17 December 2003

Doctrine for Joint

Special Operations

Joint Publication 3-05
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides the overarching doctrinal guidance for the conduct of joint special

operations (SO) across the full range of military operations. It describes the characteristics of

special operations forces (SOF), joint SOF core tasks; the typical organization; and command

and control of SOF. It further provides a joint force commander (JFC) the guidance and

information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for SOF. This

publication summarizes support requirements necessary to conduct SO missions and defines the

training and education responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command,

geographic combatant commanders, and the Services.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces

of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement

in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of

authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint operations

and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from

organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to

ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of

these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one

Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service

support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,

this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part

of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine
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Preface

JP 3-05

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine

and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. J. KEATING

VADM, USN

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, DATED 17 APRIL 1998

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Adds a discussion of special operations and principles for military operations

other than war

Adds a discussion on the nature of special operations warfare

Revises discussion of special operations missions to special operations core

tasks

Deletes special operations collateral activities

Changes mission of “civil affairs” to core task of “civil affairs operations” and

mission of “combatting terrorism” to core task of “counterterrorism”

Clarifies command and control of special operations forces within a theater

Adds a discussion of subordinate command and control organizations

Adds a discussion on the Special Operations Command and Control Element

Deletes the chapter on planning for joint special operations

Adds coverage of air support, geospatial information and services support, and

fire support of special operations forces

Adds an appendix on special operations forces education and training
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Summary of Changes

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1

• Special Operations..................................................................................................... I-1

• Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations........................................... I-2

• Characteristics of Special Operations......................................................................... I-4

• Special Operations and the Principles of War ............................................................. I-5

• Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War................ I-7

• The Nature of Special Operations Warfare ................................................................. I-7

CHAPTER II

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1

• Designated Special Operations Forces ..................................................................... II-1

• Characteristics of Special Operations Forces............................................................ II-2

• Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks..................................................................... II-3

CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1

• Assignment of Special Operations Forces ............................................................... III-2

• Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater .............................. III-3

• Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination, and

Liaison Elements ............................................................................................... III-10

• Joint Special Operations Area ............................................................................... III-13

CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ IV-1

• Intelligence Support of Special Operations Forces .................................................. IV-1

• Logistic Support of Special Operations Forces........................................................ IV-2

• Medical Support of Special Operations Forces........................................................ IV-4

• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of

Special Operations Forces ................................................................................... IV-5

• Public Affairs Support of Special Operations Forces ............................................... IV-6
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JP 3-05

• Legal Support of Special Operations Forces............................................................ IV-6

• Combat Camera Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................... IV-7

• Air Support to Special Operations Forces ............................................................... IV-7

• Space Support of Special Operations Forces ........................................................... IV-7

• Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of Special Operations Forces .............. IV-7

• Geospatial Information and Services Support of Special Operations Forces ............ IV-8

• Fire Support to Special Operations Forces .............................................................. IV-9

APPENDIX

A Special Operations Forces Education and Training ............................................. A-1

B References ......................................................................................................... B-1

C Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ C-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Principles of War ............................................................................................ I-5

I-2 Principles for Military Operations Other Than War.......................................... I-8

II-1 Special Operations Forces Truths .................................................................. II-4

II-2 Special Operations Core Tasks ...................................................................... II-5

II-3 Civil-Military Operations Relationships ....................................................... II-11

III-1 Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control ................. III-3

III-2 Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command

and Control ................................................................................................. III-5

III-3 Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component Command

and Control ................................................................................................ III-6

III-4 Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Elements................................ III-7

III-5 Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions............................. III-12

IV-1 Examples of Special Operations Forces Intelligence Requirements............... IV-2

IV-2 Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement ................................ IV-4

IV-3 Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces ...................................... IV-8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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vii

Provides an Overview of Joint Special Operations

Discusses the Forces and Core Tasks Used in Joint Special Operations

Describes Command and Control of Joint Special Operations

Discusses the Support of Joint Special Operations

Describes Education and Training of Special Operations Forces

An Overview of Joint Special Operations

Special operations (SO)

have become an integral

part of a theater campaign

across the range of

military operations.

The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on

individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of

specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with

adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The

small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short

periods of time) of special operations forces (SOF) operational

units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate

military responses. These responses may not entail the degree

of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with

employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional

forces. Although SO may be conducted as a single-Service

operation, they routinely require joint support and

coordination. In addition to being conducted across the full

range of military operations, SO may be focused on the strategic,

operational, or tactical levels of war. SO are characterized by

certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from

conventional operations. SO can be designed and conducted to

influence the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create

conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives.

Alternatively, SO may be principally offensive, of high physical

and political risk, and directed at high-value, and often timesensitive targets. The principles of war (objective, offensive,

mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security,

surprise, and simplicity) and the principles of military

operations other than war (objective, unity of effort, security,

restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) apply to SO in the same

way they apply to conventional operations. Commanders and

SO planners must understand these principles and how they relate
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Executive Summary

JP 3-05

Success by a small force

against a strategic or

operational objective

usually requires units with

combinations of special

equipment, training,

people, or tactics that go

beyond those found in

conventional units.

Successful execution of

SO requires clear,

responsive, command and

control (C2) by an

appropriate special

operations forces (SOF)

C2 element.

to SO. They must also understand the importance of integrating

and synchronizing SO with conventional missions.

The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or

operational targets with small units drives the formation of special

units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities. The demands

of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them

from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with

these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are

compatible with their capabilities. SOF are not a substitute for

conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing

conventional capabilities.

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to

accomplish nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance,

foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare,

counterterrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs

operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

and information operations.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF

based in the United States are under the combatant command

(command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, US Special

Operations Command. SOF assigned to a theater are under the

COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. Within a

geographic combatant command, command and control (C2)

of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command.

Normally, C2 of SOF is executed through either the theater special

operations command (TSOC) or a joint special operations task

force. Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and civil affairs

support both SO and conventional operations; their C2

relationships will reflect this. Deconfliction and coordination

with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SOF

commanders. To fully integrate SO and conventional operations,

SOF must maintain effective liaison with all components of

the joint force to ensure that unity of effort is maintained and risk

of fratricide is minimized.

Forces and Core Tasks

Command and Control
ix

Executive Summary

SOF require equipment

and support that are

tailored to specific mission

requirements, yet are

flexible enough to

respond to changing

employment parameters.

The joint character of SO requires support arrangements across

Service lines in order to sustain operations that are often

independent and remote. Further, SOF must be able to exploit

the full range of available national support systems such as those

offered by emerging technologies and space-based assets.

Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is

vital in determining SO mission objectives, identifying relevant

targets, and mission planning and execution. The nature of many

SO objectives and tactics requires intelligence support that is

frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional

operations. Counterintelligence support must also be

considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions. The TSOC

commander (or, when a joint task force is established, the joint

force special operations component commander) determines

logistic requirements for in-theater SOF for the geographic

combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF can be provided

through one or more of the following: Service support, joint intheater support, nonstandard support, SO-peculiar support or hostnation support. SOF medical support is characterized by an

austere structure and a limited number of personnel with enhanced

medical skills. Provision of medical support beyond SOF

capabilities depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning

with the conventional medical support structure. Command,

control, communications, and computer support to SOF must

be global, secure, jointly interoperable, and flexible so that it can

be tailored to any SO mission. The sensitivity of many SO

mandates thorough and accurate public affairs guidance and

legal support. Combat camera support to SOF is used to

portray the true nature of US operations. Air support is provided

to SOF to facilitate effective and responsive operations. Space

support ensures SOF commanders understand the

capabilities available to support them and facilitate or enable

effective operations. Meteorological and oceanographic

support services are critical to the success of SO missions. From

initial planning through execution, environmental information

should be included in the decision-making process.

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces
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Executive Summary

JP 3-05

CONCLUSION

SOF require a combination of education, basic military

training, and specialized skill training to achieve operational

proficiency. SOF-specific training includes both individual skill

training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness.

This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution

of joint special operations across the range of military operations.

It also provides guidance for commanders who determine the

force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational

requirements necessary to prepare SOF to conduct the tasks herein

described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary

to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions

appropriate for SOF.

Education and Training

SOF require education

and training that are

tailored to specific

requirements.
CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

I-1

“Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious

violence, coups d’état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks,

pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug

traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global

economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects

in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a “many small wars” scenario

is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call

“special operations” or “special forces” — the niche warriors of tomorrow.”

Alvin and Heidi Toffler

War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century

1993

1. Introduction

This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant

commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special

operations (SO). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military

commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) of special operations forces

(SOF) when assigned to a geographic combatant commander, subordinate unified commander,

or a joint task force (JTF) commander. Specific SO operational guidelines are provided in Joint

Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations

Task Force Operations, JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special

Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, JP

3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

2. Special Operations

a. These are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to

achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities

for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require

covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations.

They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other

government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces.

SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques,

mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational

intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SO are an integral part of theater campaigns. While SO can be conducted unilaterally

in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and

conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO must

complement — not compete with nor be a substitute for — conventional operations.
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JP 3-05

c. The successful conduct of SO relies on individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude

of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation,

and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of

time) of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military

responses. These responses may not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation

normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.

d. SO can be conducted directly against an adversary by forces acting in a single

engagement such as a raid against a critical communications node, or indirectly, for example,

by organizing, training, and supporting an indigenous force for unconventional warfare (UW),

or a host nation (HN) force for foreign internal defense (FID), or through the use of psychological

operations (PSYOP) to influence the opposing military or the local civilian populace. In all

cases, the results are normally disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

e. SO are inherently joint. Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation,

most are planned and executed as a joint operation. SO routinely require joint support and

coordination.

3. Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations

Military operations are conducted across a range consisting of two general states: war

and military operations other than war (MOOTW). This model assists the geographic combatant

commander in articulating strategic situations within a theater that are described by a variety of political,

Special operations forces are made up of individuals highly proficient

in specialized combat skills.
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Overview of Joint Special Operations

economic, and military conditions. Although each state within the range of military operations is described

in discrete terms, in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular

state ends and another begins. The model gives the JFC the ability to describe any situation in

clear terms and allows the JFC to define needs, devise strategies, and project resources to

meet the threat. SO are not bound by any specific environment. The principles by which SO are

planned and conducted apply equally to both war and MOOTW.

a. War. SO can be conducted across the range of military operations at all levels of war

and throughout all phases of a joint campaign. Commanders and planners should focus SO at

strategic and operational levels to maximize efficiency. SO can also be applied tactically although

the greatest utility is at the strategic level.

(1) The President designates national objectives and sanctions the military means

to achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SO may be conducted under the direct supervision

of the President or Secretary of Defense.

(2) Theater objectives are established by geographic combatant commanders,

based on national objectives, and are an integral part of a theater campaign plan. The integration

of SO through the theater special operations command (TSOC) can help the commander attain

these objectives.

(3) Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater

objectives and lead directly to theater success. SO provide the JFC with a selective, flexible

deterrent option or crisis response capability to achieve operational objectives.

(4) SO may be conducted in support of a conventional force’s tactical objectives when

doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that

conventional force.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS STRATEGIC UTILITY

1942, World War II, the German command ordered an increase in production

of “heavy water” at the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork, in occupied Norway.

