GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

November 2000 CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE

Units Better Equipped, 

but Training and 

Readiness Reporting 

Problems Remain

GAO-01-27

Page 1 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Individual Protective Equipment 22

Appendix II: Medical Decontamination Supplies 23

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 27
Page 2 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense
Page 3 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

November 14, 2000

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that chemical and biological 

weapons are likely to be used early in a conflict to disrupt U.S. operations 

and logistics and to potentially offset the overwhelming conventional 

warfare capabilities of U.S. forces. However, following the Persian Gulf 

War in 1990, studies confirmed that U.S. forces were not fully prepared to 

defend against the use of chemical or biological weapons and could have 

suffered significant casualties had they been used during this conflict. In 

1996, we reported that early deploying Army divisions (units that would 

respond during the first 30 days of a conflict) continued to have many of 

the same problems with their chemical and biological defenses that U.S. 

forces experienced in the Gulf War.1

 Among these problems were the 

following: 

• Many units did not have their required chemical and biological 

protective equipment.

• Many units were inadequately trained in basic tasks critical to surviving 

and operating in a chemical or biological environment.

• Military medical capabilities to prevent and treat casualties on a 

contaminated battlefield were very limited.

Our 1996 report also stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Status of 

Resources and Training System (DOD’s system for reporting the overall 

readiness of units) was of limited value in determining the readiness of 

units to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. 

The system was established to provide the current status of specific 

elements considered essential to readiness assessments, such as personnel 

and equipment on hand, equipment condition, and the training of operating 

forces. However, we found that commanders could subjectively upgrade 

their unit’s overall readiness rating regardless of the unit’s actual readiness 

to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. 

1

Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing 

Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29, 1996). 
Page 4 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

At the request of the late Herbert Bateman, Chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Military Readiness, and in response to his concerns about the readiness 

of early deploying U.S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically 

contaminated environment, we selected three Army divisions, two Air 

Force fighter wings, and one Marine Corps expeditionary force,2

 and 

determined if they had (1) their required personnel protection, detection, 

and decontamination equipment and medical supplies3

 and

(2) incorporated chemical and biological defense training into readiness 

exercises and had their authorized personnel to provide this training. We 

also examined DOD’s actions to improve the Status of Resources and 

Training System’s value in determining the readiness of units to operate in a 

chemically or biologically contaminated environment.

The units’ requirements for chemical and biological equipment and medical 

supplies are derived from their services’ guidance and regulations and 

computed based on various factors, such as the size of the unit, its wartime 

mission, and type of unit. We did not independently compute or verify the 

equipment and supply requirements for the forces in the units that would 

deploy within 30 days of a conflict, but accepted the units’ requirements 

computations, which are reported to higher headquarters within their 

services. 

For our review, we judgmentally selected the units based on their missions 

and the early deployment of their forces to a military conflict. The results 

of our work cannot be generalized to other units or the military services, 

but they provide insight into DOD’s efforts to address problems with the 

preparedness of U.S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically 

contaminated environment. This is the second in a series of reports we are 

preparing on the issue of chemical and biological defense.4

2

We do not identify the specific units we reviewed because that would make the report 

classified. 

3

Items needed to decontaminate chemical casualties on the battlefield prior to moving them 

to medical treatment facilities. 

4

Chemical and Biological Defense: Critical Facility Protection Is Improved, but Major Policy 

Questions Remain Unresolved (GAO/C-NSIAD-00-3, July 17, 2000).
Page 5 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Results in Brief The units we reviewed had all their required individual protective 

equipment (such as suits, boots, and gloves) and most medical supplies and 

detection and decontamination equipment needed to operate in a 

chemically or biologically contaminated environment. Overall, they were 

better equipped for chemical or biological warfare than the units reviewed 

for our 1996 report. Specifically, the Army divisions had all of their medical 

supplies. The Air Force wings had most of their medical supplies, but they 

had shortages in some critical medical items. For example, one wing had 

only 25 percent of the protective masks required to treat contaminated 

patients and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits. The 

Marine Corps did not require specific supplies for treating and 

decontaminating patients exposed to chemical agents. The units had 

shortages in detection and decontamination equipment, but those 

shortages varied across the services and within a service. For example, the 

Marine Corps unit and one Air Force unit had 31 percent and 50 percent, 

respectively, of their chemical agent monitors, whereas the other Air Force 

unit had 100 percent of its monitors. The three Army units we reviewed had 

between 88 and 103 percent of their requirements for the same item. 

