impossible to obtain, and because no 

one consents to his or her own birth, it may be argued that concerns about consent are misplaced when applied to the unborn. 

But the issue is not so simple. For reasons having to do both 

with the safety concerns raised above and with the social, psychological, and moral concerns to be addressed below, an at-
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 95

 

tempt to clone a human being would potentially expose a cloned 

individual-to-be to great risks of harm, quite distinct from those 

accompanying other sorts of reproduction. Given the risks, and 

the fact that consent cannot be obtained, the ethically correct 

choice may be to avoid the experiment. The fact that those engaged in cloning cannot ask an unconceived child for permission 

places a burden on the cloners, not on the child. Given that anyone considering creating a cloned child must know that he or 

she is putting a newly created human life at exceptional risk, the 

burden on the would-be cloners seems clear: they must make a 

compelling case why the procedure should not be avoided altogether.*

 

Reflections on the purpose and meaning of seeking consent 

support this point. Why, after all, does society insist upon consent as an essential principle of the ethics of scientific research? 

Along with honoring the free will of the subject, we insist on 

consent to protect the weak and the vulnerable, and in particular 

to protect them from the powerful. It would therefore be morally questionable, at the very least, to choose to impose potentially grave harm on an individual, especially in the very act of 

giving that individual life. Giving existence to a human being 

does not grant one the right to maim or harm that human being 

in research. 

3. Problems of Exploitation of Women and Just Distribution of Risk 

Cloning-to-produce-children may also lead to the exploitation of 

women who would be called upon to donate oocytes. Widespread use of the techniques of cloning-to-produce-children 

would require large numbers of eggs. Animal models suggest 

that several hundred eggs may be required before one attempt at 

cloning can be successful. The required oocytes would have to 

be donated, and the process of making them available would involve hormonal treatments to induce superovulation. If financial 

incentives are offered, they might lead poor women especially to 

* The argument made in this paragraph is not unique to cloning. There may 

be other circumstances in which prospective parents, about to impose great 

risk of harm on a prospective child-to-be, might bear a comparable burden. 
96 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

place themselves at risk in this way (and might also compromise 

the voluntariness of their “choice” to make donations). Thus, research on cloning-to-produce-children could impose disproportionate burdens on women, particularly low-income women. 

4. Conclusion

These questions of the ethics of research—particularly the issue 

of physical safety—point clearly to the conclusion that cloningto-produce-children is unacceptable. In reaching this conclusion, 

we join the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and the 

National Academy of Sciences. But we go beyond the findings 

of those distinguished bodies in also pointing to the dangers that 

will always be inherent in the very process of trying to make cloning-to-produce-children safer. On this ground, we conclude that 

the problem of safety is not a temporary ethical concern. It is 

rather an enduring moral concern that might not be surmountable and should thus preclude work toward the development of 

cloning techniques to produce children. In light of the risks and 

other ethical concerns raised by this form of human experimentation, we therefore conclude that cloning-to-produce-children should not be 

attempted. 

For some people, the discussion of ethical objections to cloningto-produce-children could end here. Our society’s established 

codes and practices in regard to human experimentation by 

themselves offer compelling reasons to oppose indefinitely attempts to produce a human child by cloning. But there is more 

to be said. 

First, many people who are repelled by or opposed to the prospect of cloning human beings are concerned not simply or primarily because the procedure is unsafe. To the contrary, their 

objection is to the use of a perfected cloning technology and to a 

society that would embrace or permit the production of cloned 

children. The ethical objection based on lack of safety is not

really an objection to cloning as such. Indeed, it may in time become a vanishing objection should people be allowed to proceed—despite insuperable ethical objections such as the ones we 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 97

 

have just offered—with experiments to perfect the technique.*

Should this occur, the ethical assessment of cloning-to-producechildren would need to address itself to the merits (and demerits) 

of cloning itself, beyond the safety questions tied to the techniques used to produce cloned children. Thus, anticipating the 

possibility of a perfected and usable technology, it is important 

to delineate the case against the practice itself. 

Moreover, because the Council is considering cloning within a 

broad context of present and projected techniques that can affect human procreation or alter the genetic makeup of our children, it is important that we consider the full range and depth of 

ethical issues raised by such efforts. 

How should these issues be raised, and within what moral 

framework? Some, but by no means all, of the deepest moral 

concerns connected to human cloning could be handled by developing a richer consideration of the ethics of human experimentation. Usually—and regrettably—we apply the ethical principles governing research on human subjects in a utilitarian 

spirit, weighing benefits versus harms, and moreover using only 

a very narrow notion of “harm.” The calculus that weighs benefits versus harms too often takes stock only of bodily harm or 

violations of patient autonomy, though some serious efforts 

have been made in recent years to consider broader issues. In 

addition, we often hold a rather narrow view of what constitutes 

“an experiment.” Yet cloning-to-produce-children would be a 

“human experiment” in many senses, and risks of bodily harm 

and inadequate consent do not exhaust the ways in which cloning might do damage. As we have described, cloning-toproduce-children would be a biological experiment—with necessary 

uncertainties about the safety of the technique and the possibility 

of physical harm. But it would also be an experiment in human procreation—substituting asexual for sexual reproduction and treating children not as gifts but as our self-designed products. It 

* Such improvements in technique could result in part from the practice of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research, were it to be allowed to go forward. This 

possibility is one of the issues we shall consider in evaluating the ethics of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research in Chapter Six. 
98 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

would be an experiment in human identity—creating the first human 

beings to inherit a genetic identity lived in advance by another. It 

would be an experiment in genetic choice and design—producing the 

first children whose entire genetic makeup was selected in advance. It would be an experiment in family and social life—altering 

the relationships within the family and between the generations, 

for example, by turning “mothers” into “twin sisters” and 

“grandparents” into “parents,” and by having children asymmetrically linked biologically to only one parent. And it would represent a social experiment for the entire society, insofar as the society 

accepted, even if only as a minority practice, this unprecedented 

and novel mode of producing our offspring. 

By considering these other ways in which cloning would constitute an experiment, we could enlarge our analysis of the ethics of 

research with human subjects to assess possible nonbodily harms 

of cloning-to-produce-children. But valuable as this effort might 

be, we have not chosen to proceed in this way. Not all the important issues can be squeezed into the categories of harms and 

benefits. People can be mistreated or done an injustice whether 

they know it or not and quite apart from any experienced harm. 

Important human goods can be traduced, violated, or sacrificed 

without being registered in anyone’s catalogue of harms. The 

form of bioethical inquiry we are attempting here will make 

every effort not to truncate the moral meaning of our actions 

and practices by placing them on the Procrustean bed of utilitarianism. To be sure, the ethical principles governing human research are highly useful in efforts to protect vulnerable individuals against the misconduct or indifference of the powerful. But a 

different frame of reference is needed to evaluate the human 

meaning of innovations that may affect the lives and humanity 

of everyone, vulnerable or not. 

Of the arguments developed below, some are supported by most 

Council Members, while other arguments are shared by only 

some Members. Even among the arguments they share, different 

Members find different concerns to be weightier. Yet we all believe that the arguments presented in the sections that follow are 

worthy of consideration in the course of trying to assess fully the 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 99

 

ethical issues involved. We have chosen to err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion of arguments because we acknowledge that concerns now expressed by only a few may turn out in 

the future to be more important than those now shared by all. 

Our fuller assessment begins with an attempt to fathom the 

deepest meaning of human procreation and thus necessarily the 

meaning of raising children. Our analysis will then move onto 

questions dealing with the effects of cloning on individuals, family life, and society more generally. 

B. The Human Context: Procreation 

and Child-Rearing 

Were it to take place, cloning-to-produce-children would represent a challenge to the nature of human procreation and childrearing. Cloning is, of course, not only a means of procreation. It 

is also a technology, a human experiment, and an exercise of 

freedom, among other things. But cloning would be most unusual, consequential, and most morally important as a new way 

of bringing children into the world and a new way of viewing 

their moral significance. 

In Chapter One we outlined some morally significant features of 

human procreation and raised questions about how these would 

be altered by human cloning. We will now attempt to deepen 

that analysis, and begin with the salient fact that a child is not 

made, but begotten. Procreation is not making but the outgrowth of 

doing. A man and woman give themselves in love to each other, 

setting their projects aside in order to do just that. Yet a child 

results, arriving on its own, mysterious, independent, yet the fruit 

of the embrace.* Even were the child wished for, and consciously so, he or she is the issue of their love, not the product 

of their wills; the man and woman in no way produce or choose 

a particular child, as they might buy a particular car. Procreation 

can, of course, be assisted by human ingenuity (as with IVF). In 

such cases, it may become harder to see the child solely as a gift 

* We are, of course, well aware that many children are conceived in casual, 

loveless, or even brutal acts of sexual intercourse, including rape and incest. 
100 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

bestowed upon the parents’ mutual self-giving and not to some 

degree as a product of their parental wills. Nonetheless, because 

it is still sexual reproduction, the children born with the help of 

IVF begin—as do all other children—with a certain genetic independence of their parents. They replicate neither their fathers 

nor their mothers, and this is a salutary reminder to parents of 

the independence they must one day grant their children and for 

which it is their duty to prepare them. 

Gifts and blessings we learn to accept as gratefully as we can. 

Products of our wills we try to shape in accord with our desires. 

Procreation as traditionally understood invites acceptance, rather 

than reshaping, engineering, or designing the next generation. It 

invites us to accept limits to our control over the next generation. It invites us even—to put the point most strongly—to 

think of the child as one who is not simply our own, our possession. Certainly, it invites us to remember that the child does not 

exist simply for the happiness or fulfillment of the parents. 

To be sure, parents do and must try to form and mold their children in various ways as they inure them to the demands of family life, prepare them for adulthood, and initiate them into the 

human community. But, even then, it is only our sense that these 

children are not our possessions that makes such parental nurture—which always threatens not to nourish but to stifle the 

child—safe. 

This concern can be expressed not only in language about the relation between the generations but also in the language of equality. The things we make are not just like ourselves; they are the 

products of our wills, and their point and purpose are ours to 

determine. But a begotten child comes into the world just as its 

parents once did, and is therefore their equal in dignity and humanity. 

The character of sexual procreation shapes the lives of children 

as well as parents. By giving rise to genetically new individuals, 

sexual reproduction imbues all human beings with a sense of individual identity and of occupying a place in this world that has 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 101

never belonged to another. Our novel genetic identity symbolizes and foreshadows the unique, never-to-be-repeated character 

of each human life. At the same time, our emergence from the 

union of two individuals, themselves conceived and generated as 

we were, locates us immediately in a network of relation and 

natural affection. 

Social identity, like genetic identity, is in significant measure tied 

to these biological facts. Societies around the world have structured social and economic responsibilities around the relationship between the generations established through sexual procreation, and have developed modes of child-rearing, family responsibility, and kinship behavior that revolve around the natural 

facts of begetting. 

There is much more to be said about these matters, and they are 

vastly more complicated than we have indicated. There are, in 

addition, cultural differences in the way societies around the 

world regard the human significance of procreation or the way 

children are to be regarded and cared for. Yet we have said 

enough to indicate that the character and nature of human procreation matter deeply. They affect human life in endless subtle 

ways, and they shape families and communities. A proper regard 

for the profundity of human procreation (including child-rearing 

and parent-child relations) is, in our view, indispensable for a full 

assessment of the ethical implications of cloning-to-producechildren. 

C. Identity, Manufacture, Eugenics, 

Family, and Society

Beyond the matter of procreation itself, we think it important to 

examine the possible psychological and emotional state of individuals produced by cloning, the well-being of their families, and 

the likely effects on society of permitting human cloning. These 

concerns would apply even if cloning-to-produce-children were 

conducted on a small scale; and they would apply in even the 

more innocent-seeming cloning scenarios, such as efforts to 

overcome infertility or to avoid the risk of genetic disease. Ad-
102 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

mittedly, these matters are necessarily speculative, for empirical 

evidence is lacking. Nevertheless, the importance of the various 

goods at stake justifies trying to think matters through in advance. 

Keeping in mind our general observations about procreation, we 

proceed to examine a series of specific ethical issues and objections to cloning human children: (1) problems of identity and individuality; (2) concerns regarding manufacture; (3) the prospect 

of a new eugenics; (4) troubled family relations; and (5) effects 

on society. 

1. Problems of Identity and Individuality

Cloning-to-produce-children could create serious problems of 

identity and individuality. This would be especially true if it were 

used to produce multiple “copies” of any single individual, as in 

one or another of the seemingly far-fetched futuristic scenarios 

in which cloning is often presented to the popular imagination. 

Yet questions of identity and individuality could arise even in 

small-scale cloning, even in the (supposedly) most innocent of 

cases, such as the production of a single cloned child within an 

intact family. Personal identity is, we would emphasize, a complex and subtle psychological phenomenon, shaped ultimately by 

the interaction of many diverse factors. But it does seem reasonably clear that cloning would at the very least present a 

unique and possibly disabling challenge to the formation of individual identity. 

Cloned children may experience concerns about their distinctive 

identity not only because each will be genetically essentially identical to another human being, but also because they may resemble in appearance younger versions of the person who is their 

“father” or “mother.” Of course, our genetic makeup does not 

by itself determine our identities. But our genetic uniqueness is 

an important source of our sense of who we are and how we regard ourselves. It is an emblem of independence and individuality. It endows us with a sense of life as a never-before-enacted 

possibility. Knowing and feeling that nobody has previously pos-
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 103

sessed our particular gift of natural characteristics, we go forward as genetically unique individuals into relatively indeterminate futures. 

These new and unique genetic identities are rooted in the natural 

procreative process. A cloned child, by contrast, is at risk of living out a life overshadowed in important ways by the life of the 

“original”—general appearance being only the most obvious. 

Indeed, one of the reasons some people are interested in cloning 

is that the technique promises to produce in each case a particular individual whose traits and characteristics are already known. 

And however much or little one’s genotype actually shapes one’s 

natural capacities, it could mean a great deal to an individual’s 

experience of life and the expectations that those who cloned him 

or her might have. The cloned child may be constantly compared to “the original,” and may consciously or unconsciously 

hold himself or herself up to the genetic twin that came before. 

If the two individuals turned out to lead similar lives, the cloned 

person’s achievements may be seen as derivative. If, as is perhaps more likely, the cloned person departed from the life of his 

or her progenitor, this very fact could be a source of constant 

scrutiny, especially in circumstances in which parents produced 

their cloned child to become something in particular. Living up 

to parental hopes and expectations is frequently a burden for 

children; it could be a far greater burden for a cloned individual. 

The shadow of the cloned child’s “original” might be hard for 

the child to escape, as would parental attitudes that sought in the 

child’s very existence to replicate, imitate, or replace the “original.” 

It may reasonably be argued that genetic individuality is not an 

indispensable human good, since identical twins share a common genotype and seem not to be harmed by it. But this argument misses the context and environment into which even a single human clone would be born. Identical twins have as progenitors two biological parents and are born together, before either 

one has developed and shown what his or her potential—natural 

or otherwise—may be. Each is largely free of the burden of 

measuring up to or even knowing in advance the genetic traits of 
104 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

the other, because both begin life together and neither is yet 

known to the world. But a clone is a genetic near-copy of a person who is already living or has already lived. This might constrain the clone’s sense of self in ways that differ in kind from 

the experience of identical twins. Everything about the predecessor—from physical height and facial appearance, balding patterns and inherited diseases, to temperament and native talents, 

to shape of life and length of days, and even cause of death—

will appear before the expectant eyes of the cloned person, always with at least the nagging concern that there, notwithstanding the grace of God, go I. The crucial matter, again, is not simply the truth regarding the extent to which genetic identity actually shapes us—though it surely does shape us to some extent. 

What matters is the cloned individual’s perception of the significance of the “precedent life” and the way that perception cramps 

and limits a sense of self and independence. 

2. Concerns regarding Manufacture

The likely impact of cloning on identity suggests an additional 

moral and social concern: the transformation of human procreation into human manufacture, of begetting into making. By using 

the terms “making” and “manufacture” we are not claiming that 

cloned children would be artifacts made altogether “by hand” or 

produced in factories. Rather, we are suggesting that they would, 

like other human “products,” be brought into being in accordance with some pre-selected genetic pattern or design, and 

therefore in some sense “made to order” by their producers or 

progenitors. 

Unlike natural procreation—or even most forms of assisted reproduction—cloning-to-produce-children would set out to create a child with a very particular genotype: namely, that of the 

somatic cell donor. Cloned children would thus be the first human beings whose entire genetic makeup is selected in advance. 

True, selection from among existing genotypes is not yet design 

of new ones. But the principle that would be established by human cloning is both far-reaching and completely novel: parents, 

with the help of science and technology, may determine in ad-
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 105

vance the genetic endowment of their children. To this point, 

parents have the right and the power to decide whether to have a 

child. With cloning, parents acquire the power, and presumably 

the right, to decide what kind of a child to have. Cloning would 

thus extend the power of one generation over the next—and the 

power of parents over their offspring—in ways that open the 

door, unintentionally or not, to a future project of genetic manipulation and genetic control. 

Of course, there is no denying that we have already taken steps 

in the direction of such control. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis of embryos and prenatal diagnosis of fetuses—both now 

used to prevent the birth of individuals carrying genes for genetic diseases—reflect an only conditional acceptance of the 

next generation. With regard to positive selection for desired 

traits, some people already engage in the practice of sex selection, another example of conditional acceptance of offspring. 

But these precedents pale in comparison to the degree of control 

provided by cloning and, in any case, do not thereby provide a 

license to proceed with cloning. It is far from clear that it would 

be wise to proceed still farther in our attempts at control. 

The problem with cloning-to-produce-children is not that artificial technique is used to assist reproduction. Neither is it that 

genes are being manipulated. We raise no objection to the use of 

the coming genetic technologies to treat individuals with genetic 

diseases, even in utero—though there would be issues regarding 

the protection of human subjects in research and the need to 

find boundaries between therapy and so-called enhancement (of 

this, more below). The problem has to do with the control of the 

entire genotype and the production of children to selected specifications. 

Why does this matter? It matters because human dignity is at 

stake. In natural procreation, two individuals give life to a new 

human being whose endowments are not shaped deliberately by 

human will, whose being remains mysterious, and the openendedness of whose future is ratified and embraced. Parents beget a child who enters the world exactly as they did—as an un-
106 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

made gift, not as a product. Children born of this process stand 

equally beside their progenitors as fellow human beings, not beneath them as made objects. In this way, the uncontrolled beginnings of human procreation endow each new generation and 

each new individual with the dignity and freedom enjoyed by all 

who came before. 

Most present forms of assisted reproduction imitate this natural 

process. While they do begin to introduce characteristics of 

manufacture and industrial technique, placing nascent human life 

for the first time in human hands, they do not control the final 

outcome. The end served by IVF is still the same as natural reproduction—the birth of a child from the union of gametes 

from two progenitors. Reproduction with the aid of such techniques still implicitly expresses a willingness to accept as a gift 

the product of a process we do not control. In IVF children 

emerge out of the same mysterious process from which their 

parents came, and are therefore not mere creatures of their parents. 

By contrast, cloning-to-produce-children—and the forms of 

human manufacture it might make more possible in the future—

seems quite different. Here, the process begins with a very specific final product in mind and would be tailored to produce that 

product. Even were cloning to be used solely to remedy infertility, the decision to clone the (sterile) father would be a decision, 

willy-nilly, that the child-to-be should be the near-twin of his 

“father.” Anyone who would clone merely to ensure a “biologically related child” would be dictating a very specific form of 

biological relation: genetic virtual identity. In every case of cloning-to-produce-children, scientists or parents would set out to 

produce specific individuals for particular reasons. The procreative process could come to be seen increasingly as a means of 

meeting specific ends, and the resulting children would be products of a designed manufacturing process, products over whom 

we might think it proper to exercise “quality control.” Even if, in 

any given case, we were to continue to think of the cloned child 

as a gift, the act itself teaches a different lesson, as the child becomes 

the continuation of a parental project. We would learn to receive 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 107

the next generation less with gratitude and surprise than with 

control and mastery. 

One possible result would be the industrialization and commercialization of human reproduction. Manufactured objects become commodities in the marketplace, and their manufacture 

comes to be guided by market principles and financial concerns. 

When the “products” are human beings, the “market” could become a profoundly dehumanizing force. Already there is commerce in egg donation for IVF, with ads offering large sums of 

money for egg donors with high SAT scores and particular 

physical features. 

The concerns expressed here do not depend on cloning becoming a widespread practice. The introduction of the terms and 

ideas of production into the realm of human procreation would 

be troubling regardless of the scale involved; and the adoption of 

a market mentality in these matters could blind us to the deep 

moral character of bringing forth new life. Even were cloning 

children to be rare, the moral harms to a society that accepted it 

could be serious. 

3. Prospect of a New Eugenics

For some of us, cloning-to-produce-children also raises concerns 

about the prospect of eugenics or, more modestly, about genetic 

“enhancement.” We recognize that the term “eugenics” generally 

refers to attempts to improve the genetic constitution of a particular political community or of the human race through general 

policies such as population control, forced sterilization, directed 

mating, or the like. It does not ordinarily refer to actions of particular individuals attempting to improve the genetic endowment 

of their own descendants. Yet, although cloning does not in itself point to public policies by which the state would become involved in directing the development of the human gene pool, 

this might happen in illiberal regimes, like China, where the gov-
108 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

ernment already regulates procreation.* And, in liberal societies, 

cloning-to-produce-children could come to be used privately for 

individualized eugenic or “enhancement” purposes: in attempts 

to alter (with the aim of improving) the genetic constitution of 

one’s own descendants—and, indirectly, of future generations. 

Some people, in fact, see enhancement as the major purpose of 

cloning-to-produce-children. Those who favor eugenics and genetic enhancement were once far more open regarding their intentions to enable future generations to enjoy more advantageous genotypes. Toward these ends, they promoted the benefits 

of cloning: escape from the uncertain lottery of sex, controlled 

and humanly directed reproduction. In the present debate about 

cloning-to-produce-children, the case for eugenics and enhancement is not made openly, but it nonetheless remains an 

important motivation for some advocates. Should cloning-toproduce-children be introduced successfully, and should it turn 

out that the cloned humans do in fact inherit many of the natural 

talents of the “originals,” some people may become interested in 

the prospects of using it to produce “enhanced children”—

especially if other people’s children were receiving comparable 

advantages. 

Cloning can serve the ends of individualized enhancement either 

by avoiding the genetic defects that may arise when human reproduction is left to chance or by preserving and perpetuating 

outstanding genetic traits. In the future, if techniques of genetic 

enhancement through more precise genetic engineering became 

available, cloning could be useful for perpetuating the enhanced 

traits and for keeping any “superior” manmade genotype free of 

the flaws that sexual reproduction might otherwise introduce. 

* According to official Chinese census figures for 2000, more than 116 male 

births were recorded for every 100 female births. It is generally believed that 

this is the result of the widespread use of prenatal sex selection and China’s 

one-child policy, though it should be noted that even in a country such as 

South Korea, which has no such policy, the use of prenatal sex selection has 

skewed the sex ratio in favor of males. 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 109

 

“Private eugenics” does not carry with it the dark implications of 

state despotism or political control of the gene pool that characterized earlier eugenic proposals and the racist eugenic practices 

of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, it could prove dangerous 

to our humanity. Besides the dehumanizing prospects of the turn 

toward manufacture that such programs of enhancement would 

require, there is the further difficulty of the lack of standards to 

guide the choices for “improvement.” To this point, biomedical 

technology has been applied to treating diseases in patients and 

has been governed, on the whole, by a commonsense view of 

health and disease. To be sure, there are differing views about 

how to define “health.” And certain cosmetic, performanceenhancing, or hedonistic uses of biomedical techniques have already crossed any plausible boundary between therapy and enhancement, between healing the sick and “improving” our powers.*

 Yet, for the most part, it is by some commonsense views of 

health that we judge who is in need of medical treatment and 

what sort of treatment might be most appropriate. Even today’s 

practice of a kind of “negative” eugenics—through prenatal genetic diagnosis and abortion of fetuses with certain genetic abnormalities—is informed by the desire to promote health. 

The “positive” eugenics that could receive a great boost from 

human cloning, especially were it to be coupled with techniques 

of precise genetic modification, would not seek to restore sick 

human beings to natural health. Instead, it would seek to alter 

humanity, based upon subjective or arbitrary ideas of excellence. 

The effort may be guided by apparently good intentions: to improve the next generation and to enhance the quality of life of 

our descendants. But in the process of altering human nature, we 

would be abandoning the standard by which to judge the goodness or the wisdom of the particular aims. We would stand to 

lose the sense of what is and is not human. 

The fear of a new eugenics is not, as is sometimes alleged, a concern born of some irrational fear of the future or the unknown. 

* One thinks of certain forms of plastic surgery or recreational uses of euphoriant drugs, and the uses in athletics and schools of performance-enhancing 

drugs, such as anabolic steroids, erythropoietin, and Ritalin. 
110 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Neither is it born of hostility to technology or nostalgia for some 

premodern pseudo-golden age of superior naturalness. It is 

rather born of the rational recognition that once we move beyond therapy into efforts at enhancement, we are in uncharted 

waters without a map, without a compass, and without a clear 

destination that can tell us whether we are making improvements 

or the reverse. The time-honored and time-tested goods of human life, which we know to be good, would be put in jeopardy 

for the alleged and unknowable goods of a post-human future. 

4. Troubled Family Relations 

Cloning-to-produce-children could also prove damaging to family relations, despite the best of intentions. We do not assume 

that cloned children, once produced, would not be accepted, 

loved, or nurtured by their parents and relatives. On the contrary, we freely admit that, like any child, they might be welcomed into the cloning family. Nevertheless, the cloned child’s 

place in the scheme of family relations might well be uncertain 

and confused. The usually clear designations of father and 

brother, mother and sister, would be confounded. A mother 

could give birth to her own genetic twin, and a father could be 

genetically virtually identical to his son. The cloned child’s relation to his or her grandparents would span one and two generations at once. Every other family relation would be similarly confused. There is, of course, the valid counter-argument that holds 

that the “mother” could easily be defined as the person who 

gives birth to the child, regardless of the child’s genetic origins, 

and for social purposes that may serve to eliminate some problems. But because of the special nature of cloning-to-producechildren, difficulties may be expected. 

The crucial point is not the absence of the natural biological connections between parents and children. The crucial point is, on 

the contrary, the presence of a unique, one-sided, and replicative 

biological connection to only one progenitor. As a result, family 

relations involving cloning would differ from all existing family 

arrangements, including those formed through adoption or with 

the aid of IVF. A great many children, after all, are adopted, and 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 111

 

live happy lives in loving families, in the absence of any biological connections with their parents. Children conceived by artificial insemination using donor sperm and by various IVF techniques may have unusual relationships with their genetic parents, 

or no genetic relationships at all. But all of these existing arrangements attempt in important ways to emulate the model of 

the natural family (at least in its arrangement of the generations), 

while cloning runs contrary to that model. 

What the exact effects of cloning-to-produce-children might be 

for families is highly speculative, to be sure, but it is still worth 

flagging certain troubling possibilities and risks. The fact that the 

cloned child bears a special tie to only one parent may complicate family dynamics. As the child developed, it could not help 

but be regarded as specially akin to only one of his or her parents. The sins or failings of the father (or mother), if reappearing 

in the cloned child, might be blamed on the progenitor, adding 

to the chances of domestic turmoil. The problems of being and 

rearing an adolescent could become complicated should the 

teenage clone of the mother “reappear” as the double of the 

woman the father once fell in love with. Risks of competition, 

rivalry, jealousy, and parental tension could become heightened.*

Even if the child were cloned from someone who is not a member of the family in which the child is raised, the fact would remain that he or she has been produced in the nearly precise genetic image of another and for some particular reason, with 

some particular design in mind. Should this become known to 

the child, as most likely it would, a desire to seek out connection 

to the “original” could complicate his or her relation to the rearing family, as would living consciously “under the reason” for this 

extra-familial choice of progenitor. Though many people make 

* And there might be special complications in the event of divorce. Does the 

child rightfully or more naturally belong to the “genetic parent”? How would 

a single parent deal with a child who shares none of her genes but carries 100 

percent of the genes of the person she chose to divorce? Whether such foreseeable complications would in fact emerge is, of course, an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance. But knowledge of the complexities 

of family life lead us not to want to dismiss them. 
112 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

light of the importance of biological kinship (compared to the 

bonds formed through rearing and experienced family life), 

many adopted children and children conceived by artificial insemination or IVF using donor sperm show by their actions that 

they do not agree. They make great efforts to locate their “biological parents,” even where paternity consists in nothing more 

than the donation of sperm. Where the progenitor is a genetic 

near-twin, surely the urge of the cloned child to connect with the 

unknown “parent” would be still greater. 

For all these reasons, the cloning family differs from the “natural 

family” or the “adoptive family.” By breaking through the natural boundaries between generations, cloning could strain the social ties between them. 

5. Effects on Society

The hazards and costs of cloning-to-produce-children may not 

be confined to the direct participants. The rest of society may 

also be at risk. The impact of human cloning on society at large 

may be the least appreciated, but among the most important, 

factors to consider in contemplating the morality of this activity. 

Cloning is a human activity affecting not only those who are 

cloned or those who are clones, but also the entire society that 

allows or supports such activity. For insofar as the society accepts

cloning-to-produce-children, to that extent the society may be 

said to engage in it. A society that allows dehumanizing practices—especially when given an opportunity to try to prevent 

them—risks becoming an accomplice in those practices. (The 

same could be said of a society that allowed even a few of its 

members to practice incest or polygamy.) Thus the question before us is whether cloning-to-produce-children is an activity that 

we, as a society, should engage in. In addressing this question, we 

must reach well beyond the rights of individuals and the difficulties or benefits that cloned children or their families might encounter. We must consider what kind of a society we wish to be, 

and, in particular, what forms of bringing children into the world 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 113

we want to encourage and what sorts of relations between the 

generations we want to preserve. 

Cloning-to-produce children could distort the way we raise and 

view children, by carrying to full expression many regrettable 

tendencies already present in our culture. We are already liable 

to regard children largely as vehicles for our own fulfillment and 

ambitions. The impulse to create “designer children” is present 

today—as temptation and social practice. The notion of life as a 

gift, mysterious and limited, is under siege. Cloning-to-producechildren would carry these tendencies and temptations to an extreme expression. It advances the notion that the child is but an 

object of our sovereign mastery. 

A society that clones human beings thinks about human beings 

(and especially children) differently than does a society that refuses to do so. It could easily be argued that we have already in 

myriad ways begun to show signs of regarding our children as 

projects on which we may work our wills. Further, it could be 

argued that we have been so desensitized by our earlier steps in 

this direction that we do not recognize this tendency as a corruption. While some people contend that cloning-to-producechildren would not take us much further down a path we have 

already been traveling, we would emphasize that the precedent 

of treating children as projects cuts two ways in the moral argument. Instead of using this precedent to justify taking the next 

step of cloning, the next step might rather serve as a warning 

and a mirror in which we may discover reasons to reconsider 

what we are already doing. Precisely because the stakes are so 

high, precisely because the new biotechnologies touch not only 

our bodies and minds but also the very idea of our humanity, we 

should ask ourselves how we as a society want to approach questions of human dignity and flourishing. 

D. Conclusion

Cloning-to-produce-children may represent a forerunner of what 

will be a growing number of capacities to intervene in and alter 

the human genetic endowment. No doubt, earlier human actions 
114 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

have produced changes in the human gene pool: to take only 

one example, the use of insulin to treat diabetics who otherwise 

would have died before reproducing has increased the genes for 

diabetes in the population. But different responsibilities accrue 

when one sets out to make such changes prospectively, directly, 

and deliberately. To do so without regard for the likelihood of 

serious unintended and unanticipated consequences would be 

the height of hubris. Systems of great complexity do not respond 

well to blunt human intervention, and one can hardly think of a 

more complex system—both natural and social—than that 

which surrounds human reproduction and the human genome. 

Given the enormous importance of what is at stake, we believe 

that the so-called “precautionary principle” should be our guide 

in this arena. This principle would suggest that scientists, technologists, and, indeed, all of us should be modest in claiming to 

understand the many possible consequences of any profound alteration of human procreation, especially where there are not 

compelling reasons to proceed. Lacking such understanding, no 

one should take action so drastic as the cloning of a human 

child. In the absence of the necessary human wisdom, prudence 

calls upon us to set limits on efforts to control and remake the 

character of human procreation and human life. 

It is not only a matter of prudence. Cloning-to-produce-children 

would also be an injustice to the cloned child—from the imposition of the chromosomes of someone else, to the intentional 

deprivation of biological parents, to all of the possible bodily and 

psychological harms that we have enumerated in this chapter. It 

is ultimately the claim that the cloned child would be seriously 

wronged—and not only harmed in body—that would justify 

government intervention. It is to this question—the public policy question of what the government should and can do to prevent such injustice—that we will turn in Chapter Seven. But, regarding the ethical assessment, Members of the Council are in 

unanimous agreement that cloning-to-produce-children is not 
Chapter Five: Ethics of Cloning-to-Produce-Children 115

 

only unsafe but also morally unacceptable and ought not to be 

attempted.*

ENDNOTES 

1 National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings Bethesda, 

MD, 1997. 

2 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human 

Reproductive Cloning, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002. (Referred to in subsequent citations as NAS Report.) 

3 NAS Report, pp. 6-7. 

4 Lederberg, J. “Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution” The American 

Naturalist, September-October 1966. 

5 Supreme Court of the United States. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438, 1972. 

6 Tribe, L. “On Not Banning Cloning for the Wrong Reasons” in Nussbaum, 

M., and C. R. Sunstein. Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning. New York: Norton, 1998, p. 321. 

7 Nuremberg Report. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1949. 

8 Helsinki Declaration. 18th World Medical Association General Assembly 

Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, adopted in Helsinki, Finland, June 1964, and amended in October 1975, October 1983, September 1989, October 1996, and October 2000. 

9 Belmont Report. The National Commission for the Protection of Human 

Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: Ethical 

Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. Bethesda, 

MD: Government Printing Office, 1978. 

10 See, for instance, Chapter Four of the present report, as well as Chapter 3 

of the NAS Report. 

* Not surprisingly, some of us feel more strongly than others about this conclusion. One or two of us might someday be willing to see cloning-toproduce-children occur in the rare defensible case, but then only if means 

were available to confine its use to such cases. 
116 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

11 These issues are discussed in the NAS Report (3-2) as well as in Wilmut, I., 

Roslin Institute, Scotland. “Application of animal cloning data to human 

cloning,” paper presented at Workshop: Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human 

Cloning, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, August 7, 2001; and 

Hill, J., Cornell University. “Placental defects in nuclear transfer (cloned) animals,” paper presented at Workshop: Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Cloning, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC August 7, 2001. 

12 See, for instance, Chapter 3 of the NAS Report, and Kolata, G. “In Cloning, Failure Far Exceeds Success” New York Times, December 11, 2001, p. D1. 

13 See, for instance, Rimington, M., et al. “Counseling patients undergoing 

ovarian stimulation about the risks of ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome.” 

Human Reproduction, 14: 2921-2922, 1999; and Wakeley, K., and E. Grendys. 

“Reproductive technologies and risk of ovarian cancer.” Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 12: 43-47, 2000. 

14 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of the NAS Report. 

15 Hill J.R., et al. “Clinical and pathologic features of cloned transgenic calves 

and fetuses (13 case studies)” Theriogenology 8: 1451-1465, 1999. 

16 NAS Report, p. 3-2. 

17 NAS Report, Figure 3. 

18 See for instance the NAS Report, Appendix B, tables 1, 3, and 4. 
117 

Chapter Six

The Ethics of Cloning-forBiomedical-Research

I. The Manner and Spirit of This Inquiry

The question of whether or not to proceed with human cloningfor-biomedical-research is a morally serious and difficult one. 

On the one hand, there is the promise that such research could 

lead to important knowledge of human embryological development and gene action, especially in cases in which there are genetic abnormalities that lead to disease. There is also the promise 

that such research could contribute to producing transplantable 

tissues and organs that could be effective in curing or reversing 

many dreaded illnesses and injuries—including Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, juvenile diabetes, and spinal cord injury. On the other hand, there are the morally relevant facts that 

this research involves the deliberate production, use, and ultimate destruction of cloned human embryos, and that the cloned 

embryos produced for research are no different from cloned 

embryos that could be used in attempts to produce cloned children. Complicating the moral assessment are questions about the 

likelihood that this research will deliver its promised benefits and 

about the possibility of equally promising, yet morally less problematic, approaches to the same scientific and medical goals. Finally, there is the ever-present danger of creating false hope 

among patients, and the risk of allowing the goodness of the end 

(finding cures for disease) to justify moral indifference to the 

means used to achieve it. Morally serious people may differ in 

their final judgment of the ethics of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. But they do—or should—agree on this: that fidelity 
118 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

both to the highest moral and human aspirations of science and 

medicine and to the moral standards of the wider community requires that we consider not only why and how to proceed with 

new lines of research, but also whether there might be compelling reasons not to do so or certain limits that should be observed. Both the facts (scientific and moral) and our ethical principles must be consulted in trying to judge what is best. 

Yet despite this general agreement, it is difficult to know how 

best to proceed in the present case. There are multiple questions 

about the right context for considering the ethics of cloning-forbiomedical-research. First, we must weigh whether to take up 

this matter in the context of deciding what to do about cloningto-produce-children or in the somewhat different context of the 

ethics of embryo and stem cell research more generally. The issue has in fact emerged in the public moral debate over anticloning legislation, as a complication in the effort to stop cloning-to-produce-children. Generally speaking, the most effective 

way to prevent cloning-to-produce-children would arguably be 

to stop the process at the initial act of cloning, the production 

(by an act of somatic cell nuclear transfer [SCNT]) of the embryonic human clone. Yet such a measure would rule out cloning-for-biomedical-research, and many scientists and patient advocacy groups have argued that the human and moral costs of 

doing so are too great. Alternatively, we could take up this matter in what seems philosophically to be its more natural context, 

namely, as a sub-species of a larger inquiry into the ethics of embryo and stem cell research. 

 

Each of these contexts—what to do about cloning-to-producechildren and what to do about embryo research—is certainly 

plausible. Yet each, by itself, is less than satisfactory. The first 

risks giving excessive weight to the fact that the embryos wanted 

for research are cloned embryos; the second, ignoring the aspect 

(central to cloning) of genetic manipulation, risks the opposite error 

by requiring that the ethics of cloning-for-biomedical-research 

be argued entirely in terms of what it is proper to do with embryos 

as such. We can imagine, in advance of any discussion, a variety 

of moral opinions that would emerge, influenced in part by how 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 119

the question is formulated: one person could defend stem cell 

research performed using embryos produced by IVF but oppose 

research using cloned embryos for reasons of prudence (such as 

decreasing the likelihood of cloning-to-produce-children). Another person, holding IVF embryos in higher regard than cloned 

embryos, could reach precisely the opposite conclusion. Some 

people will hold that research on any human embryo, cloned or 

not, is always morally unacceptable (or acceptable), independent 

of whether ethical or legal guidelines are in place, while others 

will judge one way or another depending on whether appropriate 

guidelines and effective regulations have been established. 

We have decided to discuss the ethics of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch in the broader moral-philosophical context, rather than 

the narrower moral-political one that has taken shape around the 

current debate over anti-cloning legislation. Though we are 

mindful of the importance of these public policy debates—and 

will consider them in the following chapter—we do not want 

our moral analysis to be skewed by the specific legal or policy 

questions at issue, especially as the moral questions discussed 

here have implications beyond the current political debate and 

even beyond the question of human cloning itself. We opt to 

take up the moral questions in their fullness. 

A second question about context is even more difficult to assess. 

Should we regard cloning-for-biomedical-research as just the latest—and continuous—step in trying to unlock the secrets of 

human development and to discover cures for diseases? Or 

should it be seen—instead or also—as the earliest stage of a 

revolutionary new science of enhancement or eugenics, which 

will go beyond treating individuals with disease and disability to 

attempt engineered improvements in human genetic endowments? Because innovations like cloning come to us gradually 

and piecemeal, and because it cannot be known in advance how 

exactly they will be used or where they might lead, there is a 

temptation to stay close to the present and to ignore possible future implications. 
120 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Yet the alleged perils of going ahead with the research are arguably no more speculative than the promised benefits. And it 

would be morally and prudently shortsighted for this Council, 

charged with investigating “the human and moral significance of 

advances in biomedical science and technology,” to refuse to 

think about where this research might lead. We will therefore 

consider, even if we cannot know in advance, whether and how 

the sort of genetic manipulation of embryos exemplified by cloning-for-biomedical-research is new or “revolutionary.” Genetic 

therapy for existing diseases and non-therapeutic genetic modifications of our native endowments raise profoundly different 

questions. Accordingly, we will keep in sight not only the moral 

questions surrounding the means of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch—which is to say, the significance of using or not using 

nascent human life as a resource—but also the possible ends to 

which our expanding knowledge and capacities might be put. At 

the same time, we will be careful not to equate genetic medicine 

that is truly in the service of human life with genetic manipulation that is not, and to avoid both the unjustified fear and exaggerated promises that sometimes accompany biomedical progress. 

