United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters 

June 1997 CHILD SUPPORT


ENFORCEMENT


Strong Leadership 

Required to Maximize 

Benefits of Automated 

Systems 

GAO/AIMD-97-72


United States GAO General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Accounting and Information 

Management Division 

B-275037 

June 30, 1997 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Lynn C. Woolsey 

House of Representatives 

This report responds to your request that we update our 1992 report entitled Child Support 

Enforcement: Timely Action Needed to Correct System Development Problems (GAO/IMTEC-92-46, 

Aug. 13, 1992). Specifically, we addressed (1) the status of state development efforts, including 

costs incurred, (2) whether the Department of Health and Human Services had implemented 

our 1992 recommendations, and (3) whether the Department was providing effective federal 

oversight of state systems development activities. This report makes several recommendations 

designed to increase the likelihood that states will develop child support systems that perform 

as required and to minimize the risk of costly technology decisions and wasted federal and state 

expenditures during the development and implementation of these systems. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we


will not distribute it until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will provide


copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Director, Office of Management and


Budget; appropriate congressional committees; and the state child support enforcement offices


included in this review. We will also make copies available to others upon request.


You can reach me at (202) 512-6253 or by e-mail at willemssenj.aimd@gao.gov if you have any


questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.


Joel C. Willemssen


Director, Information Resources Management

Executive Summary


According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Purpose	 number of child support cases in which collections are being made is 

about 20 percent. As a result, millions of children may not be adequately 

provided for or may need to rely on welfare. Child support payments will 

become even more important to recipients who may cease to be covered 

by welfare under recently enacted legislation. 

In an attempt to increase collections of child support, the Congress in 1980 

authorized federal funding to pay up to 90 percent of states’ costs for 

operating and developing automated child support enforcement systems. 

This has amounted to over $2 billion to date. Concerned about how 

effectively this money has been spent, Representatives Henry J. Hyde and 

Lynn C. Woolsey asked GAO to update its 1992 report on this subject,1 

examining (1) the status of state development efforts, including costs 

incurred, (2) whether the Department of Health and Human Services had 

implemented GAO’s 1992 recommendations, and (3) whether the 

Department was providing effective federal oversight of state systems 

development. 

The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) is part of HHS’ Background	 Administration for Children and Families. The Child Support Enforcement 

Program was established in 1975 to help strengthen families and reduce 

dependence on welfare by helping to ensure that the responsibility for 

supporting children was placed on parents. The states operate programs to 

locate noncustodial parents, establish paternity, and obtain support 

orders, along with enforcing actual collections of those court-ordered 

support payments. The federal government—through OCSE—funds 

66 percent of state administrative and operating costs, including 

automated systems, as well as 90 percent of expenses associated with 

planning, designing, developing, installing, and/or enhancing automated 

systems. 

The Family Support Act of 1988 required that statewide systems be 

developed to track determination of paternity and child support 

collections; it set a deadline of October 1, 1995, for implementation and 

federal certification of such systems. However, only a handful of states 

met the deadline. The Congress then passed legislation extending the 

deadline by 2 years, to October 1, 1997. 

1

Child Support Enforcement: Timely Action Needed to Correct System Development Problems 

(GAO/IMTEC-92-46, Aug. 13, 1992). 

Page 2 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

To meet the criteria for federal funding, state systems were required to 

carry out the following specific functions: case initiation, case 

management, financial management, enforcement, security, privacy, and 

reporting. In determining whether a state met these criteria, OCSE reviewed 

the advance planning document (APD) that each state had to develop and 

submit, describing its proposed system. 

To obtain a broad picture of systems development in the states, GAO 

analyzed OCSE and state documents concerning systems development, 

visited and conducted structured interviews with officials responsible for 

systems development in 6 states and 1 county, held a focus group 

discussion with child support enforcement personnel from 14 states and 1 

county, and surveyed all 10 HHS regional offices. GAO also discussed 

systems issues with HHS and OCSE officials and staff, both in Washington, 

D.C., and at five regional offices. 

Results in Brief	 It is too early to judge the potential of fully developed automated systems, 

yet bringing the benefits of automation to bear on child support 

enforcement appears to have played a major role in locating more 

noncustodial parents and increasing collections. As caseloads have risen 

sharply in recent years, the percentage of cases in which funds are being 

collected (about 20 percent) has been maintained. The increase in total 

dollars collected has been significant. According to HHS, in fiscal year 1995, 

almost $11 billion was collected—80 percent higher than the amount 

collected in 1990. 

While automated state child support systems are being developed, many 

may not be certified by the October 1, 1997, deadline. As of March 31, 

1997, only 12 states’ systems had been certified. In fact, OCSE’s director of 

child support information systems predicted that as many as 14 of the 

states—which account for a significant proportion of the nation’s total 

child support caseload—may miss the October 1997 deadline. 

Furthermore, states have underestimated the magnitude, complexity, and 

costs of their systems projects. Costs have increased rapidly in the past 5 

to 6 years. Systems development costs for fiscal year 1995 alone were just 

under $600 million, and over $2.6 billion has been spent since 1980 for 

county and statewide systems development. 

GAO’s 1992 report discussed significant problems in federal oversight and 

monitoring of state activity and made three recommendations. However, 

only one has been completely implemented: OCSE now works with its audit 

Page 3 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

division to identify and resolve systems problems. GAO’s recommendations 

to (1) suspend federal funding when major problems exist and (2) require 

states to initiate corrective actions when problems are first identified were 

only partially addressed. 

OCSE’s oversight of state child support systems has been narrowly focused 

and, as a result, not effective or timely in assessing the states’ systems 

approaches and progress. The agency does not evaluate or assess states’ 

systems development projects using a disciplined, structured approach. 

OCSE believes it lacks the technical expertise and resources to be involved 

at critical points in the systems development process. The agency’s role 

has been primarily limited to document review and after-the-fact 

certification when the states request an inspection of completed systems. 

Therefore, OCSE has allowed some funds to be spent without ensuring that 

states were progressing toward effective or efficient systems. And, while 

OCSE has shared some lessons learned, its oversight has operated on a 

state-by-state basis. Lacking this nationwide perspective has hindered the 

agency’s ability to provide proactive leadership to the states. 

As added systems functional requirements of the newly enacted welfare 

reform legislation come into play, it will be increasingly important that 

child support enforcement systems work as envisioned and that OCSE 

monitor progress on a broader scale. Many recipients may find that they 

no longer qualify for welfare benefits, with child support being their only 

remaining income. 

Principal Findings


Systems Yielding Benefits,


Deadlines May Not Be Met


Automating child support information systems appears to have improved 

caseworker productivity, allowing automatic searches of other 

databases—including those containing motor vehicle registrations, state 

revenue information, and new employee registries—and eliminating the 

need to develop voluminous paper documentation. Automated systems 

also help track court actions relating to paternity and support orders and 

amounts of collections and distributions. 

These benefits, however, have been expensive. Since 1980, states have 

spent a combined $2.6 billion on automated systems—with $2 billion of 

this total being federally funded. Individual state estimates of how much 

Page 4 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

will be required to complete their systems are, in many cases, double 

initial projections. 

The 12 states that currently have certified systems represent only 

14 percent of the national caseload. Many of the larger states that OCSE 

believes may miss this year’s deadline have officially reported to OCSE and 

to the HHS Office of Inspector General that they will meet the date. If they 

do not, about 44 percent of the national caseload will not be gaining the 

benefits of full automation. 

Problems Impede 

Progress; Earlier GAO 

Recommendations Not 

Fully Implemented 

Federal and state governments and private industry recognize that 

investing time and resources in defining system requirements has a large 

program payoff in the development of systems that are completed on time, 

are cost-effective, and meet the needs of their users. Since major systems 

decisions hinge on such baseline requirements, these must be known early 

in the systems development process. OCSE was expected to develop federal 

requirements for state child support enforcement systems by 1990, yet 

final requirements were not issued until June 1993. According to OCSE, the 

delay was caused by its own failure to use an incremental approach in 

defining requirements and a long review process. 

OCSE’s delay in providing states with final systems requirements slowed 

some states’ progress in developing their systems and contributed to 

contractor problems. One state official noted that the delay contributed to 

many contract modifications and, eventually, to the contract’s termination. 

According to officials of another state, late functional requirements and 

unrealistic deadlines increased costs and delayed the project. In addition, 

one of HHS’ regional offices stated that “states began their projects prior to 

receiving final requirements; however, [they] were reluctant to finalize 

anything until the requirements were issued.” 

Increased software reuse is an effective means of improving the 

productivity of computer software development, improving the reliability 

of the software itself, and reducing development time and cost. In October 

1990, OCSE mandated that states transfer systems currently in use in other 

states. However, it took this step before assessing the availability of 

sufficient systems to be used in such transfers. In fact, only eight certified 

systems were then in operation—and they were based on the 1984 

amendments. No automated systems had been certified based on the more 

extensive 1988 act, making it highly unlikely that the available systems 

Page 5 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

Inadequate Federal OCSE does not effectively use the APDs to proactively oversee, monitor, or 

Oversight Hinders State control major investments in systems development projects. The APD and 

Systems Development the states’ annual updates—advance planning document updates 

(APDUs)—are the basic communications and analysis tools that OCSE uses 

would be suitable for transfer to other states.2 As a result, many states 

attempted to transfer incomplete and/or incompatible systems, causing 

added costs and delays. 

Finally, OCSE decided not to fully implement GAO’s 1992 recommendation to 

suspend federal funding when major problems existed and require states 

to implement corrective actions as soon as problems were identified. OCSE 

recently stated that it requires corrective action when problems are noted 

but explained that it did not consider withholding funding because it 

believes the federal government should work with the states in rectifying 

deficiencies. However, it will now temporarily hold up funding; this has 

been done with several states when variations in cost figures were found 

or when OCSE had concerns about the system’s direction. 

in assessing the progress and status of states’ systems, and whether 

systems meet necessary functional requirements. OCSE does not require a 

disciplined, structured approach for developing or reviewing systems 

because, according to agency officials, it lacks the technical expertise and 

resources needed to be involved at critical points in the development 

process. Instead, OCSE primarily focuses on assessing whether states are 

meeting systems functional requirements and will meet the October 1, 

1997 deadline. 

A disciplined, structured approach to systems development entails finite 

phases that must be completed and assessed before moving forward. For 

example, systems planning and analysis must precede design, design must 

precede development, and development must precede implementation. 

These are major milestones at which one would expect and be able to 

judge progress and determine whether any corrective actions are 

necessary. If work proceeds before an earlier phase is complete, problems 

can arise from condensing the work of two or more phases into one time 

period, thereby truncating the process. While states may provide OCSE—in 

their APDs or APDUs—with information on all phases of their systems 

development, and OCSE and HHS regional officials may discuss these phases 

2

The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 authorized the federal government to provide 

states with 90-percent funding for computer hardware and software to operate certified automated 

child support systems. The Family Support Act of 1988 ended the 90-percent funding as of 

September 30, 1995. 

Page 6 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

with state officials, the agency has not used this information effectively at 

important milestones to assess system progress and redirect inadequate 

state development efforts, losing an opportunity to correct problems early 

in the process. 

A critical factor is whether the APD plans are properly carried out and 

reflect what the states are actually doing. State officials noted that the 

APDs are not useful for managing systems development. According to one, 

“[APDs] are an administrative exercise to justify obtaining funding.” With 

OCSE’s emphasis on deadlines, states are often forced to present 

inaccurate—some feel impossible—schedules if they are to continue 

receiving funding. 

Further, while OCSE is required by law to certify state systems, these 

certification reviews come too late for timely redirection of systems 

development if needed.3

 Since the agency conducts certification 

inspections upon state invitation, OCSE is rarely in a position to promptly 

intervene and solve problems. When the agency does note problems, 

correction at that point will inevitably be more time-consuming and 

expensive than it otherwise may have been. 

In general, OCSE’s state-by-state monitoring approach inhibits effective 

leadership. Because of the magnitude of the child support caseload, the 

complexity and importance of the automated systems, and the large 

amounts of funds invested, a broader, nationwide oversight that would 

look for common themes, lessons learned, and systemic problems, is 

essential for this program’s success. Without this perspective, it is difficult 

to help states manage systems and control costs. Post-implementation 

reviews after state certification would also give OCSE insight into systems 

issues and help it to further assist the states’ developmental efforts. With 

additional funding from the welfare reform legislation, OCSE now plans to 

conduct post-implementation reviews. 

Welfare Reform Increases New welfare legislation enacted last summer—the Personal Responsibility 

Need for Strong Federal and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996—dramatically altered 

Leadership the nation’s welfare system into one that requires work in exchange for 

time-limited assistance. Since child support is an integral part of welfare 

reform, the states are required to operate a child support enforcement 

program meeting federal requirements in order to be eligible for 

3

OCSE is required to certify that the states’ systems meet the functional requirements as described in 

the agency’s implementing regulations. 

Page 7 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block-grant funding.4 Guidance 

the states need to prioritize systems requirements and changes is not yet 

available. OCSE plans to release the functional requirements on an 

incremental basis—issuing requirements on selected systems components 

as soon as policy decisions are final. This will be critical if states are to 

meet welfare reform’s new requirements for their systems while at the 

same time working to complete basic child support enforcement systems. 

Another demand on systems development will be ensuring that new 

statewide child support enforcement systems, as well as existing systems 

that interface with the new systems, process date-sensitive information 

correctly in the year 2000 and beyond.5 

Recommendations	 GAO is making several recommendations to increase the likelihood of 

developing state automated child support systems that will perform as 

required. To maximize the federal government’s return on costly 

technology investments, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services direct and ensure that the Assistant Secretary of the 

Administration for Children and Families take the following actions: 

•	 develop and implement a structured approach to reviewing automation 

projects so that significant systems development milestones are identified 

and the costs of project decisions are justified during the entire effort; 

•	 suspend federal funding for any state that is experiencing delays and 

problems and that is not following generally accepted systems 

development practices until the state redirects its approach; 

•	 conduct post-implementation reviews to identify any lessons learned, to 

ensure that OCSE incorporates into its oversight role a nationwide 

assessment of child support systems that provides a broader perspective 

on costs, systemic problems, potential solutions, and innovative 

approaches; and 

•	 assess the impact of welfare reform on existing child support programs 

and develop timely technical requirements focusing on critical systems 

changes needed by established deadlines. 

GAO is also making other recommendations that are contained in 

chapter 6. 

4

This replaced the Aid to Families With Dependent Children program. 

5

Many older systems that will still be in operation in 2000 were programmed using 2 digits to represent 

the year—such as “97” for 1997. In such a format, 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900. 

Page 8 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

Agency Comments 

and GAO’s Evaluation 

GAO requested written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services or her designee. The 

Department’s comments stressed the difference in perception between the 

Department and GAO regarding the appropriate role of HHS’ Administration 

for Children and Families. Notwithstanding this difference, HHS generally 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations that OCSE evaluate its technical 

resources, conduct post-implementation reviews, assess the status of 

systems nationwide, and define in a timely manner the requirements 

arising from recent welfare-reform legislation. 

In addressing the question of role, HHS commented that it sees OCSE’s role 

as one of assisting states in meeting congressionally-mandated deadlines 

for certification of automated child support enforcement systems. The 

Department disagreed with GAO’s view that OCSE should provide more 

active, involved monitoring and oversight of state activities in this area, 

especially at critical points in the development cycle. Along with 

questioning the appropriateness of suspending funding for problem 

projects, officials further stated that making the recommended changes in 

the monitoring process would increase the administrative burden on 

states. 

GAO believes that HHS has interpreted OCSE’s role too narrowly, failing to 

take adequate responsibility for helping to ensure the success of state 

systems, especially in light of the $2.6 billion expended on child support 

enforcement systems—$2 billion of it in federal funds. By taking a reactive 

approach toward oversight—reviewing state progress annually or only 

upon request after major decisions have been made—OCSE does not 

monitor systems projects at key points in their development, thereby 

missing the opportunity to intervene and help redirect states when 

problems arise. As a result, federal dollars have been invested unwisely on 

projects that were allowed to proceed in the wrong direction. 

In terms of administrative burden, GAO believes that the streamlining it is 

advocating would not impose an additional administrative process on 

states. In any event, HHS officials did not address the burden—on states, 

support recipients, and the federal government—of failing to effectively 

complete development of these systems. 

These comments are discussed in chapter 6, and reprinted in appendix IV. 

Page 9 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Contents


Executive Summary 2


Chapter 1 

Introduction The Child Support Enforcement Program


States Are Developing Federally Funded Information Systems to


Support the Program


Recent Welfare Reform Legislation 18


Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 18


Chapter 2 


Systems Yield


Benefits, but Deadline


May Not Be Met


21 

Automated Systems Appear to Be Helping States 21 

Billions Spent for Automated Systems Not Yet in Compliance 

With Federal Mandates


Chapter 3 

Problems Impeded 

Earlier Progress as 

Recommendations 

Not Fully 

Implemented 

27 

Delayed Functional Requirements Slowed Progress 27 

Premature Policy Mandate Also Delayed Development, Increased 

Costs


GAO Recommendations Only Partially Addressed Despite Delays 

and Escalating Costs 

Chapter 4 

Inadequate Federal 

Oversight and 

Leadership Continue 

to Hinder States’ 

Development Efforts 

36 

APD Use Inadequate to Redirect States 36 

Certification Reviews Narrow in Focus and Performed Too Late 42 

for Effective Oversight 

Lack of Nationwide Perspective Inhibits Effective Leadership 45 

Page 10 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 

14 

14 

16 

22 

30 

33 
Contents 

Chapter 5 


Welfare Reform


Places New Demands


on Child Support


Systems


47


Welfare Reform Features Automated Systems 47


OCSE Plans to Address Welfare Reform 49


Millennium Changes Are Also Important to Automation 50


Chapter 6 

Conclusions, 

Recommendations, 

and Agency 

Comments 

Recommendations 53


Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55


Appendixes Appendix I: Total Cost for Each State’s Child Support 

Enforcement System and the Federal and State Shares of These 

Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1981-1996 

Appendix II: Total Federal Cost for Each State’s Child Support 

Enforcement System Including Enhanced and Regular Funding 

for Fiscal Years 1981-1996 

Appendix III: Overview of Systems Development Phases 

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Health and 

Human Services


Appendix V: Major Contributors to This Report 

Figures Figure 1.1: Total Child Support Collections, Fiscal Years 15 

1990-1995 

Figure 2.1: Cumulative Funds Spent on Child Support 23 

Enforcement Systems, Fiscal Years 1981-1996 

Figure 2.2: Certified and Conditionally Certified Child Support 25 

Enforcement Systems as of March 31, 1997 

Figure 4.1: State Plans for Software Programming and Unit 39 

Testing 

Page 11 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 

52 

62 

64 

66 

67 

79 
Contents 

Abbreviations 

ACF Administration for Children and Families


AFDC Aid to Families With Dependent Children


AIMD Accounting and Information Management Division


APD advance planning document


APDU advance planning document update


CFR Code of Federal Regulations


GAO General Accounting Office


HHS Department of Health and Human Services


IMTEC Information Management and Technology Division


OCSE Office of Child Support Enforcement


SSAIS State System Approval Information System


Page 12 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 13 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 


Introduction


The general well-being of children and families is a critical national policy 

goal. Current priorities are aimed at protecting children and preserving 

families, including meeting the needs of millions of parents who annually 

seek child support for their eligible children. However, when noncustodial 

parents fail to provide financial support, millions of children must rely on 

welfare programs. In 1995, over 9 million of the 13.6 million people 

receiving benefits from the Aid to Families With Dependent Children 

(AFDC) program were children.1 

The Congress created the national Child Support Enforcement Program in The Child Support 1975 as title IV-D of the Social Security Act. This intergovernmental

Enforcement Program	 program involves federal, state, and local governments. The Department of 

Health and Human Services’ (HHS) regional office staff and the Office of 

Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) oversee the state-administered 

programs. The purpose of the program is to increase collections from 

noncustodial parents and reduce federal, state, and local welfare 

expenditures. As shown in figure 1.1, reported collections in fiscal year 

1995 were 80 percent higher than they were in 1990. 

1

As of July 1, 1997, AFDC will be replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block 

grant. 

Page 14 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Figure 1.1: Total Child Support 

Collections, Fiscal Years 1990-1995 

Total collections in billions of dollars 

11 10.8 

10 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 

0 

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 

6.0 

6.9 

8.0 

8.9 

9.9 

Source: Child Support Enforcement—Twentieth Annual Report to Congress (draft), for the period 

ending September 30, 1995 (HHS/ACF/OCSE). We did not independently validate this 

information. 

The number of reported child support cases has also increased 60 

percent—from 13 to 20 million cases over that same time period. As a 

result, according to HHS, the number of cases in which collections are 

being made has remained about 18 to 20 percent. 

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Families entering the Child Support Enforcement Program require 

different combinations of services at different times, and child support 

enforcement agencies are directly responsible for providing these services. 

For instance, in some cases the child’s paternity has not been established 

and the location of the alleged father is unknown. In these cases, the 

custodial parent needs help with every step: locating the alleged father, 

establishing paternity, obtaining and enforcing a child support order, and 

collecting the support payment. In other cases, the custodial parent may 

already have a child support order; in such a case, the child support 

enforcement agency must review and possibly modify the order as a result 

of changes in the employment status or other circumstances of the 

noncustodial parent before tackling enforcement. 

State child support enforcement programs are organized in significantly 

different ways. They report to different state agencies and follow different 

policies and procedures. In addition, relationships between the state child 

support enforcement programs and other state agencies differ. These 

characteristics usually vary by the type of service delivery structure, levels 

of court involvement required by state family law, population distribution, 

and other variables. For example, some state child support agencies 

manage their programs centrally (operating a number of state offices), 

while others allow the counties or other governmental entities or even 

private companies to manage the programs locally.2 

Growing caseloads, increased costs, and social demands have given rise to States Are Developing the need to implement expedited processes for establishing and enforcing

Federally Funded payment of child support. As such, automation was (and still is) seen by 

Information Systems	 many, including the federal government, as an effective tool for addressing 

this need. In 1980, the Congress promoted the development of automated to Support the systems that could improve the performance of the child support program.

Program	 Public Law 96-265 authorized the federal government to pay up to 90 

percent of the states’ total costs incurred in planning, designing, 

developing, installing, or enhancing these systems.3

 The systems are 

required by OCSE to be implemented statewide and be capable of carrying 

out mandatory functional requirements, including case initiation, case 

management, financial management, enforcement, security, privacy, and 

2

Child Support Enforcement: Early Results on Comparability of Privatized and Public Offices 

(GAO/HEHS-97-4, Dec. 16, 1996). 

3

For the purposes of this report, the term systems refers to the hardware and software components of 

the child support enforcement systems. 

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

reporting.4 Incorporating these requirements can help locate noncustodial 

parents and monitor child support cases. Since 1981, the federal 

government has spent over $2 billion for automated systems to assist 

states in collecting child support. 

The Family Support Act of 1988 mandated that by October 1, 1995, each 

state have a fully operational automated child support system that meets 

federal requirements. At that time, the 90-percent development funding 

was to be discontinued. In addition, if a state did not have its system 

certified as fully operational by this date, the act declared that the state’s 

child support program may have its program funding reduced. However, 

by October 1, 1995, only five states had met the deadline. Therefore, the 

Congress passed Public Law 104-35, extending the deadline to October 1, 

1997. 

Developing child support enforcement systems is a joint federal and state 

responsibility.5

 In providing most of the funding for systems, the federal 

government, through OCSE, is responsible for providing leadership, 

technical assistance, and standards for effective systems development. 

OCSE is also responsible for assessing states’ automated systems and 

ensuring that states are effectively using the 90-percent funding.6 

To receive 90-percent federal funding for the development of an 

automated child support enforcement system, a state is required to 

develop and submit an advance planning document (APD) to OCSE, 

describing its proposed system. The APD is reviewed by OCSE’s Division of 

Child Support Information Systems and by HHS’ regional, program, and 

financial management staff to ensure that the proposed system 

incorporates the minimum functional requirements and will meet federal, 

state, and user needs in a cost-effective manner. After the APD is approved, 

OCSE provides 90-percent funding for the project and monitors its progress. 

Federal regulations and OCSE guidance (1) require states to update their 

APDs when projects have significant changes in budget or scope and 

(2) give OCSE the authority to suspend funding if a state’s development 

4

A functional requirement is a requirement that specifies a function that a system or system 

component must be able to perform. 

5

In HHS’ state systems advance planning document guide, the agency notes that the administration of 

this program is a cooperative endeavor, with federal and state governments working together to 

implement information systems. HHS provides leadership and direction and is responsible for 

approving, monitoring, and certifying states programs—and ensuring that federal funds are spent 

wisely. 

6

The federal government provides 66 percent of the costs incurred by states for operating child 

support programs, which includes operating and obtaining automated systems. The “enhanced” 

funding of 90 percent is paid to develop systems. 

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Recent Welfare 

Reform Legislation 

Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology 

does not substantially adhere to its approved plan. When the state 

considers its system complete, a state official requests that the federal 

government certify that its system meets requirements. After certification, 

a state is authorized to receive additional funding to maintain its 

operational system. 

While states are still trying to meet the challenges of the 1988 act, they are 

also faced with newer challenges. The Personal Responsibility and Work 

Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 requires that states implement 

specific expedited and administrative procedures intended to expand the 

authority of the state child support agency and improve the efficiency of 

state child support programs. In order to comply with the expedited 

processes requirement, states have to meet specific time frames for 

establishing paternity and establishing and enforcing support orders.7 

Under current law their statewide systems must automatically perform 

specific locate, establishment, enforcement, and case management 

functions and maintain financial management, reporting, and under the 

new law states’ security and privacy functions.8

 In addition, under the new 

law states must enhance their current statewide systems to electronically 

interface with other federal and state agencies. This is needed to establish, 

for example, central case registries and new-hire directories. Therefore, to 

successfully comply with the welfare reform legislation, it is critical that 

the states and OCSE have fully operational child support systems in place. 

In 1992, in response to a request from the Senate Committee on Finance, 

we reviewed HHS’ oversight of states’ efforts to develop automated child 

support enforcement systems. In August 1992, we issued a report citing 

major problems with oversight and monitoring of these development 

efforts.9

 We reported that while taking timely corrective action on known 

problems is critical to developing well designed automated systems, OCSE 

had not required needed changes in some states facing serious systems 

problems. We, therefore, made recommendations to HHS for improvement. 

On June 20, 1996, Representative Henry J. Hyde requested that we conduct 

7

States must (1) establish support orders within 6 months of service in 75 percent of title IV-D cases 

needing orders and within 12 months in 90 percent of cases, (2) take action to enforce delinquent 

orders within 30 days (or 60 days if service is needed), (3) send advance notice of income withholding 

within 15 days of location, and (4) meet additional time frames for interstate cases. 

8

For example, states must establish automated registries of child support orders and directories of 

newly hired employees to track and locate parents owing support. 

9

Child Support Enforcement: Timely Action Needed to Correct System Development Problems 

(GAO/IMTEC-92-46, Aug. 13, 1992). 

Page 18 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

a follow-up review. Later, Representative Lynn C. Woolsey joined in this 

request. 

Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the status of automated state 

systems, including costs, (2) whether HHS had implemented our 1992 

recommendations, and (3) whether HHS was providing effective federal 

oversight of state systems development. 

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed federal laws and regulations 

on OCSE’s oversight of state development of automated systems. We 

assessed OCSE systems guidelines, policies and procedures, and 

correspondence with the states. We also interviewed officials in OCSE’s 

Office of Child Support Information Systems and Division of Audit to 

discuss their continued roles and responsibilities in overseeing the 

planning, development, and implementation of state child support 

enforcement systems. 

To update our knowledge of automated systems issues, we analyzed state 

planning documents, OCSE certification reports, and state audit reports of 

automated systems. In addition, we reviewed financial reports produced 

by OCSE’s statistical and reporting systems; however, we did not 

independently verify data contained in these reports. We coordinated with 

the HHS Office of Inspector General and reviewed, analyzed, and 

summarized the results of its nationwide child support systems state 

survey. We also interviewed selected contractors developing and 

implementing child support enforcement systems. Further, we conducted 

a focus group of 18 state officials, representing 14 states (California, 

Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 

Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Texas) and 

Los Angeles County to determine the benefits, barriers, and solutions to 

developing automated child support systems. 

We performed our work at OCSE headquarters in Washington, D.C. We also 

surveyed all 10 HHS regional offices and visited 5 (Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, 

New York, and Philadelphia) to gain an understanding of the history of 

each state’s development effort and of OCSE’s role in providing regional 

oversight and technical assistance. Further, we visited six states (Alabama, 

California, Massachusetts, Ohio, Texas, and Washington) and Los Angeles 

County. We selected these locations based on the following criteria: levels 

of funding requested, methods used to develop systems (e.g., in-house, 

contractor, and combination of in-house and contractor), caseload, 

geographic location, phase of development (e.g., pilot, implementation, 

Page 19 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

enhancement, in operation), and level of certification. During our site 

visits we assessed the systems’ status, best practices, and barriers to 

implementing systems using relevant components of our system 

assessment methodology.10 We also reviewed various state and contractor 

systems-related documents and correspondence and interviewed state 

agency officials. 

We conducted this work between August 1996 and March 1997, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

requested written comments from the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services or her designee. The Inspector General provided us with written 

comments, which are discussed in chapter 6 and reprinted in appendix IV. 

10The System Assessment Framework: A Guide for Reviewing Information Management and 

Technology Issues in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-10.1.12, August 1996). 

Page 20 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Systems Yield Benefits, but Deadline May 

Not Be Met 

Many states have made progress in their automation projects, and state 

officials report that the systems have already demonstrated benefits. 

However, some states’ costs are twice as high as originally estimated, and 

the extent of final costs is not yet known. Progress in developing systems 

varies—some states have automated many features, while others are in the 

earlier phases of development and may not be certified or operational by 

the October 1, 1997, deadline. 

Automated Systems 

Appear to Be Helping 

States 

According to state program and systems managers, child support 

enforcement systems have improved program effectiveness and worker 

productivity by automating inefficient, labor-intensive processes and 

monitoring program activities. Systems have improved efficiency by 

automating the manual tasks of preparing legal documents related to 

support orders and calculating collections and distributions, including 

interest payments. Further, automated systems can help locate absent 

parents through interfaces with a number of state and federal databases 

more efficiently than could the old, manual process. These systems have 

also improved tracking of paternity establishment and enforcement 

actions. The following examples show specific reported improvements in 

program performance since states began developing their automated 

systems. 

•	 According to one systems official, while it is difficult to attribute benefits 

entirely to the system, “the system has changed the way business is done 

in the child support office.” The automated system assisted the state’s staff 

in increasing the number of parents located from almost 239,000 in fiscal 

year 1995 to over 581,000 in fiscal year 1996—a reported increase of 

143 percent. Additionally, while using the system from July 1994 through 

December 1996, the staff increased the number of support orders 

established by over 78 percent, the number of paternities established by 

almost 89 percent, and child support collections by almost 13 percent. 

•	 Officials from another state noted that staff performance increased with 

the new system because it gives staff a new tool to use to improve their 

productivity. Collections per employee have more than doubled—from 

about $162,000 to $343,000 annually. The system has also helped the state 

reduce the time required to process payments: The turnaround time for 

checks for nonwelfare custodial parents dropped from 29 days to 

processing a payment in only seconds and issuing checks within 24 hours. 

•	 Officials from the same state also reported that the automated system 

allowed cases to be viewed on-line by several individuals simultaneously, 

eliminating the bottlenecks created by manually searching, retrieving, and 

Page 21 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Not Be Met


delivering hard copy case files. Before the state implemented its new 

system, 11 percent of the child support staff was dedicated to the manual 

process of retrieving files. 

States have spent billions of dollars on automated child support Billions Spent for enforcement systems. Costs for developing and operating these systems

Automated Systems continue to mount, while progress in developing systems varies. Despite 

Not Yet in Compliance the escalating costs, only 12 systems have been certified, and as many as 

With Federal 14 states may not meet the October 1997 deadline. 

Mandates 

Systems Costs Continue to According to OCSE records, states have spent over $2.6 billion since the 

Increase; Vary Widely early 1980s to develop, operate, maintain, and modify county and 

From State to State statewide automated child support systems. Of these costs, the federal 

government has paid 66 to 90 percent of states’ systems costs, amounting 

to more than $2 billion. Since 1980, federal expenditures for child support 

enforcement systems have risen dramatically. Figure 2.1 shows the history 

of federal funding for these systems from fiscal year 1981 through fiscal 

year 1996. As the chart reveals, federal spending escalated as states began 

working to comply with the 1988 act. Appendix I provides the total 

reported costs for each state’s child support system and the federal and 

state shares of those expenditures, and appendix II provides the enhanced 

and regular federal expenditures.1 

1

We did not independently validate OCSE’s state and federal child support systems costs. 

Page 22 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Funds Spent on Child Support Enforcement Systems, Fiscal Years 1981-1996 

Spending in millions of dollars 

1997: New deadline� 

3,000 

1980: Congress authorizes 90-percent � 

"enhanced" funding for statewide systems 

1988: Family Support � 

Act mandates � 

automated statewide� 

systems 

1991: States� 

must have � 

APDs for � 

mandated � 

systems 

1993: � 

HHS/OCSE � 

issues require-� 

ments for � 

systems 

1995:� 

Systems � 

to be � 

operational� 

by 10/1/95 

(10/1/97) 

2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1,000 

500 

0 

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 

Total


Federal share


Note: We did not independently validate funds spent on child support enforcement systems. 

Source: HHS. 

Page 23 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Although the 90-percent enhanced funding ended on October 1, 1995, the 

Congress later retroactively extended it to October 1, 1997, for those states 

having approved enhanced funding in their APDs as of September 30, 1995. 

States generally underestimated the costs of developing and operating 

child support enforcement systems. During our seven site visits, we 

compared the projected costs in the original APDs with the most recent 

estimates. While two sites’ original estimates were fairly accurate, the 

remaining five were significantly understated. For example, in total, 

current cost estimates for the states we visited are about twice as high as 

originally planned. In addition, at least 10 states are now discovering that 

their systems will cost more to operate once they are completed. While 

these states expected cost increases as a result of added system 

functionality, increased information storage, and the use of sophisticated 

databases, estimated operating costs for some new systems may be even 

higher than anticipated. For example, one state’s initial estimate showed 

the new system’s data processing costs would be three to five times higher 

than that of the old system. However, according to a state official, those 

costs will likely be six to seven times higher than the current system’s 

operating costs. Operating that state’s new system may cost nearly 

$7 million more annually than the old system. 

Further, costs for developing and operating child support systems have 

varied greatly among the states—from a low of $1.5 million to a high of 

$344 million. The difference can be attributed to a variety of factors, 

including caseload size, whether the states or the counties administer the 

child support program, the number of attempts states made to develop 

child support enforcement systems, the way the systems were 

developed—by modifying an existing system or developing a new one, and 

the kind of system being developed. 

Few States Certified as Only five systems were certified and seven conditionally certified as of 

Deadline Approaches	 March 31, 1997. OCSE grants full certification when a system meets all 

functional requirements and conditional certification when the system 

needs only minor corrections that do not affect statewide operation. 

Figure 2.2 indicates which states have certified and conditionally certified 

systems as of March 31, 1997. 

Page 24 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Not Be Met


Figure 2.2: Certified and Conditionally Certified Child Support Enforcement Systems as of March 31, 1997 

Certified 

Conditionally certified 

Not certified 

Source: HHS. 

The certified and conditionally certified states represent only 14 percent of 

the nation’s reported child support caseload. Further, according to OCSE’s 

director of state child support information systems, as many as 14 

Page 25 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Not Be Met


states—6 with caseloads over 500,000—may not have statewide systems 

that fully meet certification requirements in place by this October 1. These 

states represent 44 percent of the nation’s child support caseload. OCSE 

does not yet know how long it will take or how much it will cost to bring 

these states into compliance with federal requirements. In addition, 2 of 

these states that chose to update their existing systems rather than 

develop new child support enforcement systems may need to redesign 

their systems. 

Responding to an HHS Office of Inspector General survey, 36 of the 42 

states3

 that are not certified reported that they will meet the 1997 deadline. 

However, this task may well present a challenge for many of them. While 

almost two-thirds of the states reported that they were either enhancing 

operational systems to meet certification requirements or in the 

conversion or implementation phases, the remaining one-third of the 

states responding to the 1996 survey stated that parts of their systems are 

only in the design, programming, or testing phases of systems 

development—with major phases to be completed, including conversion 

and statewide implementation.4

 State systems officials in our focus group 

considered conversion to be one of the most difficult problems and a 

barrier to successful implementation. 

3

We are using the term state to refer to the 50 states plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, 

and the Virgin Islands. 

4

The Office of Inspector General’s survey was sent to the states in April 1996 and completed and 

returned by August 13, 1996. 

Page 26 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Recommendations Not Fully Implemented 

All too often an organization’s inability to take basic but necessary steps to 

decrease systems development risks leads to failure. Problems 

consistently identified in reviews by GAO and others include information 

systems that do not meet users’ needs, exceed cost estimates, or take 

significantly longer than expected to complete. In its efforts to assist in the 

development of automated, statewide child support enforcement systems, 

OCSE is no exception. The agency did not define requirements promptly, 

adequately assess systems issues prior to mandating a transfer policy, or 

seek to identify and aggressively correct problems early in the 

development process. The lack of sound, timely federal guidance, coupled 

with some states’ own inadequate systems approaches, caused systems 

development activities to proceed with increased risks. 

The federal and state governments and private industry recognize that an Delayed Functional investment of time and resources in requirements definition has the

Requirements Slowed biggest program payoff in the development of systems that are on time, 

Progress	 cost-effective, and meet the needs of its users. Major systems decisions 

hinge on baseline requirements; these requirements, therefore, must be 

defined early. Without them, reasonable estimates of the scope, 

complexity, cost, and length of a project cannot be adequately developed.1 

In addition, failure to clearly and accurately define requirements may 

preclude alternatives, restrict competition, and further increase the risk of 

cost and schedule overruns.2 

According to OCSE’s director of state child support information systems, 

the agency was expected to develop federal requirements for the statewide 

systems by October 1990. However, OCSE did not publish federal 

regulations—which described in general the program and automated 

systems—until October 1992. The agency did provide draft systems 

development guidance—functional requirements—to the states, but it was 

not disseminated until July 1992. OCSE did not provide the states with final 

systems functional requirements until June 1993.3 

1

Mission Critical Computer Resources Management Guide, Defense Systems Management College 

(September 1988).


2

Information Technology: An Audit Guide for Assessing Acquisition Risks (GAO/IMTEC-8.1.4,


December 1992). 

3

Automated Systems for Child Support Enforcement: A Guide for States, U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families (Revised June 1993). (This guide 

replaced draft guidance distributed in July 1992.) 

Page 27 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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OCSE acknowledges that the federal requirements were late; it attributes 

this primarily to its not using an incremental approach in releasing the 

requirements to the states. Rather than issuing certain requirements as 

they were defined, it waited until all requirements could be issued 

together. This was done because OCSE believed that certain underlying 

policy issues needed to be resolved before requirements could be made 

final and released. In addition, because OCSE’s minimum requirements 

were extensive and difficult policy issues needed to be resolved, the 

review and approval process also contributed to the delayed issuance of 

requirements. According to OCSE, it took time to assess policy issues, 

determine the most effective way to automate related changes, and 

accurately define related requirements. For example, according to OCSE, 

before it could even begin to define requirements related to the 

replacement of monthly mail-in notices (e.g., of a client’s child support 

status) with telephone recordings, complex policy decisions had to be 

considered. 

Another example of a policy issue needing resolution, according to OCSE, 

was related to guidance on financial distributions. For instance, OCSE had 

to assess how systems would handle the required “$50 pass-through” 

policy of the program.4

 This policy states that the first $50 of current child 

support payments collected for a child also covered under Aid to Families 

With Dependent Children (AFDC) must be delivered to the mother of that 

child rather than to the state AFDC office. While this policy sounds simple, 

it presented a certain degree of administrative complexity, especially for 

cases in which support payments were not made on time. In such a case, 

regardless of how many months a payment has been in arrears, only $50 

(for the current month) goes directly to the mother. 

We have indicated in the past that an agency in the process of defining and 

analyzing requirements should assess the impact of changes on other 

organizational elements;5

 therefore, we agree that policy issues such as 

these must be addressed prior to developing detailed requirements. We 

also agree with OCSE that where possible, it should have made final and 

issued certain requirements sooner, using an incremental approach. 

4

The “$50 pass-through” (also referred to as the “$50 disregard”) is the amount collected and 

distributed as payment to families and disregarded in consideration of welfare program eligibility. The 

$50 pass-through was eliminated effective October 1, 1996, by the Personal Responsibility and Work 

Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 

5

GAO/IMTEC-8.1.4, December 1992. 

Page 28 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Delays in issuing final systems functional requirements meant more than 

just a late start; they compounded other problems. Uncertainties about 

final requirements slowed some states’ development activities and 

contributed to contractor problems. Seven of the 10 regions we surveyed 

indicated that the delay in requirements had an adverse effect on their 

states’ development. The following excerpts illustrate the impact of the 

delay on certain state projects. 

•	 An official of one region (representing four states) indicated that the 

requirements were issued much later than needed and ranked the “lack of 

timely final functional requirements” the number one impediment to 

states’ systems development. This official added that all four of its states 

“wanted better clarification in black and white as to . . . what the system 

should look like, how it should operate . . . etc.” The regional official added 

that its states were “left to figure this out for themselves, then they [had] 

to pass a certification review that is totally subjective in the areas of 

functionality and level of automation.” 

•	 Another regional official said that all five of its states began their projects 

prior to receiving final requirements; however, they were reluctant to 

finalize anything until final requirements were issued. Another HHS 

regional official said, “the delay in getting official regulations published 

impacted contracts with the vendors and was an embarrassment to ACF 

[Administration for Children and Families] [yet, because of the deadline 

imposed], development efforts went forward.” 

•	 Still another region surveyed indicated that requirements were somewhat 

late and, for four of its six states, this was an impediment. However, a 

regional official alluded to strong contractor relations as one of the 

primary reasons that the delay was not a problem (but otherwise could 

have been) for two of the region’s states. The official stated, “the effect of 

timing on [these two states was] unique. Each was building one system 

that supported a few offices throughout each jurisdiction. Each also had a 

fairly good working relationship with its vendor. Because of the nature of 

the projects, the type of environment and working relationship with the 

vendor, [both states were not as affected by the delay].” 

Likewise, during our visits to individual states, four of them attributed 

their systems development problems to late functional requirements. One 

state official noted that the late functional requirements and short time 

frames contributed to development delays and increased costs. Another 

state noted that the delay in functional requirements contributed to many 

changes in the contract and, eventually, to contract termination. Finally, in 

one state, the child support systems’ development contract had to be 

Page 29 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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amended to address modifications to the functional requirements. In fact, 

three work segments in the contract had to be added as a result of these 

modifications, increasing project costs by at least $210,000 due to 

reprogramming. 

The HHS Office of Inspector General has similarly reported that several 

states experienced systems problems as a result of late functional 

requirements.6

 In response to the Office of Inspector General survey, one 

state official noted that the state’s system was designed to meet the 

requirements set out in the draft guidelines; once the final requirements 

were issued, the state had to shift to a new initiative and virtually start 

over. Another state official said “. . . the late issuance of the certification 

guide was a major factor in the decision to delay statewide 

implementation of the system. The delay in receiving the guide caused [the 

state] to compress the development cycle of [its] subsystem, putting a 

higher risk on the success of the overall system.” 

In addition to being hindered by the delay in functional requirements, Premature Policy states encountered delays in developing systems and incurred more costs

Mandate Also Delayed as a result of OCSE’s policy requiring states to transfer systems. Two years 

Development,	 after the passage of the 1988 act, OCSE required states to “transfer” existing 

child support systems from other states or counties rather than building Increased Costs	 entirely new systems. While certainly a reasonable approach for saving 

money, at the time of this policy mandate, only a few available systems 

had been certified as meeting OCSE’s old requirements and no systems 

were certified based on the more extensive 1988 act. As a result, states had 

difficulty transferring these systems and adapting them for their own 

programs. OCSE had intended for the transfer policy to be an efficient 

method of building systems; however, in many cases, the transfer policy 

actually slowed systems development and led to increased systems costs 

when states attempted to transfer incompatible, incomplete, or 

inadequately tested systems. 

Policy Mandate Poorly Before issuing its transfer policy, OCSE did not perform sufficient analyses 

Planned and Implemented	 to support the requirement that states transfer systems. By not thoroughly 

evaluating the available alternatives, OCSE had no assurance that states 

would be able to transfer systems in an effective and efficient manner. As 

a result, states were faced with choosing from a limited number of 

6

Implementation of State Child Support Certified Data Systems, Department of Health and Human 

Services, Office of Inspector General (OEI-04-96-00010, April 1996). 

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systems, some of which were incomplete or unsuitable for their systems 

environments. 

OCSE established the transfer policy on October 9, 1990; it said that all 

states must transfer a child support system from another state or county. 

OCSE noted that states needed to review other states’ systems and 

determine how these systems varied from their own systems requirements. 

According to OCSE, this sharing of technology among states would 

decrease the installation time for automated systems and reduce the risk 

of systems failures due to poor system design or inadequate planning. 

The transfer policy required states to reuse software. Software reuse can 

be an appropriate part of systems development projects. According to the 

National Bureau of Standards, one of the most effective means of 

improving the productivity of software development is to increase the 

proportion of software that is reused. Reusable software not only 

increases productivity, but also improves reliability and reduces 

development time and cost. However, many technical, organizational, and 

cultural issues usually need to be resolved before widespread reuse of 

software should be mandated.7

 In this case, this was not done. 

If properly implemented, OCSE’s transfer policy could have saved states 

time and money in developing child support systems. As early as 1987, we 

reported that sharing state systems could save OCSE time and money.8 

However, we also noted at that time that OCSE had not adopted standards 

or provided adequate oversight of states’ efforts to develop compatible and 

transferable automated systems. Careful and detailed alternatives analyses 

are required prior to selecting software to be transferred. Analyses should 

consider functional requirements; standardization of data elements; 

compatibility of software and hardware platforms; and other factors, such 

as caseload processing, organizational structure, state and contractor 

expertise and skills, and any unique state requirements. For alternatives, 

state agencies should consider only completed systems that have been 

tested, validated, and successfully used in operation to ensure that 

benefits will be achieved. 

Two factors intensified the need for adequate planning for software reuse: 

states’ different organizational structures and methods of administering 

the program and the magnitude of changes required by OCSE’s 

7

William Wong, Management Guide to Software Reuse, Department of Commerce, National Bureau of 

Standards’ Special Publication 500-155 (April 1988). 

8

Letter to the Administrator, Family Support Administration, HHS, Feb. 20, 1987 (B-221220). 

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implementation of the 1988 act. Since states administer the federal child 

support program, each state determines how its program will be organized 

and operated. These differences in state programs affect systems 

development. For example, county-administered states faced an additional 

challenge in complying with the 1988 requirement to have one statewide 

child support system. Those states had to build systems that considered 

the needs of users in all of their county offices, complicating system 

design. Careful planning for software reuse was especially important. 

Under the 1988 act and implementing regulations, states were required to 

obtain and track more detailed information on each absent parent, child, 

and custodial parent. OCSE mandated that states transfer systems before 

making the requirements final, so they were unable to first evaluate the 

ability of the transfer systems to meet those requirements. 

Despite its lack of requirements, oversight, and alternatives analyses, OCSE 

mandated the transfer policy without performing sufficient analyses or 

feasibility studies of existing certified systems as potential transfer 

candidates. Only eight certified systems were available when the mandate 

was issued, and these were certified based on the 1984 requirements. At 

the same time, no automated systems were certified based on the more 

extensive 1988 act, making it highly unlikely that the available systems 

would be suitable for transfer to other states. While, in July 1994, OCSE 

changed its transfer policy making it optional, this was after most states 

had attempted to transfer systems and when systems efforts had 

progressed further. 

Only one state we visited noted that it had successfully transferred 

another system. It was among the last to transfer a system, initiating the 

transfer in 1994. Moreover, the state began its project after the final federal 

requirements were issued, conducted thorough analyses of three potential 

systems, and transferred a system that had already been certified as 

meeting the 1988 requirements. In addition, the system selected was the 

result of a successful, earlier transfer from another location. 

However, some states we visited did not take as thorough an approach and 

faced difficulties in attempting to transfer existing child support systems. 

•	 One project team we visited spent almost $400,000 attempting to transfer a 

system from another state, only to discover that the transfer was not 

possible because the system was not compatible with its existing 

operation. 

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•	 Another state’s official explained that, to meet the mandate and the 1995 

deadline, his state attempted to transfer a system that was immature, 

incomplete, and inadequately tested. While the state started to implement 

parts of the transfer system, the entire system was not delivered until a 

year later, increasing project costs. 

•	 Yet another state attempted to have a contractor modify a transfer system 

that was also incomplete. Later, the entire effort was abandoned, wasting 

over a million dollars and contributing to a delay of several years. 

The HHS Office of Inspector General recently reported that 71 percent of 

states said that their attempts to transfer a system delayed, rather than 

enhanced, development of an automated system. In response to that 

survey, one state official noted, “. . . when we began our project there were 

no systems certified to the 1988 level. We chose one state’s system as our 

transfer model and wasted about a year documenting all of its deficiencies 

in order to justify not transferring it.” In addition, we were told by officials 

in several other states that they transferred only concepts from other 

systems—that the amount of computer code actually transferred was 

negligible. 

GAO 

Recommendations 

Only Partially 

Addressed Despite 

Delays and Escalating 

Costs 

In our 1992 report, we stated that efforts to develop child support 

enforcement systems were plagued by problems, particularly in the area of 

federal oversight provided to states.9

 According to laws and regulations, 

OCSE is responsible for continually reviewing and assessing the planning, 

design, development, and installation of automated systems to determine 

whether such systems will meet federal requirements. OCSE is required to 

monitor 90-percent federally funded child support systems to ensure that 

they are successfully developed and are cost-effective. If this is not the 

case and if a state is not substantially adhering to its approved plan, OCSE is 

authorized to suspend federal funding. 

Past compliance reviews conducted by OCSE’s systems division identified 

many deficiencies with states’ development of automated child support 

systems and escalating costs. For example, development of three severely 

flawed systems continued at a total cost of over $32 million before they 

were stopped and redirected by OCSE. Rather than directing needed 

remedial actions when these problems were identified, OCSE informed the 

states of the deficiencies yet continued to fund the systems based on 

states’ assurances that the problems would be addressed. Further, OCSE’s 

9

GAO/IMTEC-92-46, Aug. 13, 1992. 

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systems division did not routinely use audit division reports to help 

monitor development because it was not required to do so. 

In 1992, we recommended that OCSE (1) work with the audit division to 

identify and resolve systems-related problems, (2) use its authority to 

suspend federal funding when major problems existed, and (3) require 

states to implement needed corrective actions when first identified. 

Despite the seriousness of the problems we identified in 1992 and 

recurring problems since then, the only recommendation fully 

implemented by OCSE was the first one, regarding working with the audit 

division to identify and resolve systems-related problems. OCSE reviews 

audit reports prior to certification visits and the auditors are now 

members of the certification review teams. In addition, officials in both the 

systems and audit areas stated that communication and coordination 

between the two have improved substantially since our 1992 report. 

Even though systems costs were escalating, OCSE did not fully implement 

the other two recommendations. It continues to assert that the federal 

government should work with the states to correct deficiencies rather than 

take enforcement actions. However, law and regulations require that OCSE 

monitor the 90-percent federally funded child support systems to ensure 

that they are successfully developed. OCSE is authorized to suspend federal 

funding if a state is not substantially adhering to its approved plan. While 

HHS regional staff noted that OCSE either held up, reduced, or stopped 

funding to 18 states since the 1988 act, almost 60 percent of these reported 

disruptions were due to insufficient information on the required APD or the 

state’s exceeding its authorized funding level. OCSE believes that 

suspending funds is counterproductive to helping states meet the deadline. 

Even when funding was held up for major systems-related problems, 

efforts to correct these problems did not appear to be timely. For example, 

one HHS regional official suggested to OCSE that it hold up funding for 

projects in his region, yet, according to this official, the agency did not 

stop any funding until one of those projects’ “initial efforts crashed.” In 

another instance, OCSE had serious concerns about the status and future 

direction of one state’s project, staffing levels, and methods of 

incorporating changes in code. As a result, it held up funding for several 

months. However, some problems were not identified until 2 years into the 

project’s life cycle; as of the end of our review, OCSE was still working with 

the state to resolve them. In another case, OCSE identified problems with 

poorly documented code, inadequate planning and guidance, and contract 

management but did not stop federal funding. 

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According to OCSE’s systems division director and analysts, states have 

primary responsibility for developing their systems and therefore the 

federal government should not assume a primary role in directing how 

states should develop systems and remedy problems. We disagree with 

OCSE’s approach of continuing to fund systems with serious problems that 

endanger the projects’ success. Such an approach involves the risk of 

needing to fix serious problems later in the development process, when it 

is much more costly and time-consuming to do so. 

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Because of the complexity, costs, and large caseloads associated with the 

child support program, effective development of automated systems 

requires continuing oversight and strong leadership. Yet despite the 

pressure that federal and state agencies are under to improve their child 

support enforcement services, the development of statewide automated 

systems is hampered by ineffective federal leadership and some 

inadequate state development approaches. Major mechanisms OCSE uses to 

oversee states’ systems development projects include reviews of the 

states’ advance planning documents (APDs); advance planning document 

updates (APDUs); and certification reviews, which are assessments to 

determine if projects meet federal requirements. While these reviews 

provide OCSE information on states’ plans for designing automated 

systems, the agency does not effectively use the APDs to oversee, monitor, 

or control the systems development projects, and the certifications are 

performed too late in the process to detect and correct problems. 

In short, critical systems development decision points are not monitored 

by OCSE and reviews of states’ systems are primarily focused on 

determining whether all federal requirements have been met. Further, OCSE 

has not completed nationwide analyses or post-implementation reviews to 

effectively assess lessons learned, hindering its ability to provide more 

thorough, helpful leadership. OCSE acknowledges these facts, yet cites a 

management approach that holds states responsible for developing their 

systems; OCSE believes it lacks the technical expertise and resources 

needed to be involved at critical points in the development process. 

While the review of APDs is one of OCSE’s principal vehicles for monitoring APD Use Inadequate states’ systems activities, the agency’s review is inadequate for systems

to Redirect States	 monitoring because OCSE does not require a disciplined, structured 

approach for developing or reviewing systems. As such, the APDs are not 

used to measure systems development progress at key decision points; 

rather, according to state officials, APDs are used primarily as a funding 

approval mechanism only, requiring the states to report information and 

plans on the basis of a deadline that may or may not be realistic. 

Consequently, systems problems may go undetected until much later in 

the process when they are considerably more difficult and expensive to 

correct. 

APDs are written plans of action submitted by states to request federal 

funds for designing, developing, and implementing their systems. 

According to an OCSE guide, the three primary purposes of the APD process 

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are to (1) describe in broad terms a state’s plan for managing the design, 

development, implementation, and operation of a system that meets 

federal, state, and user needs in an efficient, comprehensive, and 

cost-effective manner, (2) establish system and program performance 

goals in terms of projected costs and benefits, and (3) secure federal 

financial participation for the state.1

 The document contains the state’s 

statement of needs and objectives, requirements analysis, and alternatives 

analysis. The APD also sets forth the project management plan with a 

cost-benefit analysis, proposed budget, and prospective cost allocations. 

To obtain continued federal funding throughout the system’s life, a state 

submits an APDU to report the system’s status and to request additional 

funding—annually or, if needed, more frequently. 

Public Law 100-485 requires that states submit APDs to OCSE and that based 

on the APDs, OCSE review, approve, and fund information systems. This 

review focuses on ensuring that each state incorporates the minimum 

functional requirements by the legislatively mandated date of October 1, 

1997. OCSE is also required to review the security requirements, intrastate 

and interstate interfaces, staff resources, hardware requirements, and the 

feasibility of the proposed plan. HHS regional staff support OCSE by 

monitoring states’ development efforts and, at times, assist the states in 

preparing their APDs and APDUs. In addition, regional staff provide states 

technical assistance and suggestions to help the states comply with 

systems requirements. 

A well-defined, disciplined structure for systems development, covering 

the status of systems at critical design points, is key to preventing 

software development problems and encouraging strong, effective 

management oversight. For example, phases include systems planning and 

analysis, design, development, and implementation. These are major 

milestones in any system development project and are to be used to 

identify risks, assess progress, and identify corrective actions needed 

before proceeding to the next phase. Appendix III provides an overview of 

typical systems development phases. The key is to identify system risks 

and problems early in the design, in order to avoid major failures and 

abandoned projects, and to help ensure that major segments do not have 

to be extensively recoded or redesigned.2 

1

State Systems APD Guide, Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children 

and Families and Health Care Financing Administration (September 1996). 

2

GAO/AIMD-10.1.12, August 1996. 

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While states recognize the benefits of using a structured systems 

development approach and may provide OCSE with information on each of 

these phases in their APDUs, OCSE does not effectively use this information 

for determining the adequacy or progress of the systems development 

projects. APDUs are revised annually, rather than corresponding to major 

system phases. According to OCSE’s director of state child support 

information systems, the agency has not monitored the projects using a 

structured approach because it lacks the technical expertise and resources 

needed to be involved at critical points in the development process. 

Recent funding from the welfare reform legislation has allowed OCSE to 

conduct more frequent reviews; it is critical to assess systems 

development activities at each phase and to identify problems and any 

potential risks early, before moving forward to the next phase. 

Further, OCSE has not provided specific guidance describing the 

information needed in the APDUs to assess different phases of 

development. For example, while OCSE requires that the states provide 

schedules of systems development activities, these schedules—formats, 

descriptions, and structure—vary from state to state and, even within a 

state, may vary from year to year, making it difficult to effectively assess 

state progress and monitor systems development. Specifically, some APDUs 

do not provide information on how much data have been converted, code 

written, modules produced, nor portions and results of the modules tested, 

again hindering OCSE’s ability to effectively measure progress. 

While state officials indicated that the APDUs were useful for budgetary 

purposes, officials at six out of seven locations we visited said that APDUs 

are not useful in helping them manage their systems developments. “They 

are an administrative exercise to justify obtaining funding,” said one. 

Officials also noted that the deadline seemed to be OCSE’s primary concern; 

even when the deadline seemed impossible to meet, the states were forced 

to present inaccurate schedules. 

Problems in State Because of the significant financial investment in information systems and


Development Approaches their crucial role in helping locate noncustodial parents, a structured


Not Corrected or systems development approach is essential to reducing major systems


Redirected risks. In several instances, even when states’ APDUs contained adequate


information to identify significant problems in approach, OCSE has not 

required the states to correct the deficiencies. As a result, more money 

was spent and systems underwent further development without 

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disciplined, structured systems development approaches, increasing the 

likelihood of system failures. 

In the case of one state we visited, as shown in figure 4.1, despite three 

revisions to time estimates for systems testing, OCSE approved each 

updated estimate. Only after the state officials told OCSE that delays and 

problems were occurring did the agency, in November 1996 and in 

February 1997, review systems progress. State officials told us that they 

wanted the OCSE review to identify that the time for testing was insufficient 

to support the state in vendor discussions, yet the agency had not, as of 

March 31, 1997, reported on this matter. According to OCSE’s director of 

child support information systems, the review focused only on one 

specific functional requirement and was not a comprehensive systems 

review, and would not, therefore, address the software testing issue. 

Figure 4.1: State Plans for Software Programming and Unit Testing 

January 1991 APD submitted� 

with no schedule for testing 

March 1994 initial estimate (6.5 months) 

August 1994 revised estimate (6.5 months) 

December 1995 revised estimate (20 months) 

May 1996 revised estimate (34 months) 

1/91 1/92 1/93 1/94 1/95 1/96 1/97 1/98 1/99 1/2000 

Dates APDUs were submitted 

Source: State’s child support enforcement systems advanced planning document updates. 

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In systems development, building and testing sections of computer code 

and then using test results to refine the software are critical.3

 Testing 

results need to be considered in correcting errors and improving identified 

inefficiencies. Despite this essential need for systems testing, in the 

example in figure 4.1, OCSE continued to approve the APDUs and fund the 

project, without assessing the increasing risks. The APDUs also showed that 

the state was not following a structured systems development approach 

and was developing software while at the same time attempting to 

integrate software in preparation for systems testing. According to this 

state’s systems project director, the project’s costs increased from 

$30 million to over $50 million, in part because of the poor quality of 

software developed. If work on a later phase proceeds before an earlier 

phase is completed, one risks problems from condensing work and 

truncating the process. Completion of the automated system is now 

uncertain. 

In another state we visited, OCSE had ample indication that the state’s 

system was experiencing difficulty, yet failed to act until just recently. In 

August 1993, the state initially scheduled implementation to last until April 

1996—a period of 39 months. The estimated completion date was 

subsequently extended twice—first in September 1995 by an additional 10 

months (to February 1997), and then again in October 1996 by an 

additional 5 months (to July 1997). These extensions, taken together, 

prolonged the implementation phase by almost 40 percent, from an 

initially envisioned 39 months to 54 months. The 1995 updated estimate 

should have signaled to OCSE that the state’s system needed help. However, 

not until the state requested a substantial increase—$133 million in project 

costs—did OCSE, in January 1997, question the state’s systems progress. 

According to OCSE’s director of child support information systems, the 

agency should have visited this state sooner to provide technical 

assistance. Given that the October 1996 update judged implementation to 

be less than half finished, it is questionable whether the July 1997 target is 

even realistic. 

OCSE has not effectively provided program oversight by detecting and 

redirecting states’ approaches that are inadequate and threaten successful 

systems development. When planning and developing a system, a state 

must ensure that it meets users’ needs, provides the intended benefits to 

users and their constituencies, and is developed on time; otherwise, it will 

not be effective.4

 Gaining commitment and support from key 

3

GAO/AIMD-10.1.12, August 1996. 

4

GAO/AIMD-10.1.12, August 1996. 

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decisionmakers is particularly important for states developing child 

support systems because they serve a variety of users—district attorneys, 

county and state officials, and court officers. Key users’ needs should be 

considered, and general agreement is critical in developing systems’ 

requirements and design. However, not all states clearly defined their 

functional requirements and user needs. 

In one state, the system design was insufficient because it did not clearly 

define functional requirements and did not gain the support and 

involvement of key county officials. While OCSE reviewed requirements and 

reported minor deficiencies, it did not mention any serious problems in 

the state’s systems development approach. Yet just 1 year later, after the 

state had an independent contractor conduct a risk assessment of the 

project, state officials acknowledged that the approach needed to be 

completely revamped. According to OCSE’s director of child support 

information systems, the agency’s review for this state focused only on 

whether functional requirements were being met rather than the systems 

approach being followed. She further noted that the state is responsible 

for developing the system and obtaining system buy-in from the users. 

Because of OCSE’s large financial investment in systems—the approval of 

$154 million for this state alone—and the importance of gaining user 

acceptance for successful systems development, we believe the state and 

federal agencies are both responsible. 

Two states we visited also encountered similar problems by not involving 

all key players—program, systems, and management officials—in the 

decision-making process. In one state, the information resources 

management official was not involved in the systems planning and 

implementation. Later a disagreement occurred in policy decisions related 

to operating the system, resulting in an abrupt change in management of 

the system. Consequently, the project’s direction is uncertain and the 

system conversion progress has been delayed. Another state allowed its 

child support program office to develop its system without ensuring that 

key officials with technical program and managerial expertise were 

adequately involved. Systems problems were identified late in 

development, and project management was changed to put more emphasis 

on technical project experience. If this technical expertise had been 

involved initially, the system might have been more successfully planned 

and implemented. 

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Certification Reviews 

Narrow in Focus and 

Performed Too Late 

for Effective 

Oversight 

While OCSE does review and certify states’ systems to determine if 

functional requirements are being met, as described in the 1988 act and the 

agency’s implementing regulations, these reviews are conducted toward 

the end of a systems development project, at the states’ request, and are 

not performed at critical decision points (such as analysis, design, coding, 

and testing). Thus, these reviews are too late to identify problems and 

redirect approaches. Despite being the predominant stakeholder for over 

$2.6 billion worth of child support systems, OCSE maintains that its 

philosophy is to work with the states as opposed to suspending funding 

until problems are corrected, allowing federally financed projects to 

proceed when such projects do, in fact, require redirection. 

Two types of reviews are conducted by OCSE: functional and certification 

reviews. During a functional review, OCSE helps the state work on specific 

system requirements. For example, it may telephone or visit the state to 

discuss how to meet automation requirements for the noncustodial parent 

locating function. The certification review comprises a two-level process, 

level 1 and level 2. A level 1 review is performed when an automated 

system is installed and operational in one or more pilot locations. (OCSE 

created this level of review in 1990 due to state requests for agency 

guidance prior to statewide implementation.) A level 2 review is 

conducted when OCSE visits the state to determine if the system meets 

certification requirements. The certification review normally takes a week 

to perform; the OCSE review team is made up of headquarters systems 

officials and HHS regional personnel representing the systems, fiscal, 

program, and audit functions. 

Prior to a certification review, OCSE provides a questionnaire including 

questions on how the system meets specific federally required functions 

(such as case initiation and the detail supporting this function) and a test 

deck of financial transactions (mainly test cases of different types of child 

support payment distributions) to be run on the state’s system. OCSE also 

supports, through federal funds, child support user group meetings so 

state officials can meet and share related systems experiences. 

OCSE’s reviews—functional and certification—of state systems focus on 

whether functional requirements are met, while they lack but need 

comprehensive assessments of the systems’ development approaches and 

schedules. Since 1991, OCSE has visited, assessed, and reported on 31 

states’ system development projects.5

 We reviewed all of these and found 

5

Since 1991, OCSE has visited and reviewed 34 state systems projects; however, the agency had only 

issued reports on 31 of these reviews as of March 31, 1997. 

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that 28 of the 31 functional and certification reviews focused primarily on 

systems’ functional requirements. Specifically, OCSE determines whether 

the system can initiate a new case, locate an absent parent, establish a 

support order, manage cases, enforce cases, perform financial 

distributions, perform management reporting, and maintain 

security/privacy. Suggestions for improving the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the systems’ operations are discussed in reports following 

these reviews. For example, recommendations include having the states 

consider automating more functions, such as developing an automatic 

tickler file to remind caseworkers of required actions or an approaching 

time frame. While suggestions for improved efficiency in automation are 

valuable, OCSE’s reviews lack a comprehensive assessment of the states’ 

systems development approach, including the overall design, project 

management, user involvement, and delays in major milestones and 

critical tasks. While 3 of the 31 reviews did address systems development 

approaches and overall project management, OCSE officials noted that they 

only do this type of review for states that are experiencing delays and 

significant problems. 

Even though OCSE required states to submit APDs by October 1, 1991, all but 

1 of the 31 functional and certification reviews conducted by OCSE were 

performed in October 1995 or later. Since OCSE only does certification 

reviews upon state request and toward the end of systems development, 

much of the federal funding had already been spent. 

Even when OCSE identifies state systems problems and notifies the states, 

corrective actions do not always follow. In one state, OCSE performed two 

reviews and noted that the state had serious managerial problems. There 

was no project manager for extended periods of time, and users did not 

support the project, despite the fact that a key early step in designing a 

proposed system is identifying and satisfying users’ needs.6

 Even after the 

second review was performed and the problems noted in the first review 

had not been corrected, OCSE took no action to stop or delay the project or 

to suspend funding. Again, according to OCSE systems analysts, the 

agency’s main focus is to help states fix problems as they arise; agency 

officials believe that withholding funds is counterproductive to meeting 

deadlines. As a result, the federal government has approved over 

$50 million for this one system; it has been in partial operation—primarily 

in the smaller counties—since mid-1993, and its expected completion is 

still not known. 

6

GAO/AIMD-10.1.12, August 1996. 

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In another example, OCSE approved a state’s proposal to meet functional 

requirements by developing a distributed system estimated to cost nearly 

$178 million to complete and maintain through 2000. This system involves 

developmental costs for at least 23 county databases, plus additional costs 

to maintain separate systems. While OCSE questioned the state about the 

additional costs of personnel, the agency’s certification process does not 

require that a state receive an approval before moving from one phase of 

development to the next. By not visiting the project to review critical 

design documents, the agency was not able to effectively assess the 

distributed processing strategy and associated costs or to suggest an 

alternative approach. This state now estimates that the system will cost 

about $311 million to complete and maintain through 2000. Further, 

according to state officials, the system will not meet the October 1997 

deadline. 

Systems managers from three states we visited indicated their desire that 

OCSE play a more active role. Systems that are being developed are very 

sophisticated, and the officials said that it was important for OCSE to assess 

the management and direction of the project early to avoid or minimize 

problems later. One state official said that OCSE should see itself as a 

stakeholder in the development of these systems and not just a reviewer to 

see if certain requirements were followed. Another official noted that OCSE 

is scrupulously hands-off with all, especially with the private sector. 

Another state official told us that because the contractor’s work was so 

poor and late in delivery, the state had to support the project with more of 

its own staff, contributing to an increased cost of $20 million. When the 

state asked for assistance from OCSE on how to handle the contractor, they 

were told that “it was a state contract and it had to be resolved at that 

level.” 

Further, while a recent HHS Office of Inspector General survey noted that 

70 percent of the states felt that OCSE’s guidance was good to 

excellent—including the certification guide, clarification of requirements, 

and questions and answers on functional requirements—43 percent said 

they needed additional technical assistance. One state official said “there 

has been very little monitoring to date. The delays will come when we 

request certification and OCSE doesn’t like what it sees.” Another state 

official noted, “It would have been helpful to have had more compliance 

reviews and technical reviews of designs, but it was probably not practical 

given OCSE’s [limited] staffing resources.” Finally, another state official 

noted “I’ve only known OCSE to be the gatekeeper with regard to funding 

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and ultimate certification. I don’t have any experience to see them in 

another role.” 

Lack of Nationwide	 The narrowness of OCSE’s reviews limits its ability to gain a nationwide 

perspective on the status of states’ systems development; this, in turn,

Perspective Inhibits hinders effective leadership in earlier stages. OCSE has completed neither a 

Effective Leadership	 comprehensive, nationwide analysis nor post-implementation reviews to 

determine whether state systems are sound financial investments. Such 

analyses are essential to assessing the ongoing progress of child support 

systems and evaluating the impact of automated systems on program goals 

and objectives—including any lessons learned.7

 While the Administration 

for Children and Families (ACF) developed an automated system to help 

the agency perform individual state and nationwide analyses, we found the 

system was not being fully used, was not user friendly, and contained 

errors in about half of the states’ data. 

Because OCSE has not conducted a nationwide assessment, it has not 

analyzed the hardware, software, database structures, and networks 

supporting state child support systems; as a result, state officials have had 

to discuss these issues through informal means. If OCSE had performed a 

nationwide analysis, it would have a sound basis for encouraging states to 

share innovative database designs, software, and other technologies for 

greater efficiencies and cost savings. Further, analyses of systems costs, 

benefits, and schedules from a nationwide perspective would help identify 

where improvements are needed in a timely manner. Aggregate data on 

projects help identify recurring problems, successes, and other trends for 

decision-making purposes.8 

To collect states’ data more effectively, assess systems costs, and monitor 

projects nationwide, ACF created the State System Approval Information 

System (SSAIS). This was designed to establish a more accurate way of 

tracking state systems projects. SSAIS tracks the historical data on 

automated systems projects—including the child support program—on a 

state-by-state basis. Users may access the following data on any state 

project: (1) funding requests, reviews, and approvals, (2) names of 

contractors, (3) completed systems reviews, and (4) notes from systems 

reviews. 

7

Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal Agencies’ IT Investments 

Decision-making (GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February 1997). 

8

GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February 1997. 

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While we commend ACF’s actions to develop this system, we found that 

SSAIS recorded incorrect funding levels for nearly half of the projects. 

During our comparison of OCSE’s approval letters and the data in SSAIS, we 

found errors, such as duplicate entries and entries for systems projects no 

longer underway, and inconsistencies, such as entries for some states that 

included planning costs while entries for other states did not. Specifically, 

SSAIS showed that the states were authorized to spend nearly $1.9 billion 

on automated child support systems projects, while hard copy approval 

letters maintained by OCSE indicated that the states were authorized to 

spend about $100 million less. 

OCSE’s director of state child support information systems acknowledged 

that SSAIS is not yet comprehensive, complete, or user friendly. She said 

that for these reasons, OCSE was not fully using or relying on the SSAIS 

entries at the time of our review. However, she acknowledged that our 

review led the division to assign a higher priority to correcting 

discrepancies in SSAIS and to establishing a consistent policy regarding 

entries for planning costs. 

In addition to tracking systems development nationwide, 

post-implementation reviews are the basic means of ensuring that systems 

meet program objectives and identify techniques for improving work 

processes, data integrity, and project management—thereby avoiding 

costly systems mistakes.9

 This information is also helpful in identifying the 

benefits of information technology projects and prioritizing technology 

investments that best meet mission needs. To date, OCSE has not 

completed post-implementation reviews on any of the 12 certified or 

conditionally certified child support systems. 

OCSE’s information systems director called post-implementation reviews 

important. However, she said that until recently, resource constraints 

limited OCSE’s ability to complete such reviews. Instead, OCSE focused its 

resources on assessing the states’ progress in meeting system certification 

requirements. Under welfare reform, 1 percent of the federal share of child 

support payments collected annually will be provided for state child 

support programs and systems oversight.10 According to OCSE’s 

information systems director, this will allow OCSE to conduct 

post-implementation reviews. 

9

GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February 1997. 

10For 1996, the federal share of child support payments collected amounted to $1.2 billion. One percent 

of this—$12 million—is provided for program and systems oversight. 

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Recently enacted welfare reform legislation substantially increases the 

importance of collecting child support payments from noncustodial 

parents, since for welfare recipients who lose eligibility, child support may 

be their only remaining source of income. As such, it will be even more 

important that state automated systems operate correctly and efficiently in 

helping eligible child support recipients collect funds due them. The law 

also places specific new requirements on states relating to the functioning 

of their systems. Recognizing the importance of these developments, OCSE 

plans to change its approach and issue functional requirements 

incrementally, and has taken steps to work with the states; however, the 

impact of welfare reform and associated costs is not yet known. Another 

demand on systems development will be monitoring and ensuring that 

new statewide child support enforcement systems, as well as existing 

systems that interface with the new systems, will process date-sensitive 

information correctly in the year 2000 and beyond. 

Welfare Reform 

Features Automated 

Systems 

In August 1996, the Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and 

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, fundamentally changing the nation’s 

welfare system into one that requires work in exchange for a 5-year 

program of assistance; implementing many of its most critical features 

involves automated systems. The law contains work requirements, a 

performance bonus that rewards states for moving welfare recipients into 

jobs, and comprehensive child support enforcement measures. It also 

provides support for families moving from welfare to work—including 

increased funding for child care and guaranteed medical coverage. 

Provisions are also included to improve automation in order to increase 

paternity establishment, obtain more information on work and residence 

locations of noncustodial parents, and process child support orders and 

collections. 

Both the states and ACF will be required to address these provisions by 

developing new databases or enhancing existing automated child support 

systems before October 1, 2000. A $400 million cap has been placed on 

enhanced federal matching funds1

 through 2001 for development costs of 

automated systems, and funds are to be allocated to the states on the basis 

of existing workloads and level of needed automation. 

Welfare reform further underscores the need for streamlined business 

processes and automated systems for the child support program. Since 

1

The legislation lowered the federal reimbursement rate for enhanced funding from 90 percent to 

80 percent. The cap applies only to this enhanced funding, not to regular funds, which continue to be 

reimbursed at a rate of 66 percent. 

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welfare reform establishes time limits and eligibility restrictions on 

individuals in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, 

states are being faced with the need to increase child support collections. 

According to experts, this likely will force some states to manage child 

support cases differently and require modifications to existing laws 

governing child support operations.2

 States will be required to automate 

many child support operations to more efficiently disclose, exchange, and 

compare information on noncustodial parents owing delinquent support 

payments. Some of the more significant state welfare reform systems 

requirements include 

•	 establishing, by October 1, 1997, or following the close of the next regular 

legislative session, a statewide system for tracking paternity orders and 

acknowledgements of paternity; 

•	 developing, by October 1, 1997, a new-hire registry on which employers 

will report information on employees recently hired, with the capability of 

reporting the information to a national database and issuing wage 

withholding notices to employers within 2 business days, and making data 

comparisons with the case registry database by May 1, 1998; 

•	 developing, by October 1, 1998, a central case registry for all child support 

cases and support orders established or modified in the state after that 

date and, as of that date, capable of making data comparisons; and 

•	 establishing, by October 1, 1998 (or by October 1, 1999, if court 

administered), a centralized unit to collect and disburse child support 

payments, and by October 1, 2000, a statewide child support system that 

meets all requirements.3 

To comply with these mandates, many states will not only have to reassess 

the way child support cases are managed administratively but 

electronically as well. This may include developing new databases and 

electronic links to other public and private organizations, including 

financial institutions; credit bureaus; the Internal Revenue Service; and 

state agencies—including judicial, corrections, licensing, business 

ownership, motor vehicle, labor, vital statistics, and Medicaid. For 

example, the requirement to develop a registry of paternities will likely 

result in the development of a new database that interfaces with 

departments or bureaus responsible for tracking statewide births. 

However, tracking these data electronically may be a challenge since some 

2

Vickie Turetsky, Child Support Administrative Processes: A Summary of Requirements in the Personal 

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Center for Law and Social Policy 

(January 1997).


3

Vickie Turetsky, Child Support Administrative Processes.


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states have not automated the departments or bureaus responsible for 

birth certificates.4 

The states will also have to develop automated interfaces with the national 

Federal Parent Locator Service and the yet-to-be-developed federal case 

registry and new-hire registry databases. The Federal Parent Locator 

Service is an electronic system that cross-matches data to help locate 

noncustodial parents across state lines through links with other state 

systems and existing national databases, such as those of the Internal 

Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, and Department of 

Labor. 

Both the new-hire registry and the federal case registry will also need to be 

designed to receive and compare state data on child support cases and 

noncustodial parents. The states, in turn, will be required to develop 

similar databases that electronically interface with these national systems. 

The federal new-hire and case registry systems must be completed by 

October 1, 1997, and October 1, 1998, respectively.5 OCSE has contracted 

with several vendors to develop the software for these databases and to 

provide states with technical assistance. 

Many states will have to adapt their existing systems and change laws 

governing child support operations to implement many of these systems 

requirements. For example, three states we visited indicated that existing 

laws governing the child support program and new-hire reporting 

requirements for employers would have to be amended or rescinded 

before mandated systems requirements could be implemented. Other 

states will have to make welfare reform system changes while finishing 

work on child support systems mandated by the 1988 act. 

OCSE Plans to While OCSE has initiated some steps to identify welfare reform systems 

issues and plans to change its approach in issuing functional requirements,

Address Welfare the agency does not yet know the impact the legislation will have on state 

Reform systems. As of March 31, 1997, OCSE had not developed functional 

requirements for implementing welfare reform or fully analyzed the impact 

of these provisions on existing state child support systems. Guidance for 

developing the new-hire registries had not been completed, even though 

4

Vickie Turetsky, Child Support Administrative Processes. 

5

Welfare Reform Act—Telephone Seminar: Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996, American Bar Association family law section and KRM Information 

Services, Inc. (Oct. 2, 1996). 

Page 49 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Welfare Reform Places New Demands on


Child Support Systems


these registries are due to be in operation by October 1, 1997. However, 

OCSE does plan to apply lessons learned from technology projects 

mandated as part of the 1988 Family Support Act and release technical 

guidance for systems changes required by welfare reform incrementally. 

The early release of technical guidance should help states decide on 

systems requirements as soon as possible, minimizing project delays. 

With the increased funding being made available through welfare reform, 

OCSE plans to conduct more on-site reviews of child support systems 

projects to help identify and prevent costly systems development 

problems during earlier stages of the projects. The agency has also 

supported ACF user groups and established electronic information bulletin 

boards to identify and share information on systems issues. Further, OCSE 

is participating in welfare reform work groups with the states to discuss 

policy and systems-related issues. In January 1997, the agency also created 

a federal, state, and local government initiative to work with the eight 

largest states—representing almost 50 percent of the child support cases. 

This initiative focuses on improving program performance, which may 

include automated systems issues. In addition, the agency recently queried 

the states to identify technical support needs and planned to issue, in 

May 1997, a national plan to better address OCSE technical assistance to the 

states’ systems activities. Despite these early attempts to work with the 

states, according to OCSE’s information systems director, the agency does 

not know the impact the welfare reform will have on the states’ child 

support systems. She noted that until the requirements are defined, the 

extent of systems changes and their costs are not known. 

Millennium Changes The change in century could have a significant impact on state systems

that process date-dependent information related to child support.

Are Also Important to Ensuring that all state child support enforcement systems adequately 

Automation address the processing of information that is date-dependent is critical. 

Correcting noncompliant year-2000 software may be expensive. Among 

these systems are those that must interface directly and provide 

information to the newly-developed child support enforcement systems. 

Many older state systems that will still be in operation in 2000 were 

programmed using 2 digits to represent the year—such as “97” for 1997. 

However, in such a format 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900. 

OCSE has stated that it has informed the states that both the new child 

support systems and their applications software under development, as 

well as the existing systems that must still interface with the new 

Page 50 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Welfare Reform Places New Demands on


Child Support Systems


statewide systems and their applications software, must be year-2000 

compliant. 

Page 51 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and 

Agency Comments 

Thanks to technology, many states are better able to locate noncustodial 

parents who owe child support payments, seize government tax refunds or 

benefits, and issue child support payments to families more efficiently. But 

this progress has been expensive. The cost of developing state child 

support enforcement systems has risen over the past 15 years to the point 

that it now exceeds $2.6 billion, of which $2 billion is federal funds. The 

amount remaining to be spent to bring all states into full legal compliance 

is unknown. At the time of our review, most states did not yet have fully 

functional child support enforcement systems. Aside from new 

requirements resulting from welfare legislation, only 12 states had 

federally certified child support enforcement systems; as many as 14 

states—responsible for about 44 percent of the national caseload—may 

well miss the October 1, 1997, deadline for completing their automated 

systems. 

The causes are widespread. States have underestimated the magnitude, 

complexity, and costs of their projects and operations, and they could 

have received better guidance and assistance from the federal government, 

specifically OCSE. The lack of progress in the development of state child 

support systems also can be partly attributed to the agency’s limited 

leadership and oversight and some states’ inadequate systems approaches. 

OCSE’s release of final functional requirements for the state systems was 

late, which encouraged some states to automate many tasks without 

adequate requirements management or control. Though ready, some states 

hesitated to make their systems’ requirements final; it must be 

remembered that deadlines loomed, with or without final requirements. 

Another factor was OCSE’s mandated transfer policy, which was premature 

and poorly implemented. This alone caused long-term problems, increased 

costs, and delays. 

Against this backdrop, which included the failure to fully implement 

recommendations we made some 5 years ago, OCSE allowed state systems 

with serious problems to proceed, thus escalating spending with no 

assurance that effective, efficient systems would result—and many 

indicators to the contrary. Specifically, OCSE did not establish levels of 

oversight and technical review commensurate with the size and 

complexity of this nationwide undertaking. It did not require states to 

follow a structured systems development approach; nor did OCSE assess 

progress at critical decision points, thereby missing opportunities to 

intervene and successfully redirect systems development. 

Page 52 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


OCSE relied on required annual planning documents, which were optimistic 

projections and for many states did not relate to the critical phases of 

system development. Certifications were narrowly focused and conducted 

only at a state’s request, when the state was ready. While OCSE has 

supported state-to-state interaction with users’ groups, the agency itself 

cannot develop a truly nationwide perspective without an understanding 

of the trends that typify development of individual state systems. Lacking 

this knowledge, OCSE cannot disseminate valuable information to states in 

earlier stages of development. 

During the last 5 years, when much of the money has been spent and when 

it was most critical for OCSE to take a leadership role and evaluate states’ 

efforts, agency and HHS regional officials noted that their oversight was 

hindered by limited technical expertise and resources. Critical areas of 

systems expertise—systems development, systems engineering, and 

program management—are essential to assess how effectively systems are 

being implemented. 

Because of the magnitude of the caseload, the funds being provided, and 

the importance of the program’s mission, it is essential that both federal 

and state officials take responsibility for developing effective and efficient 

automated child support systems. While evaluating states’ efforts is one 

major component of OCSE’s role, it is important that the agency considers 

itself a stakeholder in these efforts. The problem appears to stem from 

OCSE’s view of its role—one of merely monitoring requirements and 

approving funds rather than being held accountable for effective systems 

development approaches. 

With the enactment of welfare reform, OCSE’s role becomes much more 

important: for those who may no longer be eligible for welfare benefits 

and rely solely on child support, the effectiveness of their state’s system 

will be critical. Effective, strong federal leadership will be necessary if we 

are determined to support those who rely on these automated systems. 

Recommendations	 We are making several recommendations to increase the likelihood of 

developing state automated child support systems that will perform as 

required. To maximize the federal government’s return on costly 

technology investments, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services direct and ensure that the Assistant Secretary of the 

Administration for Children and Families take the following actions. 

Page 53 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


•	 Develop and implement a structured approach to reviewing automation 

projects to ensure that significant systems development milestones are 

identified and that the costs of project decisions are justified during the 

entire effort. We recommend each major systems phase be reviewed and, 

at critical points—analysis, design, coding, testing, conversion, and 

acceptance—that OCSE, according to preestablished criteria, formally 

report to the state whether it considers the state ready to proceed to the 

next milestone or phase. 

•	 Develop a mechanism for verifying that states follow generally accepted 

systems development practices to minimize project risks and costly errors. 

OCSE should revise the guidance for the APDs and APDUs to ensure that these 

documents provide the information needed to assess different phases of 

development and are consistent from year to year. This information should 

include clearly defined requirements; schedules reflecting the amount of 

data converted, code written, modules produced, and the results of 

testing; and other measures to quantify progress. 

•	 Use an evaluative approach for planned and ongoing state information 

technology projects that focuses on expected and actual cost, benefits, 

and risks. OCSE should require states to implement needed corrective 

actions for federally funded systems when problems and major 

discrepancies in cost and benefits are first identified. If a state experiences 

delays and problems and is not following generally accepted systems 

development practices, OCSE should suspend funding until the state 

redirects its approach. 

•	 Evaluate current staff systems knowledge, skills, and abilities and identify 

what additional technical expertise is needed. Develop the technical skills 

needed to allow OCSE to become more actively involved with the states at 

critical points in their development processes, and enhance the skills of 

existing systems reviewers through additional training. This expertise 

should include program management, software development, and systems 

engineering. 

•	 Conduct timely post-implementation reviews on certified child support 

systems to determine whether they are providing expected benefits, 

identify any lessons learned, and assess innovative technical solutions. 

•	 At least annually assess the progress of child support systems projects 

nationwide to gain and share with the states a broader perspective on 

costs, systemic problems, potential solutions, and innovative approaches. 

Information should be shared with other states to help reduce costs and 

improve effectiveness of the child support program nationally—especially 

any practices or systems that could benefit states attempting to develop or 

implement welfare reform systems requirements. 

Page 54 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


•	 Assess the impact of welfare reform on existing child support 

programs—including automated systems and business operations—and 

determine whether states will be able to implement systems requirements 

within established time frames and without exceeding the $400 million 

cap. This assessment should also include an estimate of additional regular 

rate funding for automated systems that states may need to comply with 

the requirements of welfare reform. 

•	 Provide the states with technical requirements for implementing welfare 

reform systems, including the new-hire, central case, centralized 

collection, and disbursement registries in enough time to allow the states 

to meet the legislatively mandated deadlines of October 1997, 1998, and 

ultimately 2000. 

Agency Comments


and Our Evaluation


HHS disagreed with our recommendations on agency monitoring and 

oversight and suspending federal funding for flawed state systems, while 

generally agreeing with our other recommendations. HHS officials’ primary 

concern with the report was the degree of federal stewardship appropriate 

in the effective development of automated state child support enforcement 

systems. The Department notes that we have a different perception of the 

appropriate federal role in state automated systems development than is 

authorized. The Department indicated that reviewing state systems at 

critical phases would increase the administrative burden on the states, and 

result in OCSE’s “micromanagement” of state projects. Further, officials 

reiterated their belief that withholding funds was counterproductive to 

developing automated systems. Finally, HHS expressed concern about our 

presentation of the level of state automation and systems costs. The 

Department did, however, generally agree with our recommendations 

regarding assessing OCSE’s technical resources, conducting 

post-implementation and nationwide systems reviews, and defining—in a 

timely manner—welfare reform requirements. 

We have reviewed HHS’ comments, and found no reason to change our 

conclusions and recommendations. HHS views OCSE’s role narrowly, as one 

of monitoring requirements and approving funds. The agency believes its 

role is to assist states in meeting mandated deadlines, rather than more 

actively monitoring and overseeing state systems development activities 

with an eye towards helpful intervention. We disagree with HHS’ approach. 

Instead of placing the responsibility solely with the states, OCSE is also 

accountable for effective state systems development. According to 

statutory requirements, the agency should review, assess, and inspect 

systems throughout development. Given the significance of state child 

Page 55 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


support enforcement systems to the operation of the program and the 

magnitude of expenditures, it is critical that these systems be developed 

correctly and efficiently from the beginning. A philosophy of providing 

funds, despite serious systems problems and costly mistakes, misses the 

opportunity to reduce the risk of systems failure and save taxpayer dollars. 

OCSE does not evaluate or assess states’ systems development projects 

using a disciplined, structured approach. The agency’s reviews are 

narrowly focused and, as a result, not effective or timely in assessing the 

states’ systems approaches and progress. A summary of the Department’s 

comments and our evaluation is provided below. HHS’ comments are 

reprinted in appendix IV of this report. 

HHS’ Role Narrowly 

Focused 

We do not agree with HHS’ position that OCSE’s role be primarily focused on 

providing technical assistance and guidance. HHS’ statutory 

responsibilities, as set forth in the Social Security Act, delineate a 

leadership role in developing child support enforcement systems. Section 

452(a) of this act provides that a “designee of the Secretary” (Office of 

Child Support Enforcement) shall, . . . “review and approve state plans” for 

child support enforcement programs, “establish standards” for state 

programs, “review and approve state plans,” and “evaluate the 

implementation of state programs.” With regard to child support 

management information systems, Section 452(d) provides that OCSE shall, 

“on a continuing basis, review, assess, and inspect the planning, design, 

and operation of management information systems . . . with a view to 

determining whether, and to what extent, such systems meet and continue 

to meet requirements imposed [under the act].” 

The agency’s advance planning document (APD) guide,1

 also refers to its 

leadership role in approving, monitoring, and certifying state systems 

programs to ensure that federal expenditures are made wisely. In HHS’ 

response to our report, it noted elsewhere that the agency “has the 

authority, which it frequently exercises, to require states to send an 

as-needed APD at critical milestones in its life cycle methodology.” And in 

response to comments from states concerning the extent of OCSE’s 

reviews, HHS said that it intends to continue monitoring state systems 

projects, noting that it has “responsibilities for assuring that the 

expenditure of federal funds on state systems is necessary for the effective 

and efficient operation of the programs.”2

 This is consistent with recent 

1

State Systems APD Guide, Administration for Children and Families and Health Care Finance 

Administration, Department of Health and Human Services (September 1996). 

2

The Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 148 (July 31, 1996). 

Page 56 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


legislation that requires more effective oversight of systems development 

activities. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 19963

 and recent Office of 

Management and Budget guidance for managing information technology 

investments4

 specify the need for greater accountability for systems during 

the critical development and implementation phases. 

The federal government is a major stakeholder in these systems, paying 

about $2 billion dollars over the last 15 years. As such, it is critical that 

OCSE’s current approach to monitoring and overseeing state systems be 

improved to ensure that the federal government’s investment in systems is 

spent wisely. Our recommendations reflect systems development practices 

that are widely used in both the private and public sectors. Monitoring at 

critical points in the development process allows earlier intervention and 

greater opportunity to correct problems before they become more costly. 

We disagree that this approach constitutes micromanagement; we believe 

that to do less constitutes lax management. These activities also need not 

create an administrative burden. OCSE does not have to impose additional 

reporting requirements on the states; it must simply streamline its existing 

reporting process to ensure the inclusion of key pieces of information at 

critical phases. It is imperative that HHS take advantage of its legislatively 

authorized oversight and monitoring role. In the absence of such action, 

HHS is likely to continue to provide little added value to states; instead, it 

will remain merely a bureaucratic hurdle for states to climb to fund 

critically important systems. 

HHS asserts that OCSE should provide technical assistance to the states, 

rather than suspend federal funding—especially given the statutory 

deadline. We disagree. Federal regulations provide for the suspension of 

federal funding when states’ systems under development cease to 

substantially comply with requirements and other provisions of the APD.

5 

Further, irrespective of the deadline, allowing systems to be developed 

ineffectively and inefficiently at the expense of the taxpayers is not 

supporting the goals and underlying intent of the legislation. Allowing a 

state to go forward before correcting inadequacies in approach 

contributes to rising systems’ costs. 

In this report and in our 1992 report, we pointed out that OCSE continues to 

fund systems with serious problems—problems that threaten their very 

3

This act requires, among other things, that agencies manage risks associated with information 

technology projects from initiation to completion. 

4

Evaluating Information Technology Investments, OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Information Policy and Technology Branch, November 1995. 

5

45 CFR 307.40. 

Page 57 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


success.6 As discussed in this report, such an approach invites the need to 

correct serious problems later in the development process, when it is more 

costly and time-consuming to do so. 

OCSE has periodically suspended state funding for automation projects. As 

we reported, however, almost 60 percent of these disruptions were due to 

insufficient information on the required APD, or for states’ exceeding their 

authorized funding levels—not for more substantive issues on the 

soundness of the development approach itself. Even when funding was 

held up for major systems-related problems, efforts to correct these 

problems did not appear to be made in a timely fashion. Further, in cases 

in which an HHS regional official suggested that OCSE hold up funding for a 

project, the agency did not stop funding until the project “crashed.” 

Weaknesses in OCSE’s HHS agreed that the states are encountering automation problems and that 

Current Process
 states need a greater degree of oversight. The Department stated that OCSE 

follows a structured approach in reviewing states APD submissions. We 

believe this approach is not sufficient oversight. While we described the 

agency’s review process—APD and certification reviews, we believe that 

the APD process should ensure that systems development activities at 

critical decision points are evaluated. OCSE does not consistently monitor 

state systems development at critical milestone points, such as the 

completion of design or requirements development. We noted that OCSE’s 

certification reviews are usually conducted toward the end of the 

development process, and as such are often too late to help identify 

problems and redirect the approach. 

Structured Methodology 

Supports Systems 

Variability 

Another issue raised by HHS was that with a variety of concurrent systems 

development activities, including the staggering welfare reform deadlines, 

it may be difficult to use our suggested “one structured methodology fits 

all.” We are certainly not advocating that OCSE require or impose a “one 

structured methodology fits all” approach. A structured approach to 

reviewing systems development—irrespective of the particular 

methodology used—would also allow for systems variability, including the 

differences in project size, scope, and complexity. The key to a structured 

approach is the identification of critical milestones that are the basis for 

systems reviews. States value this process; one state official noted that its 

project would be unmanageable without it. Other state officials told us 

that OCSE should play a more active role, and that they considered it 

6

GAO/IMTEC-92-46, Aug. 13, 1992. 

Page 58 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


important that the agency assess the management and direction of the 

project early to avoid or minimize later problems. 

Post-Implementation HHS concurred with our recommendation to conduct post-implementation 

Reviews Planned	 reviews on certified child support systems. The agency has plans in fiscal 

year 1998 to conduct both technical assistance visits and 

post-implementation reviews to further identify lessons learned and assess 

innovative technical solutions. 

Nationwide Assessment 

Initiated 

HHS agreed on the importance of a nationwide assessment of child support 

systems projects and has taken steps in that direction. The Department 

noted that it has developed the State System Approval Information System 

(SSAIS) and uses electronic means for information sharing. However, it is 

critical that OCSE continue to maintain and use accurate information from 

the SSAIS and develop a sound nationwide basis for encouraging states to 

share innovative database designs, software, and other technologies for 

greater efficiencies and costs savings, and for identifying recurring 

problems. With a systematic and comparison-based assessment, OCSE 

could recognize trends and identify best practices that could be shared. 

Identifying and taking action on such issues would be a significant benefit 

of increased oversight. 

Magnitude of Welfare 

Reform 

HHS agreed on the importance of providing states with technical 

requirements associated with recent welfare reform legislation. As HHS 

noted, states’ systems funding was not limited to the $400 million 

enhanced funding.7

 We recognize that the welfare reform requirements are 

substantial, and that the legislation will allow states to be reimbursed at 

the regular and enhanced rate. The monetary magnitude of 

accommodating welfare reform systems requirements further underscores 

the importance of effective federal oversight, including comprehensive 

assessments of systems implications and timely issuance of systems 

requirements. 

7

For the enhanced funding, welfare legislation provides 80-percent reimbursement from the federal 

government. 

Page 59 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 6 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


Noncertified Systems 

Show Partial Benefits; Yet 

Systems Costs Are 

Significant 

HHS believes our report incorrectly noted that noncertified states have “no 

automation” to enforce child support collections. We acknowledge that 

state systems that are not yet certified may have some automation. In fact, 

we noted that state officials indicated that partially automated systems 

have improved their capability to locate noncustodial parents, increased 

paternity establishment and collections, and provided greater staff 

efficiency. We also noted, however, that OCSE officials said that as many as 

14 states may not meet the deadline for certification, leaving about 

44 percent of the national caseload without the full benefits of automation. 

As envisioned by the Congress in implementing this legislation, some 

states have attained benefits; however, child support enforcement systems 

costs continue to increase, and the extent of final costs is not yet known. 

We acknowledge that systems’ costs include developing new systems and 

maintaining and enhancing systems that were certified prior to 1988. OCSE, 

however, does not track these costs separately. Some states did not design 

new systems; rather, they built upon existing ones. In these cases, the 

costs attributable to the 1988 act would be less than those of states that 

developed entirely new systems. However, states that updated their 

existing systems may now, as the October 1, 1997, deadline draws near, 

need to significantly redesign their systems to fully meet child support 

certification requirements and support welfare reform legislation. 

HHS indicated that the costs of automation should be carefully placed in 

perspective and also compared automation costs to the agency’s 

administrative costs. We recognize that systems costs may be a small 

percentage of the total administrative costs; however, we do not believe 

that $2.6 billion is inconsequential. We recognize and cite examples where 

OCSE’s weak oversight contributed to the rising costs that could have been 

avoided if more of a proactive leadership role was demonstrated by the 

agency. These systems will play a critical role in effectively administering 

the child support and welfare programs in the future. As such, it is 

incumbent upon the Department and OCSE to ensure that the dollars 

invested in these systems are spent wisely, and provide an effective return 

on investment. 

Page 60 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 61 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Total Cost for Each State’s Child Support 

Enforcement System and the Federal and 

State Shares of These Expenditures for 

Fiscal Years 1981-1996 

State Federal share State share Total expenditures 

Alabama $49,222,159 $13,253,068 $62,475,227 

Alaska 11,071,718 4,653,294 15,725,012 

Arizona 47,063,019 9,509,389 56,572,408 

Arkansas 21,886,630 5,673,408 27,560,038 

California 248,299,485 95,658,921 343,958,406 

Colorado 26,907,957 5,005,726 31,913,683 

Connecticut 13,981,700 4,623,786 18,605,486 

Delaware 8,010,878 3,238,003 11,248,881 

District of Columbia 8,896,407 2,059,990 10,956,397 

Florida 60,114,807 22,418,473 82,533,280 

Georgia 41,611,875 12,697,507 54,309,382 

Guam 1,357,280 179,404 1,536,684 

Hawaii 15,070,420 3,968,630 19,039,050 

Idaho 26,870,077 8,052,556 34,922,633 

Illinois 64,753,779 24,385,762 89,139,541 

Indiana 27,479,878 6,914,774 34,394,652 

Iowa 31,310,719 7,975,500 39,286,219 

Kansas 24,449,198 7,407,991 31,857,189 

Kentucky 30,360,881 7,996,230 38,357,111 

Louisiana 14,004,464 2,542,250 16,546,714 

Maine 13,446,950 3,246,462 16,693,412 

Maryland 31,432,325 7,420,924 38,853,249 

Massachusetts 33,751,067 7,409,793 41,160,860 

Michigan 66,577,358 10,713,170 77,290,528 

Minnesota 56,661,743 18,197,130 74,858,873 

Mississippi 16,031,897 3,943,213 19,975,110 

Missouri 44,337,248 13,204,378 57,541,626 

Montana 9,324,373 2,743,493 12,067,866 

Nebraska 33,942,309 10,731,967 44,674,276 

Nevada 17,107,631 4,001,180 21,108,811 

New Hampshire 18,451,398 4,930,405 23,381,803 

New Jersey 64,364,051 23,196,922 87,560,973 

New Mexico 23,169,261 6,372,763 29,542,024 

New York 96,145,382 34,290,071 130,435,453 

North Carolina 43,056,136 9,723,106 52,779,242 

North Dakota 3,753,318 1,059,255 4,812,573 

Ohio 55,426,872 18,155,838 73,582,710 

Oklahoma 28,279,064 9,265,488 37,544,552 

(continued) 

Page 62 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Total Cost for Each State’s Child Support


Enforcement System and the Federal and


State Shares of These Expenditures for


Fiscal Years 1981-1996


State Federal share State share Total expenditures 

Oregon 15,168,684 4,015,436 19,184,120 

Pennsylvania 79,416,821 31,326,468 110,743,289 

Puerto Rico 22,882,169 4,506,891 27,389,060 

Rhode Island 13,727,135 2,863,771 16,590,906 

South Carolina 41,414,812 15,273,044 56,687,856 

South Dakota 3,427,507 938,347 4,365,854 

Tennessee 33,337,753 11,458,018 44,795,771 

Texas 123,790,741 51,140,939 174,931,680 

Utah 32,295,631 11,058,131 43,353,762 

Vermont 3,291,186 949,286 4,240,472 

Virginia 66,684,309 25,108,768 91,793,077 

Virgin Islands 5,132,533 818,705 5,951,238 

Washington 58,487,304 24,186,599 82,673,903 

West Virginia 17,011,816 4,625,153 21,636,969 

Wisconsin 63,489,909 18,934,783 82,424,692 

Wyoming 8,824,173 1,552,959 10,377,132 

Total $2,016,364,197 $645,577,518 $2,661,941,715 

Source: HHS. GAO did not independently verify this information. 

Page 63 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix II 


Total Federal Cost for Each State’s Child 

Support Enforcement System Including 

Enhanced and Regular Funding for Fiscal 

Years 1981-1996 

Enhanced federal Regular federal Total federal 

State share share expendituresa 

Alabama $33,760,795 $15,461,364 $49,222,159 

Alaska 2,118,686 8,953,032 11,071,718 

Arizona 36,906,092 10,156,926 47,063,019 

Arkansas 13,561,791 8,324,839 21,886,630 

California 87,823,438 160,476,046 248,299,485 

Colorado 23,468,483 3,439,474 26,907,957 

Connecticut 7,945,490 6,036,209 13,981,700 

Delaware 3,576,863 4,434,015 8,010,878 

District of Columbia 6,246,565 2,649,843 8,896,407 

Florida 20,889,857 39,224,951 60,114,807 

Georgia 21,425,098 20,186,777 41,611,875 

Guam 1,286,507 70,773 1,357,280 

Hawaii 10,262,676 4,807,744 15,070,420 

Idaho 20,073,452 6,796,625 26,870,077 

Illinois 20,890,710 43,863,070 64,753,779 

Indiana 21,568,032 5,911,845 27,479,878 

Iowa 21,720,806 9,589,913 31,310,719 

Kansas 12,465,611 11,983,587 24,449,198 

Kentucky 20,287,100 10,073,780 30,360,881 

Louisiana 11,584,227 2,420,237 14,004,464 

Maine 8,997,291 4,449,659 13,446,950 

Maryland 22,376,517 9,055,808 31,432,325 

Massachusetts 24,232,685 9,518,382 33,751,067 

Michigan 58,297,798 8,279,560 66,577,358 

Minnesota 30,840,617 25,821,126 56,661,743 

Mississippi 11,533,446 4,498,451 16,031,897 

Missouri 30,714,110 13,623,138 44,337,248 

Montana 5,348,540 3,975,833 9,324,373 

Nebraska 21,982,444 11,959,866 33,942,309 

Nevada 13,836,986 3,270,645 17,107,631 

New Hampshire 11,231,502 7,219,896 18,451,398 

New Jersey 23,567,719 40,796,332 64,364,051 

New Mexico 18,715,453 4,453,809 23,169,261 

New York 36,806,611 59,338,771 96,145,382 

North Carolina 34,289,025 8,767,111 43,056,136 

North Dakota 2,370,153 1,383,166 3,753,318 

Ohio 25,313,569 30,113,303 55,426,872 

(continued) 

Page 64 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix II 


Total Federal Cost for Each State’s Child


Support Enforcement System Including


Enhanced and Regular Funding for Fiscal


Years 1981-1996


Enhanced federal Regular federal Total federal 

State share share expendituresa 

Oklahoma 15,366,150 12,912,914 28,279,064 

Oregon 9,295,461 5,873,224 15,168,684 

Pennsylvania 25,242,187 54,174,634 79,416,821 

Puerto Rico 19,873,039 3,009,130 22,882,169 

Rhode Island 10,483,904 3,243,231 13,727,135 

South Carolina 20,183,220 21,231,592 41,414,812 

South Dakota 2,313,346 1,114,161 3,427,507 

Tennessee 19,932,879 13,404,874 33,337,753 

Texas 31,166,306 92,624,435 123,790,741 

Utah 14,285,463 18,010,168 32,295,631 

Vermont 1,892,442 1,398,744 3,291,186 

Virginia 21,992,655 44,691,655 66,684,309 

Virgin Islands 4,514,866 617,667 5,132,533 

Washington 12,529,291 45,958,013 58,487,304 

West Virginia 10,565,333 6,446,482 17,011,816 

Wisconsin 37,614,490 25,875,419 63,489,909 

Wyoming 8,349,121 475,052 8,824,173 

Total $1,043,916,894 $972,447,302 $2,016,364,197 

aSome totals may not add due to rounding of component figures. 

Source: HHS. GAO did not independently verify this information. 

Page 65 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix III 


Overview of Systems Development Phases
 Money 

Acceptance 

Users perform acceptance tests � 

to validate functionality and� 

processing needs.� 

� 

Conversion 

� 

� 

Data are converted and transferred to the new system. 

Testing Software is integrated and tested to ensure that it meets users' needs. 

Coding Software is written to support required functional processing identified by users. 

Design Systems are developed using the appropriate system solution and systems architectures� 

(i.e., software, hardware, security, communications, and data management). � 

System developers and users determine functional, quality, and architectural requirements. 

Time 

Source: Adapted from Roger F. Pressman, Ph.D., Software Engineering: A Practitioner’s 

Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992). 

Analysis 

Page 66 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health 

and Human Services 

Page 67 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 68 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 69 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 70 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 71 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 72 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 73 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 74 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 75 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 76 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 77 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 78 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Major Contributors to This Report


Christie M. Motley, Assistant Director Accounting and Leonard J. Latham, Technical Assistant Director

Information Robert F. Gerkin, Business Process Analyst 

Management Division, Norman F. Heyl, Business Process Analyst 

Gwendolyn M. Adelekun, Business Process Analyst Washington, D.C. Michael P. Fruitman, Communications Analyst 

Sharon O. Byrd, Senior Auditor 

Carl L. Higginbotham, Senior Computer Specialist Atlanta Regional Amanda C. Gill, Staff Evaluator

Office 

Denver Regional Yvonne J. Vigil, Information Systems Analyst 

Office 

(511206) Page 79 GAO/AIMD-97-72 Child Support Enforcement 
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