2021 IL App (1st) 172478-U 

FIRST DIVISION

July 26, 2021

No. 1-17-2478 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County

) 

v. ) No. 13 CR 6768 

) 

) 

JAMES ROMAINE, ) Honorable 

) Frank Zelezinski, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

Justice Hyman specially concurred. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The offenses 

did not occur as part of a single course of conduct, so his consecutive sentences are 

proper. His sentence is not excessive and does not violate the eighth amendment or the 

proportionate penalties clause. 

¶ 2 Defendant, James Romaine, was convicted of nine counts of aggravated criminal sexual 

assault, one count of armed robbery, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping following a bench

trial. On appeal, he argues: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 

(2) the offenses he was convicted of occurred as part of a single course of conduct with no
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substantial change in the criminal objective and, therefore, the consecutive sentencing statute’s 

limitation on aggregate terms applies; (3) his sentence violates the eighth amendment and the 

proportionate penalties clause; (4) his sentence is excessive; and (5) his convictions for 

aggravated kidnapping violate the one act, one crime rule. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On March 28, 2013, defendant and co-defendant Cedric Chambers1

, were charged with 

aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping. 

The State went to trial on nine counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, one count of armed 

robbery, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. Following a bench trial, the court found the 

defendant guilty on all counts. Judge Zelezinski sentenced defendant to consecutive 12-year

terms on each aggravated criminal sexual assault count, a concurrent 12-year term for armed 

robbery, a concurrent 12-year term on one of the aggravated kidnapping counts, and 18 years on

the other aggravated kidnapping count, consecutive to the aggravated criminal sexual assault 

counts, for a total of 126 years’ imprisonment. On August 2, 2017, the Honorable Carl Boyd 

presided over a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence. Judge Boyd 

resentenced defendant to consecutive 7-year terms on each aggravated criminal sexual assault 

count, which totaled 70 years. Defendant appealed.

¶ 5 The evidence at trial established that on February 28, 2013, at approximately 9:00 p.m., 

F.J. returned to her home in Park Forest, Illinois, after work. She parked her car in her car port 

next to her home and walked to the side door of her house. She immediately noticed that her 

1 Cedric Chambers is not a party to this appeal. Prior to defendant’s trial, Chambers pled guilty to aggravated 

criminal sexual assault in exchange for an 18-year sentence. He testified at defendant’s trial. 
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back-porch door was open and left her keys in the side door to investigate. As she walked 

towards the open door, she noticed that her cabinets and drawers in the adjacent kitchen were 

open. 

¶ 6 F.J. walked into the kitchen and could see two silhouettes in the dark living room. She 

noticed that part of her front door was open, but the storm door was closed. F.J. thought if she 

yelled loudly, she would scare the people out the front door of her house. But instead of running 

away, the two figures rushed towards her. F.J. testified that she thought the taller individual was 

holding the gun and he raised it and pointed it at her with his finger on the trigger as he quickly 

rushed towards her. Within seconds she was forced face down on her kitchen floor. 

¶ 7 F.J. testified that the men were very careful not to let her see their faces. She could only 

establish that these two individuals were black males, that one was taller, and one was shorter, 

and that based on their physique, they were not over the age of thirty. They repeatedly told her 

that if she looked at their faces, they would harm her or kill her. Throughout the entire time she 

was with the offenders, she was forcibly held down, with her head below her waist. As such, F.J. 

was only ever able to see the offenders’ bodies. 

¶ 8 As she lay face down on her kitchen floor, the two men went through her purse and bags 

looking for money. They threatened her. F.J. testified that the taller of the two men was mostly 

the one who talked and told her that “this is going to get worse for you we know you have the 

money.” As she lay on the kitchen floor, one of the offenders hit F.J. on the right side of her face 

with his hand but believed there was something in his hand when he hit her. She believed it was 

the taller offender who hit her. She was hit a couple of times, but lost count of how many times. 
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F .J. testified that the taller offender was clearly in charge as he made all of the decisions, all of 

the plans and did all of the talking. 

¶ 9 The men demanded her money and F.J. them that she did not have any cash on her. She 

offered to give them her wallet. They told F.J. things were going to get worse for her. They 

told her to take her pants off and F.J. did what the offenders demanded. The offenders held F.J. 

on the floor as she was lying on her stomach. They stood behind and over her and repeatedly 

assaulted her by forcing their fingers inside of her vagina. F.J. believed that the men traded 

places while assaulting her with their fingers but could not see because her face was held to the 

floor. They continually demanded money and accused her of “holding out on them.” After 

approximately ten minutes, F.J. was forced, by her hair, down the hallway and into her bedroom. 

