IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

ANDREA CONSTAND, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : No. 05-cv-1099 

 v. : 

 : 

WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR., : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE LIFTING OF THE SEAL 

Pursuant to the Court’s June 18, 2015 Order (doc. # 100), Defendant, William H. Cosby, 

Jr., respectfully submits this brief in opposition to the lifting of the seal impressed by the Court 

in its November 4, 2005 Case Management Order (doc. # 47). 

INTRODUCTION 

The current proceedings concern the media’s desire to gain access to discovery motions, 

which contain private information of no legitimate public interest. The specific information in 

question has been under seal for many years. The Court’s sealing order was interim and 

provisional, but the parties then settled this dispute and agreed to keep the discovery from this 

litigation confidential forever. That agreement made a determination on the finality of the seal 

unnecessary. 

Now, provoked by a new media frenzy concerning Defendant and allegations of sexual 

misconduct, the Associated Press (the “AP”) desires to publish, for all to see, the private 

discovery material from this case. Although the case is over, and although the parties agreed to 

keep the discovery confidential, the AP knows that certain discovery material was filed with the 
2 

Court as a part of discovery motions. Hoping to circumvent the parties’ settlement, the AP 

argues that the discovery motions are “judicial documents” to which it has a right of access, and 

it demands a review of the sealing order under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.5. The AP 

undertakes this effort not to shine the light of public scrutiny on the judicial process or any 

matter of legitimate public concern, but rather to sell copy about a celebrity sex scandal. 

The documents at issue are discovery motions and material, to which no public right of 

access applies. In this unique context, the balancing of the private and public interests at stake 

weighs heavily in favor of maintaining the seal. Specifically, the information at issue is of no 

legitimate public interest, while public disclosure of it would invade the parties’ privacy and also 

that of numerous non-parties, whose identities and alleged sexual encounters with the Defendant 

were revealed in the course of discovery. Disclosure also would undermine the settlement in this 

case and create publicity that would prejudice a current proceeding in another court. 

For these reasons, which are explained in more detail below, Defendant requests the 

Court to maintain the seal, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.5(c). 

BACKGROUND 

This action ended nearly nine years ago. This case did not concern a public official, a 

public company, or other matters of legitimate public concern. Rather, it was a private dispute 

between two individuals over their personal relationship. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that 

Defendant, once her mentor, tricked her into ingesting a debilitating drug and then sexually 

assaulted her. Defendant denied these allegations. Plaintiff stated that she would call several 

other women as witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 415, to testify to allegedly 

similar acts by Defendant. These women were identified as “Jane Does,” and the identity of 
3 

most was not made public at the time. Their alleged encounters with the Defendant, however, 

were the subject of discovery. 

The parties settled the case before discovery ended. Thus, the Court never was called 

upon to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. In fact, the Court’s role in the case was 

limited to administration, deciding discovery motions, and deciding motions about 

confidentiality and protective orders. The Court did not decide any substantive rights of the 

parties. 

The parties were deposed in September 2005. Those depositions led to several discovery 

disputes. On November 4, 2005, the Court entered an order creating an interim procedure for the 

resolution of these disputes. Specifically, the Court ordered the parties to file their discovery 

motions under seal, and to detail their respective requests to compel on separate pages. (Doc. # 

47 at 2.) The Court then set deadlines for the parties to oppose or to support the lifting of the 

seal. (Id.) As the Court later noted, it adopted this procedure to create a context in which the 

Court could balance the parties’ privacy interests with any public rights, without defeating the 

parties’ privacy rights in the process. (Id. at 1 n.1). 

Accordingly, the parties filed several discovery motions and related memoranda, and they 

did so under seal. The discovery motions quoted and characterized portions of the parties’ 

respective depositions. The specific discovery motions (and associated briefs in support and 

opposition) filed under seal were: 

• Plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions, concerning Defendants’ counsel’s 

conduct during Defendant’s deposition. (See doc. ## 48, 52, 60.) 

• Defendant’s motion to compel and a brief concerning “overarching issues.” (See

doc. ## 49, 57.) 

• Plaintiff’s motion to compel further deposition testimony from Defendant. (Doc. 

