IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TYRONE TRADER, * 

Petitioner, * 

v. * No.: 04-680-06 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, * Honorable Judge Jan E. DuBois 

Respondent. . RECENEO .lU~ \ i 'l.0\!» 

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO 

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE~-,.,,,,~ ~\Ji; ..... ,,% 

Now respectfully comes the Petitioner, TYRONE TRADER, pro se, and hereby submits 

this Reply to Government's Opposition 1 to Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, 

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,§ 2255. 

GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY RAISED 

The following claims for relief were raised in petitioner's initial § 2255 motion. 

•:• 1. Petitioner's convictions and sentences are based upon insufficient evidence. 

•!• 2. The evidence in this case demonstrated the existence of a multiple conspiracy. 

•:• 3. The evidence supporting the drug distribution charges was admitted in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because petitioner was not 

allowed to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 

•:• 4. The government's representatives engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. 

•:• 5. Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, in violation 

of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

•:• 6. The cumulative error doctrine requires that petitioner receive a new trial. 

•:• 7. The procedural default doctrine does not preclude relief in this case. 

GROUNDS RAISED IN AMENDED PETITION 

Petitioner submitted an amended petition raising the following claims: 

1 Hereinafter referred to as "Opposition" or "Opp." 

1 
~ Petitioner's Life sentence is unconstitutional. 

~ The trial court abused its discretion and enhanced the testimony of certain law 

enforcement officers by allowing those same agents to sit at the prosecution table 

during trial. 

Petitioner will reply to the government's opposition as follows.2 

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

The government's first position in its opposition is that: 

"Trader's claim of insufficiency of the evidence should be barred from the 

Court's analysis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) because the Third Circuit 

Court of Appeals previously adjudicated the issue on Defendant's direct 

appeal." Id. Opp. at 14. 

Petitioner responds to this assertion by the government arguing it must be rejected 

because the United States has improperly inserted the savings clause of § 2255 to argue 

petitioner can not be granted relief on his sufficiency of the evidence claim. 

Section 2255(e) applies, contrary to the facts here, where a petitioner attempts to file a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 2241. Under such 

circumstance and as a threshold matter, the petitioner must demonstrate § 2255 is inadequate or 

ineffective to challenge the legality of the person's detention. The government's argument that 

the savings clause prevents relief in this instance does not apply because petitioner Trader has 

not attempted to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

The government has asserted, 

"Both in a post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and on appeal to the 

Third Circuit, Trader argued there was insufficient evidence to establish that 

the quantity of cocaine that the defendant conspired to distribute was 5 

kilograms or more of cocaine and that the Court improperlv relied on the jury's 

finding in sentencing the defendant. The appellate Court rejected both 

arguments." Id. Opp. at 14. (emphasis added). 

2 Petitioner will not rehash the claims made in his pro se motion to vacate sentence; however, in this filing, 

petitioner will briefly reply to certain portions of the government's opposition which deserve a response. 

2 
The government is incorrect in this assertion. Petitioner is not advancing a claim which 

was rejected by the appellate court. Government counsel has misapprehended the extent of 

petitioner's present argument. A fair and impartial review of this claim demonstrates petitioner 

argues, not that the Court improperly relied on the jury's verdict, but that the specific quantity 

findings made by the sentencing court demonstrate petitioner was not involved in conspiring to 

demonstrate in excess of 5 kilograms of cocaine, but less than 240 grams. 

The government has also argued, 

"Here, Trader yet again attempts to argue that the government presented 

insufficient evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy, and the ultimate 

quantity attributable to him. These issues are virtually identical as the quantity 

attributable to the defendant and his involvement in the conspiracy was a 

fundamental component for the Third Circuit finding sufficient evidence to 

convict defendant of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. " 

Id. Opp. at 14. (emphasis added). 

This argument by the government indicates it did not research the facts surrounding this 

claim. These issues are not virtually identical, and the appellate court has not been presented 

with the instant claim for appellate adjudication. 

The government also discussed the cause and prejudice components of the procedural 

default doctrine as a defense to the present claim. The government is correct in stating, 

"The sole exception to this rule exists when a defendant can show 'cause' for 

not raising the claim, and 'prejudice' from not having done so. " Id. Opp. at 

15. 