Officials at the units with shortages of equipment said that, when the units 

deploy, the shortages would be filled from stocks held by later deploying 

units or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined whether 

this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what impact this 

action might have on the later deploying units’ capabilities or on war 

reserves. We are examining the ability of depots to support equipment 

requirements and will present our results in a later report. 
Page 6 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD’s Office of the 

Inspector General found that commanders were not integrating chemical 

and biological defense into unit exercises and the training was not always 

realistic in terms of how units would operate in war. For example, we were 

told by Marine Corps officers responsible for chemical and biological 

defense training at the unit we reviewed that commanders are not fully 

integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises, as required 

by Marine Corps policies, because operating in protective equipment is 

difficult and time consuming and this (1) decreases the number of combat 

essential tasks that can be performed during an exercise and (2) limits 

offensive combat operations. We were also told that the training often lacks 

realism. For example, during one exercise, Marines who were simulating 

operations during a chemical attack were required to wear protective 

masks but not protective gloves because it was too cumbersome to work in 

the gloves. In September 1999, we reported that the Army’s combat training 

centers were restricting the simulated use of chemical weapons against the 

units being trained because units were arriving at the centers with lower 

levels of proficiency in chemical and biological defense than in the past.5

 In 

1998, DOD’s Office of the Inspector General similarly reported that 

chemical and biological defense preparedness training in the services was 

often not fully integrated into unit exercises and, when included, was not 

always realistic in terms of how units would operate in war.6

 Officials at the 

units we reviewed stated that chemical and biological defense training is 

being adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of chemical and biological 

defense specialists and (2) specialists being assigned multiple 

responsibilities unrelated to their specialties. For example, Army units we 

reviewed had from 76 to 102 percent of their authorized enlisted chemical 

personnel and from 75 to 88 percent of their chemical officers. Officials at 

one of the units with shortages said that personnel shortages required them 

to use inexperienced specialists to provide training, which adversely 

impacted the quality of that training. The Marine Corps unit we visited had 

84 percent of its authorized enlisted chemical specialists and 80 percent of 

its chemical officers. In addition to the personnel shortages, chemical 

specialists were assigned tasks unrelated to their specialties, such as 

coaching and training individuals at the rifle/pistol range. 

5

Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not 

Being Realized (GAO/NSIAD-99-210, Sept. 17, 1999). 

6

Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training (Report No. 98-174, July 17, 

1998). 
Page 7 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

In April 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed changes to the Status of 

Resources and Training System that will require units to more clearly 

report on the quantity of chemical and biological equipment on hand and 

on training readiness. However, the recent changes do not require that 

units report on the condition of their chemical and biological defense 

equipment. Thus, for example, these reports could indicate that a unit had 

its chemical and biological equipment, but not show that most of that 

equipment was unusable. 

To further improve the readiness of U.S. forces and the readiness reporting 

system, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps to require that units include realistic chemical and biological 

defense training in exercises and these exercises adhere to realistic 

wartime scenarios. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enhance the 

Status of Resources and Training System by including in chemical and 

biological readiness ratings the condition of chemical and biological 

equipment.

DOD concurred with our first recommendation and stated that it has taken 

actions and has on-going actions to improve chemical and biological 

defense training. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Status 

of Resources and Training System should show whether available 

equipment is usable. It stated that revising the current system further by 

adding additional reporting requirements for equipment condition is 

unnecessary and would place redundant requirements on unit 

commanders. We continue to believe that the system should require the 

separate reporting of both on-hand equipment levels and the serviceability 

of this equipment because during this and prior reviews, we were told of 

and observed equipment that was unserviceable and yet reported as being 

on hand for readiness reports. 

Background The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directs the 

Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with an annual assessment of the 

overall readiness of U.S. forces to fight in a chemical or biological warfare 

environment.7

 DOD provides this required annual assessment in the form of 

7

Pub.L. 103-160, sec. 1703, 107 Stat. 1547, 1854 (Nov. 30, 1993). 
Page 8 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

an annual report to Congress entitled Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program. This program was established to coordinate and integrate the 

research, development, and acquisition of chemical and biological defense 

materiel and systems to support the joint war-fighting forces. 

The probability of U.S. forces encountering chemical or biological weapons 

during worldwide conflicts remains high, according to DOD. Moreover, 

those countries with chemical weapons programs are adding agents and 

more sophisticated delivery systems. As a result, an effective defense 

which reduces the probability of an attack and enables U.S. forces to 

survive, continue operations, and win, if an attack were to occur is vital.

According to DOD’s fiscal year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and 

Biological Defense Program, U.S. forces need equipment that would allow 

them to avoid contamination so that they can conduct successful 

operations under chemically or biologically contaminated battlefield 

conditions. However, once contaminated, they need to protect and 

decontaminate themselves and their equipment to sustain operations. 

DOD’s joint doctrine for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense states 

that chemical and biological defense should be integrated into individual 

and unit training in order to develop and evaluate the readiness of U.S. 

forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment.8

 It further states 

that performing operations in chemical and biological protective 

equipment is difficult and that training is essential to countering reductions 

in job proficiency caused by the equipment. 