## 50, 58.) 
4 

• Plaintiff’s motion to compel the National Enquirer. (Doc. ## 61, 64, 65, 66, 68.) 

On January 31, 2006, the Court ruled on the parties’ respective motions to compel. (Doc. ## 63, 

67.) The Court took Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions under advisement, and, on June 9, 2006, 

the Court ultimately concluded that her Motion for Sanctions was moot. (Doc. # 89.) 

The parties submitted briefs with respect to whether the interim seal should become 

permanent.1 (Doc. ## 63, 67.) In October 2006, before the Court issued a final order with 

respect to the interim seal, the parties reached a confidential settlement. On November 8, 2006, 

in accordance with the parties’ stipulated wishes, the Court dismissed this action. Because the 

case settled before the Court ruled upon the finality of the interim sealing order, the parties’ 

discovery motions remained sealed. 

The parties’ settlement requires each party to maintain the confidentiality of the 

discovery generated in this case, including Defendant’s deposition and sealed discovery 

motions.2

 Further, each party to the settlement agreement explicitly agreed not to disclose to 

anyone the information that it learned during discovery. The confidentiality provisions were a 

material inducement to each of the parties to enter into the settlement, and Defendant relied on 

those provisions in agreeing to the settlement. 

 

1

 On November 23, 2005, the Associated Press moved to intervene and to challenge the Court’s 

interim procedure, arguing that even an interim seal was unwarranted. On January 13, 2006, the 

Court denied the AP’s motion to intervene, without prejudice. 

2

 The parties’ settlement prohibits the disclosure of its terms or conditions, including by filing 

the agreement itself with any court, except if the agreement itself is the subject of litigation and 

then only to the extent necessary to assert rights and/or defend litigation. Because the settlement 

agreement recently became the subject of a motion to quash subpoena, in a separate 

miscellaneous action in this District Court, Defendant submitted an attorney declaration briefly 

characterizing the confidentiality terms of the settlement agreement. Here, Defendant refers only 

to the public record of that proceeding. (See Green v. Cosby, 15-mc-144 (E.D. Pa. 2015), 

Cosby’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Quash [doc. #1] at 3-4.) 
5 

The seal continued, without comment or dispute, for over eight years. In late 2014, 

however, allegations of sexual misconduct against Mr. Cosby again became a media centerpiece. 

In December 10, 2014, three women sued Mr. Cosby in the United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts, alleging that Mr. Cosby defamed them by denying their accusations 

against him. Shortly thereafter, on December 29, 2014, the AP wrote to the Court, seeking to lift 

the seal by invoking the review called for under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.5. 

ARGUMENT 

The issue now before the Court is narrow and specific. The Court need not determine the 

wisdom of a blanket protective order governing all discovery, as it did years ago in this case. 

Nor must the Court decide whether to impose a protective order upon unwilling parties. Rather, 

the Court’s task is to decide whether specific discovery motions, and the specific descriptions 

and recitals of testimony included in those motions, should remain under seal. The parties 

themselves already have agreed to keep such documents confidential as a material term of their 

settlement. Now, the narrow issue is whether the public—in particular the media—should gain 

access to this private information, through the Court, merely because it was included in 

discovery motions. 

To make this determination, the Court should perform the balancing test announced in 

Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994), balancing the public’s interest 

with the parties’ rights to privacy. Because the documents at issue are discovery motions, 

however, there is no public right to access these documents. Thus, the balancing process does 

not, as it otherwise would, include a presumption that the public will have access, and the 

showing required to maintain the seal is significantly lessened. Therefore, given the private and 

embarrassing nature of the specific material in question, and the complete lack of legitimate 
6 

public interest in the subject matter, the balance of the interests under Pansy decidedly calls for 

maintaining the seal. 

I. THE PUBLIC DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT 

TO ACCESS THE INFORMATION IN QUESTION. 