This was the world’s only facility capable of manufacturing sufficient

quantities of the element essential to the development and production of

an atomic bomb. Churchill and Roosevelt were aware they were in a race

with Hitler for possession of a strategic weapon powerful enough to

determine the fate of the free world, accordingly the plant was ordered

destroyed.

The reinforced construction of the plant and location of its critical processing

machinery in the basement eliminated attack by bomber because of the

lack of aircraft capable of the mission. The plant was built on a cliffside in

a remote mountainous area and almost impregnable to ground attack.
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JP 3-05

In November 1942, after a glider-borne commando operation failed and its

survivors were executed by the Gestapo, the British Special Operations

Executive (SOE) took over the project. A four-man SOE Norwegian advance

team parachuted in several months prior to receiving a six-man assault

force also inserted by parachute. The assault force, using cover as students

on a skiing vacation, reconnoitered the plant from a safe distance and located

a lightly secured point of entry. On the night of 27/28 February 1943, the

assault team slipped into the plant, destroyed the heavy water production

machinery, and quickly retired into the surrounding mountains. The

Germans, with great difficulty, restored limited heavy water production. In

November 1943, the US 8th Air Force launched an unsuccessful raid on the

plant, causing casualties and loss of property in the nearby civilian

community. In February 1944, a member of the SOE assault team sabotaged

and sank a ferry carrying two railway cars of heavy water across a deep

lake en route to Germany.

The effect of the operation put an end to Germany’s strategic atomic bomb

program. Hitler then redirected his scientists to concentrate on the V1 and

V2 rockets, which history has shown had little effect on Great Britain’s ability

to wage war other than increase the resolve of the British people.

Thomas Gallagher

Assault in Norway. 1975

M.R.D. Foot

SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946. 1984

b. MOOTW. MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of

national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated

with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States with the overarching

objectives of deterring war and promoting peace, they also can include military support to US civil

authorities. Especially when conducted outside the US, SO may be the best means of achieving

certain objectives, and commanders and their staffs should be familiar with SOF capabilities when

developing theater plans.

4. Characteristics of Special Operations

a. SO are characterized by certain attributes that distinguish them from conventional

operations. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership

and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. This may

involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, SO may be

principally directed at high-value targets of strategic significance. Such operations are

often time-sensitive and rely on surprise, security, and audacity, and frequently employ deception

to achieve success. These missions can be overt, clandestine, or covert in nature. Some operations

may involve high physical and political risk, and can offer the potential for high returns, but

rarely a second chance should a first attempt fail.
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Overview of Joint Special Operations

b. SO normally require tactical-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s)

and language(s) of the area where the mission is to be conducted. Rigorous training and rehearsals

of the mission are integral to the conduct of all operations.

c. SO are often conducted at great distances from operational bases employing sophisticated

communication systems and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return

from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

d. SO frequently require a high degree of discriminate and precise use of force. SOF

require unique training and may also require the development, acquisition, and employment of

weapons and equipment not standard for other Armed Forces of the United States.

5. Special Operations and the Principles of War

The principles of war apply to SO in the same way they apply to conventional operations.

However, in some cases, specific principles have different emphases in the conduct of SO,

primarily because SO are conducted by small units that seldom work with large formations or

sizable reserves. Commanders and staffs must understand the principles of war — and how they

relate to SO. The principles are an important doctrinal foundation and are essential to

understanding and mastering warfare (see Figure I-1).

Figure I-1. Principles of War

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Objective

Surprise

Simplicity

Security

Offensive

PRINCIPLES

OF WAR

Mass

Economy of

Force

Maneuver

Unity of

Command
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JP 3-05

a. Objective.SO are best employed in support of JFCs’ strategic or operational objectives.

Many missions are characterized as limited, surgical, physically challenging, low profile, and sometimes

separate from the immediate battlefield.

b. Offensive. The lethal application of SO is inherently offensive in nature because they

seek to strike or engage an adversary to compel or deter his actions. The unique manner of

application of SOF offensive capabilities assists JFCs in achieving results that may be unattainable

by larger conventional forces.

c. Mass. SO concentrate combat power at critical times and in discriminate places to

achieve decisive results. Massing combat power while avoiding concentration of forces can

enable numerically inferior SOF to achieve decisive results while minimizing both human loss

and the wasting of resources. SOF’s ability to strike at key nodes may create results equivalent

to those achievable by large force concentrations.

d. Economy of Force. Economy of force is critical to the successful conduct of SO given

the small size and lack of redundant capabilities inherent in SO tactical units.

e. Maneuver. SOF capability to maneuver allows them to strike adversaries where and

when they are most vulnerable and to avoid their strengths.

f. Unity of Command. Unity of command fosters unity of effort and allows the JFC to

integrate and synchronize SO with every aspect of the campaign. SOF C2 architecture is

often tailored for each mission to achieve this end.

g. Security. SO planning and execution require high levels of security integrated fully with operations

security (OPSEC) and force protection to protect the clandestine/covert nature of missions. Due to

operational and political sensitivities the planning and execution of many SO are compartmentalized

and limited only to personnel with a need to know. SO must balance security concerns with the

need to rehearse and to integrate operations with other committed forces to facilitate unity of effort and

help avoid fratricide. In addition, proper security planning and execution is essential to SOF force

protection. Given their operating size, SOF are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their

presence than larger conventional units.

h. Surprise. Surprise is often the most important principle in the conduct of successful SO

and the survivability of employed SOF. Even if complete strategic surprise is unattainable, an SO

must achieve operational and tactical surprise to the extent that the adversary cannot react effectively.

i. Simplicity. Although SOF may require sophisticated and often unorthodox methods and

equipment, the plans that drive their employment must be simple and direct in order to facilitate

understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and adapt to changing situations.
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Overview of Joint Special Operations

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

On the night of 19-20 December 1989, special operations forces (SOF),

organized into a 4,400-man joint special operations task force (JSOTF),

spearheaded Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. US Army

Rangers conducted pre-dawn airborne seizures of critical airfields. Navy

sea-air-land teams (SEALs) were employed to block possible escape routes

of Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega, by denying him the use of

his Learjet at Paitilla Airport and disabling a Panamanian Defense Force

(PDF) patrol boat in Balboa Harbor. Air Force Special Operations aircraft

provided aerial insertion, pinpoint target interdiction, and aerial fire support.

Army special forces (SF) set up a surveillance and antiarmor blocking

position at the Pacora River bridge and conducted other operations to

disable critical Panamanian telecommunications sites. SF and SEALs also

conducted direct action raids and roll-up operations against Noriega’s

infrastructure. The JSOTF accepted Noriega’s surrender at the Papal

Nunciatura after an 11-day standoff. Subsequent to the initial assaults,

Spanish-speaking SF soldiers — often backed up by Air Force Special

Operations Forces gunships, Rangers, and conventional forces — were used

to convince scattered PDF quartels to surrender peacefully. Army and Air

Force psychological operations units communicated a call for surrender to

PDF units, “dignity battalions,” and other hostile parties via radio, television,

print, and loudspeaker. As Operation JUST CAUSE gave way to Operation

PROMOTE LIBERTY, civil affairs and other SOF units were employed to

reconstitute the country’s political, economic, and security infrastructure.

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

6. Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

SOF and their unique capabilities are valuable assets when conducting MOOTW. SOF are

area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the cultures and languages

found in an operational area. SOF units can provide liaison to facilitate multinational and

interagency interoperability. The principles for MOOTW are shown in Figure I-2.

For further details see JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for

Military Operations Other Than War.

7. The Nature of Special Operations Warfare

The following apply to SO across the range of military operations:

a. Tempo. Tempo is critical to SOF’s ability to conduct SO. Rapid execution of a mission allows

SOF to mass combat power at the critical place and time, accomplish the mission, withdraw before the

adversary can react, and then attack again. A high tempo offsets small numbers and limited firepower

by never allowing the adversary to bring his main strength (weight of numbers) to bear on committed
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JP 3-05

SOF. At the same time, a high tempo provides security through speed, allowing acceptance of a higher

degree of risk than would be otherwise possible.

b. Preemption. SOF preempt the adversary by neutralizing its capabilities before the fight —

either directly or in support of conventional forces. SOF do this through FID and UW efforts to build

indigenous defense and intelligence capabilities; PSYOP directed at the adversary’s leadership, armed

forces, and populace; civil-military operations (CMO) in areas brought under friendly control;

counterproliferation activities to slow or inhibit development of a capability; direct action (DA) missions

against an adversary’s critical operational or strategic targets; and counterterrorist operations. Deployed

SOF often provide the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC with first-hand information

regarding local population perspectives, intentions, and other information.

c. Dislocation. SO dislocate the adversary force from chosen positions either by forcing it

to move from these positions or by rendering its strength useless or irrelevant to the fight. DA

missions may force the adversary to reposition combat forces away from the main battle area to

protect lines of communications (LOCs) and other vulnerable areas. PSYOP as part of information

operations (IO) may create diversions or deceptions that will cause the adversary to deploy in a

manner favorable to friendly forces. SOF possess the capabilities to organize and direct large indigenous

Figure I-2. Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

OTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE

SECURITY

PERSEVERANCE

UNITY OF EFFORT

RESTRAINT

LEGITIMACY

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and

attainable objective

Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational

advantage

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in

support of strategic aims

Seek unity of effort in every operation

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the

host government, where applicable
I-9

Overview of Joint Special Operations

forces that cause the adversary to spread its forces thin (through UW) or assist an HN in creating a

military shield (through FID), behind which other government agencies can operate to remove the

causes of insurgency.

d. Disruption. SO disrupt the adversary through attacks against strategic and operational targets

and centers of gravity. This may preclude the adversary from conducting successful countermoves. SO

can disrupt the adversary through special reconnaissance support of operational actions by conventional

forces, DA strikes against critical operational targets, IO to disrupt adversary decision makers, and

PSYOP directed at civilian and military leaders, military forces, and the adversary population – as well

as an adversary’s political, economic, or military allies. Indigenous forces, trained through UW operations,

can attack an adversary directly, thus disrupting its operations. When employed, SOF seek to avoid

adversary strengths, and create and attack adversary vulnerabilities.

e. Exploitation. SO can provide the conventional force commander multiple means to

attack the adversary’s will to resist. Exploiting psychological vulnerabilities can demoralize

adversary troops, weaken the resolve of adversary leaders, separate the civilian population of an

adversary nation from its leadership, and reduce or eliminate any external source of support.

DA and UW can create the impression that there are too many forces for the adversary to counter

effectively. With no safe areas, and adversary forces in rear areas subject to attack at any time,

adversary morale can be significantly weakened.

f. Main Effort. The commander will designate a main effort for every operation. The activity,

unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. The commander

should be prepared to change a main effort as the situation develops in order to exploit opportunities or

to deal with crises as they arise. Generally, the main effort should be aimed at some critical adversary

vulnerability (object or characteristic) which if attacked will contribute most directly to accomplishment

of the mission.

g. Intelligence. SOF require timely, responsive, and accurate intelligence support to

overcome their relative lack of size and firepower. Initially, SOF commanders use intelligence

to find adversary weaknesses/vulnerabilities and avoid adversary strengths. Perfect intelligence

is rarely if ever obtainable, but adequate, timely intelligence is a prerequisite for successful

operations. Leaders must be able to act with less than perfect intelligence.

h. Decentralization. While SO personnel should be included in centralized planning at

the combatant commander and subordinate JFC levels, successful SO requires decentralized

planning and execution for individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination

by SOF leaders at every echelon are vital to successful SO.

i. Initiative. SOF encourage an ability and willingness to make independent, time-critical

decisions using all available information and guidance presented in higher headquarters (HQ)

commander’s intent.

j. Operational Mission Criteria. The employment of SOF in support of the joint force campaign

or operation plan is facilitated by five basic criteria. These criteria provide guidelines for both conventional
I-10

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JP 3-05

and SOF commanders and planners to use when considering the employment of SOF.