A third difficulty concerns the relation between the ethics of research on embryos (cloned or not) and the ethics of abortion. 

For many people, these issues are linked, and there is doubtless 

an overlap in the moral questions involved. Yet the issues are, in 

important respects, quite distinct. In the case of abortion, the fetuses whose fate is at issue are unwanted and (usually) the result 

of unintended conception. The embryos produced for research 

are wanted, indeed deliberately created, with certain knowledge 

and intent that they will be used and destroyed. More important 

perhaps, the extra-corporeal embryo (whether produced specially 

for research or left-over in IVF procedures) does not exist in 

conflict with the wishes, interests, or rights of a woman who is 

pregnant. Also, although abortion is widely practiced, each decision to abort is made one at a time, case by case. In contrast, to 

embark on creating cloned embryos only for purposes of research is to countenance at one stroke the large-scale production 

of developing human life for routinized use and destruction. For 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 121

these reasons, we shall try to consider the question of the ethics 

of research on embryos in its own terms, distinct from the ethical questions about abortion. 

Finally, there is the question of the spirit in which this examination should be conducted. Reflecting the situation in American 

society, there are major differences within the Council regarding 

the morality of research involving early human (cloned) embryos. These differences turn largely, though not exclusively, on 

different judgments regarding the nature and moral status of the 

early human (cloned) embryo: namely, to what extent is it, or is it 

not, “one of us,” a human life in process? Having explored 

these questions collegially among ourselves, we have come to 

think that all parties to this debate have something vital to defend, something vital not only to themselves but also to their opponents in the debate, and indeed to all human beings. No human being and no human society can afford to be callous to the needs 

of suffering humanity, cavalier regarding the treatment of nascent human life, or indifferent to the social effects of adopting in 

these matters one course of action rather than another. 

We believe, therefore, that we can make our best contribution to 

a truthful and appropriate moral understanding of the issue by 

developing, in a single document, the moral cases both for and 

against proceeding with cloning-for-biomedical-research (and also 

articulating, where necessary and as clearly as possible, important 

differences within each of these cases). Each Member of the 

Council has been asked to help strengthen the case made for 

both sides, regardless of which side he or she inclines toward. 

By proceeding in this way, we hope to make clear to the President and the nation exactly what is morally and humanly at stake 

in the controversy and what may be gained and lost in whatever 

choice is finally made. 

Thus, notwithstanding our differences, we stand together as the 

authors of the entire chapter, hoping by this means to shed light 

rather than heat on this most vexing of moral and policy questions. At the same time, we have tried fully and fairly to articulate our differences, and to do so by speaking, in the first person, 
122 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

as members of a deliberative body called upon to make our own 

best judgments. This means that the “we” that now embraces all Members of the Council will stand in the particular sections presenting the moral 

case for and the moral case against cloning-for-biomedical-research (Parts III 

and IV, respectively), only for those among us who subscribe to the specific 

arguments being made in those sections. In other words, each opinion is a 

self-contained brief, representing not the Council as a whole but only a portion of the Council. And even within the cases for and against, Members of 

the Council disagree over matters of substance and emphasis. But while 

the Council has strong differences of opinion, as delineated in 

the sections that follow, the Council speaks in a single voice in 

its affirmation that the debate must not be won by dismissing, 

ridiculing, or demonizing the other side. Important human 

goods are to be found on all sides of the debate, a fact too often 

overlooked. 

We begin, in Part II, with a discussion of the human meaning of 

healing, for it is only by an analysis of this uniquely human activity that the contours of the debate over cloning-for-biomedicalresearch can be properly traced and understood. Here the Council speaks as one. What follows this framing discussion are two 

separate opinions: in Part III, a portion of Council Members 

make the moral case for biomedical research; in Part IV, a portion make the opposing moral case against. Going beyond just 

listing the arguments, pro and con, each opinion is a sustained 

attempt at moral suasion. Yet each opinion, by self-imposed 

stricture, has tried to respect and respond to the legitimate moral 

concerns of the other side and to indicate how it means to do 

them justice. Each has tried to address what is owed to embryonic human life, what is owed to suffering humanity, and what is 

owed to the moral well-being of society. This approach to public 

moral discourse is, we are well aware, an experiment. Whether it 

is successful or not is for the reader to judge. 

* * * 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 123

II. The Human Meaning of Healing

Before presenting the two opinions, we will place the moral 

questions surrounding cloning-for-biomedical-research in their 

larger human context. Just as we did in discussing the ethics of 

cloning-to-produce-children, we step back from the particular 

technological possibility at hand to look carefully at the larger 

human goods that we seek both to serve and defend. We look 

specifically at the human meaning of healing the sick and aiding 

the suffering, as well as the spirit and practice of biomedical research that aims to make such healing possible. This exploration 

will better prepare us to see what is humanly at stake in our 

moral judgment about cloning-for-biomedical-research, and to 

face soberly both what is gained and what is lost in either proceeding or not proceeding. The subsequent moral arguments, 

both pro and con, are informed by these larger reflections. 

To be human is to be mortal. To be alive is to be vulnerable to 

suffering. No one is better situated to appreciate these truths 

than the physician. To understand what it means to heal, one 

must therefore understand the doctor’s special encounter with 

human suffering—as both an experience (a crying out) of the patient who lies before him and as a central mystery of human existence. Why do human beings suffer? Why do they suffer in 

ways that cannot be explained—entirely or perhaps at all—with 

human notions of justice? In this role, the doctor is sometimes a 

messenger of human finitude. He must tell patients that their days 

are numbered or that their time has come; he must tell grieving 

family members that death is at the door. But the healer is also 

and more importantly—in the eyes of both doctor and patient—

a deliverer. Not only is he well armed to deliver us from specific 

maladies and miseries. He is also a much-needed ally against the 

deadly disease—traditionally regarded as a sin—of despair. Because of the moral aspirations of his calling, the physician is a 

trusted source of hope that the living might yet still live and that 

in his skill and the powerful techniques of modern medicine 

might lie the possibility of renewal. The doctor is, at different 

times, a reminder of the intractable sadness of human life, but 
124 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

also explicitly a conqueror who beats back suffering and disease 

with the saving hand of medical knowledge and technique, and 

who inspirits us with hope to go forward even in the absence of 

cure and relief. 

Until roughly the second half of the twentieth century, physicians delivered more hope than cure, and they conquered few 

diseases. Since then, their arsenal against disease (at least in technologically advanced nations) has grown enormously, and it 

promises to grow greater in the decades ahead. New healing 

powers will surely emerge from the work of medicine’s ally, 

biomedical research, firmly grounded in the principles and 

methods of modern biomedical science. This noble field of human endeavor also has a context in the larger domain of human 

life. Celebrating its achievements and eager for its gifts to human 

welfare, modern societies embrace and invest heavily in medical 

research and grant scientists great freedom to inquire and experiment. Because of the way science advances, freedom is crucial to the successful realization of its goals. 

Dr. William Osler, one of the founding figures of modern medicine, described the aspirations of biomedical research as follows: 

To wrest from nature the secrets which have 

perplexed philosophers in all ages, to track to 

their sources the causes of disease, to correlate 

the vast stores of knowledge that they may be 

quickly available for the prevention and cure of 

disease—These are our ambitions.1

It is in the very nature of a “secret” that one cannot know in advance which areas of research and discovery will prove the most 

fruitful. One proceeds by trial and error. One makes hypotheses 

grounded in what is already known, in the effort to discover 

what remains a mystery. One begins with basic research into disease processes and mechanisms, in the hope that new knowledge 

will yield new medicines and new cures. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 125

One motive for such research is simply the love of knowledge itself—the distinctively human desire to know, to see, to understand more than one already does. But biomedical research is 

also guided, above all, by the humanitarian desire to apply new 

knowledge in the service of those who suffer, to correlate 

knowledge that it “may be quickly available for the prevention 

and cure of disease.” Biomedical scientists aim to weld the virtues of charity, beneficence, and responsibility to the human 

ambition to “wrest from nature” her secrets. This is the moral 

heart of both the medical profession and the research tradition 

that supports it: to do everything in our power, consistent with 

law and morals, to provide cures, amelioration, and relief to 

those who need them. 

“Consistent with law and morals”: this requirement qualifies 

“everything in our power.” This limitation has been traditionally 

understood to be part of the healing vocation. Moral philosophers and philosophers of medicine have long held that the duty 

to heal is an “imperfect duty,” meaning that it does not trump all 

other considerations. Physicians perhaps understand this best of 

all, learning their limits empirically from their encounters with 

patients whom they cannot save or even comfort. The duty to 

heal this patient, at this time, is also an imperfect one. After all, a 

cure for one person at the direct expense of another—for example, harvesting a vital organ from someone who is living to save 

someone else who is dying—would violate the first principle of 

medicine to “do no harm.” 

It is also true that scientific freedom and medical progress are 

not the only human goods worthy of our commitment and protection. Research must be judged both by the means it employs 

and by the ends it serves (both those that were intended and 

those that were not). The Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration, and the Belmont Report, discussed in the last chapter, are 

all efforts to set moral limits on biomedical research and to ensure that science serves human beings rather than the other way 

around. Among other things, these ethical codes embody the 

recognition that those who do research about human beings can 

never escape (nor should they) their status as human beings. 
126 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Those who investigate human biology are always both the knowers and the subject that is known, both the potential healers and the 

potentially afflicted. And therefore they must never treat that 

which is their equal—their fellow human beings—as something 

less than human. 

But in the end, however imperfect it is as a duty and whatever its 

less than supreme place among all other human goods, the obligation to heal and to seek remedies is a powerful one. It is a 

mark both of man’s natural limits (as the being in need of healing) and his capacity for goodness (as the being who heals). And 

so, the freedom of inquiry that makes biomedical research possible should be restricted only for the most important reasons, lest 

we do damage to the entire enterprise, or to the human beings 

and the society that benefit from the “vast stores of knowledge” 

it creates. 

At the same time, however, those who have accepted the 

“healer’s covenant”—and those who defend, engage in, and 

benefit from the research that improves and expands the human 

capacity to heal—must avoid the seduction of medical triumphalism: the belief that all human suffering, both physical and 

psychic, can be conquered by modern technique, and therefore 

that no form of biomedical research should be opposed. Doctors and scientists must not become partial human beings who 

evade moral responsibility by claiming that they are not qualified 

to judge the moral implications of their own medical research or, 

worse, that medically beneficial research is always self-justifying, 

and hence that there are no real moral dilemmas at all. In addition, they must avoid the cruelty of creating false hopes among 

patients and their loved ones, and the folly of creating messianic 

or utopian visions of what science and medicine can accomplish. 

And patients, even as they heroically fight against suffering, must 

not forget their own mortality—including the often unpredictable nature of how and when death comes. 

These reflections point to the following conclusions: In judging 

the moral beneficence and moral hazards of medical research, 

we must remember that suffering should not be opposed by any 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 127

means possible. We would be less than human if we did not desire to alleviate such suffering, but we would be imagining ourselves to be more than human if we thought and acted as if we 

could alleviate it once and for all. Rather, we must acknowledge 

that as human beings we live in a difficult “in-between.” 

Whether as doctors, scientists, or as patients, we all wish for the 

possible renewal of life through medicine, but also acknowledge 

that suffering and mortality are part of being alive. We are morally obliged to seek relief of suffering, but only in ways that preserve our humanity. 

With these realities in mind, this chapter will now take up the 

ethics of cloning-for-biomedical-research, and specifically the 

moral and human questions raised above: What is owed to those 

who suffer from debilitating injuries and diseases? What is owed 

to nascent human life? And what is owed to the moral wellbeing of society? These are the central questions in the debate, 

questions that Members of the Council over the past year struggled to answer, and that indeed every member of society must 

ponder when considering the ethics of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. 

* * * 

A note about how the remainder of the chapter proceeds: Part III, delivered 

in the voice of some Members of the Council, makes the case for going forward with cloning-for-biomedical-research. Part IV, delivered in the voice of 

other Members of the Council, presents the opposing case, the argument 

against cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

* * * 
128 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

III. The Moral Case for Cloning-forBiomedical-Research 

The moral case for cloning-for-biomedical-research can be 

stated in the following straightforward way: American society 

and human communities in general have an obligation to try to 

heal the sick and relieve their suffering. This obligation, deeply 

rooted in the moral teaching of “love of neighbor,” lies heaviest 

on physicians and health-care professionals who attend to individual patients. But it guides also the activities of biomedical scientists and biotechnologists whose pioneering research and discoveries provide new and better means of healing and relieving 

those who suffer. Research on cloned human embryos is one 

more path to discovering such means. Like embryonic stem cell 

research, to which it is partially related, it offers a promising approach to gaining knowledge and techniques that could lead to 

new treatments for chronic genetic or acquired degenerative diseases and disabilities.2

 If successful, it could help save countless 

human lives and ameliorate untold human suffering. 

It is true that human cloning-for-biomedical-research raises ethical questions, mainly because it involves the production, use, and 

destruction of cloned human embryos. It is also true that cloned 

embryos produced for research could be used in attempts to 

produce cloned human children, and the availability of such 

cloned embryos for research and the perfection of cloning techniques might increase the likelihood that people will succeed in 

cloning children. We appreciate the concerns of people who 

voice these objections and risks, and we are prepared to accept 

certain limits and safeguards against possible abuses. Yet we believe that, on balance, the objections to cloning-for-biomedicalresearch are outweighed by the good that can be done for current and future individuals who suffer. The moral balance lies 

on the side of endorsing and encouraging this activity. 

We who endorse cloning-for-biomedical-research will attempt to 

make a version of this case here. But we will do so, for the most 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 129

part, in a somewhat different spirit, one that is informed by the 

discussion of healing just concluded. In moral debates about 

these matters, people often speak as if saving lives is the only 

value that counts and that everything else must be sacrificed to 

advancing potentially beneficial research. Others speak as if any 

failure to prevent death or suffering from disease is sinful. Our 

defense of cloning-for-biomedical-research is more complex and 

nuanced and, we believe, more true to the merits of the case in 

question. As we make our case, we will also confront—and accept—the burden of what it means to proceed with such research, just as those who oppose it must accept the burden of 

what it means not to proceed. 

In making our case, we begin in Section A by summarizing the 

specific medical benefits that might be achieved by proceeding 

with this avenue of research. We then consider in Section B the 

moral dilemmas of this research. However, among those of us 

who believe the research should go forward there is disagreement about how seriously to take certain moral objections, and 

thus two distinct positions for proceeding are presented. 

A. The Medical Promise of Cloning-forBiomedical-Research

Many people suffer from chronic debilitating diseases and disabilities, including, among others, juvenile diabetes, Parkinson’s 

disease, Alzheimer’s disease, spinal cord injuries, heart disease, 

and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. These terrible diseases shorten 

life, limit activity (often severely), and cause great suffering both 

for the afflicted and their families. The inspiring example of 

exceptional persons who bear bravely the great burdens of 

illness or injury should not blind us to the powerful warrants for 

research and therapy that might lift these burdens. The 

likelihood of premature death, in particular, can shadow the life 

of the patient and the patient’s family even before it arrives, and 

its advent can impoverish and devastate families, dash hopes, 

and cast a chill on the lives of survivors. It is certainly admirable 

to confront, endure, and redeem these unchosen afflictions. But 

it is also admirable, where possible, to ameliorate through 
130 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

also admirable, where possible, to ameliorate through research 

and medicine the diseases and injuries that cause them. 

Cloning-for-biomedical-research may offer unique ways of investigating and possibly treating several of these diseases. To 

unlock the secrets of a disease, scientists must explore its specific 

molecular and cellular mechanisms, carefully observing both 

normal and pathological development. This research could be 

greatly facilitated by in vitro cellular models of human disease. It 

is here that the potentially most valuable and unique benefits of 

research on cloned human embryos may lie. This section summarizes some of these benefits, with specific examples. 

1. Cloning to Improve Understanding of Human Disease 

The creation of cloned embryos using nuclei from individuals 

carrying genetic mutations—specifically, genes that predispose 

them to particular diseases—might be used to better understand 

and treat those diseases. Consider, for example, Parkinson’s disease. A characteristic of Parkinson’s disease is the aggregation in 

dying brain cells of a protein called alpha-synuclein. Two different mutations in the alpha-synuclein gene produce forms of the 

protein that aggregate more readily. Individuals carrying these 

gene mutations suffer from early-onset Parkinson’s disease. 

To study how genetic disease develops, scientists look for suitable laboratory models. One strategy for producing such disease 

models is to inject the disease-causing human genes into human 

or animal cells in tissue culture to produce a cell-system expressing the abnormality. Although it has been possible to introduce 

copies of mutant genes into various kinds of human and animal 

cells, the resulting in vitro cell-systems imperfectly model the 

human disease. In part this is because the behavior of specific 

proteins within cells is influenced by their interactions with other 

cellular proteins. For example, human alpha-synuclein in a 

mouse cell cytoplasm interacting with mouse proteins is unlikely 

to behave the same way that it does in a human cell surrounded 

by human proteins. To study human disease, it is generally preferable to work with human cells and tissues. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 131

 

A preferable alternative to introducing mutant genes into normal 

cells is to begin with human cells that are already abnormal—in 

this case, cells carrying the mutant genes that predispose their 

bearers to Parkinson’s disease. If one could obtain embryonic 

stem cells derived from cloned embryos produced using nuclei 

from individuals carrying these mutant genes, one could then 

stimulate them to differentiate into dopamine-producing nerve 

cells in vitro. These cells would provide a vastly improved 

model for understanding the metabolism of alpha-synuclein and 

its role in the development of Parkinson’s disease.* In this example, the availability of improved in vitro models for genetic 

and neurodegenerative diseases could shorten the time required 

to understand them and to devise new treatments. 

It is true that adult stem cells (or multipotent adult progenitor 

cells3,4), isolated from patients carrying the mutant genes that 

predispose them to Parkinson’s disease, might also be stimulated 

to become dopamine-producing neurons in vitro. But there are 

unanswered questions about the ease of culture and long-term 

viability of such cells, and the likelihood of success with cellular 

models of disease derived from adult stem cells remains unknown. In the absence of a certain and superior alternative, it 

would be wrong to forgo the possibly unique benefits of cloning 

for disease research.

2. Cloning to Devise New Treatments for Human Diseases

The same cellular model systems used to study disease processes 

are also potentially useful for assessing and developing chemical 

or pharmaceutical treatments for the disease in question. To 

continue with the Parkinson’s disease example, neurons derived 

from stem cells containing the alpha-synuclein aggregation muta-

* Once such cells were produced in one laboratory, they could be stored at 

low temperatures and supplied to other laboratories for study. And so, for at 

least this particular area of cloning-for-biomedical-research, it might not be 

necessary to perform the cloning experiment more than a few times for each 

disease, making it possible that the number of cloned embryos required will 

be limited. 
132 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

tions would be very useful for testing compounds that might 

prevent aggregation of this protein. Chemicals that effectively 

prevented aggregation in this model system could be useful starting points for the development of new drugs for the specific 

treatment of Parkinson’s disease. Here, too, neuronal cellsystems derived from adult stem cells carrying the mutations 

might serve as well as those derived from cloned embryonic 

stem cells. But there is no way of knowing in advance which of 

the alternative routes is more promising. From a medical and 

scientific point of view, research on cloned embryos may offer 

unique benefits. 

3. Cloning to Produce Immune-Compatible Tissues for Transplantation 

Some animal studies suggest that tissues derived from embryonic 

stem cells can, if injected under certain conditions, populate disease-stricken areas and differentiate so as to compensate for the 

loss of function caused by the diseased tissue. For example, liver 

or heart muscle cells injected into an animal with liver or heart 

disease could help regenerate the diseased tissues and restore 

normal function. But these cells would have a chance to do this 

only if they can survive the normal immunological rejection response to foreign material. Cloning-for-biomedical-research offers the possibility that scientists could someday generate individualized, “rejection-proof” replacement cells and tissues to 

help patients fight disease and restore health. Stem cells and tissues derived from an embryonic clone of the patient would have 

the same genes as the patient, and so, hypothetically, would not 

be rejected by the patient’s body as foreign. 

It is true that this possibility (what is sometimes called “therapeutic cloning”) remains unproved.*

 As before, there may be alternative (nonembryonic or adult) sources of such “rejectionproof” stem cells and tissues derived from them. And there is 

ongoing research to circumvent the rejection problem altogether, 

by, for example, modifying the surface of an unrelated (embryonic) stem cell so as to enable it to escape detection as “foreign” 

* See Chapter Four, in the section on stem cells and regenerative medicine. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 133

tissue when transferred to patients for therapy. But, once again, 

it is too early to say which approach will work, and therefore it is 

important, from a medical and scientific perspective, not to close 

off any avenue of promise. The only way to verify this hypothesis is to try it—first in animals, then in human volunteers. 

4. Cloning to Assist in Gene Therapy 

Cloning techniques could also be combined with precise genetic 

manipulation to devise genetic treatments for genetic diseases. 

For example, a cloned embryo produced from a patient with severe combined immunodeficiency could be genetically modified 

to correct and repair the disease-causing mutation. Stem cells 

taken from the genetically modified cloned embryo might then 

be used to develop bone marrow stem cells to transplant back 

into the patient. This combined approach to gene therapy has 

shown early promise in one attempt to correct a genetic abnormality in the immune system of mice.5

B. Possible Moral Dilemmas of Proceeding

The potentially unique medical benefits of cloning-forbiomedical-research are, to those of us who favor it, abundantly 

clear. Yet the moral meaning of proceeding, still to be considered, is the subject of some debate among us. Most of us who 

favor proceeding believe that this area of promising research is 

nonetheless fraught with moral quandaries and ethical trade-offs; 

a minority of us do not share these concerns. The minority view, 

labeled Position Number Two, follows the principal moral case 

for cloning-for-biomedical-research under strict limits, designated here as Position Number One. Each opinion is presented 

in turn. 

1. Position Number One

What makes this research morally controversial is that it involves 

the production, use, and intentional destruction of cloned human embryos. To determine whether or not the science should 

proceed—or, if it does, what limits should be placed on this re-
134 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

search—it must be asked what, if anything, is owed this nascent 

form of human life. Only then can an evaluation be made of 

whether the possible benefits of this research justify its potential 

human cost. Other moral hazards must be considered that are either inherent in, or possible consequences of, this line of research. These hazards include the following: the possibility that 

cloned embryos will be developed and experimented upon beyond the blastocyst stage (the stage from which stem cells are 

taken); the possible exploitation of women who would be donors of eggs; the possibility that the production of cloned human 

embryos will lead—intentionally or unintentionally—to cloningto-produce-children; and the possibility that engaging in such research will weaken or undermine society’s respect for human 

life, and therefore undermine the very good (life) that it is meant 

to serve. Each of these moral challenges will now be addressed. 

(a) What is owed to the cloned embryo? The subject of the moral 

status of developing human life is a difficult and controversial 

matter, one about which American society is and appears likely 

to remain deeply divided. We are well aware of the fact that we 

cannot do it full justice in the present context. Yet we believe 

that the moral defense of cloning-for-biomedical-research requires a consideration of what is owed nascent human life 

(cloned or not). There is also the question—considered at great 

length in Chapter Three—of whether cloned embryos are the 

moral equivalent of fertilized embryos, or whether the different 

nature of their origins and the uncertainty of their capacity to 

become full human beings means that our moral duties to them 

are somehow different.

Nevertheless, those who wish to defend cloning-for-biomedicalresearch—as we do here—must consider what is owed to embryos 

as such as well as the significance of the fact that the embryos in 

question would be cloned. That said, the relevant arguments, especially in this subsection and the next, are in most crucial respects the same as those regarding the treatment of embryos 

produced by IVF. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 135

Let us be clear about what we are talking about when we speak 

of cloned embryos. We are talking about the very earliest stages in 

development, from the single cell product of SCNT, through the 

early cleavage stages, up to the blastocyst stage. This is a structure comprising some 100 to 200 cells not yet differentiated into 

specific tissues, let alone organs (though there is differentiation 

into inner cell mass and trophoblast; see Chapter Four). It is 

true that the embryos at the blastocyst stage, if implanted in a 

woman’s uterus or (hypothetically) an animal or artificial womb, 

could be made to develop to later stages, and this potentiality 

must be taken into account. But it is important to keep in mind 

the primitive and undifferentiated condition of the embryonic 

stage that is relevant for the research in question.

We begin with a series of questions: Is destroying an embryo or 

cloned embryo at the blastocyst stage morally the same as killing 

a child? Is it the same as clipping a fingernail? Is it more like 

one of these acts than the other? Is it like neither? Does the 

moral status of an embryo depend on whether it is implanted in 

a woman’s uterus or remains in a laboratory? Does the moral 

status of an embryo depend on its origins, or how it was produced? Does it depend on the motives of those who create it? 

In our view, embryos have a developing and intermediate moral 

worth, such that the early human embryo has a moral status 

somewhere between that of ordinary human cells and that of a 

full human person. We acknowledge the difficulty of setting perfectly clear lines marking when an embryo’s moral status goes 

from “less than a human person” to “like a human person” to 

“fully a human person.” But we believe there are sound moral 

reasons for not regarding the embryo in its earliest stages (certainly in the first fourteen days) as the moral equivalent of a human person, though it does command significantly more respect 

than other human cells. We also hold that the embryo can be 

used for life-saving or potentially life-saving research while still 

being accorded the “special respect” it deserves, and while still 

preventing abuses such as research on later-stage embryos or fetuses or the production of cloned children. We will develop this 

view by taking up the significance of (i) twinning, (ii) implanta-
136 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

tion, (iii) the human form, and (iv) the notion of “special respect.” 

• (i) The possibility of twinning. First, it is still unclear in the 

initial fourteen-day period whether an embryo will develop into one or more human beings. The possibility 

for “twinning” is still present, suggesting that the earlieststage embryo is either not yet an individual or is a being 

that is not confined to becoming only one individual. 

There are continuing philosophical debates about how to 

understand what happens in twinning: for example, 

whether one individual embryo “clones” itself to produce a second, or whether an organism that resembles 

(but is not yet) an individual embryo divides into two 

truly individual beings.*

 Nevertheless, the biological—

and we believe moral—significance of the possibility for 

twinning is clear: after fourteen days (or after the primitive streak is formed), the being in question can no longer 

be anything but a single being—that is to say, no embryo after this stage, and thus no fetus or live-born baby, can 

replicate or divide to form another identical being. Before fourteen days, this possibility remains. 

• (ii) The moral significance of pregnancy and implantation. Both 

IVF embryos and cloned embryos in vitro differ from 

comparable embryos conceived through sexual intercourse, for two reasons. First, the possibility for pregnancy with IVF or cloned embryos requires human assistance—that is, it requires the medical procedure of transferring an embryo into the woman’s uterus. There is thus 

no possibility of the IVF or cloned embryo becoming a 

human child in its original in vitro environment. Second, 

embryos that are conceived through sexual intercourse 

have a direct physical connection with the individual 

women who carry them, whereas an in vitro embryo 

(cloned or not) has no such connection unless it is trans-

* In the first case, human individuality would be present from the start, in the 

second case, it would not, a morally significant distinction to some people. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 137

ferred into a woman’s uterus. Thus, transfer of cloned or 

IVF embryos into a woman’s uterus is a significant moral 

step, insofar as such embryos cannot be removed—they 

can never again be held in human hands—without a direct physical intrusion or violation of the pregnant 

woman. Of course, it might become technologically 

possible in the future for in vitro embryos to develop beyond the blastocyst stage—and perhaps even to birth—

without implantation into a woman’s uterus (that is, in an 

artificial womb). Moreover, just because those embryos 

(cloned or not) that exist in vitro cannot continue to develop in a self-directed way beyond the blastocyst 

stage—that is, they require human artifice of some kind 

to develop further—does not mean that the preimplantation embryo is morally insignificant. But implantation 

does mark a significant point in these two respects: after 

implantation, self-direction toward birth (without external human artifice) becomes possible and external human 

control of embryos becomes impossible without intruding 

upon or violating the pregnant woman. 

• (iii) The significance of the developed human form. Generally 

speaking, our moral sentiments respond very differently 

to the prospect—or the sight—of the destruction of an 

embryo and the murder of a child. In other words, there 

is a difference between what we respect and what we consider 

inviolable. The destruction of embryos might inspire concern or solemnity. In contrast, our reaction to the murder of a child would be one of horror, outrage, grief, and 

violation. James Q. Wilson has discussed how these two 

fundamentally different moral reactions change as the 

embryo develops into a fetus and then into a child—and 

correspondingly, how our concern and solemnity transform into horror and outrage.6

 Specifically, human beings exhibit a distinctly different moral sympathy for, and 

therefore greater willingness to protect, those organisms 

that have begun to resemble human beings in their developed form. The practice of sacrificing the life of the 

unborn in order to save the life of the pregnant 
138 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

woman—while not a moral parallel to the case of using 

cloned embryos for biomedical research—shows that 

there is some moral precedent for subordinating nascent 

human life to more developed human life. Of course, 

taken to an extreme, such a principle would justify the 

most grotesque uses of developing human fetuses for 

scientific experiments. Moreover, the case is not strictly 

analogous, for in the case of the pregnant woman, two 

lives are in conflict, a confrontation absent with freestanding embryos. We do not take the life of woman A’s 

unborn fetus to save the life of woman B, not even with 

consent. But these difficulties notwithstanding, there is 

(again) a moral insight in this example. It demonstrates 

the important moral obligation of caring for those who 

already dwell among us, and the inevitable moral complexity of weighing different forms of human life, especially nascent and developed human life, against one another. It also suggests ways in which the claim on our 

protection may increase with the emergence of powers 

of awareness and suffering. Of course, such examples—

and our moral sentiments in general—are not by themselves decisive. They are the beginning, not the end, of 

reasoning about our moral responsibilities. But they 

should also not be ignored for what they reveal about the 

nature of particular beings and particular acts—and in 

this case, for what they suggest about both the developing

and intermediate status of the early human embryo. 

• (iv) The meaning of “special respect.” Finally, there is the 

question of whether it is possible to accord early-stage 

embryos “special respect” while still using them for biomedical research. We might reason here by an admittedly 

imperfect analogy. Various religions have rules governing 

the killing of animals for food. These exist in part to restrain cruelty. But they also serve to demonstrate respect 

for beings that command our affections and our wonder, 

because they are (like us) part of the mystery of existence. In a similar way, many hunters have a deeprooted respect and even affection for the animals they 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 139

kill. This is not to say that human embryos are the same 

as animals, because, in our opinion, they are indeed human organisms, if not fully developed human beings. 

But it is to show that there might be ways both to respect beings and to use them—for serious, not frivolous, 

reasons, and as part of our place in the order of being, 

not simply as an extension of our subjective will. 

For the above-stated reasons, we would assign an intermediate 

and developing status to the human embryo. Those who treat 

the developing early embryo as nothing more than “mere cells” 

(see Position Number Two below) are in danger of ignoring its 

direct and inherent connection to the profound mystery of the 

origins of human life and seem willing to ignore the fact that an 

embryo will (and a cloned embryo might) eventually become one 

(or more) human being(s). This view greatly underestimates the 

moral seriousness of the question of whether to proceed with research on nascent human life. And it gravely mischaracterizes 

the meaning of potentiality—specifically, the difference between 

having the capacity to become anything at all (a pile of building 

materials, for example) and the capacity to become something in 

particular (an individuated human person or persons). 

At the same time, those who believe that early-stage embryos are 

the moral equivalent of a human person (see Part IV below) are 

also, we believe, misguided. Just as we must listen to—and then 

articulate—the moral meaning of our disquiet at the idea of 

cloning-to-produce-children, we must listen to and articulate our 

fundamentally different moral responses to the destruction of an 

embryo on the one hand and the murder of a child on the other. 

While no single criterion like “appearance,” “selfconsciousness,” “the capacity to express needs and desires,” or 

“the capacity to feel pain” can by itself be decisive in conferring 

human dignity, the absence of all such criteria in the early-stage 

embryo or cloned embryo suggests that it is not a truly human 

being, but something different, commanding our respect because 

of what it is and may become, but yet not fully one of us. 
140 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

In sum, what is owed the embryo is not the same protections, attachments, and rights as a human person; nor is it no respect at 

all. In making the decision to proceed with research on embryos 

or cloned embryos, we must do so only for the most compelling 

reasons—namely, the reasonable expectation that such research 

will save human lives—and only with eyes open to the moral 

burden of doing what we believe to be morally best. Even as we 

establish the biological and moral grounds for using human embryos in certain forms of research, we must face and accept the 

solemnity of what we propose. Finally, we must proceed with 

the paradox that accompanies all human suffering and human 

imperfection in full view: that sometimes we seem morally obligated to do morally troubling things, and that sometimes doing 

what is good means living with a heavy heart in doing it. 

(b) The problem of deliberate creation for use in research. We next address whether the creation of embryos explicitly for the purposes 

of biomedical research presents additional ethical problems, beyond those just examined. In the case of research on cloned embryos, this form of deliberate production and destruction—

rather than the use of leftover embryos initially created for reproductive purposes—is the only means of proceeding, if, at the 

same time, society prohibits cloning-to-produce-children. It is 

one thing to overcome the respect owed to an already existing 

embryo that would die even if not used for research. It is, some 

argue, quite another thing to bring the embryo into being solely 

for use and exploitation in research. Willing to accept the first, 

they reject the second.*

 In this connection, three issues seem 

worth considering. 

First, the fundamental moral judgment about whether to proceed with cloning-for-biomedical-research must be grounded in 

* See, for example, “The Ethics of Stem Cell Research,” by Gene Outka, a 

paper presented and discussed at the Council’s April 2002 meeting. Outka extends the principle “that nothing more be lost” to justify use of excess IVF 

embryos in research, but argues that this principle cannot be used to justify 

creating cloned (or IVF) embryos explicitly for research (available online at 

www.bioethics.gov). A slightly revised version has been published in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12(2), 175-213, 2002. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 141

our judgment about the moral status of the embryos themselves, 

not the purpose of their creation. If an embryo or a cloned embryo had no moral standing, then creation for research and eventual destruction would present no moral problem. If the embryo 

or cloned embryo were morally the equivalent of a child, then 

regardless of how or why it was produced, experiments upon it 

would be morally abhorrent. But if, as we have just argued, an 

embryo or a cloned embryo has a developing and intermediate 

moral status, certain worthy uses of them may be justified regardless of how and why they were produced. Because the use 

of stem cells from cloned embryos may in the future provide 

treatment for serious human diseases, the creation of cloned 

embryos and their subsequent disaggregation to isolate stem cells 

can be justified. 

Second, the moral responsibilities for producing new embryos 

solely for research and for producing extra IVF embryos later used

in research are not really so different. In the case of IVF and 

leftover embryos, the individuals who create them for reproductive purposes typically and deliberately create more embryos 

than they are likely to use, and therefore know in advance that 

some will probably be destroyed. It is true that they are produced with the intent of initiating a pregnancy and that the embryo wastage is not all that different from what obtains in efforts 

to conceive in vivo. But the moral responsibility for production, 

use, and destruction of leftover embryos are finally no less than 

for deliberate production for use (and subsequent destruction in 

research). (We acknowledge that some who accept this logic 

come to the opposite conclusion—namely, not that cloning-forbiomedical-research is morally permissible but that IVF should 

be morally restricted to creating one embryo at a time, if permitted at all.) 

Third, in both cases—creating embryos to aid fertility or creating 

embryos for biomedical research—the ultimate goal is something humanly good: a child for an infertile couple or research 

that holds promise for curing debilitating diseases and easing 

suffering. Thus, in the case of cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

it is wrong to argue, as some do, that embryos are being “created 
142 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

for destruction.” Certainly, their destruction is a known and unavoidable effect, but the embryos are ultimately created for research in the service of life and medicine. 

In the end, while we acknowledge the risk of turning nascent 

human life into a “resource”—fully separate from its intrinsic 

connection to human procreation—we hold that the concern 

over deliberate creation and destruction is misplaced. What matters instead is whether a proper regard is shown for the created 

embryos, and therefore whether a proper moral and legal 

framework can be established that limits and governs their use in 

accordance with the respect they are owed as human cloned embryos. 

(c) Development and use of cloned embryos beyond the earliest stages. A 

perceived danger of allowing cloning-for-biomedical-research is 

that some researchers will develop cloned embryos beyond the 

blastocyst stage for research purposes. There are good scientific 

reasons and even moral arguments for doing so: one could learn 

much more about development, normal and abnormal, by going 

to later stages; and differentiated tissues taken from cloned fetuses would likely be more useful in regenerative medicine than 

stem cells. There is already at least one animal study showing the 

potential of this approach.7

 Transplantable functioning kidney 

tissue has been attained from six-week-old cloned cow fetuses, 

developed from cloned cow embryos transferred into a cow’s 

uterus for partial gestation. Cloned human embryos might be 

developed past the blastocyst stage by implantation into an animal or human uterus, by the development of artificial wombs, or 

by advances in sustaining nascent human life in vitro. 

This is a serious concern for those of us who believe that the 

cloned embryo has only an intermediate moral status and who 

also recognize the difficulty of drawing bright lines for when developing human life changes from “less than a human person” 

to “like a human person” to a “fully developed person.” Clearly, 

the longer cloned embryos are allowed to develop, the more severe the moral burden in using them. And at some point, the 

moral burden of proceeding becomes a moral obligation not to 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 143

 

proceed—even if significant medical benefits might be gained 

from doing so. In such circumstances, the medical principle of 

“do no harm” must override the researcher’s desire to do good, 

lest we undermine the humanistic principles and spirit of the entire medical enterprise. 

The moral tradition of “erecting a fence around the law”* may 

provide a useful guide in this case. We recommend that research 

on cloned embryos be strictly limited to the first fourteen days 

of development—a point just about when the primitive streak is 

formed and before organ differentiation occurs. We acknowledge that by erecting the fence more widely, we might be more 

certain to prevent this particular abuse (developing cloned embryos beyond the blastocyst stage). We also acknowledge that relaxing this limit to permit research beyond fourteen days might 

yield additional medical benefits. There is a moral burden in 

both directions. But we hold that there is a point of development beyond which research on nascent human life is morally 

intolerable no matter what the potential medical benefits. By 

raising a permanent fence at fourteen days, the dignity of human 

life will be sufficiently protected. 

(d) Exploitation of women who are egg donors. Additional concerns in 

proceeding with cloning-for-biomedical-research are the possible 

dangers to, and exploitation of, women who are egg donors. The 

removal of eggs remains an unpleasant and (owing to the hormone treatments needed to hyperstimulate the ovaries) a risky 

medical procedure for women. It is therefore restricted mostly to 

circumstances where such a procedure is necessary to treat infertility—that is, where the women themselves are the beneficiaries 

of the procedure. Moreover, one possible avenue of cloning-forbiomedical-research—namely, the creation and future use of in-

* To increase the chances of keeping people from a serious transgression (the 

law), a prohibition is imposed (the fence) on activities that might lead or 

tempt one to commit it. For example, if the goal is to keep people from engaging in commerce on the Sabbath, one makes it unlawful for them to handle money on the Sabbath. 
144 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

dividualized stem cells—would potentially require, if it became 

feasible, a very large and indefinite number of eggs. 

These are genuine concerns. But they can be addressed by 

strictly adhering to the established body of ethics for research on 

human subjects. These ethical codes suggest the following requirements: regulation to prevent the creation of improper financial incentives for participating in such research; full disclosure by the users of human eggs of their practices; a commitment to consider using nonhuman eggs, so as to decrease the 

need for human egg donors*; and strict limits on the uses of 

cloned embryos for only those investigations that uniquely require them. 

(e) The connection to cloning-to-produce-children. The final moral concern is that cloning-for-biomedical-research will lead—

intentionally or not—to cloning-to-produce-children. For the 

reasons described in Chapter Five, we believe that the creation 

of cloned human children would be unethical and that society 

has a moral responsibility to ensure that this does not happen. 

Thus we are obliged to consider whether the pursuit of cloningfor-biomedical-research is consistent with a serious commitment 

to stopping cloning-to-produce-children. A number of points 

must be considered. 

First, the production of cloned embryos, even for research purposes, crosses a new line by bringing into existence for the first 

time forms of nascent human life that are asexually produced. 

