2013 UT App 241

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEVIN J. CARD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ARIA R. CARD,

Defendant and Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20120837‐CA

Filed October 10, 2013

Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable L.A. Dever

No. 120904019

Devin J. Card, Appellant Pro Se

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, STEPHEN L. ROTH, and

MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Devin J. Card appeals the trial court’s order denying his

motion to vacate the dismissal of his complaint. We affirm.

¶2 The trial court dismissed Card’s complaint in an order

entered on August 29, 2012. On September 5, 2012, Card filed a

motion to vacate the dismissal pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, along with a memorandum in support of

the motion. On September 14, Card filed a supplemental

memorandum in support of the motion and a notice to submit. The

trial court denied the motion to vacate in an order dated September

19, 2012.

¶3 On September 27, 2012, Card filed a notice of appeal from

the denial of his motion to vacate. The notice specified that the
Card v. Card

order appealed was the final order of the trial court entered on

September 19, 2012, and further stated that the appeal was taken

from the part of “the judgment that states that ‘any issue of alleged

failure of notice is the burden of Plaintiff.’” Orders denying relief

underrule 60(b) are separate final orders from which appeals may

be taken. See Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989). This notice of appeal was timely filed following the

entry of the order denying Card’s motion to vacate. See Utah R.

App. P. 4(a). Accordingly, the notice of appeal properly invoked

this court’s jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to vacate

the dismissal.

¶4 The sole issue raised in Card’s brief that relates to the order

denying the motion to vacate is his claim that the trial court abused

its discretion in striking his supplemental memorandum. The trial

court noted that it struck the memorandum because it did not

comply with rule 7(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Card

does not address the court’s reason for striking the memorandum

and, as a result, has not demonstrated that the trial court erred. See

Duchesne Land, LC v. Division of Consumer Prot., 2011 UT App 153,

¶ 8, 257 P.3d 441 (mem.) (concluding that no error was

demonstrated because the appellant failed to address the rationale

of the trial court).

¶5 The rest of the issues raised in Card’s brief challenge the

August 29 order dismissing the complaint. However, issues

regarding the dismissal order are beyond the scope of this appeal,

and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. An appeal may

be taken from final judgments or orders “by filing a notice of

appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by

rule 4.” Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The notice of appeal “shall designate

the judgment or order, or part thereof,” from which the appeal is

taken. Id. R. 3(d). “This requirement is jurisdictional because the

object of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an

appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular

case.” In re B.B., 2002 UT App 82, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 527. In this case, the

20120837‐CA 2013 2 UT App 241
Card v. Card

notice of appeal identified the order denying Card’s motion to

vacate the dismissal as the subject of the appeal.

¶6 Orders denying motions under rule 60(b) are separate

appealable orders, andthe scope ofreview is limitedto considering

whether the denial of relief was appropriate. See Fisher v. Bybee,

2004 UT 92, ¶ 10, 104 P.3d 1198. The review does not encompass

the merits ofthe underlying judgment or order. Seeid.Accordingly,

the notice of appeal filed on September 27 does not confer

jurisdiction on this courtto review the August orderdismissing the

complaint.

¶7 Furthermore,the amendednotice of appealfiledonOctober

18, 2012, had no effect. In that notice, Card “amended” his initial

notice of appeal to change the order appealed to the August 29

order and to change the scope of the appeal to “the entire

judgment.” However, because the final order dismissing the

complaint and the final order denying rule 60(b)relief are separate,

final, and appealable orders, the orders require separate notices of

appeal.The purportedamendmentto the notice of appealfrom one

order therefore was insufficient to independently invoke

jurisdiction to appeal from a separate final order. In addition, even

if the October amended notice were treated as a new notice, the

appeal from the August 29 order would be untimely, and thus

would not conferjurisdiction. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000

UT App 299, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616 (holding that if an appeal is not timely

filed, this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal).

¶8 In sum, the challenge to the August 29 order dismissing

Card’s complaint is not within the scope of this appeal. Card has

shown no error in the trial court’s order denying his motion to

vacate the dismissal under rule 60(b).

¶9 Affirmed.

20120837‐CA 2013 3 UT App 241