¶ 10 Once in her bedroom, the men bent her over her bed with her feet remaining on the 

ground and her face in the mattress. She was naked from the waist down. The shorter man 

positioned himself in front of her with his knees on the bed and his penis in F.J.’s face and forced 

F.J. to give him oral sex. As she was giving oral sex, the taller man was behind F.J. attempting to 

vaginally rape her with his penis. F.J. testified that this “went on over and over with the guy in 

front forcing his penis in [her] mouth and the guy in back ramming [me] from behind.” 

Eventually, the two men switched places. F.J. testified that as she was being “tortured,” she was 

trying to pull herself away and was pretending to be somewhere else. 

¶ 11 When they were finished, the men took her back into the kitchen and continued to ask

about money. F.J. told the men to take anything they wanted. The men wanted her to go in a 

car and she asked them if she could put her pants back on because it was cold outside, which 

they allowed. The men got F.J.’s keys from the side door where she had left them after first 
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entering. The offenders also gathered F.J.’s laptop with a memory stick, cell phone, I-Pad, I-Pod, 

wallet and purse.

¶ 12 F.J. was forced to leave her house through the front door. Although she did not see the 

gun, she felt something hard at her back. One of the offenders was always holding onto F.J. or 

pushing her down to prevent her from standing up straight. They “shoved” F.J. in the back 

passenger door of her car. The shorter offender got in the back seat with F.J. and the taller 

offender got into the driver’s seat. Her head was held down and her face was on the car seat. 

One of the men continued to tell her that things were going to get worse for her and that they 

knew she had money. 

¶ 13 The men drove F.J. around, stopping multiple times, for approximately thirty or forty 

minutes. When they stopped the first time, they demanded the PIN to her credit cards. F.J. 

testified that she may have given them cards that did not work, or the wrong PIN to an expired 

card, and this made them angry. F.J. testified that she was not trying to trick them, but she was 

stressed. She thought if she cooperated and gave them money, they would stop hurting her. They 

went through bank ATMs, a convenience store, a gas station and a liquor store. The taller 

offender made F.J. think that she was not being cooperative by telling her it was only going to 

get worse if she did not cooperate. They also made her think they were not getting any money; 

however, she learned later that they did get money from her account. Throughout the time in the 

car, the taller man encouraged the shorter offender to periodically force F.J. to perform oral sex 

on him in the back seat. This occurred more than three times, to the point she could not breath 

and she felt like she was suffocating. 

¶ 14 The second to last time the car stopped F.J. thought they were back in Park Forest 

because the house’s roof tops looked familiar. She was held down, as the taller offender got out 
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of the front, opened the passenger door, and pushed F.J. over. The taller man was on F.J.’s right 

side and the shorter man was on her left. F.J. was forced to perform oral sex on the shorter 

offender and the taller man pulled F.J.’s pants down and made contact with his penis to F.J.’s 

vagina. The men then forced F.J. to turn around so that she was then forced to have the taller 

offender’s penis in her mouth while the shorter offender vaginally raped her with his penis. F.J. 

testified that that this “was the roughest, longest duration of the sexual assault, and it was both of 

them.” 

¶ 15 The taller offender got back in the driver’s seat and drove the car a few blocks, before 

stopping again. The men made F.J. crouch down on the floor of the backseat, with her knees on 

the floor. The shorter offender then got out of the car while the taller offender stayed in the front 

seat, “fussing” with the steering wheel and the dashboard. He eventually got out of the car. F.J. 

heard them talking on the sidewalk before she heard a car door slam and drive away. 

¶ 16 F.J. testified that she stayed in the car for a while, but eventually became brave enough to 

look out of the window. She recognized that she was a few blocks away from her house. The 

keys to her car were gone, so she got out of the car and started running towards her house. As she 

was running, she saw a police car with its lights on, and as she approached her house, she saw 

police officers and her neighbor outside.

¶ 17 F.J. was taken by ambulance to St. James Hospital where a sexual assault kit was 

completed, and her clothing was collected. F.J. suffered a black eye, red marks to the right side 

of her face and her face was swollen as a result of being beaten. In addition to the injuries to her 

face, she also had severe back pain from being forced to the ground in the kitchen and from 

being bent over and held down. 