(1) Is this an appropriate SOF mission?

(2) Does the mission support the JFC’s campaign or operation plan?

(3) Is the mission operationally feasible?

(4) Are required resources available to execute the mission?

(5) Does the expected outcome of the mission justify the risk?
CHAPTER II

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS

II-1

“The modernization goal is a joint special operations forces (SOF) capability,

quantitatively and qualitatively manned, trained and equipped to react swiftly to

conduct a wide range of special operations missions worldwide, across the full

spectrum of conflict and crisis, . . . This capability must be founded on

comprehensive joint doctrine, inclusion of SOF in all joint plans and, wherever

feasible, in joint exercises, and the provision of dedicated and augmenting units

forward deployed in, or immediately deployable to, all unified commands.”

Casper Weinberger

Secretary of Defense 1981-1987

1. Introduction

a. Throughout history, success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective

usually has required units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics

that go beyond those found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such units

to be employed in unconventional ways for which the adversary often was unprepared.

b. Conventional units are not normally trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO;

any wholesale change to do so would restrict their ability to conduct their own mission-essential

tasks. The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small

units drive the formation of special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities.

c. SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167 or

those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Designated Special Operations Forces

a. US Army. Special forces (SF), Ranger, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA),

PSYOP, and civil affairs (CA) units, both of the active and reserve components.

b. US Navy. Sea-air-land team (SEAL), SEAL delivery vehicle team, and special boat

team units, both of the active and reserve components.

c. US Air Force (USAF). SO flying (does not include USAF rescue/combat search and

rescue units), special tactics, combat weather, and FID units, both of the active and reserve

components.

d. Conventional units conducting or supporting SO. Designated SOF are the force of

choice for the conduct of SO. However, under certain circumstances, conventional forces

may be tasked to conduct limited SO on a mission-specific, case-by-case basis. Commanders

should base this decision on the availability of SOF, the mission requirements, and the capabilities

of available conventional forces. In addition, certain conventional forces receive enhanced
II-2

Chapter II

JP 3-05

training and/or equipment to support SO and have developed habitual relationships with SOF

units to conduct these missions.

3. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces

a. SOF are inherently joint. SOF conduct joint and combined training regularly, both within the

SOF community and with conventional forces. SOF and their command elements routinely plan and

execute joint operations. The SOF C2 structure is capable of and should be used to integrate SOF into

joint force plans easily and effectively. SOF can conduct a wide range of operations in war and

MOOTW, including a surgical, rapid, worldwide strike capability. Additionally, SOF routinely operate

closely with other US Government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), and other nations’ military forces.

b. SOF are distinct from conventional forces. The demands of SO require forces with

attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with

these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities.

(1) Most SOF personnel undergo a careful selection process and mission-specific

training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make

unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities.

(2) SOF are composed of mature and experienced personnel, many of whom maintain

a high level of competency in more than one military specialty.

(3) Selected SOF are regionally oriented for employment; cross-cultural

communications skills are a routine part of their training.

c. SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing

conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in

conjunction with conventional forces. SOF should not be used for operations whenever

conventional forces can accomplish the mission. When fully integrated into the joint campaign

plan, SOF can complement conventional forces allowing the JFC to achieve an objective that

might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in

SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise,

and focused use of force.

d. SOF Capabilities. SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that provide

a JFC with an extremely flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing

scenarios. They can:

(1) Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to

many different situations.

(2) Gain access to hostile or denied areas.
II-3

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

(3) Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support.

(4) Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.

(5) Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.

(6) Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.

(7) Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.

(8) Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.

(9) Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger

conventional forces.

(10) Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.

e. SOF Limitations

(1) Improper employment of SOF could result in the depletion of forces. SOF

require a long lead-time to be effectively fielded. SOF cannot be quickly replaced/reconstituted

nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded. Improper employment of SO resources in purely

conventional roles or on inappropriate/inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of depleting

these resources rapidly (see Figure II-1).

(2) SOF should normally be employed against targets with strategic or operational

relevance. Such employment is congruent with the use of limited SOF resources.

(3) SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. In most cases SOF are neither

trained nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations, and therefore should

not be substituted for conventional units that are able to effectively execute that mission.

(4) SOF logistic support is austere. A large number of SOF units generally cannot

maintain themselves for extended periods of time without significant support from a conventional

support structure.

4. Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks

SOF perform two types of activities. They perform tasks that no other forces in the Department of

Defense (DOD) conduct, and they perform tasks that other forces in Department of Defense conduct

but do so to a unique set of conditions and standards. By performing these tasks, SOF offers Department

of Defense an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives. SOF are specifically organized,

trained, and equipped to accomplish the following nine core tasks: direct action, special

reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism,

counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological
II-4

Chapter II

JP 3-05

operations, and information operations (see Figure II-2). These core tasks represent the collective

capabilities of all SOF rather than those of any one unit.

a. Direct Action. These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions

conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and

which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or

damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical

and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force

to achieve specific objectives. Activities within DA include the following:

(1) Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults. These are operations designed to achieve

specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results. They are sometimes beyond the effective

strike capabilities of conventional force elements. Such operations typically involve attacks on critical

targets, interdiction of LOCs or other target systems, capturing designated personnel or material; or the

seizure, destruction, or neutralization of adversary facilities or capabilities.

(2) Standoff Attacks. These are attacks by weapon systems or through IO. Standoff

attacks can be conducted by air, maritime, or by ground platforms or units. When targets can

be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat forces, these

attacks can be performed as independent actions.

Figure II-1. Special Operations Forces Truths

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TRUTHS

Humans are more important

than hardware

Quality is better

than quantity

Special operations

forces cannot be mass

produced

Competent

special operations forces

cannot be created after

emergencies arise
II-5

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

(3) Terminal Attack Control and Terminal Guidance Operations. These are actions

to identify and precisely report the location of targets, and with global positioning systems, laser

designators, beacons, or other means, conduct either terminal attack control (TAC) or terminal

guidance operations (TGO) to effectively engage them. TAC involves actions to control the

maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. TGO includes any

electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or

weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. TAC differs from TGO

in that TAC includes the authority to clear aircraft to release ordnance and TGO does not. Because

of this, TAC requires individuals to be qualified as joint terminal attack controllers, but TGO

does not.

(4) Recovery Operations. These are operations conducted to search for, locate,

identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

SO recovery missions are characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough

intelligence analysis. These operations employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine

search, possible indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

(5) Precision Destruction Operations. These are operations in which collateral damage

must be minimized, requiring highly sophisticated weapons and/or timed detonation of specific amounts

of explosives placed in exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision destruction operations

Figure II-2. Special Operations Core Tasks

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE TASKS

Direct Action

Civil Affairs Operations

Special Reconnaissance

Psychological Operations

Foreign Internal Defense

Information Operations

Unconventional Warfare

Counterterrorism

Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
II-6

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JP 3-05

can be conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first strike success

or when the contents of a facility must be destroyed without damage to that facility.

(6) Anti-Surface Operations. These are operations conducted against adversary maritime

surface targets, including combatants. These include, but are not limited to, visit, board, search, and

seizure operations which are shipboarding operations to board and seize cooperative, uncooperative,

or hostile contacts of interest.

b. Special Reconnaissance (SR). These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions

conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect

or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities

not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for

commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Even

with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be

obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF’s highly

developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications,

and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces or

assets. Activities within SR include the following:

(1) Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted to collect and

report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information.

(2) Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that involve locating and attacking

targets of opportunity, e.g., adversary materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned general areas or

Special operations forces have a highly developed capability to get in and out

of hostile or denied areas.
II-7

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

along assigned LOCs. Armed reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific

identified targets.

(3) Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations conducted to detect, identify,

locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of weapons. This type of

operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to include collateral damage) of

a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or toxic industrial material site.

(4) Poststrike Reconnaissance. These operations are undertaken for the purpose of

gathering information used to measure results of a strike.

c. Foreign Internal Defense. These are operations that involve participation by civilian

and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government

or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,

and insurgency. Both conventional and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID

missions. SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity is to assess, train, advise, and assist

HN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities.

The goal is to enable these forces to maintain the HN’s internal stability, to counter subversion

and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability. Internal stability forms the

shield behind which a nation-building campaign can succeed. Successful FID missions can lead

to strategic successes for US foreign policy. FID activities include the following:

(1) HN Military Assistance. These are operations that train HN military individuals

and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills,

provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques,

and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and

develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills.

(2) Population Security. These are operations that strengthen population security by

providing supervision of tactical operations conducted by HN military units to neutralize and

destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil population, and protect the civil

population. As a subset of FID, designated SOF units may also train select HN forces to perform

counterterrorist missions.

For more details on FID, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign

Internal Defense (FID).

d. Unconventional Warfare. These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military

and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or

by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in

varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either be conducted as

part of a geographic combatant commander’s overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate

campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives

and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements.
II-8

Chapter II

JP 3-05

UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil

populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to

develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further

US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and

assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required,

accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the

focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain.

Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set of

circumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent

mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited

to, the following activities:

(1) Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by

irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. It is the military

aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla warfare techniques

can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as

destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.

(2) Subversion. These operations are designed to undermine the military, economic,

psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of

subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

(3) Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act or acts with intent to injure,

interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or

attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to

include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes

hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

(4) Intelligence Activities. These activities assess areas of interest ranging from

political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces.

SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning

and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition

forces.

(5) Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These operations consist of UW forces

establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted

recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military

and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas

under friendly control.
II-9

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

In early November, 2001 Army Special Forces teams (often reinforced with

Air Force Special Tactics Team members) infiltrated Afghanistan via Special

Operations Forces (SOF) aircraft and linked up with anti-Taliban Afghan

forces. Their unconventional warfare (UW) mission was to facilitate the

overthrow of the Taliban regime. These SOF teams immediately gained

the confidence of the Afghans, and between the intelligence they received

from the Afghans and what they were able to determine themselves, the

arrival of the SOF teams produced an immediate and exponential increase

in the number of Taliban targets that could be identified to conventional

strike aircraft. In addition to radically increasing the effectiveness of United

States airpower, the UW teams also improved the effectiveness of the Afghan

anti-Taliban forces they joined. Less than a month after the first UW team

arrived in country, the fall of the Taliban had begun, and in the weeks that

followed, the last regions under Taliban control were liberated by anti-Taliban

Afghan forces.