While the public ordinarily has a presumed right of access to court proceedings and 

judicial documents, that right does not apply to discovery motions. In Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied 

Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Third Circuit held that “there is a presumptive right to public access to all material filed in 

connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, . . . but no such right as to discovery motions and 

their supporting documents.” 998 F.2d at 165 (emphasis added). The court noted that “we 

cannot overlook the Supreme Court’s statements in Seattle Times v. [Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 

(1984)] . . . that ‘pretrial deposition and interrogatories are not part of public components of a 

civil trial.’” Id. at 164. The court stated that “a holding that discovery motions and supporting 

materials are subject to a presumptive right of access would make raw discovery, ordinarily 

inaccessible to the public, accessible merely because it had to be included in motions precipitated 

by inadequate discovery responses or overly aggressive discovery demands. This would be a 

holding based more on expediency than principle.” Id. at 165. 

When Defendant and the AP briefed this issue to the Court in late 2005 and early 2006, 

the AP suggested that Leucadia “is of limited precedential value.” (Doc. # 51 at 7 n.2.) While 

that argument was wrong then, it is even more clearly so now. In United States v. Wecht, 484 

F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit affirmed its holding in Leucadia. As the court 

noted, “documents filed with the court are generally subject to the common law right of access, 

unless attached to a discovery motion.” Id. at 209. 
7 

Other United States circuit courts agree. In Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st 

Cir. 1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held: “We think it is clear 

and hold that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery 

motions.” 805 F.2d at 12. The court noted: 

[D]iscovery proceedings are fundamentally different from 

proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of 

access. . . . [A] request to compel or protect the disclosure of 

information in the discovery process is not a request for a 

disposition of substantive rights. Materials submitted to a court for 

its consideration of a discovery motion are actually one step further 

removed in public concern from the trial process than the 

discovery materials themselves, materials that the Supreme Court 

has said are not subject to the public's right of access. 

Anderson, 805 F.2d at 12-13; see also Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 

F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The better rule is that material filed with discovery motions 

is not subject to the common-law right of access.”); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 

(2d Cir. 1995) (“We think that the mere filing of a paper or document with the court is 

insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to the right of public access.”). 

Here, the documents currently under seal are discovery motions (and corresponding 

briefs in support and opposition) to which there is no right of access. Indeed, the underlying case 

itself ended before the discovery phase concluded, and the judicial proceedings did not include 

an adjudication of the parties’ substantive rights. Thus, the public does not have a right to access 

the material in question. 

II. THE PANSY FACTORS WEIGH HEAVILY 

IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING THE SEAL. 

Balancing the private and public interests at stake demonstrates that good cause exists to 

maintain the interim sealing order in question. See Wecht, 484 F.3d at 212. The Third Circuit 
8 

detailed its well-known balancing analysis in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsbourg, 23 F.3d 772 

(3d Cir. 1994). Under Pansy, the Court should consider the following factors: 

(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 

(2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an 

improper purpose; 

(3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment; 

(4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public 

health and safety; 

(5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and 

efficiency; 

(6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or 

official; and 

(7) whether the case involves issues important to the public. 

Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Glenmede Trust C. v. Thompson, 56 

F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-91)).3

 

Application of the Pansy factors in this case demonstrates that the seal should continue. 

Because the seal concerns only discovery motions, demonstrating good cause “does not require 

overcoming a strong presumption in favor of public access.” Wecht, 484 F.3d at 212 n.22. 

Accordingly, the balance of interests weighs heavily in favor of maintaining the seal. 

A. Lifting the Seal Would Violate 

Defendant’s and Others’ Privacy (Factors #1 & #2). 

Lifting the seal in this case unquestionably would violate Defendant’s privacy interests. 

The motions in question include specific quotations from and characterizations of Defendant’s 

 

3

 Pansy requires the Court to make findings in support of its order, but those findings themselves 

may be sealed, if necessary. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 789. 
9 

deposition testimony concerning private portions of his and others’ lives. Release of these 

passages would intrude not only on Defendant’s privacy but that of others about whom he was 

questioned. 