All Required Individual 

Protective Equipment 

and Most Medical 

Supplies and Other 

Equipment Are on 

Hand

The units we reviewed were better equipped for chemical or biological 

warfare than the units reviewed for our 1996 report, possessing most of 

their required equipment and medical supplies. For example, all of the units 

had their required individual protective equipment (such as suits, boots, 

and gloves). Also, the Army divisions had all of their medical supplies, and 

the Air Force wings had shortages in only a few critical medical items. 

There were shortages of detection and decontamination equipment; 

however, those shortages were not consistent across the services or even 

within a service. According to officials at the units, most shortages resulted 

from the services’ insufficient allocation of funds to purchase the items. 

Officials at the units with equipment shortages said that the shortages 

8

Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense, Joint Pub 3-11, July 10, 1995. 
Page 9 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

would be filled when the units deploy from stocks held by later deploying 

units or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined whether 

this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what impact this 

action might have on the later deploying units’ capabilities or on war 

reserves. This solution for meeting shortages could pose a risk for those 

later deploying units or adversely impact the war reserves, which would be 

needed to sustain military operations under chemical and biological 

attacks. We are examining the ability of depots to support equipment 

requirements and will present our results in a later report. 

Units Had Required 

Individual Protective 

Equipment 

Individual protective equipment consists of various items, such as the 

individual’s protective mask, gloves, and suits. According to equipment 

records and statements by Army officials at the units we visited, the 

required individual protective equipment items were on hand or had been 

requisitioned. We found similar conditions at the Air Force and Marine 

Corps units that we visited. A list of required individual protective 

equipment is included as appendix I. Figure 1 shows a soldier in individual 

protective equipment.

Figure 1: Soldier in Individual Protective Equipment Decontaminating a Vehicle

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 10 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

In contrast, our 1996 report stated that the Army’s early deploying divisions 

had shortages of various types of critical individual protective equipment. 

For example, three of the active divisions had 50 percent or greater 

shortages of protective clothing (battle dress overgarments) and shortages 

of other critical individual protective equipment items such as boots, 

gloves, and hoods.

Air Force Units Had 

Shortages in Medical 

Supplies

The Army and the Air Force required specific patient chemical 

decontamination items—such as aprons, gloves, sponges, and utility 

pails—for decontaminating casualties, whereas, the Marine Corps did not 

require such supplies. For the units included in our review, the Army 

divisions had all of their required medical supplies and the Air Force wings 

had most of their medical supplies. Lists of the Army and Air Force 

required patient decontamination items are included as appendix II.

The Air Force wings had shortages in a few items, including some 

categorized as critical by the Air Force. Specifically, one wing had 

requirements for 87 medical items and had shortages in 8 item areas, 

5 critical. For example, it had only 25 percent of the protective masks 

required to treat contaminated patients and 48 percent of its patient 

decontamination kits. The masks would be used to protect the patient from 

further contamination after that individual has been decontaminated. The 

other wing had requirements for 85 medical items and had shortages in 

14 item areas, 10 critical. For example, it had only 21 percent of its required 

protective masks. 

In contrast, our 1996 report stated that medical units assigned to support 

the early deploying Army divisions we visited often lacked specific supplies 

needed to treat casualties in a chemically or biologically contaminated 

environment. For example, the Army medical units had on hand only about 

50 to 60 percent of their authorized medical supplies. 

Units Had Most Detection 

and Decontamination 

Equipment on Hand

The units were required to have equipment that would be used to detect 

and identify the presence of chemical agents and to decontaminate 

equipment and personnel. As table 1 shows, the shortages in detection and 

decontamination equipment at the units we visited were not consistent 

across the services or even within a service. However, the shortages were 

less severe for the early deploying Army and Air Force units that we 

reviewed than the overall servicewide shortages reported in DOD’s fiscal 
Page 11 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program.

Table 1: On-hand Percentage of Requirements for Primary Detection and Decontamination Equipment 

Note: Individual units are referred to by letter (A, B, C).

a

No requirement for the unit or service.

b

Almost 60 percent of the Corps’ inventory of chemical agent monitors were awaiting repair at their 

logistics center.

c

Equipment on hand, but no requirement.

Source: GAO developed from unit reports and DOD’s fiscal year 2000 report to Congress on its 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

Officials at the units we visited told us that in the event of a conflict, 

equipment shortages would be filled from stocks taken from later 

deploying units or from war reserves at equipment depots. However, they 

had not determined whether these sources could provide sufficient 

equipment to fill shortages in time to meet deployment requirements or 

what effect this solution might have on the detection and decontamination 

capability of later deploying units. Without this information, the services 

cannot be sure that this solution for meeting shortages would not place 

later deploying units at risk or adversely impact the war reserves, which 

would be needed to sustain military operations under chemical and 

biological attacks. We have work under way to review the extent to which 

chemical and biological defense equipment stocks (1) are adequate to meet 

Marine Corps Army Air Force

Items Unit visited Servicewide Unit visited Servicewide Unit visited Servicewide

A ABC A B

Detection

M8A1, automatic 

chemical agent alarm

a 71 98 99 102 65 100 63 38

Chemical agent monitor 31 114b 99 103 88 35 100 50 7

M21 remote sensing 

chemical agent alarm

62 87 aaa 127 aa a

Decontamination

M-17, lightweight 

decontamination 

apparatus

79 67 66 100 95 41 a a 72

M11, portable 

decontaminating 

apparatus

90 586 c a 100 70 aa a
Page 12 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

requirements and (2) can be delivered from depots to deploying or 

deployed forces in time to effectively support operations. 