Second, experience with producing cloned embryos for biomedical research might well improve the technique of cloning itself, and therefore result in the greater perfection of the first step 

toward cloning-to-produce-children. Third, cloning-forbiomedical-research means that cloned embryos would exist in 

laboratories where they could be available for efforts to initiate a 

pregnancy. Finally, a society that allows cloning-for-biomedical-

* This means of reducing demand for human oocytes would imply increased 

SCNT of human nuclei into animal eggs, a practice that may bring additional 

moral questions. It was unanimously opposed by the National Institutes of 

Health Human Embryo Research Panel in its 1994 report (p. 82). 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 145

research, while setting strict legal limits on cloning-to-producechildren, will likely require the mandatory destruction of nascent 

human life. 

The first concern is intrinsic to cloning-for-biomedical-research 

in itself. Are we a different society because we have brought 

asexually produced human embryos into existence? In some 

ways, perhaps we are. We are confronted by the scope of our 

powers to change human life, to alter human procreation, and to 

modify the nature of human origins and the genetic makeup of 

new life. But we are also reminded of what should be the animating purpose of that power: to cure disease and relieve suffering. We are reminded of both new and unique possibilities for 

human harm (from the production of human clones) and new 

and unique possibilities for human benefit (from research on 

cloned embryos). This is, we suggest, the meaning of crossing 

this line. 

The second and third concerns are connected to where this research might lead: namely, to a perfected cloning technique and 

to the intentional production of cloned children. This is indeed a 

genuine concern. It is perhaps the case that the best way to prevent the production of cloned children is to prohibit the creation 

of cloned embryos. But in the end, we are not convinced that 

cloning-for-biomedical-research will inevitably lead to cloningto-produce-children; rather, we believe that the best approach is 

a system of regulation that prevents such an abuse. Such a system would include: a legal ban on the implantation of cloned 

embryos in any uterus (human, animal, or artificial); a prohibition 

on developing cloned embryos beyond fourteen days; a requirement that any individual or group engaging in cloning-forbiomedical-research register with proper regulatory authorities; 

prior scientific review of all proposed uses of cloned embryos to 

judge their medical and scientific benefits; and strict accounting 

of all cloned embryos that are produced to prevent their removal 

from the lab of origin or their use in attempts at cloning-toproduce-children. 
146 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Of course, no system of regulation is perfect. There is always the 

possibility of malfeasance or error. The prudential question in 

this case is whether the likelihood of cloning-to-producechildren is increased—at all, slightly, or significantly—by allowing the production and use of cloned embryos for biomedical research. But there is also the question of whether some additional 

risk of cloning-to-produce-children is justified or tolerable given 

the human goods that might be achieved through cloning-forbiomedical-research. In our view, it is. 

The final concern is that to pursue research on cloned embryos 

while preventing cloning-to-produce-children would require laws 

that mandated the destruction of nascent human life. In assessing the moral significance of this fact, we return to our judgment 

about the moral status of cloned embryos, what is owed to them, 

and whether the human goods that can be achieved by cloningfor-biomedical-research justify the real and potential human 

costs. In our view, the possible existence of a law requiring the 

destruction of cloned embryos at or before fourteen days of development would force moral clarity about what we are doing—

and the burdens of doing it. Such a law might remind society of 

the ambiguity and limits of the efforts to “heal the world,” and 

therefore the dangers of trying to do so by any means possible. 

The need for such a law requiring the destruction of nascent 

human life would also remind us that there is a burden in acting 

just as there is a burden in not acting. 

(f) Conclusion. The case for cloning-for-biomedical-research—as 

with all research that involves the use of nascent human life—

should not consist simply of guessing how many people might 

be saved and how many embryos might be lost. The moral concerns cannot so simply be taken up, addressed, and retired. They 

are permanent concerns and permanent burdens. 

We believe, in this particular case, that the promise of cloningfor-biomedical-research justifies proceeding, but that the genuine 

possibility of moral harm requires strict regulations of how we 

proceed. We have tried to articulate what such a system of regulation might include: (1) a legal requirement not to develop 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 147

cloned embryos beyond fourteen days of development and not 

to implant cloned embryos in any uterus, human, animal, or artificial; (2) the creation of a governmental oversight body to regulate individuals and groups who engage in this research, and to 

account for all cloned embryos that are produced so as to prevent their removal from the lab of origin or their use in cloningto-produce-children; (3) a ban on commerce in living cloned 

human embryos; (4) adherence to the highest standards of the 

ethics of research on human subjects, especially when it comes 

to procuring eggs; (5) a prior scientific review of the proposed 

uses of cloned embryos to judge their unique medical and scientific benefits; and (6) continued research into possible nonembryonic sources of stem cells and tissues for developmental 

studies, and ways other than cloning to solve the immune rejection problem. Such regulations amount to much more than mere 

bureaucratic red tape. They embody a profound ethical insight—

namely, that the means of serving human beings must never corrupt our responsibilities to human beings. 

2. Position Number Two

A few of us who favor proceeding with cloning-for-biomedicalresearch have few of the ethical qualms expressed by our colleagues in Position Number One. It is our view that this research, at least in the forms and for the purposes presently contemplated, presents no special moral problems, and therefore 

should be endorsed with enthusiasm as a potential new means of 

gaining knowledge to serve humankind. Because we accord no 

special moral status to the early-stage cloned embryo, we believe 

that the moral issues involved in this research are no different 

from those that accompany many existing forms of biomedical 

research, requiring mainly the usual commitment to high standards for the quality of research, scientific integrity, and the need 

to obtain informed consent from, and to protect the health of, 

donors of the eggs and somatic cells used in nuclear transfer. 

It is also our view that there are no sound reasons for treating 

the early-stage human embryo or cloned human embryo as anything special, or as having moral status greater than human so-
148 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

matic cells in tissue culture. A blastocyst (cloned or not), because it lacks any trace of a nervous system, has no capacity for 

suffering or conscious experience in any form—the special 

properties that, in our view, spell the difference between biological tissue and a human life worthy of respect and rights. Additional biological facts suggest that a blastocyst should not be 

identified with a unique individual person, even if the argument 

that it lacks sentience is set aside. A single blastocyst may, until 

the primitive streak is formed at around fourteen days, split into 

twins; conversely, two blastocysts may fuse to form a single 

(chimeric) organism. Moreover, most early-stage embryos that 

are produced naturally (that is, through the union of egg and 

sperm resulting from sexual intercourse) fail to implant and are 

therefore wasted or destroyed. 

There is a moral precedent for using materials from early human 

embryos in the widely accepted practice of using organs from 

brain-dead human beings. Upon determination of death, and 

with permission from the next of kin, surgeons routinely harvest 

organs to save the lives of sick or dying patients. In a similar 

way, donors of somatic cells and human oocytes could justifiably 

grant a biomedical scientist permission to use cells derived from 

the resulting cloned five-to-six-day-old blastocyst, which also 

completely lacks a brain and a capacity for consciousness. 

Some argue that the transplantation analogy is misleading, because a blastocyst has the potential to become a fetus and ultimately a child, whereas the brain-dead individual does not. But 

the potential to become something (or someone) is hardly the 

same as being something (or someone), any more than a pile of 

building materials is the same as a house. A cloned embryo’s potential to become a human person can be realized, if at all, only 

by the further human act of implanting the cloned blastocyst 

into the uterus of a woman. Such implantation is not a part of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research, whose aims and actual practice 

do not require it. 

Moreover, thanks to the results of nuclear transplantation research, there is reason to believe that every human cell has the 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 149

genetic potential to develop into a complete human being, if 

used in cloning efforts to produce a child. If mere potentiality to 

develop into a human being is enough to make something morally human, then every human cell has a special or inviolable 

moral status, a view that is patently absurd. 

“Slippery slope” warnings that the use of early-stage cloned embryos for research would lead necessarily either to the production of cloned children or to research on later-stage cloned fetuses should be treated with skepticism. Appropriate regulations 

can easily be established and enforced to prevent any such 

abuses. Although the continuity of biological development 

means that there is no naturally given moment after which an 

embryo or fetus becomes a person, defensible boundaries can be 

set. It is perfectly possible to treat a blastocyst as a clump of 

cells usable for lifesaving research, while prohibiting any such 

use of a later-stage embryo or fetus. 

Where to set the boundary is a matter for prudent judgment. For 

the foreseeable future, the moral line might be safely drawn at 

fourteen days of development, when no nervous system has developed and when a distinct identity as a single individual has 

not yet been preordained. Also, derivation of the valuable stem 

cells can be accomplished well before fourteen days. Whether 

society will be faced, in the future, with reason to reconsider 

such a line is for now a matter of speculation. If such an occasion ever arose, it would require an evaluation of the proposed 

scientific use and its likely medical benefits and a moral consideration of whether the research in question justified using embryos beyond the fourteen-day point. 

* * * 
150 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

IV. The Moral Case against Cloning-forBiomedical-Research 

Our colleagues who joined in Part III in making the case for 

cloning-for-biomedical-research began their analysis by describing the medical promise of such research. Those of us who 

maintain—for both principled and prudential reasons—that 

cloning-for-biomedical-research should not be pursued similarly 

begin by acknowledging that substantial human goods might be 

gained from this research. Although it would be wrong to speak 

in ways that encourage false hope in those who are ill, as if a cure 

were likely in the near future, we who oppose such research take 

seriously its potential for one day yielding substantial (and perhaps unique) medical benefits. Even apart from more distant 

possibilities for advances in regenerative medicine, there are 

more immediate possibilities for progress in basic research and 

for developing models to study different diseases. All of us 

whose lives benefit enormously from medical advances that began with basic research know how great is our collective stake in 

continued scientific investigations. Only for very serious reasons—to avoid moral wrongdoing, to avoid harm to society, and 

to avoid foolish or unnecessary risks—should progress toward 

increased knowledge and advances that might relieve suffering 

or cure disease be slowed. 

We also observe, however, that the realization of these medical 

benefits—like all speculative research and all wagers about the 

future—remains uncertain. There are grounds for questioning 

whether the proposed benefits of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch will be realized. And there may be other morally unproblematic ways to achieve similar scientific results and medical 

benefits. For example, promising results in research with nonembryonic and adult stem cells suggest that scientists may be 

able to make progress in regenerative medicine without engaging 

in cloning-for-biomedical-research. We can move forward with 

other, more developed forms of human stem cell research and 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 151

 

with animal cloning. We can explore other routes for solving the 

immune rejection problem or to finding valuable cellular models 

of human disease.* Where such morally innocent alternatives exist, one could argue that the burden of persuasion lies on proponents to show not only that cloned embryo research is promising 

or desirable but that it is necessary to gain the sought-for medical 

benefits. Indeed, the Nuremberg Code of research ethics enunciates precisely this principle—that experimentation should be 

“such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study.” Because of all the scientific 

uncertainties—and the many possible avenues of research—that 

burden cannot at present be met. 

But, we readily concede, these same uncertainties mean that no 

one—not the scientists, not the moralists, and not the patients 

whose suffering we all hope to ameliorate—can know for certain 

which avenues of research will prove most successful. Research 

using cloned embryos may in fact, as we said above, yield knowledge and benefits unobtainable by any other means. 

With such possible benefits in view, what reasons could we have 

for saying “no” to cloning-for-biomedical-research? Why not 

leave this possible avenue of medical progress open? Why not 

put the cup to our lips? In The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare has 

Leontes, King of Silicia, explain why one might not.8

There may be in the cup 

A spider steep’d, and one may drink, depart, 

And yet partake no venom, for his knowledge 

Is not infected; but if one present 

The abhorr’d ingredient to his eye, make known 

How he hath drunk, he cracks his gorge, his sides 

* We are especially impressed by the promise of the research of Dr. Catherine 

Verfaillie and her group, showing the stability and multipotency of cells derived from bone marrow of animals and human adults. Should this work 

prove successful, it might serve all of the purposes said to require cells from 

cloned embryos. See presentation by Dr. Verfaillie at the April 25, 2002, meeting of the Council (transcript on the Council’s website, www.bioethics.gov) 

and the papers cited in endnotes 3 and 4 to this chapter. 
152 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

With violent hefts. I have drunk, and seen the spider. 

To discern the spider in the cup is to see the moral reality of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research differently. It is to move beyond 

questions of immediately evident benefits or harms alone toward 

deeper questions about what an ongoing program of cloningfor-biomedical-research would mean. In part, this approach 

compels us to think about embryo research generally, but cloning (even for research purposes alone) raises its own special concerns, since only cloned embryos could one day become cloned 

children. We need to consider and articulate the reasons why, 

despite the possibility of great benefits, society should nevertheless turn away and not drink from this cup, and why the reasons 

for “drinking with limits” (offered by our colleagues in Position 

Number One above) are finally not persuasive. 

Our analysis proceeds along three pathways: what we owe to the 

embryo; what we owe to society; and what we owe to the suffering. We differ, among ourselves, on the relative importance of 

the various arguments presented below. But we all agree that 

moral objections to the research itself and prudential considerations about 

where it is likely to lead suggest that we should oppose cloning-forbiomedical-research, albeit with regret.

A. What We Owe to the Embryo

The embryo is, and perhaps will always be, something of a puzzle to us. In its rudimentary beginnings, it is so unlike the human 

beings we know and live with that it hardly seems to be one of 

us; yet, the fact of our own embryonic origin evokes in us respect for the wonder of emerging new human life. Even in the 

midst of much that is puzzling and uncertain, we would not want 

to lose that respect or ignore what we owe to the embryo. 

The cell synthesized by somatic cell nuclear transfer, no less than 

the fertilized egg, is a human organism in its germinal stage.* It 

* That the embryo in question is produced by cloning and not by the fertilization of an egg should not, in our view, lead us to treat it differently. The 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 153

 

is not just a “clump of cells” but an integrated, self-developing 

whole, capable (if all goes well) of the continued organic development characteristic of human beings. To be sure, the embryo 

does not yet have, except in potential, the full range of characteristics that distinguish the human species from others, but one 

need not have those characteristics in evidence in order to belong to the species. And of course human beings at some other 

stages of development—early in life, late in life, at any stage of 

life if severely disabled—do not forfeit their humanity simply for 

want of these distinguishing characteristics. We may observe 

different points in the life story of any human being—a beginning filled mostly with potential, a zenith at which the organism 

is in full flower, a decline in which only a residue remains of 

what is most distinctively human. But none of these points is itself the human being. That being is, rather, an organism with a 

continuous history. From zygote to irreversible coma, each human life is a single personal history. 

But this fact still leaves unanswered the question of whether all 

stages of a human being’s life have equal moral standing. Might 

there be sound biological or moral reasons for according the 

early-stage embryo only partial human worth or even none at all? 

If so, should such embryos be made available or even explicitly 

created for research that necessarily requires their destruction—

especially if very real human good might come from it? Some of 

us who oppose cloning-for-biomedical-research hold that efforts 

to assign to the embryo a merely intermediate and developing 

moral status—that is, more humanly significant than other human cells, but less deserving of respect and protection than a 

human fetus or infant—are both biologically and morally unsustainable, and that the embryo is in fact fully “one of us”: a human life in process, an equal member of the species Homo sapiens

in the embryonic stage of his or her natural development. All of 

us who oppose going forward with cloning-for-biomedicalcloned embryo is different in its origins, but not in its possible destiny, from a 

normal embryo. Were it brought to term it too would indisputably be a 

member of the human species. We caution against defining the cloned embryo into a “non-embryo”—especially when science provides no warrant for 

doing so. 
154 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

research believe that it is incoherent and self-contradictory for 

our colleagues (in Position Number One) to claim that human 

embryos deserve “special respect” and to endorse nonetheless 

research that requires the creation, use, and destruction of these 

organisms, especially when done routinely and on a large scale. 

The case for treating the early-stage embryo as simply the moral 

equivalent of all other human cells (Position Number Two, 

above) is entirely unconvincing: it denies the continuous history 

of human individuals from zygote to fetus to infant to child; it 

misunderstands the meaning of potentiality—and, specifically, 

the difference between a “being-on-the-way” (such as a developing human embryo) and a “pile of raw materials,” which has no 

definite potential and which might become anything at all; and it 

ignores the hazardous moral precedent that the routinized creation, use, and destruction of nascent human life would establish 

for other areas of scientific research and social life. 

The more serious questions are raised—about individuality, potentiality, and “special respect”—by those who assign an intermediate and developing moral status to the human embryo, and 

who believe that cloned embryos can be used (and destroyed) 

for biomedical research while still according them special human 

worth (Position Number One, above). But the arguments for 

this position—both biological and moral—are not convincing. 

For attempts to ground the special respect owed to a maturing 

embryo in certain of its developmental features do not succeed. 

And the invoking of a “special respect” owed to nascent human 

life seems to have little or no operative meaning once one sees 

what those who take this position are willing to countenance. 

We are not persuaded by the argument that fourteen days marks 

a significant difference in moral status. Because the embryo’s 

human and individual genetic identity is present from the start, 

nothing that happens later during the continuous development 

that follows—at fourteen days or any other time—is responsible 

for suddenly conferring a novel human individuality or identity. 

The scientific evidence suggests that the fourteen-day marker 

does not represent a biological event of moral significance; 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 155

rather, changes that occur at fourteen days are merely the visibly 

evident culmination of more subtle changes that have taken 

place earlier and that are driving the organism toward maturity. 

Indeed, many advocates of cloning-for-biomedical-research implicitly recognize the arbitrariness of the fourteen-day line. The 

medical benefits to be gained by conducting research beyond the 

fourteen-day line are widely appreciated, and some people have 

already hinted that this supposed moral and biological boundary 

can be moved should the medical benefits warrant doing so (see 

Position Number Two, above). 

There are also problems with the claim that its capacity for 

“twinning” proves that the early embryo is not yet an individual 

or that the embryo’s moral status is more significant after the 

capacity for twinning is gone. There is the obvious rejoinder that 

if one locus of moral status can become two, its moral standing 

does not thereby diminish but rather increases. More specifically, 

the possibility of twinning does not rebut the individuality of the 

early embryo from its beginning. The fact that where “John” 

alone once was there are now both “John” and “Jim” does not 

call into question the presence of “John” at the outset. Hence, 

we need not doubt that even the earliest cloned embryo is an individual human organism in its germinal stage. Its capacity for 

twinning may simply be one of the characteristic capacities of an 

individual human organism at that particular stage of development, just as the capacity for crawling, walking, and running, or 

cooing, babbling, and speaking are capacities that are also unique 

to particular stages of human development. Alternatively, from a 

developmental science perspective, twinning may not turn out to 

be an intrinsic process within embryogenesis. Rather, it may be a 

response to a disruption of normal development from which the 

embryo recovers and then forms two. Twinning would thus be a 

testament to the resilience of self-regulation and compensatory 

repair within early life, not the lack of individuation in the early 

embryo. From this perspective, twinning is further testimony to 

the potency of the individual (in this case two) to fullness of 

form. 
156 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

We are also not persuaded by the claim that in vitro embryos 

(whether created through IVF or cloning) have a lesser moral 

status than embryos that have been implanted into a woman’s 

uterus, because they cannot develop without further human assistance. The suggestion that extra-corporeal embryos are not 

yet individual human organisms-on-the-way, but rather special 

human cells that acquire only through implantation the potential 

to become individual human organisms-on-the-way, rests on a 

misunderstanding of the meaning and significance of potentiality. An embryo is, by definition and by its nature, potentially a 

fully developed human person; its potential for maturation is a 

characteristic it actually has, and from the start. The fact that embryos have been created outside their natural environment—

which is to say, outside the woman’s body—and are therefore 

limited in their ability to realize their natural capacities, does not 

affect either the potential or the moral status of the beings themselves. A bird forced to live in a cage its entire life may never 

learn to fly. But this does not mean it is less of a bird, or that it 

lacks the immanent potentiality to fly on feathered wings. It 

means only that a caged bird—like an in vitro human embryo—

has been deprived of its proper environment. There may, of 

course, be good human reasons to create embryos outside their 

natural environments—most obviously, to aid infertile couples. 

But doing so does not obliterate the moral status of the embryos 

themselves. 

As we have noted, many proponents of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch (and for embryo research more generally) do not deny 

that we owe the human embryo special moral respect. Indeed, 

they have wanted positively to affirm it.* But we do not under-

* Thus, for example, the 1994 report of the National Institutes of Health 

Human Embryo Research Panel, even while endorsing embryo research under certain circumstances, spoke (p. xi) of “respect for the special character of 

the preimplantation human embryo” and affirmed (p. x) that “the preimplantation human embryo warrants serious moral consideration as a developing 

form of human life” (though not, the report added, “the same moral status as 

infants and children”). Another report, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, released in 1999 by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, while 

declining to claim that the embryo should receive “the same level of respect 

accorded persons” (p. 50), spoke of and seemed to endorse the “ethical intui-
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 157

 

stand what it means to claim that one is treating cloned embryos 

with special respect when one decides to create them intentionally for research that necessarily leads to their destruction. This 

respect is allegedly demonstrated by limiting such research—and 

therefore limiting the numbers of embryos that may be created, 

used, and destroyed—to only the most serious purposes: namely, 

scientific investigations that hold out the potential for curing 

diseases or relieving suffering. But this self-limitation shows only 

that our purposes are steadfastly high-minded; it does not show 

that the means of pursuing these purposes are respectful of the cloned 

embryos that are necessarily violated, exploited, and destroyed in 

the process. To the contrary, a true respect for a being would 

nurture and encourage it toward its own flourishing. 

It is, of course, possible to have reverence for a life that one 

kills. This is memorably displayed, for example, by the fisherman Santiago in Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, 

who wonders whether it is a sin to kill fish even if doing so 

would feed hungry people. But it seems difficult to claim—even 

in theory but especially in practice—the presence of reverence 

once we run a stockyard or raise calves for veal—that is, once 

we treat the animals we kill (as we often do) simply as resources 

or commodities. In a similar way, we find it difficult to imagine 

that bio-technology companies or scientists who routinely engaged in cloning-for-biomedical-research would evince solemn 

respect for human life each time a cloned embryo was used and 

destroyed. Things we exploit even occasionally tend to lose their 

special value. It seems scarcely possible to preserve a spirit of 

humility and solemnity while engaging in routinized (and in 

many cases corporately competitive) research that creates, uses, 

and destroys them. 

The mystery that surrounds the human embryo is undeniable. 

But so is the fact that each human person began as an embryo, 

and that this embryo, once formed, had the unique potential to 

become a unique human person. This is the meaning of our emtion” that “the act of creating an embryo for reproduction is respectful in a 

way that is commensurate with the moral status of embryos, while the act of 

creating an embryo for research is not” (p. 56). 
158 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

bodied condition and the biology that describes it. If we add to 

this description a commitment to equal treatment—the moral 

principle that every human life deserves our equal respect—we 

begin to see how difficult it must be to suggest that a human 

embryo, even in its most undeveloped and germinal stage, could 

simply be used for the good of others and then destroyed. Justifying our intention of using (and destroying) human embryos for 

the purpose of biomedical research would force us either to ignore the truth of our own continuing personal histories from 

their beginning in embryonic life or to weaken the commitment 

to human equality that has been so slowly and laboriously developed in our cultural history. 

Equal treatment of human beings does not, of course, mean 

identical treatment, as all parents know who have more than one 

child. And from one perspective, the fact that the embryo seems 

to amount to so little—seems to be little more than a clump of 

cells—invites us to suppose that its claims upon us can also not 

amount to much. We are, many have noted, likely to grieve the 

death of an embryo less than the death of a newborn child. But, 

then, we are also likely to grieve the death of an eighty-five-yearold father less than the death of a forty-five-year-old father. Perhaps, even, we may grieve the death of a newborn child less than 

the death of a twelve-year-old. We might grieve differently at the 

death of a healthy eighty-year-old than at the death of a severely 

demented eighty-year-old. Put differently, we might note how 

even the researcher in the laboratory may react with excitement 

and anticipation as cell division begins. Thus, reproductive 

physiologist Robert Edwards, who, together with Dr. Patrick 

Steptoe, helped produce Louise Brown, the first “test-tube 

baby,” said of her: “The last time I saw her, she was just eight 

cells in a test-tube. She was beautiful then, and she’s still beautiful now.”9

 The embryo seems to amount to little; yet it has the 

capacity to become what to all of us seems very much indeed. 

There is a trajectory to the life story of human beings, and it is 

inevitable—and appropriate—that our emotional responses 

should be different at different points in that trajectory. Nevertheless, these emotions, quite naturally and appropriately different, would be misused if we calibrated the degree of respect we 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 159

owe each other on the basis of such responses. In fact, we are 

obligated to try to shape and form our emotional responses—

and our moral sentiments—so that they are more in accord with 

the moral respect we owe to those whose capacities are least developed (or those whom society may have wrongly defined as 

“non-persons” or “nonentities”). 

In short, how we respond to the weakest among us, to those 

who are nowhere near the zenith of human flourishing, says 

much about our willingness to envision the boundaries of humanity expansively and inclusively. It challenges—in the face of 

what we can know and what we cannot know about the human 

embryo—the depth of our commitment to equality. If from one 

perspective the fact that the embryo seems to amount to little 

may invite a weakening of our respect, from another perspective 

its seeming insignificance should awaken in us a sense of shared 

humanity. This was once our own condition. From origins that 

seem so little came our kin, our friends, our fellow citizens, and 

all human beings, whether known to us or not. In fact, precisely 

because the embryo seems to amount to so little, our responsibility to respect and protect its life correspondingly increases. As 

Hans Jonas once remarked, a true humanism would recognize 

“the inflexible principle that utter helplessness demands utter 

protection.”10

B. What We Owe to Society

Having acknowledged all that, we would miss something if we 

stopped with what is owed to the embryo—with the language of 

respect, claims, or rights. An embryo may seem to amount to little or nothing, but that very insignificance tests not the embryo’s 

humanity but our own. Even those who are uncertain about the 

precise moral status of the human embryo—indeed, even those 

who believe that it has only intermediate and developing 

status—have sound ethical-prudential reasons to refrain from 

using embryos for utilitarian purposes. Moreover, when the embryos to be used have been produced by cloning, there are additional moral dilemmas that go beyond the ethics of embryo research alone. There are principled reasons why people who accept
160 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

research on leftover IVF embryos created initially for reproductive purposes should oppose the creation and use of cloned embryos explicitly for research. And there are powerful reasons to 

worry about where this research will lead us. All these objections 

have their ground not only in the embryo’s character but also in 

our own, and in concern not only for the fate of nascent human 

life but for the moral well-being of society as a whole. One need 

not believe the embryo is fully human to object vigorously to cloning-forbiomedical-research. 

We are concerned especially about three ways in which giving 

our moral approval to such research would harm the character 

of our common life and the way of life we want to transmit to 

future generations: (i) by crossing the boundary from sexual to 

asexual reproduction, in the process approving, whether recognized or not, genetic manipulation and control of nascent human 

life; (ii) by allowing and endorsing the complete instrumentalization of human embryos; and (iii) by opening the door to other—

for some of us, far greater—moral hazards, such as cloning-toproduce-children or research on later-stage human embryos and 

fetuses. 

1. Asexual Reproduction and the Genetic Manipulation of Embryos 

It is worth noting that human cloning—including cloning-forbiomedical-research itself and not simply cloning-to-producechildren—would cross a natural boundary between sexual and 

asexual reproduction, reducing the likelihood that we could either retrace our steps or keep from taking further steps. Cloning-for-biomedical-research and cloning-to-produce-children 

both begin with the same act of cloning: the production of a 

human embryo that is genetically virtually identical to its progenitor. The cloned embryo would therefore be the first human 

organism with a single genetic “parent” and, equally important, 

with a genetic constitution that is known and selected in advance. Both uses of cloning mark a significant leap in human 

power and human control over our genetic origins. Both involve deliberate genetic manipulation of nascent human life. It 

is, of course, precisely this genetic control that makes cloned 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 161

embryos uniquely appealing and perhaps uniquely useful to 

those who seek to conduct research on them. But we should 

not be deceived about what we are agreeing to if we agree to 

start to clone: saying yes to cloned embryos in laboratories 

means saying yes in principle to an ever-expanding genetic mastery 

of one generation over the next. 

2. The Complete Instrumentalization of Nascent Human Life 

By approving the production of cloned embryos for the sole 

purpose of research, society would transgress yet another moral 

boundary: that separating the different ways in which embryos 

might become available for human experimentation. It is one 

thing, as some have argued, to conduct research on leftover embryos from IVF procedures, which were created in attempts to 

have a child and, once no longer needed or wanted, are “destined” for destruction in any case. It is quite another to create 

embryos solely for research that will unavoidably and necessarily 

destroy them. Thus, for example, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (in its report on stem cell research) reasoned 

that in circumstances where embryos were going to be discarded 

anyway, it did not undermine the moral respect owed to them if 

they were destroyed in one way (through research) rather than 

another (by being discarded when no longer wanted for IVF).11

By contrast, the Commission reasoned that it was much harder 

to embrace the language of respect for the embryo if it were 

produced solely for purposes of research and, having been used, 

then destroyed. This argument maintained the following moral 

and practical distinction: that embryos created for reproduction 

but no longer desired could, with proper consent, be used as research subjects, but that embryos ought not be produced solely 

in order to be used as research subjects. So long as we oppose 

morally and may perhaps one day prohibit legally the production 

of cloned children, it is in the very nature of the case that cloned 

human embryos will not be acquirable as “spare” embryos left 

over from attempts at reproduction. To the contrary, they will 

have to be produced solely and explicitly for the purpose of 

biomedical research, with no other end in view. 
162 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Some have argued that there is no significant moral difference 

between creating excess IVF embryos for reproduction knowing 

in advance that some will be discarded and creating cloned embryos for research that leads necessarily to their destruction. Because in both cases embryos are wittingly destroyed, there is, so 

the argument goes, no moral difference here. 

When viewed simply in terms of the fates of embryos once they 

are created, the distinction between using leftover embryos and 

creating embryos solely for research may indeed be morally insignificant. But when viewed in terms of the different effects 

these two activities might have on the moral fabric of society—

and the different moral dispositions of those who decide to produce embryos for these different purposes—the issue is more 

complex. In the eyes of those who create IVF embryos to produce a child, every embryo, at the moment of its creation, is a potential child. Even though more eggs are fertilized than will be transferred to a woman, each embryo is brought into being as an end 

in itself, not simply as a means to other ends. Precisely because 

one cannot tell which IVF embryo is going to reach the blastocyst stage, implant itself in the uterine wall, and develop into a 

child, the embryo “wastage” in IVF is more analogous to the 

embryo wastage in natural sexual intercourse practiced by a couple trying to get pregnant than it is to the creation and use of 

embryos that requires (without exception) their destruction. 

Those who minimize or deny this distinction—between producing embryos hoping that one of them will become a child and 

producing embryos so that they can be used (and destroyed) in 

research—demonstrate the very problem we are worried about. 

Having become comfortable with seeing embryos as a means to 

noble ends (be it having a child or conducting biomedical research), they have lost sight of the fact that the embryos that we 

create as potential children are not means at all. Even those who 

remain agnostic about whether the human embryo is fully one of 

us should see the ways in which conducting such research would 

make us a different society: less humble toward that which we 

cannot fully understand, less willing to extend the boundaries of 

human respect ever outward, and more willing to transgress 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 163

moral boundaries that we have, ourselves, so recently established, once it appears to be in our own interests to do so. We 

find it disquieting, even somewhat ignoble, to treat what are in 

fact seeds of the next generation as mere raw material for satisfying the needs of our own. Doing so would undermine the very 

prudence and humility to which defenders of limited embryo research often appeal: the idea that, while a human embryo may 

not be fully one of us, it is not humanly nothing and therefore 

should not be treated as a resource alone. But that is precisely 

what cloning-for-biomedical-research would do. 

3. Opening the Door to Other Moral Hazards

This leads directly to our third concern—that the cloning of 

human embryos for research will open the door to additional 

(and to some of us, far greater) moral hazards. Human suffering 

from horrible diseases never comes to an end, and, likewise, our 

willingness to use embryonic life in the cause of research, once 

permitted, is also unlikely to find any natural stopping point. To 

set foot on this slope is to tempt ourselves to become people for 

whom the use of nascent human life as research material becomes routinized and everyday. That much is inherent in the 

very logic of what we would do in cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. 

In addition, the reasons justifying production of cloned embryos 

for research can be predicted to expand. Today, the demand is 

for stem cells; tomorrow it may be for embryonic and fetal organs. The recent experiments with cloned cow embryos implanted in a cow’s uterus12 already suggest that there may be 

greater therapeutic potential using differentiated tissues (for example, kidney primordia) harvested from early fetuses than using 

undifferentiated stem cells taken from the very early embryo. 

Should this prove to be the case, pressure will increase to grow 

cloned human blastocysts to later stages—either in the uteruses 

of suitably prepared animal hosts or (eventually) using artificial 

placenta-like structures in the laboratory—in order to obtain the 

more useful tissues. One can even imagine without difficulty 

how a mother might be willing to receive into her womb as a 
164 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

temporary resident the embryonic clone of her desperately ill 

child, in order to harvest for that child life-saving organs or tissues. In such ways the coarsening of our moral sensibilities can 

be the fruit of understandable desires. Indeed, to refuse such further steps in the name of moral wisdom might come to seem increasingly sentimental, and, even if we were reluctant to give our 

approval, we might be hard-pressed to say why. 

We should not be self-deceived about our ability to set limits on 

the exploitation of nascent life. What disturbs us today we 

quickly or eventually get used to; yesterday’s repugnance gives 

way to tomorrow’s endorsement. A society that already tolerates 

the destruction of fetuses in the second and third trimesters will 

hardly be horrified by embryo and fetus farming (including in 

animal wombs), if this should turn out to be helpful in the cure 

of dreaded diseases. 

We realize, of course, that many proponents of cloning-forbiomedical-research will recommend regulations designed to 

prevent just such abuses (that is, the expansion of research to 

later-stage cloned embryos and fetuses). Refusing to erect a red 

light to stop research cloning, they will propose various yellow 

lights intended to assure ourselves that we are proceeding with 

caution, limits, or tears. Paradoxically, however, the effect might 

actually be to encourage us to continue proceeding with new (or 

more hazardous) avenues of research; for, believing that we are 

being cautious, we have a good conscience about what we do, 

and we are unable to imagine ourselves as people who could take 

a morally disastrous next step. We are neither wise enough nor 

good enough to live without clear limits. 

Cloning-for-biomedical-research could require thousands of 

human eggs and would, as presently contemplated, give rise, as 

we have said, to a new industry of embryo manufacture. This industry would depend on eggs procured from women, themselves 

participants in the research, who would need to take drugs 

stimulating ovulation and to submit to the egg retrieval procedure. One might wonder whether their informed consent is sufficient to permit this in circumstances where, in the very nature 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 165

of the case, the research is so preliminary that it cannot possibly 

provide effective therapies for patients. We might also worry lest 

women who are potential donors (because, for example, they 

have sought in vitro fertilization) might be vulnerable to pressure 

to participate in this research or financial inducements to do so. 

Even if such pressure does not rise to the level of coercion, we 

should acknowledge that there are inducements a just society 

would not offer and risks it would not ask potential research 

subjects—themselves vulnerable for a variety of reasons—to accept. 

To get around the shortage of human eggs and the ethical dilemmas it could produce, scientists are exploring the possibility 

of substituting animal eggs in the initial cloning step of SCNT. 

Experiments creating animal-human hybrid-embryos, produced 

by inserting human DNA into enucleated rabbit oocytes, have 

already been conducted in China, with development up to the 

blastocyst stage.13 Yet far from solving our ethical dilemma, the 

use of animal eggs raises new concerns about animal-human hybrids. We have no idea where these and later interspecies experiments might lead. Yet the creation of such chimeras, even in 

embryonic form, shows how ready we seem to be to blur further 

the boundary—biological and moral—between human being 

and animal. 

Finally, if we accept even limited uses of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch, we significantly increase the likelihood of cloning-toproduce-children. The technique will gradually be perfected and 

the cloned embryos will become available, and those who would 

be interested in producing cloned children will find it much easier to do so. The only way to prevent this from happening 

would be to prohibit, by law, the implantation of cloned embryos for the purpose of producing children. To do so, however, the government would find itself in the unsavory position 

of designating a class of embryos that it would be a felony not to 

destroy. It would require, not just permit, the destruction of 

cloned embryos—which seems to us the very opposite of showing such cloned embryos “special respect.” 
166 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

4. Conclusion: What Prudence Requires 

As history so often demonstrates, powers gained for one purpose are often used for other, less noble ones. We are about to 

harness powers over our own (human) nature to be used for our 

own well-intentioned purposes. But the knowledge that provides 

this power does not teach us how to use it. And given our fallibility, that should give us pause. We should consider, in making 

our moral judgment about cloning-for-biomedical-research, not 

simply the origin of these cells, but their possible uses (and misuses), as well as their place in the larger story of our increasing 

technological powers. We must keep in mind not simply where 

we took these cells from, but where they might take us, and what 

might be done with them. 

In light of these moral and prudential dangers—namely, the 

crossing of the boundary from sexual to asexual reproduction; 

the possible misuse of our new genetic powers over embryonic 

life; the reduction of human embryos to nothing more than a resource and the coarsening of our moral sensibilities that would 

come with it; the prospect of a law that would mandate the destruction of nascent human life; and the prospect of other 

(greater) harms down the road, most notably the production of 

cloned children, research on later-stage fetuses, or genetic engineering of future generations—we must take pause and resist. In 

trying to discern where a wise and prudent boundary must be 

drawn—to protect those beings who are humanly inviolable, to 

prevent the dangers that most tempt us, and to protect the moral 

fabric of society—we hold that the boundary must be drawn by 

prohibiting the production and use of cloned embryos. To cross 

this boundary or to set it further down the road—that is, “with 

limits”—is to invite (and perhaps ensure) that some (or all) of 

the dehumanizing possibilities described above will come to 

pass. 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 167

C. What We Owe to the Suffering

The final question to be considered is what we owe to the suffering. Like our colleagues who endorse cloning-for-biomedicalresearch, we believe it would be less than human to turn a blind 

eye to those who suffer and need relief, or to stand silent in the 

face (especially) of suffering and premature death. In saying “no” 

to cloning-for-biomedical-research, we are not closing the door 

on medical progress—not in principle and not in practice. We 

are simply acknowledging that, for very strong moral reasons, 

progress must come by means that do not involve the production, use, and destruction of cloned embryos and that do not reduce nascent human life to a resource for our exploitation. This 

does mean, of course, that advances in basic research and progress in the cure of disease, though not halted, might be slowed 

(though, as described above, this is far from certain on scientific 

grounds). It is possible that some might suffer in the future because research proceeded more slowly. We cannot suppose that 

the moral life comes without cost. And honesty compels us not 

to offer guarantees where our human limits—and the unpredictable nature of the future—ensure that no such assurances are 

possible. 

There may be occasions in life when the only means available for 

achieving a desired end is a means that it would be wrong to 

employ. This is especially true in circumstances such as those 

considered here; for to give our initial approval to cloning-forbiomedical-research is to set foot on a path whose deepest implications can scarcely be calculated. People sometimes imagine 

that human beings are responsible for all the harms they could 

prevent but do not; yet, this cannot be true. When we refuse to 

achieve a good outcome by doing what is wrong, and thereby 

perhaps accept some suffering that might have been avoided, we 

are not guilty of causing that suffering. To say otherwise would 

mean that sufficiently evil men could always hold us morally 

hostage. In order to obligate us to do an evil deed, they need 

only credibly threaten to do great harm unless we comply. Were 

we actually responsible for all the harm we might have prevented 
168 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

but did not, they would have us in their moral power. If our duty 

to prevent harm and suffering were always overriding, if it always held moral trump, we could not live nobly and justly. 

We are not deaf to the voices of those who desperately want 

biomedical research to proceed. Indeed, we can feel the force of 

that desire ourselves, for all of us—and those we love most—are 

or could one day be patients desperate for a cure. But we are not 

only patients or potential patients. We are human beings and 

citizens, and we know that relief of suffering, though a great 

good, is not the greatest good. As highly as we value health and 

longer life, we know that life itself loses its value if we care only 

for how long we live, and not also for how we live. 

Suppose, then, that we refrain from such research and that future sufferers say to us: “You might have helped us by approving 

cloning for research, but you declined to do so.” What could we 

say to them? Something like the following: “Yes, perhaps so. But 

we could have done so only by destroying, in the present, the 

sort of world in which both we and you want to live—a world in 

which, as best we can, we respect human life and human individuals, the weak and the strong. To have done it would have 

meant stepping across boundaries that are essential to our humanity. And, although we very much want to leave to our children a world in which suffering can be more effectively relieved, 

that is not all we want to leave them. We want to bequeath to 

them a world that honors moral limits, a world in which the 

good of some human lives is not entirely subordinated to the 

good of others, a world in which we seek to respect, as best we 

can, the time each human being has and the place each fills.” 