Source: United States Special Operations Command

Public Affairs Office

e. Counterterrorism (CT). These are operations that include the offensive measures

taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. SOF’s role and additive capability is

to conduct offensive measures within DOD’s overall combatting terrorism efforts. SOF conduct

CT missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. SOF’s activities

within CT include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks

and infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations,

and non-kinetic activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism.

(1) Intelligence Operations. These are operations to collect, exploit, and report

information on terrorist organizations, personnel, assets, and/or activities. SOF have the capability

to conduct these operations in an overt, covert, and/or clandestine manner.

(2) Network and Infrastructure Attacks. These are operations that involve

preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations with the objective of destroying, disorganizing,

or disarming terrorist organizations before they can strike targets of national interest.

(3) Hostage or Sensitive Materiel Recovery. These are operations conducted to

rescue hostages and/or recover sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring capabilities

not normally found in conventional military units. The safety of the hostages and preventing

destruction of the sensitive materiel are essential mission requirements.

(4) Non-Kinetic Activities. These are actions that are focused on defeating the ideologies

or motivations that spawn terrorism by non-kinetic means. These could include, but are not limited to,

PSYOP, IO, CA operations, UW and/or FID.
II-10

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JP 3-05

f. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). CP refers to

actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of CP

are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and their delivery systems; roll back proliferation where it has

occurred; deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems; and adapt US military forces and planning

to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. The continued spread of

WMD technology can foster regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and

potent weapons. The core capabilities of CP include counterforce, active defense, passive defense,

and consequence management. SOF focus on counterforce tasks and conduct CP missions as special

operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.

For more details on CP, see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations.

g. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). These consist of CA activities and other tasks

conducted by CA to support commanders conducting CMO.

(1) Commanders have an inherent responsibility to maintain proper, prudent and lawful

relations with the indigenous population, authorities, and government within their operational

areas. These relations are facilitated through CMO.

(2) Specialized CMO support is provided by CA personnel assigned as staff who

plan, coordinate, and oversee CMO while implementation is performed by other elements of

the joint force (i.e., other SOF, engineers, health services support, transportation, military police,

security, and maneuver units).

(3) CA support to CMO enhances military effectiveness by focusing efforts to minimize

civilian interference with military operations and limit the adverse impact of military operations

on civilian populations and resources. CA give commanders the capability to coordinate and

provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of a civilian

population.

(4) CA activities include, when directed and by operational necessity, establishing

and conducting a military government or civil administration within operational areas until

civilian authority or government can be restored or transitioned to other appropriate authorities.

These activities are planned and conducted by CA and involve application of functional specialty

expertise in civil sector disciplines normally the responsibility of civil government (see Figure

II-3).

(5) CA operations are predominantly joint, interagency, and multinational in nature and are

conducted through or with indigenous populations, authorities and institutions, international organizations,

and NGOs.

For more detailed information on CMO and CA activities, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for CivilMilitary Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
II-11

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

h. PSYOP. These are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to

foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior

of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce

or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the JFC’s objectives. Planning and

employment considerations include:

(1) Force Multiplier. PSYOP are among the most effective nonlethal weapons

available to a commander. It can reduce casualties on both sides by reducing the morale and

combat effectiveness of the adversary, creating dissent and disaffection within their ranks,

encouraging surrenders or defections, promoting disobedience, or inducing a lack of support for

a hostile regime within a civilian populace.

(2) Combatant Commander Responsibilities. Each geographic combatant commander

is responsible for conducting PSYOP programs in peacetime. Such efforts are designed to create a

favorable image of the friendly government, of the United States, and of the Armed Forces of the United

States; encourage support for democratic institutions, human rights, regional stability, and counterdrug

activities; and assist a HN in explaining and publicizing humanitarian and civic action projects to local

citizens. When used as part of an integrated theater strategy or strategic information operation,PSYOP

Figure II-3. Civil-Military Operations Relationships

Planned and conducted by CA and

consist of:

CA activities

Specialized support to commanders

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Usually planned by Civil Affairs (CA)

forces but implemented by all elements

of the joint force

JOINT FORCE MILITARY OPERATIONS

The range of military operations from war

to military operations other than war

CIVIL - MILITARY OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIPS
II-12

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JP 3-05

can reduce the probability of conflict, reduce the damage if conflict does occur, and speed the transition

to normality in the postconflict phase.

(3) PSYOP Applications. Taking advantage of their language and culture skills, in-depth

knowledge of the region, and understanding of interagency operations, SOF provide the geographic

combatant commander with a broad range of PSYOP capabilities to be employed independently or in

support of a larger theater campaign. These capabilities include the following:

(a) Developing, Producing, Distributing, and Disseminating. PSYOP units

design, develop, and produce programs. They distribute and disseminate products that support

tactical, operational, and strategic goals.

(b) Coordinating and Directing PSYOP Programs. PSYOP support national

policy goals with programs developed for and approved by higher authority. PSYOP personnel

coordinate with the chain of command to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the program.

(c) Producing PSYOP Studies and Estimates. PSYOP personnel produce and

maintain studies and estimates for the commander. They advise supported commanders on the

expected psychological impacts of their courses of action (COAs). They identify the adversary

PSYOP effort and the susceptibilities of friendly forces.

(d) Support Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), Civilian Internee (CI), and

Dislocated Civilian (DC) Operations. PSYOP support can dispel rumors, create dialogue and

pacify or indoctrinate EPWs, CIs, or DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations,

and ensure safe and humane conditions persist.

(e) Providing Support to HN Assistance Operations. During CMO, PSYOP

personnel may work with CA or conventional units to promote civic action projects either by or

in support of the host government.

(f) Employ Tactical PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP forces, with augmentation, are capable

of providing all functions of PSYOP, on a limited scale, to component commands within a designated

area of operations (AO).

(4) PSYOP Support to Information Operations. PSYOP are a core capability of

IO. PSYOP activities are integrated into IO plans and synchronized with IO objectives and

themes. Mission-type orders and decentralized execution can give PSYOP forces considerable

autonomy to conduct tactical operations within established IO guidance.

For additional information on PSYOP, see JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

i. Information Operations. IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and

information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO may

be conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at every

level of war. IO involve many different capabilities which are applied either individually or
II-13

Special Operations Forces and Their Core Tasks

through integration. Major capabilities include computer network operations, electronic warfare,

operational security, PSYOP, and military deception. Beyond intelligence support, other

capabilities include counterintelligence, physical security, information assurance, public affairs

(PA), and CMO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and

national-level coordination and approval.

For additional information on IO, see JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

III-1

“In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely dispersed and largely

undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing

point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields

or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions

will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society

as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields,

fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because

of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats

of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as

manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint

operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred.”

William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA),

Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC),

Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and

Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR)

The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, 1989

1. Introduction

a. SOF may be assigned to either US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) or

a geographic combatant command. Operational control (OPCON) of SOF assigned to a

geographic combatant command is exercised by the commander of the TSOC. OPCON of SOF

attached to a geographic combatant command is normally exercised by the commander of the

TSOC or other JFC (e.g., commander, joint special operations task force [CDRJSOTF];

commander, joint psychological operations task force; or commander, joint civil-military

operations task force). In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

(1) Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.

(2) Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.

(3) Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support

the operations.

(4) Integrate SOF in the planning process.

(5) Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

b. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan (war or

MOOTW). Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive C2 by an appropriate SOF

C2 element. The limited window of opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions,

as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions, requires a C2 structure that is, above all,
III-2

Chapter III

JP 3-05

responsive to the needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or

operation.

c. Liaison between all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever assigned, is vital

for effective employment of SOF as well as the prevention of fratricide.

2. Assignment of Special Operations Forces

a. SOF in the United States. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all

SOF based in the continental United States are assigned to USSOCOM and are therefore

under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander,

USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM). USSOCOM is a unique unified command in Department of

Defense in that it has the responsibilities of a functional combatant command, has Service-like

responsibilities, and when established as a supported command, plans and conducts certain SO

missions worldwide. CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM over assigned SOF through the

commanders of its Service components or its subordinate unified command.

(1) In its role as a functional combatant command, USSOCOM provides SOF on a

temporary basis to other combatant commands for operational employment. When transferred,

the forces are attached to the gaining combatant command with the geographic combatant

commander normally exercising OPCON over them.

(2) When directed, CDRUSSOCOM will plan and conduct SO missions as the

supported commander. In certain situations, the President or the Secretary of Defense, depending

The nature of SO requires clear, responsive C2 by an appropriate SOF C2 element.
III-3

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

upon the specific mission requirements, could choose to exercise OPCON directly over SOF for a

particular operation without any intervening levels of command.

b. SOF in Theater. SOF assigned to a geographic combatant command are under the

COCOM of the respective geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant

commander normally exercises COCOM of all assigned and OPCON of all attached SOF through

the TSOC commander (see Figure III-1).

c. SOF under control of a non-US command. When directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, geographic combatant

commanders may place SOF units under the control of a non-US multinational forces commander.

In such instances, OPCON of US SOF units will be retained by a US SOF commander within

the multinational command structure.

For further information on command relationships, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF).

3. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater

Normally, C2 of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. C2 of PSYOP and

CA forces, based on their unique role in the theater, is discussed separately in JP 3-53, Doctrine for

Joint Psychological Operations, and JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. The

Figure III-1. Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control

THEATER-LEVEL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Administration and Support

Operational Control

Combatant Command

(command authority)

AFFOR

AFSOF

ARSOF

ARFOR

Air Force Forces

Air Force Special Operations Forces

Army Special Operations Forces

Army Forces

MARFOR

NAVFOR

NAVSOF

TSOC

Marine Corps Forces

Navy Forces

Naval Special Operations Forces

Theater Special Operations Command

MARFOR TSOC

NAVSOF AFSOF ARSOF

Geographic Combatant

Commander

ARFOR AFFOR NAVFOR
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JP 3-05

identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives,

security requirements, and the operational environment. C2 of SOF is executed through one or

more of the following:

a. Theater Special Operations Command. To provide the necessary unity of command, each

geographic combatant commander (except for US Northern Command) has established a TSOC as a

subunified command within the geographic combatant command. The TSOC is the primary theater

SOF organization capable of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities.

The TSOC is also the primary mechanism by which a geographic combatant commander exercises C2

over SOF. The TSOC commander has three principal roles.

(1) Joint Force Commander. As the commander of a subunified command, the

TSOC commander is a JFC. As such, he has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations

as directed by the geographic combatant commander and exercises OPCON of assigned

commands and forces and normally over attached forces as well. The TSOC commander may

establish JTFs that report directly to him, such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or

joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF), in order to plan and execute these missions.

(2) Theater SO Advisor. The TSOC commander advises the geographic combatant

commander and the other component commanders on the proper employment of SOF. The

TSOC commander may develop specific recommendations for the assignment of SOF in theater

and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The role of theater SO

advisor is best accomplished when the geographic combatant commander establishes the TSOC

commander as a special staff officer on the theater staff (in addition to his duties as a

commander — i.e., “dual hatted”). In this case, the TSOC commander may appoint a deputy as

his representative to the theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.