Chemical and 

Biological Defense 

Training Continues to 

Be a Problem Area 

Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD’s Office of the 

Inspector General found that commanders were not integrating chemical 

and biological defense into unit exercises and the training was not always 

realistic in terms of how units would operate in war. Officials at the Army 

and Marine Corps units we reviewed stated that chemical and biological 

defense training is being adversely affected by (1) a shortage of chemical 

and biological defense specialists and (2) specialists being assigned 

multiple responsibilities unrelated to their specialties.

Policies Require That 

Chemical and Biological 

Defense Be Fully Integrated 

Into Readiness Training

Joint doctrine provides expectations for continuing mission-essential 

operations in a chemical or biological environment. Joint Publication 3-11 

contains overall policy guidance for operations in a chemical or biological 

environment. The policy prescribes that U.S. forces be prepared to conduct 

operations in a chemical or biological warfare environment with minimal 

degradation of capabilities. The publication states that chemical and 

biological defense training will be integrated into individual and unit 

training programs.

The objectives of this training are to develop and evaluate the readiness of 

U.S. forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment and to 

ensure proficiency with defensive equipment, materiels, and procedures. 

Each service is responsible for incorporating chemical and biological 

defense training into overall training plans for units and individuals. Army 

and Marine Corps policies require that chemical and biological defense 

training be fully integrated into unit exercises. Similarly, Air Force policy 

requires that units conduct exercises that include chemical and biological 

defense training at least annually.

Training Not Fully 

Integrated and Lacks 

Realism 

Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD’s Inspector General 

found that Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force commanders were not 

integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises and the 

training was not always realistic in terms of how units would operate in 

war. For example, we were told by Marine Corps officers responsible for 

chemical and biological defense training at the unit we reviewed that 

commanders are not fully integrating chemical and biological defense into 
Page 13 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps policies. According to the 

officials, realistic chemical and biological defense training requires that 

individuals put on protective clothing and masks and perform in that 

equipment for extended periods, which makes it difficult and time 

consuming for the individuals to perform combat essential tasks. 

Therefore, many commanders do not integrate chemical and biological 

defense into training scenarios because it would (1) decrease the number 

of combat essential tasks that can be performed during an exercise and

(2) severely limit offensive combat operations. We were also told that the 

training often lacks realism. For example, during one exercise, Marines, 

who were simulating operations during a chemical attack, were required to 

wear protective masks, but not protective gloves because it was too 

cumbersome to work in the gloves. 

Air Force officials at one of the units visited stated that readiness exercises 

were suspended for over 3 years because of deployment requirements. 

They stated that the readiness exercise, conducted in February 1999, 

included minimal chemical and biological defense because the unit was not 

familiar with the chemical and biological equipment and procedures. The 

unit reported that during the February 1999 exercise, personnel from that 

unit did not consistently practice proper contamination avoidance 

procedures and did not have protective equipment readily available.

DOD’s fiscal year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program stated that the Army’s combat training centers continue 

to see units at the company, battalion, and brigade levels unable to perform 

all chemical and biological defense tasks to standard. The report concludes 

that this less than satisfactory performance is directly attributable to the 

lack of chemical and biological training at the units’ home installations.

In September 1999, we reported that the Army’s combat training centers 

were restricting the simulated use of chemical weapons against the units 

being trained because the units were not proficient in chemical and 

biological defense. Specifically, we reported that a ceiling was placed on 

the numbers, types, and times that the opposing force can use chemical 

weapons against units that demonstrate a low level of proficiency in 

chemical defense. 

In 1998, DOD’s Office of the Inspector General reported that chemical and 

biological defense preparedness training is often not fully integrated into 

unit exercises, and when included, is not always realistic. At 187 of 232 

units it reviewed, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating 
Page 14 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

chemical and biological defense into unit mission training. As a result, 

commanders could not adequately assess unit readiness to successfully 

complete wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions. The 

Inspector General recommended that the Army, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps revise the format of periodic training briefings to include reports by 

unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct their wartime 

missions under chemical and biological conditions, require the use of 

internal and external evaluations in assessing unit readiness for those 

periodic briefings, require that support units receive evaluations of 

chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluations 

received by combat units, and elevate the results of external evaluations to 

a higher level.