This understanding of what commitment to our shared humanity requires is not alien to the efforts of scientific researchers to 

make progress in the cure of disease and relief of suffering. 

Theirs is, after all, a moral mission, which serves us all and which 

we all support. But if history teaches anything, it is the danger of 

assuming that, because our motives are praiseworthy and our 

hope is to heal, our actions cannot possibly violate or diminish 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 169

human well-being. Indeed, we may be least likely to see the dangers when we are most confident of the goodness of our cause. 

Scientists already accept important moral boundaries in research 

on human subjects, and they do not regard such boundaries as 

unwarranted restrictions on the freedom of scientific research. 

More generally, the scientific enterprise is a moral one not only 

because of the goals scientists seek but also because of the limits 

they honor. Indeed, it is precisely the acceptance of limits that 

stimulates creative advance, that forces scientists to conceive of 

new and morally acceptable ways of conducting research. Surely, 

therefore, before society takes a step that cannot be undone, it 

should ponder soberly the moral implications of accepting cloning, even for research. 

To approve cloning-for-biomedical-research, to drink from that 

cup, is an inviting prospect indeed, but there is a spider in the 

cup. When we consider what we owe to the embryo, to our society, and to the suffering, we can see it more clearly and can, 

perhaps, acquire the wisdom and even the courage not to put 

this cup to our lips. 

* * * 
170 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

V. Conclusion 

In this chapter, Council Members have presented as best we can 

the moral cases for and against cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

seen in the contexts of efforts to heal the sick; present and projected developments in reproductive, developmental, and genetic 

biotechnology; and the moral concerns for nascent life and the 

moral well-being of American society. Our different moral outlooks and judgments have been preserved and, we hope, clarified. We are now ready to move from ethics to public policy, in 

search of the best course of action regarding human cloning. 

ENDNOTES 

1 Osler, W. “Chauvinism in Medicine” Aequanimitas, with Other Addresses to 

Medical Students, Nurses and Practitioners of Medicine Philadelphia: Blakiston, 

1943, p. 267.

2 For more information about the scientific and medical case for cloning-forbiomedical-research, see the following two reports: (1) National Research 

Council/Institute of Medicine (NRC/IOM), Stem Cells and the Future of Regenerative Medicine, Washington DC, National Academy Press, 2001. (2) National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS), Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive 

Cloning, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 2002. 

3 Reyes, M., et al. “Origin of endothelial progenitors in human postnatal bone 

marrow” Journal of Clinical Investigation, 109: 337-346, 2002.

4 Jiang, Y. et al. “Pluripotency of mesenchymal stem cells derived from adult 

marrow” Nature, 418: 41-49, 2002. 

5 Rideout III, W.M. et al. “Correction of a genetic defect by nuclear transplantation and combined cell and gene therapy” Cell, 109: 17-27, 2002. 

6 Wilson, J.Q. “On Abortion” Commentary, 97(1): 21ff, 1994.

7 Lanza, R.P., et al. “Generation of histocompatible tissues using nuclear 

transplantation” Nature Biotechnology, 20: 689-696, 2002. 

8 Brian Appleyard calls attention to this passage in his book, Brave New Worlds: 

Staying Human in the Genetic Future (New York: Viking, 1998). 
Chapter Six: Ethics of Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 171

9 Cited in Kass, L. “The Meaning of Life—in the Laboratory” The Public Interest, No. 146, pp. 45-46, Winter 2002. 

10 Jonas, H. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting With Human Subjects” in Readings on Ethical and Social Issues in Biomedicine, ed. Richard W. Wertz 

(Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 32. 

11 National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell 

Research, volume I, p. 53. Bethesda, MD: Government Printing Office, 1999. 

12 See endnote 7, above.

13 Leggett, K., and A. Regalado. “China Stem Cell Research Surges as Western 

Nations Ponder Ethics” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2002, p. A1. 
172 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
173 

Chapter Seven

Public Policy Options 

The connection between moral assessment and public policy, 

here as elsewhere, is hardly straightforward. The relation of morality to law is notoriously complex, especially in free societies 

such as our own in which citizens may live their lives according 

to their own moral views. At the same time, however, practices 

deemed seriously wrong and harmful are outlawed, from incest 

and sexual abuse to slavery and racial discrimination. In addition, 

law functions not only to encourage or discourage conduct but 

also as a moral teacher. It expresses the social norms of the 

community, whether by fostering public education and medical 

research or by discouraging dishonest business practices and 

teenage pregnancy. Whether and how the law should address any 

given morally charged topic is often a debatable matter, requiring 

careful study and prudent judgment. Not everything that is morally defensible should be encouraged by public policy; not everything that is morally troubling should be legally proscribed. 

These general remarks apply also to the case at hand. The moral 

assessments of the previous two chapters do not carry selfevident policy recommendations. Even a thoroughly developed 

moral position on either or both of the uses of human cloning 

still leaves open the question of what public policy would be appropriate, prudent, and effective. One can be morally opposed 

to cloning-to-produce-children, yet also oppose making it illegal, 

say, because of hesitation to increase the police power of the 

state in matters of reproduction. Or one can have no personal 

moral objection to cloning-for-biomedical-research, but still find 

practical reasons to favor a moratorium on such activity, say, because one wants to develop regulatory institutions before allow-
174 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ing the research to proceed. Moral principle and judgment, 

though necessary, are not sufficient for deliberating about what 

to do about human cloning. Prudence is also required. 

In this chapter, we consider a broad range of public policy options. We assess and compare these options in the hope of seeing our way clear, in the eighth and final chapter of this report, 

to offer recommendations that comport, not only with our ethical judgments, but also with our sense as citizens of what is prudent, practical, and appropriate for this country at this time. 

The policy debate about human cloning is a particularly vivid example of the tension between competing public goods, between 

the goods served by biomedical science and technology and 

other moral and social goods important to community life. The 

desire to ban human cloning, whether for producing children or 

for biomedical research, arises primarily from moral and social 

objections made in the name of human dignity, individuality, and 

respect for life. The opposition to a comprehensive ban on human cloning arises primarily from a belief that cloning research 

may lead to new remedies for human diseases and disabilities, 

backed also by appeals to the principle of freedom for scientific 

inquiry and technological innovation. Assumptions about the 

relative merits of these competing goods, as well as about the 

broader relation between science and society, lie just beneath the 

surface of this debate. Wittingly or not, these assumptions inform how people think about the various policy options proposed for dealing with human cloning. A brief examination of 

the more general question of the relation between science and 

society might clarify the principles that should guide our approach to a national policy on human cloning. 

I. Science and Society

Since its birth in the seventeenth century, modern science—and 

especially modern medicine—has been guided by a desire to improve and elevate the human condition. Unlike ancient science, 

which sought speculative knowledge of what things are purely as 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 175

an end in itself satisfying to the knower, modern science from 

the start sought effective knowledge of how things work, in the 

service of what Francis Bacon called “the conquest of nature for 

the relief of man’s estate.” Since then, scientists have been increasingly motivated not only by a deep desire to know, but also 

by a desire to do: that is, to provide resources, know-how, and relief in humanity’s pursuit of health, happiness, and comfort. 

Biomedical scientists especially have pursued a dual goal: to increase our knowledge and understanding of living nature and to 

help the sick and the suffering. 

In exchange for the promise of great human benefits, the practice of science entered into an unprecedented relation to the larger society. Scientists gradually acquired a privileged standing in 

modern societies, first with protections against persecution and 

censorship, later with public recognition and financial support. 

But it deserves to be noted that, insofar as the public respect for 

science rests on its moral intention and its ability to deliver the 

goods that society wants, scientists tacitly subject themselves to 

public scrutiny and moral judgment of their work, both as to 

ends and to means. The tacit social contract between scientists 

and society—freedom and support for scientists, benefits for all 

humanity—is double-sided: on the one hand, the opportunity 

for scientists to be public benefactors and recognized as such; on 

the other hand, the need, in cases where values conflict, for scientists to defend what they do in terms of the community’s 

judgments about the relation of scientific activity to other moral 

and social goods. 

As we have noted in the previous chapters, in the twentieth century, biomedical science made tremendous advances, resulting in 

both greater knowledge of how the human body works and 

greater ability to affect its workings. The results have been so 

dramatic, and so beneficial, that in the United States today virtually no one questions the benefits of the modern scientific endeavor, especially in medicine. This consensus about benefits has 

expressed itself as consistently strong public support for public 

funding of basic research, as well as strong support for the freedom of scientists to set their own research agendas, limited only 
176 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

by their curiosity, their imaginations, and our commonly agreedupon moral and ethical norms. The tacit “contract” or relationship between science and society recognizes and celebrates the 

great benefits of freedom for all involved. 

But for all these great benefits and good purposes, there are also 

times when the activities of scientists or the products of scientific work can imperil society and its members. For one thing, 

the work of scientific research is by its nature experimental. Scientific inquiry involves action, not only observation or theory. 

For this reason, freedom of inquiry does not adequately describe the 

freedom that scientific work requires and is generally granted. It 

may be more accurate to say that scientists desire and often receive great freedom of action. Yet because scientists learn by doing, 

some of what scientists do can be dangerous or inappropriate. 

And because some of their actions may infringe on the rights, 

security, or dignity of individuals, or on the principles and interests of society as a whole, scientific freedom of action cannot be 

absolute. 

In addition, many of the technological products of scientific research can be used to do harm as well as good. Just as society 

has moved in the past to restrict access to dangerous nuclear and 

biological agents, as well as to restrict public access to information about these things, so too will society be confronted with 

moral challenges by the new biomedical technologies. Technologies that disclose our genetic abnormalities or that alter the human genome, neurotropic drugs that can enhance (or destroy) 

memory or libido, computer implants in human brains—these 

and many other technological possibilities now on the horizon 

may raise profound moral and social challenges to privacy, freedom, equality, dignity, and human self-understanding. As citizens 

we may—indeed we must—decide whether and where to limit 

potentially harmful research or technology even as we continue 

to desire and uphold free intellectual inquiry and technological 

innovation. 

American society has done this in the past. The various codes of 

conduct for human experimentation, discussed at several points 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 177

in this report, demonstrate some of the ways in which the polity 

has established important moral boundaries that biomedical researchers must respect. In addition, rules and restrictions 

governing the pharmaceutical industry, the practice of medicine, 

the sale of organs for transplantation, the handling of 

biohazards, the development of biological weapons, and 

numerous other areas of scientific and technological work show 

that even given our desire for scientific advance and our belief in 

the inherent value of freedom, the pursuit of research and 

technology has not been allowed to trump all other concerns. 

Thus we conclude that in the realm of genetics and reproduction, as in many others, boundaries and regulations may be 

needed: lines may need to be drawn that none may cross, guidelines may need to be established that all must follow. Because 

the wisdom needed to decide how scientific knowledge and 

technology should be used is not something that science can 

provide by itself, these boundaries and regulations must be set 

by the whole community, democratically, through its representative institutions, and not only by those who are experts in the 

scientific work involved. Our analysis in Chapters Five and Six 

of the serious moral and social questions raised by human cloning has persuaded us that human cloning in both its forms is an 

appropriate area for public policy. 

II. Public Policy Options: 

General Considerations 

A. The Scope of Policy 

Having decided that human cloning is an activity fit for public 

policy decision, we still face many questions. Does it warrant legislative proscription, governmental regulation, professional oversight or self-regulation, or merely civil tort liability for bad results? And how broadly or narrowly should we delimit the domain in which human cloning is to be considered? Although the 

ethical analysis in this report has often concentrated on human 

cloning considered on its own, when considering public policy it 
178 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

is especially important to recall the larger contexts in which human cloning belongs. As we emphasized in Chapters One and 

Two, human cloning (in both its possible uses) would be but a 

special area of a larger domain of biotechnology, made possible 

by present and projected techniques of embryo research, assisted 

reproduction, genetic screening, and genetic engineering—all of 

which are coming to be grouped under the field of “reprogenetics.” As we contemplate possible policy options regarding human cloning, it behooves us to consider what cloning’s place 

within this broader context might mean for public policy. 

Many other countries have in fact taken up cloning in this 

broader context. In Germany, for example, this broader approach has taken the form of a series of legal proscriptions and 

restrictions, centered on the Embryo Protection Act of 1990. 

The act treats all embryo research together and prohibits all interventions not undertaken for the well-being of the embryo (including the creation of embryos specifically for research). The 

German system also includes specific rules for IVF procedures, 

and in general treats all interventions involving the human embryo under one rubric. Human cloning, for whatever purposes, 

is legislatively prohibited. 

In the United Kingdom, too, policy on these subjects takes as its 

organizing principle the human embryo itself, though the approach here is regulative rather than proscriptive. The British 

system is centered around a regulatory body—the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), created in 1990—

charged with monitoring and regulating essentially all of what 

has come to be called reprogenetics, including human cloning, 

both for producing children and for biomedical research. The 

HFEA regulates infertility treatment and clinical work; storage of 

gametes and embryos; and all embryo research, whether publicly 

or privately funded. It licenses these various activities, monitors 

compliance, sets standards of practice, establishes limits and requirements on the use of embryos for various purposes, and 

maintains a detailed information registry about both assisted reproduction and embryo research. Human cloning is treated 

within this broader regulatory scheme: cloning-to-produce-
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 179

children is not permitted; cloning-for-biomedical-research is allowed, but only with cloned embryos no older than fourteen 

days. 

Canada is completing the process of establishing a national system, combining elements of legal proscription and governmental 

regulation, to govern all technological activities used to help 

people have children as well as the use of embryos in research. 

Some activities would be permitted and regulated, others would 

be prohibited by law. The chosen point of departure is not the 

human embryo, but rather the goods of human health and dignity: to protect the health and safety of Canadians; to prevent 

commercial exploitation of reproduction; and to protect human 

individuality and diversity and the integrity of the human genome. A single broad regulatory body, the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada, would issue and renew licenses 

for assisted reproduction facilities, collect and analyze health information, set policies, and monitor compliance. Among the 

prohibited activities are all human cloning, whether to produce 

children or for biomedical research. Human embryos no longer 

needed for infertility may be used for stem cell research (with 

consent of the progenitors). But producing in vitro embryos for 

research purposes is prohibited, except for efforts to improve 

assisted reproduction procedures.1

Several other countries have approached this area of biotechnology with a similar broad outlook. The United States to date has 

not; indeed we lack any national monitoring, oversight, or 

regulatory system in this area. It may therefore be appropriate, in 

connection with thinking about specific policies for human cloning in the United States, to initiate discussions of a national policy for these related arenas. Doing so might allow us to regard 

the question of embryo research in its full scope, and to consider 

it together with the closely related issues that arise when the 

techniques of assisted reproduction come together with those of 

genetic diagnosis and potential genetic engineering. In putting 

forward its recommendations in the next chapter, the Council 

will take into account this broader context of related biotechnologies. 
180 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Yet, much as it would be desirable to consider public policy regarding human cloning in its larger context, it is for us also necessary to consider it on its own. Owing to the immediate concern over the prospect of cloning-to-produce-children, legislative 

proposals and public debate have largely treated the subject of 

human cloning in isolation—though for reasons we have noted, 

it has overlapped with the controversy about embryonic stem 

cell research. Accordingly, the policy options presented below 

are drawn for the most part from the ongoing public and legislative debate about human cloning, and therefore direct themselves to legislative alternatives regarding cloning in particular. 

B. A Legislative Complication

There is a complication that bedevils prospects for legislation regarding human cloning. Given that human cloning may be used 

for two very different purposes—to produce children and for 

biomedical research—one might think that these two different 

uses could be treated independently, just as we have done (for 

the most part) in the ethical analyses in Chapters Five and Six. 

The ethical issues of cloning-to-produce-children and cloningfor-biomedical-research differ considerably, and, as our own discussions have indicated, one’s moral assessment of the second 

can be independent of one’s moral assessment of the first. Some 

people who oppose cloning-to-produce-children may favor cloning-for-biomedical-research; some people who oppose producing embryos solely for research may object less forcefully to 

cloning-to-produce-children (should it ever become safe to attempt it). And people who oppose both uses may differ as to 

which they think is the worse. Given these variations, it would 

seem sensible to disaggregate the two forms of cloning and develop independent public policies for each. 

But this is easier said than done. The reason is simple: both 

forms begin in the same way with the act of cloning (by somatic 

cell nuclear transfer [SCNT]) that produces a cloned human embryo. It is therefore difficult—perhaps impossible—to craft a 

public policy regarding one use of cloned human embryos that 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 181

does not, at least tacitly but usually explicitly, also affect the 

other. A thoroughgoing attempt to prevent cloning-to-producechildren by banning the first step would also prevent cloningfor-biomedical-research. An attempt to promote cloning-forbiomedical-research might well have consequences for cloningto-produce-children (for example, by improving the technique or 

by increasing the likelihood of attempts to initiate a pregnancy). 

An attempt to prevent cloning-to-produce-children at the step of 

transfer of a cloned embryo to initiate a pregnancy would tacitly 

approve the initial creation of cloned embryos for other purposes. Moreover, by imposing penalties on implantation while 

sanctioning creation, a policy that banned only transfer to a 

uterus would in effect require, by law, that cloned human embryos be destroyed. 

Even if one thinks only of the task of statutory drafting, the difficulty persists. For if one wants to make a particular action illegal, one must specify precisely the act to be proscribed. It turns 

out to be very difficult to specify precisely and unambiguously 

the forbidden act of human cloning without touching both uses 

at once. “It shall be unlawful to attempt to clone a human being” 

is simple enough to say, but vexing to specify. The meaning of 

the term “human being” is contested: does it mean only a child 

or adult, or is an embryo too a human being, albeit in its primordial stage? The definition of “to clone” must specify either the 

initial act of somatic cell nuclear transfer or the birth of a cloned 

child. “Attempting to clone” will mean either somatic cell nuclear 

transfer itself or the transfer of the resulting cloned embryo to a 

woman’s uterus. 

There is, of course, one possible policy approach that could disentangle the two uses of human cloning, but it would require 

dealing with cloning-for-biomedical-research in a different context. Since cloning-for-biomedical-research is one form of embryo research—another is research that uses embryos produced 

by IVF—one could have a broad policy on all embryo research, 

which would then necessarily apply to research with cloned embryos. Several states have separate laws that cover research on all 

human embryos, cloned or not. In these cases, a law to deal with 
182 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

the special practice of cloning-to-produce-children could then be 

added without difficulty. And, as we have indicated, in the 

United Kingdom and several other countries, there is a broad 

regulatory system for handling all activities involving human 

embryos—both for research and for initiating pregnancies—into 

which further regulations regarding cloned embryos may easily be 

fit. But the legislative debates in Congress, both in 1998 and in 

2001-2002, have not squarely addressed independent treatment 

of embryo research in general and cloning-for-biomedicalresearch in particular. That fact shapes our examination of specific public policy options.

III. Public Policy Options: 

Specific Alternatives 

What sort of policy regarding human cloning would be most appropriate in this country at this time? In approaching the various 

alternatives, we operate on the following premises. 

First, given the seriousness of the subject, we favor a policy that 

makes an explicit and considered decision about whether to proceed. Should our society come to have no rules or guidelines regarding human cloning, it should do so deliberately, not by default. 

Second, we need to decide whose decision and responsibility this 

should be. And while we may differ among ourselves on the answer to this question, we agree that whichever persons, institutions, or agencies of government have authority for the decision 

and any subsequent oversight, the responsible parties should be 

answerable to and held accountable by the people and their representatives. This is not an arena where secrecy or lack of accountability should be tolerated. 

Third, whether one opts for permission with or without regulation or for legislative proscription, permanent or temporary, we 

believe that the following two balancing principles should be followed: (1) Because of the gravity of the issues at stake, whoever 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 183

 

bears the power of decision needs to be persuaded that we 

should now proceed with human cloning, in either or both of its 

forms. (2) At the same time, we should not stand in the way of 

proceeding simply out of some vague fear of possible future 

harms of unknown magnitude; we should interfere only if the 

harms are deemed serious, important to the common good, and 

likely to occur. 

A. Federal or State Jurisdiction? 

We begin, as we should in America, by examining human cloning in the context of our constitutional system and, in particular, 

of our special form of federalism. In short, we must consider 

which level of government has jurisdiction. Human cloning is 

not obviously a federal concern, nor is it plainly outside the jurisdiction of the states; thus it might be presumed to be a matter 

for regulation by the states alone. Certainly a number of states 

have moved to legislate in this area. As of this writing, twentytwo state legislatures have considered bills on cloning, and six of 

them have passed laws on the subject. Of these, five directly or 

indirectly prohibit both forms of human cloning, while one prohibits only cloning-to-produce-children.*

 It is possible to argue 

that human cloning is one of those many issues, essentially local 

in nature, that call more or less exclusively for the exercise of local self-government, which in the American system means primarily government by the states. And yet, a number of factors 

point to the need to consider a federal policy as well. 

For one thing, as we hope the foregoing chapters have made 

clear, human cloning-to-produce-children has nationwide implications, with potentially profound effects on individuals, families, and all of society. This view is reflected in the efforts in 

* As of June 2002, three states (Iowa, Michigan, and Virginia) ban both cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research. Two states 

(Louisiana and Rhode Island) ban cloning-to-produce-children, but also have 

embryo-research laws that appear to prohibit cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

One state (California) has banned cloning-to-produce-children until December 31, 2002, but has no embryo-research law and thus effectively permits 

cloning-for-biomedical-research. 
184 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Congress to legislate on the subject, first in 1998 and again in 

2001 and 2002. President Clinton made clear, in his executive 

order on human cloning,2 that he regards it as a federal issue; and 

President Bush has done likewise in several public statements.3

For another thing, the federal government plays an extensive 

role in funding and regulating scientific research. Insofar as there 

has been a role for government in the oversight of scientific 

work in America, it has generally been filled by the federal government, for reasons of scale and efficacy and also to some extent of historical accident. So long as this remains the case, questions relating to the funding and regulation of human cloning 

will, in practice, be addressed mostly or even solely at the federal 

level. 

Moreover, it can be assumed that, if they remain legally permissible, both forms of human cloning would tend to enter into interstate commerce, thus bringing them within the purview of 

Congress, at least as far as its power to regulate interstate commerce allows. 

Historically, when several or most of the states have proscribed 

some activity they regard as injurious to public health, safety, or 

morals (such as prostitution or the use of narcotic drugs), the 

federal government has tended to enact laws supportive of the 

states’, or most of the states’, moral proscriptions, either by restricting interstate commerce (as in the Mann Act relating to 

prostitution) or even by directly prohibiting the activity itself (as 

in the Federal Controlled Substances Act). Since the states have 

begun to act on human cloning, it has become valid therefore to 

ask whether federal legislation is also needed. 

Finally, human cloning has become a subject of international 

law. A number of nations have moved to prohibit one or both 

forms of human cloning, and the United Nations is currently 

debating whether to promulgate an international convention to 

ban cloning-to-produce-children. Since only the federal government can make treaties or conduct foreign policy for the whole 

nation, it seems likely that at some point the United—and not 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 185

 

merely the separate—States will be under pressure to legislate on 

this subject. 

For some or all of these reasons, we think it reasonable to conclude that human cloning, of either variety, is a fit subject for 

debate and action at the federal level.*

B. Seven Basic Policy Options 

With respect to each form of human cloning, cloning-toproduce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research, there are 

two basic alternatives: permit or prohibit. For each of these alternatives, there are again two further possibilities: permit with 

or without regulation; prohibit indefinitely (“ban”) or for a limited time (“moratorium”). (The alternative “permit with regulation” might or might not make permission contingent upon getting the regulatory system in place beforehand.) Among the numerous permutations and possibilities, we now take up seven basic 

policy options that have been publicly discussed and that appear 

to us worthy of consideration: 

 

• Policy Option 1: Professional self-regulation 

with no legislative action (“self-regulation”). 

• Policy Option 2: A ban on cloning-to-producechildren, with neither endorsement nor restriction of cloning-for-biomedical-research 

(“ban plus silence”). 

* We prescind from trying to determine at length whether federal legislation 

limiting human cloning would infringe on what some believe is a fundamental 

constitutional right to attempt to procreate. Nor will we try to offer our own 

legal opinion about whether the Food and Drug Administration has existing 

authority that would enable it to regulate either or both forms of human cloning. These questions we are content to leave to others. Instead we proceed 

here on the assumption that, whatever the precise state of the law, Congress 

may (and we would argue, should) take the lead in determining federal cloning 

policy.
186 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

• Policy Option 3: A ban on cloning-to-producechildren, with regulation of the use of cloned 

embryos for biomedical research (“ban plus 

regulation”). 

• Policy Option 4: Governmental regulation, perhaps by a new federal agency, with no legislative prohibitions (“regulation of both”). 

• Policy Option 5: A ban on all human cloning, 

whether to produce children or for biomedical 

research (“ban on both”). 

• Policy Option 6: A ban on cloning-to-producechildren, with a moratorium, or temporary 

ban, on cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban 

plus moratorium”). 

• Policy Option 7: A moratorium, or temporary 

ban, on all human cloning, whether to produce children or for biomedical research 

(“moratorium on both”). 

In considering each of these options, we bear in mind four basic 

questions: (1) How would the policy be enforced and by whom? 

(2) On what moral opinions, and on what views of the role of 

government, is it based? (3) What are the arguments in favor? (4) 

What are the possible objections? To avoid needless repetition, 

where two options are very similar we refrain from repeating the 

same arguments at great length, and instead focus on the major 

new points worthy of note. 

* * * 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 187

Policy Option 1: Professional self-regulation with no legislative action (“selfregulation”). 

This option would enact no new legal restraints on human cloning, and rely instead on self-regulation and private decision making. Passing no law on the subject would maintain the legal 

status quo; it would leave in place the existing moratorium on 

federal funding for either form of human cloning, while also 

leaving private parties free to use private funds to conduct either 

form of human cloning, as they see fit, consistent with state law. 

This approach would let physicians and patients decide privately 

whether to engage in cloning-to-produce-children* It would rely 

upon the people actually engaged in cloning-for-biomedicalresearch to establish a mechanism for self-regulation and to prevent abuses. And it could utilize tort liability to deter tragedies 

and mishaps, by holding people legally responsible for harms inflicted upon a cloned child or his or her mother. 

This approach assumes that neither form of human cloning 

poses moral or practical dangers sufficient to require public action. It assumes that the harms of cloning-to-produce-children 

are not so grave as to merit a legal restriction, and it sees no 

harm, or at least negligible harm, in cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. It also assumes that government’s role in regulating 

scientific research and reproductive medicine should be minimal; 

that federal legislation may cause more harms than it prevents; 

that self-regulation provides sufficient safeguards against the 

worst abuses of cloning practices; that the subject is so complex 

that the people best qualified to regulate it are the experts in the 

field themselves; or that any more restrictive policy is unlikely to 

succeed and likely to drive scientific talent overseas to more 

permissive jurisdictions. 

 

* The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has stated that attempts to clone 

humans would come under its jurisdiction. But this assertion of regulatory 

authority has never been tested, and might well be disputed if it were invoked 

in practice. The FDA has never attempted to regulate the human uses of IVF 

embryos. 
188 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

This hands-off approach would seem to ignore the widespread 

public and congressional support for a ban on cloning-toproduce-children, as evidenced in the July 31, 2001, vote in the 

House of Representatives, where nearly every member voted for 

some kind of federal ban on at least one form of human cloning. 

Of this option, it may be asked: Is cloning-to-produce-children 

so morally unproblematic that we could safely leave people free 

to try it? Would tort liability really be sufficient to deter abuses? 

And can we afford a laissez-faire policy on what is surely only 

the first of a series of powerful new genetic technologies? For 

those who answer “no” to any of these questions, it will be necessary to seek another option. 

Policy Option 2: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with neither endorsement nor restriction of cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban plus silence”). 

A second option would be to prohibit cloning-to-producechildren but remain silent on cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

Such a policy would prohibit the implantation rather than the 

creation of cloned human embryos. By remaining silent on the 

question of creating cloned human embryos, this approach 

would not establish an oversight mechanism or other means of 

keeping track of cloned embryos or otherwise preventing implantation before the act itself is undertaken. It would therefore 

probably not require a new enforcement agency; enforcement of 

the ban would presumably fall to the Department of Justice. 

This approach assumes that cloning-to-produce-children is sufficiently unacceptable as to merit legal prohibition, but minimizes 

or sets aside the disputed question of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. It seeks to balance the responsibility for establishing 

public control over potential misuses of technology with public 

tolerance for competing worldviews and interests. It permits potentially valuable medical and scientific research to go forward. It 

preserves the current federal embryo-research policy, which (1) 

permits all embryo research to proceed unimpeded with private 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 189

funds, (2) permits research on certain embryonic stem cell lines 

to proceed under federal guidance with public funds, and (3) 

leaves open, for continued debate, the question of whether there 

should be public funding for embryo and embryonic stem cell 

research. 

Against this option, it can be argued that it is not possible for the 

government to be neutral on the question of cloning-forbiomedical-research. It is difficult, if not impossible, to write a 

statute banning the act of implanting cloned embryos without 

tacitly sanctioning the creation of the cloned embryos in the first 

place. Thus, a ban on cloning-to-produce-children not accompanied by a prohibition on cloning-for-biomedical-research would 

put the government in the position of allowing the creation of a 

class of (cloned) human embryos and then effectively mandating 

their destruction (or at least their perpetual preservation in cold 

storage), a class of (cloned) human embryos that it would be a 

felony to try to keep alive to birth. Also such a partial ban could 

arguably make cloning-to-produce-children more likely to occur. 

After all, without a regulatory system in place to keep track of 

and govern the use of cloned human embryos, the ban on implantation would be difficult to monitor and enforce. The commercial production of embryos for research would be protected 

by industrial secrecy. The transfer of cloned embryos to begin a 

pregnancy would be virtually undetectable and protected by doctor-patient confidentiality. Those charged with monitoring and 

enforcing the ban on cloning-to-produce-children would not 

know who is doing what with cloned human embryos. Moreover, actually enforcing the ban in the event of a violation would 

be nearly impossible. Once a clonal pregnancy has begun, there 

would be no real remedy except a forced abortion, an untenable 

option. 

Policy Option 3: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with regulation of 

the use of cloned embryos for biomedical research (“ban plus regulation”). 

This option would be similar to Option 2 (“ban plus silence”), 

but in place of silence would require the establishment of a sys-
190 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

tem of oversight and regulation of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. These functions would be carried out by a regulatory 

agency (new or existing) authorized to do some or all of the following things: 

1. Establish what may and may not be done with cloned 

human embryos once they are created, including a prohibition on implantation of cloned human embryos into 

human, animal, or artificial wombs. 

2. License and conduct prior review of all research involving cloned embryos. 

3. Establish guidelines for the protection of all human subjects participating in the research, including donors of 

eggs and nuclei. 

4. Register and track each individual cloned human embryo. 

5. Establish the number of days beyond which a cloned 

human embryo may not be grown in vitro, and enforce 

this requirement. 

6. Monitor and regulate financial transactions regarding 

cloned embryos and human oocytes used in cloning-forbiomedical-research. 

7. Monitor corporate, academic, and industrial cloning-forbiomedical-research, check for compliance, and enforce 

sanctions against violations of regulations. 

To be effective, such a regulatory structure would have to be applied to both federally funded and privately funded research. Its 

first purpose would be to facilitate the ban on cloning-toproduce-children, by keeping close track of all research using 

cloned human embryos. Its second aim would be to enforce certain general standards for the handling and use of cloned human 

embryos, to ensure that they are not created for frivolous pur-
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 191

poses, used irresponsibly, or treated in ways that go beyond what 

American society deems morally acceptable. 

This option assumes that neutrality on the question of cloningfor-biomedical-research is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, 

it assumes that a system is needed to regulate and limit the use of 

cloned embryos—both in the interest of preventing cloning-toproduce-children, and in the interest of establishing a clear ethical framework for undertaking cloning-for-biomedical-research 

and allowing that research to flourish. At the same time, such a 

system would establish clear rules and limits to prevent abuses—

for example, experimentation on later-stage embryos and fetuses 

or attempts to produce cloned children. 

This new task could be assigned to an existing regulatory agency 

(or combination of agencies), such as the Food and Drug Administration or the National Institutes of Health, or, alternatively, it could be carried out by a new regulatory agency devised 

specifically for the purpose. 

Establishment of a regulatory structure may be aided by the 

study of models in other countries, such as the United Kingdom’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 

or the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency being brought into 

existence in Canada—taking into account, of course, the important differences between their political, economic, and healthcare systems and our own. 

Regulation, for these proponents, would limit the uses of cloned 

embryos to especially promising and worthy biomedical research 

and would set boundaries beyond which such embryos may not 

be grown or exploited. For some proponents of this option, 

such oversight and regulation would be aimed primarily at preventing the use of cloned embryos to produce children. For others, regulation is called for to ensure that cloned human embryos 

be treated not simply as a natural resource but with appropriate 

measures of respect owed them as human embryos. 
192 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Against this option can be raised some of the same objections 

that were raised against Option 2 (“ban plus silence”), namely, 

that it puts the government in the new position of requiring the 

destruction of nascent human life, and that it could, by allowing 

the production of cloned human embryos, make cloning-toproduce-children more likely. It might also be argued against this 

option that setting up a workable regulatory structure is either 

impossible or impossible to do very quickly. After all, the IVF 

and assisted-reproduction industry is today largely unregulated in 

any way that could be called coordinated, comprehensive, or systematic. The federal government has no experience in regulating 

or keeping track of the number and fate of embryos produced in 

IVF clinics.* And the biotechnology industry has shown little enthusiasm for outside regulation. Establishing an effective regulatory regime could take several years of trial and error, during 

which time cloned embryos might be mishandled or implanted 

in an effort to produce children. There are also the dangers that 

regulatory bodies often prove ineffective and unaccountable and 

that they are vulnerable to capture by special interests that have a 

large stake, economic or other, in their regulatory decisions but 

little incentive to respect the permanent and aggregate interests 

of the nation. Establishing the regulatory body overseeing human cloning-for-biomedical-research within the National Institutes of Health, for example, would not be reassuring to those 

who worry that the fate of the embryo will always be subordinated to the imperative for research. In this view, regulation is 

not enough. 

Policy Option 4: Governmental regulation, perhaps by a new federal agency, 

with no legislative prohibitions (“regulation of both”). 

This option is similar to the regulatory half of Option 3 (“ban 

plus regulation”), but the regulatory agency would have authority 

to set policy and guidelines also regarding cloning-to-producechildren. In addition to the functions listed in the description of 

 

* The FDA has never attempted to regulate the practice of IVF, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or embryo research conducted with IVF-produced embryos. 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 193

Option 3, the regulatory body would determine if and when human cloning techniques were sufficiently safe to warrant attempts to produce children by human cloning. The entity might 

also function as a licensing agency, setting down clear guidelines 

delineating acceptable and unacceptable purposes for such a 

practice (for example, it might choose to permit cloning to “replace” a deceased child but not to “replicate” a famous athlete). 

The major argument for this option is flexibility: as the science 

and technology of human cloning proceeds in nonhuman animals, and as the public’s views develop in response to new information and new debates, the nation will not be locked into a 

legislatively defined position that might later appear to have been 

misguided. Either a congressional ban or the refusal to enact a 

ban may prove to be a decision that will later look undesirable 

and yet difficult to undo. 

Against this option are many of the same objections raised 

against the regulatory part of Option 3. Also, it may be argued 

that, given our society’s strong moral opposition to cloning-toproduce-children, any decision to permit such a practice, even in 

exceptional cases, should not be left to a regulatory body; it 

should rather require a decision by people directly accountable to 

the voters. This option fails that test. 

Policy Option 5: A ban on all human cloning, whether to produce children 

or for biomedical research (“ban on both”). 

This option would ban the initial act of human cloning—the 

production of cloned human embryos—regardless of the intended purpose. It would thus prohibit both forms of human 

cloning. 

Specifically, this approach would proscribe the act of producing 

cloned human embryos by means of SCNT. Although enforcing 

the ban would be the responsibility of law enforcement agencies—as would enforcing a ban on cloning-to-producechildren—the “policing of laboratories” would hardly be neces-
194 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

sary. Financial and criminal penalties, along with the inability to 

publish, patent, or profit from (the now illegal) work involving 

cloned human embryos, would by themselves eliminate nearly all 

incentive to clone. The ban would deter by subjecting to prosecution and social stigma any researchers or institutions whose efforts to create cloned human embryos came to public attention. 

As we have seen in previous chapters, some proponents of this 

option argue that the creation, use, and ultimate destruction of 

cloned human embryos solely for research is morally unacceptable, either in itself or because of its moral consequences. Others 

hold that a ban only on the transferring of cloned embryos to a 

woman’s uterus, even with additional regulations, would fail to 

prevent the cloning of a child, and that human cloning must be 

comprehensively stopped before it starts. Also, any regulatory 

arrangements that allowed cloning-for-biomedical-research 

within legally established limits would put the federal government 

in the novel and morally troubling position of mandating the destruction of nascent life. 

In favor of this approach it can be argued that a “ban on both” 

would steer scientists toward less morally troubling (and, in the 

view of some, more medically promising) forms of biomedical 

research. Indeed, some argue that pursuing cloning-forbiomedical-research might actually hurt those patients whom it 

claims to help, by diverting valuable resources away from more 

promising areas of research or more urgent health-care needs. By 

taking this option, some proponents argue, America would send 

a strong signal of moral leadership to the rest of the world, 

where the human cloning question is also currently being debated. 

Against this option it is frequently and vigorously argued that 

prohibiting cloning-for-biomedical-research would cut off a 

promising avenue of medical research. It is also argued that forbidding such research here may simply drive American talent 

overseas and thus diminish American scientific preeminence and 

economic strength. 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 195

Policy Option 6: A ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with a moratorium, 

or temporary ban, on cloning-for-biomedical-research (“ban plus moratorium”).

This option would impose a permanent legal prohibition on 

cloning-to-produce-children, by banning the creation and subsequent transfer of cloned embryos into a woman’s uterus. At the 

same time, it would also prohibit the creation of cloned human 

embryos for any reason, but would require a mandatory review 

of that latter prohibition after a certain period of time (for example, five years). This option would lock in a permanent ban 

on the activity virtually everyone opposes (cloning-to-producechildren), while calling for continued and enlarged debate on a 

question about which people currently differ (cloning-forbiomedical-research). 

The main benefits of a moratorium on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch are that it would (1) allow time for research in related 

fields to proceed and perhaps clarify the potentially unique benefits of cloning-for-biomedical-research or discover superior alternatives that would make cloning-for-biomedical-research unnecessary; (2) allow time for a regulatory structure—whether 

narrow or broad in scope—to be developed, if deemed desirable; 

and (3) allow time for further debate and deliberation about the 

moral questions, to determine if the prohibition on cloning-forbiomedical-research should be renewed, made permanent, or 

abandoned after the moratorium expires. Rightly understood, a 

moratorium should not be seen as an attempt to stall, but as an 

opportunity to figure out the wisest way to proceed. And for 

those interested in exploring and establishing regulatory arrangements, a moratorium, as a de jure halt, would provide prospective researchers with an incentive (otherwise lacking) to recommend moral and legal guidelines before the moratorium 

would expire and be up for possible renewal. 

This option separates cloning-to-produce-children from cloningfor-biomedical-research. It therefore would enable policymakers 

to take up the question of cloning-for-biomedical-research in the 
196 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

larger context of the embryo-research question, rather than in 

the narrower context of human cloning. 

This option captures much of the current public debate, in 

which there is general agreement on the need to prohibit cloning 

for producing children, but a great deal of uncertainty over the 

proper approach to cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

The arguments against this option are the same as those leveled 

against Option 5 (“ban on both”), namely, that prohibiting cloning-for-biomedical-research, even for a limited time, would cut 

off a promising avenue of medical research and simply drive 

American talent overseas. Others may object that the two uses 

of human cloning might hereafter be delinked, a prospect that 

troubles some for both practical and moral reasons (laid out in 

the discussion of the next option). 

Policy Option 7: A moratorium, or temporary ban, on all human cloning, 

whether to produce children or for biomedical research (“moratorium on 

both”). 

The final option is a temporary form of Option 5 (“ban on 

both”), with a mandatory review of the policy after a certain period of time (for example, five years). 

The main benefits of this option are the same as those listed 

above for Option 6 (“ban plus moratorium”). But this option 

has what some consider the additional virtue of keeping the two 

uses of cloning linked in the policy arena. This has, they say, two 

major benefits. 