(3) Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC). When

designated by the geographic combatant commander, the TSOC commander will function as a

JFSOCC. This will normally be the case when the geographic combatant commander establishes

functional component commanders for operations, absent the establishment of a JTF. The TSOC

commander can also be designated the JFSOCC within a JTF if the scope of the operations

conducted by the JTF warrant it (see Figure III-2).

b. SOF Operational C2

(1) JFSOCC. The JFSOCC is the commander within a unified command, subordinate

unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations

on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and

assets; planning and coordinating SO; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be

assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned

by the establishing commander. The TSOC commander or CDRJSOTF will normally be the

individual functioning as a JFSOCC. When acting as a JFSOCC, they retain their authority and

responsibilities as JFCs. A JFSOCC may command a single or multiple JSOTFs. The TSOC
III-5

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

commander will normally be established as a JFSOCC if there is more than one JSOTF to command

(see Figure III-3). If only one JSOTF is established (i.e., within a JTF), the CDRJSOTF will be dualhatted as the JFSOCC. When a joint force special operations component is established and combined

with elements from one or more allied or coalition nations, it becomes a combined forces special

operations component and its commander becomes a combined forces special operations component

commander.

Figure III-2. Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command and Control

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUBORDINATE

JOINT FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

JCMOTF

JFACC

JFLCC

JFMCC

JFSOCC

JPOTF

JSOTF

JTF

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Joint Force Air Component Commander

Joint Force Land Component Commander

Joint Force Maritime Component

Commander

Joint Force Special Operations Component

Commander

Joint Psychological Operations Task

Force

Joint Special Operations Task Force

Joint Task Force

Operational Control

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

JFSOCC

JPOTF JCMOTF

JFLCC JFMCC

JSOTF

Army

Component

Marine Corps

Component

Marine Corps

Component*

Theater

Special

Operations

Command

Navy

Component

Navy

Component*

Air Force

Component

Air Force

Component*

Geographic Combatant Commander

Present when a JTF is

established**

* Normally exists if forces from that Service are present in the JTF in order to coordinate/provide support

to those Service forces, both special operations forces and conventional.

**When a JTF is not established, functional component commanders will report directly to the geographic

combatant commander

JFACC

Army

Component*
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JP 3-05

(2) JSOTF. A JSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed

to carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. A

JSOTF may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct

of specific missions. A notional depiction of JSOTF elements is shown in Figure III-4.

(a) A JSOTF, like any JTF, is normally established by a JFC (e.g., a combatant

commander, a subordinate unified commander such as a TSOC commander, or a JTF commander).

For example, a geographic combatant commander could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a

specific region of the theater. Then either the geographic combatant commander or the JTF commander

could establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that JTF, to plan and execute SO. Likewise, a TSOC

commander could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region assigned by the geographic

combatant commander. A JSOTF may also be established as a joint organization and deployed as an

entity from outside the theater.

(b) A JSOTF is established to conduct operations in a specific operational area or to

accomplish a specific mission. If geographically oriented, multiple JSOTFs will normally be assigned

different operational areas.

(c) Within a JTF, if only one JSOTF is established, the CDRJSOTF will be dual-hatted

as the JFSOCC. When a JSOTF is formed to directly support a combatant command headquarters,

the TSOC commander normally acts as the CDRJSOTF. Regardless of who it is, a CDRJSOTF is a

JFC and exercises the authority and responsibility assigned by the establishing authority. A JSOTF staff

is normally drawn from the TSOC staff or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other

SOF or conventional units and/or personnel as appropriate.

(d) When a JSOTF is established and combined with elements from one or more allied

or coalition nations, it becomes a combined special operations task force and its commander becomes

a combined special operations task force commander.

Figure III-3. Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component Command and Control

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

COMPONENT COMMAND AND CONTROL

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

TASK FORCE

NORTH

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

TASK FORCE

SOUTH

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

AIR COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL

OPERATIONS COMPONENT

COMMANDER
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Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

For further information on a JSOTF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for JSOTF Operations.

c. Subordinate C2 Organizations

(1) Air Force SO. Air Force SOF (AFSOF) denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) Air Force Special Operations Component (AFSOC). The AFSOC (not to be

confused with the Air Force Special Operations Command that is the Air Force component of

USSOCOM) is the Air Force component of a joint SO force. It normally is composed of a

special operations wing, special operations group, or special tactics group. When subordinate

Figure III-4. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Elements

NOTIONAL JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK

FORCE ELEMENTS

JSOTF

NAVSOF

AFSOF ARSOA Other

Air Assets

JSOAC

ARSOF

Forces that might

include:

USAF SO

aviation units

Special Tactics

FID units

Forces that might

include:

Army SO

aviation units

Forces made

available

Forces that might

include:

SEALs

Special Boat

Teams

SEAL Delivery

Vehicle Teams

Forces that might

include:

SF

Ranger

PSYOP Units

Civil Affairs

AFSOF

ARSOA

ARSOF

JSOAC

FID

JSOTF

NAVSOF

PSYOP

SEAL

SF

SO

USAF

Air Force Special Operations Forces

Foreign Internal Defense

Army Special Operations Aviation

Army Special Operations Forces

Joint Special Operations Air Component

Joint Special Operations Task Force

Naval Special Operations Forces

Psychological Operations

Sea-air-land Team

Special Forces

Special Operations

United States Air Force

Operational Control
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JP 3-05

Air Force SOF units deploy to forward operations bases (FOBs) or advanced operations bases (AOBs),

the AFSOC commander may establish one or more provisional units.

(b) Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD). The AFSOD is a

squadron-size AFSOF HQ that could be a composite organization composed of different USAF

assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC, JSOTF, joint special

operations air component commander (JSOACC), or JTF depending upon the size and duration

of the operation.

(c) Air Force Special Operations Element (AFSOE). The AFSOE contains

selected AFSOF units and is normally subordinate to a theater AFSOC or AFSOD, depending

upon the size and duration of the operation.

(2) Navy SO. Navy SOF denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) Naval Special Operations Component (NAVSOC). A NAVSOC is the

Navy component of a joint SO force.

(b) Naval Special Warfare Task Force (NSWTF). C2 structure to command

one or more subordinate naval special warfare (NSW) task groups (NSWTGs). A NSWTF may

be commanded by the in-theater NSW unit commander or a designated 0-5/0-6.

(c) Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG). Composed of a C2 element

and one or more subordinate NSW task units (NSWTUs). Standing peacetime deployments

dictate the basic structure of the theater specific NSWTG, and deviations from the basic structure

will be designated as NSWTG plus or minus.

(d) Naval Special Warfare Task Unit. An independent component of a NSWTG

consisting of a C2 element, an operational element, and a mobility element.

(e) Naval Special Warfare Task Element (NSWTE). A NSWTE is a temporary,

task-organized force of a NSWTU, tailored to address a specific operational requirement.

(3) Army SO. Army SOF (ARSOF) denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) Army Special Operations Component (ARSOC). An ARSOC is the Army

component of a joint SO force.

(b) Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF). If there is only one

group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO, it is generally called an ARSOTF. The

CDRJSOTF may establish multiple subordinate ARSOTFs. Each ARSOTF is organized around

the nucleus of a SF or Ranger unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements.

The CDRJSOTF assigns each ARSOTF an area within the joint special operations area (JSOA)

or functional mission.
III-9

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

(c) Special Forces. SF units normally task-organize into a number of operations bases.

Used in this sense, the term “operations base” connotes a headquarters and support element as well as

physical location. SF operations bases include the special forces operations base (SFOB), FOB,

and AOB.

1. Special Forces Operations Base. The SFOB is established by a SF group

to synchronize activities of subordinate FOBs and AOBs. The SFOB normally serves as an

ARSOC or ARSOTF HQ directly subordinate to the CDRJSOTF.

2. Forward Operations Base. A FOB is established by a SF battalion to

control and support deployed operational elements. Tactical SF elements conduct mission

planning and preparation at a FOB. Although generally subordinate to SFOB, an independent

FOB may be established under the OPCON of the CDRJSOTF.

3. Advanced Operations Base. An AOB is established by an SF company

to extend the C2 and support functions of a FOB. For example, an AOB may function as a

launch-and-recovery or radio relay site.

(d) Rangers. Rangers normally exercise C2 through command posts collocated

with other SOF or conventional units. They do not have the organic capability to establish their

own operations bases.

(e) Army Special Operations Aviation. ARSOA are normally assigned to a

JSOTF. OPCON may be exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either functional or Service

components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a joint special operations

air component (JSOAC) is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, and under certain

circumstances, OPCON of ARSOA may be exercised through the JSOACC.

(4) Joint Special Operations Air Component. JSOAC refers to the commander, staff,

and assets of a SO air component of a subordinate unified command, a joint force special operations

component (JFSOC) or a JSOTF. A JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF may establish a JSOAC. It is

established as a functional component within a joint SO force to control SO aviation assets. The

JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for planning and executing joint

SO air activities. This includes the responsibility to coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the

assigned joint SO aviation assets. The establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as

appropriate) normally exercises OPCON of joint SO aviation through a JSOACC. However, there

are also circumstances where the SOF commander may elect to place selected SO aviation assets

under separate control. A JSOAC may be subordinate to a single JSOTF or separate, tasked to

support the activities of multiple JSOTFs within a JFSOC (see Figure III-3). A JSOAC may be a

standing organization or can be formed in response to a contingency or other operation.

d. Interagency C2 Considerations. A JTF HQ is the operational focal point for

participating in interagency coordination. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ provides

the structure for a unified effort. Depending on the level of a JSOTF HQ in the command

structure of an operation, the JSOTF may play a key role in the interagency process. If the JSOTF is
III-10

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JP 3-05

the senior or stand-alone JTF, then, de facto, the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal

point in the interagency process.

For further information on interagency considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination

During Joint Operations.

e. Multinational C2 Considerations. Any control of SOF operating elements transferred

to a foreign commander must include an appropriate SOF C2 element for direct C2 of the

operating elements.

For further information on multinational considerations, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed

Forces (UNAAF).

4. Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination, and Liaison

Elements

 SOF commanders have available specific elements that facilitate C2, coordination,

and liaison. They include the special operations command and control element (SOCCE)

to command and control, and coordinate SOF activities with conventional forces; the special

operations liaison element (SOLE) to provide liaison to the joint force air component

commander (JFACC) or appropriate Service component air C2 facility; and SOF liaison officers

(LNOs) placed in a variety of locations as necessary to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict

SO within the operational area. Although not part of a SOF organization, there is also the

special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) that advises Army corps commanders

on SO. All of these elements significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent

planning, and enhance overall mission accomplishment of the joint force.

a. Special Operations Command and Control Element. The SOCCE is the focal point

for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force operations. It performs C2 or

liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF

commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as appropriate). Its level of authority and responsibility

may vary widely. The SOCCE normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support

of a conventional force. It collocates with the command post of the supported force to coordinate

and deconflict SO with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications

interoperability with that force. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and

target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported

component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, and JSOTF component commanders may attach

liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required. The SOCCE remains under

the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the following functions:

(1) Exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct support of,

the supported conventional commander.

(2) Advises the conventional force commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities,

and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.
III-11

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

(3) Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported force commander’s

current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

(4) Provides required secure communications links.

(5) Coordinates and deconflicts SO activities with supported force operations.

(6) When linkup becomes imminent, assists the supported force commander and staff

with linkup planning and execution.

b. Special Operations Liaison Element

(1) A SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC (if designated) or

appropriate Service component air C2 organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special

operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations.