Personnel Shortages and 

Inexperienced Personnel 

Adversely Affect Training

Officials at the units we visited cited a shortage of experienced personnel, 

as well as assigned personnel having multiple responsibilities, as adversely 

impacting chemical and biological defense training and equipment 

maintenance. In addition, we were told that shortages in chemical and 

biological specialists at the Marine Corps unit we visited could also 

negatively affect the unit’s ability to fully perform their wartime mission. 

The three services have specialists who are responsible for training combat 

and combat support personnel in chemical and biological defense 

preparedness. For the most part, these specialists are also responsible for 

maintaining chemical and biological equipment. In wartime, these 

specialists would perform various functions, including operating chemical 

and biological detection and decontamination equipment. 

The following table shows the authorized and assigned chemical specialists 

at the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force units we visited.
Page 15 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Table 2: Authorized and Assigned Chemical Specialists at Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force Units

Source: Service units.

At one Army unit, officials said that personnel shortages required them to 

use inexperienced personnel to provide training, which adversely affected 

the quality of that training. At another Army unit, we were told that 

specialists responsible for chemical and biological defense training and 

equipment maintenance did not have the correct qualifications and/or 

experience required for the job. 

Marine Corps officials said that chemical and biological specialists are 

required to perform multiple tasks, such as preparing Status of Resources 

and Training System reports and coaching and training individuals at the 

rifle/pistol range, and that these multiple tasks diminish their ability to train 

other personnel on chemical and biological defense. We were also told by 

officials of the subordinate unit that would be responsible for 

decontaminating personnel and equipment in wartime that the subordinate 

unit only had 44 of 62 (or 71 percent) of its authorized enlisted personnel 

and that without its full complement of personnel, the unit’s 

decontamination capabilities would be seriously degraded.

Officers Enlisted

Service Authorized Assigned Percent assigned Authorized Assigned Percent assigned

Army

Unit A 32 24 75 335 255 76

Unit B 43 38 88 300 270 90

Unit C 37 31 84 308 314 102

Marine Corps

Unit A 39 31 80 228 192 84

Air Force

Unit A 1 1 100 10 7 70

Unit B 1 1 100 9 6 67
Page 16 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Monitoring of 

Chemical and 

Biological Defense 

Needs Further 

Improvement

DOD’s monitoring of chemical and biological defense readiness has 

improved since our 1996 report. Since 1993, DOD has required units from 

all the military services to assess their equipment and training status for 

operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment and 

to report this data as a distinct part of the Status of Resources and Training 

System. However, DOD did not require that chemical and biological 

defense readiness be factored into the units’ overall readiness assessment.

In 1996, we reported that this system’s effectiveness for reporting unit 

chemical and biological defense readiness was limited for a variety of 

reasons. For example, although the reporting of critical equipment 

shortages was required, the determination of which equipment was critical 

was left up to the unit commander. As a result, data across units were 

inconsistent. Also, units were not required to report on some critical 

equipment items if they were being centrally stored as opposed to being on 

hand in the individual units, thus presenting an inaccurate picture of their 

equipment status. Our report recommended that DOD consider modifying 

the Status of Resources and Training System to require that chemical and 

biological readiness be factored into units’ overall readiness assessments. 

However, DOD disagreed with this recommendation, stating that this 

reporting system provided a broad range of information on selected unit 

status indicators and was not intended to function as a detailed 

management tool. Nevertheless, DOD officials told us that unit 

commanders would no longer be allowed to subjectively determine what 

equipment is critical for reporting purposes.

In April 2000, the Joint Staff directed changes to the system that make the 

units’ chemical and biological defense readiness data much more 

comparable to their overall readiness data.9

 For example, the new guidance 

requires the units to (1) report on the availability of chemical and biological 

defense equipment and supplies and training status and (2) assign a 

chemical and biological defense readiness rating to their units. The 

chemical and biological defense readiness rating would be in addition to 

the units’ overall readiness rating. The guidance, however, does not require 

reporting on equipment serviceability or personnel on hand as is required 

for the unit’s overall readiness rating. During this and prior reviews, we 

were told of and observed equipment that was unserviceable and yet 

9

The changes are found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02, 

April 15, 2000. 
Page 17 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

reported as being on hand for readiness reporting. Thus, despite the recent 

changes to the readiness reporting system, these reports could indicate 

that a unit had all its chemical and biological defense equipment, but not 

show that some of the equipment was unserviceable.

Conclusions DOD believes that chemical and biological weapons are likely to be used in 

a conflict to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics and to potentially offset 

the overwhelming conventional warfare capabilities of U.S. forces. 