In particular, the excerpts concern Defendant’s sex life, which is “the most private of 

human conduct.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). The testimony at issue also 

concerns Defendant’s health, including his medical conditions and use of prescription drugs, 

another topic of unquestionable private nature. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 

The discovery motions also reveal Defendant’s testimony about Defendant’s financial affairs and 

personal relationships. Such information is also private. See e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 

Lodge No. 5. v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1987). While Defendant cannot 

explain here the detail of the testimony without defeating the purpose of this brief, Defendant 

refers the Court to the underlying discovery motions and to pages 5, 8, 9, 15, and 16 of his Brief 

in Partial Opposition to the Lifting of the Seal (doc. # 63), which contain a more specific 

explanation. 

Under Pansy, the Court should consider whether “privacy interests are diminished” 

because “the person seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny.” 

Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787. In other words, the Court should ask “whether the information is being 

sought for a legitimate purpose.” Id. Here, while the Defendant is a celebrity, as the Court 

already has held, Defendant is not a public official. (Doc. # 72 at 11 (“Shingara emphasized that 

the issues in that case involved a matter of public concern and the defendant was a public 

official. Neither is present in this case.”).) Given the intensely personal nature of the matters in 

question, Defendant’s privacy interests should remain intact, and these factors weigh in favor of 

maintaining the seal. 
10 

B. Lifting The Seal Would Embarrass 

Defendant And Other Parties (Factor #3). 

The Pansy court also stated that preventing embarrassment is a factor that weighs in favor 

of a protective order. Id. at 787. The embarrassment must be “particularly serious.” Cipollone 

v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). “[E]mbarrassment is usually thought 

of as a nonmonetized harm to individuals.” Id. Where the litigants are natural persons, as 

opposed to businesses, it is easier to show the embarrassment necessary to justify a protective 

order. Id. As Defendant explained in his Brief in Partial Opposition to Lifting the Seal, his 

embarrassment at the release of the discovery motions—deposition excerpts about sex, money, 

health, and marriage—would be severe. (See doc. #63 at 8-10, 15-16.) The “Jane Does” about 

whom he was questioned similarly would be embarrassed. 

Indeed, in its June 2, 2005 opinion denying Defendant’s request for a blanket protective 

order, this Court acknowledged that subjects covered in Defendant’s depositions “may cause 

Defendant serious embarrassment.” (Doc. #25 at 21.) The Court held that Defendant had yet to 

link this threat (as well as the threat of invasion of privacy and jury taint) to specific discovery 

material. Now, Defendant has done precisely that, as the excerpts, quotations, and 

characterizations of his deposition at issue pose a real, specific threat of serious embarrassment. 

Defendant no longer seeks to shield all of the discovery material in the case, but rather the 

specific notes of his testimony currently under seal. 

Moreover, unlike a deposition in a typical case, there is a voracious media appetite for 

Defendant’s deposition, and public release of it would quickly become widespread public 

knowledge of it. There is no doubt that public disclosure of the motions and Defendant’s sworn 

deposition testimony, which delves into the most intimate subjects imaginable, would generate a 

firestorm of publicity. Indeed, media exposure of Defendant’s private life—as opposed to 
11 

information about the operations of the judicial system—is why the AP sought this review. 

Especially given that there is no presumption of public access to this material, Defendant’s 

showing of embarrassment weighs in favor of maintaining the seal. 

C. Defendant Is Not A Public Official, And The Sealed 

Discovery Motions Do Not Present Issues Of A Public Nature 

Or Important To Public Health Or Safety (Factors #4 and #6).

There is no public interest in disclosing these discovery materials: Defendant is not a 

public official, nor is the relevant information important to public health or safety. See Pansy, 23 

F.3d at 787-88 (instructing court to consider “whether a party benefiting from the order of 

confidentiality is a public entity or official” and whether “confidentiality is being sought over 

information important to public health and safety”). These factors also weigh against lifting the 

seal. 

Defendant’s status as a well-known comedian and entertainer does not render him a 

“public” person within the meaning of the law. Pansy made clear that a “public” person is a 

“public official,” one who serves the public using public funds. Privacy interests are diminished 

only where the person seeking protection “is subject to legitimate public scrutiny,” noting that 

“‘[t]he public has a substantial interest in the integrity or lack of integrity of those who serve 

them in public office.’” Id. at 787 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 

1104, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985)). 