However, the government is wrong to suggest, 

"Trader attempts to establish 'cause' by asserting that his trial and appellate 

counsel suggested that he wait until after his appeal to present these claims. 

Trader argues that counsel suggested these claims were meritorious but chose 

not to bring them up at trial or on appeal. Trader offers no evidence in support 

of this claim, and none can be (ound (rom a review of the record, leaving only 

Trader's bare assertion to support his 'cause' claim." Id. Opp. at 16. 

(emphasis added). 

3 
The government's suggestion that petitioner can not demonstrate cause for the failure to 

raise his present claims on direct appeal does not take into account the Supreme Court's decision 

in Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 146 L.Ed.2d 518, 120 S.Ct. 1587 (2000), where the 

Court held: 

"Procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim held to provide 

cause excusing procedural default of other claim in federal habeas proceedings 

only if petitioner showed cause and prejudice with respect to counsel claim. " 

Id. 

In addition, on related facts, the Third Circuit has issued a non-precedential decision in 

Peters v. Folino, 450 Fed. App'x 127 (3d Cir. 2011), which supports petitioner's argument that he 

can meet the requirements of the procedural default doctrine, i.e., cause and prejudice: 

"In order for attorney ineffectiveness to constitute 'cause' sufficient to satisfy 

the 'cause and prejudice' exception, the claim 'must be presented to the ... courts 

as an independent claim be/ ore it may be used to establish cause or procedural 

def a ult. " Id. 

The government's position concludes petitioner is not able to satisfy the cause and 

prejudice standards because "Trader offers no evidence in support of this claim, and none can be 

{Ound from a review of the record, leaving only Trader's bare assertion to support his 'cause' 

claim." Id. 

However, the government is mistaken for several reasons: (1) petitioner has offered 

evidence which complies with the cause requirement of procedural default by asserting (and 

previously swearing under penalty of perjury) that conversations occurred between petitioner 

and counsel concerning whether certain issues should be argued during appeal, and counsel 

decided that these meritorious issues should be reserved until the post-conviction stages;3 (2) the 

government can not realistically be expected to conduct a "review" of the trial record to 

3 See, also, Declaration of Tyrone Trader, attached as Exhibit One. (Petitioner initially submitted a sworn 

declaration when the initial § 2255 motion was filed. The government has not contested or attempted to refute the 

truthfulness of the earlier declaration and petitioner continues to assert the truthfulness of the earlier declaration). 

4 
determine whether petitioner possesses a legitimate claim or whether he has satisfied his burden 

of proving constitutional violations (for the government to suggest the contrary makes a mockery 

of the adversary process); and, (3) since petitioner's assertions were left uncontroverted because 

the government did not provide an affidavit from counsel, this demonstrates the existence of 

factors in dispute which warrants an evidentiary hearing. To conclude otherwise would cause 

the Court to render a decision which is not factually sound nor based upon the existing record of 

this case. 

The opposition suggests this Court should not determine petitioner has satisfied the cause 

standard by stating: 

"Trader did not bring the following claims on appeal, no exception applies. and 

Trader cannot sufficiently prove cause or prejudice, ... " Id. Opp. at 16. 

(emphasis added). 

In making this statement, the government has attempted to seek complete dismissal of 

petitioner's motion to vacate sentence by urging this Court not to conduct an independent review 

and assessment of each claim pursuant to appropriate judicial precedent. The government is 

wrong to suggest relief should be denied, without simultaneously requesting this Court to 

determine whether petitioner has satisfied the standards applicable to the procedural default 

doctrine. 

The government has also erred in determining petitioner's claim of evidence insufficiency 

must fail because of the following improper conclusions the government has reached: 

"As referenced above, defendant's claim that the government did not prove at 

trial the quantity of cocaine with which he should be held responsible under 

Count One was previously raised by Trader on appeal to the Third Circuit, and 

therefore should be dismissed." Id. Opp. at 18, fn. 6. 

"Using the lowest amount purchased, 4.5 ounces, throughout a 60 week 

conspiracy, the total amount of cocaine Stillis bought from Green alone would 

exceed 7.5 kilograms. The amount is likely understated as Wilson testified that 

5 
Stillis sometimes bought larger quantities. And of course, in turn, Stillis' 

distributors, including Trader, distributed the cocaine. " Id. Opp. at 19. 