Chemical and biological defense equipment, supplies, and training are 

essential to counter this threat. Although the units we reviewed have 

improved in the equipment and supplies they have on hand, our current and 

prior work as well as the work of the DOD’s Inspector General found that 

commanders were not integrating chemical and biological defense into unit 

exercises and the training that was conducted was not always realistic in 

terms of how units would operate in war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Status of Resources and Training System is used 

to measure the extent individual service units possess the required 

resources and training to complete their wartime missions. Recent changes 

to the system are a step in the right direction to improving chemical and 

biological defense readiness reporting, but the changes do not require units 

to report on the condition of their chemical and biological defense 

equipment. Thus, these reports could provide incomplete or misleading 

information on the status of equipment, a key element included in 

assessing overall unit readiness. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To further improve the readiness of U.S. forces and the effectiveness of the 

readiness reporting system, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps to require that units include realistic chemical and 

biological defense training in exercises. We also recommend that these 

exercises adhere to realistic wartime scenarios. Finally, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to enhance the Status of Resources and Training System by including 

the condition of chemical and biological equipment in its chemical and 

biological readiness ratings.
Page 18 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Deputy for Chemical/Biological Defense, Office of the Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs, provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD 

partially concurred on the recommendations in the draft report. Regarding 

our first recommendation, DOD concurred and stated that it has taken 

actions and has on-going actions to improve chemical and biological 

defense training. For example, DOD stated that the April 2000 Defense 

Planning Guidance directs the services and Commander in Chiefs to ensure 

that routine individual, unit, joint, and combined training and exercises 

incorporate realistic chemical and biological warfare threats. Also, to 

facilitate the proper training of U.S. forces to counter chemical and 

biological warfare threats or use, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

will ensure that the Universal Joint Task List includes chemical and 

biological conditions in all applicable tasks. Moreover, combatant 

commanders, service component commands, combat support agencies, 

and services are working towards the full integration of chemical and 

biological defense related Joint Mission Essential Tasks into joint training. 

Our draft report submitted to DOD for comments recommended that DOD 

further improve the Status of Resources and Training System by including 

the condition of chemical and biological equipment and the on-hand levels 

of chemical and biological personnel in its chemical and biological 

readiness ratings. DOD disagreed with those recommended improvements. 

It stated that, although the Status of Resources and Training System should 

be enhanced, revising the current system further by adding additional 

reporting requirements for chemical personnel and equipment condition is 

unnecessary and would place redundant requirements on unit 

commanders. DOD said that (1) the only chemical personnel not captured 

in the system are the small numbers of chemical soldiers assigned to other 

than chemical units, (2) because of the small numbers of personnel 

involved, designating chemical and biological defense personnel as a 

critical specialty could distort readiness reports, and (3) personnel 

shortages can be highlighted in commanders’ comments, which are 

included in the Status of Resources and Training System. We agree with 

DOD’s position on chemical personnel and have deleted reference to this 

part of the recommendation.

With regards to the condition of chemical and biological equipment in 

readiness ratings, DOD said that the majority of this equipment, primarily 

individual protection and unit detection equipment, is presently reported as 

either fully serviceable or not reported at all. It stated that the serviceability 
Page 19 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

of unit-level power-driven decontamination systems is presently not 

reported but that the services are being encouraged to incorporate the 

serviceability of these systems into readiness ratings and that they are 

currently performing analyses to determine the feasibility of doing this.

We continue to believe that the new chemical and biological reporting 

requirement in the Status of Resources and Training System should require 

the separate reporting of both on-hand equipment levels and the 

serviceability of this equipment. We acknowledge that this distinction may 

not be as important for some types of individual protective equipment as 

mentioned in DOD’s comments above. However, much of a military unit’s 

capability to perform essential chemical and biological defense functions—

such as the detection of chemical and biological agents and the 

decontamination of major items of equipment—is dependent on unit as 

opposed to individual equipment. As stated previously, during this and 

prior reviews, we were told of and observed equipment that was 

unserviceable and yet reported as being on hand for readiness reports. For 

example, in a recent review of deployed forces, we found that a large unit 

overseas was reporting that it had all of its power-driven decontamination 

systems on hand and was consistently reporting a high degree of unit 

readiness. However, unit personnel could not locate over half of the 

systems and only one system that they located was known to have a usable 

water storage bladder, which is critical to the system’s effectiveness. 

Moreover, it took unit personnel several attempts over 2 hours and partial 

disassembly and cleaning of this system’s motor before the system could be 

operated. In ongoing work, we continue to find problems with equipment 

serviceability, including individual protective equipment, in some units 

reporting high levels of readiness in the chemical and biological portion of 

their Status of Resources and Training System report. Furthermore, the 

April 2000 changes to the Status of Resources and Training System now 

require the units to report on the availability of chemical and biological 

equipment and supplies and training status and to assign a chemical and 

biological defense readiness rating to their units. The system previously 

required and still requires that units report on these elements as well as 

equipment serviceability for overall readiness reporting. Therefore, we do 

not believe the reporting on equipment serviceability would be redundant 

but rather it would improve the visibility of the real status of chemical and 

biological equipment. 