Indeed, this Court already held this case did not “involve[] a matter of public concern” 

and that Defendant is not “a public official.” (Doc. # 72 at 11.) Other courts have confirmed 

that a case does not involve “public” issues or persons merely because one of the litigants is a 

celebrity. See Paisley Park Enters. v. Uptown Prods., 54 F. Supp. 2d 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 

(protecting rock star Prince from public scrutiny of deposition). In Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 
12 

113 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), a case against a public official, the court noted that “[m]ore than mere 

celebrity interest is involved in this case.” Id. at 120. In Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 295 

(N.D.N.Y. 2001), the court based its decision on the fact that the case involved “elected officials 

and the performance of their governmental responsibilities.” Id. at 299–300. Defendant is an 

entertainer, not a public servant. 

Finally, while the allegations of sexual misconduct by Defendant have attracted 

significant media attention, that does not mean that the discovery motions that the AP seeks are 

matters of significant public interest. The media has had no apparent difficulty flooding the 

airwaves and press with reports on this story, even without access to the discovery materials. 

Nor is there any credible argument that public knowledge of the details of those motions will 

serve some public purpose. 

As the Pansy Court held, “if a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of 

little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of . . . maintaining an 

order of confidentiality.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788. That is the case here, and thus the public 

interest factors weigh in favor of maintaining the Court’s seal in this case. 

D. Lifting The Seal Would Undermine The 

Settlement Of This Case And Create Inefficiencies. 

The Pansy court also recognized that encouraging settlement is a factor to consider when 

deciding whether to impose confidentiality. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788.4

 In this case, a material term 

of the parties’ settlement was their agreement to keep all discovery from the case confidential. 

Indeed, due to the private nature of the information at issue, confidentiality was an important 

 

4

 The fifth Pansy factor asks whether “the sharing of information among litigants will promote 

fairness and efficiency.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787. This factor weighs in Defendant’s favor, too, as 

no fairness or efficiency will be gained by disclosing the materials. 
13 

inducement to the settlement, and Defendant relied on the confidentiality provisions in entering 

into the settlement. Disclosing that material now would undermine the settlement and deprive 

Defendant of one of the material benefits of that agreement. Indeed, this Court has already 

recognized that, where the parties have agreed to keep discovery material confidential, it would 

render such agreements pointless if the material became public anyway because it was included 

in a discovery motion. (See doc. # 54 at 6.) This factor also weighs in favor of maintaining the 

seal. 

E. Lifting The Seal Would Interfere With The Massachusetts Litigation. 

Early in the case, this Court noted its concern “that information which is disseminated 

widely potentially could interfere with the ability to select an impartial jury in this case.” (Doc. 

#25 at 2.) Now, lifting the seal would create widespread publication of Defendant’s specific 

testimony about specific topics that would impact jury selection in the case currently proceeding 

against him in the District of Massachusetts. The Court now has before it specific examples of 

prejudicial discovery material and a known record of pretrial publicity on matters directly at 

issue in the Massachusetts proceeding. This case is therefore markedly different from Shingara 

v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005), where the court declined to find that a broad and 

unspecific concern over publicity could interfere with jury selection. Id. at 307. Thus, lifting the 

seal over this material would prejudice the selection of an impartial jury. In such a case, concern 

over pretrial prejudice is warranted. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) 

(“The district court was concerned that the extensive publicity . . . would inhibit and perhaps 

prevent the selection of an impartial jury . . . . Because it was faced with specific instances of 
14 

massive and potentially harmful publicity, we find there was good cause for the district court to 

issue the protective order.”).5

III. THE COURT SHOULD USE ITS DISCRETION TO MAINTAIN THE SEAL IN 

THIS CASE. 

As the Supreme Court has held, courts have wide latitude to control access to judicial 

records and should do so to prevent the release of information “that could be damaging to 

reputation and privacy.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35. Faced with similar situations involving 

the combination of heightened media scrutiny, personal information, and scandalous allegations, 

courts have not hesitated to employ their broad discretion to protect the parties’ privacy rights. 

In Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2923 (E.D. Ark. 1998), a case 

about alleged sexual harassment by President Clinton when he was the governor of Arkansas, the 

court noted: 

Much of the discovery in this case of alleged sexual harassment 

has delved deeply into the personal lives of individuals and elicited 

information that, regardless of its truth or falsity, could prove 

damaging to reputation and privacy. Many in the media have 

shown no restraint in their willingness to place such personal 

information in the public domain despite the pain it may cause. . . . 

The Court finds that there is good cause under Rule 26(c) in 

attempting to protect private individuals from the stigma of being 

associated with a case that involves alleged sexual indiscretions 

and which is being played out on a national stage. 

 

5

 Moreover, much of what Defendant proposes to seal is simply Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

deposition questions and Plaintiff’s written characterizations of Defendant’s testimony, which 

often, and at times grossly, misrepresent the record. Question 15 of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, 

for instance, mischaracterizes a Rule 415 witness’s purported police statement. Questions 2, 9, 

10, and 26 misrepresent Defendant’s testimony. Question 41 blatantly misrepresents the 

evidence. Counsel’s questions misrepresented the content of a Daily News article. (Doc. # 48 at 

30.) Other portions of Plaintiff’s discovery motions cite discovery material—including quotes 

from over 50 pages of transcript—that is clearly unnecessary and irrelevant to the relief sought 

by Plaintiff, apparently for the purpose of attempting to disclose Defendant’s private 

information. 
15 

1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2923, at *30. In another case involving alleged sexual misconduct by a 

famous entertainer (in this case, criminal molestation of a minor), People v. Jackson, 27 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), the court held that the combination of the defendant’s 

celebrity and the sexual, as opposed to “white collar,” nature of the charges, mandated against 

public disclosure. 

The Court has the inherent power to seal the discovery motions, to which the public has 

no right of access. “[T]o the extent that courthouse records could serve as a source of public 

information, access to that source customarily is subject to the control of the trial court.” Seattle 

Times, 467 U.S. at 33 n.19. The Court has “supervisory power over its own records and files.” 

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Whether or not any particular 

rule authorizes a particular order, “we have no question as to the court’s jurisdiction to [seal 

records] under the inherent ‘equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent 

abuses, oppression, and injustices.’” Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 

1963) (quoted in Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35) (quoting Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 

(1888)). The Court should exercise this authority and maintain the seal protecting the discovery 

motions. 

CONCLUSION 

“Simply stated, the purpose of discovery is to resolve legal disputes between parties, not 

to provide newsworthy material.” Chicago Tribune, 263 F.2d at 1316 (Black, J., concurring). 

“If it were otherwise and discovery information and discovery orders were readily available to 

the public and the press, the consequences to the smooth functioning of the discovery process 

would be severe.” Id. “Such interference by parties who have no interest in the underlying 

litigation could seriously impair an Article III court from carrying out its core function—
16 

resolving cases and controversies.” Id. For this reason and those stated above, Defendant 

respectfully requests the Court to maintain the seal imposed in this case. 

Dated: June 24, 2015 George M. Gowen III 

George M. Gowen III 

COZEN O’CONNOR 

1900 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

215.665.2000 

Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, George M. Gowen, hereby certify that on June 24, 2015, I caused a true and correct 

copy of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to the Lifting of the Seal via the court’s electronic 

filing system and/or first class mail as follows: 

Bebe H. Kivitz, Esquire 

JACOBS SINGER KIVITZ & HERMAN, LLC 

1525 Locust Street, 12th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Ann C. Lebowitz, Esquire 

200 South Broad Street 

Suite 600 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

Dolores M. Troiani, Esquire 

TROIANI & GIBNEY, LLP 

1171 Lancaster Avenue, Suite 101 

Berwyn, PA 19312 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Jennifer B. Jordan, Esquire 

Paul D. Weller, Esquire 

MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 

1701 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Attorneys for National Enquirer 

Gayle Chatilo Sproul, Esquire 

Michael Berry, Esquire 

LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ LLP 

1760 Market Street, Suite 1001 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Attorneys for The Associated Press 

B. Joyce Thompson Dale, Esquire 

204 South Avenue 

Media, PA 19063 

Attorneys for Jane Doe Witnesses 

 

 George M. Gowen III 

 George M. Gowen