"The evidence also supported the finding that the quantity of cocaine that the 

organization distributed exceeded the amount that it purchased, because the 

cocaine was 'stepped on' or 'cut' (diluted) with Inositol or another substance !!r. 

street level sellers. At trial, seller Richard Robinson testified that the sellers at 

least doubled the weight of what Stillis gave them when cut. Police 

corroborated this testimony by finding two bottles of Inositol, a chemical agent 

that dealers use to cut cocaine, in Wilson's car when he was arrested on 

unrelated charges." Id. Opp. at 20. 

The preceding references noted within the government's opposition show the United 

States' response to petitioner's claim concerning Count One must be rejected because: (1) the 

argument raised on direct appeal was not the same as presented in the instance complaint; (2) the 

government's response actually supports petitioner claims that, on a maximum level, petitioner 

only possessed a buyer-seller relationship with those alleged to be ringleaders of the charged 

drug conspiracy; and (3) there was no direct evidence or testimony demonstrating that all of the 

charged defendants cut the alleged drugs or took any other steps to increase potential quantity 

and profits. 

Further, in relation to a buyer-seller relationship, the government unintentionally supports 

petitioner's position by stating: 

"Alternatively, the quantities that the individual sellers received from Stillis also 

show the volume that the conspiracy distributed. " Id. Opp. at 2. (emphasis 

added). 

The government's opposition further demonstrates it was unsure of the quantity of drugs 

which should be attributed to petitioner, but then the United States engaged in speculation 

regarding drug quantity in its effort to manipulate petitioner's sentence: 

"Lastly, adding the quantities of cocaine from the individual transactions 

testified to at trial gives an illustration, albeit incomplete, of the amount of 

cocaine the conspiracy distributed." Id. Opp. at 20. (emphasis added). 

6 
The evidence in this case was insufficient because the highest quantity of drugs 

attributable to petitioner comes from the alleged transaction which occurred with Trooper 

Miscannon: 

"The quantities of cocaine most precisely measured are sales to undercover 

state troopers. On July 15, 2004, Stillis and Defendant sold Trooper Miscannon 

9 ounces (244 grams) for $4,200. Other conspirators sold Troopers 230 grams 

of cocaine from August 6, 2003 through May 6, 2004." Id. Opp. at 21. 

Where is evidence that the government speculated about drug quantity associated with 

petitioner? Speculation comes from the following statement noted by the United States in its 

opposition: 

States: 

"Just this handful of sales to undercover officers amounted to nearly a halfkilogram of cocaine, hinting at the bulk this conspiracy was ultimately able to 

move. " Id. Opp. at 21. 

Petitioner also urges this Court to disregard the following conclusion of the United 

"The application of Pinkerton provides that the actions of a conspirator or 

many conspirators make all those involved in the conspiracy responsible for the 

crimes committed in furtherance of their agreement. Pinkerton liability 

eviscerates the defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim regarding the 

quantity of cocaine as Trader remains liable (or whatever quantity the 

conspiracy distributed as a whole as long as it was reasonably foreseeable to 

him. " Id. Opp. at 22. 

Petitioner disagrees with the government's assessment of this claim because the United 

States has argued petitioner must be held accountable for a quantity of cocaine which is greater 

than the lower quantity this Court specifically found at sentencing. 

In support of petitioner's contention, this Court's attention is directed to the recent 

decision in United States v. Davison, 761 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2014). In Davison, the appellate 

court held that the sentencing judge erred by holding the defendant responsible for all 

7 
foreseeable drug sales by other conspirators without making an additional finding that the 

defendant agreed to help make those sales. The Davison Court further held: 

"[W]hether the defendant is liable at sentencing for drug sales made by coconspirators 'depends not only on whether the sale quantity was foreseeable to 

him (which the district court held it was), but also on whether he joined with 

other conspirators in a joint undertaking of which the making of those sales 

was an objective, or had agreed to join in such an undertaking." Id. (emphasis 

added). 

Finally, the Davison decision provides the following factors which must be considered in 

the instant case and which demonstrates the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction 

here: 

"The district court and the government equated 'jointly undertaken criminal 

activity' with conspiracy, and that is incorrect ... Neither the district court nor the 

government pointed to evidence in the record that the defendant agreed to help 

co-conspirators with their drug sales, and the defendant might have entered 

into the conspiracy only to supply himself with his own inventory ... " Id. 