First, on practical grounds, the policy on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch will bear heavily on the feasibility and efficacy of any 

ban on cloning-to-produce-children, and therefore there is an 

advantage in ensuring that the two are considered together. Because the availability of cloned embryos would make enforcement of the ban on cloning-to-produce-children more complicated and demanding, a ban on cloning-to-produce-children 
Chapter Seven: Public Policy Options 197

should never be de-coupled from an identical ban on cloningfor-biomedical-research. 

Second, on moral grounds, some argue that permitting the creation of cloned human embryos for research crosses an important 

line, and that one use of cloned embryos should not be separated fully from the other in public consideration. They hold 

that human cloning is a single thing, and therefore should be 

taken up whole. They are concerned that, at the end of the 

moratorium outlined in Option 6, the situation would be transformed into Option 2 (“ban plus silence”) or Option 3 (“ban 

plus regulation”), with all the deficiencies that they think these 

permissive options would hold. For this reason, these opponents 

argue, it is more appropriate for both forms to be considered together at the end of the moratorium period, even if the eventual 

resulting policy does not treat them equally. 

Once again, the arguments against this option are the same as 

those leveled against Option 5 (“ban on both”) or Option 6 

(“ban plus moratorium”)—that it would cut off, at least temporarily, a promising avenue of medical research and drive American talent overseas. In addition, some may object that linking the 

two uses of cloning misrepresents the state of the public discussion on the subject and places cloning-for-biomedical-research in 

the wrong context—causing it to be considered always as a form 

of cloning, rather than as a form of embryo research. 

Finally, some do not want to forgo the present opportunity to 

enact a permanent ban on cloning-to-produce-children; failure to 

do so now, they argue, would seem to imply that cloning-toproduce-children may one day be perfectly acceptable. 

* * * 

Having sketched out what we consider to be the most plausible 

options, we now proceed to offer our own policy recommendations and our reasons for them. 
198 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ENDNOTES 

1 Presentation made by Dr. Patricia Baird, chair, Royal Commission on New 

Reproductive Technologies, at the June 2002 meeting of the President’s 

Council. Transcript available at the Council’s web site, www.bioethics.gov. 

2 Clinton, W.J., “Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for 

Cloning of Human Beings, March 4, 1997” In Weekly Compilation of Presidential 

Documents (Volume 33, Number 10), p. 281. Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1997. 

3 Bush, G.W., “Remarks on Human Cloning Legislation, April 10, 2002” In 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Volume 38, Number 15), pp. 608-

610. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002. 
199 

Chapter Eight

Policy Recommendations 

The Council’s formation of its policy recommendations is 

shaped by the following considerations: 

First, our recognition of both the scientific and technological and 

the human and ethical contexts of human cloning, considered in 

Chapters One through Four. 

Second, our awareness that human cloning is but a small part of a 

large and growing field of biomedical science and technology 

based on the convergence of developmental biology and genetics; and our awareness that this field offers relief for human disease and suffering while impinging also upon human procreation 

and family life, regard for nascent human life, and the relations 

between science and society. 

Third, our ethical assessments of cloning-to-produce-children 

and cloning-for-biomedical-re-search, as presented in Chapters 

Five and Six. 

Fourth, our ethical and prudential assessment of the strengths 

and weaknesses, benefits and harms, of the various policy options, as presented in Chapter Seven, including a serious effort to 

judge—in the face of unavoidable ignorance about what the future may bring—what will likely be gained and what will likely be 

lost should we pursue one path rather than another. 

Fifth, our assessment of recent congressional efforts to develop 

national legislation on human cloning, and the reasons for their 

failures to date. 
200 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Sixth, our respect for the strongly held moral views of those with 

whom we do not agree, both on the Council and in the larger 

society. 

Seventh, our desire to seek a wise and prudent course of action 

that does justice to our deepest moral concerns while preserving 

our nation’s thriving biomedical science and technology. 

I. The Council’s Points of Departure in 

Formulating Policy Recommendations

(a) The Council regards the country’s public policy decision 

about human cloning as a matter of great moment. It is important not only for its effect on the prospects of human cloning 

but also for what it will say about our democratic society’s ability to govern the course of technological innovation and use in 

the name of things we as a nation hold dear. 

(b) The Council is unanimous in opposing cloning-to-producechildren. We hold that the likely harms and injustices to prospective cloned offspring and the women involved, as well as to 

their families and the broader society, are sufficiently great and 

sufficiently likely as to justify governmental action to prevent 

cloning-to-produce-children. 

(c) Two general approaches have thus far been proposed by 

those seeking to prevent cloning-to-produce-children. The first 

would stop the process at the first step by banning the creation 

of any cloned embryos. The second would stop the process at 

the initiation of a pregnancy by banning the transfer of a cloned 

embryo into a woman’s uterus (or other gestational environment). If the question of cloning-to-produce-children were 

considered in isolation, the first and stricter ban would be most 

prudent: if it were illegal to produce cloned embryos, they 

would be less likely to be created and hence less likely to be 

available for attempts at pregnancy. But such a comprehensive 

ban would preclude cloning-for-biomedical-research, research 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 201

favored by most scientists and patient advocacy groups, but 

about which the public is deeply divided. 

(d) Regarding the ethics of cloning-for-biomedical-research, the 

Council is of many minds. Among Members who approve the 

practice—all of whom strongly endorse the worthiness and importance of the research and its enormous potential for medical 

therapies—a few approve it unconditionally and with enthusiasm, but more approve it with moral concern. Among the latter 

are a few Members who, though approving it in principle, are 

reluctant at this time to approve it in practice, for one or more 

of the following prudential reasons: the current lack of sufficient scientific evidence to sustain claims of the unique value of 

cloned embryos for the desired researches; the absence of proper 

regulatory institutions and mechanisms to enforce regulations, 

held by these Members to be a prerequisite for allowing the research to go forward; and an unwillingness to alienate large 

numbers of our fellow citizens who oppose this research on 

moral grounds. 

Among Members who disapprove of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch, most oppose it permanently because they think it is 

immoral to create human embryos for purposes that are foreign 

to the embryos’ own well-being and that necessarily require 

their destruction. Others oppose such cloning permanently because they hold that society (and not only the embryos) will suffer irreversible moral harm by crossing the boundary that allows 

nascent human life routinely to be treated as a natural resource. 

Some Members oppose permitting the practice because they 

fear that it will greatly increase the likelihood that cloning-toproduce-children will occur or because they think that a law 

banning only the transfer of a cloned embryo into a woman’s 

uterus would be unenforceable. Some Members oppose the 

practice also because they think that the scientific case for proceeding has not yet met the burden of showing why this research is necessary and of sufficient importance to justify crossing 

the moral barrier of creating nascent human life for the purpose 

of experimentation. 
202 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

(e) Were we to indicate where we stand on the ethical and prudential assessments of the two forms of human cloning, each considered independently, we would line up as follows: 

 Permit Now 

 (with Regulation) Moratorium Ban

To produce children 0 0 17 

For biomedical research 7* 3 7

Where we stand on the public policy options—in which both cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research are 

necessarily considered together—we shall indicate below, in our recommendations. 

(f) The Council notes that research on stem cells, both embryonic and adult, is still in its very early stages. Work with both 

embryonic and non-embryonic stem cells has led to some very 

promising results,† and it is impossible to predict which avenues 

of research will prove most successful in providing basic knowledge of disease processes and tools for regenerative medicine. It 

is likely that different diseases or research problems will require 

different approaches. The Council also notes that the possible 

benefits of cloning-for-biomedical-research are, at the present 

time, uncertain and undemonstrated. There is little evidence 

from animal experimentation to indicate, one way or the other, 

whether work with embryonic stem cells derived from cloned embryos offers unique benefits not otherwise available. Only further 

research can answer these questions. These uncertainties about 

 

* This group includes some Members who would make the permission to 

proceed contingent upon the prior institution of strict regulations and a 

mechanism for enforcing them, and some Members who would allow the 

regulations to be developed as the research proceeds. 

† The embryonic stem cells in these studies were obtained from non-cloned human embryos, produced by IVF. 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 203

the future should cut in two directions. They should temper 

claims of medical miracles just around the corner, placing a high 

demand for cautious accumulation of evidence. They should also 

temper assertions that biomedical researchers can pursue their 

goals without using human embryos because other approaches 

that are morally nonproblematic will surely prove successful. 

(g) The Council notes, with special emphasis, that proposals to 

engage in cloning-for-biomedical-research necessarily endorse 

the creation of (cloned) human embryos solely for the purpose of such 

research. Public policy that specifically promoted this research 

would thus explicitly and officially approve crossing a moral boundary.*

(h) The Council also notes that, at the present time, human embryo research proceeds unregulated in commercial biotechnology companies and with local oversight in university-based laboratories (under the governance of institutional review boards 

[IRBs], whose oversight is generally stringent). In addition, federally funded research on human embryonic stem cell lines is 

now proceeding, under guidelines established by the National 

Institutes of Health pursuant to President Bush’s decision of 

August 9, 2001. Any legislative action on human cloning, including cloning-for-biomedical-research, would not directly affect 

this other valuable research, including all research on embryonic 

stem cells derived from IVF embryos. In addition, a ban on 

cloning-for-biomedical-research would leave undisturbed the 

freedom that scientists (in the private sector) now have to create 

embryos solely for research by means of IVF, a practice that 

lacks official sanction and that has drawn public criticism but 

that is nonetheless legal (except in those few states that have 

banned this practice). 

 

* The National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended that federal 

agencies not fund research involving the derivation or use of human embryonic stem cells from embryos made solely for research purposes or using SCNT. 

(NBAC, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, Vol. I, 1999, Recommendations 3 and 4, pp. 71-72.) 
204 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

(i) Finally, in viewing congressional efforts in 1998 and in 2001-

2002 to enact a legislative ban on human cloning, the Council 

notes the failure to enact a ban on cloning-to-producechildren—a ban that nearly everyone supports—because of irreconcilable differences between the supporters of cloning-forbiomedical-research and the opponents of any research that destroys (cloned) human embryos. Failure to prohibit cloning-toproduce-children, especially after protracted debate on the issue, 

amounts tacitly to public willingness to allow this practice to remain legal. We are accordingly interested in seeking a policy proposal that would, among other things, overcome this impasse. 

Below are the two alternative proposals to which Council Members have given their support. 

* * * 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 205

-

 

II. First Proposal

Ban on Cloning-to-Produce-Children, Moratorium 

on Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research (Policy Op

tion 6 of Chapter Seven). 

Call for a federal review of current and projected 

practices of human embryo research, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, genetic modification of human embryos and gametes, 

and related matters, with a view to 

recommending and shaping 

ethically sound policies 

for the entire field.

We recommend a congressionally enacted ban on all attempts at cloning-toproduce-children and a four-year national moratorium (a temporary ban) on 

human cloning-for-biomedical-research.* These measures would apply everywhere in the United States and would govern the conduct of all researchers, 

physicians, institutions, or companies, whether or not they accept public funding. We also recommend that, during this moratorium, the federal government undertake a thoroughgoing review of present and projected practices of 

human embryo research, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, genetic modification of human embryos and gametes, and related matters, with a view to 

proposing, before the moratorium expires, an ethically acceptable public policy to govern these scientifically and medically promising but morally 

challenging activities. Several reasons converge to make this our recommended 

* Operationally, the legislation could address separately the two uses of cloning and define the prohibited acts as follows. Cloning I: the creation of a 

cloned human embryo by somatic cell nuclear transfer. Cloning II: the creation of a cloned human embryo, produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer, 

followed by transfer into a woman’s (or animal’s) uterus or into an artificial 

womb. It could then declare that: (1) Cloning I shall be unlawful for four 

years from the date of the enactment of this legislation. (2) Cloning II is 

hereby declared unlawful. 
206 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

course of action at the present time. Members of the Council who support 

this recommendation do so for different reasons; some individual Members do 

not endorse all the concurring arguments given below. 

A. Strengths of the Proposal 

1. Bans Cloning-to-Produce-Children 

The strong ethical verdict against cloning-to-produce-children, 

unanimous in this Council (and in Congress) and widely supported by the American people, is hereby translated into clear 

and strong legal proscription. The nation’s moral conviction is 

expressed with force of law through the people’s representatives. 

To be sure, such a ban (like any proscription) could be violated, 

but it could not be violated with impunity. By reflecting the pervasive moral judgment of the community, this ban would also 

serve as a source of moral instruction and a sign that we can exercise some control over the direction and use of biotechnology. 

Moreover, were we at this time to settle for a mere moratorium 

on cloning-to-produce-children, we might lose what may be our 

society’s best chance to get a permanent ban on this practice before it occurs and to declare our opposition to the idea of 

designing and manufacturing our children. We would lose this 

precious opportunity to demonstrate that we are able to practice 

democratic self-rule regarding biotechnology and that we can establish firm guidelines for the moral practice of science and 

technology. 

2. Provides a Highly Effective Means of Preventing Cloning-to-ProduceChildren 

The proposal’s ban on all efforts to produce cloned children is a 

primary goal. The moratorium on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch (while desired by many for its own sake) would also 

provide an additional safeguard against cloning-to-producechildren during the next four years, beyond what would be available in a proposal that banned only the implantation of cloned 

embryos but left cloning-for-biomedical-research unregulated. 

By stopping all human cloning for four years, this proposal 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 207

would prevent the creation of cloned embryos, thus decreasing 

the chances that anyone will be able to attempt to produce a 

cloned child. The moratorium would also permit time to explore 

other effective safeguards against this possibility that might be 

put in place should the moratorium not be reenacted after four 

years. 

3. Calls for and Provides Time for Further Democratic Deliberation 

A true national discourse on cloning-for-biomedical-research has 

not yet taken place. Certainly it has begun. But no consensus has 

been reached, no clear majority has appeared, and only in rare 

cases have the various parties to the debate acknowledged (as we 

have attempted to do in this report) that their opponents are also 

defending important and shared values. The matters at stake are 

too significant to be settled now—either by proceeding with the 

research with minimal delay or by banning the research outright—when the nation is so divided and when the implications 

of proceeding or not proceeding are as yet unclear. Under these 

circumstances, the proper attitude is modesty, caution, and moderation, expressed in a temporary ban to be revisited when time 

and democratic argumentation have clarified the matter. By allowing the debate and deliberation to continue, a moratorium 

would offer the following specific benefits: 

(a) Seeking consensus on crossing a major moral boundary. To decide to 

create nascent human life expressly for the purpose of experimentation and use is to cross a significant moral boundary. It 

goes beyond permitting the use of extra embryos, created for reproductive purposes, that are stored in IVF clinics and otherwise 

destined for destruction. Yet the meaning and moral propriety of 

crossing such a boundary are today hotly contested. Many people believe that even the earliest stages of a new human life 

should be protected against such use and destruction and would 

oppose such a practice at any time. Many others favor permitting 

the practice, but only under conditions of strict governmental 

regulation that would guard against abuses and reflect measured 

respect for the embryonic life that is being sacrificed. Our society needs more time to explore the full moral significance of tak-
208 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ing such a step, to debate the moral and practical issues involved, 

and to seek a national consensus—about all research on early 

human embryonic (and fetal) life (not just that formed through 

cloning techniques). 

(b) Gaining needed scientific evidence. The moratorium on all human 

cloning will allow time for scientists to produce hard evidence 

from cloning research in animals and animal disease models—

evidence not available today. Such evidence, if available, would 

support their present claims regarding the value of cloning-forbiomedical-research, both for understanding normal and disease 

processes and for finding new treatments. The moratorium will 

also provide time to see whether cloning research will be indispensable for these goals or whether there are equally fruitful but 

morally nonproblematic alternatives to cloning, (such as, for example, work with adult stem cells or multipotent adult progenitor cells or work that would solve the transplant rejection problem for tissues derived from ordinary embryonic stem cell lines). 

(c) Promoting fuller and focused public debate, leading to a better-informed 

decision. For people who believe that the human embryo must not 

be violated, and who would therefore advocate a permanent ban 

on cloning-for-biomedical-research, this moratorium offers a 

partial step in what they deem to be the right direction, and an 

opportunity to make further progress through moral persuasion 

and political action. By preventing cloning-for-biomedicalresearch for a while, this proposal takes seriously their warnings 

of possible harms from allowing such research. But it also calls 

on them to make those warnings more concrete and convincing, 

by arguing their case in the proper context of embryo research in general

and not just that of cloning. Meanwhile, those who now do (or 

later might) support cloning-for-biomedical-research would also 

find benefits in this moratorium. It would allow them the opportunity to make their full case and win over new supporters, to 

prepare the ground properly (using new scientific evidence) for 

agreement on the merits of research when the time to decide 

comes, and to devise safeguards against likely abuse and misuse. 

The public decision made after the moratorium expires would be 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 209

better informed and more fully considered as a result of such 

debate. 

(d) Preserving a decent respect for the deep moral concerns of our fellow citizens. A large number of Americans, perhaps even a majority, 

hold that it is deeply immoral to create what they regard as new 

human life for the purposes of experimental research that involves the destruction of that life. We should be very reluctant to 

ride roughshod over these views and to practice contempt for 

our fellow citizens, especially for the sake of promised benefits 

that are at this point highly uncertain and speculative, and especially when the necessity of this approach to the treatment of disease has not been demonstrated and when the public debate has 

been so brief. A moratorium will enable us to respect and assess 

these moral concerns while we look to science to provide alternatives that do not require crossing this moral boundary. Should 

the community decide, after the ongoing deliberation made possible by the moratorium, to cross it, no group would have 

grounds to complain that its views had been treated with contempt. Also, we could have in the meantime established new 

boundaries and devised effective regulations that could give 

genuine assurance that additional and more problematic practices would be forestalled or avoided altogether. 

4. Provides Time and Incentive to Develop Adequate Regulation Regarding 

Human Cloning 

Because of the widespread concern to prevent cloning-toproduce-children, those who support cloning-for-biomedicalresearch bear the burden of devising and instituting adequate 

oversight and regulatory mechanisms that would effectively reduce the risk that embryos cloned for research might be used in 

efforts to produce cloned children. In addition, regulatory guidelines and mechanisms, devised and installed in advance, are 

called for regarding cloning-for-biomedical-research itself. Because everyone has a stake in how nascent human life is treated, 

serious efforts are necessary to protect the public interest. Cloning-for-biomedical-research, if and when it is to be allowed, must be preceded 

by the formulation of proper rules and the institution of effective safeguards.
210 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

Devising effective regulatory instruments takes time, and a 

moratorium could afford regulation proponents that time. 

Equally important, in the absence of a moratorium, few proponents 

of the research would have much incentive to help institute an effective regulatory system. And a governmental policy simply to withhold federal 

funding pending the development of a regulatory regimen would 

have no effect on the conduct of this research in the private sector. The following matters, at a minimum, would need to be 

considered by any serious program of regulation: 

(a) Comprehensive scope. Regulations that would cover all cloning 

research, whether done with public or private funds, whether 

done in universities, private research institutes, assisted reproduction clinics, or biotech companies. 

(b) Protections for egg donors. Regulations governing the safety and 

consent of the oocyte donors, with safeguards against improper 

inducements and exploitation of poor or otherwise vulnerable 

women.

(c) Transparency and accountability. Regulations permitting full public 

knowledge and scrutiny of what is being done with cloned embryos produced for research purposes.*

* Careful consideration should be given to the following matters: licensing requirements to engage in such research; accurate inventory and reporting of 

the numbers, uses, and fates of all cloned embryos; decisions about whether 

to permit the buying and selling of cloned human embryos; rules governing 

commerce or traffic in cloned human embryos, should it be allowed; patent 

law questions regarding cloned human embryos, blastocysts, and later stages 

of cloned human organisms; age and stage of embryonic development beyond 

which it would be impermissible to maintain and experiment upon cloned 

embryos; rules regarding the permissibility of growing cloned human embryos 

in animal hosts or artificial substitutes for a human or animal uterus; regulations concerning cloned human-animal chimeras (for example, human nuclei 

placed in animal oocytes); guidelines specifying the kinds of experiments that 

may be performed on the cloned embryos; guidelines regarding production 

levels and storage of cloned embryos; and, finally, effective institutional 

mechanisms—designed to prevent easy capture by cloning researchers or biotech companies—for monitoring cloning activities, enforcing the rules, and 

penalizing violators. 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 211

(d) Equal access to benefits. Guidelines to promote equal access to 

the medical benefits that flow from such research. 

The very process of proposing such regulations would clarify the 

moral and prudential judgments involved in deciding whether 

and how to proceed with this research, as well as how cloningfor-biomedical research relates to other areas of embryological, 

reproductive, and genetic experimentation. 

5. Calls for and Provides Time for a Comprehensive Review of the Entire 

Domain of Related Biotechnologies 

A moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research would enable 

us to consider this activity in the larger context of research and 

technology in the areas of developmental biology and genetics. 

The practices of human embryo research and preimplantation 

genetic diagnosis are largely unregulated by the federal government, or regulated in a haphazard, uncoordinated way. These 

practices, along with those of assisted reproduction, are largely 

unstudied: we lack comprehensive knowledge about what is being done, with what success, at what risk, under what ethical 

guidelines, respecting which moral boundaries, subject to what 

oversight and regulation, and with what sanctions for misconduct or abuse. If we are to have wise public policy regarding 

these scientifically and medically promising but morally challenging activities, we need careful study and sustained public moral 

discourse on this general subject, and not only on specific narrowly defined pieces of the field. To achieve this goal, the moratorium here proposed should be accompanied by a concerted review of the entire field, with the aim of establishing permanent 

institutions to advise and shape federal policy in this arena. 

The President’s Council on Bioethics stands ready to undertake 

the preliminary steps of such a process and to provide advice on 

further steps. As part of our ongoing inquiry, we intend to continue to study various models of oversight and regulation of 

biomedical research and technology, both professional and governmental, that are used in the United States and abroad. As the 

necessary efforts will likely lead beyond the authority, scope, and 
212 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

 

perhaps also the duration of this advisory Council,*

 we shall be 

especially interested in recommendations for devising a more 

permanent national agency or institution, with broad oversight, 

advisory, and decision-making authority,† that could emerge before the expiration of the four-year moratorium here proposed. 

Such a body could provide much-needed understanding and national guidance on these vitally important subjects. Progress toward creating such a body would ratify and perpetuate the deliberative goals of the moratorium. 

6. Provides Time to Garner Long-Term Respect and Support for Biomedical Research and to Reaffirm the Social Contract between Science and Society 

A moratorium, rather than a lasting ban, signals a high regard for 

the value of biomedical research and an enduring concern for 

patients and families whose suffering such research may help alleviate. By providing time to consider whether and how regulations might govern research in this morally troubling area, the 

moratorium invites the scientific, medical, and industrial communities into the activities of devising boundaries that they 

themselves would willingly respect. Such responsible behavior of 

biomedical researchers would go a long way to protect them 

against a public backlash should some less responsible scientists 

or technologists engage in practices repugnant to community 

standards or should some of their experiments result in great 

harm to some human subjects. It would reaffirm the principle 

that science can progress while upholding the community’s 

moral norms. It would reassure researchers that any public moral 

* The President’s Council on Bioethics is currently chartered through November 2003. 

† In thinking about this process we think it will be helpful to consult the work 

of the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. The 

process by which that Commission arrived at its final conclusions, and its 

manner of presenting those conclusions (carefully taking into account voluminous public testimony and dissenting opinions) strike us as providing an 

excellent model worthy of study and, to the extent appropriate, emulation. 

The scope, principles, structure, and functions of the proposed Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada seem to us worthy of special attention. 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 213

restrictions on their activities will be rare, strictly limited, and 

carefully drawn. It would reassure the community that there is to 

be no slippery slope toward significant interference with the 

progress of beneficial biomedical research, the treatment of human diseases, or the moral uses of biomedical technologies. Friction between scientists and the wider community, aggravated by 

precipitate decision, would be reduced. The community’s moral 

support for science and biomedical technology would be reaffirmed, and, as a result, the long-term interests of patients, families, and the entire society could be better served. 

B. Some Specifics for the Legislation 

Drafting the legislation that would give effect to this proposal 

lies beyond the scope and competence of the Council. Yet the 

following considerations would seem to be indispensable for a 

well-drafted and effective statute. 

1. Broad Coverage

The ban and moratorium should cover everyone, corporations as 

well as individuals, private as well as public institutions. 

2. Narrowly Drafted

The statute should be very narrowly drafted, making sure that 

only the human cloning actions in question are proscribed, and 

indicating explicitly other research and assisted-reproduction 

practices that will not be in any way affected by the ban or moratorium. 

3. Temporary 

Regarding the moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

in the event that Congress takes no further action after four 

years, the moratorium should lapse. 
214 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

C. Conclusion 

The proposal we recommend is, admittedly, a compromise, requiring some give on both sides of the national debate if it is to 

be enacted. But it is by no means merely a compromise. On the 

contrary, it is perfectly warranted by the state of public opinion 

and justified by the supreme value in our democracy of informed 

and deliberate decision in matters of great moment. If enacted, it 

would establish a permanent ban on cloning-to-producechildren, a practice that the nation overwhelmingly opposes. 

And it would not prematurely settle the equally important question of cloning-for-biomedical-research. 

As already noted, this proposal accurately reflects the state of the 

public discussion of human cloning. There is broad agreement 

that cloning-to-produce-children should be banned, but there is 

deep disagreement and uncertainty regarding whether and how 

to proceed with cloning-for-biomedical-research. Such uncertainty calls for more discussion, more data, and more time—

things a moratorium would provide. In proposing the combination of a ban on cloning-to-produce-children and a moratorium 

on cloning-for-biomedical-research, we do not imply that we 

hold one form of cloning to be worse than the other, but rather 

that the state of the public debate is such that a clearly-agreedupon course of action presents itself in the one case, but more 

time and deliberation are called for in the other. Even some of 

us who see merit in proceeding with cloning-for-biomedicalresearch worry that cloning-for-biomedical-research may turn 

out to be morally worse than cloning-to-produce-children, at 

least in magnitude, especially should it lead to a routinized practice of embryo cultivation and the growth of nascent human life 

for body parts. But given the present state of the public discussion and the dearth of scientific evidence, the Council has not 

reached consensus on how to formulate a permanent policy on 

this matter at this moment, and the American people are apparently divided on the subject. 

The proposal we have offered is not just an acknowledgement of 

the current lack of consensus. It is intended to advance the dis-
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 215

cussion toward an informed decision by forcing both sides to argue for their positions clearly and openly. A moratorium means 

that neither side would be free to cling to the status quo and 

avoid presenting its full case for public discussion. 

On the one hand, the moratorium would permit and require the 

research community to provide the public with more information about the desirability and necessity of the research, and to 

indicate how it can go forward within proper limits and respectful of communal norms. It will also provide time and incentive 

for researchers to seek out and invest in alternative technological 

approaches that are morally nonproblematic. It may well be that 

when Congress revisits the issue after the moratorium expires, 

the facts on the ground may show no unique or compelling need 

for cloning-for-biomedical-research, and morally nonproblematic alternatives may have been discovered. Yet the ban on cloning-to-produce-children would remain in place regardless of 

what happens on the research front. 

On the other hand, the moratorium would permit and require 

the community concerned about defending the inviolability of 

embryonic human life to continue the moral argument in the 

hope of persuading the broader society to desist. That argument, 

we point out, has to be about embryo research in general, and 

not just about cloned embryos in particular. With cloning-toproduce-children prohibited and hence off the table, the debate 

could focus honestly and fully on this central question. 

We acknowledge the concerns raised by opponents of this proposal, who worry that even a four-year moratorium on cloningfor-biomedical-research cuts off urgently needed investigation, 

and that prominent scientists may be tempted to leave the 

United States for countries without such restrictions on cloning 

research. These are understandable worries, but we believe they 

are misplaced and are not sufficient to force an immediate decision on this subject. 

First, the promise of this research is for now purely speculative, 

and no significant evidence from animal research has presented 
216 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

itself that might demonstrate that this (to many people) morally 

disquieting or objectionable practice is in fact necessary for the 

goals that researchers aim to serve, or that adult stem cells cannot provide equally good models for studying inherited diseases, 

or that other routes are not more effective in addressing the 

transplant rejection problem. 

Second, there is more to this matter than scientific and medical 

progress. We ask proponents to recognize the moral hazards that 

such research would be unleashing. Treating nascent human life 

as a natural resource (or even, more respectfully, as a human resource to which we ought to feel indebted) is morally troubling, 

and there is a clear and present danger that it could lead us down 

a path where our reverence for life may be imperiled. We would 

therefore ask proponents of this research and the public-at-large 

to keep these moral concerns in mind as we try to develop a 

sound public policy for the whole area of embryo research. We 

think that the moratorium provides needed time to do this right. 

Finally, while it is possible that a few scientists will leave the 

country if a moratorium is enacted, the vast majority will not. 

We have examples at the state and national levels (for instance, 

Michigan and Germany) where highly restrictive laws banning all 

human cloning have been enacted yet where the biotechnology 

industry is thriving. We have confidence that this robust field 

will continue to grow, including the area of stem cell research 

from sources other than cloned embryos (Indeed, several other 

countries, including France, Italy, Norway, South Korea, and 

Canada, permit work on embryonic stem cells but do not allow 

cloning-for-biomedical-research). Moreover, succumbing to the 

threat that some researchers might leave would not be a worthy 

way of making such a crucial moral decision. A scientist, like any 

other citizen, may choose to leave the United States for many 

different reasons. But there is no reason to assume that good 

scientists will not be able to work with and within the moral 

boundaries of the communities of which they are members and 

whose blessings and support they enjoy. 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 217

We believe that a permanent ban on cloning-to-produce-children 

coupled with a four-year moratorium on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch would be the best way for our society to express its firm 

position on the former, and to engage in a properly informed 

and open democratic deliberation on the latter. Moreover, combined with a systematic review at the federal level of the general 

field of embryo, reproductive, and genetic research and technology, this proposal would enable our society to think more comprehensively about how we should deal not just with human 

cloning but also with other vitally important areas of biotechnology. Ethical principles and boundaries need to be established; 

regulatory mechanisms need to be considered and devised; and 

ways must be found to give guidance to biomedical researchers 

and technological innovators so that beneficial research may proceed while upholding the moral and social norms of the 

community. The decision before us is of great moment and importance. Creating cloned embryos for any purpose requires 

crossing a major moral boundary, with grave risks and likely 

harms, and once we cross it there will be no turning back. Our 

society should take the time to do it right and to make a judgment that is well-informed and morally sound, respectful of 

strongly held views, and representative of the priorities and principles of the American people. We believe this proposal offers 

the best means of achieving these goals. 

* * * 
218 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

III. Second Proposal

Ban on Cloning-to-Produce-Children, with 

Regulation of the Use of Cloned Embryos 

for Biomedical Research (Policy 

Option 3 of Chapter Seven). 

We recommend a congressionally enacted ban on all attempts at cloning-toproduce-children while preserving the freedom of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. We recommend the establishment of a system of oversight and regulation that would permit cloning-for-biomedical-research to proceed promptly, 

but only under carefully prescribed limits. These measures would apply everywhere in the United States and would govern the conduct of all researchers, 

physicians, institutions, or companies, whether or not they accept public funding. In addition, we recommend that the federal government undertake a 

thoroughgoing review of present and projected practices of human embryo research. Several reasons converge to make this our recommended course of action at the present time. Members of the Council who support this recommendation do so for different reasons; some individual Members do not endorse all the concurring arguments given below. 

A. Strengths of the Proposal 

1. Bans Cloning-to-Produce-Children 

The strong ethical verdict against cloning-to-produce-children, 

unanimous in this Council (and in Congress) and widely supported by the American people, is hereby translated into clear 

and strong legal proscription. The nation’s moral conviction is 

expressed with force of law through the people’s representatives. 

To be sure, such a ban (like any proscription) could be violated, 

but it could not be violated with impunity. By reflecting the pervasive moral judgment of the community, this ban would also 

serve as a source of moral instruction and a sign that we can exercise some control over the direction and use of biotechnology. 

Moreover, were we at this time to settle for a mere moratorium 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 219

 

on cloning-to-produce-children, we might lose what may be our 

society’s best chance to get a permanent ban on this practice before it occurs and to declare our opposition to the idea of 

designing and manufacturing our children. We would lose this 

precious opportunity to demonstrate that we are able to practice 

democratic self-rule regarding biotechnology and that we can establish firm guidelines for the moral practice of science and 

technology.*

2. Provides an Effective Means of Preventing Cloning-to-Produce-Children 

Statutory prohibition on the transfer of a cloned human embryo 

to a woman’s uterus, backed by heavy penalties, would provide a 

sufficient deterrent for anyone contemplating cloning-toproduce-children. Cloned embryos created for research could, it 

is true, possibly get into the hands of those who would attempt 

to use them to produce cloned children. But the regulatory 

mechanisms and guidelines governing cloning-for-biomedicalresearch, provided for by this proposal (see below), will greatly 

minimize the likelihood of such an occurrence. And anyone who 

attempted to clone a child could not claim the credit for any successes without incurring prosecution. Even if slightly less foolproof than a ban that also blocked the creation of cloned embryos, this is a sufficiently effective means for preventing cloning-to-produce-children. 

3. Approves Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research and Permits It to Proceed 

without Substantial Delay 

Here is the major benefit to be obtained from this proposal 

(benefits foreclosed by the First Proposal). This proposal would 

provide clear congressional endorsement of the importance of 

proceeding with cloning-for-biomedical-research. This potentially very valuable research, promising for all the reasons enu-

* On this point and some others to follow, this policy proposal is identical to 

the First Proposal. To indicate this fact, the earlier argument will sometimes 

be repeated in this Second Proposal verbatim. We do so for symmetry and 

balance, and to allow each proposal to be read as a self-contained unit, without relying on the other. 
220 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

merated in Chapter Six, Part III (“The Moral Case for Cloningfor-Biomedical-Research”) could now go forward without substantial delay using human cloned embryos and the stem cells and 

tissues derived therefrom. Uncertainty about the potential of this 

research can only be overcome by doing the research. It will be 

critically important to compare directly the advantages and disadvantages of adult stem cells, embryonic stem cells from IVF 

blastocysts, and embryonic stem cells from cloned blastocysts 

side by side in the same laboratory. Regardless of how much 

time we allow, no amount of experimentation with animal models could provide the essential and urgently needed understanding of human diseases. Moreover, the special and possibly unique 

benefits of stem cell research using cloned embryos (see Chapter 

Six, Part III) cannot be obtained using embryos produced by in 

vitro fertilization. The possible benefits to potentially millions of 

patients are so great that we think they should be pursued as 

soon as possible (under proper guidelines and regulations; see 

next point). While not disturbing the current policy on embryo 

research (which permits federal funding for research only on certain designated stem cell lines), this proposal explicitly eschews 

federal legal bans on new approaches to the revolutionary possibilities of regenerative medicine. 

4. Establishes Necessary Protections against Possible Misuses and Abuses, 

Thus Paying the Respect Owed to Embryos Sacrificed in the Research 

Unlike those human cloning bills, recently considered by Congress, that would permit cloning-for-biomedical-research, this 

proposal takes seriously the special respect owed to nascent human life as well as the moral hazards involved in this research, 

and it proposes concrete steps to prevent or minimize them. 

While such regulation will not satisfy those who believe that all 

such research is morally wrong, it will give concrete expression 

to our view that human embryos are never merely a natural resource, and that the special respect owed to them as human resources must be reflected in limits on what we may do with 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 221

 

them. In addition, such regulation may succeed in assuaging everyone’s worst fears about where this research might lead.*

 

Because of our concern to prevent cloning-to-produce-children, 

we call for adequate oversight and regulatory mechanisms to effectively reduce the risk that embryos cloned for research might 

be used in efforts to produce cloned children. In addition, we 

welcome regulatory guidelines and mechanisms, devised in advance, regarding cloning-for-biomedical-research itself. We agree 

that everyone has a stake in how nascent human life is treated, 

and that therefore serious efforts are necessary to protect the 

public interest. And although we want now to approve cloningfor-bio-medical-research, we agree that it shall not go forward in 

the absence of appropriate regulations and effective mechanisms 

for enforcing them. 

Although this is not the place to draft legislation, the regulatory 

mechanisms we favor would be based on the following principles: 

(a) Prevent cloned embryos from being used to initiate pregnancies. To do 

this, regulations must register, inventory, and track the fate of 

individual cloned embryos; prohibit the shipping or sale of 

cloned embryos (but not stem cells or other tissues or products 

derived from these embryos). 

(b) Provide enforceable ethical guidelines for the use of cloned embryos for research. To do this, regulations must license and conduct prior review of all research involving cloned human embryos; set a definite time limit and developmental stage beyond which a cloned 

human embryo may not be grown, either in vitro or in vivo (we 

suggest fourteen days, or the formation of the primitive streak); 

prohibit the transfer of a cloned human embryo into the womb 

(or other gestational environment) of a human being or an ani-

* See Position Number One of “The Moral Case for Cloning-for-BiomedicalResearch” in Chapter Six and the discussion of Policy Option 3 in Chapter 

Seven for the details of the moral hazards and how specific regulations can 

deal with them.
222 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

mal (or into an artificial equivalent of the same) for research 

purposes; and provide strong penalties to deter unlicensed or 

impermissible research. 

(c) Protect the adult participants in this research. To do this, regulations 

must establish clear regulations for the protection of any human 

egg donors; set rules for financial compensation for egg donation; and establish other relevant measures designed to protect 

against the exploitation of women. 

(d) Promote equal access to the medical benefits that flow from this research. 

To do this, guidelines must be developed that will keep down 

costs of medical therapies made available through this research, 

which would have been explicitly sanctioned by the community 

to serve the health needs of all. 

5. Who Should Regulate This?

Whether done by an existing agency or a new one devised for 

this purpose, the regulatory authority should include scientists, 

physicians, and representatives of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, but also lawyers, ethicists, humanists, 

clergy, and members of the public. In its composition and in its 

activities, every effort should be made to avoid even the appearance of conflict of interest, to prevent capture by special interests, and to ensure that the public’s moral concerns are fully addressed in the devising of the regulations. A special Cloning Research Review Board, appointed by the President, might be one 

way to ensure high visibility and accountability. 

6. Calls for a Comprehensive Review of the Entire Domain of Embryo Research 

The ethical and policy issues regarding cloning-for-biomedicalresearch deserve to be considered in the context of all human 

embryo research. Regulatory mechanisms for cloning-forbiomedical research should be part of a larger regulatory program governing all research involving human embryos. To 

achieve this goal, we recommend that the federal government 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 223

undertake a thorough-going review of present and projected 

practices of human embryo research, with the aim of establishing 

appropriate institutions to advise and shape federal policy in this 

arena. 

B. Some Specifics for the Legislation 

Drafting the legislation that would give effect to this proposal 

lies beyond the scope and competence of the Council. Yet the 

following considerations would seem to be indispensable for a 

well-drafted and effective statute. 

1. Broad Coverage 

The ban on cloning-to-produce-children, as well as the regulations devised for cloning-for-bio-medical-research, should cover 

everyone, corporations as well as individuals, private as well as 

public institutions. 

2. Narrowly Drafted 

The statute should be very narrowly drafted, making sure that 

only the human cloning actions in question are proscribed and 

indicating explicitly other research and assisted-reproduction 

practices that will not be in any way affected by the ban or regulations. 

C. Conclusion 

This recommendation is above all grounded in the importance 

of not needlessly foreclosing or delaying a promising avenue of 

medical research. Permitting cloning-for-biomedical-research 

now, while governing it through a prudent and sensible regulatory regime, is the most appropriate way to allow this important 

research to proceed while ensuring that abuses are prevented. 

Combined with a firm ban on the transfer of cloned embryos 

into a woman’s uterus, as we have recommended, such a policy 

would provide the balance of freedom and protection, medical 

progress and respect for moral standards, always sought in a free 
224 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

society. Most important, it would leave open and endorse an important new avenue of research that might help alleviate the suffering of millions of our fellow citizens. 

We respect and recognize the concerns of many in the public 

and in this Council regarding cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

especially about the need for further deliberation and the necessary safeguards to prevent cloning-to-produce-children. But we 

do not believe that our proposal forecloses continued deliberation. On the contrary, the public process of designing a system 

to regulate cloning-for-biomedical-research is likely to generate 

public discussion about the difficult ethical issues posed by embryo research in general. 

First, the ban we propose on cloning-to-produce-children would 

be a strong deterrent against a practice that the nation overwhelmingly opposes. By stopping, with the force of law, the 

transfer of cloned embryos into a uterus, this ban would effectively prevent the cloning of children. Like any law, the ban we 

propose could be violated, but so too could a more comprehensive ban on all cloning of embryos. Moreover, we believe that 

the sort of regulatory mechanisms we have proposed here would 

provide sufficient protection against the implantation of cloned 

embryos. Research scientists and fertility specialists are not out 

to break the law or violate the moral norms of their communities. They can in general be relied upon to abide by the ban we 

have proposed, and those who violate it can be penalized. 