DOD also provided some technical comments, which we incorporated into 

the report, where appropriate. DOD’s overall comments are included in 

appendix III. 
Page 20 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine whether U.S. forces were adequately equipped, staffed, and 

trained, we compared service- and command-level requirements for 

chemical and biological defense to the equipment and personnel reported 

to be on hand and to the training that had been conducted at selected units 

of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. We discussed with key command 

and unit officials the significance of any reported shortages of equipment 

or personnel. We also discussed with officials whether equipment reported 

as on hand was in working condition. During our observation of storage 

locations, we randomly selected some items of equipment and asked unit 

officials to operate them for us. We reviewed training reports and held 

discussions with officials on the extent to which chemical and biological 

factors were included in the major training exercises. The units visited 

were one Marine Corps expeditionary force, two Air Force fighter wings, 

and three Army divisions. We also interviewed officials and obtained 

documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; the headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force; U.S. Joint 

Forces Command; Army Forces Command; and the Air Force Air Combat 

Command.

To determine what actions had been taken to improve chemical and 

biological defense readiness reporting, we reviewed recent revisions to the 

guidance for preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports 

and discussed these changes with officials from the staff of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. We also compared these revisions to our prior recommendations 

and to the conditions that we found at the units visited to determine if the 

revisions would adequately surface readiness problems.

Our review was conducted from February through September 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; General James 

Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and interested congressional 

committees. Copies of this report will also be made available to others 

upon request. 
Page 21 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Please contact me at (202) 512-6020 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Robert 

Pelletier, Connie Sawyer, Linda Koetter, and William Cawood.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond Decker

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management 
Page 22 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix I

Individual Protective Equipment ApendxiI

Equipment Description

M256 chemical agent detector kit Kit is used to detect and identify concentrations of nerve agents (e.g., sarin, tabun), 

blister agents (e.g., mustard, phosgene oxime), and blood agents (e.g., hydrogen 

cyanide and cyanogen chloride) in vapor form in about 15-20 minutes.

M9 detector paper

M8 detector paper

Dye impregnated papers that change color when exposed to liquid chemical agents 

or aerosols.

M291 skin decontamination kit Kit consists of fiber applicator pads which enable individual to remove, neutralize, 

and destroy chemical warfare agents on contaminated skin.

M295 equipment decontamination kit Kit consists of individual mitts which enable the individual to remove, neutralize, or 

destroy chemical agents and toxins on personal items and equipment.

C2/C2A1 filters The filters are used with the protective mask and provide the ingredients that 

absorb chemical agent particles as small as .3 microns in size.

Protective mask Masks that provide face and respiratory protection from chemical and biological 

agents, toxins, and radioactive fallout particles.

Chemical protective helmet covers and hoods These items fit over the helmet to protect the individual against chemical and 

biological agents.

Battlefield protective suit A garment that is typically worn over the duty uniform to protect the individual 

against chemical agent vapors and liquid droplets, biological agents, and 

radioactive particles.

Chemical protective gloves Rubber outer gloves for protection from chemical agents and a cotton inner glove 

for perspiration absorption. 

Chemical protective overshoes Overshoes that are worn over the combat boots to provide chemical agent and/or 

moisture protection.
Page 23 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II

Medical Decontamination Supplies ApendxiI

The Army maintains its medical decontamination supplies in kits. The three 

units we visited were required to have 12, 32, and 46 kits comprised of the 

items in table 3.

Table 3: Required Medical Decontamination Supplies for Army Units

Source: Army units.

Table 4 provides a list of medical decontamination supplies that are 

required by the Air Force units we visited and the on-hand amounts and 

percent.

Description Authorized

Scissors bandage 16

Hypodermic syringe 1

Folding litter support 8

Folding litter 2

No. 4 chest 3

No. 6 chest 1

M8 chemical agent paper 6

M9 chemical agent paper 1

Calcium hyprochlorite 49

Decontaminating kit 2

Utility pail 10

Black pencil 2

Cellulose sponge 10

Plastic bag 2

Roll, plastic sheet 1

Apron, toxic agent protect, small 2

Apron, toxic agent protect, medium 4

Apron, toxic agent protect, large 2

Chemical protective glove set, small 2

Chemical protective glove set, medium 4

Chemical protective glove set, large 2

Chemical gloves insert, small 25

Chemical gloves insert, medium 25
Appendix II

Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 24 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Table 4: Required Medical Decontamination Supplies for Air Force Units