(emphasis added). 

For the reasons stated above, the government's argument that petitioner can not prevail on 

the present claim is unjustified and not supported by statutory interpretation, nor judicial 

precedent. 

AIDING & ABETTING 

The government argues petitioner was properly held to be an aider & abettor of the 

alleged drug transaction which occurred between Trooper Miscannon and Defendant Stillis on 

July 15, 2004. The government suggests the following in support of its position: 

"[T]here exists overwhelming evidence that Trader had precise and explicit 

knowledge of the circumstances providing a basis for his charges. As 

previously stated, defendant distributed the cocaine provided by Stillis. 

Furthermore, Miscannon fa state trooper] testified that during the course of the 

nine ounce sale of cocaine on July 15, 2004, by Stillis and Trader, Trader 

advised Miscannon of the superior quality of the cocaine, which alone suffices 

to establish the 'knowing' threshold to establish his role in aiding and abetting 

the transaction. " Id. Opp. at 24. 

8 
Based upon this suggestion, the government believes an alleged post-transaction 

statement by petitioner to the State trooper demonstrates petitioner aided or abetted this offense. 

No evidence nor testimony was offered to show petitioner attempted to make this offense 

succeed, or that petitioner performed any other act to encourage or procure this transaction. 

In addition, the government's argument does not take into consideration relevant Circuit 

precedent on this issue. In particular, in United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841 (3d Cir. 2010), 

the Court held: 

"The relevant inquiry on appeal is whether any reasonable juror could find that 

Mercado facilitated the drug transaction. One who aids and abets the 

possession, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled substance ... is 

punishable as a principal. One is guilty of aiding and abetting if the 

government proves: (1) that another committed a substantive offense; and (2) 

the one charged with aiding and abetting knew of the commission of the 

substantive offense and acted to facilitate it ... Additionally, we require proofthat 

the defendant had the specific intent to facilitate the crime. United States v. 

Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 1999)." Id. (emphasis added). 

The evidence presented at trial regarding aiding & abetting liability was lacking because, 

as shown, supra, the government was required, but did not, present evidence that petitioner knew 

a drug transaction would take place and that petitioner had the specific intent to facilitate the 

alleged drug transaction. For these reasons, relief at this juncture is required. 

MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES 

The government is correct in its opposition where it asserted: 

"Multiple conspiracies . exist instead when 'separate networks operat[e] 

independently of each other. " Id. Opp. at 26. 

However, the United States' position regarding this claim is in error because it relies on 

the following to support its argument: 

"[T]he facts presented at trial proved that one conspiracy existed - from Smith 

to Green, Green to Stillis, and Stillis to several street level dealers including 

Trader." Id. Opp. at 27. 

9 
The government's trial theory concerned its belief that several layers were involved in a 

drug conspiracy before the contraband reached the street-level dealers. The government argued 

petitioner was a street-level dealer; however, the United States also argues petitioner should be 

held accountable for the unknown acts of co-conspirators. The government can't have it both 

ways: Either petitioner was a street-level dealer with no knowledge of the activities of those on 

higher levels or individuals who allegedly maintained the same status as petitioner. 

In order for the charged single conspiracy to remain an accurate conviction, there must 

have been proof that each charged co-conspirator maintained the same goals and each person 

engaged in words and/or activities to cause the venture to become successful. Evidence on this 

point was lacking. 

The government offered various forms of proof which indicated many people were 

involved in an alleged criminal venture, but the activities and goals were not the same. The 

proof offered at trial allowed the government to merely lump many people together from a 

general vicinity to sustain each conviction and/or enhanced sentence. 

This case was not a single conspiracy, but, according to the many various and unrelated 

pieces of evidence at trial, demonstrated the existence of multiple conspiracies, which were 

prejudicial to petitioner's legal interests. 

CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 

With regard to this claim, the government states: 

"Trader only cites to a small portion of the record as an example of a purported 

Crawford violation, though he asserts that 'many instances' occurred which 

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Government's careful review of the 

record could not locate any such instances." Id. Opp. at 28. 

First, the government is under the mistaken impression that it represents petitioner and 

that petitioner needs government counsel to conduct a "careful review of the record." Id. 

