### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-18-00649- CV

The State Bar of Texas, App ellant

v. Robert J. Wilson , Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 200 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 8-0 0421 6, H ONO RAB LE DON R. B URGESS, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appea l from an order of the district court of Travis County overr uling a plea to the jurisdiction. Appellant is the State Ba r of Texas (State Ba

r) and appellee is Robert J

. Wil son. I n 2018, Wil son fil ed an u n sworn decla ratory judgme nt suit ag ainst the State Ba r claiming that a 1994 letter by which he purportedly resig ned from the prac tice of law was a forg ery . By his suit, Wil son sough t d ec lara tory relief and actua l damag es as well as punitive damag es. I n response , the State Ba

r fi l ed an unsworn plea to the jurisdiction challeng ing Wil son’s petition,

asser ting, among other things, that Wil son’s suit was barr ed by sovere ign immunit y . Neither party offe red jurisdictional evidenc e. We will reve rse the order and rende r judgme nt dismiss ing Wil son’s

cause of ac tion for want of jurisdiction. When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the p le a d in g s , th e c o u r t deter mines whether the pleade r has alleg ed fac ts that aff irmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction. I f the pleading saff

irmat i v el y n egate the exis tence of jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004).

Wil son pleade d that in 1990 his la w license was suspended for three y ear s. During the suspension, Wil son was involved in litigatio n wi t h his former associate s. One result of his participa tion in that litigation was that the court found him in violation of the suspension order and imposed a fine.

I n 1994, the State Ba

r rec eived a letter supposedly signe d by Wil son resig ning from the prac tice of law. There afte r, the State Ba r listed Wil son as “re signe d pending disciplinary action.” Wil son alleg ed that the letter was not authe ntic. Wil son alleg ed further that in 2012, seeki n g t o obtain an Arizona law license, he wrote the State Ba

r reque sting it to cer

tify that he was in g ood standing in Texas and inquiring what steps wer e neede d to perf ect the reque st. The State Ba r responde d that Wil son should pay the outstanding fine and file a petition for re- instatement. W i l s o n al l eg ed that he “complete d this proce ss,” but that the State Ba r still ref used to chang e h is standing based upon the 1994 letter of resig nation. Wil son avowe d further that the State Ba r ignor ed his sever al reque sts to investiga te or dete rmine whe ther the 1994 le tter of r esig nation was a uthentic. Wil son pleade d further that in 2017, when he was a candida te for the Arizona Senate,

a local newspa

per published a story that he had resig ned from the Texas Ba r “in lieu of disciplinary action.” He alleg ed that the news story was “dama g ing” to his campa ign for the Senate and that such damag e was proxi mately cause d by the State Ba r’s re fusal to investiga te his reque sts conce rning the alleg ed re signa tion and its refusal to cor rec t his standing. 2By way of relief , Wil son reque sted the court to de clar e that the letter of re signa tion

was a forg ery ; that the court order the State Ba r to disreg ard the said letter; that the court deter mine the State Ba

r had no other g round to continue to “suspend his license” ; and that the court order that his law license be reinstated and that he be cer tified as a member in g ood standing

. Wil son pray ed for up to $99, 0 0 0 in actua l damag es in addition to punitive damag es for the State Ba r’s alleg ed neg lige nce a

nd willful conduct. Sovereig n immunit y from su i t d ef eats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id

. at 225–26. The State Ba r is a g overnme ntal ag ency that i s en t itled to the protec tion aff orded by sovere ign immunit y . Doe v. Board of Dirs. of the Stat e B a r o f T ex. , No. 03-15-00007- CV, 2015 WL 6656216, at * 2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Laubach v. State Bar of Tex. , No. 03-00-00282- CV, 2000 WL 1675701, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 9, 2000,

no pet.) (mem. op.); see Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.011(a) (desc ribing State Ba r as “an administrative ag ency of the judicial de partment of g overnme nt”). Wil son sought a decla

ratory judgme nt f

rom the district court that the 1994 letter of resig nation was a forg ery . The Uniform Dec lara tory J udg ment Act, howeve r, is not a g ener al waiver of sovere ign immunit y . Texas Parks & W ildlif e v. Sawyer Tr. , 354 S.W .3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006; City o f E l Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009)). Rather, the Act only waives sovereig n immunit y in those case s ch al l en gi n g the viability of statutes or ordinanc es. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d at 377. Although the Act waives immunit y in particula

r ca ses, Wils on’s re quest for a decla ration that the 1994 letter is a forg ery does not fall within the scope of the express waiver

.

3Wil son pleade d that the State Ba r failed and ref

used to investiga te and make a deter mination whether he had resig ned from the State Ba r. To the extent that Wil son’s pleading may be construed as an ultra vires claim, he has sued the wrong party
. Ultra vires suits cannot be broug ht ag ainst the state, which reta ins its immunit y , but mu s t b e b ro ug ht ag ainst the state actor s in their officia l capa city

. Id. at 373. And even if Wil son had sued the proper parties, he has not complained of any State Ba

r conduct that would exceed its stat utory authority

. See id. at 372 (to come within the ultra vires exception, plaintiff “must alleg e and ultimately prove, that the office r acte d without leg al authority

or fa iled to perfor

m a pure ly

minist eria l act”)

. Wil son claimed actua l and punitive damag es stemming from the State Ba r’s alleg ed neg lige nce and willful conduct. Wi l s on can neither rec over money damag es by his decla ratory
judgme nt suit, see Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W

. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 6 0 (Tex. 2002), nor pursuant to the Texas T ort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act is not a g ener al waiver of

sovere ign immunit y . I nstead, the Act waives immunit y in three g ener al are as: use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defe cts, and injuries arising o u t o f conditions or use of tang ible persona l p r o p e r ty
. S e e T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e § 1 0 1

. 0 2 1 ; Co u n ty o f Ca m e r o n v . B r

o wn , 8 0 S. W. 3 d 5 4 9 , 554 (Tex. 2002). Howeve r, the Act does not w aive immunit y for the neg lige nt or wrong ful use of information contained in paper s and documents. Laubach, 2000 WL 1675701, at *1 (citing Dallas Co u n ty v . H

a r p e r , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d 2 0 7 , 2 0 7

– 0 8 ( T e x. 1 9 9 5 ) ; U n iv e r s it y o f Te x . M e d

. B r a n c h a t G a lv e

s to n v. Y ork , 871 S.W .2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994)).

The order i s reversed and judgme nt is here rende red dismiss ing Wil son’s cause of action for want of jurisdiction.

4__________________________________________ Bob E. Shannon, Justice Be fore J ustices Goodwin, B aker , and Shannon* Reverse d and Rende red Filed: Mar ch 20, 2019 * Be fore Bob E. Shannon, Chief J ustice (r etired) , Third Court of Appe als, sitting by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

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