Unit A Unit B

Description Critical Required On hand

Percent

on hand On hand

Percent

on hand

Aircraft cargo pallet X 1 1 100 1 100

Top cargo net tie down X 1 1 100 1 100

Side cargo net tie down X 2 2 100 2 100

Insecticide sprayer 2 2 100 2 100

Air conditioner, 50/60 HZ 2 2 100 2 100

Decontaminating kit 100 100 100 48 48

Chemical/biological mask, hood X 160 160 100 268 167

Chemical/biological mask, small X 7 6 86 6 86

Chemical/biological mask, medium X 38 3 8 0 0

Chemical/biological mask, large X 7 2 29 7 100

Chemical/biological mask, canister X 160 117 73 160 100

Manual inflating pump X 1 1 100 1 100

Centrifugal pump unit 1 1 100 1 100

Dry chemical water purifier X 2 2 100 2 100

Rubber water hose, 50 feet X 16 16 100 16 100

Garden hose nozzle X 4 4 100 4 100

Crash steel blade knife X 10 10 100 10 100

Safety rescue knife X 20 20 100 20 100

Shovel 4 4 100 4 100

Collapsible fabric tank X 2 3 150 1 50

Standard distribution box X 2 2 100 2 100

Distribution box X 2 2 100 2 100

Convenience outlet accessory X 3 0 0 3 100

Nonrechargeable battery 9 9 100 9 100

Electric power cable assembly 100 feet X 3 3 100 3 100

Right angle flashlight 40 40 100 40 100

Fluorescent light set X 5 5 100 5 100

Povidone-Iodine cleaner, 1 gallon 6 6 100 10 167

Gauze surgical sponge X 24 24 100 35 146

Surgical sponge, 12 ply X 24 24 100 220 92

Tongue depressor 5 5 100 5 100

Scissors bandage X 80 76 95 80 100

Hand operated resuscitator X 2 2 100 2 100
Appendix II

Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 25 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Wheeled litter carrier X 14 14 100 14 100

Aluminum litter, polegreen X 12 14 117 15 125

Chemical agent detector paper X 50 50 100 50 100

Chemical detector kit X 10 10 100 10 100

Chemical agent monitor X 6 6 100 2 33

Chemical agent paper X 20 20 100 20 100

Simulator detector ticket X 3 3 100 3 100

ADM 300A multifunction survey meter X 3 3 100 3 100

Radiac verification kit X 1 1 100 1 100

Calcium hypochlorite tech 5 5 100 0 0

Skin decontaminating kit X 2 2 100 2 100

Individual decontaminating kit 4 2 50 4 100

Folding steel chair X 12 12 100 12 100

Food storage shelving 2 0 0 2 100

Utility pail X 20 12 60 35 175

Waste receptacle, 32 gallon 15 9 60 15 100

Steel dustpan, 7 inches long 2 2 100 2 100

Plastic coat hanger 40 0 0 41 102

Pressure sensitive adhesive tape X 20 20 100 20 100

Bench dusting brush 13 inches 6 6 100 6 100

Upright broom 2 2 100 4 200

Plastic bag 1 1 100 1 100

Plastic bag, 60 X 36 200S X 1 1 100 1 100

Ship and storage container X 2 3 150 2 100

Pin tent wood 24 inches long X 60 60 100 60 100

Pin tent 0.625 X 12 inches X 60 60 100 60 100

Single ply floor tent X 4 4 100 7 175

Tent pin container X 3 3 100 3 100

Fly, tent X 4 4 100 4 100

Fly, tent section TAN X 5 5 100 5 100

Tent door X 2 2 100 2 100

Tent window X 8 8 100 13 162

Frame section, tent X 10 10 100 10 100

Apron toxic agent, protect M-2 X 20 20 100 20 100

Apron toxic agent, protect M-2 X 20 20 100 20 100

Unit A Unit B

Description Critical Required On hand

Percent

on hand On hand

Percent

on hand
Appendix II

Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 26 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

a

No requirement for the unit.

Source: Air Force units

Chemical protective suit, small X 5 4 80 5 100

Chemical protective suit, medium X 80 25 31 80 100

Chemical protective suit, large X 80 27 34 80 100

Glove insert large X 160 160 100 161 101

Black rubber chemical gloves, small X 10 10 100 10 100

Black rubber chemical gloves, medium X 160 160 100 160 100

Black rubber chemical gloves, large X 10 10 100 10 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 8 X 20 20 100 20 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 9 X 50 50 100 50 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 10 X 50 50 100 50 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 11 X 30 30 100 30 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 12 X 10 10 100 10 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 13 X 20 21 105 20 100

Overshoes chemical, mens 14 X 20 20 100 20 100

Trunk locker plywood 2 2 100 2 100

Diatomaceous earth 50 pound 3 3 100 3 100

Contamination sign kit 2 2 100 2 100

Battery charger analyzer 1 a 0 0

Chemical protective suit, x-large 5 a 5 100

Unit A Unit B

Description Critical Required On hand

Percent

on hand On hand

Percent

on hand
Page 27 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO-01-27 Chemical and Biological Defense

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