10 
Petitioner did not request the United States to review the trial record to determine whether 

petitioner has made a legitimate claim of the violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation and cross-examine. 

stated: 

However, the government's position lends credence to petitioner's argument, where it is 

"Miscannon 's testimony related to the cocaine purchase, the field test, and the 

results of the laboratory test of the cocaine he purchased from defendant. He 

did not testify as to the processes of the test or the accuracy - merely that the 

report generated corresponded with cocaine he purchased from defendant ... He 

did not offer testimony concerning specific testing procedures - simply that the 

tests and conclusions corresponded with the evidence Miscannon recovered. " 

Id. Opp. at 29. 

Further, the government makes the following statement concerning this claim: 

"With regard to defendant's Ground Four claim that Trooper Skahill 

impermissibly testified as an expert as opposed to a fact witness at trial, once 

again, defendant misstates the facts. At a sidebar prior to Trooper Skahill 's 

testimony, Judge DuBois stated that 'I think to simplify matters, we will permit 

him [Skahill] to testify as a fact witness, not as an expert witness. " Id. Opp. at 

30. 

Petitioner must first point out that the United States has conceded the accuracy of this 

claim because it has neglected to offer case law or precedent to support its claimed contrary 

position. 

Also, the government has failed to apply the relevant precedent established by the 

Supreme Court and its progeny in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 

L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), while the United States attempts to confuse the issues by engaging in 

impermissible and irrelevant double-talk. This Court should not be swayed by such a strategy. 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court made clear statements which "contain[ed] a testimonial 

certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial," could be "admitted only where 

11 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine. " Id. 

The statements made by Troopers Miscannon and Skahill concerning the results of 

forensic testing of which they did not conduct, and of which the declarant did not testify, violated 

defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination. This is because 

petitioner was not allowed to confront or cross-examine the proponents of the testimonial reports 

offered into evidence via testimony of law enforcement officers who did not possess personal 

knowledge of the conclusions reached by the analysts. Cf. United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 

363 (3d Cir. 2012). 

The State troopers were allowed to provide hearsay testimony on these issues because the 

officers were not directly involved with securing and verifying this evidence in preparation for 

trial. Thus, petitioner's clearly established Sixth Amendment rights were violated and 

impermissible hearsay testimony was admitted during trial. 

PROSECUTOR/AL MISCONDUCT 

Petitioner has presented a claim alleging government counsel engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct during trial. The United States has responded by asserting, 

"Arguing arguendo that any purported instances of 'misconduct' occurred, they 

certainly do not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. They are neither 

'arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudice of the jury[,] nor are 

they 'sufficiently prejudicial' to violate a defendant's due process rights ... [T]he 

instances cited by Trader, are common interactions between the Court and 

counsel." Id. Opp. at 35. 

Petitioner does not contend government counsel made statements which would inflame 

the passions of the jury; however, it is contended the government injected the trial with 

numerous instances of impermissible evidence and testimony which caused this Court to 

admonish government counsel on several occasions. The government's behavior showed its 

12 
intent to impermissibly tip the fair trial scales in its favor, now requiring a new trial in this 

matter. 

CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE 

Rather than deny the existence of numerous individual errors during trial which 

necessitates invocation of the cumulative error doctrine, the government has taken the position 

that relief should be denied because evidence of guilt was overwhelming. No court has 

concurred that there was exceptional evidence presented against petitioner; therefore, the 

government's response on this claim must be rejected: 

"Even if error occurred, Christie provides that where overwhelming evidence of 

guilt exists, a hand/ ul of harmless errors do not contravene the Sixth 

Amendment. Trial can withstand a hand/ ul of errors as long as the evidence 

remains strong. " Id. Opp. at 36. 

The government's argument on this claim appears to concede petitioner is correct in 

arguing the cumulative error doctrine requires a new trial. The United States has neglected to 

provide appropriate or credible authority showing why a new trial is not necessary in this case or 

why petitioner should not be granted relief on this claim; therefore, petitioner urges this Court to 

invoke the cumulative error doctrine by Ordering the government to bring petitioner to trial 

within 120 days from the Court's Order which is necessary and appropriate to cure the many 

separate fundamental rules violations which were intentionally committed by the government, 

which resulted in an unfair trial in this cause. 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Petitioner's post-conviction motion has advanced clear evidence of ineffective assistance 

of trial and appellate counsel. This ineffectiveness has resulted in deficient performance, leading 

to substantial prejudice, contrary to petitioner's constitutional rights. 