¶ 18 Co-defendant Cedric Chambers testified defendant picked Chambers up in defendant’s 
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car on the day of the offense. As Chambers approached the car, defendant told Chambers to go 

back inside and get a “hoody,” which he did. They drove to defendant’s house and defendant 

went inside and came back with a BB gun. They drove a few blocks before defendant told 

Chambers to “follow him” because they were going to “go on a stain.” Chambers understood that

to mean they were going to rob someone. Defendant had the BB gun with him. They jumped 

over some fences and defendant stopped at a house with a sunroom. Chambers did not know 

who lived at the house. Defendant opened the door by breaking the glass and reaching in and 

unlocking the lock. Chambers followed him inside. Defendant took a butcher knife from inside 

the house and gave it to Chambers. Chambers testified that he put the knife down on the kitchen 

counter before he went into the living room. He identified a photograph of the knife he had been 

holding on the floor by the front door but testified that he did not remember how it ended up in 

the living room. 

¶ 19 Chambers testified that defendant went into one of the bedrooms while Chambers stayed 

in the living room by the front door. Chambers heard a noise in the bedroom and, when he went 

to check, he saw defendant inside the bedroom, which was in disarray with the mattress slid 

partly off the bed and the drawers and a closet open. Defendant told Chambers that there was 

nothing in the bedroom. 

¶ 20 Chambers then went to the living room and saw a car in the driveway. He tried to get out 

the front door, but as he started to turn the lock, a woman, F.J., walked through the kitchen with 

two of her dogs. Chambers testified that defendant, who was standing with him in the living 

room, raised and pointed the gun at F.J. and said, “don’t move.” Defendant went into the kitchen, 

dumped F.J.’s purse out, and told Chambers to come into the kitchen. Defendant had F.J.’s 

laptop, and he gave Chambers F.J.’s tablet and iPhone from F.J.’s purse. Defendant also took 
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F.J.’s credit cards. He ordered F.J. to the ground and asked her for the PINs to her credit cards. 

F.J. responded that “it was chipped.” Defendant then struck F.J. with his hands, punching her in 

the face, while demanding her PIN’s. 

¶ 21 Chambers testified that defendant told F.J. to pull her pants down as she lay on the 

kitchen floor and when she did defendant put his fingers inside F.J.’s vagina. Defendant then told 

Chambers to turn around, which he did. Chambers did not see what defendant did next to F.J., 

but he thinks defendant put his penis in her mouth. Chambers testified that he did not touch F.J. 

while they were in the kitchen. When defendant finished, he told F.J. to get up and he led her to 

her bedroom in a headlock with the gun to her head. Chambers followed them with F.J.’s laptop, 

iPad and iPhone. 

¶ 22 Chambers testified that defendant then took F.J. inside the bedroom and closed the door 

halfway. Chambers could see defendant and F.J. inside of the room through the partly open 

door. Defendant had F.J. bent over the end or side of the bed, with her feet on the floor. He saw 

defendant take his penis out and put it inside F.J.’s vagina. Chambers testified that he was 

looking around while he was in the hallway because he was “disgusted” by what he saw. About 

two minutes later, defendant told Chambers to come inside. Defendant was still behind F.J. with 

his penis in her vagina, “having sex” with her. Chambers testified that he did not want to go into 

the bedroom, but defendant had a gun. 

¶ 23 Chambers entered the bedroom and defendant commanded him “to get some head from 

her,” so he inserted his penis into her mouth, as defendant was “having sex” with her from 

behind. Defendant stopped and told F.J. to turn around. He again asked her for her PIN’s, and 

she continued to reply that it was “chipped.” Defendant hit her in the face, arm and back. 

Defendant told F.J. to give them both oral sex, but she only did it to defendant. Chambers stated 
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that he and defendant did not switch places while they were in the bedroom. 

¶ 24 Chambers then went to find the keys. When he returned to the living room, defendant 

was holding F.J. in a headlock, bent over, with the gun pointed at her head. They left the house 

and went to F.J.’s car. Chambers had F.J.’s iPad, cell phone and laptop. Defendant had all of her 

credit cards. Defendant got in the front and Chambers got in the back with F.J. Chambers put the 

gun in the back window.

¶ 25 Defendant first drove to a bank in Park Forest, and then to an ATM in Matteson. 

Chambers did not remember if defendant withdrew any money on the first or the second stop. At 

the third stop, defendant withdrew somewhere between $200 and $400 dollars using F.J.’s card. 

