Filed 8/15/14 P. v. Woodward CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DEAMUS HEATH WOODWARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

F066965

(Super. Ct. No. 1452317)

O P I N I O N

THE COURT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Linda A. 

McFadden, Judge.

Tracy Lum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

 

 Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Chittick, J.†

†

Judge of the Superior Court of Fresno County, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
2

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and 

Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOooAppellant Deamus Heath Woodward was convicted by plea in case No. 1432475 

of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b))1 and in case No. 1441769 

of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). 

In case No. 1452317 a jury convicted Woodward of taking or driving a vehicle 

without the owner’s consent (count I/Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen 

vehicle (count II/§ 496d, subd. (a)), resisting arrest (count III/§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), and

possession of burglary tools (count IV/§ 466). In a separate proceeding Woodward 

admitted three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

On March 8, 2013, the court sentenced Woodward in case No. 1452317 to an 

aggregate local prison term of seven years six months: the upper term of four years on 

Woodward’s vehicle theft conviction, a stayed term on his receiving a stolen vehicle 

conviction, a consecutive six months on his resisting arrest conviction, a concurrent sixmonth term on his possession of burglary tools conviction, and three prior prison term 

enhancements. In case No. 1441769, the court recalled the sentence it had imposed in

April 2012 and sentenced him to a concurrent middle term of two years. In case No. 

1432475, the court revoked probation and sentenced Woodward to a concurrent middle 

term of two years. 

On appeal, Woodward contends: (1) his sentence violates section 654’s 

prohibition against multiple punishment; and (2) the court erred by its failure to state the 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

statutory basis for some of the fees, fines, and assessments it imposed. We will find 

partial merit to this last contention.

FACTS

On December 2, 2012, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Sintia Vasquez drove her 1995 

Honda Civic to the Burlington Coat Factory in Modesto. The car was gone when she 

came out of the store. 

On December 4, 2012, Modesto police officers located the Honda and placed it 

under surveillance. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., as a police officer approached the Honda 

while it was parked at a shopping center, Woodward exited the Honda through the 

driver’s door and took off running. Woodward was captured a short time later after he 

jumped in a canal.

During a search of the Honda officers found a key ring with 19 shaved keys2from 

different manufacturers and a knapsack containing numerous tools including a crowbar, 

bolt cutters, gloves, three screwdrivers, and another set of keys. An additional shaved 

key with a ring of keys attached was found in the Honda’s ignition. 

DISCUSSION

The Section 654 Issue

In sentencing Woodward, the court stated,

“For the burglary tools, I am going to order that you serve six 

months concurrent on the burglary tools, that being count IV. That’s -- that 

is -- although there were a number of tools [that] quite easily could have 

been found by the jury [to be] burglary tools, I’m not [sure] which tool they 

selected or tools, I imagine they looked at all of them, felt that they were 

burglary tools. There was certainly no good reason for you to have all of

those tools, especially the 17 shaved keys, and -- but I guess it’s possible 

they could have found just the one that you had in the car was a burglary 

 

2 Shaved keys were described as keys that car thieves file down to facilitate turning 

over the car’s ignition to start it so it can be driven off without the original key. 
4

tool, and that would be kind of part of the same offense. So I’ll order six

months concurrent.” 

Woodward appears to contend, based on the above quotation, that because the 

court found he had the same objective in possessing the burglary tools as he did in 

committing his auto theft offense, the court violated section 654 when it imposed a 

concurrent term on his possession of burglary tools conviction. We disagree.

“[S]ection 654 prohibits punishment for two crimes arising from a single 

indivisible course of conduct. [Citation.] If all of the crimes were merely incidental to, 

or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, a defendant may be 

punished only once. [Citation.] If, however, a defendant had several independent 

criminal objectives, he may be punished for each crime committed in pursuit of each 

objective, even though the crimes shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise 

indivisible course of conduct. [Citation.]” (People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 

1521, 1525, italics added.) “Although the question of whether defendant harbored a 

‘single intent’ within the meaning of section 654 is generally a factual one, the 

applicability of the statute to conceded facts is a question of law. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) “Section 654 does not allow any multiple 

punishment, including either concurrent or consecutive sentences. [Citation.]” (People 

v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 592.)

The applicability of section 654 here is a question of law because the facts are 

undisputed. Further, Woodward’s vehicle theft, possession of a stolen vehicle and 

possession of burglary tools shared the common act of using one shaved key to operate 

the stolen Honda. However, that shaved key could also be used to steal other Hondas.

Thus, it is clear from Woodward’s possession of other shaved keys and other burglary 

tools that his possession of the shaved key found in the Honda’s ignition was not merely 

incidental to possessing or operating that Honda. It is also clear from his possession of 

numerous burglary tools that Woodward’s objective in possessing these tools, including 
5

the shaved key found in the Honda’s ignition, was to burglarize other vehicles as well as 

buildings. Therefore, since Woodward’s objective in possessing the burglary tools 

transcended and was independent of his objective in driving and possessing the stolen 

Honda, imposition of a concurrent term on his possession of burglary tools conviction did 

not violate section 654.

The Other Errors

Woodward contends that his abstract of judgment does not identify the authority 

for the $160 security fee the court imposed or memorialize the theft fee and air 

emergency fee the court imposed.3 He requests that the matter be remanded to the trial 

court so that it may correct these errors. Respondent agrees that the abstract of judgment 

contains certain errors that require a remand to the trial court so that it may correct these 

errors. 

“Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, 

fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not 

authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of 

judgment. [Citations.] The abstract of judgment form used here, Judicial 

Council form CR–290 [rev. July 1, 2012] provides a number of lines for 

‘other’ financial obligations in addition to those delineated with statutory 

references on the preprinted form. If the abstract does not specify the 

amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its 

statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the 

appropriate agency. [Citation.] At a minimum, the inclusion of all fines 

and fees in the abstract may assist state and local agencies in their 

collection efforts. [Citation.] Thus, even where the Department of 

Corrections has no statutory obligation to collect a particular fee, such as 

the laboratory fee imposed under Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, 

the fee must be included in the abstract of judgment. [Citation.] As [one] 

court explained, ‘Just as a “‘[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose [ ]’”

 

3 Although Woodward also contends that the abstract does not memorialize the 

conviction fee the court imposed, this contention ignores the notation in the abstract that 

the court imposed a “conviction assessment” of $120 pursuant to Government Code 

section 70373. 
6

[citation], a fine is a fine is a fine is a fine and is part of the judgment which

the abstract must “‘digest or summarize.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]

“‘Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts 

... that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction 

of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of 

sentencing courts.’ [Citation.]” (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 

1192, 1200.)

We agree with the parties that Woodward’s abstract of judgment does not

accurately reflect all the fines and fees the court imposed and the statutory authority for 

some of these fines and fees as noted above. Additionally, we note that although the 

court revoked probation in case No. 1432475, it did not impose a probation revocation 

fine and that the abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that Woodward was 

convicted of second degree burglary in that case and receiving stolen property in case No. 

1441769 on March 8, 2013. It also appears that the court erred by not imposing a 

conviction fee or security fee for each of Woodward’s convictions in case Nos. 1432475 

and 1441769. Accordingly, we will remand the matter to the trial court so that it may 

correct, if necessary, the errors and apparent errors discussed above.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial court so it may correct, if necessary, the errors 

and apparent errors discussed above, for it to issue an amended abstract of judgment that 

accurately reflects the fines and assessments imposed, including the statutory authority 

for them, and for it to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the 

appropriate authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.