13 
The opposition discusses why the government believes the strategies of trial and appellate 

counsel did not result in ineffective assistance. The arguments of the government on this claim 

must be rejected because government counsel has inappropriately invited its personal opinion 

into these proceedings. Without sworn statements and/or testimony from trial and appellate 

counsel, resolution of the instant claim can not occur because an adequate record has not been 

developed. 

EVIDENT/ARY HEARING 

Petitioner asserts an evidentiary hearing is required in this instance, contrary to the 

government's belief. The government suggests, 

"{T]he district court 'need only supplement the factual record when the merits 

of the section 2255 motion may turn on the truth of a non-frivolous allegation. " 

Id. Opp. at 45. 

The government also believes the record needs no supplementation nor testimony from 

counsel. This argument is untenable. The United States has failed to engage in fair play and 

refuses to support this Court's efforts to protect petitioner's constitutional rights, because the 

government argues a hearing is unnecessary: 

"Likewise , defendant has raised no claims that require supplementation of the 

record via testimony of defense counsel, such as a claim that defendant's 

request to testify or call certain witnesses was ignored by counsel. Here, all of 

the defendant's claims may be reviewed, and resolved, on the record as it 

exists. " Id. Opp. at 46, fn. 11. 

As this Court is aware, this case can not be resolved without in-court testimony because 

most of the issues concern private conversations between counsel and petitioner.4 If there is no 

evidentiary hearing, how can the Court make appropriate findings which are necessary to aid 

4

See, United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2005): "The district court is required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing 'unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the movant is not entitled to 

relief' We have characterized this standard as creating a 'reasonably low threshold for habeas petitioners to meet.' 

United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Woodford, 267.F.3d 966, 973 (9th 

Cir. 2001))." 

14 
appellate review? The United States, despite its position to the contrary, must be directed to 

prepare for an evidentiary hearing to resolve each claim raised in this proceeding. 5 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, and any others found just and 

appropriate, Petitioner, TYRONE TRADER, prose, hereby prays this Court will: 

1. Grant petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by Ordering 

petitioner's immediate release from federal confinement; 

2. Grant a new trial in this matter; or, 

3. Order an evidentiary hearing in this case with presentation of sworn testimony of 

the parties involved; and, 

4. Appoint counsel to assist petitioner with further proceedings in this matter. 

Respectfully submitted, 

\ ~ L\'01 i_ 7:>- 0\P..f 

NE TRADER, Petitioner, pro se 

egister Number - 40143-066 

United States Penitentiary 

Post Office Box 2099 

Pollock, Louisiana 71467-2099 

Executed this 5th day of June, 2015. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, TYRONE TRADER, Petitioner, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

mailed to: Katayoun M. Copeland, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, 615 

Chestnut Street, Suite 1250, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-4476. The envelope was placed in the hands of 

federal prison officials for prompt mailing via first-class United States Mail, postage prepaid, on the 5th day of June, 

2015. 

5 Those factors noted in the government's opposition which have not received a response in the instant pleading was 

an intentional act on petitioner's part because the government's position is not justified nor supported by judicial 

precedent or facts from the record. 

15 
STATE OF LOUISIANA 

PARISH OF GRANT 

DECLARATION OF TYRONE TRADER 

I, TYRONE TRADER, am sui juris and compos mentis and this statement is made of my 

own free will, without improper influence or duress of any sort. 

This Declaration is made in support of my request for post-conviction relief before the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Case No. 04-680-06. 

1. I swear that all of the allegations, statements and contentions which were made 

by me in my prose motion, filed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 2255, are true and 

correct. No material falsehood is presented in the motion. 

2. All allegations concerning private conversations with counsel are true and I did 

not provide any false statement or claim against counsel concerning our personal and private 

communications. 

THIS DECLARATION IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF 

MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND IS MADE 

UNDER THE PAINS AND PENALTIES OF PERJURY. 

Executed this 5th day of June, 2015. 

EXHIBIT ONE 

16