Alegis filed a response to Carr’s cross-motion to compel that included a revised protective order. In her

1

reply, Carr reasserts her position that Alegis has failed to satisfy the requirements for a protective order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KATRINA CARR, individually and on : CIVIL ACTION

behalf of all others similarly situated, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

ALEGIS GROUP, L.P., :

Defendant : No. 04-CV-5985

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TIMOTHY R. RICE

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendant, Alegis Group, L.P., (“Alegis”) seeks a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, Katrina Carr (“Carr”) contends the proposed

order is too broad and that Alegis has failed to establish good cause, as required by the United 1

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Carr also seeks to compel Alegis’ compliance with

its discovery requests. For the following reasons, I deny Alegis’ motion and grant Carr’s motion.

Carr has filed a consumer class action arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, alleging that Alegis, a Texas-based debt collector, made false and

misleading statements in its collection notice. On or about May 6, 2005, Alegis requested that

Carr stipulate to a protective order that would allow Alegis to protect documents it believes

contain confidential information. Carr refused, and as a result, Alegis has not fully responded to

discovery requests. Carr asserts that she is thereby hampered in her ability to effectively

prosecute this case, including complying with a now-expired, court deadline of May 31, 2005 to

Case 2:04-cv-05985-JP Document 17 Filed 05/31/05 Page 1 of 6
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seek class certification. 

Upon a demonstration of good cause I may order that “a trade secret or other confidential

research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed in a

designated way.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(7); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d

Cir. 1994). 

Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a

clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The

injury must be shown with specificity. Broad allegations of harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do

not support a good cause showing. The burden of justifying the

confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered

by a protective order remains on the party seeking the order.

Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (citations omitted). Thus, I must balance the harm to the party seeking

protection with the importance of disclosure to the public, considering factors such as:

1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 2) whether

the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an

improper purpose; 3) whether disclosure of the information will

cause a party embarrassment; 4) whether confidentiality is being

sought over information important to public health and safety; 5)

whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote

fairness and efficiency; 6) whether a party benefitting from the

order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and 7) whether

the case involves issues important to the public.

Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-

91). Broad allegations of harm, without specific examples or articulated reasoning, are

insufficient. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). 

The original protective order proposed by Alegis is expansive. It contemplates permitting

the parties to designate information provided in discovery that they believe constitutes protected

material. It also permits the designation of deposition testimony as protected material within one

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Alegis’ second proposed protective order appears to be a copy of a draft unopposed order previously 2

rejected by Carr. Thus, I will assume that inclusion of the “unopposed” designation was an oversight. 

3

month after receipt of the transcript of the deposition. If any party disagrees with the designation

of protected material, that party make seek relief from the court. This proposed order fails to

comport with either the letter or spirit of the decisions in Pansy and Glenmede. In support of its

request, Alegis relies on a series of cases that either pre-date Pansy and Glenemede or have been

decided by courts in other jurisdictions that do not apply the Third Circuit’s “good cause”

standard. To the extent those cases are inconsistent with Third Circuit law they are not

controlling.

Alegis contends that it has responded to Carr’s discovery requests and objected where

reasonable and appropriate. Alegis does not provide a copy of its responses, nor does Alegis set

forth with particularity a description of the specific request it deemed objectionable and why it

reached that conclusion. Alegis has attached as an exhibit to its reply brief a second proposed

protective order, which it labeled as an “unopposed” request of the parties. Carr’s reply,

however, contests that characterization.2

The second proposed protective order is somewhat more specific. It purports “to avoid

violations of significant privacy interests of Alegis in disclosing tax information and corporate

net worth information, as well as any training materials, business contracts, and procedural

handbooks where dissemination would violate the legitimate privacy interests of Alegis.” (Alegis

Reply Exh. B, at 1). Alegis asserts that good cause supports its order because public

dissemination of information sought by Carr “could have a significant effect on the business

practices of Alegis.” Id. at 2. 

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Although the second proposed protective order is more narrowly drawn, Alegis has failed

to provide sufficient and specific details to justify it. As a general matter, some discoverable

information may require confidentiality, e.g., employee personnel records, proprietary training

materials, and business contracts. The party seeking closure nevertheless must make a specific

showing of good cause for every item to be sealed. Lazin v. Pavilion Partners, 1995 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 11325 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995) (Padova, J.). Although Alegis asserts that such materiels

may fall within Carr’s discovery requests, it must reference the particular request and lodge a

specific objection, based on good cause, to obtain a protective order. 

In any event, I am confident that experienced and able counsel will reach an agreement --

consistent with Pansy -- to protect any specific items that truly merit confidentiality. Such

agreement should be crafted based on the principle that even joint motions for a protective order

must be denied absent a showing of serious injury to the party seeking closure. See e.g.,

Sprinturf, Inc. v. Southwest Rec. Indus., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4683 (E.D. Pa., Mar. 11, 2003)

(Pollak, J.) (stipulated protective orders must meet requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26©

demonstrating existence of confidential information and good cause why information should not

be disclosed); accord Software Consulting Partners, Inc. v. Medline Industries, Inc., 1999 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 5908 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 28, 1999) (Hutton, J.); Lazin, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11325. 

Thus, Alegis’ request for a protective order is unwarranted on the existing record. Carr’s

motion to compel, however, is well-founded and she is entitled to relief. Although Alegis

advises that it has responded to Carr’s requests, Carr denies it, noting that the contested Rule

30(b)(6) deposition has not been scheduled. I need not dwell on the factual nuances of this

dispute. To the extent discovery has not been provided, the parties are directed to do so

Case 2:04-cv-05985-JP Document 17 Filed 05/31/05 Page 4 of 6
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forthwith, as contemplated by the Hon. John R. Padova in his March 29, 2005 scheduling order. 

Consistent with the goals of Judge Padova’s order, therefore, I grant Carr’s motion to compel and

order that written discovery be completed within ten (10) days of this order and the Rule 30(b)(6)

deposition take place within twenty (20) days of this order. Carr is also granted leave to

supplement the record on class certification within five (5) days of Alegis’ compliance with this

order. 

An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:04-cv-05985-JP Document 17 Filed 05/31/05 Page 5 of 6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KATRINA CARR, individually and on : CIVIL ACTION

behalf of all others similarly situated, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

ALEGIS GROUP, L.P., :

Defendant : No. 04-CV-5985

ORDER

TIMOTHY R. RICE

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AND NOW, this day of May, 2005, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for a

Protective Order, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Motion for Protective Order and

Cross-Motion to Compel, and the parties’ replies thereto;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to Compel is GRANTED. 

Defendant shall respond to all discovery requests within ten (10) days of this order and the Rule

30(b)(6) deposition shall take place within twenty (20) days of this order. Plaintiff is granted

leave to supplement the record on class certification within five (5) days of Alegis’ compliance

with this order.

BY THE COURT:

 

TIMOTHY R. RICE

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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