Second, we believe that the regulatory system we have proposed 

would address those concerns specific to cloning-forbiomedical-research itself. We do not discount these concerns. 

The moral seriousness of working with nascent human life and 

the larger public concern about where this research may lead 

make it imperative, even as a matter of enlightened self-interest, 

for the research community to welcome and participate in the 

regulation of this research. Because the issues at stake are not 

just those of safety and efficacy, but moral and social ones as 

well, the participation of other citizens in these decisions is entirely appropriate. Cooperation with the broader community in 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 225

this matter of public moral concern can only advance the relations between science and technology and the broader society. 

Third, we do not believe that cloning-for-biomedical-research is 

the place to settle the more general question of research on human embryos. That is why we have proposed that the federal 

government review in a systematic way the general field of embryo research, with an eye to devising a possible set of general 

policies or institutions. In the meantime, it seems inappropriate 

to halt promising embryo research in one arena (cloned embryos) while it proceeds essentially unregulated in others. A sensible system of regulation will allow this important research to 

continue safely, while the nation considers a possible general 

policy on all embryo research. 

Last, in answer to the specific concern that our proposal may put 

the government in the position of mandating the destruction of 

human embryos, we point out that those who would be producing the cloned embryos for research would have absolutely no 

intention of keeping them alive beyond the limits needed for the 

research. Hence there would be no occasion when governmental 

interference might be called for to compel unwilling researchers 

to destroy the cloned embryos. Strictly speaking, it would be the 

researchers, not government officials, who would be responsible 

for the destruction of the embryos; the government would not 

be requiring anything that was not already implicit in the research activity itself. True, the government, by enacting this 

legislation, would be accepting the use of cloned embryos for research, but it would be doing so fully mindful of the moral cost, 

for very good reason and under strict guidelines. 

We therefore believe that the legitimate concerns about human 

cloning expressed throughout this report are sufficiently addressed by a ban on cloning-to-produce-children and the regulation of cloning-for-biomedical-research. And we believe that the 

nation should affirm and support the responsible effort to find 

treatments and cures that might help ameliorate or thwart diseases and disabilities that shorten life, limit activity (often severely), and cause great suffering for the afflicted and their fami-
226 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

lies. Finding a way to support such valuable research while preserving moral standards is the challenge that confronts the federal government and the American public in the matter of cloning. We believe our approach offers the best means of achieving 

that goal. 

* * * 
Chapter Eight: Policy Recommendations 227

IV. Recommendation 

After extensive deliberation, Members of the Council have coalesced around the two policy proposals, as follows: 

The following ten Members of the Council form a majority in 

support of the First Proposal: Rebecca S. Dresser, Francis Fukuyama, Robert P. George, Mary Ann Glendon, Alfonso GómezLobo, William B. Hurlbut, Leon R. Kass, Charles Krauthammer, 

Paul McHugh, Gilbert C. Meilaender. 

The following seven Members of the Council form a minority in 

support of the Second Proposal: Elizabeth H. Blackburn, Daniel 

W. Foster, Michael S. Gazzaniga, William F. May, Janet D. Rowley, Michael J. Sandel, James Q. Wilson. 
228 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
229 

Glossary of Terms 

Asexual reproduction 

Reproduction not initiated by the union of oocyte and 

sperm. Reproduction in which all (or virtually all) the genetic material of an offspring comes from a single progenitor. 

Blastocyst 

Name used for an organism at the blastocyst stage of development. 

Blastocyst stage

An early stage in the development of embryos, when (in 

mammals) the embryo is a spherical body comprising an 

inner cell mass that will become the fetus surrounded by 

an outer ring of cells that will become part of the placenta. 

Cloned embryo 

An embryo arising from the somatic cell nuclear transfer 

process as contrasted with an embryo arising from the 

union of an egg and sperm. 

Cloning 

• Cloning-to-produce-children—Production of a cloned human 

embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of initiating 

a pregnancy, with the (ultimate) goal of producing a child 

who will be genetically virtually identical to a currently 

existing or previously existing individual. 

• Cloning-for-biomedical-research—Production of a cloned 

human embryo, formed for the (proximate) purpose of 

using it in research or for extracting its stem cells, with 

the (ultimate) goals of gaining scientific knowledge of 
230 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

normal and abnormal development and of developing 

cures for human diseases. 

• Gene (molecular) cloning—Isolation and characterization of 

DNA segments coding for proteins (genes) using carrier 

pieces of DNA called vectors. 

• Human cloning—The asexual reproduction of a new human organism that is, at all stages of development, genetically virtually identical to a currently existing, or previously existing, human being. 

Chromosomes

Structures inside the nucleus of a cell, made up of long 

pieces of DNA coated with specialized cell proteins, that 

are duplicated at each cell division. Chromosomes thus 

transmit the genes of the organism from one generation 

to the next. 

Cytoplasmic 

Located inside the cell but not in the nucleus. 

Diploid 

Refers to the chromosome number in a cell, distinct for 

each species (forty-six in human beings). 

Diploid human cell 

A cell having forty-six chromosomes. 

Embryo 

1. The developing organism from the time of fertilization 

until significant differentiation has occurred, when the 

organism becomes known as a fetus. 

2. An organism in the early stages of development. 

 

Enucleated egg 

An egg cell whose nucleus has been removed or destroyed. 
Glossary of Terms 231

Epigenetic modification 

The process of turning genes on and off during cell differentiation. It may be accomplished by changes in (a) 

DNA methylation, (b) the assembly of histone proteins 

into nucleosomes, and (c) remodeling of chromosomeassociated proteins such as linker histones. 

Epigenetic reprogramming 

The process of removing epigenetic modifications of 

chromosomal DNA, so that genes whose expression was 

turned off during embryonic development and cell differentiation become active again. In cloning, epigenetic 

reprogramming of the donor cell chromosomal DNA is 

used to reactivate the complex program of gene expression and repression required for embryonic development. 

Eugenics 

An attempt to alter (with the aim of improving) the genetic constitution of future generations. 

Gamete

A reproductive cell (egg or sperm). 

Haploid human cell 

A cell such as an egg or sperm that contains only twentythree chromosomes. 

 

Infertility 

The inability to conceive a child through sexual intercourse. 

In vitro fertilization (IVF) 

The union of an egg and sperm, where the event takes 

place outside the body and in an artificial environment 

(the literal meaning of "in vitro" is "in glass"; for example, in a test tube). 
232 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Mitochondria

Small energy-producing organelles inside of cells. Mitochondria give rise to other mitochondria by copying their 

small piece of mitochondrial DNA and passing one copy 

of the DNA along to each of the two resulting mitochondria. 

Moral status 

The standing of a being or entity in relation to other 

moral agents or individuals. To have moral status is to be 

an entity toward which human beings, as moral agents, 

have or can have moral obligations. 

Multipotent cell

A cell that can produce several different types of differentiated cells. 

Nucleus 

An organelle, present in almost all types of cells, which 

contains the chromosomes. 

Nuclear transfer 

Transferring the nucleus with its chromosomal DNA 

from one (donor) cell to another (recipient) cell. In cloning, the recipient is a human egg cell and the donor cell 

can be any one of a number of different adult tissue cells. 

Oocyte 

Egg. 

Organism

Any living individual animal considered as a whole. 

Parthenogenesis

A form of nonsexual reproduction in which eggs are 

subjected to electrical shock or chemical treatment in order to initiate cell division and embryonic development. 
Glossary of Terms 233

Pluripotent 

A cell that can give rise to many different types of 

differentiated cells. 

Somatic cell (human) 

A diploid cell containing forty-six chromosomes obtained or derived from a living or deceased human body 

at any stage of development. 

Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)

Transfer of the nucleus from a donor somatic cell into 

an enucleated egg to produce a cloned embryo. 

Stem cells 

Stem cells are undifferentiated multipotent precursor 

cells that are capable both of perpetuating themselves as 

stem cells and of undergoing differentiation into one or 

more specialized types of cells. 

Totipotent 

A cell with an unlimited developmental potential, such as 

the zygote and the cells of the very early embryo, each of 

which is capable of giving rise to (1) a complete adult organism and all of its tissues and organs, as well as (2) the 

fetal portion of the placenta. 

Zygote 

The diploid cell that results from the fertilization of an 

egg cell by a sperm cell. 
234 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY
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242 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

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APPENDIX

245 

Appendix

Personal Statements 

The eight chapters, plus Bibliography and Glossary of Terms, constitute the official body of this report. Though it contains expressed differences of opinion, especially in Chapters Six and Eight, it stands as the work of the entire Council. In 

the interest of contributing further to public discussion of the issues, and of enabling individual Members of the Council to speak in their own voice on one or 

another aspect of this report, we offer in this Appendix personal statements from 

those Members who have elected to submit them: 

 Elizabeth H. Blackburn, Ph.D., D.Sc.

 Rebecca S. Dresser, J.D., M.S. 

 Daniel W. Foster, M.D. 

 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Ph.D. 

 Robert P. George, D.Phil., J.D. (joined by Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, Ph.D.) 

 William B. Hurlbut, M.D. 

 Charles Krauthammer, M.D.

 Paul McHugh, M.D. 

 William F. May, Ph.D. 

 Gilbert C. Meilaender, Ph.D. 

 Janet D. Rowley, M.D., D.Sc. 

 Michael J. Sandel, D.Phil. 

 James Q. Wilson, Ph.D. 

* * * 
246 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Professor Blackburn

Why a Moratorium on Cloning-for-BiomedicalResearch Is Not the Way to Proceed 

There are several reasons why a moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research 

(SCNT) is not a logical or productive direction in which to proceed. 

The goal of a moratorium is to wait until something happens, then make a decision. For a moratorium on SCNT (cloning-for-biomedical-research), waiting 

would have several consequences that I do not believe reflect the spirit of much 

of the Council’s opinion. 

First, during any such proposed moratorium, patients will continue to have currently incurable diseases—for which there is now no hope of alleviation—and 

many will continue to die of them. Second, a moratorium is used to gain more 

information. It may sound tempting to impose a moratorium to get more information, since, despite very promising results, it is true, at this early stage of the 

research, that we still know only a little. But that information can only be gained 

by performing the same research that the moratorium proposes to halt. 

It has been proposed that other kinds of research will provide such answers. One 

cannot find out the answers about oranges by doing all the research on apples. 

Some kinds of research on apples will be useful, because it will provide information about generalities that apply to fruit in general. But diseases are very specific, 

and humans are very specific. They share overarching features with other animals, but the very nature of disease is to be particular. Thus, diabetes research 

does not apply to Parkinson’s research. 

Furthermore, it has been proposed that the needed information can be gained 

from research in animal models. However, it is of crucial importance to be aware 

that human diseases are different, in certain specific ways, from their counterpart 

models in animals. This is the case just as the course of development in a mouse 

has overarching similarities to, yet at the same time startling and highly specific 

differences from, the course of development of a human. Hence, animal models, 

while invaluable up to a point, cannot provide the needed information for understanding and treating a human disease. 

Currently, there are excess in vitro fertilization embryos, and it has been proposed that biomedical research on these, if allowed by their parents and those responsible for them, would be adequate for obtaining the types of information 

that could be gained from research that involves SCNT. But first, these excess 

embryos represent only a limited set of genetic backgrounds. They do not represent the wide diversity of genetic and ethnic groups that will be needed if the 

fruits of this research are to be available to all. Second, the limited set of available 

excess IVF embryos would not, of course, represent the very genotypes of per-
Appendix: Personal Statements 247

haps greatest interest: those representing the diseases that are the rightful subject 

of research involving SCNT. A final point concerns why these embryos are in 

excess. It is not only to attempt to ensure success of IVF, but also, in current 

IVF practice, these excess embryos are more often the ones that were judged by 

the IVF clinic professionals as appearing less likely to develop well—which is 

why they were not chosen for implantation in the first place. If they have a 

higher chance of abnormality, this is not the group of embryos that is ideal for 

obtaining the best, most relevant information about development and disease. 

SCNT-derived stem cells could provide other crucial information, in a way impossible for excess in-vitro-fertilized-embryo-derived stem cells. Researchers 

could address, in a clear and experimentally controlled way, a key unknown issue 

about the therapeutic value of stem cell use for regenerative medicine: the immune rejection issue. There are excellent in vitro investigations that could cast a 

lot of much needed light on this area, and could be done only with cells derived 

from the same genetic background—i.e., using stem cells from SCNT. Again, 

this cannot be done with animal models alone, which have been the only source 

of information on this topic to date, because we know that animal models are 

not complete models for many particular biological questions in humans. 

In sum, reliance on excess IVF embryos would severely hobble efforts to gain 

the information that is needed to be able to judge the promise of cloning-forbiomedical-research. Further, the use of IVF embryos in no way facilitates the 

most immediately promising areas of SCNT research, which involve not tissue 

transplantation but rather the development of laboratory tissue that has been 

grown from somatic cells with known genetic mutations that are needed for 

study and for testing of new pharmaceutical interventions. 

Hence, a moratorium, imposed in order to wait for more information that will 

give us a better informed set of facts from which to proceed, is logically flawed. 

The President’s Council on Bioethics currently is proposing two possible policy 

recommendations. Both would ban cloning-to-produce-children. One proposal is 

to proceed with cloning-for-biomedical-research (SCNT) with appropriate regulations; the other is to put it under a four-year moratorium. I support the former 

proposal. 

Some have called for a moratorium pending development of elaborate regulatory 

innovations, such as the creation of a new government body to oversee all this 

research. Unfortunately, such regulations might well never emerge, allowing 

opponents of research to accomplish by administrative delay what they have 

been unable to accomplish through legislation, that is, a de facto ban on SCNT 

research. Furthermore, these proposals ignore the extensive regulation already in 

place. 

Based on the Council’s public deliberations, over half of the Council do not have 

ethical problems with cloning-for-biomedical-research based simply on the status 
248 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

of the embryo. The proposal of a moratorium on SCNT, and not its outright 

ban, by the President’s Council on Bioethics certainly implies that the Council 

deems this research to be important for medical science. A moratorium can only 

be counterproductive to the good that can come out of this research. Rather, the 

thoughtful application of current regulations to all SCNT research and consideration of independent efforts to regulate the market in human gametes will allow 

this research to proceed with its risks minimized and its benefits maximized for 

all. 

ELIZABETH H. BLACKBURN

* * * 
Appendix: Personal Statements 249

Statement of Professor Dresser

Below are my reasons for agreeing with the First Proposal. 

I. Cloning to Have a Child 

The ethical question presented today is not, “if cloning to have a child were safe, 

should it then be permitted?” Instead, the question is whether societies should allow scientists and physicians to conduct research aimed at producing babies 

through cloning. Posing the question this way highlights the research ethics issues raised by this form of cloning. 

A central ethical issue is whether studies of cloning to have a child would present 

a balance of risks (to women, fetuses, children, and society) and expected benefits (to the child, prospective parents, and society) that justifies proceeding with 

human trials. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning observes that high numbers of human 

eggs would be required for this research. Women serving as research subjects 

would be exposed to the risks presented by fertility drugs and egg retrieval procedures. Women would also be exposed to risks associated with gestating a 

cloned fetus. As the NAS report notes, animals pregnant with cloned fetuses 

have had miscarriages and other health complications. If prenatal tests revealed 

problems in the fetus, women would face decisions about pregnancy termination. 

At least initially, human studies would expose children to the risk of disability 

and premature death. Parents and society could face burdens associated with caring for disabled children. Even if further cloning work in other species leads to 

better outcomes, good outcomes would not be assured in humans. 

Added to these risks are the broader ethical concerns raised by cloning to have a 

child, such as psychological harm and objectification of children. Admittedly, 

many children today are born into environments that expose them to serious 

physical, social, and psychic harms. Prenatal and preimplantation screening allow 

parents to exercise deliberate control over children=s genetic makeup. Confused 

and difficult family relations can arise in “natural” family settings and as a result 

of currently practiced assisted reproduction methods. Certain social practices 

may allow and encourage parents to regard children as projects or products. 

What is different about cloning is the array of risks and worries it presents, together with the relatively little that would be gained by developing the procedure. 

Although there are a few cases in which cloning to have a child might be morally 

acceptable, there are not enough of those cases to justify exposing research subjects and others to the harms that could accompany human testing. 

Research on cloning to have children would also consume resources that might 
250 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

otherwise be devoted to more worthwhile projects. The limited resources available to support biomedical research should go to studies relevant to serious human health problems. Responsible companies and scientists ought to devote 

their efforts to research on important health problems, rather than on cloning to 

have children. 

 

II. Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 

Several U.S. court opinions and advisory panel reports assign an intermediate 

moral status to the human embryo. According to these statements, embryos 

should be treated with special respect—not the respect we give to fully developed humans, but more respect than we give to items of property. One difficulty 

with the intermediate status position is that there is little clarity or agreement on 

what it means to treat human embryos with special respect. 

Special respect might mean that embryos ought not be created purely for use as a 

research tool or a therapy to help others. Creating embryos for these purposes 

would represent a significant step beyond allowing the research use of donated 

IVF embryos that would otherwise be destroyed. Creating embryos for research 

would require women to provide eggs for research use. It is possible that payment would be necessary to attract a sufficient number of egg-providers (this 

would depend on the number of eggs needed and the number of women willing 

to donate for altruistic reasons). In this context, women would be helping to 

produce a research tool, rather than helping infertile people to have children. 

Some people believe that creation of cloned and other embryos for research 

would be consistent with the special respect view. In 1994, a majority of the National Institutes of Health Human Embryo Research Panel said that creating embryos for research “for the most serious and compelling reasons” would be permissible. Former President Clinton disagreed with this judgment, however. And 

because panel Members themselves were concerned about the risks associated 

with egg donation, they recommended that eggs for research embryos be obtained solely from women already undergoing IVF for infertility treatment, 

women undergoing gynecological surgery for other reasons, and deceased 

women based on their previous consent or the consent of their next-of-kin. The 

deliberations in 1994 concerned acceptable conditions for government funding 

of human embryo research, but I do not think the participants meant to suggest 

that privately funded research should be evaluated according to wholly different 

moral considerations. 

Because there are legitimate moral concerns raised by the practice of creating 

human embryos for research, I believe it would be premature to endorse cloningfor-biomedical-research. To approve cloning is to approve the creation of embryos as research tools. Past advisory groups and others have expressed sufficient 

reservations about this step to warrant more extensive national deliberation 

about whether it is justified at all and, if so, under what conditions. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 251

I find it hard to reconcile the special respect view with a policy that allows embryos to be created purely as a research tool. I also recognize that some individuals assign a higher moral status to the early embryo. I do not want to endorse a 

practice that many people believe is wrong in the absence of compelling reasons 

to do so. At the same time, I can imagine studies that would offer sufficient 

benefit to patients to justify the creation of embryos for research through cloning 

or other methods. 

For me, an important consideration is whether there are or will be in the near future alternative methods of investigating the relevant scientific questions. With 

regard to potential stem cell therapies, the question is whether cloning will be 

necessary to avoid the immune rejection problem. The NAS report Stem Cells and 

the Future of Regenerative Medicine repeatedly states that additional research in many 

areas is needed to determine whether embryonic stem cells can provide effective 

therapies to patients. A period of research focused on stem cells from donated 

embryos remaining after infertility treatment and on the immune rejection problem in animals could help to clarify whether it is necessary to move to research 

on stem cells from cloned human embryos. As for other types of research that 

might be conducted with stem cells from cloned human embryos, I believe scientists need to explain in more detail the significance of the research questions and 

the reasons why they cannot be investigated using alternative methods. 

The appropriate oversight system is another matter meriting further analysis. In 

my view, proposals to create research embryos should be evaluated by a group 

that includes scientific experts, members of other professions, and ordinary citizens. The review group should include individuals with different positions on the 

moral status of early embryos. Approval should occur only after a rigorous and 

thorough analysis of individual proposals. The review group should require 

strong evidence that a proposal will generate information both relevant to a serious human health problem and not available through alternative research approaches. 

I also believe that the temptation will be strong to extend the time limits for permissible human embryo and fetal research. Events in the past demonstrate that 

the desire to advance knowledge can lead to immoral research practices. Because 

there is likely to be pressure to allow destructive research on developing humans 

past the point at which stem cells can be retrieved, our nation should establish a 

strong moral and policy basis for drawing the line at a particular point in 

development. 

In sum, I believe that a four-year moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research 

is justified for a variety of reasons. A moratorium gives scientists time to gather 

data and develop a stronger account of why it is necessary to obtain stem cells 

from cloned embryos. A moratorium allows Members of this Council and others 

to consider embryo cloning in its broader ethical and policy context and to deliberate about appropriate oversight structures for cloning and related practices. I 

hope that the moratorium also gives members of the public an opportunity to 
252 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

learn more about the actual state of stem cell research. This is truly a promising 

area, but it is far from certain that all or even some of its projected therapeutic 

benefits will materialize. 

Finally, I hope that future public and policy discussions will confront the challenge of providing patients with access to any stem cell therapies that may be developed. Millions of patients in the United States lack access to established health 

care that could improve and extend their lives. People in developing countries 

lack access to the most basic medical assistance. Because helping patients is the 

ethical justification for conducting stem cell and other forms of biomedical research, improved access to existing and future therapies must be part of the national discussion. 

REBECCA S. DRESSER

* * * 
Appendix: Personal Statements 253

Statement of Dr. Foster 

For Proposal Two

I begin by saying that the deliberations of the Council have been from the beginning serious, open and collegial. Although strong differences exist amongst some 

members, these have been expressed in scholarly and dignified fashion, without 

anger or personal attacks. 

I support Proposal 2. The core issues in the discussion have been two. The first 

is “the nature of the embryo” argument. Some supporting Proposal 1 feel 

strongly that from the moment of conception, or the moment of cloning, the 

germ of potential life is so powerful as to render the nascent embryo deserving 

of protection equal to that of a full human. Others believe that respect for the 

embryo, though it is not yet fully human, requires a moratorium to see if alternatives might render cloning unnecessary. There is no doubt that a five or six day 

embryo is potentially human, but it cannot become a human by itself as would 

occur in normal human conception. The one or two hundred cell organism, the 

blastocyst, is neither viable nor feeling; there are no organs and there is no brain. 

There is nothing it can do without external help and implantation. From the 

standpoint of science it is potentially human but biologically pre-human. The 

evidence for this conclusion seems unarguable to me. 

Proponents of Proposal 1, although they may agree with the biological facts, focus on “what might be” for the embryo. If implanted, some of the blastocysts 

from any source might become fully human, a child. However, in natural conception many embryos, perhaps half or more, are deleted in the first trimester. I calculated, using the World Health Organization 2001 estimate of about 360,000 

births in the world each day, and assuming 50 percent implantation possibility, 

that more than 130 million embryos are lost naturally each year. Thus what any 

embryo might become is far from certain. Obviously the philosophical/moral argument of absolute or near absolute sanctity of any embryo cannot be answered 

by the scientific/biological argument. But I hold to the latter. 

The “slippery slope” argument has been extensively discussed and fundamentally 

devolves to the fear or belief that lessons learned in cloning for research and 

therapy would make cloning-to-produce-children easier or more likely to occur. 

That is a legitimate fear, hence the desire by all of us for a ban on cloning-toproduce-children and the demand for regulation of all cloning. 

I believe that biomedical science is a powerful good in the universe. The 

achievements in the prevention and cure of human disease and suffering over the 

past half century have been remarkable. What we know about nature grows daily. 

Stem cell research has great potential to take us further. Is it certain that dramatic 
254 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

health benefits will follow? Of course not. Science is a discipline of uncertainty. 

That is why in my view we should begin the research. I believe we have to compare the stem cells side by side: adult stem cells versus IVF stem cells versus 

cloned stem cells. Then we will know whether the potential is real and what the 

advantages or disadvantages of each cell type might be. Supporters of Proposal 1 

also believe that research is necessary and argue that the moratorium will allow 

research on adult and IVF stem cells. But it eliminates a critical element, the direct comparison by controlled experiments for all three types of potentially 

therapeutic cells. 

I said above that science is a discipline of uncertainty that requires experiments 

to answer questions of truth. It is also a discipline of hope. I believe that Proposal 2 is a very good thing for all those who suffer from disease. It is a decision 

for hope. It is for this reason that I support it. 

DANIEL W. FOSTER

* * * 
Appendix: Personal Statements 255

Statement of Dr. Gazzaniga

Oscar Wilde’s lament, “A man who moralizes is usually a hypocrite,” is a fairly 

rough statement. While I don’t fully subscribe to it, I do believe that it cuts to the 

heart of much of the problematic nature of moralization: the divide that can exist 

between reasoning as reflected in actions in the face of a collection of facts and 

reasoning grounded on little more than a cultural belief system. 

Of course, we are all free to have our views on everything from baseball to embryos. This is a large part of what makes this country great. But moralizers often 

go much further. Frequently, they want you to conform to their views, an agenda 

that I find entirely disturbing, and particularly troubling, when cast in the large, as 

a basis for social and even scientific policy. 

My personal view on these matters is driven by forty years of scientific study on 

how the brain enables mind, which gives me a particular professional perspective 

on how our species forms and maintains its belief systems. This, for better or 

worse, is the lens through which I see these deliberations. 

I disagree with most of the moral reasoning argued in this report. For me it is full 

of unsubstantiated psychological speculations on the nature of sexual life and 

theories of moral agency. In what follows, I state my position on the issue of 

both cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-for-biomedical-research in the 

form of a short essay. I try to capture my own passion for what is at stake. 

Let Science Roll Forward 

 

It was a bright and wintry January day when President Bush convened his advisory panel on bioethics in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. I was excited to be there and our charge was, and is, to see, explicate, and finally advise 

him how to respond to the flood of ethical complexities unearthed by the torrent 

of new biomedical technology. The President implored us to engage in that ageold technique of intellectual dueling that is debate. I was confident that a sensible 

and sensitive policy might evolve from what was sure to be a cacophony of 

voices of scientists and philosophers, representing a spectrum of opinions, beliefs, and intellectual backgrounds. 

It was thus a surprise to me to hear the President’s April speech on cloning. His 

opinions appeared fully formed, even though our panel had yet to finalize a report and still awaited a vote on the singularly crucial point of so-called cloningfor-biomedical-research. While it is true that the President’s position is one held 

by some of the Members of the panel, it is not unanimous, and the panel’s 

charge, the public nature of our panel’s debate, and our national political process 

leave me wanting to make public my own personal view at this time. 
256 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Most people are aware that we no longer see cloning in a simple one-process-fitsall framework. At the very least there are two flavors. Cloning-to-producechildren is that process by which a new human being might be grown from the 

genetic material of a single individual. At this point in our history, no one supports cloning-to-produce-children. It is, by consensus, dangerous, probably not 

even attainable for years, and simply an odd concept. Even if cloning-toproduce-children did succeed in the future, the idea of informing one’s spouse, 

“Let’s go with my genes, not yours,” is bizarre and socially a nonstarter. 

In juxtaposition to cloning-to-produce-children is cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. This is another matter entirely. Cloning-for-biomedical-research is carried out with a completely different set of intentions from cloning-to-produce 

children. Cloning-for-biomedical-research is a bit of a misnomer, but it is the 

term the panel wants to use instead of “therapeutic cloning,” for it is meant to 

cover not only cloning for therapeutics (for such diseases as diabetes, Parkinson’s 

disease, and so on) but also that cloning now deemed necessary for understanding all genetic disorders. This is cloning for the sole purpose of enabling various 

types of lifesaving biomedical research. Perhaps the Council should have called it 

“lifesaving cloning.” 

Intentions aside, it is worth recalling the mechanics of cloning-for-biomedicalresearch. Scientists prefer to call this somatic cell nuclear transfer for a simple 

reason. That is all it is. Any cell from an adult can be placed in an egg whose own 

nucleus has been removed and given a jolt of electricity. This all takes place in a 

lab dish, and the hope is that this transfer will allow the adult cell to be reprogrammed so that it will form a clump of approximately 150 cells called a blastocyst. That clump of cells will then be harvested for the stem cells the clump contains, and medical science will move forward. 

The general public gets confused around this point in a discussion. The confusions come from a conflation of ideas, beliefs, and facts. At the core seems to be 

the idea, asserted by some religious groups and some ethicists, that this moment 

of transfer of cellular material is an initiation of life, and so is the moment when 

a moral equivalency is established between a developing group of cells and a human being. They believe this is true for a normally sexually produced embryo and 

now so too for this new activated cell. This is the point of view that led to the 

President’s view that both cloning-to-produce-children and cloning-forbiomedical-research should be outlawed. But in light of modern biological 

knowledge, is the view that life and moral agency start at the same time reasonable and true? Some think not. 

First, consider embryos. We now know that as many as 50 to 80 percent of all 

fertilized eggs spontaneously abort. Those fertilized eggs are simply expelled 

from the body. It is hard to believe that under any religious belief system people 

would grieve and/or hold funerals for these natural events. Yet, if these unfortunate zygotes are considered human beings, then logically they should. Second, 
Appendix: Personal Statements 257

the process of a single zygote splitting to make identical twins can occur at least 

until fourteen days after fertilization. Thus, how could we possibly identify a person with a single fertilized egg? Additionally, even divided embryos can recombine back into one. The happy result would be a person who has emerged from 

two distinct fertilized eggs but is otherwise just like you and me. The “person = 

zygote” theory would have to say that he is two people! Finally, with respect to 

activated cells, there is no real claim when it all starts because it is not known in 

any detail. 

Because the fertilization process is now understood, it serves as the modern scientific basis for the British position, which does not grant moral status to an embryo until after fourteen days, the time when all the twinning issues cease and the 

point where it must be implanted into the uterus if development is to continue. 

Thus, in Britain, embryo research goes on up to the blastocyst stage only and 

now, most recently, attempts at cloning to the blastocyst stage will be permitted. 

The laboratory-devised blastocyst to be used for cloning-for-biomedical-research, 

the biological clump of cells at issue here, is the size of the dot on this “i.” It has 

no nervous system and is therefore not sentient in any way and has no trajectory 

to becoming a human unless it is re-implanted into a women’s uterus. And yet it 

likely carries the gold for the cure of millions of people. My brother is a general 

surgeon. He has saved hundreds of lives because he was able to transplant hearts 

and livers and kidneys and lungs to others from clinically brain-dead patients. 

The next of kin gave their loved one’s tissue to help others, a practice which is 

condoned by all of society, including Catholics. It seems only right that those 

adults not needing leftover IVF embryos or eggs, neither of which have a brain 

at all, should have the same right to will them for use in biomedical research. The 

no-brained blastocyst that can develop from these tissue gifts, from both IVF 

and biomedical cloning technologies, is ready to help the suffering of brain-alive 

children and adults. 

The President asked us to debate on our opening day. He said, “That’s what I 

want. You haven’t heard a debate until you have heard Colin Powell and Don 

Rumsfeld go at it.” He lets these two trusted aides have it out, and I think he 

made a courageous and wise decision to send in the troops to have at the terrorists who would destroy innocent women and children. Disease does the same. I 

only hope he hears the debate, and then I hope he decides 

to send in the stem cells to root out disease. In the spirit of these times, I too say, 

“Let’s roll.” 

MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA

 

* * * 
258 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Professor George 

(Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo) 

The subject matter of the present report is human cloning, the production of a 

human embryo by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or similar 

technologies. Just as fertilization, if successful, generates a human embryo, cloning produces the same result by combining what is normally combined and activated in fertilization, that is, the full genetic code plus the ovular cytoplasm. Fertilization produces a new and complete, though immature, human organism. The 

same is true of successful cloning. Cloned embryos therefore ought to be treated 

as having the same moral status as other human embryos. 

A human embryo is a whole living member of the species homo sapiens in the 

earliest stage of his or her natural development. Unless denied a suitable environment, an embryonic human being will by directing its own integral organic 

functioning develop himself or herself to the next more mature developmental 

stage, i.e., the fetal stage. The embryonic, fetal, infant, child, and adolescent 

stages are stages in the development of a determinate and enduring entity—a 

human being—who comes into existence as a single cell organism and develops, 

if all goes well, into adulthood many years later.* 

Human embryos possess the epigenetic primordia for self-directed growth into 

adulthood, with their determinateness and identity fully intact. The adult human 

being that is now you or me is the same human being who, at an earlier stage of 

his or her life, was an adolescent, and before that a child, an infant, a fetus, and 

an embryo. Even in the embryonic stage, you and I were undeniably whole, living 

members of the species homo sapiens. We were then, as we are now, distinct and 

complete (though in the beginning we were, of course, immature) human organisms; we were not mere parts of other organisms. 

Consider the case of ordinary sexual reproduction. Plainly, the gametes whose 

union brings into existence the embryo are not whole or distinct organisms. They 

are functionally (and not merely genetically) identifiable as parts of the male or 

female (potential) parents. Each has only half the genetic material needed to 

 

* A human embryo (like a human being in the fetal, infant, child, or adolescent 

stage) is not properly classified as a “prehuman” organism with the mere potential to become a human being. No human embryologist or textbook in human 

embryology known to us presents, accepts, or remotely contemplates such a 

view. The testimony of all leading embryology textbooks is that a human embryo 

is—already and not merely potentially—a human being. His or her potential, assuming a sufficient measure of good health and a suitable environment, is to develop by an internally directed process of growth through the further stages of 

maturity on the continuum that is his or her life. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 259

guide the development of an immature human being toward full maturity. They 

are destined either to combine with an oocyte or spermatozoon to generate a 

new and distinct organism, or simply die. Even when fertilization occurs, they do 

not survive; rather, their genetic material enters into the composition of a new 

organism. 

But none of this is true of the human embryo, from the zygote and blastula 

stages onward. The combining of the chromosomes of the spermatozoon and of 

the oocyte generates what every authority in human embryology identifies as a 

new and distinct organism. Whether produced by fertilization or by SCNT or 

some other cloning technique, the human embryo possesses all of the genetic 

material needed to inform and organize its growth. Unless deprived of a suitable 

environment or prevented by accident or disease, the embryo is actively developing itself to full maturity. The direction of its growth is not extrinsically determined, 

but is in accord with the genetic information within it.* The human embryo is, 

then, a whole (though immature) and distinct human organism—a human being. 

If the embryo were not a complete organism, then what could it be? Unlike the 

spermatozoa and the oocytes, it is not a part of the mother or of the father. Nor 

is it a disordered growth such as a hydatidiform mole or teratoma. (Such entities 

lack the internal resources to actively develop themselves to the next more mature stage of the life of a human being.) Perhaps someone will say that the early 

embryo is an intermediate form, something that regularly emerges into a whole 

(though immature) human organism but is not one yet. But what could cause the 

emergence of the whole human organism, and cause it with regularity? It is clear 

that from the zygote stage forward, the major development of this organism is 

controlled and directed from within, that is, by the organism itself. So, after the embryo 

comes into being, no event or series of events occur that could be construed as 

the production of a new organism; that is, nothing extrinsic to the developing organism itself acts on it to produce a new character or new direction in development. 

But does this mean that the human embryo is a human being deserving of full 

moral respect such that it may not legitimately be used as a mere means to benefit others? 

To deny that embryonic human beings deserve full respect, one must suppose 

that not every whole living human being is deserving of full respect. To do that, 

one must hold that those human beings who deserve full respect deserve it not in 

virtue of the kind of entity they are, but, rather, in virtue of some acquired characteristic that some human beings (or human beings at some stages) have and others 

 

* The timing of the first two cleavages seems to be controlled by the maternal 

RNA within the embryo rather than by its new DNA (see Ronan O’Rahilly and 

Fabiola Mueller, Human Embryology and Teratology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 

1992), 23). Still, these cleavages do not occur if the embryo’s nucleus is not present, and so the nuclear genes also control these early changes. 
260 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

do not, and which some human beings have in greater degree than others.*

We submit that this position is untenable. It is clear that one need not be actually 

conscious, reasoning, deliberating, making choices, etc., in order to be a human 

being who deserves full moral respect, for it is clear that people who are asleep 

or in reversible comas deserve such respect. So, if one denied that human beings 

are intrinsically valuable in virtue of what they are, but required an additional 

attribute, the additional attribute would have to be a capacity of some sort, and, 

obviously a capacity for certain mental functions. Of course, human beings in the 

embryonic, fetal, and early infant stages lack immediately exercisable capacities 

for mental functions characteristically carried out (though intermittently) by most 

(not all—consider cases of severely retarded children and adults and comatose 

persons) human beings at later stages of maturity. Still, they possess in radical (= 

root) form these very capacities. Precisely by virtue of the kind of entity they are, 

they are from the beginning actively developing themselves to the stages at which 

these capacities will (if all goes well) be immediately exercisable. In this critical 

respect, they are quite unlike cats and dogs—even adult members of those 

species. As humans, they are members of a natural kind—the human species—

whose embryonic, fetal, and infant members, if not prevented by some extrinsic 

cause, develop in due course and by intrinsic self-direction the immediately 

exercisable capacity for characteristically human mental functions. Each new 

human being comes into existence possessing the internal resources to develop 

immediately exercisable characteristically human mental capacities—and only the 

adverse effects on them of other causes will prevent their full development. In this 

sense, even human beings in the embryonic, fetal, and infant stages have the basic 

natural capacity for characteristically human mental functions. 

 

* A possible alternative, though one finding little support in current discussions, 

would be to argue that what I am, or you are, is not a human organism at all, but 

rather a nonbodily consciousness or spirit merely inhabiting or somehow “associated with” a body. The problem with this argument is that it is clear that we are 

bodily entities—organisms, albeit of a particular type, namely, organisms of a rational nature. A living thing that performs bodily actions is an organism, a bodily 

entity. But it is immediately obvious in the case of the human individual that it is 

the same subject that perceives, walks, and talks (which are bodily actions), and that 

understands, deliberates, and makes choices—what everyone, including anyone 

who denies he is an organism, refers to as “I.” It must be the same entity that 

perceives these words on a page, for example, and understands them. Thus, 

what each of us refers to as “I” is identically the physical organism that is the 

subject both of bodily actions, such as perceiving and walking, and of mental activities, such as understanding and choosing. Therefore, you and I are physical 

organisms, rather than consciousnesses that merely inhabit or are “associated 

with” physical organisms. And so, plainly, we came to be when the physical organism we are came to be; we once were embryos, then fetuses, then infants, and 

so on. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 261

We can, therefore, distinguish two senses of the “capacity” (or what is sometimes 

referred to as the “potentiality”) for mental functions: an immediately exercisable 

one, and a basic natural capacity, which develops over time. On what basis can 

one require for the recognition of full moral respect the first sort of capacity, 

which is an attribute that human beings acquire (if at all) only in the course of 

development (and may lose before dying), and that some will have in greater degree than others, and not the second, which is possessed by human beings as 

such? We can think of no good reason or nonarbitrary justification. 

By contrast, there are good reasons to hold that the second type of capacity is the 

ground for full moral respect. 

First, someone entertaining the view that one deserves full moral respect only if 

one has immediately exercisable capacities for mental functions should realize 

that the developing human being does not reach a level of maturity at which he 

or she performs a type of mental act that other animals do not perform—even 

animals such as dogs and cats—until at least several months after birth. A sixweek-old baby lacks the immediately exercisable capacity to perform characteristically 

human mental functions. So, if full moral respect were due only to those who 

possess immediately exercisable capacities for characteristically human mental 

functions, it would follow that six-week-old infants do not deserve full moral respect. If one further takes the position that beings (including human beings) deserving less than full moral respect may legitimately be dismembered for the sake 

of research to benefit those who are thought to deserve full moral respect, then 

one is logically committed to the view that, subject to parental approval, the body 

parts of human infants, as well as those of human embryos and fetuses, should 

be fair game for scientific experimentation. 

Second, the difference between these two types of capacity is merely a difference 

between stages along a continuum. The proximate, or immediately exercisable, 

capacity for mental functions is only the development of an underlying potentiality that the human being possesses simply by virtue of the kind of entity it is. The 

capacities for reasoning, deliberating, and making choices are gradually developed, or brought toward maturation, through gestation, childhood, adolescence, 

and so on. But the difference between a being that deserves full moral respect 

and a being that does not (and can therefore legitimately be dismembered as a 

means of benefiting others) cannot consist only in the fact that, while both have 

some feature, one has more of it than the other. A mere quantitative difference 

(having more or less of the same feature, such as the development of a basic 

natural capacity) cannot by itself be a justificatory basis for treating different entities in radically different ways. Between the ovum and the approaching thousands 

of sperm, on the one hand, and the embryonic human being, on the other hand, 

there is a clear difference in kind. But between the embryonic human being and 

that same human being at any later stage of its maturation, there is only a difference in degree. 
262 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Third, being a whole human organism (whether immature or not) is an either/or 

matter—a thing either is or is not a whole human being. But the acquired qualities that could be proposed as criteria for personhood come in varying and continuous degrees: there is an infinite number of degrees of the relevant developed 

abilities or dispositions, such as for self-consciousness, intelligence, or rationality. 

So, if human beings were worthy of full moral respect only because of such 

qualities, and not in virtue of the kind of being they are, then, since such qualities 

come in varying degrees, no account could be given of why basic rights are not 

possessed by human beings in varying degrees. The proposition that all human 

beings are created equal would be relegated to the status of a superstition. For 

example, if developed self-consciousness bestowed rights, then, since some people are more self-conscious than others (that is, have developed that capacity to a 

greater extent than others), some people would be greater in dignity than others, 

and the rights of the superiors would trump those of the inferiors where the interests of the superiors could be advanced at the cost of the inferiors. This conclusion would follow no matter which of the acquired qualities generally proposed as qualifying some human beings (or human beings at some stages) for full 

respect were selected. Clearly, developed self-consciousness, or desires, or so on, 

are arbitrarily selected degrees of development of capacities that all human beings 

possess in (at least) radical form from the coming into being of the organism until his or her death. So, it cannot be the case that some human beings and not others

are intrinsically valuable, by virtue of a certain degree of development. Rather, 

human beings are intrinsically valuable in virtue of what (i.e., the kind of being) they are; 

and all human beings—not just some, and certainly not just those who have advanced sufficiently along the developmental path as to be able to exercise their 

capacities for characteristically human mental functions—are intrinsically valuable. 

Since human beings are intrinsically valuable and deserving of full moral respect 

in virtue of what they are, it follows that they are intrinsically valuable from the 

point at which they come into being. Even in the embryonic stage of our lives, 

each of us was a human being and, as such, worthy of concern and protection. 

Embryonic human beings, whether brought into existence by union of gametes, 

SCNT, or other cloning technologies, should be accorded the status of inviolability recognized for human beings in other developmental stages. 

Three arguments have been repeatedly advanced in the course of our Council’s 

deliberations in an effort to cast doubt on the proposition that human embryos 

deserve to be accorded such status. 

(1) Some have claimed that the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning shows 

that the embryo in the first several days of its gestation is not a human individual. 

The suggestion is that as long as twinning can occur, what exists is not yet a unitary human being but only a mass of cells—each cell is totipotent and allegedly 

independent of the others. 

It is true that if a cell or group of cells is detached from the whole at an early stage of em-
Appendix: Personal Statements 263

bryonic development, then what is detached can sometimes become a distinct 

organism and has the potential to develop to maturity as distinct from the embryo from which it was detached (this is the meaning of “totipotent”). But this 

does nothing to show that before detachment the cells within the human embryo 

constituted only an incidental mass. Consider the parallel case of division of a 

flatworm. Parts of a flatworm have the potential to become a whole flatworm 

when isolated from the present whole of which they are part. Yet no one would 

suggest that prior to the division of a flatworm to produce two whole flatworms 

the original flatworm was not a unitary individual. Likewise, at the early stages of 

human embryonic development, before specialization by the cells has progressed 

very far, the cells or groups of cells can become whole organisms if they are divided and have an appropriate environment after the division. But that fact does 

not in the least indicate that prior to such an extrinsic division the embryo is 

other than a unitary, self-integrating, actively developing human organism. It certainly does not show that the embryo is a mere clump of cells. 

In the first two weeks, the cells of the developing embryonic human being already manifest a degree of specialization or differentiation. From the very beginning, even at the two-cell stage, the cells differ in the cytoplasm received from 

the original ovum. Also they are differentiated by their position within the embryo. In mammals, even in the unfertilized ovum, there is already an “animal” 

pole (from which the nervous system and eyes develop) and a “vegetal” pole 

(from which the future “lower” organs and the gut develop).* After the initial 

cleavage, the cell coming from the “animal” pole is probably the primordium of 

the nervous system and the other senses, and the cell coming from the “vegetal” 

pole is probably the primordium of the digestive system. Moreover, the relative 

position of a cell from the very beginning (that is, from the first cleavage) has an 

impact on its functioning. Monozygotic twinning usually occurs at the blastocyst 

stage, in which there clearly is a differentiation of the inner cell mass and the trophoblast that surrounds it (from which the placenta develops).†

The orientation and timing of the cleavages are species specific, and are therefore 

genetically determined, that is, determined from within. Even at the two-cell 

stage, the embryo begins synthesizing a glycoprotein called “E-cadherin” or 

“uvomorulin,” which will be instrumental in the compaction process at the eightcell stage, the process in which the blastomeres (individual cells of the embryo at 

the blastocyst stage) join tightly together, flattening and developing an insideoutside polarity.‡ And there is still more evidence, but the point is that from the 

 

* Werner A. Muller, Developmental Biology (New York: Springer Verlag, 1997), 12 f. 

Scott Gilbert, Developmental Biology 5th edition (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinnauer Associates, 1997); O’Rahilly and Mueller, Human Embryology and Teratology, 23-24. 

† O’Rahilly and Fabiola Mueller, Human Embryology and Teratology, 30-31. 

‡ Ibid. 23-24; Keith Moore, and T.V.N. Persaud, Before We Are Born: Essentials of 

Embryology and Birth Defects (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders, 1998), 41; William J. 
264 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

zygote stage forward, the embryo, as well as maintaining homeostasis, is internally integrating various processes to direct them in an overall growth pattern 

toward maturity.*

But the clearest evidence that the embryo in the first two weeks is not a mere 

mass of cells but is a unitary organism is this: if the individual cells within the embryo 

before twinning were each independent of the others, there would be no reason why each would 

not regularly develop on its own. Instead, these allegedly independent, noncommunicating cells 

regularly function together to develop into a single, more mature member of the human species. 

This fact shows that interaction is taking place between the cells from the very 

beginning (even within the zona pellucida, before implantation), restraining them 

from individually developing as whole organisms and directing each of them to 

function as a relevant part of a single, whole organism continuous with the zygote. Thus, prior to an extrinsic division of the cells of the embryo, these cells 

together do constitute a single organism. So, the fact of twinning does not show 

that the embryo is a mere incidental mass of cells. Rather, the evidence clearly 

indicates that the human embryo, from the zygote stage forward, is a unitary, 

human organism. 

(2) The second argument we wish to address suggests that since people frequently do not grieve, or do not grieve intensely, for the loss of an embryo early 

in pregnancy, as they do for the loss of a fetus late in pregnancy or of a newborn, 

we are warranted in concluding that the early embryo is not a human being worthy of full moral respect.

The absence of grieving is sometimes a result of ignorance about the facts of 

embryogenesis and intrauterine human development. If people are told (as they 

still are in some places) that there simply is no human being until “quickening”—

a view which is preposterous in light of the embryological facts—then they are 

likely not to grieve (or not to grieve intensely) at an early miscarriage. But people 

who are better informed, and women in particular, very often do grieve even 

when a miscarriage occurs early in pregnancy. 

Granted, some people informed about many of the embryological facts are nevertheless indifferent to early miscarriages; but this is often due to a reductionist 

view according to which embryonic human beings are misdescribed as mere 

“clumps of cells,” “masses of tissue,” etc. The emotional attitude one has toward 

early miscarriages is typically and for the most part an effect of what one thinks—

rightly or wrongly—about the humanity of the embryo. Hence it is circular reasoning to use the indifference of people who deny (wrongly, in our view) that 

human beings in the embryonic stage deserve full moral respect as an argument 

 

Larson, Human Embryology 3rd edition (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 2001), 

18-21. 

* Gilbert, Developmental Biology, 12 f; 167 f. Also see O’Rahilly and Mueller, Human 

Embryology and Teratology 23-24. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 265

for not according such respect. 

Moreover, the fact that people typically grieve less in the case of a miscarriage 

than they do in the case of an infant’s death is partly explained by the simple 

facts that they do not actually see the baby, hold her in their arms, talk to her, 

and so on. The process of emotional bonding is typically completed after the 

child is born—sometimes, and in some cultures, months after the child is born. 

However, a child’s right not to be killed plainly does not depend on whether her 

parents or anyone else has formed an emotional bond with her. Every year—

perhaps every day—people die for whom others do not grieve. This does not 

mean that they lacked the status of human beings who were worthy of full moral 

respect. 

It is simply a mistake to conclude from the fact that people do not grieve, or 

grieve less, at early miscarriage that the embryo has in herself less dignity or 

worth than older human beings. 

(3) We now turn to the third argument. Some people, apparently, are moved to 

believe that embryonic human beings are not worthy of full moral respect because a high percentage of embryos formed in natural pregnancies fail to implant 

or spontaneously abort. Again, we submit that the inference is fallacious. 

It is worth noting first, as the standard embryology texts point out, that many of 

these unsuccessful pregnancies are really due to incomplete fertilizations. So, in 

many cases, what is lost is not actually a human embryo. To be a complete human organism (a human being), the entity must have the epigenetic primordia for 

a functioning brain and nervous system, though a chromosomal defect might 

only prevent development to maximum functioning (in which case it would be a 

human being, though handicapped). If fertilization is not complete, then what is 

developing is not an organism with the active capacity to develop itself to the 

mature (even if handicapped) state of a human. 

Second, the argument here rests upon a variant of the naturalistic fallacy. It supposes that what happens in “nature,” i.e., with predictable frequency without the 

intervention of human agency, must be morally acceptable when deliberately 

caused. Since embryonic death in early miscarriages happens with predictable frequency without the intervention of human agency, the argument goes, we are 

warranted in concluding that the deliberate destruction of human beings in the 

embryonic stage is morally acceptable. 

The unsoundness of such reasoning can easily be brought into focus by considering the fact that historically, and in some places even today, the infant mortality 

rate has been very high. If the reasoning under review here were sound, it would 

show that human infants in such circumstances could not be full human beings 

possessing a basic right not to be killed for the benefit of others. But that of 

course is surely wrong. The argument is a non sequitur. 
266 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

In conclusion, we submit that law and public policy should proceed on the basis 

of full moral respect for human beings irrespective of age, size, stage of development, or condition of dependency. Justice requires no less. In the context of 

the debate over cloning, it requires, in our opinion, a ban on the production of 

embryos, whether by SCNT or other processes, for research that harms them or 

results in their destruction. Embryonic human beings, no less than human beings 

at other developmental stages, should be treated as subjects of moral respect and 

human rights, not as objects that may be damaged or destroyed for the benefit of 

others. We also hold that cloning-to-produce-children ought to be legally prohibited. In our view, such cloning, even if it could be done without the risk of defects or deformities, treats the child-to-be as a product of manufacture, and is 

therefore inconsistent with a due respect for the dignity of human beings. Still, it 

is our considered judgment that cloning-for-biomedical-research, inasmuch as it 

involves the deliberate destruction of embryos, is morally worse than cloning-toproduce-children. Thus we urge that any ban on cloning-to-produce-children be 

a prohibition on the practice of cloning itself, and not on the implantation of 

embryos. Public policy should protect embryonic human beings and certainly not 

mandate or encourage their destruction. An effective ban on cloning-to-producechildren would be a ban on all cloning.*

Although an optimal policy would permanently ban all cloning, we join in this 

Council’s call for a permanent ban on cloning-to-produce-children combined 

with a four-year ban (or “moratorium”) on cloning-for-biomedical-research for 

the reasons set forth by Gilbert Meilaender in his personal statement. It is our 

particular hope that a four-year period will provide time for a careful and thorough public debate about the moral status of the human embryo. This is a debate 

we welcome. 

ROBERT P. GEORGE

ALFONSO GÓMEZ-LOBO

* * * 

 

* A ban on implantation of an existing embryo or class of embryos would be subject to constitutional as well as moral objections. Such a ban would certainly be 

challenged, and the challenge would likely come from a powerful coalition of 

“pro-life” and “pro-choice” forces. A prohibition of the production of embryos 

by cloning would have a far better likelihood of withstanding constitutional challenge than would a ban on implantation. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 267

Statement of Dr. Hurlbut 

In joining with fellow Members of the Council in support of a moratorium on 

cloning for biomedical research, I consider this recommendation not an admission of ambivalence on matters of policy, but a recognition of the difficulty of 

the moral issues involved and an affirmation of the need for further discussion 

and deliberation. Throughout our proceedings it has become increasingly apparent that without clear and distinct moral principles, grounded in scientific evidence and reasoned moral argument, no policy can be effectively formulated or 

enforced. Most specifically, the proposed limitation of fourteen days for research 

on human embryos and the prohibition against implantation appear to be arbitrarily set and therefore vulnerable to transgression through the persuasive promise of further scientific benefit. Clearly, a more thorough and thoughtful consideration of the moral status of the human embryo is warranted. It is in the spirit 

of this continuing discussion that I offer the personal perspectives that follow. 

Introduction 

In pondering the ethics of cloning-for-biomedical-research it is apparent that as 

our science is changing, so is the nature of our moral dilemmas. Each advance 

forces us to think more deeply about what it means to be human. As the scientific focus on genomics moves on to proteomics and now to the early stages of 

the study of developmental biology, we are confronted with the challenge of understanding the moral meaning of human life in its dynamics of change, as both 

potential and process. 

A reasonable anticipation of the likely course of science suggests that concerns 

about cloning are just the beginning of a series of difficult ethical issues relating 

to embryo experimentation and medical intervention in developing life. In addition, advances in developmental biology will open more deeply the dilemmas related to human-animal hybridization, extra-corporeal gestation, and genetic and 

cellular enhancement. Driven by the vast range of research applications and opportunities for clinical interventions in disease and disability (especially the open 

ended possibilities promised by regenerative medicine) this technology will be 

powerfully propelled into the forefront of medical science. 

Given the complex course of science and the drive to its development, any moral 

assessment of cloning-for-biomedical-research (CBR) must describe the central 

human goods it seeks to preserve, the range and boundaries of these values, and 

the broad implications for science and society implied by them. Such an assessment should serve the dual purpose of helping to define the moral dangers while 

clearing the course for the fullest and most open future for scientific investigation and application. 
268 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Moral Principles 

Although there are already numerous promising approaches for research on human development even without cloning-for-biomedical-research (CBR), I believe 

this technology could provide valuable tools for scientific inquiry and medical 

advance. In my judgment, the moral imperative to foster an increase of knowledge and new modes of therapeutic intervention weighs heavily in the equation 

of consideration. Nonetheless, I believe that, as they stand, current proposals for 

CBR will breach fundamental moral goods, erode social cohesion and ultimately 

constrain the promise of advances in developmental biology and their medical 

applications. However, there may be morally acceptable ways of employing CBR 

that could both preserve our commitment to fundamental moral principles and 

strengthen our appreciation of the significance of developing life, while also 

opening avenues of advance less limiting and more promising than the current 

scientific proposals. 

The principle of human life as the fundamental good serves as the cornerstone 

of law for our civilization. In no circumstance is the intentional destruction of 

the life of an innocent individual deemed morally acceptable. Even where a right 

to abortion is given, for example, it is based on a woman’s right not to be encumbered, a right of privacy, not a right to directly kill the fetus.* This valuing of 

human life is indeed the moral starting point for both advocates and opponents 

of CBR. This principle of the inviolability of human life is the reciprocal respect 

that we naturally grant as we recognize in the other a being of moral equivalence 

to ourselves. Although different cultures and different eras have affirmed this 

recognition in varied ways, I will argue that it is reasonable in light of our current 

scientific knowledge that we extend this principle to human life in its earliest developmental stages.

Life as Process 

When looked at through the lens of science, it is evident that human existence 

cannot be defined atemporally, but must be recognized in the full procession of 

continuity and change that is essential for its development. From conception, our 

unique genetic endowment organizes and guides the expression of our particular 

nature in its species and individual character. Fertilization initiates the most complex chemical reaction in the known universe: a self-directing, purposeful integration of organismal development. In both character and conduct the zygote and 

subsequent embryonic stages differ from any other cells or tissues of the body; 

they contain within themselves the organizing principle of the full human organism. 

This is not an abstract or hypothetical potential in the sense of mere possibility, 

 

* If the fetus is delivered alive during an abortion, there is a legal obligation to resuscitate and sustain its life. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 269

but rather a potency, an engaged and effective potential-in-process, an activated 

dynamic of development in the direction of human fullness of being. For this 

reason a zygote (or a clonote) differs fundamentally from an unfertilized egg, a 

sperm cell, or later somatic cells; it possesses an inherent organismal unity and 

potency that such other cells lack. Unlike an assembly of parts in which a manufactured product is in no sense “present” until there is a completed construction, 

a living being has a continuous unfolding existence that is inseparable from its 

emerging form. The form is itself a dynamic process rather than a static structure. 

In biology, the whole (as the unified organismal principle of growth) precedes 

and produces the parts. It is this implicit whole, with its inherent potency, that 

endows the embryo with its human character and therefore its inviolable moral 

status. To interfere in its development is to transgress upon a life in process.*

The argument is sometimes made that potential should not be part of the moral 

equation because of the low probability of successful development of the early 

embryo.†

 This, however, is itself an argument based on potential, in this case the 

lack of potential to develop normally.‡ The fact that life in its early stages is extremely fragile and often fails is not an argument to lessen the moral standing of 

the embryo. Vulnerability does not render a life less valuable. 

Accrued Moral Status 

The major alternative to the view that an embryo has an inherent moral status is 

the assertion that moral status is an accrued or accumulated quality related to 

 

* To recognize a potential as in some sense “actual” and worthy of protection, 

we need only consider how we would react to the intentional sterilization of a 

prepubescent girl when her fertility was only potential yet precious to her larger 

dignity and developmental integrity as a human person. 

† Such an argument might hold some weight if one could argue that a given stage 

of development represents an emergent state in which a relational property is in 

ontological discontinuity with the material from which it emerged. At first consideration, this seems true of all biological systems where the whole reveals properties unpredicted within the parts. The problem in this line of reasoning, however, is that these properties are exactly that to which the whole is ordered and so 

are inherent powers, “actual” within the whole when seen across time. To know 

what a biological being is, we must observe it over time, understand it across its 

life span. It is the essence of life that it is ordered to employ these leaps to emergent states as an agency in development. New realities will emerge; this is established in the potency of the developing organism. 

‡A similar problem arises in clinical medicine. It is crucial that we not equate the 

statistical probability of a specific outcome with the actual prognosis of the individual patient involved. 
270 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

some dimension of form or function. Several arguments have been put forward 

for this position. 

1. Gastrulation

One such accrual argument is based on the idea that before gastrulation (designated as the fourteenth day) the embryo is an inchoate clump of cells with no actuated drive in the direction of distinct development.* It is argued that the undifferentiated quality of the blastocyst justifies its disaggregation for the procurement of stem cells, while the evident organization at gastrulation reveals an organismal integrity that endows inviolable moral status to all subsequent stages of 

embryological development. Scientific evidence, however, supports the argument 

that from conception there is an unbroken continuity in the differentiation and 

organization of the emerging individual life. The anterior-posterior axis appears 

to be already established within the zygote, early cell divisions (at least after the 

eight-cell stage) exhibit differential gene expression† and unequal cytoplasmic 

concentrations of cell constituents suggest distinct cellular fates. This implies that 

the changes at gastrulation do not represent a discontinuity of ontological significance, but merely the visibly evident culmination of more subtle developmental 

processes (at the cellular level) driving in the direction of organismal maturity. 

 

 

* The differentiation of the trophoblast, which will form the extra-embryonic 

membranes, is generally considered as distinct from the embryo itself. More true 

to the nature of life, it might be recognized as an organ of embryogenesis used 

and discarded within the dynamic process of development. Throughout the continuum of human life, from the embryo to the adult, cells, tissues and organs are 

reabsorbed, transcended and transformed. Examples include the umbilical vein 

and arteries (which become supporting ligaments), neurologic cells (more than 

half of which are culled by apoptosis and reabsorption), systems of reflexes (such 

as the moro reflex which is manifest only in infants), immune organs and functions such as the thymus (which shrivels in an adult), and allergies (which change 

throughout life and generally wane in mid-life). We do not just develop and then 

age, but undergo a continuous transformation and fuller manifestation of our organismal nature present within the earliest embryo. 

† In fact, the first several cell divisions after natural fertilization do not require a 

nucleus to be present and therefore may not involve gene expression from the 

newly united bi-parental genetic material. The mRNA essential for protein synthesis at these early stages appears to be generated during the maturation of the 

egg and then remains dormant until after fertilization. This may very well preclude the possibilities of the optimistic but simplistic proposal that merely by 

adding a recipe of cytoplasmic factors essential for reprogramming we could 

transform any cell into a functional zygote. Nonetheless, even without differential gene expression, cytoplasmic studies reveal unequal cytoplasmic distributions, 

and implicit differential cell fates, even at these early stages. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 271

2. Twinning 

Another argument for accrued moral status is that as long as an embryo is capable of giving rise to a twin it cannot be considered to have the moral standing of 

an individual. There is the obvious objection that as one locus of moral status 

becomes two it does not diminish but increases the moral moment. But perhaps 

more substantially, this argument actually supports the notion that crucial dimensions of individuation (and their disruption that results in twinning) are already at 

work in the blastocyst, the stage at which most twinning occurs. Monozygotic 

twinning (a mere 0.4 percent of births) does not appear to be either an intrinsic 

drive or a random process within embryogenesis. Rather, it is a disruption of 

normal development by a mechanical or biochemical disturbance of fragile cell 

relationships that provokes a compensatory repair, but with the restitution of integrity within two distinct trajectories of embryological development.* In considering the implications of twinning for individuation, one might ask the question 

from the opposite perspective. What keeps each of these totipotent cells from 

becoming a full embryo? Clearly, crucial relational dynamics of position and 

intercellular communication are already at work establishing the unified pattern 

of the emerging individual. From this perspective twinning is not evidence of the 

absence of an individual, but of an extraordinary power of compensatory repair 

that reflects more fully the potency of the individual drive to fullness of form. 

3. Implantation 

Some have argued that the implantation of the embryo within the uterine lining 

of the mother constitutes a moment of altered moral status. Implantation, however, is actually a process that extends from around the sixth or seventh day to 

about the eleventh or twelfth day when the uteroplacental circulation is established. This complex circulatory exchange extends the earlier relationship between mother and embryo in which physiological conditions, including the diffusion of essential nutrients, sustained the life and nourished the growth of the developing embryo. Although these early conditions can be artificially simulated as 

in IVF, the delicate balance of essential factors and their effect on development 

(as seen in Large Offspring Syndrome)† is evidence of the crucial contribution of 

 

* The fact that these early cells retain the ability to form a second embryo is testimony to the resiliency of self-regulation and compensation within early life, not 

the lack of individuation of the first embryo from which the second can be considered to have “budded” off. Evidence for this may be seen in the increased incidence of monozygotic twinning associated with IVF by Blastocyst Transfer. 

When IVF embryos are transferred to the uterus for implantation at the blastocyst stage, there is a two to ten-fold increase in the rate of monozygotic twinning, 

apparently due to disruption of normal organismal integrity. It is also interesting 

to note that with Blastocyst Transfer there is a slightly higher rate of male births. 

† In some animal studies, it has been noted that particular components in the 

culture medium in which the embryo is nourished increase the size of the off-
272 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

the mother even in the first week of embryogenesis. Changes in the intricate interrelations between mother and infant cannot be viewed as an alteration of 

moral status, but as part of the ongoing epigenetic process all along the continuum of natural development that begins with conception and continues into infancy. This continuity implies no meaningful moral marker at implantation.*

 

4. Function 

Arguments for a change in moral status based on function are at once the most 

difficult to refute and to defend. The first and most obvious problem is that the 

essential functions (even their minimal criteria and age of onset) are diverse and 

arbitrarily assigned. Generally they relate to the onset of sentience, awareness of 

pain, or some apparently unique human cognitive capability such as consciousness.†

 But if human moral worth is based on actual manifest functions, then does 

more of a particular function give an individual life a higher moral value? And 

what are we to make of the parallel capacities in animals that we routinely sacrifice for food and medical research? Furthermore, what becomes of human moral 

status with the degeneration or disappearance of such a function? While we 

might argue that our relational obligations change along with changes in function, such as occur with senile dementia, we would not sanction a utilitarian calculus and the purely instrumental use of such persons no matter how promising 

the medical benefits might be. The diagnostic requirements of “brain death” for 

removing organs for transplantation, far from being a justification for interrupting a developing life before “brain birth”, actually point to the moral significance 

of potential and the stringency of the criteria for irreversible disintegration and 

death. 

From a scientific perspective, there is no meaningful moment when one can definitively designate the biological origins of a human characteristic such as consciousness. Even designations such as ‘the nervous system’ are conceptual tools, 

reifications of an indivisible organismal unity. Zygote, morula, embryo, fetus, 

child and adult: these are conceptual constructions for convenience of descrip-

 

spring during later stages of gestation. 

* It should be noted that this argument could be used as a counter-argument 

against the disaggregation of the preimplantation embryo, or as a justification for 

the production of more advanced cells, tissues, and organs either through implantation into an artificial endometrium or through natural gestation. 

† In fact, from a scientific perspective, we should have a measure of humility 

when drawing conclusions about moral status from evidence concerning consciousness or capacities involving subjective experience. The fact that consciousness and subjective awareness appear to be mediated by matter does not exhaust 

their mystery. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 273

tion, not distinct ontological categories. With respect to fundamental moral status 

therefore, as distinguished from developing relational obligations, the human being is an embodied being whose intrinsic dignity is inseparable from its full procession of life and always present in its varied stages of emergence. 

A Bright Line at Conception

If the embryo has an inherent moral status that is not an accrued or accumulated 

quality related to some dimension of form or function, then that moral status 

must begin with the zygote (or clonote). Anything short of affirming the inviolability of life across all of its stages from zygote to natural death leads to an instrumental view of human life. Such a revocation of our most fundamental moral 

principle would reverse a long and overarching trend of progress in moral 

awareness and practice in our civilization. From human sacrifice,* to slavery, 

child labor, women’s rights and civil rights, we have progressively discerned and 

prohibited practices that subject the individual to the injustice of exploitation by 

others. The reversal of such a basic moral valuation will extend itself in a logic of 

justification that has ominous implications for our attitude and approach to human existence. This is not a mere “slippery slope,” where we are slowly led 

downward by the ever more desirable extension of exceptions to moral principle. 

It is, rather, a “crumbly cliff” where the very utility of abrogating a basic moral 

prohibition carries such convenience of consequence that the subsequent descent 

is simply practice catching up with principle. 

The inviolability of human life is the essential foundation on which all other 

principles of justice are built, and any erosion of this foundation destabilizes the 

social cooperation that makes possible the benefits of organized society. Medicine is especially vulnerable to such effects since it operates at the intrinsically 

moral interface between scientific technique and the most tender and sensitive 

dimensions of personal reality in the vulnerable patient. As we descend into an 

instrumental use of human life we destroy the very reason for which we were 

undertaking our new therapies; we destroy the humanity we were trying to heal. 

The promise of stem cells lies beyond simple cell cultures and cell replacement 

therapies. The fourteen-day marker will not hold up to logical argument.† The 

 

* The sacrifice of infants for the supposed larger flourishing of life bespeaks the 

potency ascribed to purity and generative potential. 

† The designation of fourteen days as the moral boundary for embryo experimentation is in the category of a “received tradition,” almost a superstition in the 

sense that it is a belief in a change of state without a discernible cause. The validity of this designated moral marker has not been reexamined in the light of recent 

advances in our understanding of developmental biology. As a moral marker of 

ontological change fourteen days makes no sense. Even if one disagrees with the 

discussion above, the date should be set earlier: implantation is complete by the 

twelfth day, the onset of gastrulation occurs between the twelfth and fourteenth 
274 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

technological goal is to produce the more advanced cell types of tissues, organs, 

and possibly even limb primordia. Producing such complex tissues and organs 

may require the cell interactions and microenvironments now available only 

through natural gestation.* The benefits of implanting cloned embryos (either 

into the natural womb or possibly an artificial endometrium) so as to employ the 

developmental dynamics of natural embryogenesis seem self-evident. The implantation of cloned embryos for the production of patient-specific tissue types 

to bypass problems of immune rejection would further extend the logic of the 

instrumental use of developing life. The public pressure that has already been 

brought to bear on the politics of stem cells and cloning by patient advocacy 

groups has provoked such a sense of promise that it may propel the argument 

for allowing implantation of cloned embryos. Different people may have different limits to the duration of gestation they find morally acceptable, but in light of 

the current sanction of abortion up to and beyond the end of the second trimester, it is difficult to argue that creation, gestation and sacrifice of a clone to save 

an existing life is a large leap in the logic of justification. 

A Speculative Proposal

While maintaining a bright line at conception safeguards our most fundamental 

moral principle, the challenge remains to find an acceptable method of drawing 

on the great medical promise of CBR while precluding its use in ways that degrade the dignity of human existence. Some proponents of CBR maintain that 

the laboratory creation of the cloned embryo makes it a “pseudo-embryo” or “artifact,” a product of human technological production.† The problem with this assertion is that, once created, the cloned embryo appears to be no different than 

 

day and twinning is rare after the ninth day. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 

fourteen days is not of current scientific relevance since stem cells can be procured at the four-five day stage and, with present technology, human embryos 

can sustain viability in culture for only eight-nine days. 

* Natural development proceeds within the context of a highly refined spatial and 

temporal niche of organized complexity of positional cues, signal diffusion and 

cell-cell contact between cellular lineages of diverse types. See for example the 

recent article, “Dominant role of the niche in melanocyte stem-cell fate determination” (Nature 25 April 2002). 

† In fact, there will be several (and perhaps numerous) ways to produce cloned 

blastocysts from which stem cells can be harvested. These include: the current 

common method of cloning designated somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or 

nuclear transplantation, embryo splitting, use of animal oocytes as receptacles of 

nuclear transfer, fusion of embryonic stem cells and possibly fetal or adult stem 

cells into existing blastocysts and possibly the production of artificial gametes for 

the transfer of adult nuclear material, (and probably others more difficult to anticipate or legally regulate). 
Appendix: Personal Statements 275

the product of natural fertilization. But what if we could use the cloning techniques of nuclear transfer to create an entity that lacks the qualities and capabilities essential to be designated a human life in process? By intentional alteration 

of the somatic cell nuclear components or the cytoplasm of the oocyte into 

which they are transferred, could we truly create an artifact (a human creation for 

human ends) that is biologically and morally more akin to tissue or cell culture?* 

The intention in creating such an intrinsically limited “clonal artifact” would not 

be one of reproduction, but simply the desire to draw on natural organic potential through technological manipulation of biological materials. This intention is 

in keeping with the purposes of scientific research and medical therapy in which 

many “unnatural” manipulations are used for human benefit. In order to employ 

such an entity for research, it must be capable of yielding stem cells while lacking 

the capacity for the self-directed, integrated organic functioning that is essential 

for embryogenesis. The intervention that precludes the possibility of human development would be undertaken at a stage before the development was initiated, 

and thus, no active potentiality, no human life in process, would be violated. If 

the created artifact were accorded a certain cautionary respect (as with all human 

tissues), even though not the full protection of human life, the consequences of 

such a program would not compromise any moral principle. 

The project of creating these altered “clonal artifacts” for the procurement of 

human stem cells could have many loci of scientific intervention. Techniques 

might range from removing genes for extra-embryonic structures, to the alteration of genes for angiogenesis (such that the stem cells procured could produce 

differentiated cell types with therapeutic potential, but would have to rely on the 

host into whom they were placed for their vascular connections). If the created 

stem cells could only form specific germ layers or limited lineages of cell types, 

they still might be useful for the generation of valuable research models as well as 

many cell lines, tissues and organs. Furthermore, in bypassing the moral concerns 

associated with full embryonic potential, the created cells might legitimately be 

developed within artificial microenvironments beyond fourteen days. This would 

allow the production of more advanced cell types, the study of tissue interactions 

and the formation of primordial organismal parts. Just as we have learned that 

neither genes, nor cells, nor even whole organs define the locus of human moral 

standing, in this era of developmental biology we will come to recognize that tissues with “partial generative potential” may be used for medical benefit without a 

violation of human dignity.† The fact that one does not need full embryonic in-

 

* Such a procedure could be designated “Altered Nuclear Transfer” (ANT). 

† Consider blood transfusions, organ transplantation, and the recombination of 

human genes into bacteria for the production of human hormones such as 

growth hormone and insulin. All of these raised initial moral controversy until it 

was recognized that the locus of human dignity lies not it human parts but in the 

full organismal integrity of a human life. 
276 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

tegrity for these partial generative capacities is evident in the well-formed body 

parts such as teeth, fingernails and hair seen in teratomas.*

Clearly, there will be some point where partial generative potential is so close to 

full human development that our basic moral principals would be violated. We 

will need to carefully define the circumstances under which it is acceptable for 

serious medical purposes to manipulate human parts apart from their natural 

context in human development. Here the fundamental principle of protection of 

human life must be affirmed, while the more subtle moral issues concerning respect and natural integrity are carefully explored. 

At this early stage in our technological control of developing life, we have an opportunity to break the impasse over stem cell research and provide moral guidance for the biotechnology of the future. This may require a constructive reformulation of some aspects of moral philosophy, together with creative exploration 

of scientific possibilities, but any postponement of this process will only deepen 

the dilemma as we proceed into realms of technological advance unguided by 

forethought. A moratorium will allow the cooperative dialogue that is essential to 

frame the moral principles that can at once defend human dignity and promote 

the fullest prospects for scientific progress and its medical applications. 

WILLIAM B. HURLBUT

* * * 

 

* These benign ovarian tumors, derived by spontaneous and disorganized development of activated ova, typically have a full array of primary tissue types and 

some well-developed body parts. The possibility that embryonic stem cells could 

be derived from entities lacking integrated developmental potential is given further support from recent studies in which cells from abnormal early embryos 

were fused with normal embryos and went on to produce normal tissues in the 

developed organism. (See “Dependable Cells From Defective Embryos.” Science 3 

May 2002, p. 841, and Byrne, Simons and Gurdon: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) online, April 23, 2002.) 
Appendix: Personal Statements 277

Statement of Dr. Krauthammer 

I oppose all cloning, reproductive and research. I would like to see them banned. 

But I live in the real world. As I have explained, both in the Council and in my 

writings, I oppose research cloning for prudential reasons. Prudence dictates taking into account the real world, meaning the realities of American democracy, 

and at present there is no consensus for banning research cloning. I therefore 

strongly support a moratorium. At this point in the history of this debate, a 

moratorium is more than a compromise. It is an important achievement. 

Let’s remember. In a democracy, there is no such thing as a permanent ban in 

any case. Any ban can be revisited at any time. Thus the difference between a 

ban and a moratorium is simply this: Under a ban, when the issue is reconsidered, the burden of proof is on those who wish to lift the ban. With a moratorium, when the issue is reconsidered, the burden of proof is on those who wish 

to maintain the ban. I have no trepidation about remaking the case for a ban 

when the moratorium expires. 

In the interim, I vote strongly in favor of the moratorium over the alternative 

proposal of regulation. First, because I am keenly aware of the power of the scientific imperative to breach frontiers of ethics, and deeply distrustful of the ability of society to resist those scientific imperatives. I am highly skeptical about the 

ultimate efficacy of regulation in preventing the breaching of further moral barriers. 

And second, because regulation is really just a nicely confectured way of saying 

that we are prepared as a society today to utterly abolish a crucial moral barrier, 

namely, the prohibition of the creation of human embryos solely for the purpose 

of experimentation. 

That is a serious moral barrier. The argument that we already crossed that barrier 

when we permitted the use of discarded embryos from IVF clinics for stem-cell 

research is simple sophistry.* Creating human embryos solely for their exploitation in research and therapy is new. It is dangerous. It is something that we will 

live to regret. A moratorium will prevent that for now, and allow a restatement of 

the case for its unwisdom and its danger when the issue is later reconsidered. 

I support the moratorium on research cloning for several additional reasons. 

First, because the impasse on research cloning has led to congressional failure to 

enact any anti-cloning legislation. That is absurd. There is a unanimous national 

feeling that reproductive cloning should be banned. Our proposal provides a 

compromise that both sides can embrace so that cloning legislation can be 

passed. 

 

* As I elaborate in my memo to Council Members, reprinted below. 

. 
278 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Second, for those who support regulation, the moratorium is the only effective 

way to move toward serious regulation. The vague call for regulation, made by 

proponents of Position Two, has no political traction. None of the relevant players has any incentive to prepare the regulations. The scientific community is 

largely opposed to any interference in this research. And while people are dithering, the cloning research in the private biotech industries will put facts on the 

ground that will be difficult to challenge. Only a moratorium can test the good 

faith of those who say they want regulation. Moreover, Position Two does not 

explicitly say that the existence of the strict regulations it calls for is a precondition for allowing the research to go forward. There is no talk here, as there was 

in the public Council sessions, that this proposal amounts to a de facto moratorium. 

Third, this proposal does not abandon the strong anti-cloning position. It stops 

cloning at the very beginning, namely at the point of creating a cloned embryo. It 

is thus much stronger than the pseudo-ban on cloning proposed by those who 

want regulation, which would block only implantation. 

A ban on reproductive cloning and a moratorium on research cloning allows the 

country to clearly express itself: definitively make law regarding reproductive 

cloning and at least temporarily prevent the launching of an industry whose business is the manufacture of (cloned) human embryos purely for experimentation. 

And it allows the country to engage now in a serious and extended debate on the 

virtues and pitfalls of such an enterprise, on the promise and problems of regulation, and, ultimately, on the question of not only where these cells come from, 

but where these cells are taking us. 

I include here a memo that I circulated to Council Members during our deliberations*: 

* * * 

The conquest of rejection is one of the principal rationales for research 

cloning. But there is reason to doubt this claim on scientific grounds. 

There is some empirical evidence in mice that cloned tissue may be rejected anyway (possibly because a clone contains a small amount of foreign—mitochondrial—DNA derived from the egg into which it was 

originally injected). Moreover, enormous advances are being made elsewhere in combating tissue rejection. The science of immune rejection is 

much more mature than the science of cloning. By the time we figure 

out how to do safe and reliable research cloning, the rejection problem 

 

* A longer version of this argument appears in my article, “Crossing Lines,” The 

New Republic, April 29, 2002, pp. 20-23. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 279

may well be solved. And finally, there are less problematic alternatives—

such as adult stem cells—that offer a promising alternative to cloning 

because they present no problem of tissue rejection and raise none of 

cloning's moral conundrums. 

These scientific considerations raise serious questions about the efficacy 

of, and thus the need for, research cloning. But there is a stronger case 

to be made. Even if the scientific objections are swept aside, even if research cloning is as doable and promising as its advocates contend, there 

are other reasons to pause. 

The most obvious is this: Research cloning is an open door to reproductive cloning. Banning the production of cloned babies while permitting 

the production of cloned embryos makes no sense. If you have factories 

all around the country producing embryos for research and commerce, it 

is inevitable that someone will implant one in a woman (or perhaps in 

some artificial medium in the farther future) and produce a human 

clone. What then? A law banning reproductive cloning but permitting 

research cloning would then make it a crime not to destroy that fetus—

an obvious moral absurdity. 

This is an irrefutable point and the reason alone to vote for the total ban 

on cloning. Philosophically, however, it is a showstopper. It lets us off 

too early and too easy. It keeps us from facing the deeper question: Is 

there anything about research cloning that in and of itself makes it morally problematic? 

Objection I: Intrinsic Worth 

For some people, life begins at conception. And not just life—if life is 

understood to mean a biologically functioning organism, even a single 

cell is obviously alive—but personhood. If the first zygotic cell is owed 

all the legal and moral respect due a person, then there is nothing to talk 

about. Ensoulment starts with Day One and Cell One, and the idea of 

taking that cell or its successor cells apart to serve someone else's needs 

is abhorrent. 

This is an argument of great moral force but little intellectual interest. 

Not because it may not be right. But because it is unprovable. It rests on 

metaphysics. Either you believe it or you don't. The discussion ends 

there. 

I happen not to share this view. I do not believe personhood begins at 

conception. I do not believe a single cell has the moral or legal standing 

of a child. This is not to say that I do not stand in awe of the developing 

embryo, a creation of majestic beauty and mystery. But I stand in equal 

awe of the Grand Canyon, the spider's web, and quantum mechanics. 

Awe commands wonder, humility, appreciation. It does not command 
280 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

inviolability. I am quite prepared to shatter an atom, take down a spider's web, or dam a canyon for electricity. (Though we'd have to be very 

short on electricity before I'd dam the Grand.) 

I do not believe the embryo is entitled to inviolability. But is it entitled 

to nothing? There is a great distance between inviolability, on the one 

hand, and mere "thingness," on the other. Many advocates of research 

cloning see nothing but thingness. That view justifies the most ruthless 

exploitation of the embryo. That view is dangerous. 