(2) The SOLE director works directly for the JFSOCC. The SOLE director is not in

the SOF chain of command, and thus command authority for mission tasking, planning, and

execution of SO remains with the JFSOCC. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime,

and air liaison personnel in divisions of the joint air operations center (JAOC) to integrate with

the JFACC staff. The SOLE accomplishes the coordination, deconfliction, and integration of

SOF air, surface, and subsurface operations by providing a SOF presence in the JAOC that is

aware of the activities of SOF units in the field and by providing visibility of SOF operations in

the air tasking order and the airspace control order. The SOLE must also coordinate appropriate

fire support coordinating measures to help avoid fratricide. A notional SOLE consists of 43

personnel, but in practice is tailored as appropriate (see Figure III-5).

c. Special Operations Coordination Element. The SOCOORD serves as the primary

advisor to an Army corps commander with regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations.

The SOCOORD is the functional organic staff element of the corps operations division [G-3].

With augmentation, it can function as the operations directorate Special Operations Division if

the corps is established as a JTF. A SOCOORD, while not organic to a Marine expeditionary

force (MEF), may be established to augment the staff of a MEF.

d. SOF LNOs. SOF LNOs ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support

information to aid mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption

of ongoing operations, or loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination

of fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, PSYOP, CAO, and other

operational issues based on ongoing and projected SO missions. These efforts are crucial to

maintaining the JFC’s unity of effort, tempo, and coordination of limited resources and

assets.
III-12

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JP 3-05

Figure III-5. Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions

NOTIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS

LIAISON ELEMENT FUNCTIONS

ATO

ISR

JAOC

JFACC

JFC

JSOAC

JSOTF

JSRC

JTAC

SO

SOF

SOLE

SPINS

Air Tasking Order

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Joint Air Operations Center

Joint Force Air Component Commander

Joint Force Commander

Joint Special Operations Air Component

Joint Special Operations Task Force

Joint Search and Rescue Center

Joint Technical Augmentation Cell

Special Operations

Special Operations Forces

Special Operations Liaison Element

Special Instructions

SOLE Director (Liaison to JFACC)

STRATEGY DIVISION

Coordinates and synchronizes SO strategy and targets with other components to meet

combatant commander objectives and guidance

Represents the SO component on the Guidance, Apportionment, Targeting Team

Nominates SOF targets for inclusion in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

Provides SOF input for JFC apportionment recommendation decisions

COMBAT PLANS DIVISION

COMBAT OPERATIONS DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE DIVISION

OTHER COORDINATION

Coordinates SOF air requirements within the Master Air Attack Plan

Coordinates with JSOTF/JSOAC on ATO inputs and ensures distributed ATOs are merged

with master ATO

Provides SO input for inclusion in SPINS

Coordinates airspace requirements and deconfliction for future operations

Monitors and coordinates current day flying operations with other components

Deconflicts ongoing SO surface operations in real time with other components

Maintains updated list of team locations for deconfliction

Coordinates support for and prosecution of SOF-monitored targets to include

time-sensitive targets

Coordinates airspace management with JAOC airspace manager

Coordinates ISR requirements for SOF in the field

Provides intelligence support to Combat Plans and Operations Divisions

Coordinates requirements for airfield surveys supporting force basing (Air Mobility

Division)

Coordinates JTAC support for SOF when required

Coordinates with JSRC

Coordinates logistic requirements including supply, transportation, and contracting

(Air Mobility Division)

Coordinates communications requirements, as necessary, for SOF in the field

(Communications Representative)
III-13

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

5. Joint Special Operations Area

a. Coordination and deconfliction with conventional forces are always critical concerns for

SOF commanders. SOF are often employed prior to the arrival of conventional forces. Effective

coordination is vital in the transition from advance force operations involving SOF to follow-on

operations and in ensuring that the timing and tempo of the overall campaign is maintained.

b. The JFC may establish a joint special operations area. A JSOA is a restricted area of

land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to

conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may

further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate

commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’

mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the

number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special

operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or

may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations.

JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same

general operational area. When a JSOA is designated, the JFSOCC (or CDRJSOTF) is the

supported commander within the designated JSOA.

c. While establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent operations

assists in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide, the JFC should always

evaluate the value of isolating SOF against the greater benefit of integrating SOF into the

overall campaign plan.
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JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

IV-1

“Closely allied to the confidence which is due to good leadership is that which is

caused by the feeling of being supported.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Thoughts on War, 1944

1. Introduction

SOF support must be tailored to specific mission requirements yet flexible enough to respond

to changing employment parameters. The joint character of SO requires support arrangements

across Service lines with emphasis on unique support required in order to sustain independent

and remote operations. Further, SOF must be able to exploit information derived from the full

range of available national, theater, and tactical (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)

support systems.

2. Intelligence Support of Special Operations Forces

Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in identifying relevant

targets, COA development, and mission planning/execution. SO require detailed planning, often

by relatively small units. Consequently, intelligence for SO is often broader in scope than that of

conventional forces. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace provides the foundation

for SO intelligence production. Like conventional operations, SO intelligence analysis focuses

on the operational area and the area of interest (AI); however, the strategic nature of SOF missions

frequently incorporates an expanded AI. SO planning requires a comprehensive analysis of the

geopolitical and socioeconomic situation in the operational area and AI to ensure all factors

affecting mission success are considered.

a. Interface with National and Theater Intelligence Assets. The ability to interface with

theater/national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SO mission success. The theater

joint intelligence center (JIC) or joint analysis center is the focal point for intelligence activities

in support of joint operations with additional support from the National Military Joint Intelligence

Center (NMJIC). Joint force requests for information (RFIs) are forwarded to the combatant

command JIC. If the theater JIC is unable to respond, RFIs are forwarded to the NMJIC. The

defense collection coordination center is collocated with the NMJIC and will determine the

appropriate tasking of national assets in response to RFIs. The accomplishment of a SO mission

may depend on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF,

when formed, will have access to these same theater and national interfaces through the theater

JIC and the NMJIC. Additionally, a JSOTF may be augmented with a national intelligence

support team comprised of representatives from many national intelligence and combat support

agencies.

b. All-Source Intelligence. The nature of many SO objectives and tactics requires fused,

all-source intelligence support that is often more detailed than that required in conventional
IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 3-05

operations. SOF often use intelligence information

to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or

composition, as opposed to intelligence

information that would allow conventional forces

to engage the adversary (see Figure IV-1).

c. Expanded Focus During MOOTW.

Intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires

various intelligence disciplines to widen their focus

to include political, informational, economic, and

cultural institutions and relationships as well as

adversary, friendly force, and target specific data.

This is particularly true during FID and when

tasked to participate in noncombatant evacuation

operations.

d. Sensitivity to HN and Adversary Collection Efforts. SO missions are particularly sensitive

to HN and adversary collection efforts. Counterintelligence support and OPSEC assist in protecting

sensitive SOF missions.

For further information on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support

to Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations

Task Force Operations.

3. Logistic Support of Special Operations Forces

Geographic combatant commanders and theater Service component commanders, in coordination

with the TSOC, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are

developed and provided for assigned SOF. The TSOC commander or the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF,

when a JTF is established, validates logistic requirements for SOF in theater for the geographic

combatant commander. To the extent possible, SOF logistic requirements should be identified during

the deliberate planning process. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more

of the following:

a. Service Support. The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service,

except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility

exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the

TSOC, JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOF Service-common logistic support includes equipment, material,

supplies, and services adopted by a military Service for use by its own forces and their activities. These

include standard military items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a

Military Service to support and sustain its own forces, including those forces assigned to the combatant

commands. Items and services defined as Service-common by one Military Service are not necessarily

Service-common for all other Military Services.

Figure IV-1. Examples of Special Operations

Forces Intelligence Requirements

EXAMPLES OF SPECIAL

OPERATIONS FORCES

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:

Terrain, cultural, and demographic factors

Ingress, egress, or cross-country movement analysis

Options for terminal area and evacuation operations

TARGET-SPECIFIC ITEMS:

Graphics

Imagery

Textual elaboration
IV-3

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

b. Joint In-Theater Support. The majority

of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and

execution. When a theater Service component

cannot satisfy its Service SOF support

requirements, the geographic combatant

commander will determine if another Service

component can do so through common or joint

servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements

may also be used when more effective than normal

Service support.

c. Nonstandard Support. When

operations involving SOF impose time,

geographic, and/or resource constraints on the

theater support infrastructure, making it impractical

for the theater to provide the requisite support to

SOF, the geographic combatant commander may

request from CDRUSSOCOM the deployment

of organic USSOCOM combat service support

assets.

d. SO-Peculiar Support. SO-peculiar

logistic support includes equipment, materials,

supplies, and services required for SO missions

for which there is no Service-common requirement.

These are limited to items and services initially

designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for

Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by CDRUSSOCOM

for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services

approved by the CDRUSSOCOM as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special

operations mission. This support will be provided via USSOCOM Service component logistic

infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components.

e. Host-Nation Support (HNS). Countries with or without a government infrastructure may

only be able to provide limited support. To negotiate for HNS, authority must be obtained through the

Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State.

For further information on SOF logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of

Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations

Task Force Operations.

Support, both of intelligence and material, is

essential for successful Special Operations

planning.
IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 3-05

4. Medical Support of Special Operations Forces

a. Austere SOF Support Structure. SOF medical support is characterized by an austere

structure and a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel

provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the operational team level. Medical

support and patient movement (see Figure IV-2) provided to SOF units in the operational area is

planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

for SOF personnel is the transport of casualties by any expedient means possible. SOF medical

personnel perform CASEVAC missions, forward of the intermediate staging base (ISB), on opportune

aircraft or other means of transport, back to the ISB or a predetermined point where aeromedical

evacuation (AE) assets are located. AE is conducted once the casualty is regulated into the patient

movement system. AE is performed using fixed-wing aircraft and AE trained medical crews. It is the

movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities. SOF units

have varying degrees of Level I treatment capabilities and limited Level II capabilities. SOF

do not have organic Levels III or IV capabilities available to them, and must rely either on

available theater health service support assets, or local HN capabilities when access to Level

III care is an urgent necessity.

Figure IV-2. Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement

STRATEGIC SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

PATIENT MOVEMENT

FIXED

HOSPITAL

Aeromedical

Evacuation

Mobile Staging

Facility

Mobility/Intermediate

Staging Base Casualty

Evacuation

Forward

Staging Base

Mission Tasking

Package

Medical Treatment

Facility
IV-5

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

b. Conventional Support Structure. Provision of medical support beyond SOF capabilities

depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure

umbrella is extended to cover the limited organic capability or to meet requirements for additional

medical assets (such as surgical intervention, evacuation, and expanded medical logistics). Certain

operations may also require special security requirements to be put in place as to not compromise the

identification of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system.

For further information on medical support, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support

in Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special

Operations Task Force Operations.

5. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of

Special Operations Forces

a. Global Support. Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support to

SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. C4 must be flexible so that it can be

tailored to any SO mission, and it must add value to the SOF operational capability. C4 systems

support the full range of SO worldwide. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and any

time using the full spectrum of national capabilities required to support the mission. The SOF

operational unit must have a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying

available resources, regardless of geographic location. C4 systems must never compromise the

SOF operational unit on the ground, in the air, or at sea.

b. Multiple and Varied Systems. SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups

of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different

echelons, from the national to the tactical levels. C4 systems must support discrete as well as

collective functions. SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest operational level that

can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control

at the national level. SOF C4 systems must offer seamless connectivity.

c. Interoperable Systems. SOF C4 systems must be interoperable at the appropriate security

level with the C4 systems deployed by US conventional forces, joint commands, allied units and US

commercial networks to facilitate the seamless transport of critical information and common services.

They must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems, but also must be capable of integrating with

less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. Interoperability includes attaining

commonality, compatibility, and standardization of C4 systems.

d. CDRUSSOCOM Responsibilities. CDRUSSOCOM, as do each of the Services, has

the following C4 responsibilities:

(1) To provide, operate, and maintain C4 facilities organic to assigned SOF, including

organic Service elements.

(2) To provide, operate, and maintain interoperable and compatible C4 systems.
IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 3-05

(3) To provide the capability for interface of non-Defense Information Systems Network

facilities.

(4) To provide the combatant commands with SO C4 systems and connectivity for

SOF assigned to that command for inclusion in deliberate planning.

For further information on C4 support of SOF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, and the JP 6-0 series of

publications.

6. Public Affairs Support of Special Operations Forces

a. Political Sensitivity of SO. The political sensitivity of many SO, particularly in MOOTW,

mandates that thorough and accurate PA guidance be developed during the operational planning stage

and approved for use in advance of most SO.

b. Accurate Reflection of the SO Mission. PA planning must accurately reflect the

objective of the mission to domestic audiences consistent with the overall PSYOP and CMO

effort, and with strategic, operational, and tactical OPSEC requirements. The commander should

develop proposed PA guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and government

agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Public Affairs) for approval.

For further information on PA support, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs Support of

Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special

Operations Task Force Operations.

7. Legal Support of Special Operations Forces

SO missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are Federal laws and

Executive Orders, Federal agency publications and directives, the law of armed conflict, and

rules of engagement (ROE) that may affect SO missions as well as the SO joint planning and

targeting processes. These guidelines become especially critical during sensitive MOOTW

when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements may affect

mission planning and execution. SOF commanders must seek legal review during all levels of

planning and execution of SO missions, to include planning of the ROE.

For further information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Legal Support, JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint

Special Operations Task Force Operations, and JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning.
IV-7

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

8. Combat Camera Support of Special Operations Forces

Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support PSYOP and

other SO missions. Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with

night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides gun

camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used to portray

the true nature of US operations to allies and civil populaces, as well as adversaries, and to

counter adversary disinformation with on-screen or gun camera evidence. The SOF link to

combat camera support normally is through the supported geographic combatant commander’s

PA office.

9. Air Support to Special Operations Forces

Air support is often provided to SOF and requires detailed integration. The JFACC may

provide additional support to SOF. This support can include terminal attack controllers, tactical

air control parties (TACPs), and/or the capabilities of an air support operations center (ASOC)

or elements thereof. TACPs can work directly for SOF units supporting various missions. ASOCs

can help the SOF commander request and integrate air power into the JFC’s special operations.

Elements provided to SOF units may require additional training or equipment to effectively and

safely facilitate air support during SO.

10. Space Support of Special Operations Forces

US Strategic Command can provide deployable space support personnel to SOF upon request

through the supported geographic combatant commander. Space support teams and liaison personnel

can assist SOF commanders and staff in understanding the capabilities, limitations, and effective application

of space systems, and ensure that SOF support requirements are clearly understood. Space based

support to SOF can include: precision navigation and/or geopositioning, global communications, global

intelligence collection, surveillance and warning, meteorological support, imagery for geospatial support

and targeting, blue force tracking data, and denying adversary use of space-based capabilities (see

Figure IV-3). Satellite threat advisories can provide additional mission security by influencing SOF

operational timing.

For further information on space support, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,

and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task

Force Operations.

11. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of Special Operations Forces

a. Use of Environmental Data. Environmental information should be included in the

SOF commander’s decision-making process from initial planning to execution. Meteorological

and oceanographic support (METOC) data can provide information such as studies of general

climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the operational area. These may

provide the commander with the data which to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute,
IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 3-05

support, and sustain specific SOF operations. Local conditions may expedite a particular COA or

render it impractical.

b. Exploitation of METOC Conditions. Potentially, an execution decision may be based

on exploiting certain weather and METOC conditions to provide cover for operations while

avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper operations. However, these decisions

often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while the weapons systems are operating near

their environmental limits, they do not exceed those limits.

c. Environmental Effects on Space Operations. With increased military reliance on space

capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations.

METOC support personnel can provide information that will allow the SOF commander to plan for the

possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems.

For further information on METOC support, refer to JP 3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

12. Geospatial Information and Services Support of Special Operations Forces

a. Foundation for SOF Visualization of the Battlespace. Geospatial information and

services (GI&S) support can provide SOF with timely, complete, and accurate information about

Figure IV-3. Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces

SPACE-BASED SUPPORT TO

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Precision navigation and/or

geopositioning

Global communications

Surveillance and warning

Meteorological support

Imagery for geospatial

support and targeting

Blue Force Tracking

Global intelligence collection
IV-9

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

the battlespace. SOF commanders use geospatial data to help determine friendly and adversary COAs

and to plan for deployment of SOF and key weapons systems. USSOCOM, when required, has the

responsibility as defined in DOD Instruction 5000.56, Programming Unique Mapping, Charting,

and Geodesy Requirements for Developing Systems, to submit requirements for new geospatial data

to support emerging systems. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency has primary responsibility

for providing GI&S.

b. Integral Part of SOF Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning. GI&S deliberate planning

identifies the AI, determines GI&S requirements for SO activities and weapons systems,

determines current availability for resources to meet those requirements, determines risk, and

then develops a production strategy to address shortfalls. During crisis action planning (CAP),

the requirement to plan GI&S support for crisis operations depends greatly upon the scope of

the mission, how much GI&S data can be adapted from existing deliberate plans, and the total

time available for GI&S to be included in the CAP process.

For further information on GI&S, refer to JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations.

13. Fire Support to Special Operations Forces

SOF may require long-range ground-based joint fire support in remote locations or for targets well

beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious operational force AO. SOF liaison elements coordinate fire

support through both external and SOF channels. SOF liaison elements (SOCCE, SOCOORD)

provide SOF expertise to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO fire support. Compatible

communications and detailed procedures between fire support providers and SOF operating deep

within enemy territory must be considered. Comprehensive fire support planning between SO and

supporting elements will facilitate rapid, responsive and accurate mission execution.

For further information on Joint Fire Support, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.
IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES EDUCATION AND TRAINING

A-1

1. Introduction

Military education and training have an integral relationship. Many times, the two are

indistinguishable, but they are in fact different. Military education is the instruction of individuals

in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. Military training, on

the other hand, is the preparation of individuals or units to enhance their capacity to perform

specific military functions, tasks, or missions. In other words, education provides an individual

with the ability to determine what to do in a given circumstance while training provides the

how. SOF require a combination of education and specialized training to achieve operational

proficiency. Education enhances the understanding of joint special operations and fosters

disciplined thought and creativity to develop solutions to complex problems in dynamic and

ambiguous situations. Training is designed to produce SOF personnel and units that have mastered

the tactics, techniques, and procedures through which SOF units accomplish their missions.

2. Education and Training Organizations

a. In addition to the common education and basic individual military skills training provided

by the Services to SOF personnel, each Service component of USSOCOM has a school to

provide education and/or training to its personnel in their combat specialties. These schools are

the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Naval Special Warfare

Center, and the Air Force Special Operations School.

b. USSOCOM has also established the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). It focuses

on educating SOF senior and intermediate leaders and selected non-SOF decision makers, both military

and civilian, in joint special operations. In addition to USSOCOM, the Special Operations Command,

Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) provides specialized training for SOF and conventional staffs

in special operations. As an example of the relationship of SOF education and training, there are three

levels of learning for the education and training of JSOTFs. JSOU conducts the first two levels, which

are focused on individual education, while SOCJFCOM conducts the third level, which is focused on

battlestaff training.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Services. The Services are responsible for basic individual military skill training and

common professional military education (PME) for personnel programmed for assignment to

SOF units.

b. CDRUSSOCOM

(1) CDRUSSOCOMResponsibilities. CDRUSSOCOM is charged by Title 10, USC,

Section 167 with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings and ensure their interoperability

with conventional forces as well as other SOF. SO-peculiar individual, continuation, and
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-05

professional training and PME are the direct responsibility of CDRUSSOCOM. Joint training of SOF

is the shared responsibilityof CDRUSSOCOM and the geographic combatant commanders.

(2) USSOCOM Component Training. The focus of USSOCOM component training

is to ensure that SOF units are capable of performing assigned wartime missions through the

accomplishment of individual and collective tasks. Component training, managed by the

USSOCOM Service component commands, is governed by the doctrine of the Military

Departments and primarily driven by mission requirements identified in the various geographic

regions by the TSOCs.

(3) Assessments. USSOCOM closely monitors the assessment phase of the joint

training system. Within this phase, the results of SOF collective training over time are translated

into future training requirements for subsequent training cycles, developed into lessons learned,

used to identify and resolve joint SO issues, and made available to geographic combatant

commanders and other commands that may employ SOF. Assessments allow USSOCOM and

component commands to use the aggregate results from all training events to judge the command’s

overall mission capability.

c. Geographic Combatant Commander

(1) Geographic Combatant Commander Responsibilities. Through the TSOC and in

coordination with CDRUSSOCOM, geographic combatant commanders should articulate SO joint

mission-essential tasks required to support theater campaign plans, operation plans, and operation

plans in concept format. CDRUSSOCOM will develop and resource the SO-specific training architecture.

USSOCOM component commanders then develop supporting mission-essential tasks for

CDRUSSOCOM validation and implement training programs to meet validated requirements.

Geographic combatant commanders conduct joint exercises, some Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff-sponsored, which are supported and monitored by CDRUSSOCOM. Such exercises stress

SOF under conditions resembling the operational environments in which they will be tasked. Further,

these exercises build and reinforce the regional area orientation required to support theater campaign

plans. This orientation, including language and cultural familiarity, is labor-intensive and may take years

of preparation for units to reach full capability. A joint exercise program utilized extensively by SOF is

the joint combined exchange training (JCET) program. The JCET is a means by which SOF maintain

their combat readiness and at the same time participates in the theater security cooperation strategy.

(2) Role of the TSOC. As the operational commanders of in-theater SOF, TSOC

commanders have the best perspective concerning ongoing and projected missions for deploying

SOF. The use of mission letters can greatly assist CDRUSSOCOM in the execution of

responsibilities for the preparation for employment in a specific theater. Mission letters serve as

a formal link between theater missions and the training of CDRUSSOCOM-assigned, theaterapportioned SOF. Mission letters should be developed for specific units designated for deployment

to the theater and provided to the unit commander in a timely manner to influence the unit’s

predeployment training program.
A-3

Special Operations Forces Education and Training

d. Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM)

(1) CDRUSJFCOM Responsibilities. Among other responsibilities, the Unified Command

Plan 02 established US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the center of excellence for training,

training support, and integration of US forces and its allies in preparing to conduct the full range of joint,

multinational, and interagency operations in order to protect and defend US national interests. To this

end, CDRUSJFCOM has assigned the mission for training of SOF to SOCJFCOM.