Defendant gave some of that money to Chambers. They then went to a Shell gas station and a 

liquor store where defendant went inside and came out with a fifth of Hennessey, which they 

started to drink. Defendant told Chambers to “get some more head,” so he took his penis out and 

put it into F.J.’s mouth as defendant drove F.J.’s car. 

¶ 26 About a block later, defendant got in the backseat and inserted his penis into F.J.’s 

vagina. Chambers stated that he put his penis in F.J.’s mouth, but he did not have an erection. 

Defendant then told F.J. to turn around and Chambers touched his penis to her vagina, but he still 

did not have an erection. F.J. was performing oral sex on defendant. After about two minutes, 

defendant told Chambers to wait while he got the car. Defendant took the navigation system 

from the car and four or five of F.J.’s credit cards and went to his car. Chambers collected the 

gun, iPad, laptop and cell phone. Defendant told F.J. to lie down. Chambers testified that neither 

he nor defendant wore a condom that night.

¶ 27 They stayed at Chambers’ house that night. They went to defendant’s house so he could 

change his clothes. They stopped at a few locations, including two gas stations where defendant 
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took out additional money. Defendant split the money with Chambers. They then went to 

Walmart where they attempted to buy some televisions with F.J.’s credit cards, but they were 

unsuccessful. While they were on their way to another store they were pulled over and arrested.

¶ 28 Chambers testified that he was sixteen years old and six feet tall at the time of the 

offense. He was taller than defendant. Chambers viewed video footage from two banks and a 

Shell gas station and testified that these were locations they went to while defendant was driving 

F.J.’s car and while he was in the backseat with F.J., and he identified defendant outside of the 

car in two of the videos. He also identified video surveillance from a Speedway gas station and 

Walmart as the locations he and defendant went to prior to being arrested. He identified 

defendant’s car in the Speedway video, and he identified himself and defendant entering and 

exiting the Walmart. 

¶ 29 Park Forest Department Deputy Chief Paul Finley testified that in February 2013, he was 

Commander of the Investigation Unit and was one of the officers who arrested defendant. 

Commander Finley stated that a custodial searched of defendant yielded a large amount of 

United States Currency as well as a red iPod, which displayed F.J.’s first name when 

Commander Finley powered it on at the police station. Commander Finley testified that 

defendant was five feet, eleven inches when he was arrested. 

¶ 30 Detective Kristopher Vallow testified that Chambers’ height was 5’10” when he was 

arrested. Detective Vallow testified a search of Chambers’ house on March 2, 2013, yielded a 

BB gun under a mattress in Chambers’ bedroom. Chambers identified this BB gun as the one 

defendant used the night F.J. was assaulted.

¶ 31 The parties stipulated to the testimony of Registered Nurse Danyelle Hubbard’s 

testimony. Hubbard testified that on March 1, 2013, she examined F.J. at St. James Hospital. 
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Hubbard observed a one-half centimeter skin tear on F.J.’s vagina as well as bruising and 

swelling around F.J.’s right eye and cheek. 

¶ 32 Forensic scientist Jamie Jett was qualified as an expert in the field of microscopy and 

testified that he received a black knit hat and black hooded sweatshirt, recovered from 

defendant’s house, and that he collected hairs using a process called taping. Jett determined that 

five hairs collected were Caucasian head hairs but was unable to determine further details from 

the hairs. Mr. Jett prepared four hairs for further DNA testing. 

¶ 33 Forensic biologist Katherine Sullivan was qualified as an expert in forensic biology and 

DNA analysis. Sullivan testified that she received F.J.’s criminal sexual assault kit which 

contained vaginal, anal and oral swabs, as well as paper and cloth items from the crime scene. 

Sullivan did not identify any semen in those swabs or the items from the crime scene. She further 

testified that she was not able to generate a DNA profile from the oral and vaginal swabs because 

there was not enough male DNA. Sullivan was also unable to generate a DNA profile from F.J.’s 

fingernail scrapings. 

¶ 34 Sullivan also received four different hair portions that had been prepared for DNA 

analysis by Jett. Sullivan generated DNA profiles from these items and determined that female 

DNA from F.J. was a match to the DNA profile from these items. 

¶ 35 At the conclusion of this evidence and after closing arguments, Judge Zelezinski found 

defendant guilty of all counts, noting that F.J.’s testimony was “a story out of a horror novel.” 

Judge Zelezinski sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 126-years in prison.