Why? Three possible reasons. First, the Brave New World Factor: Research cloning gives man too much power for evil. Second, the Slippery 

Slope: The habit of embryonic violation is in and of itself dangerous. 

Violate the blastocyst today and every day, and the practice will inure 

you to violating the fetus or even the infant tomorrow. Third, Manufacture: The very act of creating embryos for the sole purpose of exploiting 

and then destroying them will ultimately predispose us to a ruthless utilitarianism about human life itself. 

Objection II: The Brave New World Factor 

The physicists at Los Alamos did not hesitate to penetrate, manipulate, 

and split uranium atoms on the grounds that uranium atoms possess intrinsic worth that entitled them to inviolability. Yet after the war, many 

fought to curtail atomic power. They feared the consequences of 

delivering such unfathomable power—and potential evil—into the 

hands of fallible human beings. Analogously, one could believe that the 

cloned blastocyst has little more intrinsic worth than the uranium atom 

and still be deeply troubled by the manipulation of the blastocyst 

because of the fearsome power it confers upon humankind. 

The issue is leverage. Our knowledge of how to manipulate human 

genetics (or atomic nuclei) is still primitive. We could never construct ex 

nihilo a human embryo. It is an unfolding organism of unimaginable 

complexity that took nature three billion years to produce. It might take 

us less time to build it from scratch, but not much less. By that time, we 

as a species might have acquired enough wisdom to use it wisely. Instead, the human race in its infancy has stumbled upon a genie infinitely 

too complicated to create or even fully understand, but understandable 

enough to command and perhaps even control. And given our demonstrated unwisdom with our other great discovery—atomic power: As we 

speak, the very worst of humanity is on the threshold of acquiring the 

most powerful weapons in history—this is a fear and a consideration to 

be taken very seriously. 

For example. Female human eggs seriously limit the mass production of 

cloned embryos. Extracting eggs from women is difficult, expensive, 

and potentially dangerous. The search is on, therefore, for a good alter-
Appendix: Personal Statements 281

native. Scientists have begun injecting human nuclei into the egg cells of 

animals. In 1996 Massachusetts scientists injected a human nucleus with 

a cow egg. Chinese scientists have fused a human fibroblast with a rabbit egg and have grown the resulting embryo to the blastocyst stage. We 

have no idea what grotesque results might come from such interspecies 

clonal experiments. 

In October 2000 the first primate containing genes from another species 

was born (a monkey with a jellyfish gene). In 1995 researchers in Texas 

produced headless mice. In 1997 researchers in Britain produced headless tadpoles. In theory, headlessness might be useful for organ transplantation. One can envision, in a world in which embryos are routinely 

manufactured, the production of headless clones—subhuman creatures 

with usable human organs but no head, no brain, no consciousness to 

identify them with the human family. 

The heart of the problem is this: Nature, through endless evolution, has 

produced cells with totipotent power. We are about to harness that 

power for crude human purposes. That should give us pause. Just 

around the corner lies the logical by-product of such power: humananimal hybrids, partly developed human bodies for use as parts, and 

other horrors imagined—Huxley's Deltas and Epsilons—and as yet un 

imagined. This is the Brave New World Factor. Its grounds for objecting to this research are not about the beginnings of life, but about the 

ends; not the origin of these cells, but their destiny; not where we took 

these magnificent cells from, but where they are taking us. 

Objection III: The Slippery Slope 

The other prudential argument is that once you start tearing apart blastocysts, you get used to tearing apart blastocysts. And whereas now 

you'd only be doing that at the seven-day stage, when most people 

would look at this tiny clump of cells on the head of a pin and say it is 

not inviolable, it is inevitable that some scientist will soon say: Give me 

just a few more weeks to work with it and I could do wonders. 

That will require quite a technological leap because the blastocyst will 

not develop as a human organism unless implanted in the uterus. That 

means that to go beyond that seven-day stage you'd have to implant this 

human embryo either in an animal uterus or in some fully artificial 

womb. 

Both possibilities may be remote, but they are real. And then we'll have 

a scientist saying: Give me just a few more months with this embryo, 

and I'll have actual kidney cells, brain cells, pancreatic cells that I can 

transplant back into the donor of the clone and cure him. Scientists at 

Advanced Cell Technology in Massachusetts have already gone past that 

stage in animals. They have taken cloned cow embryos past the blasto-
282 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

cyst stage, taken tissue from the more developed cow fetus, and reimplanted it back into the donor animal. 

The scientists' plea to do the same in humans will be hard to ignore. 

Why grow the clone just to the blastocyst stage, destroy it, pull out the 

inner cell mass, grow stem cells out of that, propagate them in the laboratory, and then try chemically or otherwise to tweak them into becoming kidney cells or brain cells or islet cells? This is Rube Goldberg. Why 

not just allow that beautiful embryonic machine, created by nature and 

far more sophisticated than our crude techniques, to develop unmolested? Why not let the blastocyst grow into a fetus that possesses the 

kinds of differentiated tissue that we could then use for curing the donor? 

Scientifically, this would make sense. Morally, we will have crossed the 

line between tearing apart a mere clump of cells and tearing apart a recognizable human fetus. And at that point, it would be an even smaller 

step to begin carving up seven- and eight-month-old fetuses with more 

perfectly formed organs to alleviate even more pain and suffering 

among the living. We will, slowly and by increments, have gone from 

stem cells to embryo farms to factories with fetuses in various stages of 

development and humanness, hanging (metaphorically) on meat hooks 

waiting to be cut open to be used by the already born. 

We would all be revolted if a living infant or developed fetus were 

carved up for parts. Should we build a fence around that possibility by 

prohibiting any research on even the very earliest embryonic clump of 

cells? Is the only way to avoid the slide never to mount the slippery 

slope at all? On this question, I am personally agnostic. If I were utterly 

convinced that we would never cross the seven-day line, then I would 

have no objection on these grounds to such research on the inner cell 

mass of a blastocyst. The question is: Can we be sure? This is not a 

question of principle; it is a question of prudence. It is almost a question 

of psychological probability. No one yet knows the answer. 

Objection IV: Manufacture 

Note that while, up to now, I have been considering arguments against 

research cloning, they are all equally applicable to embryonic research 

done on a normal—i.e., noncloned—embryo. If the question is tearing 

up the blastocyst, there is no intrinsic moral difference between a twoparented embryo derived from a sperm and an egg and a single-parented 

embryo derived from a cloned cell. Thus the various arguments against 

this research—the intrinsic worth of the embryo, the prudential consideration that we might create monsters, or the prudential consideration 

that we might become monsters in exploiting post-embryonic forms of 

human life (fetuses or even children)—are identical to the arguments for 

and against stem-cell research. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 283

These arguments are serious—serious enough to banish the insouciance 

of the scientists who consider anyone questioning their work to be a 

Luddite—yet, in my view, insufficient to justify a legal ban on stem-cell 

research (as with stem cells from discarded embryos in fertility clinics). I 

happen not to believe that either personhood or ensoulment occurs at 

conception. I think we need to be apprehensive about what evil might 

arise from the power of stem-cell research, but that apprehension alone, 

while justifying vigilance and regulation, does not justify a ban on the 

practice. And I believe that given the good that might flow from stemcell research, we should first test the power of law and custom to enforce the seven-day blastocyst line for embryonic exploitation before assuming that such a line could never hold. 

This is why I support stem-cell research (using leftover embryos from 

fertility clinics) and might support research cloning were it not for one 

other aspect that is unique to it. In research cloning, the embryo is created with the explicit intention of its eventual destruction. That is a 

given because not to destroy the embryo would be to produce a cloned 

child. If you are not permitted to grow the embryo into a child, you are 

obliged at some point to destroy it. 

Deliberately creating embryos for eventual and certain destruction 

means the launching of an entire industry of embryo manufacture. It 

means the routinization, the commercialization, the commodification of 

the human embryo. The bill that would legalize research cloning essentially sanctions, licenses, and protects the establishment of a most ghoulish enterprise: the creation of nascent human life for the sole purpose of 

its exploitation and destruction. 

How is this morally different from simply using discarded embryos from 

in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics? Some have suggested that it is not, 

that to oppose research cloning is to oppose IVF and any stem-cell research that comes out of IVF. The claim is made that because in IVF 

there is a high probability of destruction of the embryo, it is morally 

equivalent to research cloning. But this is plainly not so. In research 

cloning there is not a high probability of destruction; there is 100 percent probability. Because every cloned embryo must be destroyed, it is 

nothing more than a means to someone else's end. 

In IVF, the probability of destruction may be high, but it need not necessarily be. You could have a clinic that produces only a small number 

of embryos, and we know of many cases of multiple births resulting 

from multiple embryo implantation. In principle, one could have IVF 

using only a single embryo and thus involving no deliberate embryo destruction at all. In principle, that is impossible in research cloning. 

Furthermore, a cloned embryo is created to be destroyed and used by 

others. An IVF embryo is created to develop into a child. One cannot 
284 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

disregard intent in determining morality. Embryos are created in IVF to 

serve reproduction. Embryos are created in research cloning to serve, 

well, research. If certain IVF embryos were designated as "helper embryos" that would simply aid an anointed embryo in turning into a child, 

then we would have an analogy to cloning. But, in fact, we don't know 

which embryo is anointed in IVF. They are all created to have a chance 

of survival. And they are all equally considered an end. 

Critics counter that this ends-and-means argument is really obfuscation, 

that both procedures make an instrument of the embryo. In cloning, the 

creation and destruction of the embryo is a means to understanding or 

curing disease. In IVF, the creation of the embryo is a means of satisfying a couple's need for a child. They are both just means to ends. 

But it makes no sense to call an embryo a means to the creation of a 

child. The creation of a child is the destiny of an embryo. To speak of 

an embryo as a means to creating a child empties the word "means" of 

content. The embryo in IVF is a stage in the development of a child; it is 

no more a means than a teenager is a means to the adult he or she later 

becomes. In contrast, an embryo in research cloning is pure means. 

Laboratory pure. 

And that is where we must draw the line. During the great debate on 

stem-cell research, a rather broad consensus was reached (among those 

not committed to "intrinsic worth" rendering all embryos inviolable) 

that stem-cell research could be morally justified because the embryos 

destroyed for their possibly curative stem cells were derived from fertility clinics and thus were going to be discarded anyway. It was understood that human embryos should not be created solely for the purpose 

of being dismembered and then destroyed for the benefit of others. Indeed, when Senator Bill Frist made his impassioned presentation on the 

floor of the Senate supporting stem-cell research, he included among his 

conditions a total ban on creating human embryos just to be stem-cell 

farms. 

Where cloning for research takes us decisively beyond stem-cell research 

is in sanctioning the manufacture of the human embryo. You can try to 

regulate embryonic research to prohibit the creation of Brave New 

World monsters; you can build fences on the slippery slope, regulating 

how many days you may grow an embryo for research; but once you 

countenance the very creation of human embryos for no other purpose 

than for their parts, you have crossed a moral frontier. 

Research cloning is the ultimate in conferring thingness up on the human embryo. It is the ultimate in desensitization. And as such, it threatens whatever other fences and safeguards we might erect around embryonic research. The problem, one could almost say, is not what cloning does to the embryo, but what it does to us. Except that, once clon-
Appendix: Personal Statements 285

ing has changed us, it will inevitably enable further assaults on human 

dignity. Creating a human embryo just so it can be used and then destroyed undermines the very foundation of the moral prudence that informs the entire enterprise of genetic research: the idea that, while a 

human embryo may not be a person, it is not nothing. Because if it is 

nothing, then everything is permitted. And if everything is permitted, 

then there are no fences, no safeguards, no bottom. 

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

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286 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Dr. McHugh

I am concerned that section (g) of Part I of Chapter Eight does not adequately 

describe my views about somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), expressed at several meetings of the Council. That section says, “[P]roposals to engage in cloning-for-biomedical-research necessarily endorse the creation of human (cloned) 

embryos solely for the purpose of such research. Public policy that specifically promoted 

this research would thus explicitly and officially approve crossing a moral boundary.” 

(Italics in the text.) I believe (1) those words imply that the prime effect of SCNT 

is the creation of a new individual human being and (2) that implication prejudges the problem before us and does not comport to my opinion of this matter. 

I hold that SCNT rests on a major discovery in cellular biology, the implications 

of which need much more discussion and debate than it receives in Chapter 

Eight (and especially in section (g)). With this discovery we now know that every 

one of our somatic cells not only has a full complement of our genes but as well 

that every one of our somatic cells, if manipulated in a particular fashion, has the 

power to recapitulate in growth its own beginnings. 

When a technician takes a donor’s somatic cell and proceeds with it to follow the 

method of somatic cell nuclear transplantation, he or she evokes an intrinsic program present within that nucleus that brings about cellular multiplication and differentiation. One need not hold that a new and unique human individual starts 

up immediately as these cells are made and multiply. One could see this process 

as an engineered culturing of cells from the somatic nucleus that recapitulates 

embryonic development but rests upon a potential for growth and replication 

resident in and intrinsic to all somatic cells. The cellular products are direct extensions of the donor as with other forms of tissue culture and as such have 

some licit potentials for further use. 

I agree with those who say that my argument—that the products of SCNT and 

the products of impregnation are crucially different—places a strong emphasis 

on origins of these products and less emphasis on potentials that we deplore. But 

I would hold that the section (g) from Part I of Chapter Eight places all the emphasis on potential and no emphasis on origins. It thus ignores the fact that an 

overemphasis on potential would lead us to the unreasonable position that since 

every one of our somatic cells has “potential” for producing a human, it should 

receive some reverence. I believe that in our presentation to the American people 

we must acknowledge that some of the arguments in favor of the use of SCNT 

rest upon the view that what is emerging here are cells and not human beings. 

This very fundamental disagreement should be thoroughly aired, as it carries with 

it quite different policy implications. 

PAUL MCHUGH
Appendix: Personal Statements 287

Statement of Dr. May 

Substantial moral debate on cloning-for-biomedical-research focuses on the 

question as to whether the preimplanted embryo is “one of us” or not. The 

group in favor of unregulated research would define “one of us” narrowly in order to exclude the microscopic material in the petri dish from “one of us.” 

Therefore we can do with it what we will. Proponents of a ban define “one of 

us” broadly to include the preimplanted embryo. Therefore they would refuse to 

clone/kill a preimplanted embryo used in research, even at the expense of the relief that successful research might offer some patients who are seriously impaired 

or face premature death. Both parties seek to escape the stigma (and perhaps the 

regulatory burdens) that might accompany therapy that owed something to “one 

of us.” 

However, there is a way of thinking about the preimplanted embryo that does 

not rely on the inclusionary/exclusionary language of “one of us.” The somewhat awkward language of the intermediate status of the embryo (neither a mere 

thing nor a full human being) both permits research but also requires regulation. 

The status of the preimplanted embryo permits research because it does not hold 

such a claim on us as to ban a line of inquiry that might thwart grave human suffering and premature death. However, the source of this research in the human argues for the necessity of regulations. The preimplanted embryo is more than a 

yard lot of building materials; it is a cluster of cells moving toward, if implanted, 

nourished, and protected, a human life. In removing it, through research, from 

the circle of life, we cannot remove it from the circle of human indebtedness. 

This position has powerful implications for the content as well as the necessity of 

regulations. Most discussion has centered on regulations as they might bear on 

the generation of knowledge and therapies (for example, the protection of 

women as the source of eggs, the time limit on research to a fourteen-day period 

before the onset of the neural streak, the development of licensing and monitoring procedures, and extending the scope of regulations to private as well as publicly funded projects). However, the acceptance of a human source for the conduct of this research has equally powerful consequences for the distribution of 

knowledge and therapies. Gratefully accepting a human source that makes possible the conduct of this research requires the most inclusive destination of its 

fruits in the common good. The element of gift in origin requires common human access to benefits. It does not permit the capture of knowledge and benefits 

in such a way as to thwart their eventual arrival to all in need. 

WILLIAM F. MAY

* * * 
288 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Professor Meilaender 

Like some of my colleagues on the Council, I believe that a ban on all forms of 

human cloning (including a ban on what in this report is called cloning-forbiomedical-research) would be the optimal policy for this Council to recommend 

and for our society to adopt. Nevertheless, because other Council Members who 

have serious moral reservations about human cloning are not at this time prepared to recommend a permanent ban on all human cloning, we have joined with 

them to support a policy that would ban cloning-to-produce-children and would 

place a four-year moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research. Even if the 

policy I regard as optimal is for now impossible, we need not settle for no policy 

at all. Nor should we think of the majority recommendation as simply a compromise position. On the contrary, we have found genuine—though only partial—agreement with some of our colleagues on the Council, and I prefer to try 

to use and build on that partial agreement than to act as if it were unimportant or 

insignificant. Were the majority recommendation enacted into law, it would prohibit all human cloning (whether publicly or privately funded) for four years. 

That would be a considerable achievement. It would give us a period in which 

the optimal policy was in place, during which time we would hope that further 

moral debate and advances in alternative forms of research (that would not involve human cloning or destruction of embryos) would persuade others to continue that optimal policy indefinitely. 

In the Council’s deliberations, those who oppose all human cloning have worked 

very hard to respect and acknowledge the views of Council Members with whom 

we disagree or do not fully agree. In particular, the following points are worth 

noting: 

(a) For the sake of continued conversation, we have acquiesced in terminology 

that some of us do not fully accept and that to some extent distorts our position. 

That is, any human cloning is morally objectionable, and there is for some of us 

no crucial moral divide between cloning-for-biomedical-research and cloning-toproduce-children. Put differently, research cloning is also reproductive cloning, 

since it brings into existence a new human being (in the very earliest stages of 

developing human life). Agreeing to converse in terms that do not fully acknowledge this has inevitably been problematic; nevertheless, we have accepted this 

burden so that the Council’s work could proceed. I believe that the definitions of 

cloning-for-biomedical-research and cloning-to-produce-children given at the 

end of Chapter Three of the Council’s report make clear that, however the 

proximate or ultimate purposes of those engaged in cloning may differ, the nature of the act remains the same. 

(b) In supporting a proposed four-year moratorium on cloning-for-biomedicalresearch (even though some of us are quite prepared to support a permanent 

ban) we have sought to make common cause with those Council Members who 
Appendix: Personal Statements 289

worry more about cloning-to-produce-children than about cloning-forbiomedical-research and for whom control of the latter is chiefly a means to 

control of the former. I myself incline to think, on the contrary, that an industry 

of routinized embryo cloning (which would be the inevitable result of approval 

of cloning-for-biomedical-research) would be an even greater moral evil than the 

gestation and birth of a cloned human being. Nevertheless, recognizing that 

some colleagues on the Council who support a moratorium do not yet share this 

view, others of us have chosen to endorse the partial agreement that we do now 

share. 

(c) We have accepted in good faith the assertion—and it has seldom been more 

than an assertion—that advocates of cloning-for-biomedical-research have a 

principled commitment to drawing a line at a very early point in embryonic development and permitting no research beyond that point. We have accepted this 

in good faith even though we have been offered no coherent argument to support the “developmental” view of human status put forward by cloning proponents. Other Members of the Council have offered a variety of arguments against 

that view. We have offered evidence that embryologists do not make the sort of 

distinction on which cloning proponents rely. We have noted that the embryo’s 

“potential” is something actual, something present in the developing human being, and that it is a misuse of the idea of potential to describe the embryo as 

merely a potential human being. We have argued that, while it is true that we 

would be unlikely to feel the same grief at the death of an embryo as we do at the 

death of a child, this hardly means that the embryo’s life should not be protected. 

We have noted that criteria for “protectability” offered by at least one Council 

member (namely, the presence of brain activity) would clearly permit research to 

a point well beyond the development of the early embryo. Indeed, I do not think 

that the Council has been fully willing to take up the question of the moral status 

of the embryo. Nevertheless, despite the belief of some of us that the morality of 

human cloning probably cannot be addressed satisfactorily without doing so, we 

have agreed that the Council must examine the morality of cloning in ways alert 

to the many other important moral issues it also raises. 

(d) Most of all, we have been willing to join in this report’s majority recommendation of a policy that would prohibit cloning-to-produce-children and prohibit 

for four years all cloning-for-biomedical-research, even though such a policy is 

not, in our view, the optimal one. We have concurred in this recommendation in 

order to join with some Council Members who, because of their moral concerns 

about human cloning, endorse a moratorium for reasons somewhat different 

from ours. I, for instance, specifically decline to think of a moratorium as simply 

providing time to put in place regulations—after which cloning-for-biomedicalresearch could proceed. For me a moratorium is good because it prohibits all 

human cloning for four years and provides opportunity to continue the argument 

and the research that may, one hopes, make the case against cloning still more 

persuasive four years hence. Although some of us would favor a ban on all cloning, including cloning-for-biomedical-research, we have recognized that such a 

policy proposal would, in effect, have said to fellow Council Members who, for 
290 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

their own different reasons, support a moratorium: “We’re not prepared to continue this discussion.” Rather than adopt such a position, we have been willing to 

support a position we regard as good even if less than optimal. As I noted above, 

however, this is not simply a compromise position. On the contrary, it is a partial 

agreement which may, I hope, give rise to still greater agreement in the future. 

Finally, I note the following about the moral (and not simply the policy) aspects 

of the human cloning debate: 

(a) A number of Council Members, of whom I am one, hold that the human embryo is fully deserving of our moral respect and that such respect is incompatible 

with its deliberate destruction in research. That judgment about the status of the 

human embryo (whether cloned or resulting from union of egg and sperm) is 

not, so far as I can see, based on our religious beliefs. We have taken seriously 

what the science of embryology teaches us. We have taken seriously what careful 

philosophical reasoning about the meaning of “potentiality” teaches us. We have 

taken seriously the lessons of human history in which the limits of our sympathy 

for fellow human beings who seem “different” from us have more than once had 

to be overcome in order to learn a more inclusive and egalitarian respect for human life. This does not mean, for me at least, that religious belief should play no 

role here. On the contrary, Jews worship a Lord who favors the widow and the 

orphan, who teaches us to speak on behalf of those no one else defends. And 

Christians worship a crucified God who has himself accepted vulnerability. Instructed by our religious traditions, we may see in the weakest and most vulnerable of human beings—those unable to speak in their own behalf—special objects of our care. Such care for the vulnerable seems to me incompatible with an 

industry of routine manufacture, use, and destruction of cloned embryos—even 

if the goal is to help others who are also vulnerable. 

(b) The position of those who support cloning-for-biomedical-research (while 

opposing cloning-to-produce-children) amounts, in effect, to criminalizing the 

implantation of cloned embryos. Nothing could be more revealing of the moral 

underpinnings of their position. In their view, moral status is conferred not by 

belonging to the human species but by the will and choice of some human beings (those like us who are stronger and in control). We cannot pretend that being unimplanted is somehow a natural fact about an embryo; on the contrary, it is 

what we choose. First we produce the cloned human embryo, then we decide to 

use it for our purposes in research rather than to implant it, and then we argue 

that until implanted it lacks the capacity for continued development. This reasoning is specious, it should be rejected, and it can find no support in the definitions 

given at the close of Chapter Three of this report. 

(c) Because the defense of cloning-for-biomedical-research rests ultimately upon 

a view that the will and choice of some confers moral status on others, and because no coherent defense of the “developmental” approach to human dignity 

and worth has been offered by proponents of research cloning, I think it very 

unlikely that research—if allowed to proceed—can really be confined to the early 
Appendix: Personal Statements 291

blastocyst. With no principled reasons to place limits on our will, and with the 

likelihood that more developed embryos or fetuses will actually be much more 

useful for researchers, I doubt whether the momentum of cloning research can 

be stopped in any way other than by stopping all human cloning. Indeed, I suspect that, if cloning-for-biomedical-research proceeds, the distinction between 

cloning-for-biomedical-research and cloning-to-produce-children will come to 

seem artificial. Having accustomed ourselves to use cloning techniques to shape 

and mold the next generation, we will be hard-pressed to explain why we should 

not, in fact, exercise an even fuller control by cloning-to-produce-children. Our 

earlier opposition to it will seem to have been merely sentimental. 

I am happy, therefore, to join with other colleagues on the Council in recommending a policy that would prohibit for at least four years all human cloning, 

whether for the purpose only of research or for the additional purpose of producing children, but it is imperative to emphasize that this good policy is less 

than optimal. We should hope that four years from now our society will be able 

to do still better. 

GILBERT C. MEILAENDER

* * * 
292 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Dr. Rowley 

Support for Proposal Two 

During the deliberations of the President’s Council on Bioethics, we asked many 

questions about the comparative usefulness of embryonic compared with adult 

human stem cells to treat a host of fatal and non-fatal but debilitating diseases. 

We never received a clear answer; thus the role of stem cell treatment is largely 

based on promise, rather than on persuasive evidence of efficacy. Given the intense interest of scientists in this research problem for at least a decade, the public can reasonably ask why we do not have convincing data on the use of embryonic stem cells to treat diabetes, Parkinson’s disease and other medical problems? 

The answer is shockingly clear! American scientists have been prevented from 

working on these very critical problems because of a ban on any federally funded 

research using cells from human embryos. Progress in our understanding of human diseases and the development of effective treatment for these diseases has 

come largely from federally funded research, primarily supported through NIH. 

Thus, a consequence of the present Congressional ban (instituted in 1994 after 

an NIH panel established guidelines and oversight to allow such research) has 

been that the only research on the development of embryonic stem cell lines and 

on the use of embryonic cells has been limited to private and for-profit ventures. 

Not only are these efforts relatively small as compared with those funded by 

NIH, the results are largely hidden from the general scientific community and the 

benefits are likely to be available to the public on a very restricted basis, usually 

based on the ability to pay whatever price is asked. The effect of extending and 

expanding this moratorium will be to maintain our ignorance by preventing any 

research for four more years; this proposal will force American scientists who 

have private funding to stop their research. It will also accelerate the scientific 

“brain-drain” to more enlightened countries. 

The recent publication of reports on the plasticity of human stem cells from 

adult bone marrow has raised the possibility that the problem is solved, that we 

do not need stem cells derived from embryos. However, even Dr. Catherine Verfaillie (author of one such report) emphasizes the need for research on embryonic stem cells to complement work on adult stem cells. Will adult stem cells 

have the same unlimited capacity for renewal as is present in embryonic cells? 

Will embryonic and adult stem cells both be suitable for somatic cell nuclear 

transfer? Will embryonic or adult stem cells be more amenable to manipulation 

to reduce the problem of immune rejection? These are just a few of the critical 

questions that are urgently in need of answers – answers that NIH is prohibited 

from allowing American scientists to answer. 

As summarized here, it is clear that there is an urgent need immediately to fund 

research on the actual potential of human embryonic stem cells to treat human 
Appendix: Personal Statements 293

disease. However, it is equally clear that research using cells from human embryos requires great sensitivity and careful thought. It is thus appropriate to accompany the lifting of the NIH ban with the simultaneous implementation of an 

appropriate regulatory mechanism. It is important to emphasize that every US 

academic institution has an Institutional Review Board in place, whose function 

is to review all research related to human subjects before a grant can be submitted to any agency for funding; this ensures that the research proposal protects 

the health, safety and privacy of the individuals involved in the project. In 1998, 

the NIH Director established a task force to review the policy regarding stem cell 

research. This task force developed Guidelines for Pluripotent Stem Cell Research which were approved after extensive public comment (more than 50,000 

responses) and which were published in the Federal Registry, August 2000. The 

task force proposed the establishment of The Human Embryonic Research 

Board. This Board would represent a broad constituency including consumers, 

ethicists, lawyers, as well as scientists knowledgeable in all aspects of human and 

animal embryonic stem cell research appointed by the Secretary of HHS. Thus 

there is no need to delay research until a Board is in place because the design of 

the Board is already in place. 

Our ignorance is profound; the potential for important medical advances is very 

great. We must remove the current impediments to this critical research. Congress should lift the ban and establish a broadly constituted regulatory board, 

NOW. 

JANET D. ROWLEY

* * * 
294 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Statement of Professor Sandel 

After six months of searching ethical and scientific inquiry, a majority of this 

Council has rejected a ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research of the kind passed 

by the House of Representatives last year. Among those of us who reject a ban, 

some prefer a moratorium, while others would permit such research to proceed 

subject to regulation. (See table in Chapter Eight.) 

I will first give my reasons for concluding that cloning-for-biomedical-research 

should not be banned, and then explain why I believe such research should be 

permitted subject to regulation. 

Any ethical analysis of cloning-for-biomedical-research must address the moral 

status of the human embryo. Before turning to that question, however, it is important to place cloning-for-biomedical-research in the broader context of embryonic stem cell research. Some who find cloning-for-biomedical-research morally objectionable support stem cell research that uses spare embryos left over 

from fertility clinics. They argue that it is wrong to create embryos for research 

(whether cloned or non-cloned) but morally acceptable to use excess embryos 

created for reproduction, since these “spare” embryos would otherwise be discarded. But this distinction is not persuasive. If it is wrong to carry out stem cell 

research on embryos created for research, it is wrong to carry out any embryonic 

stem cell research. 

Those who oppose the creation of embryos for stem cell research but support 

research on embryos left over from in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics beg the 

question whether those IVF “spares” should have been created in the first place: 

if it is immoral to create and sacrifice embryos for the sake of curing or treating 

devastating diseases, why isn’t it also objectionable to create and discard spare 

IVF embryos for the sake of treating infertility? After all, both practices serve 

worthy ends, and curing diseases such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and diabetes 

is at least as important as enabling infertile couples to have genetically related 

children. 

Those who would distinguish the sacrifice of embryos in IVF from the sacrifice 

of embryos in stem cell research might reply as follows: the fertility doctor who 

creates excess embryos does not know which embryos will ultimately be sacrificed, and does not intend the death of any; but the scientist who deliberately 

creates an embryo for stem cell research knows the embryo will die, for to carry 

out the research is necessarily to destroy the embryo. 

But it is hard to see the moral difference between a practice that typically sacrifices embryos (by the tens of thousands, in the case of the IVF industry) and one 

that inevitably does so. If IVF as currently practiced in the United States is morally permissible, its justification does not rest on the idea that the sacrifice it entails is only typical, not inevitable. It rests instead on the idea that the good 
Appendix: Personal Statements 295

achieved outweighs the loss, and that the loss is not of a kind that violates the respect embryos are due. This is the same moral test that must be met to justify the 

creation of embryos for stem cell research and regenerative medicine. 

Comparing the range of practices that sacrifice embryos clarifies the stakes: if 

cloning-for-biomedical-research is morally wrong, then so is all embryonic stem 

cell research, and so is any version of IVF that creates and discards excess embryos. If, morally speaking, these practices stand or fall together, it remains to ask 

whether they stand or fall. The answer to that question depends on the moral 

status of the embryo. 

There are three possible ways of conceiving the moral status of the embryo—as a 

thing, as a person, or as something in between. To regard an embryo as a mere 

thing, open to any use we may desire or devise, misses its significance as nascent 

human life. One need not regard an embryo as a full human person in order to 

believe that it is due a certain respect. Personhood is not the only warrant for respect; we consider it a failure of respect when a thoughtless hiker carves his initials in an ancient sequoia—not because we regard the sequoia as a person, but 

because we consider it a natural wonder worthy of appreciation and awe—modes 

of regard inconsistent with treating it as a billboard or defacing it for the sake of 

petty vanity. To respect the old growth forest does not mean that no tree may 

ever be felled or harvested for human purposes. Respecting the forest may be 

consistent with using it. But the purposes should be weighty and appropriate to 

the wondrous nature of the thing. 

One way to oppose a degrading, objectifying stance toward nascent human life is 

to attribute full personhood to the embryo. Because this view is associated with 

the religious doctrine that personhood begins at conception, it is sometimes said 

to be a matter of faith that lies beyond rational argument. But it is a mistake to 

assume that religiously informed beliefs are mere dogmas, beyond the reach of 

critical reflection. One way of respecting a religious conviction is to take it seriously—to probe and explore its moral implications. 

The notion that the embryo is a person carries far-reaching consequences, some 

of which emerged in the course of this Council’s deliberations. One is that harvesting stem cells from a seven-day-old blastocyst is as morally abhorrent as harvesting organs from a baby. This is a bold and principled claim, even if deeply at 

odds with most people’s moral intuitions. But the implications do not stop there. 

If the equal moral status view is correct, then the penalty provided in recent anticloning legislation—a million dollar fine and ten years in prison—is woefully inadequate. If embryonic stem cell research is morally equivalent to yanking organs 

from babies, it should be treated as a grisly form of murder, and the scientist 

who performs it should face life imprisonment or the death penalty. 

A further source of difficulty for the equal moral status view lies in the fact that, 

in natural pregnancies, at least half of all embryos either fail to implant or are 

otherwise lost. If natural procreation entails the loss of some number of embryos 
296 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

for every successful birth, then perhaps we should worry less about the loss of 

embryos that occurs in IVF and in stem cell research. It might be replied that a 

high rate of infant mortality does not justify infanticide. But the way we respond 

to the natural loss of embryos suggests that we do not regard these events as the 

moral or religious equivalent of infant mortality. Otherwise, wouldn’t we carry 

out the same burial rituals and the same rites of mourning for the loss of an embryo that we observe for the death of a child? 

The conviction that the embryo is a person derives support not only from certain 

religious doctrines but also from the Kantian assumption that the moral universe 

is divided in binary terms: everything is either a person, worthy of respect, or a 

thing, open to use. But as the sequoia example suggests, this dualism is overdrawn. 

The way to combat the instrumentalizing impulse of modern technology and 

commerce is not to insist on an all-or-nothing ethic of respect for persons that 

consigns the rest of life to a utilitarian calculus. Such an ethic risks turning every 

moral question into a battle over the bounds of personhood. We would do better 

to cultivate a more expansive appreciation of life as a gift that commands our 

reverence and restricts our use. Human cloning to create designer babies is the 

ultimate expression of the hubris that marks the loss of reverence for life as a 

gift. But stem cell research to cure debilitating diseases, using seven-day-old blastocysts, cloned or uncloned, is a noble exercise of our human ingenuity to promote healing and to play our part in repairing the given world. 

Those who warn of slippery slopes, embryo farms, and the commodification of 

ova and zygotes are right to worry but wrong to assume that cloning-forbiomedical-research necessarily opens us to these dangers. Rather than ban stem 

cell cloning and other forms of embryo research, we should allow them to proceed subject to regulations that embody the moral restraint appropriate to the 

mystery of the first stirrings of human life. Such regulations should include licensing requirements for embryo research projects and fertility clinics, restrictions on the commodification of eggs and sperm, and measures to prevent proprietary interests from monopolizing access to stem cell lines. This approach, it 

seems to me, offers the best hope of avoiding the wanton use of nascent human 

life and making these biomedical advances a blessing for health rather than an 

episode in the erosion of our human sensibilities. 

MICHAEL J. SANDEL

* * * 
Appendix: Personal Statements 297

Statement of Professor Wilson 

Regulated Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research 

I would allow regulated biomedical research on cloned embryos provided the 

blastocyst is no more than fourteen days old and would not allow implantation in 

a uterus, human or animal. 

I take this position because I believe that research on human blastocysts may 

have substantial medical value in finding ways of improving human life. As our 

report indicates, such research may help doctors deal with Parkinson’s disease, 

Alzheimer’s disease, juvenile diabetes, and spinal cord injury. Members of the 

Council disagree as to how best to do that research. 

The group that favors a moratorium on the use of cloned embryos for such research may think that the study of adult stem cells or in vitro fertilized eggs that 

are not used to impregnate a woman will produce all the knowledge we need to 

discover whether stem cells have therapeutic value. The other group, of which I 

am a part, favors regulated research on cloned embryos because it believes that 

all sources of stem cells, including those produced from cloned blastocysts, must 

be studied if we are to discover whether great medical advances are possible. 

That is because the use of cloned blastocysts may be the only important way of 

overcoming the problems of immune rejection and learning more about genetic 

diseases. If substantial medical benefit can be had from research, then it is 

unlikely that those benefits will derive from studying only stem cells derived 

from adult tissue or from leftover IVF eggs. To follow the policy recommended 

by the majority of this Council would be to do research with one hand tied behind our backs. 

Moreover, I do not think there is any moral difference between a fertilized egg 

created in an in vitro fertilization clinic and one created by cloning an embryo. 

Both eggs are deliberately produced by scientific intervention and both (except 

for the IVF egg used to impregnate a woman) are destroyed. 

Having said that there is no moral difference between these two sources of eggs 

does not mean, I believe, that using either kind of egg does not raise important 

and difficult moral questions. Every human begins as a fertilized egg, even 

though not every fertilized egg becomes a human. But the issue before us is not 

whether any human life should be destroyed but whether every fertilized egg 

should be preserved. To oppose the willful destruction of any fertilized egg is to 

oppose in vitro fertilization (since all fertilized eggs beyond that needed for successful implantation will be destroyed). Yet, in vitro procedures have produced 

(as of 1999) about thirty thousand babies for otherwise infertile couples. Initially, 

in vitro fertilizations were opposed by many who have since changed their 

minds, because the great benefits (many healthy new infants) so greatly outweighed the trivial costs (some tiny cells frozen or destroyed). 
298 HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY

A fertilized cell has some moral worth, but much less than that of an implanted 

cell, and that has less than that of a fetus, and that less than that of a viable fetus, 

and that the same as of a newborn infant. My view is that people endow a thing 

with humanity when it appears, or even begins to appear, human; that is, when it 

resembles a human creature. The more an embryo resembles a person, the more 

claims it exerts on our moral feelings. Now this last argument has no religious or 

metaphysical meaning, but it accords closely, in my view, with how people view 

one another. It helps us understand why aborting a fetus in the twentieth week is 

more frightening than doing so in the first, and why so-called partial birth abortions are so widely opposed. And this view helps us understand why an elderly, 

comatose person lacking the ability to speak or act has more support from people than a seven-week-old fetus that also lacks the ability to speak or act. 

Human worth grows as humanity becomes more apparent. In general, we are 

profoundly grieved by the death of a newborn, deeply distressed by the loss of a 

nearly born infant or a late-month miscarriage, and (for most but not all people) 

worried but not grieved by the abortion of a seven-week-old fetus. Our humanity, and thus the moral worth we assign to people, never leaves us even if many 

elements of it are later stripped away by age or disease. 

This fact becomes evident when we ask a simple question: Do we assign the 

same moral blame to harvesting organs from a newborn infant and from a sevenday-old blastocyst? The great majority of people would be more outraged by doing the former than by doing the latter. A seven-day-old blastocyst that is no 

more than one millimeter in diameter and contains only a hundred or so largely 

undifferentiated cells does not make the same moral claims on us as does a live 

infant. Unless everyone who makes this distinction is wrong, then the moral 

status of a blastocyst is vastly less compelling than that of a neonate. 

Some people believe that human life begins at conception and ought to be free 

from any human attack from that moment on. The difficulty with this rejoinder 

is that a large fraction (perhaps one-third or one-half) of fertilized cells fail to 

implant in the uterus or, if implanted, fail to develop into an embryo. Knowing 

this, one who offers this rejoinder would have to say that there is at best only a 

reasonable chance that the event of conception begins a human life. 

But even blastocysts and leftover IVF eggs deserve some protection, because if 

society authorizes their destruction it has taken a dramatic and morally significant 

step. It has intervened in a profoundly important human process in ways that 

may lead future generations to take what may then appear to be the easy next 

steps, such as implanting a cloned embryo in a uterus or killing a fetus to extract 

some supposedly beneficial substance. 

To avoid this, I favor federal regulations that would ban implanting a cloned embryo in any uterus, animal as well as human, and would insist that every cloned 

embryo raised in a glass dish exist for no more than fourteen days. 
Appendix: Personal Statements 299

There is always some risk that allowing even strongly regulated research will create conditions that lead some scientists to ask for access to fertilized eggs beyond 

the blastocyst stage. But I do not believe we can object to this by making a generalized slippery slope argument, since virtually every medical procedure that involves entering or affecting the human body would also be liable to such an argument, a conclusion that would leave us (for example) without surgery. The 

slippery slope argument, stated baldly, would lead us to oppose allowing doctors 

to remove an inflamed appendix because they might later decide to remove a 

kidney, and after that a heart, and to oppose as well doctors prescribing a drug 

that will harm 0.5 percent of its recipients because we suspect that, once they do 

this, they will later insist on prescribing drugs that harm 1 percent, and then 10 

percent, and possibly 50 percent of their patients. There may be good slippery 

slope arguments, but they cannot rest simply on the phrase “slippery slope”; they 

must also point clearly to a serious moral hazard and contain some reason for 

thinking that this hazard will become much more likely if we take the first step. 

JAMES Q. WILSON