(2) Role of the SOCJFCOM. SOCJFCOM assists in CDRUSSOCOM’s joint SOF

training responsibilities through its JSOTF, JPOTF, and Joint Civil-Military Operations Task

Force (JCMOTF) training charter. SOCJFCOM conducts worldwide training and facilitates

joint integration to enhance the effectiveness and interoperability of SOF in joint, multinational,

and interagency environments. SOCJFCOM’s derived tasks are:

(a) To conduct worldwide joint SOF training to enhance SOF effectiveness within the

joint, multinational, and interagency environment in support of USJFCOM’s training program; focus

training on geographic combatant commanders’ staffs, TSOC staffs, and JTF commanders and staffs

as well as the identified training needs of the JSOTF, JPOTF, JCMOTF commanders and staffs.

(b) To improve JTF to JSOTF and JSOTF to JTF component interoperability

through participation in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USJFCOM Joint Exercise

Program.

(c) To facilitate joint integration, to include concept development and

experimentation and enhance SOF effectiveness within the joint, multinational, and interagency

environment.
A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

B-1

The development of JP 3-05 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Title 10, USC, and as specifically amended by:

a. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

b. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986, as contained in the National Defense Authorization Act, for Fiscal

Year 1987.

2. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01E, Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan (JSCP) FY 2002.

4. CJCSI 3110.05A, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1998.

5. CJCSI 3110.06, Special Operations Supplemental to JSCP FY 1998.

6. CJCSI 3110.12, Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP.

7. CJCSI 3210.01 Joint Information Warfare Policy.

8. CJCSI 3214.01 Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.

9. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 71-87, 29 May 1987, Mission and Functions of the US

Special Operations Command.

10. Unified Command Plan.

11. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

12. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

13. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.

14. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

15. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.

16. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-05

17. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services

Support to Joint Operations.

18. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

19. JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task

Force Operations.

20. JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and

Mission Planning.

21. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

22. JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

23. JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

24. JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

25. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

26. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

27. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

28. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).

29. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

30. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

31. JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.

32. JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue.

33. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

34. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

35. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations.

36. JP 3-57.1, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.

37. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.
B-3

References

38. JP 3-59, Joint Doctrine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and

Oceanographic Support.

39. JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

40. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

41. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

42. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

43. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

44. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems

Support to Joint Operations.

45. USSOCOM Pub 1, Special Operations in Peace and War.

46. USSOCOM Pub 3-11, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special

Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments.

47. USSOCOM Document 525-7, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX C

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116

Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy,

usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05, 17 April 1998, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-PJ-D//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force

Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with

info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate

will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military

Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C

JP 3-05

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers

listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not

available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to

foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon,

Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative

support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters

of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

700 Robbins Avenue

Bldg 1, Customer Service

Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)

814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
C-3

Administrative Instructions

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in

accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AE aeromedical evacuation

AFSOC Air Force special operations component

AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment

AFSOE Air Force special operations element

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces

AI area of interest

AO area of operations

AOB advanced operations base

ARSOA Army special operations aviation

ARSOC Army special operations component

ARSOF Army special operations forces

ARSOTF Army special operations task force

ASOC air support operations center

C2 command and control

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

CA civil affairs

CAO civil affairs operations

CAP crisis action planning

CASEVAC casualty evacuation

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command

CI civilian internee

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CMO civil-military operations

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

CP counterproliferation

CT counterterrorism

DA direct action

DC dislocated civilian

DOD Department of Defense

EPW enemy prisoner of war

FID foreign internal defense

FOB forward operations base

GI&S geospatial information and services
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-05

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HQ headquarters

IO information operations

ISB intermediate staging base

JAOC joint air operations center

JCET joint combined exchange training

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFSOC joint force special operations component

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

JIC joint intelligence center

JP joint publication

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force

JSOA joint special operations area

JSOAC joint special operations air component

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

JTF joint task force

LNO liaison officer

LOC line of communications

MEF Marine expeditionary force

METOC meteorological and oceanographic

MOOTW military operations other than war

NAVSOC naval special operations component

NGO nongovernmental organization

NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence Center

NSW naval special warfare

NSWTE naval special warfare task element

NSWTF naval special warfare task force

NSWTG naval special warfare task group

NSWTU naval special warfare task unit

OPCON operational control

OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs

PME professional military education
GL-3

Glossary

PSYOP psychological operations

RFI request for information

ROE rules of engagement

SEAL sea-air-land team

SF special forces

SFOB special forces operations base

SO special operations

SOCCE special operations command and control element

SOCJFCOM Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command

SOCOORD special operations coordination element

SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

SR special reconnaissance

TAC terminal attack control

TACP tactical air control party

TGO terminal guidance operations

TSOC theater special operations command

UAR unconventional assisted recovery

USAF United States Air Force

USC United States Code

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

WMD weapons of mass destruction
aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between

medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Also called AE. (JP 1-02)

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces

designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02)

area assessment. The commander’s prescribed collection of specific information that commences

upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to

previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment.

(JP 1-02)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are

based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area.

(JP 1-02)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated

by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct

and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a

strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

casualty evacuation. The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and between

medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. Also called

CASEVAC. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military

force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs.

(JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory,

under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority

normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States

forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an

indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-

02.)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained,

and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military

operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 3-05
civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship

between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2)

involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of

civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations. Operations conducted by civil affairs, the designated Active and Reserve

Component forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct civil affairs activities and to provide

specialized support to commanders responsible for civil-military operations. Also called CAO.

(This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be

referenced outside this publication.)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or

exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military

forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military

actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces,

or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or

agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs

from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather

than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be

both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and

intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

collateral mission. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by

title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of

unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary

of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority

of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary

to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority)

should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority

is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component

commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and

employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish

GL-5

Glossary
GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-05

assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority).

Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of

distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-

02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce

vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent,

deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat

spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

combined joint special operations task force. A task force composed of special operations

units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed

to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a

theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force

may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the

conduct of specific missions. Also called CJSOTF. (This term and its definition modify the

existing term “multinational joint special operations task force” and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear

weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (This term and

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,

preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (This term and its definition modify the

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or

permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation

in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment

of the operation. (JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or

falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s

interests. (JP 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special

operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized

military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct

action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational

techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
GL-7

Glossary

Also called DA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly

increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful

mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the

action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect

its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02.)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of

forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of

military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration

or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along

military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or

denied territory. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile

territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems

while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP

1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through

use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce

uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential

area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to

determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations, and presents it

in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also

called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill US forces training

requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between US forces and

host nation counterparts. Training activities are designed to improve US and host-nation capabilities.

Also called JCET. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-05

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate

unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for

tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational

missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called

JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander,

or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority)

or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command,

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for

making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available

for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or

accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations

component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned

by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of

headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic,

operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations.

Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the

joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force special

operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities.

Also called JSOACC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and

are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force

commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations

activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or

sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution.

The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and

politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special

operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to

accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing

broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from

more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special

operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task
GL-9

Glossary

force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the

conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across

the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement

any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after

war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an

alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces

of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

(JP 1-02)

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations

of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense

advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations

position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive

action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the

Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated

from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural

disaster to safe havens or the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or

below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command

(command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred

between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise

(and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of

Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training

necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised

through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to

employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters

of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON.(JP 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the

employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-05

are as follows. a. permissive environment — Operational environment in which host country

military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist

operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment — Operational environment in

which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to

conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational

area. c. hostile environment — Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as

well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to

conduct. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing

friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those

actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators

hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to

derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute

measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions

to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country,

but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to

foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately

the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose

of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable

to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to

secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned

withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 1-02)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly

complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special

operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support

of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and

can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of

combined arms. (JP 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of

a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national

defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02)

sea-air-land team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in

maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called SEAL. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)
GL-11

Glossary

Service-common. Equipment, material, supplies, and services adopted by a Military Service for use

by its own forces and activities. These include standard military items, base operating support, and

the supplies and services provided by a Military Service to support and sustain its own forces,

including those assigned to the combatant commands. Items and services defined as Servicecommon by one Military Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Military Services.

See also special operations-peculiar. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special boat team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support

special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft. Also called SBT. (This term

and its definition modify the existing term “special boat unit” and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations

with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. (This term and

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to

achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities

for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert,

clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of

military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of

conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by

indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of

physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly

support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called

SO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a

joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special operations

within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations command and control element. A special operations command and control

element (SOCCE) that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces

activities with conventional forces operations. It performs command and control or liaison

functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing special operations

forces commander. Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. It normally collocates

with the command post of the supported force. The SOCCE can also receive special operations

forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special

operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. The SOCCE

remains under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander

or commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE. See also special operations;

special operations forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and

are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-05

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services

designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct

and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint

force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander

(if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization,

to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface

operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations

missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and

services initially designed for, or used by, special operations forces until adopted for Servicecommon use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander, US

Special Operations Command for application to standard items and services used by the Military

Services; and items and services approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command

as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission. Also called

SO-peculiar. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special

operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify

information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not

normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for

commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.

Also called SR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and

are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special tactics. US Air Force special operations forces organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct special operations. They include combat control team, pararescue, and combat

weather personnel who provide the interface between air and ground combat operations.

Also called ST. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special tactics team. A task-organized element of special tactics that may include combat

control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel. Functions include austere airfield and

assault zone reconnaissance, surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; terminal attack control;

combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather

observations and forecasting. Also called STT. (This term and its definition modify the existing

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength

or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)
GL-13

Glossary

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military

capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and

control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish

missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control

may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.

When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the

gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these

forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient

authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat

support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

terminal attack control. The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance

to attacking aircraft. (JP 1-02)

terminal control. 1. The authority to direct aircraft to maneuver into a position to deliver ordnance,

passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target. Terminal control is a type of air control. 2.

Any electronic, mechanical, or visual control given to aircraft to facilitate target acquisition and

resolution. See also terminal guidance. (JP 1-02)

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse guidance and

arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an

aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air

landing or airdrop facility. 3. Any electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides

approaching aircraft or weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target.

Terminal guidance is not a type of air control. Those providing terminal guidance do not have

weapons release authority, or authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft. See also terminal control.

(JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear;

intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally

political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long

duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are

organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It

includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and

unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (This term and its definition modify the existing

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of

being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction

can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the

means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part

of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
GL-14

Glossary

JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and combatant

commands

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones,

and who will develop

drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, combatant

command, or Joint Staff

(JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

 The combatant commands

receive the JP and begin to

assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director, J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality

of each JP and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, combatant commands,

or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

combatant commands

J-7 initiates Program Directive



STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required

changes and prepares pub for coordination with

Services and combatant commands

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

 Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA)

to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE



















 

JP 0-2

UNAAF

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS