OPERATION URGENT FURY

The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada

12 October - 2 November 1983

Ronald H. Cole

Joint History Office

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC 1997
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

 Cole, Ronald H., 1943-

 Operation Urgent Fury : the planning and execution of joint

 operations in Grenada, 12 October-2 November 1983 / Ronald H. Cole.

 p. cm.

 Includes index.

 1. Grenada--History--American Invasion, 1983. 2. Military

 planning--United States. 3. United States--Armed Forces--Grenada.

 4. United States--Armed Forces--Civic action. I. Title

 F2056.8.C65 1997 97-10401

 972.9845--dc21 CIP
FOREWORD

Written several years after the end of Operation

URGENT FURY, this study focuses specifically on the

involvement of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and the Joint Staff in planning and directing operations in Grenada in 1983. The monograph begins with a

discussion of contingency planning for noncombatant

evacuation which started after the 12 October 1983 coup

that removed Grenada’s Marxist leader, Maurice Bishop,

and ends with the conclusion of the combat phase of

URGENT FURY on 2 November 1983. The author, Dr. Ronald

H. Cole, relied primarily on Joint Staff files and

interviews as sources of information.

In writing this account, Dr. Cole was given

valuable help by a number of the key participants and

members of the Joint Staff; their contributions are

cited in the endnotes. The final manuscript was

reviewed by Mr. Willard J. Webb and Dr. Walter S.

Poole, edited by Ms. Penny Norman and typed by Ms.

Helga Echols. The end maps are taken from US Marines

in Grenada by LtCol Ronald H. Spector, USMCR, and are

used with the permission of the History and Museums

Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.

This study was reviewed for declassification by

the appropriate US Government agencies and cleared for

release. While the text has been declassified, some of

the sources remain classified. The volume is an

official publication of the Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the views expressed are

those of the author and do not necessarily represent

the official position of the Chairman or the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

 DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

 Director for Joint History

Washington, DC

July 1997
v

CONTENTS

FOREWORD................................................ iii

OVERVIEW.................................................. 1

Chapters

1. The Crisis............................................ 9

Background 1979-1983.................................. 9

The Crisis Begins, 12 October 1983................... 10

The JCS Warning Order, 19 October 1983............... 13

USCINCLANT’s Contingency Plan........................ 14

Meeting of the Special Situation Group,

20 October 1983.................................... 16

2. Planning and Preparation, 21-24 October 1983......... 19

Planning for a Military Operation, 21 October 1983... 19

Appeals from the OECS and the Governor-General,

21-22 October 1983................................. 22

The Execute Order, 22 October 1983................... 26

Final Preparation, Washington and Norfolk,

23 October 1983.................................... 27

Final Political-Military Coordination,

23 October 1983.................................... 32

Final Preparation, CJTF 120, 24 October 1983......... 34
vi

3. Combat Operations, 25 October - 2 November 1983...... 41

D-day URGENT FURY, 25 October 1983................... 41

Rescue of the Governor-General, the Drive

to Grand Anse, and the Push for PSYOPS,

26 October 1983.................................... 47

Final Combat, Evacuation, and Public Affairs,

27 October 1983.................................... 51

Preparations to Neutralize the Threat

of a Cuban-Led Insurgency, 28 October 1983......... 56

The End of Combat Operations,

29 October - 2 November 1983....................... 58

4. Assessment of URGENT FURY............................ 63

NOTES.................................................... 69

INDEX.................................................... 79

MAPS

Grenada............................................ viii

Grenada Showing Tactical Phase Lines................. 85

St. George’s City.................................... 85

OVERVIEW

Early in the morning of 25 October 1983, Operation URGENT

FURY began with assaults on airstrips at Point Salines and Pearls

on the tiny island nation of Grenada. Over the next nine days US

troops would rescue American citizens, restore a popular native

government, and eliminate a perceived threat to the stability of

the Caribbean and American strategic interests there.

Memories of the Iranian hostage crisis and the aborted

rescue attempt at Desert One were fresh. Anxious to avoid a

similar experience, policymakers mounted URGENT FURY in haste in

response to a threat to American medical students on Grenada.

The operation succeeded, but flaws in its execution revealed

weaknesses in joint operations. Together with the bombing of the

Marine Corps barracks in Beirut that same month, the experience

of Operation URGENT FURY added impetus to efforts to reform the

joint system which were already under way.

Since 1979, when Maurice Bishop took power in Grenada,

concern in the US State Department had grown as the country moved

closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union. In late 1983 events in

Grenada led to President Reagan’s decision to conduct a military

operation there. Cuba had built a runway on Grenada suitable for

aircraft capable of interdicting US air and sea routes to Europe

and the Middle East. Bishop’s overthrow in October by militantly

anti-US Marxists appeared to pose an immediate threat to the

nearly six hundred American students and four hundred other

foreigners living in Grenada.1

State Department evacuation planning rapidly shifted to

Department of Defense (DOD) planning for a much larger military

operation.2

 Uncertain of the strength of the Grenadian troops

and armed Cuban workers, US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) planners
2

developed a wide range of courses of action and recommended a

large joint task force (JTF) to overwhelm the opposition.3

In a 20 October meeting, Secretary of State George P. Shultz

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W.

Vessey, Jr., USA, warned the Special Situation Group (SSG)

comprised of Vice President George Bush and other top national

security advisors that the Grenadian junta might resist an

evacuation and that armed Cuban construction workers might

intervene. The SSG approved a recommendation by the Chairman

that the mission be expanded to include neutralization of

Grenadian forces and the armed Cuban workers and reconstruction

of the Grenadian government.4

Following presidential approval of an expanded mission, GEN

Vessey made two far-reaching decisions. To ensure maximum

operational security, he imposed special category (SPECAT)

restrictions on all planning message traffic; this limited

planning information to selected members of the Intelligence (J2)

and Operations (J3) Directorates. Vessey then approved the course

of action which specified a coup de main in which Rangers or

Marines and airborne troops would conduct multiple simultaneous

rescue and combat operations.5 After the diversion of US

warships to Grenada became news on 21 October, US intelligence

agencies reported that the Grenadians and Cubans were organizing

to resist. The President then approved the Chairman’s

recommendation that the US ground forces include both Rangers and

Marines.6

Three days before D-Day, the Secretary of Defense inserted

the Chairman directly into the operational chain of command. He

gave GEN Vessey authority to summon backup forces and to give
3

strategic direction to US Commander in Chief, Atlantic

(USCINCLANT) and the supporting unified commands. The multiple

missions of URGENT FURY--along with the rugged terrain of Grenada

and reports of Grenadian plans to resist--caused Vessey to employ

additional forces. Vessey responded positively to a request from

Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN, USCINCLANT, for aerial

surveillance operations between Cuba and Grenada to deter Cuban

interference.7

 To avoid civilian casualties and property damage,

GEN Vessey also directed ADM McDonald to restrict use of tactical

aircraft, naval gunfire, and helicopter gunships.

Support for URGENT FURY would be strengthened by

international participation in the task force. When the

governments of Jamaica, Barbados, and the Organization of the

Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) offered modest forces, GEN Vessey

directed Major General George B. Crist, USMC, to assist in

setting up the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). Vessey

insisted that the CPF be given a visible but comparatively safe

role. Crist arranged for the CPF to take custody of key

Grenadian facilities after their capture by US forces.8

 At the

urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), ADM McDonald

rearranged the joint task force, placing the Rangers and the 82d

Airborne Division directly under Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf,

III, USN, Commander, Second Fleet.9

 With guidance from Vessey

and the other Chiefs, ADM McDonald designated a tactical boundary

to separate Army and Marine areas of operation on the island. To

help coordinate the ground forces, Vessey sent an experienced

ground operations officer, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

USA, to serve as advisor to Metcalf.10

Problems beset the operation from the start. The loss of

the inertial navigation system in the lead C-130 aircraft meant

that the flow of C-130s, had to be adjusted in the air and
4

delayed the parachute assault by the Rangers at Point Salines.

Delay of the airdrop until daylight put it thirty-six minutes

behind the Marine assault at Pearls and cost the Rangers and

other Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces tactical

surprise. Adjusting the airflow changed the order of the C-130

airdrop which mixed the Ranger units on the landing zone. The

delay of the airdrop and confusion resulting from the unplanned

sequence of the airdrop was a major operational slip-up. After

overcoming stiff Cuban resistance at the airport and rescuing

students at the True Blue campus, the Rangers learned of other

American students at the Grand Anse campus south of St. George’s

and radioed for reinforcements. Meanwhile, having lost the cover

of darkness as they entered St. George’s, Navy SEALs found

themselves trapped and outgunned as they tried to rescue the

Governor-General.

At ADM McDonald’s request, GEN Vessey sent two battalions

from the 82d Airborne Division to reinforce the Rangers. At the

same time, MG Schwarzkopf advised VADM Metcalf to redraw the

tactical boundary between the Army and the Marines and move the

Marines to rescue the SEALs. On 26 October, Schwarzkopf

commandeered Marine helicopters on board the USS Guam to fly

Rangers from Point Salines to rescue nearly two hundred American

students at Grand Anse.11

On 25 October, Navy A-7 Corsairs mistakenly bombed a mental

hospital near the Grenadian command post at Fort Frederick. Two

days later, an Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

lacking Army communications-electronics operating instructions

(CEOI) failed to coordinate an attack on a sniper target near

Frequente with the fire support element of the 82d Airborne

Division. This time, the Corsairs attacked a brigade
5

headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division, wounding seventeen

soldiers, three seriously.12

Major General Edward Trobaugh, USA, advanced his airborne

troops northward slowly because he anticipated resistance and

lacked fire support. Trobaugh’s troops also had to guard and

care for Cuban prisoners and Soviet refugees. The free movement

of Marine units in the north contrasted starkly with Army

movement in the south; Trobaugh’s deliberate pace increasingly

frustrated the desire of the JCS to complete the operation

quickly.13

On 26 October, after the Marines had rescued the GovernorGeneral and the SEALs, MajGen Crist escorted the Governor-General

back to St. George’s. While maintaining contact with GEN Vessey,

he coordinated the evacuation of third country nationals,

including Cuban and Soviet citizens, and continued his efforts to

involve the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force in Operation URGENT

FURY.14

During the first three days of Operation URGENT FURY,

USCINCLANT banned reporters from Grenada for operational reasons.

Faced with cries of censorship from the media and some members of

Congress, GEN Vessey directed USCINCLANT to land reporters in

Grenada starting on 28 October. Vessey would later comment that:

“The huge mistake at the National level was failing to find a way

to take some press along.”15

The success of Operation URGENT FURY was marred by the

consequences of inadequate time for planning, lack of tactical

intelligence, and problems with joint command and control. The

21 October news report that US warships had been diverted to

Grenada robbed the operation of strategic surprise. The Chairman

and ADM McDonald compensated by striking with overwhelming force

before the Grenadians or Cubans could react effectively. To
6

protect the force, GEN Vessey compartmentalized planning;

however, the restriction excluded experts in logistics, civil

affairs, and public affairs. Their absence was felt during the

first days of the operation.16

An adequate JTF organization did not exist in the Caribbean

so USCINCLANT chose Second Fleet to serve as the JTF

headquarters. Second Fleet headquarters was a naval staff with

little or no experience in planning and commanding large ground

operations. Vessey sent Major General Schwarzkopf to advise the

fleet commander and to insure coordination of ground operations.

Because of incompatible radios, Navy ships within sight of

Rangers and airborne troops could not initially receive or

respond to their requests for fire support. On two occasions,

when Navy jets did respond, they attacked the wrong targets.

Despite faults in execution, Operation URGENT FURY

accomplished all of its objectives. The eight thousand soldiers,

sailors, airmen, and Marines rescued nearly 600 Americans and 120

foreigners, restored popular government to Grenada, and

eliminated the potential strategic threat to US lines of

communication in the area. URGENT FURY cost US forces 19 killed

and 116 wounded; Cuban forces lost 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638

captured. Grenadian forces suffered 45 killed and 358 wounded;

at least 24 Grenadian civilians were killed. URGENT FURY

reinforced awareness of weaknesses in the joint system and helped

prod Congress to undertake the fundamental reforms embodied in

the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.17

Commenting on the JCS role in URGENT FURY, GEN Vessey would

later state that:

We, the JCS, followed our interpretation of the

lessons of Desert One and of the broader allegations

of weaknesses in the system during the Grenada

operation. (1) We gave the task to the commander
7

responsible for the territory. (2) The JCS, personally

reviewed the CINCLANT plan, agreed on its weaknesses

and directed the commander to come up with a new plan.

. . . .(3) The SecDef personally reviewed the plan and

approved it; he also had all of the JCS go with him

and the Chairman to brief the President on the plan.

The President personally queried each of the JCS about

their support for the plan before approving it,

himself. (4) The President and the SecDef personally

reviewed the plan a second time before ordering its

execution. The execution of the plan was then in the

hands of the Unified Commander. The SecDef and the

President did not interfere, but the SecDef was

repeatedly briefed on progress. I had SecDef’s

authority to supervise execution of the plan, but

only within the context of the plan he had approved.18
8
9

Chapter 1

The Crisis

Background 1979-1983

About 133 square miles in size, twice the size of

Washington, DC, with a current population of about one hundred

thousand, primarily English-speaking, descendants of African

slaves, Grenada belonged to France for more than a century before

it was ceded to Great Britain in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris. A

British dependency, Grenada was under colonial administration

after 1833 before attaining home rule in 1967 and full

independence in 1974.

In March 1979, widespread dissatisfaction with economic

conditions and the government of Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy

resulted in a bloodless coup in which the charismatic and Marxist

Maurice Bishop, leader of the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare,

Education, and Liberation (JEWEL), took complete power. During

the next few years, Bishop’s regime replaced democratic

institutions with Marxist ones and deprived Her Majesty’s

Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, of any influence. Under

Bishop, Grenada moved into the orbit of Cuba and the Soviet

Union.

With Fidel Castro in Cuba and Bishop in Grenada, Soviet

influence was established in the northernmost and southernmost of

the Antilles, the chain of islands that bounds the Caribbean from

the Florida Keys to the coast of Venezuela. Hostile control of a

portion of the Antilles by Soviet Union proxies threatened US

strategic interests, particularly vital air and shipping lanes

through the Caribbean.19
10

Construction of a nine thousand-foot runway at Point Salines

by a Cuban work force of about six hundred armed men worried US

analysts. The Bishop regime claimed that the runway was

essential to Grenada’s tourism and economic development.

Military experts observed that it would enable MiG 23s to operate

from Grenada and extend the operating range of these Cuban

fighter-bombers across the Caribbean. Nearly sixteen hundred

miles closer than Havana to Angola, the runway at Point Salines

could facilitate both eastbound flights supporting the nearly

fifty thousand Cubans in Africa and flights from Libya and the

Soviet bloc to Central America.20

The prospect of Libyan and Soviet bloc citizens planting

seeds of revolutionary warfare in Central America concerned

President Reagan and the leaders of the island nations of the

Antilles. In 1981, to counter Marxist subversion, Dominica, St.

Lucia, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, Antigua, Barbados, St.

Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada had banded together as

the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Recognizing the

limited capabilities of the OECS, President Reagan determined in

early October 1983 to assist in defending their soil or in

responding to emergencies on neighboring islands. He directed

the Department of Defense to maintain military forces in the

eastern Caribbean to deter aggression and to provide emergency

air or sealift of refugees or other groups. The President also

directed frequent exercises in the Caribbean and periodic

updating of contingency plans for the region.21

The Crisis Begins, 12 October 1983

A major emergency began in Grenada on 12 October.

Disillusioned with Bishop’s leadership, particularly after he
11

conferred with US officials in Washington in June 1983, a left

wing faction of the government’s Central Committee decided to

remove Bishop. At midnight, with the assistance of General

Hudson Austin, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Deputy

Prime Minister Bernard Coard placed Bishop under house arrest.

One week later, followers of the popular Prime Minister freed him

and accompanied him to army headquarters at Fort Rupert. After

armored vehicles fired into the crowd, Hudson Austin’s troops

recaptured Bishop and executed him and several cabinet members

and union leaders. Intelligence confirmed at least eighteen

deaths, including Jacqueline Creft, the Minister of Education,

who was viciously beaten.22

In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor,

General Austin dissolved the civilian government and established

a Revolutionary Military Council with himself as spokesman.

Austin closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew,

and warned that violators would be shot on sight. These

restrictions prevented the thousand or more US citizens on the

island from leaving, and caused special hardship to the six

hundred American students in the St. George’s School of Medicine.

The students had to violate the curfew to obtain adequate

supplies of food and water.23

In Washington, State Department and JCS officials feared

that the new regime threatened the lives of the US medical

students and other Americans and would provide the Cubans a base

from which to operate against the Central American mainland. At

a meeting of the Regional Interagency Group (RIG) of the National

Security Council (NSC), on 12 October, Langhorne A. Motley,

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,

conferred with JCS representative Colonel James W. Connally,

USAF, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Plans and Policy
12

Directorate. Motley advised Connally that it might become

necessary to plan on short notice a military operation in support

of the evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. Noting that it

would take several days to plan and execute such an operation,

Connally promised to alert his superiors at the Pentagon.24

On 14 October, Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, the Latin American desk

officer on the National Security Council, contacted Commander

Michael K. McQuiston, USN, in the Joint Operations Division,

Operations Directorate (J-3/JOD). Sapia-Bosch wanted to know

what military resources could be mustered on short notice to

safeguard evacuation from Grenada. Told of this request,

Lieutenant General Richard L. Prillaman, USA, the Director of

Operations (J-3), activated a response cell in the National

Military Command Center (NMCC) to assess the crisis and formulate

possible courses of action. Organized under the Crisis Action

System, the cell included action officers from the Western

Hemisphere (WHEM) Branch of J-3/Joint Operations Division (JOD),

an officer from the J-5/WHEM, and an officer from the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA).25

The Unified Command Plan assigned primary responsibility for

forces and “normal operations” in the Caribbean to the

USLANTCOM.26 The response cell contacted USCINCLANT’s J-3 on 14

October and requested a list of options for both “show of

force/presence” and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

In the meantime, the intelligence community assessed the likely

response of Grenadians to such US military operations.27

From 14 to 17 October, Milan Bish, the US Ambassador to

Barbados, who also had responsibility for Grenada, learned from

informants in Grenada of growing danger to the US medical

students. Ambassador Bish’s reports prompted a meeting of the

RIG on 17 October. During the meeting, Assistant Secretary
13

Motley asked Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt, USA, Director of

the Joint Staff, to begin contingency planning for military

operations to rescue the students. The next day, LTG Merrit

asked LTG Prillaman to consult with ADM McDonald at USLANTCOM on

options for evacuating the medical students in various

circumstances ranging from permissive or peaceful to armed

resistance by Grenadians and Cubans.28

The JCS Warning Order, 19 October 1983

The RIG met again on 19 October with Vice Admiral Arthur S.

Moreau, Jr., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, attending the meeting. Richard Brown, Deputy Director of

State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs, briefed the RIG on the

current situation. Noting the presence in Grenada of nearly six

hundred Cubans and two Cuban vessels moored in St. George’s

Harbor, Mr. Brown advised VADM Moreau that the JCS should plan

for the worst scenario, one in which US military forces would

have to evacuate civilians in the face of armed opposition from

Grenadian and Cuban forces. Such an evacuation could begin,

Brown warned, as early as the next day.29

Admiral Moreau noted that a JCS response cell was monitoring

the situation and that LTG Prillaman would alert USCINCLANT on

the need to plan a noncombatant evacuation operation. Moreau

pointed out, however, that the decision to plan combat operations

would have to be made either by the Vice President in the Special

Situation Group, or in the National Security Planning Group, by

the President.30
14

Late in the evening of 19 October, LTG Prillaman sent ADM

McDonald a JCS warning order, signed by General Vessey. By dawn,

McDonald was to submit alternative courses of action for a threeto five-day noncombatant evacuation operation to include one or

more of the following options: seizure of evacuation points,

show of force, combat operations to defend the evacuation, and

post-evacuation peacekeeping. The warning order designated the

Commanders of the Readiness Command (USCINCRED) and the Military

Airlift Command (USCINCMAC) as supporting commanders and directed

that all press queries about the operation be referred to the

Public Affairs Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.31

USCINCLANT, USCINCRED, and USCINCMAC immediately requested DIA

imagery coverage and daily intelligence summaries on Grenada.32

USCINCLANT’s Contingency Plan

Upon receipt of the JCS warning order, ADM McDonald’s staff

reviewed contingency plans for noncombatant evacuations and show

of force operations.33 Major operations in either category

required forces from the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Tactical

Air Command. While deploying, Army and Air Force units would be

under the command of a USLANTCOM component commander, but once

ashore, they would be under the tactical control of the senior

ground commander. Planning for such operations emphasized

maximum restraint in the use of heavy firepower, particularly

weapons such as aircraft, naval gunfire, and artillery.34

In August 1981, USLANTCOM had conducted a large joint

exercise in which Rangers and Marines landed on a small Caribbean

island to practice a rescue of a group of US citizens.
15

Influenced by that experience and revisions in contingency

planning, ADM McDonald replied to the warning order very early on

the morning of 20 October with his commander’s estimate. Later

that day, he briefed GEN Vessey on the estimate. McDonald

outlined an operation in which forces would be assigned “to

protect and evacuate US citizens and designated foreign

nationals.”35

After Grenada moved into the orbit of the Soviet Union and

Cuba in 1979, US agencies had few opportunities to collect

intelligence. Admiral McDonald’s staff had inadequate tactical

intelligence concerning Grenada. Aerial photography indicated

numerous sites for landing zones and parachute drops. An old

intelligence estimate calculated Grenadian forces at about twelve

hundred regulars with more than twice that number of militia and

four torpedo boats. Since the precise deployment of Grenadian

forces was unknown, picking the sites to land troops would be a

risky business.36

From 20 to 25 October, planners in the JCS response cell and

USLANTCOM J-3 relied mainly on information gleaned from the OECS

and broadcasts of a Grenadian ham radio operator. DIA did pick

up two significant pieces of information. First, on 6 October

the Cuban vessel Vietnam Heroica had landed an undisclosed number

of Cuban workers presumably to join others already at work on the

runway at Point Salines. Second, on 13 October other Cuban

vessels had delivered a cargo of arms for transit to an

undisclosed location in the interior.37 The presence of a wellarmed force of Cubans complicated planning.

With incomplete intelligence, the USLANTCOM staff developed

several courses of action to cover “permissive” and “hostile”

environments. For evacuation operations in a permissive or

uncontested environment, they recommended relying upon diplomatic
16

negotiations and movement of evacuees by commercial aircraft. In

the event of resistance, the planners proposed to overawe the

Grenadians with Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) 1-84, en

route from Morehead City, North Carolina, to Lebanon; the USS

Independence battle group in transit from Hampton Roads,

Virginia, to the Mediterranean; and by one or more airborne

battalions from USREDCOM. To coordinate the evacuation the

planners recommended a team from the US Forces, Caribbean

(USFORCARIB) headquarters, Key West, Florida.38

Meeting of the Special Situation Group, 20 October 1983

The JCS received the USCINCLANT plan on the morning of 20

October. General Vessey directed the J-3, J-5, and DIA to assess

the impact of each of USCINCLANT’s courses of action upon

strategic readiness in the Atlantic area. Later that morning, he

gave the assessment to the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) of

the National Security Council. Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter,

USN, the Military Assistant to the NSC, chaired the meeting which

included John McMahon, Deputy Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA); Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and Assistant Secretary

of State Langhorne A. Motley, the State Department’s senior

action officer during the crisis. The conferees agreed that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue planning a military

operation to protect the evacuation of civilians.39

The CPPG also recommended a meeting of the Special Situation

Group (SSG), the top crisis management committee of the NSC, that

afternoon. With the Vice President as chairman, the SSG included

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of

Central Intelligence, the Counselor to the President, the Chief
17

of Staff to the President, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the

President, the Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.40

The SSG met at 1645 on 20 October in the Executive Office

Building. Since no decision had been made for military action,

the crisis was still a diplomatic problem and Secretary Shultz

explained plans for evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. As

background, Shultz’s staff had provided him a paper on US

military operations to protect an evacuation which included a

comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of

amphibious and airborne operations to support the evacuation.

The paper also advocated disarmament of the Grenadian forces.

Although disarmament could lead to charges of “gunboat

diplomacy,” it would demonstrate the willingness of the United

States to fight for its interests in Central America and the

Caribbean.41

General Vessey also briefed the SSG, focusing on the risks

in using US military force and the possibility of third country

military intervention on behalf of the Grenadian government. DIA

advised that while the ineffectual Grenadian People’s

Revolutionary Army would resist attempts to evacuate the US

students, neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union were likely to

intervene militarily. The Cuban Navy had only a few submarines,

guided missile patrol boats, hydrofoil craft, and minesweepers.

While the Soviets might take measures elsewhere, they were not in

a position to intervene militarily in the Caribbean. However,

according to General Vessey, the JCS were determined that Castro

and the Soviets get a clear and early message that “This is a US

show; hands off!”

A third, albeit lesser consideration was the impact that a

US military operation might have upon US forces in Europe and the
18

Middle East. Diversion of MARG 1-84 and the USS Independence

battle group would extend the deployment of MARG 2-83 in Lebanon

and carrier battle groups either in the Mediterranean Sea or the

Indian Ocean. Diversion of naval forces would force curtailment

or cancellation of US participation in the upcoming exercise with

Spain, CRISEX ‘83, which could cause the Spanish government to

question American regard for Spain’s importance to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).42

The SSG decided that, as the danger to the Americans on

Grenada increased, the President would probably order

intervention. Given the assessment of probable resistance by

Grenadian forces, the SSG supported contingency planning by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and began drafting a National Security

Decision Directive (NSDD) expanding the original mission to

include neutralization of enemy forces and the political

reconstruction of Grenada.43 To make an expanded operation

feasible, the JCS directed diversion of MARG 1-84 to a location

to the east of Puerto Rico and the Independence battle group to

the vicinity of Dominica--positions within striking range of

Grenada. Late in the evening of 20 October, the ships of both

forces altered course to move to these new positions.44
19

Chapter 2

Planning and Preparation, 21-24 October 1983

Planning for a Military Operation, 21 October 1983

On 21 October, GEN Vessey called ADM McDonald to tell him of

the decision to expand USCINCLANT’s original mission to include

planning for a possible military operation to deter or disarm

Grenadian and Cuban forces. In addition to the naval and Marine

forces from the Independence battle group and MARG 1-84 moving

toward Grenada, Vessey told McDonald that military forces to be

considered should include both battalions of US Army Rangers and,

as a follow-on peacekeeping force, units from the 82d Airborne

Division.45

Late in the afternoon of 21 October, Admiral James D.

Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), briefly replaced

GEN Vessey as the Chairman since GEN Vessey was preparing to fly

to Chicago for a speaking engagement. At 1700 hours, ADM Watkins

attended another meeting of the CPPG which discussed intelligence

reports indicating the possibility of armed resistance by Cubans.

Intelligence sources estimated that the Vietnam Heroica might

have carried some 240 Cuban combat troops to St. George’s on 6

October. Other sources indicated that about fifty Soviet

citizens resided in Grenada. The CPPG reviewed the draft NSDD

giving particular attention to its discussion of an operation to

neutralize hostile forces. The possible involvement of Cuban

troops fueled the growing consensus that a military operation

would be needed to protect the evacuation area or to disarm

hostile forces elsewhere on the island.46
20

Before leaving for Chicago, GEN Vessey sent new guidance to

the commanders of USLANTCOM, MAC, USREDCOM, and the Joint Special

Operations Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed

USCINCLANT to plan for the most demanding contingencies: rescue

of the medical students in the face of hostile fire or a small

invasion aimed at disarming Grenadian and Cuban forces. In

preparation for either eventuality, USCINCLANT was to move MARG

1-84 and the Independence battle group to the vicinity of Grenada

and CINCMAC was to seek to reduce the time needed to airlift

Rangers, airborne troops, and JSOC forces to the island. To

execute the more demanding mission of disarming all hostile

forces, USCINCLANT and CINCMAC should plan for the airlift of one

or more battalions of the 82d Airborne Division to Grenada.47

Vessey stressed the importance of communications security.

He directed that all coordination be limited to secure

teleconferences and SPECAT messages. In the Pentagon, LTG

Prillaman directed the JCS response cell to transfer all

Grenadian message traffic from General Service (GENSER) channels

to SPECAT channels. However, these precautions were too late,

for CBS had already learned of the diversion of the warships to

Grenada and would break the story on the news later that

evening.48 The stringent limits placed on message distribution

to the commanders and key personnel at USLANTCOM, MAC, USREDCOM,

and JSOC prevented further leaks. But they also excluded from

preliminary planning and preparation the Strategic Air Command

(SAC), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense

Mapping Agency, and four Joint Staff organizations: J-4, C3S, the

Deputy Directorate for Political-Military Affairs in J-5, and the

Public Affairs Office.49

The JCS decision to plan for a large multi-service operation

was based upon thorough Joint Staff analysis which envisioned the
21

rescue and evacuation of US citizens and foreign nationals from

many points on an island about twice as large as the District of

Columbia. The Joint Staff also considered the need to neutralize

an enemy force of uncertain strength, intent, or disposition.

Intelligence analysts offered planners estimates of 1,000 to

1,200 People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) regulars, 2,000 to 5,000

militiamen, and about 250 armed Cubans. These estimates would

later be shown to be much lower than the actual numbers of such

forces on the island.

Given the uncertainty, the JCS determined that a military

operation should be a coup de main, that is, a surprise attack

with overwhelming force. While catching the enemy off guard,

such an operation could perform rescue missions and seize key

military targets vital to the enemy’s command and control of

defensive operations. Forces substantially larger than the one

available Marine battalion landing team of eighteen hundred men

would be required. Earmarking the Marines for an amphibious

assault to take one airfield, the Joint Chiefs decided to employ

Rangers to seize the other airfield. Troops from the 82d

Airborne Division would provide reinforcements.

The JCS knew that the highly trained forces assigned to the

Joint Special Operations Command were especially adept at rescue

operations and other actions anticipated in Grenada.

Consequently, they permitted USCINCLANT to use them during URGENT

FURY. However, the JCS directed ADM McDonald to return JSOC

forces to JCS control as quickly as possible to allow them to

resume their counter-terrorist mission.50

On 21 October, following Vessey’s message, planners from

JSOC and the Rangers flew to USLANTCOM headquarters in Norfolk,

Virginia; and liaison personnel from the 82d Airborne Division

arrived the next day. The Army planners met with their USLANTCOM
22

counterparts and liaison officers from MAC to develop preliminary

concepts of operations.51

Appeals from the OECS and the Governor-General, 21-22 October

1983

While Army planners flew to meet with their Navy and Marine

counterparts in Norfolk, Donald Cruz, the US consular officer to

Barbados, traveled to Grenada to meet with Major Leon Cornwall,

the titular head of the Revolutionary Military Council. Cornwall

was vague and evasive about the identities of Grenada’s other

leaders and their intentions toward US citizens. Talking with

students from the medical school at St. George’s, Mr. Cruz found

them apprehensive about the future. A plane sent to retrieve

Cruz was temporarily denied permission to land.52

Nearby in Bridgetown, Barbados, the OECS convened in

emergency session to discuss ways of ending the anarchy and

violence on Grenada. Acting under Article 8 of the OECS

collective security treaty of 1981, the members voted to ask

Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States to join them in sending

a multinational peacekeeping expedition to Grenada. Hours later,

early in the morning of 22 October, Sir Paul Scoon, the GovernorGeneral of Grenada, asked the OECS to free his country from the

Revolutionary Military Council. The OECS sent its request and

the Governor-General’s to the ranking US diplomat in the

Caribbean, Charles A. Gillespie, Executive Assistant to the

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. From

Barbados, Gillespie dispatched the requests to the State

Department on 21 and 22 October.53
23

After General Vessey returned to Washington from Chicago at

0130 on 22 October, he met with the SSG to discuss the requests.

At 0430 hours, members of the SSG contacted Secretary Shultz and

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, both of whom were vacationing with President

Reagan in Atlanta. Shultz and McFarlane informed the President

of the two requests, and he called a teleconference with the

members of the SSG for 0900 hours. With the addition of the

President, the SSG became a National Security Planning Group

(NSPG), the highest level in the NSC system.54

With two separate requests for intervention in hand, the

NSPG jettisoned the idea of a peaceful evacuation. The NSPG

tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan a military expedition to

seize Grenada from local military forces. Anticipating such an

order, the Joint Staff had prepared alternative force packages:

either two battalions of Rangers with JSOC elements or a Marine

battalion landing team with SEALs totaling about eighteen hundred

men. Either package would be reinforced with a follow-on force

of at least two airborne battalions.55

The concept for employing JSOC elements and the Rangers

called for five specially equipped C-130s to drop JSOC teams

under cover of darkness at Point Salines at the southwest tip of

Grenada and at Pearls midway up the east coast. Protected by

four helicopter gunships, the commandos would seize the

airfields. From Point Salines some of them would then move up

the west coast about four miles to St. George’s, the island

capital, and capture the radio station and police headquarters.

These forces would then move about four miles southeast to

capture the Grenadian military barracks at Calivigny. Later,

sixteen C-130s would land the 1st and 2d Ranger Battalions at

Point Salines and Pearls. They would consolidate control of all

objectives and pursue any enemy forces fleeing into the
24

highlands. The Joint Staff estimated that up to four and one

half hours would be required to seize control of all objectives.

To begin the operation on the night of 25 October, the earliest

possible date, a presidential decision would be required by 2000

hours on 22 October.

The second concept, an amphibious/heliborne assault by

Marines with a Ranger follow-up force, used more manpower, but

could be executed several hours earlier. Teams of SEALs would go

ashore after midnight on 24 October to reconnoiter beach

conditions at Point Salines and Pearls. By dawn of 25 October, a

battalion landing team with air cover from the USS Independence

would either land on the beaches or move by helicopter to

objectives at Point Salines airfield, the St. George’s medical

school, and the Grand Anse beach about two miles below St.

George’s. Deploying to the east of Grand Anse, the Marines would

then seize the Calivigny barracks. Once the Marines had secured

their objectives, Rangers could land at Point Salines and move to

St. George’s to seize police headquarters, government buildings,

and army headquarters.

Either option had risks. Landings by Rangers or Marines

might prompt the Grenadians or Cubans to kill the students or

hold them hostage. The Cuban construction workers might

reinforce Grenadian troops and inflict significant casualties

upon US forces; the Soviet Union might exert pressure on US

forces or those of US allies in Europe or the Middle East. If

any of those events occurred, the Reagan administration could

expect criticism from Congress, the media, and foreign

governments. Some critics would focus on the casualties or

hostages; others might accuse the President of disregard for

international law.

The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful

operation offset the risks. A swift, precise strike probably
25

would rescue most of the students and avert a hostage situation.

Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US

strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of

US military prowess would convey US determination to protect its

vital interests. In Western Europe where US willingness to fight

for European soil was questioned, such action might inspire

confidence in the United States.

The Joint Staff also listed several steps that should be

taken to establish a legal foundation for sending an

expeditionary force into Grenada. If possible, the President

should consult Congress in advance of the operation as required

by Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution; if this was not

possible, within 48 hours of the invasion he should explain the

necessity and the legal grounds for the operation to the

lawmakers. In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and

Article 5 of the Rio Treaty, the State Department should inform

the Security Council of the United Nations and the signatories of

the Rio Treaty of the operation and the reasons for it. Since

Grenada technically remained a member of the British

Commonwealth, the United States should also obtain the assistance

or at least the approval of the United Kingdom. Finally, to

legitimize continued military occupation after evacuating the US

civilians, a request to form an interim Grenadian government

would be needed.56

State Department experts would later argue that Article 52

of the UN Charter and Article 22 of the Organization of American

States (OAS) charter allowed regional bodies such as the OECS to

act to preserve local peace and security. Indeed, the OECS

charter stated that, in taking lawful collective action, the

members could call upon the United States or other friendly

nations for assistance. Eugenia Charles, spokesperson for the
26

OECS, had on 21 October made a formal request to the United

States for such assistance.57

The Execute Order, 22 October 1983

In the wake of new intelligence that the Grenadians were

mobilizing about two thousand reservists to join an estimated

fifteen hundred regulars and approximately six hundred armed

Cubans (over four thousand troops altogether), the JCS concluded

that neither the JSOC/Rangers nor the Marines alone would

suffice. According to GEN Vessey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

wanted “to go in with enough force absolutely to get the job done

...to minimize casualties, both on our side and on theirs. We

wanted to intimidate the Cubans.” Accordingly, the NSPG directed

the Joint Chiefs to send an execute order to ADM McDonald

authorizing him to land a multi-service force of JSOC, Rangers,

Marines and airborne troops, on Grenada on 25 October.58

The presidential decision to use military action authorized

ADM McDonald to organize a joint force with the missions of

evacuating US citizens, disarming hostile forces, and restoring

orderly government to Grenada. It also directed USCINCRED and

CINCMAC to provide additional ground forces and transport planes.

If, within twenty hours of receipt of the execute order, danger

to the US citizens on the island had significantly increased, ADM

McDonald was free to launch an immediate rescue using JSOC teams

flown in by C-130.59

Shortly after dispatch of the execute order, GEN Vessey

alerted CINCSAC that his command would support the operation.

CINCSAC immediately ordered the Director of Tanker Operations to

assemble KC-135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft at Robbins Air Force
27

Base, Georgia, and Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station (NAS),

Puerto Rico, to refuel aircraft used during the operation. He

also prepared to support USCINCLANT with airborne reconnaissance

and monitoring missions in the eastern Caribbean.60

Starting on 22 October, GEN Vessey communicated with ADM

McDonald primarily by secure telephone. In the course of these

conversations, the Chairman stressed the JCS belief that the size

of the joint force planned by the LANTCOM staff did not appear

adequate to intimidate and overwhelm the enemy. Vessey urged

McDonald to revise his plan to increase the size of the force “to

do the job quickly,” and to request any additional forces

needed.61

At this point, DIA provided the JCS with a revised estimate

of Grenadian capacity and will to resist. Estimating Grenadian

strength at no more than fifteen hundred regulars and three

thousand reservists, DIA analysts expected the Grenadian forces

to mount a determined resistance. The analysts also pointed out

the presence of at least six Soviet-made armored personnel

carriers (BTR 60s) and four Soviet-made 23-mm antiaircraft guns

(ZU-23s), most of which were believed to be sited around the

Cuban construction site at the Point Salines runway. Analysts,

however, expected little resistance from the nearly six hundred

Cuban construction workers and fifty Cuban military advisers

believed to be on the island.62

Final Preparation, Washington and Norfolk, 23 October 1983

The execute order did not end Joint Staff involvement in the

final preparations for URGENT FURY. During the next several

days, the Joint Staff would coordinate allied participation and
28

increase logistical and Command, and Control and Communications

(C3) support for USLANTCOM. On 23 October, the State Department

sent Ambassador Francis J. McNeill to meet with representatives

of the OECS, Jamaica, and Barbados in Bridgetown, Barbados, and

assess their countries’ willingness to join peacekeeping

operations. At the Secretary of State’s request, Major General

George B. Crist, USMC, Vice Director of the Joint Staff,

accompanied the ambassador to advise him concerning US

capabilities for military action in the Caribbean. During the

next five days, MajGen Crist would help the Caribbean states

organize a small peacekeeping force and coordinate its activities

with the US forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the

State Department.63

On the morning General Crist departed for Grenada, LTG

Merritt expanded the URGENT FURY response cell to include J-4,

C3S, and the J-3 Special Operations Division personnel. General

Vessey’s emphasis on maximum operational security on 21 October

had prevented Merritt from including these officers until he was

certain that URGENT FURY would involve a conventional military

assault.64

While MajGen Crist and LTG Merritt assisted with the

preparation for URGENT FURY, ADM McDonald’s staff revised the

concept of operations. Admiral McDonald flew to Washington late

on 23 October to brief the JCS on the new concept. Titled

“Evacuation of US Citizens from Grenada,” it reflected the

missions added to the NEO on 21 October: restoration of a

democratic government in concert with the OECS, Jamaica, and

Barbados; logistical support for US allies; and deterrence of

Cuban intervention. The operational concept had four phases. In

Phase 1, “Transit,” the Independence battle group and MARG 1-84

would close to positions fifty-five nautical miles northwest and

forty nautical miles north of Grenada. Six hours before the
29

invasion, JSOC teams and Rangers would fly out of Pope Air Force

Base, North Carolina, and Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia.

Phase 2, “Insertion,” required heliborne and seaborne

insertions of special operations forces several hours before dawn

to conduct final reconnaissance, strike at critical Grenadian

police and military installations in the St. George’s area, and

move to the Governor-General’s residence to protect him.

Meanwhile, battalions of Rangers and Marines would capture the

airfields at Point Salines and Pearls. At this stage, URGENT

FURY was seen as primarily an unconventional operation to

evacuate civilians with a strong force of Rangers and Marines to

deter outside interference. If Grenadians or Cubans attempted to

block evacuation, the Rangers and Marines would respond as

required by the situation. As backup, the 82d Airborne Division

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, would go on full alert three hours

before H-hour.65 Admiral McDonald’s guidance to the task force

reflected concern that the invasion be conducted with precision

to minimize civilian casualties and damage to the local economy

and infrastructure.66

Phases 3 and 4 of the concept were known as “Stabilization/

Evacuation” and “Peacekeeping,” respectively. In Phase 3, after

forces had secured airfields and key military and government

installations, they would locate and protect US citizens,

Governor-General Scoon, and foreigners, including those from

communist countries. Evacuation of civilians set the stage for

Phase 4, “Peacekeeping.” Admiral McDonald’s plan excluded the

untrained OECS constabulary from assault landings. Instead, MAC

would fly the three hundred-man force from Jamaica and Barbados

to Grenada to work with the US force and the Governor-General to

establish the interim government.67
30

Admiral McDonald proposed that Vice Admiral Metcalf, as

Commander of the Second Fleet, command the invasion force. On DDay, VADM Metcalf would command four task forces known

collectively as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 120. Task Force

123, also known as “the JSOC/Rangers Task Force,” included JSOC

teams, pilots and crews of the 160th Aviation Battalion from Fort

Campbell, Kentucky, and two battalions of Army Rangers. Task

Force 124 comprised an amphibious group made up of several ships

including the flagship of VADM Metcalf, the USS Guam, and a

battalion landing team of Marines from the 22d Marine Amphibious

Unit.68 Task Force 126 included a detachment of eight F-15s from

the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing and four E-3As from the 552d

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Detachment. Task

Force 126’s principal mission would be to prevent interference by

Cuban vessels or aircraft. Task Force 121, made up of the 2d and

3d Brigades and support units of the 82d Airborne Division, would

land on Grenada about nine hours after the initial assaults and

then take charge of the Rangers and other Army units. To support

CJTF 120, VADM Metcalf had the ships and planes of the

Independence battle group69 as well as elements from SAC, MAC,

and USREDCOM. In the USLANTCOM concept, the SAC and MAC aircraft

would operate independently of Task Force 126.70

The JCS were not satisfied with provisions for command and

control. The plan placed the Navy captain whose ships would

bring the Marines ashore temporarily in command of the Army major

general who would lead the ground forces once they were ashore.

At JCS direction, ADM McDonald placed the Army commander under

VADM Metcalf’s command.71

McDonald’s staff had earlier proposed blending Marines and

Rangers in heterogeneous units for the initial landings at Point
31

Salines and Pearls. The JCS rejected carrying jointness to that

extreme and advised McDonald to keep the plan simple and allow

the units to operate under their customary organization.

Initially, the plan lacked a boundary between Army and Marine

areas of operation. In a session with ADM McDonald and the JCS,

GEN Vessey drew a boundary dividing Grenada into northern

(Marine) and southern (Army) sectors. In the afternoon of 23

October, the JCS approved the operational concept as revised.72

Many of the difficulties in ADM McDonald’s concept of

operations stemmed from the makeup of his and VADM Metcalf’s

headquarters. Both organizations were “bluewater commands”

overwhelmingly made up of naval officers. Atlantic Command

lacked the Army and Air Force staff officers needed to plan the

maneuver and tactical air support of several battalions of ground

troops. To remedy that deficiency, on the night of 23 October,

the JCS ordered MG Schwarzkopf, Commanding General of the 24th

Mechanized Infantry Division, to report to VADM Metcalf at

Norfolk to serve as Metcalf’s adviser on ground operations. Two

of General Schwarzkopf’s superiors, Lieutenant General Jack V.

Mackmull, USA, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and

General Richard E. Cavazos, USA, Commander in Chief, Forces

Command, had recommended Schwarzkopf because of his extensive

experience with airborne troops and Rangers and with Marines

while assigned to a unified command.73

General Prillaman later stated that the revised concept

embodied a traditional rule of offensive warfare: it is better

to overwhelm an enemy with preponderant force at the outset

rather than to deploy a modest force that will encourage

resistance or lead to a battle of attrition. Despite the lack of

good tactical intelligence, the relatively small size of Grenada,
32

along with the US control of the air and sea surrounding it, made

a powerful surprise strike most likely to succeed.74

Despite their approval of the concept of overwhelming the

enemy, the JCS stressed the need for strict rules of engagement

to limit the use of firepower. Unnecessary casualties and

property damage would negate the humanitarian aspects of the

rescue operation and damage the economic infrastructure of the

island, jeopardizing US efforts to restore popular, democratic

government.75

With JCS approval of the plan, ADM McDonald formally

activated CJTF 120 with an operations order summarizing the

revised concept of operations and adding significant guidance

about enemy resistance. Aware of JCS concern that the Cubans

might intervene, ADM McDonald decided to support VADM Metcalf

with aerial surveillance operations northwest of Grenada and make

them conspicuous enough to deter any Cuban vessels or aircraft

heading toward the island. For the aerial support required, ADM

McDonald arranged with USREDCOM to deploy E-3A and F-15 aircraft

to Roosevelt Roads NAS. In the operations order, ADM McDonald

directed VADM Metcalf to submit all press queries to USCINCLANT

Public Affairs Office for referral to the Office of the Secretary

of Defense.76

Final Political-Military Coordination, 23 October 1983

In the wake of the bombing attack against US Marines at the

Beirut Airport in Lebanon on 23 October, President Reagan,

Secretary Shultz, and Mr. McFarlane returned to Washington for

emergency sessions of the NSC and the NSPG. After discussing the

Lebanon crisis, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger briefed
33

President Reagan on USCINCLANT’s plan for the proposed operation

in Grenada. Having heard reports from Ambassador McNeill and

MajGen Crist in Barbados that the violence and danger to US

citizens had increased, President Reagan approved continued

planning for an operation on the basis of an NSDD drafted on 20

October, but not formally issued.77

The draft NSDD spelled out a three-fold mission: rescue of

US citizens, restoration of democratic government, and preclusion

of Cuban interference. For execution of military operations in

support of the mission, the NSDD assigned primary responsibility

to the Secretary of Defense, but directed him to coordinate

political aspects of the mission with the Secretary of State and

the Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary of State was

to arrange diplomatic cooperation with the OECS, Jamaica, and

Barbados; to inform the Soviet Union and Cuba, at the proper

time, of plans to protect and evacuate their nationals; and to

prepare a campaign to convince Congress and the public that the

operation was truly multilateral, that the current regime

threatened US lives, and that the next Grenadian government would

be more democratic.78

Formally tasked with responsibility for the execution of

URGENT FURY, Secretary Weinberger gave GEN Vessey full power to

conduct the operation. The Chairman had the authority to call up

backup forces, deploy them, and to issue guidance to unified and

specified commanders--without going to the Secretary. Both

Secretary Weinberger and GEN Vessey hoped to speed up responses

to problems and requests from the tactical commander. During the

next several days, the Chairman exercised his authority either by

personally contacting ADM McDonald and supporting commanders, or

through LTG Prillaman.79
34

Secretary Shultz instructed Under Secretary for Political

Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary

Langhorne A. Motley to work with MajGen Crist to arrange and to

publicize the role of the Caribbean allies. The Secretary

recommended that elements of the Eastern Caribbean force, known

as the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), be integrated in US

command arrangements, be included in the initial landings on

Grenada, and be given a conspicuous role in reconstruction of the

government. Secretary Shultz envisioned a brief US presence

followed by rapid drawdown of military forces and transfer of all

peacekeeping duties to the CPF and the interim government.80

Early in the evening of 23 October, intelligence indicated

growing preparation by the Grenadian junta to mobilize popular

resistance to a foreign invasion. Perhaps the news leaks about

the diversion of the Independence battle group and MARG 1-84 had

sounded the tocsin. From Barbados, the US defense attaché

reported that Grenadian security guards and troops at the

Richmond Hill Prison, St. George’s, had received orders to kill

all prisoners in the event of invasion. DIA also had unconfirmed

information that British subjects and other foreign businessmen

had already been executed. Meanwhile, the Barbadan National

Radio spoke of growing dissatisfaction with the Grenadian armed

forces over the brutal excesses of the regime and of the failure

of militia members to report to their assigned units.81

Final Preparation, CJTF 120, 24 October 1983

Early on 24 October, the JCS ordered the JSOC Task Force

(TF 123) to fill gaps in USCINCLANT’s tactical intelligence about

Grenada. Before dawn, two C-130s dropped teams of four Navy

SEALs, equipped with Boston Whaler boats, off Point Salines and
35

Pearls to reconnoiter the beaches and airfields in preparation

for the landings. After going ashore near Pearls, one team

reported that beach conditions did not favor the amphibious

assault planned for the Marine battalion landing team and

recommended a heliborne assault.82 Before its rendezvous with

the USS Clifton Sprague near Point Salines, the other SEAL team

vanished in unexpectedly rough seas.83

Shortly after dawn, ADM McDonald conducted a pre-invasion

commander’s conference at Norfolk. The meeting included VADM

Metcalf; MG Richard A. Scholtes, USA, Commander of the

JSOC/Rangers task force (TF 123); MG Trobaugh, Commanding General

of the 82d Airborne Division (TF 121); and MG Schwarzkopf, the

senior Army adviser to VADM Metcalf. Representatives from the

Services, CIA, and the State Department also attended. General

Scholtes reported the loss of the SEALs sent to reconnoiter the

Point Salines area earlier that morning. Concerned about the

lack of tactical intelligence on the enemy’s defenses for the

Point Salines airfield, the commanders considered postponing the

operation for twenty-four hours. The State Department

representative protested that such a delay might unnerve the

governments participating in the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force.

Admiral McDonald refused to alter the operational plan solely due

to concerns about a “third rate, lightly armed and poorly trained

adversary.” He kept D-day on schedule, but postponed H-hour from

0400 hours to 0500 hours to give Scholtes’ SEALs time for a

second look at Point Salines. His decision required the special

operations forces and Rangers to land at dawn instead of in the

dark as had been planned.84

The JCS execute order directed “close coordination with the

Caribbean community forces (Caribbean Peacekeeping Force—CPF) at

the appropriate time.” In frequent contact with ADM McDonald,
36

GEN Vessey afterward insisted that the Admiral knew “from the

beginning how important it was, politically and diplomatically,

to involve the CPF ‘early on’ in the operation.” Yet, the

USCINCLANT concept of operations excluded the CPF from any active

role. While in Barbados on 24 October, MajGen Crist tried to

remedy the omission. He suggested to Vessey that ADM McDonald

employ the CPF as a follow-on force to take custody of key

Grenadian government facilities once they had been captured by

the US forces. Early on 24 October, Crist met with the

commanders of the Barbados and Jamaica Defense Forces and the

OECS Regional Security Unit. The Jamaica Defense Force

contributed a rifle company, an 81-mm mortar section, and a

medical section--150 troops; the Barbados Defense Force, a rifle

platoon of fifty troops; and the OECS Regional Security Unit, one

hundred constabulary, apparently not organized in any particular

fashion. Crist persuaded the Caribbean commanders that their

entire force should enter Grenada on 25 October and relieve US

troops holding Richmond Hill Prison, Radio Free Grenada, police

headquarters, and the Government House.85

Receiving word of the Crist-CPF agreement late in the

morning of 24 October, Vessey directed McDonald to expand the

URGENT FURY mission statement. The new version specified that

Metcalf would act “in cooperation with other OECS/Friendly

Government participants....” His task force would “...assist in

restoration of democratic government in Grenada, provide the

logistical support necessary to the peacekeeping force, and duly

record by video tape and motion picture all military activities

conducted by US and CPF military forces.” Immediately after

sending the modification, GEN Vessey directed MajGen Crist to

improvise multinational command arrangements once all forces were

on the ground in Grenada.86
37

Reaching USCINCLANT the afternoon before D-day, the

modification of the execute order gave ADM Metcalf little

guidance on how to integrate CPF units into his force structure.

In a later analysis of URGENT FURY, McDonald characterized the

Chairman’s order as too little, too late. In McDonald’s view,

details of such arrangements should have been worked out days

earlier with the governments of the OECS, Barbados, and Jamaica.

The failure to do so, the Admiral believed, thwarted effective

CPF support of military operations during the first two days of

URGENT FURY.87

On the afternoon of 24 October, accompanied by MG

Schwarzkopf, VADM Metcalf departed Norfolk for the USS Guam to

assume command of the task force. En route, he stopped at

Bridgetown, Barbados, to confer with the commander of the CPF,

Brigadier Rudyard Lewis of the Barbados Defense Force. When

MajGen Crist greeted VADM Metcalf and MG Schwarzkopf at the

airport, he advised them that the brigadier could not be reached

for at least forty-five minutes. Not wishing to wait that long,

Metcalf asked Crist to help Brigadier Lewis organize the CPF for

airlift either to Grenville or to Pearls airfield. From there,

they would move to Point Salines and St. George’s to relieve the

US troops of duty guarding prisoners and conducting other policetype functions. The only obstacle appeared to be the transport

of the Jamaican company and the OECS constabulary to staging

areas in Barbados. To resolve the problem, Crist contacted

CINCMAC who sent liaison officers that night to make the

necessary arrangements.88

Publicizing CPF participation in URGENT FURY required

changes in the Joint Staff’s crisis action organization. The

Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) coordinated efforts with J-3

to convince the US public and the world that URGENT FURY was

truly a multinational operation with limited objectives and of
38

very short duration. On 24 October, LTG Prillaman and Lieutenant

General Herman O. Thomson, USAF, Director, J-5, agreed to augment

the JCS response cell, starting on D-day, with politico-military

experts. Referred to as the Current Situation Room Crisis Action

Team (CSR CAT), the augmented organization would meet in the

National Military Command Center.89

The CSR CAT included representatives from several other

offices of the Joint Staff and their counterparts in the Service

staffs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the

Department of State. Members shared interest and expertise in

one or more functional or geographical aspect of US strategic

interests in the eastern Caribbean. The CSR CAT would strive for

the next week to master the political challenge posed by the

crisis in Grenada--that of putting the best possible face on a

military operation that combined a rescue mission with

containment of Cuban adventurism in the Caribbean. From 25

October through 1 November, it would provide background and

talking papers for the Chairman, public affairs statements for

each Service, a radio script for USCINCLANT to use for

psychological operations (PSYOPS), and an information booklet for

the J-5 to use in presentations before Congress.90

General Vessey was forced to divide his time between the

crises in Lebanon and Grenada. During the afternoon of 24

October, VADM Moreau substituted for GEN Vessey at the meeting of

the CPPG in Washington. For the next few days, Moreau

represented the JCS in most NSC deliberations concerning URGENT

FURY.91

Meanwhile in Tampa, Florida, General Wallace H. Nutting,

USA, Commander in Chief, USREDCOM, directed the XVIII Airborne

Corps to prepare battalions of the 82d Airborne Division for

deployment to Grenada within the next four hours. According to
39

USCINCLANT’s operations order of 23 October, the battalions would

not be needed on Grenada until 1400 hours on 25 October. Shortly

after his first message, GEN Nutting sent a second which placed

the XVIII Airborne Corps under the operational command of ADM

McDonald.92

Back in Washington President Reagan conferred twice with the

Joint Chiefs. Late that morning he asked for their individual

views on the operation. All agreed that while it would be

preferable to avoid the use of force, the situation on the island

gave no alternative to its use to rescue the medical students.

The JCS assured the President that the operation would succeed.

That evening they met again with the President, this time in the

upstairs residential area of the White House. On that occasion,

the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate

attended. GEN Vessey explained the final plan of operations.

Although the Democratic congressional leaders appeared uneasy

about the use of force, they offered no alternative.93

After the congressional leaders departed, President Reagan

asked GEN Vessey two questions. What were the critical decision

times for executing and for calling off the operation? How did

the General plan to spend his final hours before the first

landings on Grenada? To the first question Vessey responded

that, if the landings were to begin on schedule, he must call the

Pentagon immediately after their meeting and give the prearranged

code word; the President, however, could call off the operation

as late as a few hours before the landings. In response to the

second question, Vessey said:

As soon as I send the message to the Pentagon

to go ahead, I’m going home to go to bed. We’ve

given this mission to an operational commander.

He has the forces that he believes he needs. He

knows that he has the full support of the Secretary

of Defense and of you [the President] and the Joint
40

Chiefs of Staff. If he needs more help, then he’ll

call for it, but otherwise, there’s nothing you or

I can do until these troops have landed unless you

decide to call it off between then and now. I’m

going home to go to bed and in the morning [go to

the Pentagon and] wait for the first reports to

come in. The President replied, “I’m going to do

the same thing.”94

With the transmittal of the President’s “go” to the

Pentagon, GEN Vessey shifted the primary role of the Joint Staff

from strategic planning and direction to strategic and logistic

support. While Vessey would largely refrain from giving

operational guidance, his liaison officer in Barbados and

Grenada, MajGen Crist, would advise ADM McDonald and VADM Metcalf

on the employment of the CPF and on such politically sensitive

areas as the internment and evacuation of citizens of Cuba, the

Soviet Union, and other communist countries.
41

Chapter 3

Combat Operations, 25 October - 2 November 1983

D-Day URGENT FURY, 25 October 1983

In the predawn darkness, ships of the USS Guam amphibious

ready group and C-130s from Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia,

approached Grenada. Acting upon information from the SEALs’

reconnaissance, nearly four hundred Marines made a helicopter

assault upon Pearls at 0500 hours. Although scheduled at

precisely the same time, the airdrop of several hundred Rangers

at Point Salines was held up for thirty-six minutes because of

the loss of the inertial navigation system in the lead C-130

which required that the sequence of C-130s be adjusted in the

air. Adjusting the sequence of aircraft lost the JSOC forces the

cover of darkness, cost them tactical surprise and mixed the

Ranger units on the landing zone.95

Combat results were uneven during the first hours. The

Marines encountered very light resistance at Pearls and none at

Grenville. They occupied the airfield and nearby objectives

within two hours. Special operations forces and the Rangers

began landing on the island at 0536 hours. Even as special

operations helicopters tried to approach targets near St.

George’s, Grenadian troops opened fire with antiaircraft and

automatic weapons. As the Rangers’ C-130s approached the Point

Salines airfield, the Cubans put up stiff resistance using

antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons. Lieutenant Colonel

Wesley B. Taylor, USA, commanding the 1st Ranger Battalion,
42

decided to reduce the time of descent and vulnerability to ground

fire by having his men jump from five hundred feet.96

Once on the ground a company of Rangers assembled at either

end of the airfield. Hot-wiring a bulldozer and using it to

clear obstacles strewn on the runway, the two companies attacked

the Cuban defenders. The Cubans fought back with small arms and

machine guns. At one point they sent BTR 60 armored personnel

carriers towards the Rangers. Within the next two hours,

gunships from the carrier USS Independence suppressed the armored

personnel carriers, and the Rangers surrounded and captured about

250 Cubans. At 0900 hours, the Rangers rescued 138 American

medical students at the True Blue Campus adjacent to the airfield

only to learn that over two hundred more were still trapped at

Grand Anse, a few miles to the north.97

Learning almost immediately of the Cuban resistance at Point

Salines, the JCS conferred at 0600 hours. The volume of Cuban

firepower proved a tactical surprise, but GEN Vessey reassured

his colleagues that gunships and superior ground forces would

quickly suppress further resistance. To expedite a ceasefire, he

recommended that the Secretary of State bluntly inform the

regimes in Havana and St. George’s that there was “no point in

shooting muskets at us; we are going in with overwhelming

force.”98

The resistance encountered by the Rangers convinced the JCS

and the US commanders that the Cuban construction workers

constituted a combat force. In fact, on 24 October, Cuba’s

Premier Castro had sent an experienced officer, Colonel Pedro

Tortola Comas, to direct the defense of southern Grenada.

Tortola Comas’ men had just begun to break out the weapons and

pile up sandbags when the first battalion of Rangers appeared on

25 October. Later, US forces would find a thousand rifles as
43

well as the equipment and barracks for a full strength Cuban

battalion. Interrogation would reveal that many of the Cubans

had fought for Castro in Ethiopia and Angola.99

After the initial reports of Cuban resistance arrived at the

Pentagon, GEN Vessey approved a request from ADM McDonald to send

two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg to

Grenada. Commanded by MG Trobaugh, the fifteen hundred

paratroopers began the airlift to Point Salines at about 1000

hours. After their arrival, General Trobaugh consolidated the

two airborne battalions with the Rangers and JSOC teams into Task

Force 121. Meanwhile, after consulting with ADM McDonald about

MG Trobaugh’s need for Spanish-speaking interrogators to question

the 250 Cuban prisoners held by the Rangers, LTG Prillaman

arranged for the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters to send three

interrogators at once and keep three more on standby.100

With the Rangers heavily engaged near Point Salines, VADM

Metcalf decided to send the CPF to the airfield there, instead of

to Pearls as originally planned. Accompanied by General Crist,

the CPF landed at 1045 hours. The CPF commander, Brigadier

Lewis, met with MG Scholtes and MG Trobaugh. Lewis agreed to

guard the Cuban prisoners while the Rangers and airborne troops

devoted their efforts to securing the perimeter and moving north

toward St. George’s. Meanwhile, MajGen Crist set up a

communication station near the airport. General Crist asked the

governments of the OECS to inform the governments of the United

Kingdom, France, Grenada, and West Germany that the CPF had

landed on Grenada to link up with CJTF 120. He also assisted

representatives of State and US Information Agency (USIA) in

setting up an interim US Embassy.101

From the beaches at St. George’s, a team of SEALs made its

way east of the city to the residence of Governor-General Scoon.
44

After overwhelming the guards and rescuing the Governor-General,

the SEALs came under heavy fire from armored personnel carriers.

Lacking antitank weapons, the SEALs held off their attackers with

grenades and automatic weapons and waited for the Rangers to

rescue them. The lightly armed Rangers, however, were heavily

engaged north of Salines against what appeared to be a fullyequipped Cuban battalion and could not move fast enough to save

the SEALs. To support the SEALs until their relief could be

mounted, VADM Metcalf ordered Navy and Marine aircraft to fly

combat sorties over the Governor-General’s residence and the

vicinity.102

Heavy antiaircraft fire from Fort Frederick and Fort Rupert

downed two Marine Sea Cobra helicopters and deterred others from

approaching the Governor-General’s residence. Meanwhile,

Grenadian military broadcasts indicated that Fort Frederick was

probably an enemy command post. Admiral Metcalf’s desire to

protect the Governor-General and the SEALs while destroying a

Grenadian headquarters and antiaircraft site overcame his

concerns about serious “collateral damage.” Squadrons of A-7

Corsairs from the USS Independence began attacking Fort Frederick

and Fort Rupert in mid-afternoon.103

One event marred naval air operations against Fort

Frederick. Lacking military maps or other means of identifying a

building next to the fort as a hospital, Corsair pilots bombed

the building at 1535. During an investigation, the director of

the hospital revealed that before the attack Grenadian troops had

occupied the building, emplaced gun positions, and armed members

of the hospital staff and several of the patients. Later,

according to the director, the Grenadian troops evacuated all

able-bodied staff and inmates to Fort Frederick, but locked up
45

the mental patients in one wing of the building where eighteen

were killed during the air attack.104

The resistance encountered between St. George’s and Point

Salines, combined with the realization that a second medical

student campus existed at Grand Anse, prompted a reassessment of

the ground tactical situation. Meeting about noon, VADM Metcalf

and MG Schwarzkopf agreed that most, if not all, of the action

was on the southern part of the island. Since the Marines in the

amphibious craft off Pearls and Grenville had little to do,

Schwarzkopf recommended to VADM Metcalf that they land at Grand

Mal Bay north of St. George’s, to open a “second front” to the

rear of the Grenadian and Cuban forces. Metcalf agreed. After

sailing around Grenada, a landing force of 250 Marines, five

tanks, and thirteen amphibious vehicles landed at Grand Mal about

1900 hours, and moved south and east toward the GovernorGeneral’s residence.105

In Washington, President Reagan told Congress and the press

of the reasons for US operations in Grenada. Reporting to

Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution,106 the

President informed Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, Speaker of the House,

and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, that US

troops had joined the “OECS collective security forces in

assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order...and to

facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States

citizens.” Then, in reference to the resolution’s sixty-day

limitation upon such intervention without congressional approval,

Reagan added, “Our forces will remain only so long as their

presence is required.”107

In an 0900 briefing at the White House, the President gave

three reasons for the intervention: to protect innocent lives, to

forestall further chaos, and to assist in the restoration of law
46

and order and of governmental institutions on the island. He

stressed the first, saying, “When I received reports that a large

number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island thereby

exposing themselves to great danger, and after receiving a formal

request for help...I concluded the United States had no choice

but to act strongly and decisively.” When reporters asked for

details about the military situation, the President replied:

“...we are yielding to the influence of General Vessey in that we

don’t think in these early hours of that landing that we should

be on the horn asking the commanders to stop and give us detailed

reports.”108

Events on Grenada compelled VADM Metcalf to extend the ban

on reporters. He had included in his concept of operations a

press blackout until students had been rescued at the True Blue

campus. By noon on 25 October, US troops had secured that

campus, but had yet to reach the students at Grand Anse. Other

factors influenced VADM Metcalf’s decision to extend the press

ban. During the remainder of that day and the next, JSOC teams

and SEALs would employ techniques and systems that the JCS wished

to protect from public disclosure. The unexpected extent of

Cuban resistance and rumors that a Cuban colonel was organizing

it also helped to explain the ban on reporters. Faced with

unanticipated firefights, neither VADM Metcalf nor his

subordinate wanted to jeopardize or slow down the tactical

advance to provide escorts, shelter, and food for a group of

reporters. The final consideration involved delays in the

landing of military aircraft. Hampered by runways pockmarked by

shell holes and littered with combat debris, airplanes bringing

reinforcements and equipment were delayed while planes already on

the runway offloaded. Admiral Metcalf was reluctant to delay the
47

arrival of men and material while planes carrying reporters

shuttled back and forth blocking runways and airspace.109

Rescue of the Governor-General, the Drive to Grand Anse,

and the Push for PSYOPS, 26 October 1983

The Marine task force that had landed at Grand Mal on 25

October fought its way to the Governor-General’s residence by

0712 on 26 October. At about 1000, after rescuing GovernorGeneral Scoon, his wife, twenty-two special operations personnel,

and nine civilians, the Marines flew them by helicopter to the

USS Guam. That afternoon, at Scoon’s request, he was flown to

Point Salines where he stayed until the Marines could secure St.

George’s. The Marine task force then moved a few miles east to

the Grenadian stronghold at Fort Frederick in St. George’s

southern suburbs. Ten hours later, the Marines subdued the

defenders and captured the fort.110

With St. George’s in friendly hands, MajGen Crist

accompanied the Governor-General from Point Salines to the

capital and installed Scoon in a private residence. General

Crist then arranged with the JCS and CIA to establish a secret

communications link between the Governor-General and the Privy

Council in London. Scoon soon received instructions establishing

him as the nucleus of an interim regime. The next day the Soviet

embassy recognized Scoon’s authority.111

At the southern end of the island on the morning of 26

October, MG Trobaugh’s Task Force 121 deployed from the True Blue

Campus to Grand Anse in search of more US medical students. On

the way, troopers overcame stiff resistance at Frequente, a Cuban

stronghold about one mile north of True Blue. Later, finding
48

Grand Anse also heavily defended by Cubans and Grenadians,

Trobaugh asked VADM Metcalf for aid.

On board the USS Guam with Metcalf, MG Schwarzkopf studied

the beach at Grand Anse and recommended that MG Trobaugh conduct
49

a heliborne assault to rescue the students at the nearby campus.

Since no Army helicopters were available, MG Schwarzkopf

convinced the Marine helicopter commander to fly Trobaugh’s

Rangers to Grand Anse later that afternoon. Major General

Schwarzkopf’s ambiguous status as an “adviser” had impeded his

efforts to coordinate ground operations. At Schwarzkopf’s

recommendation, on 26 October, VADM Metcalf designated him the

deputy commander of the JTF. Schwarzkopf redrew the tactical

boundary to include Grand Anse in the Marine area; this was the

second extension of the Marine area of operations in two days.

At about 1600 on 26 October, six Marine Sea Knight helicopters

flew the Rangers to Grand Anse. After a firefight lasting about

thirty minutes, four Marine Sea Stallion helicopters landed and

evacuated 224 medical students. As at the True Blue Campus on

the previous day, the Rangers learned that there was yet another

campus, this time at Lance aux Epines, a peninsula on Prickly Bay

east of Point Salines.112

During the evening of 26 October, troopers and Marines

evacuated refugees and interned prisoners. General Crist

coordinated both operations with the State Department, the JCS,

and ADM McDonald. After the rescue at Grand Anse on 25 October,

the State Department requested DOD assistance in evacuating

noncombatants to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; the

JCS directed USCINCLANT and CINCMAC to provide airlift support.

Bodies of US military personnel were to be flown to Dover,

Delaware. Late that evening the JCS tasked the Logistics

Directorate (J-4), headed by Vice Admiral W.J. Cowhill, USN, to

arrange food for one thousand prisoners in custody of the CPF.113

During the combat and evacuation operations, ADM McDonald

asked the JCS to validate a request for USCINCRED to send two

more battalions of the 82d Airborne Division. They were needed
50

to relieve the exhausted Rangers and Marines and attack any new

strongholds. The unexpected resistance by the Cubans at Point

Salines, Grand Mal, Grand Anse, Frequente, and Fort Frederick

justified the reinforcements. General Prillaman advised ADM

McDonald that he did not need permission to ask USCINCRED for

reinforcements. By 2117, two more battalions and a brigade

headquarters had landed at Point Salines airfield, increasing the

number of airborne troops in Grenada from about two thousand to

nearly five thousand.114

On the international scene, news of US military operations

on Grenada embarrassed the government of Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher in Great Britain and aroused resentment in the Canadian

government. In the British House of Commons, Labor Chief Denis

Healey derided Prime Minister Thatcher as “Reagan’s poodle.”

Healey concluded that Reagan’s unilateral intervention in a

nation of the Commonwealth offered new evidence of US disdain for

British sensitivities and raised doubts over Thatcher’s ability

to control US cruise missiles stationed in the United Kingdom.

In Ottawa, spokesmen questioned the need and legal justification

for US intervention, especially after the Canadian government had

already announced plans to conduct peaceful evacuation of its

citizens from Grenada.115

Hoping to find a sympathetic forum in the Organization of

American States, J. William Middendorff, US Permanent

Representative, again explained the reasons for intervention:

violence on Grenada endangered the inhabitants, US citizens

living there, and the security of neighboring island republics.

Article 52 of the UN Charter allowed regional bodies to deal with

such disturbances; and Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter

allowed member states to enforce collective security if necessary

by inviting joint participation in a peacekeeping force by the

United States. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the United
51

Nations, made a similar case to the Security Council on 27

October and to the General Assembly on 2 November.116

In a message to the JCS on 26 October, ADM McDonald

requested guidance on themes for PSYOPS broadcasts to the

Grenadian populace. He considered such operations essential to

the speedy conclusion of military operations and the successful

launching of a new government. Some of the proposed themes were:

US involvement had been requested by Caribbean countries that

feared the spread of Marxism by violent means; Caribbean and US

forces were carefully avoiding civilian casualties or damage to

private property; Cubans and Soviets were being offered safe

conduct out of the country; and the presence of foreign troops

would continue until the safety of the people of Grenada was

assured. The JCS approved ADM McDonald’s concept the following

day; radio broadcasts began on 28 October.117

The JCS also approved expansion of the CSR CAT to include

more experts on psychological operations and politico-military

affairs. After midnight on 26 October, the CSR CAT moved to the

Operations Planning Group (OPG) facility at the NMCC where it

began coordinating all guidance relative to tactical operations,

PSYOPS, and public affairs. Politico-military specialists from

the Western Hemisphere Division of J-5 prepared to support MajGen

Crist in planning the evacuation of noncombatants, the handling

of detainees, cooperation with the CPF, and the exploitation and

disposition of captured equipment and documents.118

On Grenada, MajGen Crist immersed himself in PSYOPS and

politico-military affairs. After locating local radio announcers

to broadcast on Radio Free Grenada, he worked with the GovernorGeneral to establish an interim government. By late 26 October,

the ground force commanders on Grenada had provided Crist with

many captured Cuban and Soviet documents. At Crist’s request the
52

CIA sent several linguists to translate them. The captured

documents included five military assistance agreements between

the Bishop government, the Soviet Union, and Cuba which provided

for the training of Grenadian soldiers in both countries. The

documents indicated a Soviet promise of $30.5 million worth of

uniforms, rifles, machine guns, antitank weapons, antiaircraft

guns, and other military supplies to be delivered to Grenadian

authorities over a five-year period. Meeting with VADM Metcalf,

MajGen Crist recommended that ADM McDonald display the weapons

and copies of the documents to counter the mounting criticism of

URGENT FURY in Canada and Western Europe.119

Final Combat, Evacuation, and Public Affairs, 27 October 1983

Combat operations continued throughout the daylight hours of

27 October. Meeting scant resistance in the St. George’s area,

the Marines rapidly fanned out and occupied Fort Lucas, Richmond

Hill Prison, and other points. Meanwhile, paratroopers advanced

methodically eastward across southern Grenada. Since the

paratroopers lacked adequate tactical intelligence and believed

that, after fierce Cuban resistance at Salines, Frequente and

Grand Anse, the enemy might be strong enough to resist or even

counterattack; they employed the slow but thorough tactic of

clearing all enemy in the zone, phase line by phase line, leaving

no pockets of resistance. Several factors contributed to the

deliberate pace of the airborne troops. Problems with the runway

at Point Salines had delayed their deployment and the arrival of

helicopter gunships. Without the helicopters, the paratroopers

depended for fire support upon naval aircraft and naval gunfire.

Since their radios could not communicate with the ships of the

Independence battle group, Army radiomen were forced to send
53

their request for fire support to Fort Bragg which in turn

relayed them by satellite to the ships. The requirement to guard

new prisoners also slowed the advance of the airborne.120

During a phone conversation on the 27th, GEN Vessey asked

ADM McDonald about the seizure of the military barracks at

Calivigny, a priority objective in the original plan. At noon,

USCINCLANT sent a message to VADM Metcalf and MG Schwarzkopf at

Point Salines stating that the JCS wanted Calivigny barracks

taken before dark. The message’s unusual reference to the JCS

likely reflected the CINCLANT staff’s desire to underscore GEN

Vessey’s concern. The order surprised Schwarzkopf inasmuch as

there was little resistance expected at Calivigny and the

airborne troops were planning to take the barracks early the next

day during the normal course of their advance. In view of the

success of the operation to date, Schwarzkopf questioned JCS

intervention in the tactical command of ground operations. When

VADM Metcalf directed his staff to confirm the order, USCINCLANT

replied, “JCS has ordered you to take Calivigny barracks before

dark.” Metcalf relayed the order to General Trobaugh at 1200.121

Instead of using airborne troops to take Calivigny barracks,

Trobaugh selected the Rangers who, after two days of heavy

fighting, were relaxing at Point Salines airfield waiting to be

redeployed to the United States. Although the airborne troops

were within eight kilometers of Calivigny, their rate of advance

would not permit them to reach the barracks before dark. The

Rangers and their helicopters were available for immediate duty.

Trobaugh knew that the Rangers were more experienced in heliborne

assaults, and that they had originally planned to take Calivigny

on D-day. Before the Rangers’ assault at 1750, VADM Metcalf’s

ships delivered salvoes of naval gunfire and launched sorties of

Corsairs. Army UH-160 Black Hawk helicopters then landed the
54

Ranger battalions at the barracks compound area; three

helicopters were damaged, but the Rangers took control of the

barracks by 2100.122

An incident involving the accidental strafing of friendly

troops about a half mile east of Frequente occurred on 27

October. When snipers fired on an airborne battalion near a

sugar mill east of the 2d Brigade command post, a nearby Air

Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team called in an air

strike by Corsairs from the USS Independence. Although the

ANGLICO team had carefully described the source of sniper fire,

the team lacked the necessary Communications Electronic Operating

Instructions (CEOI) to clear the target with the 2d Brigade fire

support element. As a result, the Corsairs struck the command

post injuring seventeen troops, three of them seriously.123

By 27 October, the requirement to guard, feed, house, and

provide medical care to Cuban prisoners and Soviet citizens

concerned the Joint Chiefs. Properly carried out, such duties

would continue to slow combat operations by the 82d Airborne. On

the other hand, neglect of these matters could jeopardize the

health and safety of prisoners and refugees and possibly provoke

intervention or protests by their home countries.124

Early on 27 October, the JCS directed ADM McDonald to

evacuate Cuban and Soviet noncombatants as soon as possible.

McDonald recommended flying Cuban prisoners and noncombatants to

the US naval base at Guantanamo for release to Cuban custody.

The State Department coordinated arrangements to screen persons

seeking refuge in the Soviet consulate for airlift to Kingston,

Jamaica.125

In the afternoon, the JCS and their Operations Deputies met

to discuss Cuban prisoners and possible fugitives hiding in the

interior. They agreed that dead or seriously wounded Cubans
55

should be returned to Cuba as soon as possible, but that other

prisoners should not be released until US intelligence officers

had interrogated them. The Joint Chiefs agreed on the importance

of apprehending Cubans hiding in the interior of Grenada before

they could establish bases for guerrilla warfare; as a

consequence, they directed a thorough reconnaissance of the

nearby island of Carriacou.126

On 27 October, CINCMAC proposed establishing an aeromedical

evacuation control center on Barbados. Wounded US troops would

be flown to the USS Guam for medical stabilization and then to

Roosevelt Roads NAS, Puerto Rico, for more extensive treatment.

After approving the CINCMAC proposal, the JCS directed ADM

McDonald to lift the ban on foreign flights to Grenada to permit

the Royal Canadian Air Force to evacuate Canadian citizens.

Meanwhile, MAC had evacuated 379 US medical students to

Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina.127

While wounded US troops and medical students were leaving

Grenada, US reporters were angrily demanding to be let in.

Newspaper headlines on 25 and 26 October denounced the Reagan

administration for condoning “an unparalleled act of censorship

that forced the public to rely on the Government’s self-serving

accounts of the action.”128 In a session before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee on 27 October, Senator Paul Sarbanes

(D, Maryland) noted that “the treatment by the Administration of

the free press raises very serious questions about our function

as a free society.”129 Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R, Kansas)

dismissed earlier DOD statements that reporters had to be kept

from the island for their own safety with the remark that

“reporters have faced far worse conditions in Lebanon.” Other
56

senators cited the presence of reporters with invasion forces on

D-day in 1944.130

In response to an order from Secretary Weinberger on 26

October, ADM McDonald submitted a public affairs plan the

following day. The time had come to allow reporters on the

island, but McDonald did not want them killed or interfering with

operations. To establish control, he proposed setting up a Joint

Information Board (JIB) in Bridgetown, Barbados, with branches on

Grenada and on the USS Guam. During the day, either of the

branches would transport a pool of no more than twenty reporters

to the sites of previous fighting and other comparatively safe

areas. On the return of the media pool, JIB representatives

would review stories and photographs for immediate release. At

about 0900, the Secretary of Defense approved McDonald’s plan,

and late that afternoon a pool of twelve reporters from Barbados

landed in Grenada. General Vessey would later note that:

The huge mistake at the National level was

failing to find a way to take some press along.

We missed a great opportunity to have the American

people get reports about how well the Rangers and

Marines operated. We compounded the error by

permitting Admiral Metcalf to keep the media out

longer than we had intended.131

While reporters waited for their first opportunity to file

stories from Grenada, translators and intelligence experts from

the CIA continued to study the captured documents. These records

confirmed the presence of more than six hundred Cuban workers and

technical assistants on Grenada, including Cuban and Soviet

advisers within every government ministry. They also revealed

how dependent the Marxist regime had been upon Cuban support to

remain in power. The analysts were able to substantiate earlier

estimates that the Cubans were constructing the oversized runway
57

to fly large jets from Cuba and the Soviet Union to destinations

in Latin America and west Africa.132

Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley arrived in

Grenada on 27 October. General Crist briefed him on final

preparations to move Governor-General Scoon and the CPF to St.

George’s where the CPF would assume control of all key political

facilities. With Secretary Motley and the CPF now fully in

charge of efforts to reconstruct a viable government on the

island, MajGen Crist viewed his mission as complete; he returned

to the Pentagon the following day.133

Preparations to Neutralize the Threat of a Cuban-Led Insurgency,

28 October 1983

By 28 October the tempo of combat operations had declined

significantly; units were dealing with occasional snipers,

mopping up, and continuing to search for Hudson Austin, Bernard

Coard, and other members of the revolutionary junta. While

sweeping the peninsula of Lance aux Epines near St. George’s,

airborne troopers located the last group of 202 US medical

students, bringing the number rescued to 564. Subsequently, the

troopers linked up with Marines at the Ross Point Hotel near St.

George’s. That same day, ADM McDonald redeployed both battalions

of Rangers to Hunter Army Air Field. To aid Mr. Motley and the

CPF in political reconstruction, USREDCOM sent an “augmentation

support package” of engineers, PSYOPS teams, military police,

civil affairs teams, signal troops, military intelligence

personnel, medics, and part of an aviation battalion to

Grenada.134
58

Treatment and classification of Cuban prisoners had become a

pressing issue. The Army Operations Deputy, Lieutenant General

Fred K. Mahaffey, USA, advised the other services’ Operations

Deputies that captured Cubans should be reclassified as

“prisoners of war” rather than “personnel under protective

custody.” Speaking as the DOD’s executive agent for the prisoner

of war program, LTG Mahaffey explained that the term “prisoner of

war” would accord the Cubans certain rights under the Geneva

Convention, for example, the right to communicate with relatives.

However, as LTG Merritt later explained, the Operations Deputies

decided to retain the original classification to avoid even the

slightest hint that the United States might be at war with

Cuba.135

Within the CSR CAT, J-5 officers recommended to GEN Vessey

that Cuban prisoners be segregated according to rank to lessen

command influence and permit more fruitful interrogations. The

J-5 officers hoped that the results of interrogation would

bolster their contention that six hundred prisoners were members

of combat units sent to make Grenada into a Cuban military base.

To preclude future charges of torture, the staff also recommended

that prisoners be screened by medical experts and that reporters

be allowed to interview them.136

Earlier resistance convinced the JCS that the six hundred

prisoners accounted for a little more than half of the Cubans

present on the island. The Acting Chairman of the JCS, General

John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, estimated that up to five hundred

Cubans might have fled to Grenada’s mountainous interior to wage

guerrilla warfare. He asked ADM McDonald to submit a concept of

operations for isolating and eliminating them.137

Within eight hours, ADM McDonald submitted a revised plan

for Grenada and the nearby northern island of Carriacou.
59

McDonald planned to redeploy the approximately five hundred

Marines on Grenada back to their ship and leave peacekeeping

operations on Grenada in the hands of the 82d Airborne Division

and the CPF. The CPF would assume responsibility for peace and

order in the capital and its vicinity while the paratroopers

conducted sweeps of the mountains to flush out any remaining

pockets of resistance. On l November the Marine battalion

landing team would make an amphibious assault upon Carriacou.138

The JCS approved McDonald’s concept.139

The End of Combat Operations, 29 October - 2 November 1983

During the last five days of URGENT FURY, capture of Bernard

Coard, Leon Cornwell, and Edward Layne and their incarceration on

board the USS Guam virtually ended major organized resistance on

Grenada. Reports of armed Cubans holding out on the nearby

island of Carriacou turned planners’ efforts in that direction.

Meanwhile, movement of communist diplomats and Cuban prisoners

continued to occupy VADM Metcalf, ADM McDonald, and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

On 29 October, shortly after paratroopers surrounded the

Cuban embassy, a Cuban diplomat handed the US commander a note

signed the previous day by the Cuban ambassador to Grenada,

Jullian Torrez Rizo. In the note, the ambassador explained that

his government had ordered him to depart the island and to leave

behind his staff for evacuation by the US military forces.

General Trobaugh passed the note to a State Department

representative. Washington policymakers decided that evacuation

would wait until US troops had dealt with all Cuban fighters.
60

Moreover, arrangements with the Red Cross and third country

intermediaries for repatriation had not been worked out.140

Following consultation with the State Department, the JCS

sent further guidance on third country nationals to VADM Metcalf

and MG Trobaugh. Diplomats and their dependents from Cuba, the

Soviet Union, North Korea, Eastern Europe, and Libya would be

allowed to leave immediately once their passports had been

validated. Persons with questionable passports, along with

captured Cuban combatants, would be interrogated, photographed,

and held until hostilities had ceased and arrangements for their

repatriation had been concluded.141

By 29 October, URGENT FURY had attained its initial

objectives of rescuing and evacuating 599 US citizens and 121

foreigners and defeating Cuban and Grenadian armed forces.

However, installation of a non-Marxist government and protection

of that government from Cuban-sponsored guerrilla warfare

remained to be done. Paramount among the remaining tasks was the

operation against Carriacou proposed on 28 October. Other tasks

included redeployment of MARG 1-84 and the Independence battle

group; promotion of Grenadian stability when the new government

assumed control; detention and care of prisoners pending their

release; and continued collection of captured supplies, weapons,

and documents.142

Conferring with ADM McDonald, VADM Metcalf and MG Trobaugh

on board the USS Guam, General Vessey noted the concern that a

sizable number of armed Cubans or Grenadians were regrouping for

guerrilla operations. He asked Trobaugh what action had been

taken against the reported Grenadian guerrilla training camp at

Grand Etans in the hills of central Grenada. Trobaugh replied

that one of his battalion commanders had conducted an aerial

reconnaissance of the area, but that he had found nothing.
61

Operations to date and the information found in captured

documents convinced Trobaugh that neither the Grenadians nor the

Cubans had any plans to start an insurgency; they had buried

weapons simply to conceal the extent of the communist arms

buildup in Grenada. Leaving the Guam, Vessey, McDonald, and

Trobaugh flew to Point Salines, the scene of the most intense

fighting. Seeing Cuban prisoners held in the hot sun in a barbed

wire enclosure on a macadam parking lot, Vessey told McDonald and

Trobaugh to get the prisoners under shade immediately and to make

certain they were treated humanely.143

On 31 October, while Trobaugh’s men scoured Grenada’s

highlands, VADM Metcalf directed Operation DUKE, an amphibious

operation against Carriacou. That evening the Marines of Task

Force 124 boarded the USS Saipan and departed Grenada for their

new mission. At 0530 on l November, under cover of eight Air

Force A-10s, the Marines landed unopposed and, in less than three

hours, occupied all objectives. They captured seventeen members

of the Grenadian Army and a quantity of military equipment

including rifles, radios, explosives, ammunition, jeeps, a truck,

and a generator, but they found no Cubans. On 2 November,

paratroopers relieved the Marines who reboarded the USS Saipan

and returned to the fleet.144

Late in the afternoon of 2 November, after redeploying both

MARG 1-84 and the Independence battle group to the Middle East,

ADM McDonald designated MG Trobaugh, “Commander, Combined Forces,

Grenada.” The combat phase of URGENT FURY had ended. Secretary

Weinberger ordered Trobaugh to continue reconstruction with the

goal of withdrawing all US troops as soon as the new government

could stand on its own. The 82d Airborne Division reached a peak

strength of more than six thousand troops in Grenada on 3
62

November, but began redeploying almost immediately. The last

battalion flew back to Fort Bragg on 12 December.145

Nearly eight thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines

had participated in URGENT FURY along with 353 Caribbean allies

of the CPF. US forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded;

Cuban forces lost 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 personnel

captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358

wounded; at least 24 civilians were killed. On 10 November in

recognition that US forces on Grenada had “encountered foreign

armed opposition that included heavy small arms, machine guns,

and antiaircraft artillery,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff made all

military participants in URGENT FURY eligible to receive the

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.146
63
64

Chapter 4

Assessment of URGENT FURY

Public questions and criticism of the need for URGENT FURY

surfaced during the operation and continued well into 1984.

During URGENT FURY, spokesmen for the Defense Department and the

JCS responded immediately to such questions. General Vessey

detailed the reasons for URGENT FURY in a backgrounder to the

press on 29 October. On 2 November, Deputy Secretary of State

Kenneth W. Dam and MajGen Crist explained the operation to the

House Foreign Affairs Committee while ADM McDonald and General

Paul Gorman, USA, the Commander in Chief of US Southern Command,

provided a similar briefing to the Senate Armed Services

Committee.147

As criticism mounted, GEN Vessey recognized the need to

conduct thorough inquiries into various aspects of the operation.

He began with the press embargo. During the interview on 6

November with “Meet the Press,” the Chairman stated that, due to

the unexpected intensity of Cuban resistance and the needs of

operational security, military leaders had denied reporters

access to Grenada until the third day of the operation. To

review the problem of balancing legitimate news coverage with

troops safety General Vessey announced the formation of a

commission of military and media experts. Under the chairmanship

of a former Army public affairs chief, Major General Winant

Sidle, USA (Ret), and consisting of eight media representatives

and six military officers, the commission would recommend

creation of a media pool of selected reporters who would, on

short notice and in secrecy, be called to accompany joint task

forces either for training exercises or on real joint military

operations.148
65

On 8 November, members of the House Appropriations Committee

questioned Secretary Weinberger and General Paul X. Kelley, USMC,

Commandant of the US Marine Corps, about the press embargo and

joint tactical planning and execution. To find detailed answers

to the issues raised, GEN Vessey ordered the Joint Staff and

USCINCLANT to conduct separate investigations into URGENT FURY

planning procedures, operations security, command and control,

PSYOPS, public affairs, and politico-military affairs. The Joint

Staff submitted a draft report in January 1984; ADM McDonald’s

report followed a month later.149

Creation of the Joint Staff report was assigned to Colonel

George W. Kirschenbauer, USA, Chief of the Planning System

Branch, Operations Plans Division, J-3; Kirschenbauer’s report

was submitted to LTG Prillaman, the J-3, in January 1984. After

revision, the J-3 submitted the report to the Operations Deputies

on 22 February 1984. Finalized under the supervision of Colonel

Kirschenbauer’s successor, Captain Michael J. Harris, USN, “The

Joint Overview of Operation URGENT FURY” was submitted to the

Operations Deputies on l May l985.150

During an appearance on “Meet the Press” on 6 November l983,

General Vessey candidly summarized URGENT FURY in these words:

“We planned the operation in a very short

period of time--in about 48 hours. We planned it

with insufficient intelligence for the type of

operation we wanted to conduct. As a result we

probably used more force than we needed to do the

job, but the operation went reasonably well.

...Things did go wrong, but generally the operation

was a success. The troops did very well...”151

To improve the planning and execution of future joint contingency

operations, the Joint Staff studied the operation to learn how a
66

“very short period of time” for planning and “insufficient

intelligence” caused some “things [to] go wrong.”

The 21 October news report that US warships had been

diverted to Grenada drastically limited the time available for

planning. Intelligence reports that Fidel Castro had sent an

army colonel to organize the defense of Grenada raised the

possibility that, if the United States did not act quickly, the

Cubans and Grenadians would hold the US students hostage and

fight attempts to evacuate them. President Reagan directed a

military operation to avert either eventuality. Retaining the

element of surprise required maximum secrecy in planning and

preparation. To assure such secrecy, the JCS severely restricted

access to operational planning, excluding planners from the Joint

Deployment Agency and various intelligence and combat support

agencies.

Faced with limited intelligence, GEN Vessey and the joint

planners chose to use overwhelming force on Grenada. The

objectives were diverse and the available Marine battalion

landing team was not large enough to cover all targets. Rangers

were available but too few in number. The 82d Airborne Division

was also at hand and could provide the necessary reinforcement.

Rangers, paratroopers, Marines--all had different equipment,

transportation, and close air support. Combined for the first

time, such an amalgam inevitably experienced problems with

command and control, communications, and combat support.

Proper command and control of a joint task force with land,

sea, and air components requires a truly joint headquarters.

Within USLANTCOM, the Headquarters, US Forces Caribbean, provided

a staff of officers from all services. However, USFORCARIB was

located at Key West, Florida, a considerable distance from

USLANTCOM headquarters, Norfolk, Virginia. To save time in

coordinating and to maintain tight operational security, ADM

McDonald chose instead Second Fleet headquarters as the
67

headquarters for the CJTF l20. Collocated with ADM McDonald’s

headquarters in Norfolk, Second Fleet had operational forces at

its disposal; USFORCARIB was only a headquarters. USCINCLANT did

add Army officers to Second Fleet headquarters during the last

two days of the planning, but in the opinion of the Joint Staff,

the new headquarters still lacked needed ground and air

expertise. Hence, the first few days of URGENT FURY saw

uncoordinated ground operations by Rangers and Marines and the

absence of unified air support.152

Lack of interoperable communications exacerbated systemic

lack of command and control. Here again short planning time and

excessive security were contributory factors. Faced with the

sudden transformation of a noncombatant evacuation operation into

a joint combat operation, communications planners hurriedly made

adjustments in their systems, but ran out of time before they

could supply the same Communications Electronics Operating

Instructions (CEOI), codes, and communications security

procedures to all the combatants. Critically, communications

planners were unable to provide tactical forces with compatible

communications equipment. Navy radios could not communicate with

the Vinson secure radio equipment used by the Army units,

delaying and complicating requests for naval air and naval

gunfire support. Soldiers in sight of warships delayed

operations until distant Air Force gunships and Army helicopters

could be summoned.

The pre-D-Day exclusion of several types of planners impeded

the operation’s logistical flow, civil-military relations, and

public affairs. Inadequate logistics planning delayed arrival of

troops, supplies, and fuel on Grenada after D-Day. To

compensate, troops took needed items from local businesses or

homes. Shortage of medical personnel and confusion over Medevac

procedures sometimes held up treatment of the injured. Army
68

helicopter pilots carrying wounded men had to learn the

techniques for landing on naval vessels. Lack of civil affairs

and public health personnel meant that combat troops had to be

diverted to perform these tasks. During the early stages of

URGENT FURY, PSYOPS units were not on hand to urge Grenadian

cooperation with US forces. Public affairs planners in the

Pentagon did not have time to organize a pool of reporters to

cover the Rangers and Marines on D-day. Lack of such coverage

created ill will among the US media who complained about

suppression of the public right to know.

Despite deficiencies in planning and intelligence that

complicated tactical execution, the Joint Staff termed the

operation a success:

Guidance and policy were concise and clear as were

the orders given by the NCA, the JCS, the CINC, and the

JTF Commander to the forces involved. The clearly

defined Rules of Engagement permitted mission

effectiveness with minimal civilian casualties. ...

Although time available for planning the operation was

constrained, the plan which evolved made the best use

of the forces allocated, and their capabilities,

training, and readiness. The procedures established

for crisis situations generally proved adequate for ...

highly sensitive and time critical requirements. The

military personnel assigned ... especially those who had

joint tour experience, were very effective. ... Lastly,

... the NCA and JCS (and their staffs) permitted the

chain of intervention ... to use their experience,

expertise, and familiarity with the situation to

accomplish the mission.153
69
70

NOTES

While the text of this study has been declassified, some of its

sources remain classified.

Overview

1

 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 105, 4 Oct 83, TS, JMF 001 (CY

1983); US Department of State and Department of Defense, “Grenada: A

Preliminary Report,” 16 Dec 83, U, pp. 5-6; Baltimore Sun, 26 Oct 83, p. 8;

Msg, State 307725, 280507Z Oct 83, S, J-5/Western Hemisphere (WHEM) Files.

2

 LTG Richard L. Prillaman, USA, Director of Joint Operations (J-3),

interviewed by Dr. Ronald H. Cole, 9 Feb 83, S, Joint History Office (JHO)

Files; Philadelphia Enquirer, 26 Oct 83, p. 14; NY Times, 26 Oct 83; Msg,

USCINCLANT to JCS, 200616Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt

for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, CJCS

Files; Msg, State to JCS 200632Z Oct 83, S, UF Master Scenario Events List

(MSEL), J-3/JOD Files.

3

 Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 200616Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns Files, J-3/JOD Files;

URGENT FURY Log Book, 201400Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Washington Post, 6

Nov 83, p. A1; DIA Assessment, Tab A to J-5 Point Paper for CJCS for SSG Mtg

on 20 Oct 83, “Grenada,” TS, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files; GEN John W. Vessey, USA,

CJCS, interviewed by Dr. Cole, 25 Mar 87, S, JHO Files; J-3 Background Paper

for CJCS, 2 Nov 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; VADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., Asst to

CJCS, interviewed by Dr. Cole, 12 Jul 84, TS, JHO Files; Col James W.

Connally, USAF, J-5/WHEM, interviewed by Dr. Cole, 25 Jun 84, S, JHO Files.

4

 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; Connally Interview; Moreau

Interview; Msg, JCS/CJCS to USCINCLANT, CINCMAC, USCINCRED, CDRJSOC, 211755Z

Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files;

Prillaman Interview; LTG Jack N. Merritt, USA, DJS, interviewed by Dr. Cole,

21 Jun 84, S; JHO Files; Msg, JCS/CJCS to CINCSAC, 230242Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT,

CJCS Files.

5

 DOS and DOD Preliminary Report, 16 Dec 83, U, p. 2; Newsweek, 7 Nov 83, p.

75; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. A1; MajGen George Crist, USMC, VDJS,

interviewed by Dr. Cole, 16 Feb 84, S, JHO Files; Msg, State 307725 to All

Dip. And Consular Posts, 280507Z Oct 83, U, J-5/WHEM Files; Draft NSDD, 23 Oct

83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files; NY Times, 26 Oct 83, p.

18; CJCS Backgrounder, 1730, 29 Oct 83, U, CJCS Files; Talking Paper (TP) for

CJCS for Mtg of National Security Policy Group (NSPG) on 22 Oct 83, S, UF

File, J-5/WHEM Files; J-3 Backgrounder for CJCS, 2 Nov 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files;

Msg, CJCS to JCS et al, 222054Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD

Files; Vessey Interview.

6

 Draft NSDD, 23 Oct 83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files;

Prillaman Interview; Vessey Interview; DIA Assessment by Col Peter Cummings,

USAF, Asst to DepDir for CI, 22 Oct 83, S-NF, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files;

Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 232242Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD, Opnl Msg File (URGENT

FURY) as cited in UF MSEL; URGENT FURY Log Book, 24 Oct 83, TS-SENS, J-3/JOD

Files.

7

 Briefing on USLANTCOM Plan URGENT FURY, n.d., TS, J-3/JOD Files; Msg,

USCINCLANT to CINCMAC et al, 240007Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT, URGENT FURY Opns File,

J-3/JOD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; Vessey

Interview.

8

 Crist Interview; Merritt Interview; Briefing on USLANTCOM Plan for URGENT

FURY, n.d., TS, J-3/JOD Files; Moreau Interview; LTG H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

USA, DCSOPS, interviewed by Dr. Cole, 15 Dec 87, S, JHO Files; Memo, MajGen

Crist to GEN Vessey and ADM McDonald, 23 Oct 83, TS-SENS, J-3 Chron File

(URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files.

9

 Prillaman Interview; Moreau Interview; Vessey Interview.
71

10 Grenada Update Briefing for OpsDeps, 24 Oct 83, TS-SENS, Sec 1, J-3 Chron

File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files; Prillaman Interview; Merritt Interview;

Vessey Interview; Schwarzkopf Interview; MAJ Bruce Pirnie, USA, Operation

URGENT FURY: The United States Army in Joint Operations (Washington: USA

Center of Military History, 1986), S, pp. 73-74.

11 Operations Planning Group (OPG) Outline of Operations on Grenada, Final

Update, 1500, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Schwarzkopf Interview; LtCol Ronald

H. Spector, USMCR, US Marines in Grenada, 1983 (Washington, USMC History and

Museums Div, 1987), pp. 8-9; CJCS Backgrounder to the Press, 29 Oct 83, U; GEN

Vessey, Interview with “Meet the Press,” 6 Nov 83, U, CJCS Files; Army Times,

5 Nov 84, p. 34; Minutes of JCS Mtg, by Col David H. Roe, USAF, Spec Asst on

Jt Matters to DJS, 25 Oct 83, TS, JHO Files; Crist Interview; DOS and OD,

“Preliminary Report,” 16 Dec 83, U, p. 27; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J3/OPD Files; URGENT FURY Log Book, 240030Z and 250045Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD

Files; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 250701Z Oct 83, S; Msg, JCS to Army, 250717Z

Oct 83, S; UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, State to JCS, 251722Z Oct 83, S, UF,

Opnl Msg File, GF-3, J-3/OPD Files; Pirnie, Operation URGENT FURY, S, pp. 119-

120; Telecon, JCS-USMC, 251900Z Oct 83, TS, UF MSEL, J-3/OPD Files; Vessey

Interview.

12 Schwarzkopf Interview; Pirnie, Operation URGENT FURY, S, pp. 119-120;

Spector, US Marines in Grenada, 1983, pp. 10-11; CAPT Michael F. O’Brien, USN,

interviewed by Dr. Cole, 19 Nov 87, S, JHO Files; During URGENT FURY O’Brien

led Attack Squadron (VA) 87 on sorties from the USS Independence; OPG Final

Update, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Telecon, JCS-USMC, 251900Z Oct 83, TS, UF

MSEL, J-3/OPD Files.

13 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; Analysis of the Lind

Report, 1 May 1984, S, CJCS Files; Army Times, 5 Nov 84, p. 34; Schwarzkopf

Interview; Baltimore Sun, 5 Jun 84, p. 7; Vessey Interview; OPG Final Update,

2 Nov 83, U; Msg, USCINCLANT to COMJTF 120, 271622Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to

CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldier (NY, NY: Simon

& Schuster, 1995), p. 266.

14 URGENT FURY Log Book, 260209Z Oct 83, TS; Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 260611Z

Oct 83, S; Msg, USCINCRED to XVIII Abn Corps, 261210Z Oct 83, S, UF Opnl Msg

File, GF-4, J-3/JOD Files; Prillaman Interview; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S,

Memo, JCS to J-3, 262500Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/OPD Files; Merritt

Interview; Msg, MajGen Crist to JCS, 262100Z Oct 83, S, Sec II, J-3 Chron File

(URGENT FURY); OPSUM, URGENT FURY, for Congressional Delegation, prepared for

COL Cullom, 2 Nov 83, S, UF File, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, CJTF 120 to USCINCLANT,

270030Z Oct 83, S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files; Crist Interview; Msg, JCS to

USCINCLANT, 270313Z Oct 83, Sec 1, J-3 Chronology, S, URGENT FURY, J-3/OPD

Files; Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 270946Z Oct 83, and reply 272245Z Oct 83, S, UF

MSEL, Opnl Msg File, GF-5, J-3/JOD Files; Mins of JCS Mtg, by Col David H.

Roe, USAF, Spec Asst on Joint Matters to DJS, 27 Oct 83, TS, JHO Files; Msg,

SecDef to USCINCLANT, 261815Z Oct 83, and reply, 270517Z Oct 83, S, UF File,

J-5/WHEM Files; Msg, SecDef to JCS, 271354 Oct 83, S, UF Opnl Msg File, GF-5,

J-3/JOD Files.

15 President Ronald Reagan’s interview by reporters at the White House of 25

Oct 83, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 31 Oct 83, p. 1487;

Prillaman Interview; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S; GEN Vessey,

interviewed on “Meet the Press,” 6 Nov 83, U, CJCS Files; Vessey Interview;

Ltr, GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA (Ret) to BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret),

Director for Joint History, OCJCS, 1 Sep 96, U, JHO; hereafter Ltr, GEN Vessey

to BG Armstrong, 1 Sep 96.

16 Vessey Interview with “Meet the Press”; Vessey Interview; J-3/OPD Joint

Overview, 1 May 85, S, JHO Files.

17 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files (See updated J-3 casualty

chart in historian’s files); Major Mark Adkin, URGENT FURY: The Battle for

Grenada (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 309; Michael Clodfelter,

Warfare and Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures,

1618-1991, Vol II (London: McFarland, 1991), p. 1180.
72

18 Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, 1 Sep 96.

Chapter 1

The Crisis

19 NSDD l05, 4 Oct 83, TS, JMF 00l (CY l983). 20 US Department of State and Department of Defense, “Grenada: A Preliminary

Report,” 16 Dec 83, U, p. 5. (Hereafter DOS and DOD, Preliminary Report, l6

Dec 83, (U); Baltimore Sun, 26 Oct 83, p.8.

21 DOS and DOD Preliminary Report, l6 Dec 83, U, pp. 5-6; NSDD l05, 4 Oct 83,

TS, JMF 00l (CY l983).

22 Msg, State to JCS, l72l44Z Oct 83, S, URGENT FURY (hereafter UF), Opnl Msg

File, GF-l, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, State 307725 to All Dip. and Consular Posts,

280507Z Oct 83, U, URGENT FURY File (hereafter UF File), J-5 WHEM Files

(hereafter Msg State 307725, 280507Z Oct 83, J-5/WHEM Files); DOS and DOD,

Preliminary Report, l6 Dec 83, U, pp. 3l-36; Transcript, DepSecState and VDJS

before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International, Security,

Scientific, and Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Situation in Grenada,” 2 Nov 83,

U, CJCS Files.

23 Msg, State 307725, 280507Z Oct 83, J-5/WHEM Files; Washington Post, 6 Nov

83, p. Al.

24 Connally Interview. 25 URGENT FURY Log Book, J-3/JOD, l4 Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for

J-3, “Opn URGENT FURY (U),” Jan 83, S, J-3/OPD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS,

“Opn URGENT FURY (U),” 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; (hereafter Rpt, USCINCLANT to

CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files.)

26 SM-356-75 to CINCs, 27 Jun 75, C, JMF 040 (ll Jan 74) Sec ll; Briefing

Paper for SecDef for DEF/JCS Mtg on 9 Jun 8l, “Unified Command Plan of l975,”

n.d. [before 8 Jun 8l], JCS l259/905, S, JMF 040 (l Dec 80).

27 URGENT FURY Log Book, l4 Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files. 28 Merritt Interview; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. A1. 29 Connally Interview; Moreau Interview. 30 Moreau Interview. 31 J-3 Background Paper for CJCS for CINC’s Mini-Conference on 2-3 Nov 83,

atch to DJSM l839-83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files

(hereafter J-3 Background Paper for CJCS, 2 Nov 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files).

32 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-5/OPD Files. 33 This contingency plan, like those of other unified commands, fulfilled a

JCS requirement spelled out in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP (FY

83), Vol I] in SM-l25-82 to CINCs, l2 Feb 83, JCS l844/7l8, TS, JMF 5l0 (l2

Feb 83) Sec 2.

34 Prillaman Interview. 35 Historical Report of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, 1981, S-NOFORN, pp.

V-2 to V-3; Philadelphia Enquirer, 26 Oct 83, p. l4; NY Times, 26 Oct 83, p.

22; Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 2006l6Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files;

Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb

84, S, CJCS Files.

36 Msg, State to JCS 200632Z Oct 83, S, UF Master Scenario Events List

(hereafter MSEL), J-3/JOD Files; Prillaman Interview.

37 Msg, State to JCS, 200632Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files; Prillaman

Interview.

38 Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 2006l6Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files. 39 URGENT FURY Log Book, 20l400Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Washington Post, 6

Nov 83, p. Al.

40 J-5 Point Paper for CJCS for SSG Mtg on 20 Oct 83, “Grenada,” 20 Oct 83,

TS, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files.

41 Background Paper for SSG Mtg on 20 Oct 83 (prepared by State Department),

“Grenada,” 20 Oct 83, TS, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files. Four years later, when

asked about Secretary Shultz’s briefing to the SSG on 20 October 1983, General

Vessey expressed serious doubt that the Secretary had specifically discussed
73

military operations at that time: “Secretary Shultz would have been

embarrassed to discuss the specifics of military operations with us [the

military] as it was really not his place to do so.” Vessey Interview.

42 J-3 Background Paper for CJCS, 2 Nov 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; DIA Assessment,

Tab A to J-5 Point Paper for CJCS for SSG mtg on 20 Oct 83, “Grenada,” 20 Oct

83, TS, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files; Vessey Interview; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG

Armstrong, l Sep 96.

43 Moreau Interview; Connally Interview. 44 Moreau Interview; Connally Interview; Draft of SecDef Remarks on Grenada,

28 Oct 83, TS-SENS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY); Msg, CINCLANTFLT to

COMSECONDFLEET, 2l0040Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns File; J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for

J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. Al; NY Times, 26

Oct 83, p. l8.

Chapter 2

Planning and Preparation, 21-24 October 1983

45 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files. 46 Connally Interview; Moreau Interview. 47 Msg, JCS/CJCS to USCINCLANT, CINCMAC, USCINCRED, CDRSOC, 2ll755Z Oct 83,

TS, J-3/JOD Files.

48 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Prillaman Interview. 49 Merritt Interview; Msg, JCS/CJCS to CINCSAC, 230242Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT,

CJCS Files.

50 Response of GEN Vessey to Congress, “Analysis of the Lind Report (U),” l

May 84, S, pp. l-5. (This response was subsequently declassified, with minor

changes and published as an article by Benjamin F. Schemmer, entitled “JCS

Reply to Congressional Reform Caucus’ Critique [“Lind Report”] of the Grenada

Operation,” Armed Forces Journal, Jul 84, p. l4.); CJCS Backgrounder to the

Press, l730, 29 Oct 83, U, CJCS Files; Merritt Interview; Crist Interview;

Moreau Interview; Connally Interview; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, l Sep

96.

51 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, and Response of GEN Vessey to

Congress, “Analysis of the Lind Report,” l May 84, S, pp. l-5, CJCS Files.

52 DOS and DOD, Preliminary Report, l6 Dec 83, U, p. 2; Newsweek, 7 Nov 83, p.

75; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. Al.

53 Crist Interview; Msg, State 307725 to All Dip. and Consular Posts, 280507Z

Oct 83, U, J-5/WHEM Files; Draft NSDD, 23 Oct 83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT

FURY), J-3/JOD Files; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. Al; NY Times, 26 Oct 83,

p. l8; Newsweek, 7 Nov 83, p. 75.

54 Msg, State 307725 to All Dip. and Consular Posts, 280507Z Oct 83, U, UF

File, J-5/WHEM Files; CJCS Backgrounder, 1730, 29 Oct 83, U, CJCS Files; NY

Times, 26 Oct 83, p. 18; Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. A1. 55 TP for CJCS for Mtg of NSPG on 22 Oct 83, S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files;

Crist Interview.

56 J-5 TP for CJCS for Mtg to NSPG on 22 Oct 83, S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files. 57 Msg, State 307725 to All Dip. and Consular Posts, 280507Z Oct 83, S, UF

File, J-5/WHEM Files.

58 J-3 Background Paper for CJCS, 2 Nov 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, CJCS to

JCS et al., 222054Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files;

Washington Post, 6 Nov 83, p. Al; NY Times, 26 Oct 83, p. 18; Vessey

Interview.

59 Msg, CJCS to JCS USCINCLANT, CINCMAC, USCINCRED, COMJSOC, 222054Z Oct 83,

TS-SPECAT PIERCER, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, USCINCRED to USCINCLANT,

l92l00Z Nov 83, S, J-3/OPD Files.

60 Msg, JCS/CJCS to CINCSAC, 230242Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT, CJCS Files; History of

the Strategic Air Command, 1983, TS, p. l83.

61 Vessey Interview. 62 DIA Assessment by Col Peter Cummings, USAF, Asst to DepDir for CI, 22 Oct

83, S-NF, UF Opns File, J-3/JOD Files.
74

63 Crist Interview. 64 Merritt Interview. 65 Bfg on USLANTCOM Plan URGENT FURY, n.d., TS, J-3/JOD Files; Moreau

Interview; Schwarzkopf Interview.

66 Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 232242Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD, Opnl Msg File (URGENT

FURY) as cited in UF MSEL; URGENT FURY Log Book, 24 Oct 83, TS-SENS, J-3/JOD

Files.

67 Bfg on USLANTCOM Plan URGENT FURY, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Moreau Interview. 68 Other ships in CJTF l24 included the Trenton, Fort Snelling, Manitowoc, and

Barnstable County. 69 The group included the Independence, Richmond K. Turner, Caron, Clifton

Sprague, Coontz, and Moosbrugger. 70 URGENT FURY Task Force and Command Structure, Sec l, TS, J-3 Chron File, J3/JOD Files.

71 Grenada Update Briefing for OpsDeps, 24 Oct 84, TS-SENS, Sec l, J-3 Chron

File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, l Sep 96.

72 (S) Prillaman Interview; Moreau Interview; Vessey Interview; Ltr, GEN

Vessey to BG Armstrong, l Sep 96.

73 Prillaman Interview; Merritt Interview; Vessey Interview; Schwarzkopf

Interview; MAJ Bruce Pirnie, USA, Operation URGENT FURY: The United States

Army in Joint Operations (Washington: USA Center of Military History, l986),

S, pp. 73-74.

74 Prillaman Interview; U.S. News and World Report, l4 Nov 83, p. 25. 75 Vessey Interview. 76 Msg, USCINCLANT to CINCMAC et al., 240007Z Oct 83, TS-SPECAT, URGENT FURY

Opns File, J-3/JOD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files;

Vessey Interview.

77 Draft NSDD, 23 Oct 83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files;

Prillaman Interview.

78 Draft NSDD, 23 Oct 83, TS, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files. 79 Vessey Interview. 80 Memo, MajGen Crist to GEN Vessey and ADM McDonald, 23 Oct 83, TS-SENS, J-3

Chron File (URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files.

81 DIA Intsum #8, 240040Z Oct 83, S, UF Opns File; Point Paper for J-3,

“Grenada Situation Update,” 24 Oct 83, S, Sec l, J-3 Chron File (URGENT FURY);

J-3/JOD Files.

82 Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 240040Z Oct 83, TS, UF Opnl Msg File, GF 2; Grenada

Update Briefing for OpsDeps, 24 Oct 83, TS, Sec l, J-3 Chron File (URGENT

FURY); URGENT FURY Log Book, 24l205Z Oct 83; J-3/JOD Files.

83 Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 260036Z Oct 83, S, UF, MSEL, J-3/JOD Files. 84 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS File; Schwarzkopf Interview; MAC

Study, URGENT FURY: The United States Air Force and the Grenada Operation,

Jan 88, S, p. 29.

85 Msg, MajGen Crist to JCS, 240815Z Oct 83, TS, Sec l, J-3 Chron File (URGENT

FURY), J-3/JOD Files. Crist Interview; Vessey Interview.

86 Msg, CJCS to JCS, USCINCLANT, et al., 24l643Z Oct 83; TS-SPECAT, UF Opns

File, J-3/JOD Files; Crist Interview; Vessey Interview.

87 Rpt, USCINCLANT To CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files. 88 Crist Interview; Schwarzkopf Interview. 89 CSR CAT Point Paper for J-5, “Current Situation Room Action Team (U)“ n.d.

[ca. 24 Oct 83], S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files; Oral Order, J-3 to J-3/JOD,

24l600Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-5/JOD Files; Prillaman Interview.

90 CSR CAT Point Paper for J-5, “CSR CAT,” n.d. [ca. 24 Oct 83], S, UF File,

J-5/WHEM Files.

91 J-3 Chronology of Events, l4 Oct-2 Nov 83, S, prepared by Maj Mike Moore,

USAF, URGENT FURY Working Group/J-3/JOD Files (hereafter J-3 Chronology), S,

URGENT FURY J-3/OPD Files).

92 Msg, USCINCRED to XVIII Airborne Corps, 242030Z Oct 83, TS, UF MSEL, J3/JOD Files.

93 Vessey Interview. 94 Ibid.
75

Chapter 3

Combat Operations, 25 October - 2 November 1983

95 Operations Planning Group (OPG) Outline of Operations on Grenada, Final

Update, l500, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files (hereafter OPG Final Update, 2 Nov

83, U, J-3/JOD Files); Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, 1 Sep 96.

96 Ibid; Schwarzkopf Interview; LtCol Ronald H. Spector, USMCR, US Marines in

Grenada, 1983 (Washington, USMC History and Museums Div., 1987), pp. 8-9.

97 CJCS Backgrounder to the Press, 29 Oct 83, U; Interview, “Meet the Press”

with GEN Vessey, 6 Nov 83, U, CJCS Files; Army Times, 5 Nov 84, p. 34.

98 Minutes of JCS Mtg, by Col David H. Roe, USAF, Spec Asst on Jt Matters to

DJS, 25 Oct 83, TS, JHO Files.

99 Crist Interview; DOS and DOD, “Preliminary Report,” l6 Dec 83, U, p. 27. 100 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files. 101 Crist Interview; Schwarzkopf Interview; URGENT FURY Log Book, 240030Z and

250045Z Oct 83, TS, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 25070lZ Oct 83, S;

Msg, JCS to Army, 2507l7Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files; Msg, State to

JCS, 25l722Z Oct 83, S, UF, Opnl Msg File, GF-3, J-3/OPD Files.

102 Schwarzkopf Interview; Pirnie, Operation URGENT FURY, S, pp. ll4-ll5;

Spector, US Marines in Grenada, 1983, p. l0.

103 Schwarzkopf Interview; Pirnie, Operation URGENT FURY, S, pp. ll9-l20;

Spector, US Marines in Grenada, 1983, pp. l0-ll; CDR Michael F. O’Brien, USN,

interviewed by Dr. Cole, 19 November 1987. During URGENT FURY, then CDR

O’Brien led Attack Squadron (VA) 87 on sorties from the USS Independence. A

published account of his combat experiences may be found in Timothy J.

Christmann’s “A Look Back: TacAir in Grenada,” Naval Aviation News, Nov-Dec

85, pp. 6-9. OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Telecon, JCS-USMC,

25l900Z Oct 83, TS, UF MSEL J-3/OPD Files.

104 Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS 3ll824Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files;

Transcript, testimony of SecDef and CMC before House Approp. Cmte, “Situation

in Lebanon and Grenada,” 8 Nov 83, S, JHO Files; NY Times, l Nov 83, p. L;

Schwarzkopf Interview; O’Brien Interview. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed

Conflicts, p. 1180.

105 OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Telecon, JCS-USMC, 25l900Z

Oct 83, TS, UF MSEL, J-3/OPD Files; Schwarzkopf Interview; Spector, US Marines

in Grenada, l983, pp. l2-l6.

106 Public Law 93-l48, 7 Nov 73. This law required the President to withdraw

troops within 60 days or less from any foreign military operation not

previously authorized by Congress.

107 Ltrs, Pres. Reagan to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro

Tempore of the Senate, 25 Oct 83, Weekly Compilation of Presidential

Documents, 3l Oct 83, pp. l493-l494.

108 Interview, President Reagan with reporters, White House, 25 Oct 83, Weekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents, 3l Oct 83, p. l487.

109 Prillaman Interview. Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S; “Meet the

Press,” with GEN Vessey, 6 Nov 83, U, CJCS Files; Vessey Interview; Ltr, GEN

Vessey to BG Armstrong, 1 Sep 96.

110 OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S,

J-3/OPD Files; Schwarzkopf Interview; Spector, US Marines in Grenada, 1983, p.

l6.

111 Crist Interview. 112 (S) OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U, J-3/JOD Files; Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan

84, S, J-3/OPD Files. General Vessey found the lack of HUMINT about the

medical campuses at Grand Anse and Lance aux Epines inexcusable. Before Dday, the president of the medical college was visiting in the United States.

When interrogated about the layout of True Blue Campus near Point Salines, he

provided much useful information. Neither the interrogators asked nor did he

volunteer, however, intelligence about the campuses at Grand Anse or Lance aux
76

Epines. Hence, tactical commanders had to plan impromptu rescues for the two

other campuses. Vessey Interview; Schwarzkopf Interview.

113 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT et al.,

26l748Z Oct 83, S; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, CINCMAC, 436 MAW, 262l05Z Oct 83,

S; UF Opnl Msg File GF-4, J-3, URGENT FURY Log Book, 262223Z Oct 83, TS, J3/OPD Files.

114 URGENT FURY Log Book, 260209Z Oct 83, TS, Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 2606llZ

Oct 83, S; Msg, CINCLANT to REDCOM, 260846 Oct 83, S; Msg, USCINCRED to XVIII

Abn Corps, 26l2l0Z Oct 83, S; UF Opnl Msg File, GF-4, J-3/JOD Files; Prillaman

Interview.

115 (S) Msgs: London 22996 to State, 26l344Z Oct 83, C-SPECAT; London 23064 to

State, 26l806Z Oct 83, C; Ottawa 08009 to SecState, 26l920Z Oct 83, C; J5/WHEM Files. In fact, during the meeting with Ambassador McNeill and General

Crist on Sunday night, 23 October, the leaders of the OECS, Jamaica, and

Barbados had strongly opposed involving either the United Kingdom or the

Commonwealth. For years, the Caribbean leaders had importuned both countries

for intervention in Marxist Grenada only to be ignored. The leaders therefore

preferred to go into Grenada either with the more sympathetic United States or

on their own. Nonetheless, on 24 October President Reagan had belatedly

informed Prime Minister Thatcher of the impending operation in an effort to

enlist her support if not participation. Before Thatcher could respond, D-day

arrived and the operation went off as scheduled. Crist Interview.

116 Dept of State Bulletin, Dec 83, pp. 72-77. 117 Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 26l302Z Oct 83, S, UF File; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT,

2703l7Z Oct 83, S, Sec I, J-3 Chronology; J-3/JOD Files; Msg, USCINCLANT to

CJTF l20 info JCS 270722Z Oct 83, S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files.

118 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S; Memo, JCS to J-3, 262500Z [sic] Oct 83, S, UF

MSEL; J-3/OPD Files JCS; Merritt Interview.

119 Msg, MajGen Crist to JCS, 262l00Z Oct 83, S, Sec II, J-3 Chron File (URGENT

FURY); OPSUM, URGENT FURY, for Congressional Delegation, prepared for COL

Cullom, 2 Nov 83, S, UF File; J-3/JOD Files; Msg, CJTF l20 to USCINCLANT,

270030Z Oct 83, S, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files; Crist Interview.

120 Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, JHO Files; Analysis of the Lind

Report, l May l984, S; CJCS Files; An almost verbatim unclassified version of

this analysis may be found in Armed Forces Journal, July l984, pp. l2-l4, l8,

and 99. Also see Army Times, 5 Nov 84, p. 34; Schwarzkopf Interview.

121 An article in the Baltimore Sun (5 Jun 84, p. 7) alleged that GEN Vessey

complained bitterly to MG Trobaugh on 27 October that: “We have two companies

of Marines running all over the island and thousands of Army troops doing

nothing. What the hell is going on?” Nearly four years later, Vessey neither

recalled that remark nor asking MG Trobaugh to employ Rangers in a daytime

assault role. In a letter to the JHO in l996, GEN Vessey stated that “My

memory of the events, a check of my phone log for that day, and my generally

fairly scrupulous insistence that the existing chain of command be used, lead

me to say that the assertion that I called Trobaugh is just, flat wrong,

despite the Baltimore Sun article.” Vessey Interview; OPG Final Update, 2 Nov

83, U; Msg, USCINCLANT to COMJTF l20, 27l622Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD

Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG

Armstrong, l Sep 96. Concerning the “JCS order” to take Calivigny barracks

before dark, no such order has been found in JCS records. Shortly after the

operation, MG Schwarzkopf met with the Joint Staff and Service

representatives. When he asked who had sent the order, LTG Prillaman, the J3, replied that no one in the Joint Staff had sent such an order. Four years

later, Schwarzkopf speculated that some staff officer at USCINCLANT

headquarters used the phrase to emphasize Vessey’s concern. Schwarzkopf

Interview.

122 OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U; Msg, USCINCLANT to COMJTF 120, 271622Z Oct

83, S, UFMSEL, J-3/JOD Files; Rpt USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files;

Major Mark Adkins, Urgent Fury (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.

279-280.
77

123 Pirnie, Operation URGENT FURY, S, pp. l48-l5l; Schwarzkopf Interview;

O’Brien Interview.

124 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb

84, S, CJCS Files.

125 Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 2703l3Z Oct 83, Sec l, J-3 Chronology, S, URGENT

FURY, J-3/OPD Files; Msg USCINCLANT to JCS, 270946Z Oct 83, and reply 272245Z

Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, Opnl Msg File, GF-5, J-3/JOD Files.

126 Mins of JCS Mtg, by Col David H. Roe, USAF, Spec Asst on Joint Matters to

DJ S, 27 Oct 83, TS, JHO Files.

127 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Msg, CINCMAC to JCS, 27l0l2Z

Oct 83, S, UF MSEL; OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, U; Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT,

2703l4Z Oct 83, and reply, 2705l6Z Oct 83, S, UF Opnl Msg File, GF-5; J-3/JOD

Files.

128 NY Times, 5 Feb 84, p. 8. 129 Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 Oct 83, p. l4. 130 Baltimore Sun, 28 Oct 83, p. l0. 131 Msg, SecDef to USCINCLANT, 26l8l5Z Oct 83, and reply, 2705l7Z Oct 83, S, UF

File, J-5/WHEM Files; Msg, SecDef to JCS, 27l354Z Oct 83, S, UF Opnl Msg File,

GF-5, J-3/JOD Files; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, 1 Sep 96.

132 (C) Msg, SecState to SecDef, 27l858Z Oct 83, C, J-3 Chronology (Moore), S,

URGENT FURY; J-3/OPD Files; Crist Interview. During the week after the combat

phase of URGENT FURY ended on 2 November, and for the next four months,

thousands of captured documents were sent to the DIA for exploitation and

analysis. Within the National Military Intelligence Center of the Pentagon,

DIA analysts screened the documents for those of immediate interest to the

President, State, and CIA. During the next several weeks, thousands of other

documents were catalogued and microfilmed for permanent retention. The

original documents were sent back to the new government of Grenada. The

documents are considered an invaluable source for studies of how the Soviet

and the Cuban governments methodically established a “third world proxy.”

Interview, Dr. Cole with Mr. Roger Denk, DIA Management Office, 20 Apr 84, S,

JHO Files.

133 Crist Interview. 134 Msg, JCS to AMEMB Kingston, JM, et al., 28l2l4Z Oct 83, S; Msg, USCINCRED

to JCS, 28l820Z Oct 83, S; Msg, USCINCLANT to CJTF l20, 28l904Z Oct 83, S;

WINMSG l30, USARMY to JCS, 282500 [sic] Oct 83, S, UF opnl Msg File, G-F’s

4,5, and 6;

J-3/JOD Files; Army Times, 5 Nov 84, p. 34.

135 Memo, LTG Mahaffey, DCS/OPS Army to DJS, 30 Oct 83, S, J-5/WHEM Files;

Memo, JCS for CSA, 3l Oct 83, S, UF MSEL; J-3/OPD Files; Merritt Interview.

136 J-5 Background Paper for CJCS, 28 Oct 83, TS, UF File, J-5/WHEM Files. 137 Msg, Actg CJCS to USCINCLANT, 280l40Z Oct 83, TS, Sec II, J-3 Chron File

(URGENT FURY), J-3/JOD Files.

138 Conf Memo, USCINCLANT, 280900Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files. 139 Msg JCS 28l8llZ Oct 83 to USCINCLANT, S, Sec II, J-3 Chron File (URGENT

FURY), J-3/JOD Files.

140 URGENT FURY Log Book, 29 Oct 83, TS; Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS, 29l9l6Z Oct

83, S, UF Opnl Msg File GF-7; J-4/JOD Files.

141 Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 300l53Z Oct 83, S, UF Opnl Msg File, GF-8, J-3/JOD

Files.

142 Msg, JCS to USCINCLANT, 291952Z Oct 83, Secl, J-3; Chronology, S, URGENT

FURY, J-3/OPD Files.

143 Rpt, USCINCLANT to JCS, 20 Oct 83, TS, UF MSEL, J-3/JOD Files; Vessey

Interview; Ltr, GEN Vessey to BG Armstrong, l Sep 96.

144 OPG Log, 29l842Z Oct 83, S, UF MSEL; Msg, USCINCLANT to JCS 3l2346Z Oct 83,

TS, UF Opnl File, GF-9; OPG Final Update, 2 Nov 83, J-3/JOD Files.

145 JCSM-285-83 for SecDef, l0 Nov 83, JCS 2532/23, U, JMF l6l (2 Nov 83).

Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPD Files; Interview, Dr. Cole with Mr.

George MacGarrigle, Center of Military History, 20 Apr 84, U, JHO Files.
78

146 JCSM-285-83 for SecDef, l0 Nov 83, JCS 2532/23, U, JMF l6l (2 Nov 83).

Rpt, USCINCLANT to CJCS, 6 Feb 84, S, CJCS Files. Clodfelter, Warfare and

Armed Conflict, p. 1180.

Chapter 4

Assessment of URGENT FURY

147 CJCS Backgrounder, 29 Oct 83, U; Interv, “Meet the Press” with GEN Vessey,

6 Nov 83, U; Transcript, testimony of DepSecState Dam and MajGen Crist before

House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Situation in Grenada,” 2 Nov 83, U; CJCS

Files; NY Times, 3 Nov 83, pp. l7 and 2l.

148 Interview, “Meet the Press,” with GEN Vessey, 6 Nov 83, U, CJCS Files; Rpt,

MG Winant Sidle (USA, Ret), to CJCS, 23 Aug 84, U, JHO Files.

149 Draft Rpt for J-3, Jan 84, S, J-3/OPF Files; Merritt Interview. 150 J-3/OPD Joint Overview, l May l985, S, JHO Files. 151 Interview, “Meet the Press,” with GEN Vessey, 6 Nov 83, CJCS Files. By “48

hours,” General Vessey referred to “serious military planning,” that is, joint

tactical planning by the staffs of Admiral McDonald and Vice Admiral Metcalf

after their receipt of the JCS execute order of 22 October l983 (Msg 222054Z

Oct 83, Q.V., p. 30.) Vessey Interview.

152 Four years later, General Vessey still agreed with the choice of Admiral

Metcalf’s Second Fleet to execute URGENT FURY. The general had visited

USFORCARIB before the operation and found it too isolated and lacking in

organic forces. He said, “It would have been as useful as an extra tit on a

warthog. . . . It would have been the worst choice for an operational

headquarters.” Vessey Interview.

153 J-3/OPD Joint Overview, l May 85, S, JHO Files.
79

INDEX

Aerial surveillance: 3, 15, 27, 32,

59

Aeromedical evacuation control

center: 54

Airborne Corps, XVIII: 14, 38–39,

43

Airborne Division, 82d: 3, 4–5, 19,

20, 21–22, 29, 30, 35, 38–39,

43, 48–49, 51–52, 53, 56, 57–

58, 60-61, 64

Airborne troops: 2, 5, 16, 20, 23,

26

Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) Detachment, 552d: 30

Aircraft

A-7s: 4–5, 44, 52–53

A-10s: 60

C-130s: 3–4, 23, 26, 34–35, 41

E-3As: 30, 32

F-15s: 30, 32

KC-10s: 26

KC-135s: 26

UH-160s: 52–53

helicopters: 4, 23, 41, 44, 47–

48, 51–53

loss of navigation system: 3–4,

41

Marine: 44

Navy: 44

transport: 26

Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

(ANGLICO): 4–5, 53

American medical students in Grenada

evacuation of: 48, 54, 56, 59

planning for evacuation of: 1–2,

11–18, 20–21, 24–25, 28–29, 39

rescue of: 4, 42, 45, 46, 47–48,

75n112

threat to: 1, 11–13, 22, 24, 26,

33, 64

Amphibious assaults: 21, 24, 35,

41, 45, 58, 60

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal:

61

Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM): 1–2,

12–13, 14–16, 20, 21–22, 27,

28, 30, 31, 64

Austin, GEN Hudson, Grenadian Armed

Forces: 11, 56

Aviation Battalion, 160th: 30

Baltimore Sun: 75–76n121

Barbados Defense Force: 36, 37

Barbados: 3, 10, 12–13, 22, 28, 29,

33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 54, 55,

75n115

Bish, Milan: 12–13

Bishop, Maurice: 1, 9, 10–11, 51,

55–56

British Commonwealth: 25, 49,

75n115

Brown, Richard: 13

Bush, George: 2, 13, 16–17

Calivigny Barracks, Grenada: 23,

24, 52–53, 75–76n121

Canada: 49, 51, 54

Captured documents: 50–51, 55–56,

59, 60, 76n132

Captured equipment: 50, 59

Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF):

3, 5, 34, 35–38, 40, 43, 48,

50, 56, 57–58, 61

Carriacou: 54, 57–58, 59, 60

Castro, Fidel: 9, 17, 42–43, 64

Casualties

American: 4–5, 6, 48, 53, 54, 61

civilian: 4, 6, 44, 50, 61

Cuban: 6, 53–54, 61

due to friendly fire: 53

Grenadian forces: 6, 61

minimization of: 26, 29, 32, 50

Cavazos, GEN Richard E., USA: 31

CBS: 20

Censorship. See Press, relations

with the.

Central America: 10, 11–12, 17

Central Intelligence Agency: 28,

35, 47, 50–51, 55–56, 76n132

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2–

3. See also Vessey, GEN John

W., Jr., USA.

Charles, Eugenia: 25–26

Charleston AFB, SC: 48, 54

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO):

19. See also Watkins, ADM

James D., USN.

Clifton Sprague, USS: 35, 73n69

Coard, Bernard: 11, 56, 58

Comas, COL Pedro Tortola, Cuba: 42

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

120: 30, 32, 34–40, 43, 48,

65–66

Commander in Chief, Military Airlift

Command (USCINCMAC): 14, 20,

26, 37, 48, 54

Commander in Chief, Readiness

Command (USCINCRED): 14, 26,

48–49

Commander, Second Fleet: 3. See

also Metcalf, VADM Joseph, III,

USN.
80

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

(USCINCLANT): 2–3, 5, 6, 7,

12, 13–16, 19, 20, 21, 27, 32–

33, 34–35, 36–37, 38–39, 48,

52, 63, 65, 75–76n121. See

also McDonald, ADM Wesley L.,

USN.

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air

Command (USCINCSAC): 26–27

Communications

problems with: 4–5, 6, 51–52,

53, 65, 66

secret: 47

security of: 2, 20, 27

Connally, Col James W., USAF: 11–12

Cornwall, MAJ Leon, Grenada: 22, 58

Cowhill, VADM W. J., USN: 48

Creft, Jacqueline: 11

CRISEX '83: 18

Crisis Action System: 12

Crist, MajGen George B., USMC: 3,

5, 28, 32–33, 34, 36, 37, 40,

43, 47, 48, 50–51, 56, 63,

75n115

Cruz, Donald: 22

Cuba

captured documents: 50–51,

76n132

combat troops in Grenada: 19, 41

construction in Grenada: 1, 10,

13, 55–56

deterrence of interference by:

3, 17, 28–29, 30, 32, 33, 42

threat to Central America: 10–12

vessels: 13, 15, 17, 19

Cuban nationals in Grenada

armed: 15, 19, 21, 26, 41–43,

57, 58–59, 65

construction workers: 2, 10, 15,

24, 27, 42, 55–56

evacuation of: 5, 40, 50, 53, 59

proposed disarmament of: 19, 20

resistance from: 4, 19, 41–43,

44, 46, 47–49, 51, 58, 70

Current Situation Room Crisis Action

Team (CSR CAT): 38, 50, 57

Dam, Kenneth W.: 63

Defense, Office of the Secretary of:

38

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 34,

76n132

Defense Mapping Agency: 20

Director of Central Intelligence:

33

Dominica: 10, 18

Dover, DE: 48

Eagleburger, Lawrence S.: 16, 34

Foreign nationals in Grenada: 1, 6,

34, 58–59

American. See American medical

students in Grenada.

British: 34

Canadian: 49, 54

Cuban. See Cuban nationals in

Grenada.

evacuation of: 5, 15, 40, 50,

53–54, 59

planning for the evacuation of:

20–21, 29

Soviet: 5, 19, 40, 50, 53, 58–59

Fort Bragg, NC: 29, 43, 51–52, 61

Fort Campbell, KY: 30

Fort Frederick, Grenada: 4, 44, 47,

49

Fort Lucas, Grenada: 51

Fort Rupert, Grenada: 11, 44

Frequente, Grenada: 47, 49, 53

Gairy, Eric: 9

Geneva Convention: 57

Gillespie, Charles A.: 22

Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization

Act of 1986: 6

Gorman, GEN Paul, USA: 63

Grand Anse, Grenada

beach: 24, 47–48, 49

campus: 4, 42, 45, 46, 47,

75n112

Grand Etans, Grenada: 59

Grand Mal Bay, Grenada: 45, 47, 49

Grenada

government of: 9–11, 36, 43

Governor General of. See Scoon,

Paul.

political reconstruction of: 18,

25, 33–34, 36, 50–51, 56, 59,

60

PSYOPS broadcasts to: 50-51

Revolutionary Military Council:

22

terrain: 3, 9

Grenadian People's Revolution- ary

Army: 17, 60

casualties: 6

estimates of: 15, 21, 26, 27

proposed disarmament of: 17, 19,

20

resistance by: 41, 47

training for: 51

Grenville, Grenada: 41, 45

Guam, USS: 4, 30, 37, 41, 47-48,

54, 55, 58, 59, 60

Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba: 53
81

Harris, CAPT Michael J., USN: 64

Healey, Denis: 49

Helicopters

gunships: 51–52

heliborne assaults: 41, 47–48,

52–53

Marine: 44, 48

Hunter Army Airfield, GA: 28–29,

41, 56

Independence, USS, battle group:

16, 17–18, 19, 20, 24, 28–29,

30, 34, 42, 44, 51–52, 53, 59,

60, 73n69, 74n103

Jamaica: 3, 22, 28, 29, 33, 37, 53,

75n115

Jamaica Defense Force: 36, 37

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 5, 11–

12, 47, 48–49

and Calivigny Barracks: 52

and Carriacou: 58

Deputy Director for PoliticalMilitary Affairs: 20

execute order: 35–37

Logistics Directorate: 48

and prisoners: 58

Public Affairs Office: 20, 67

response cell: 12, 15, 20, 28,

38

role in planning: 3, 6–7, 13–14,

16, 19–20, 23–24, 26, 27–28,

30-31, 64–65, 67

Special Operations Division: 28

warning order: 13–14

Joint Deployment Agency: 65

Joint Information Board (JIB): 55

"Joint Overview of Operation URGENT

FURY, The": 64

Joint Special Operations Command

(JSOC): 4, 20

forces: 20, 21, 23, 26, 28–29,

30, 35, 41, 43, 44

and planning: 21–22

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan:

71n33

Joint Task Force (JTF): 3, 6

Kassebaum, Nancy: 54–55

Kelley, GEN Paul X., USMC: 64

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.: 49–50

Kirschenbauer, COL George W., USA:

64

Lance aux Epines, Grenada: 48, 56,

75n112

Layne, Edward: 58

Lebanon: 15–16, 17–18, 32, 38

Lewis, Brig Rudyard, Barbadan

Defense Force: 37, 43

Libya: 59

Logistical support for US allies:

28–29

McDonald, ADM Wesley L., USN: 3, 4,

5–6, 13–16, 19, 21, 26, 27, 28–

32, 33, 35–36, 37, 39, 40, 43,

48–49, 50–51, 52, 53, 54, 55,

56, 57–58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65–

66, 77n151

McFarlane, Robert C.: 23, 32–33

Mackmull, LTG Jack V., USA: 31

McMahon, John: 16

McNeill, Francis J.: 28, 32–33,

75n115

McQuiston, CDR Michael K., USN: 12

Mahaffey, LTG Fred K., USA: 57

Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG)

1-84: 15–16, 17–18, 19, 20, 28–

29, 34, 59, 60

2-83: 17–18

Marine Amphibious Unit, 22d: 30

"Meet the Press": 63, 64

Merritt, LTG Jack N., USA: 12–13,

28, 57

Metcalf, VADM Joseph, III, USN: 3,

4, 30, 32, 35, 36–37, 40, 43,

44, 45, 46, 47–48, 51, 52, 55,

58–59, 60, 77n151, 77n152

Middendorff, J. William: 49

Military Airlift Command (MAC): 21–

22, 29, 30, 54

Military intelligence

and Carriacou: 54

lack of: 35, 51

for planning: 12, 14, 19, 21,

26, 64

problems with: 15, 31–32, 63–64

tactical: 15, 27, 29, 31–32, 34–

35, 41, 51

Mission statements: 1–2, 18, 19,

20, 26, 28–29, 33, 36

Moreau, VADM Arthur S., Jr., USN:

13, 38

Motley, Langhorne A.: 11–13, 16,

34, 56

Multinational command arrangements:

36–37

National Military Command Center:

12, 38, 50

National Security Agency (NSA): 20

National Security Council (NSC):

32–33, 38
82

Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG):

16, 19, 38

Regional Interagency Group: 11–

13

National Security Decision Directive

(NSDD): 18, 19, 33

National Security Planning Group

(NSPG): 13, 23, 26, 32–33

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO): 18

North Korea: 59

Nutting, GEN Wallace H., USA: 38–39

O’Brien , CDR Michael F.., USN:

74N103

O'Neill, Thomas P. "Tip": 45

Operation DUKE: 60

Organization of American States

(OAS): 25, 49–50

Organization of the Eastern

Caribbean States (OECS): 3,

10, 15, 22–26, 28, 29, 33, 36,

37, 43, 45, 75n115

Parachute assaults: 3–4

Peacekeeping forces: 19, 22, 28,

29, 34, 57–58. See also

Caribbean Peacekeeping Force.

Pearls, Grenada: 4, 23, 24, 29, 30–

31, 34–35, 41, 43, 45

Poindexter, RADM John M., USN: 16

Point Salines, Grenada: 3–4, 37,

47, 49, 60

airfield at: 10, 11, 15, 22, 24,

27, 29, 35, 51

landings at: 30-31, 34–35, 41–43

Pope Air Force Base, NC: 28–29

Press, relations with the arrangements for: 14, 32, 55–56, 63

banning of reporters: 5, 46, 54–

55, 63–64, 657

news leaks: 20, 34, 65

Reagan and: 45–46, 54

Prickly Bay, Grenada: 48

Prillaman, LTG Richard L., USA: 12–

14, 20, 31–32, 33, 38, 43, 49,

64, 75–76n121

Prisoners

capturing of: 42, 58

Cuban: 5, 6, 42, 43, 53–54, 57,

58–59, 60, 61

responsibility for: 37, 43, 48,

50, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60

treatment of: 60

Property damage

bombing of hospital: 44

efforts to minimize: 29, 32, 50

Psychological operations (PSYOPS):

38, 50–51, 67

Public relations. See also Press,

relations with the.

and CPF participation: 37–38

CSR CAT and: 38, 50

videotaping of operations: 36

Radio Free Grenada: 50–51

Ranger units: 2, 3–4, 14–15, 19,

20, 21–22, 23, 24, 26, 28–29,

30–31, 35, 41–43, 44, 48–49,

52–53, 56, 65, 66, 75–76n121

1st Battalion: 23, 41

2d Battalion: 23

Readiness Command (USREDCOM): 16,

20, 30, 32, 38, 56

Reagan, Ronald: 1, 7, 10, 13, 18,

23, 24, 32–33, 39–40, 45–46,

49, 54–55, 65, 75n115

Red Cross: 58–59

Refugees

evacuation of: 48, 53

Soviet: 5

Richmond Hill Prison, Grenada: 34,

36, 51

Rio Treaty: 25

Robbins Air Force Base, GA: 26–27

Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station,

PR: 26–27, 32, 54

Royal Canadian Air Force: 54

St. George's, Grenada: 4, 5, 13,

19, 23, 24, 29, 37, 41, 43–44,

47, 51, 56

St. George's School of Medicine: 11

Saipan, USS: 60

Sapia-Bosch, Alphonso: 12

Sarbanes, Paul: 54

Scholtes, MG Richard A., USA: 35,

43

Schwarzkopf, MG H. Norman, USA: 3,

4, 6, 31, 35, 37, 45, 47–48,

52, 75–76n121

Scoon, Paul: 4, 5, 8, 22–26, 29,

43–44, 45, 47, 50–51, 56

SEALS units: 4, 5, 23, 24, 34–35,

41, 43–44, 46

Second Fleet: 3, 6, 30, 65–66,

77n152

Secretary of Defense: 2–3, 7, 32-

33, 55, 60, 64

Secretary of State: 2, 33, 42. See

also Shultz, George P.

Security

of communications: 2, 20, 27, 66

operational: 63

and planning: 2, 5–6, 28, 65, 66
83

Shultz, George P.: 2, 17, 23, 32–

33, 34, 72n41

Sidle, MG Winant, USA (Ret): 63

Spain: 18

Special Situation Group (SSG): 2,

13, 16–18, 23, 72n41

State, US Department of: 1, 11, 22,

25–26, 28, 35, 38, 43, 48, 53,

58–59, 76n132

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 20, 30

Tactical Air Command: 14

Tactical boundaries (by Service):

3, 4, 30–31, 48

Tactical Fighter Wing, 33d: 30

Task Forces

121: 30, 35, 43, 47

123: 30, 34–35

124: 30, 60, 73n68

126: 30

Taylor, LTC Wesley B., USA: 41

Thatcher, Margaret: 49, 75n115

Thomson, Lt Gen Herman O., USAF: 38

Thurmond, Strom: 45

Torrez Rizo, Jullian: 58–59

Trobaugh, MG Edward, USA: 5, 35,

43, 47–48, 52, 58–59, 60, 75–

76n121

True Blue campus: 4, 42, 46, 47,

75n112

Unified Command Plan: 12

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR): 9, 17, 24, 33, 47

captured documents: 50–51, 55–

56, 76n132

equipment in Grenada: 27

nationals in Grenada: 5, 19, 40,

50, 53, 55–56, 58–59

United Kingdom: 25, 43, 47, 49,

75n115

United Nations General Assembly:

49–50

United Nations Security Council:

25, 49–50

US Air Force: 14, 31, 60

US Army: 3, 14, 21–22, 31

US Congress: 33, 74n106

banning of reporters: 5, 63–64

consultation with: 25, 39, 45

presentations to: 38

US Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB):

16, 65–66, 77n152

US House of Representatives

Appropriations Committee: 64

Foreign Relations Committee: 63

US Information Agency: 43

US Marine Corps: 2, 3, 14–15, 19,

26, 48–49, 56, 57–58, 66,

75n121

assaults by: 4, 5, 29, 41, 60

battalion landing teams: 21, 23,

24, 30–31, 35, 45, 47, 51, 58,

65

US Navy: 19, 31

air operations: 44, 51–52

SEALS. See SEALS units.

support for Rangers: 51–53, 66

US Senate

Armed Services Committee: 63

Foreign Relations Committee: 54–

55

Vessey, GEN John W., Jr., USA: 2–3,

4, 6–7, 13–14, 23, 64, 71n41

and banning of reporters: 5, 55,

64

and Congress: 63, 64

and operations: 33, 35–36, 38,

39–40, 42, 43, 46, 52, 59, 75–

76n121

and planning: 5–6, 16, 17, 19,

20, 21–22, 26–27, 28, 31, 65,

75n112, 77n151, 77n152

and prisoners: 57, 60

Vietnam Heroica (Cuban vessel): 15,

19

War Powers Resolution: 25, 45,

74n106

Watkins, ADM James D., USN: 19

Weinberger, Caspar W.: 32–33, 55,

60, 64

Wickham, GEN John A., Jr., USA: 57