¶ 36 On August 2, 2017, Judge Carl Boyd heard defendant’s motion to reconsider his 

sentence. Judge Boyd read Judge Zelezinski’s sentencing transcript and found that the 126-year

sentence “is essentially the death penalty,” and he resentenced defendant as follows: 7 years on 
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each count, with all counts of the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges and one count of 

aggravated kidnapping running consecutive, and the remaining counts of aggravated kidnapping 

and armed robbery running concurrently, for a total of 70 years. Defendant appealed. 

¶ 37 ANALYSIS

¶ 38 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that F.J. 

suffered bodily harm contemporaneous to the sexual assault as required by the aggravated 

criminal sexual assault statute. As such, defendant urges, his five aggravated criminal sexual 

assault convictions should be reduced to criminal sexual assault. 

¶ 39 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must determine 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). We will not 

reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory 

as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 98 (2008). 

A reviewing court does not retry the defendant or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact 

with regards to the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to each witness’ testimony. 

People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). Rather, we “carefully examine the evidence while 

bearing in mind that the trier of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

due consideration must be given to the fact that the fact finder saw and heard the witnesses.” 

People v. Herman, 407 Ill. App. 3d 688, 704 (2011).

¶ 40 To sustain a conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State was required to 

prove defendant committed an act of sexual penetration through force or threat of force and during 

the commission of the offense defendant caused bodily harm to the victim. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30
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(a)(2) (West 2018). The term “bodily harm,” although difficult to precisely define, requires 

physical pain or damage to the body, i.e., lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether temporary or 

permanent. People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256 (1982). In determining whether a defendant's 

actions caused bodily harm, the trier of fact may consider direct evidence of an injury and may 

equally infer an injury based upon circumstantial evidence in light of common experience. People 

v. Bishop, 218 Ill.2d 232, 250 (2006). The aggravated criminal sexual assault counts in this case 

that were based on the alleged bodily harm of “str[iking] F.J. about the face.” Defendant argues 

that the bodily harm suffered by F.J. was not committed during the offense. We disagree.

¶ 41 The evidence in this case clearly established that defendant caused F.J. bodily harm 

during the commission of the sexual assault. F.J. testified at trial that defendant and Chambers 

rushed at her in the kitchen and forced her to the floor. As she lay there, one of the two men 

struck her in the face. She was hit several times. Defendant and Chambers demanded money 

and then instructed her to take off her pants. They then held her down and repeatedly sexually 

assaulted her with their fingers, while demanding money. After about ten minutes, defendant 

and Chambers stood F.J. up, but kept her bent over, grabbed her by her hair and forced her down 

the hallway to her bedroom. Chambers substantially corroborated F.J.’s testimony regarding 

what occurred in the kitchen. He denied touching F.J. at that time. Chambers did testify that 

once they were in F.J.’s bedroom, that defendant struck F.J. in her face, arm and back after 

vaginally raping her but before he forced her to perform oral sex. The bodily harm suffered by 

F.J. clearly occurred just prior to and during the sexual assault and was sufficiently close in time 

to be considered during the course of the sexual assault. 

¶ 42 Defendant next contends that the offenses he was convicted of occurred as part of a 

single course of conduct with no substantial change in the criminal objective and, therefore, the 
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consecutive sentencing statute’s limitation on aggregate terms applies. The State responds that as 

an initial matter, defendant has forfeited any challenge that his sentence violated the sentencing 

statute's aggregate maximum term and has not shown that this claim warrants plain error review. 

We agree with the State.

¶ 43 “A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the 

sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed with the circuit court clerk within 30 

days following the imposition of sentence.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2016). It is well 

settled that to "to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a 

written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required." People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 

544 (2010). We therefore find defendant forfeited these issues. 

¶ 44 Nonetheless, the defendant urges us to review the issue under the plain error doctrine. 

The plain error doctrine allows this court to bypass normal forfeiture principles and consider an 

unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, 

or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Magallanes, 409 

Ill. App. 3d 720, 727-28 (2011). The first step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is to 

determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred at trial. People v. Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st) 

150074, ¶ 58. We will accordingly determine if the consecutive sentence statue applies to the 

defendant. 

¶ 45 When multiple offenses are committed in a single course of conduct during which there 

was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, the sentence shall not exceed 

the sum of the maximum terms for the two most serious felonies involved. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-

4(f)(2) (West 2016). In determining whether multiple offenses were committed as part of a 

single course of conduct, we must assess whether the defendant's acts were independently 
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motivated. People v. Wilder, 325 Ill. App. 3d 987, 1001 (2001). The determination of whether a 

defendant's actions constituted a single course of conduct is a question of fact for the trial court 

to determine. People v. Edwards, 259 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156 (1994). Therefore, we defer to the 

trial court's conclusion unless that conclusion is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

People v. Daniel, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 287.

¶ 46 Defendant argues that the offenses in this case were part of a single course of conduct. 

The State responds that the offenses were not committed as part of a single course of conduct. 

The trial court did not make an express finding in this case as to whether the offenses committed 

on March 28, 2013, of which defendant was convicted, arose out of a single course of conduct. 

However, there is a presumption that a trial court knows the law and applies it. People v. 

Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 420 (1996); People v. Robinson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130837, ¶ 103. 

Thus, we must presume that the trial court reasoned that there was a substantial change in 

defendant's criminal objective and that the consecutive sentences imposed were authorized by 

statute. Cf. People v. Sergeant, 326 Ill. App. 3d 974 (2001). 

¶ 47 The record supports this presumption. Chambers established that defendant’s original 

criminal intent at the beginning of the night was to rob someone. That criminal objective was 

fulfilled after defendant and Chambers entered F.J.’s home and robbed her of her credit cards, 

phone, iPad, and laptop. Defendant’s criminal objective then changed from robbing F.J. to 

sexually assaulting her in her home. The objective then changed to kidnapping F.J. Defendant 

and Chambers again forcefully raped F.J. as she was held against her will in the back seat of the 

car. This was a completely separate sexual assault, different in time and location than the first 

two sexual assaults and was not part of the same course of criminal conduct that occurred in her 

home. See People v. Perruquet, 118 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296-97 (1983) (finding that the defendant 
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formed separate criminal objectives where “the defendant committed two acts of rape against the 

victim that were separate in time and location” even though they occurred during the same day). 

We therefore reject the defendant's argument that his offenses were committed as part of a single 

course of conduct. Consequently, the trial court did not err by failing to sentence the defendant in 

accordance with the consecutive sentencing statute. Since there was no error, there can be no 

plain error.

¶ 48 Defendant next argues that, because he was an "emerging adult who committed a nonhomicide offense," his seventy-year sentence is a de facto life sentence which violates the Eighth 

Amendment and Illinois' Proportionate Penalties Clause as applied to him. 

¶ 49 The eighth amendment's prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment[ ]” applies to the 

states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; People v. Davis, 2014 

IL 115595, ¶ 18. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-80 (2012), the United States Supreme 

Court held that mandatory life sentences imposed on juvenile offenders, those under the age of 

18 at the time of the offense, violate the eighth amendment because this prevents the sentencing 

court from considering the mitigating aspects of youth, i.e., their immaturity, impulsivity, and 

increased vulnerability to negative influences. Our supreme court has since determined that 

Miller applies to mandatory, discretionary, natural, or de facto life sentences imposed on 

juveniles. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 40, 46; People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. 

It also drew the line for a de facto life sentence at 40 years. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 

40-41. Accordingly, “to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant 

sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was 

subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing 
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court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27 

(citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40).

¶ 50 In this case it is undisputed that defendant was 22 years old at the time he committed the 

aggravated criminal sexual assaults at issue. “By now, it is clear that the categorical findings 

made by Miller and its progeny under the federal eighth amendment apply only to juveniles.” 

People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 49-61 (collecting cases and stating that the 19-year-old 

defendant “cannot avail himself of the eighth amendment” under Miller). “[C]laims for 

extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older have been repeatedly rejected.” Id. ¶ 61. 

“It is well established that offenders who are 18 years and older cannot raise a facial challenge to 

their sentences under the eighth amendment and the Miller line of cases.” People v. Franklin, 

2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 49. Therefore, defendant’s eighth amendment challenge fails. 

¶ 51 Forfeiture aside, defendant also makes an as applied challenge to his sentence under the 

proportionate penalties clause. The proportionate penalties clause provides that “[a]ll penalties 

shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of 

restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Our courts have 

construed the clause to extend greater protections against excessive punishment than the eighth 

amendment. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL App (1st) 120508. A defendant's sentence violates 

the proportionate penalties clause where “the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or 

so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People 

v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). To comply with the proportionate penalties clause, the 

court must balance the goals of retribution and rehabilitation, carefully considering all factors in 

aggravation and mitigation. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). “To determine 

whether a penalty shocks the moral sense of the community, we must consider objective 
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evidence as well as the community's changing standard of moral decency.” People v. Hernandez, 

382 Ill. App. 3d 726, 727 (2008).

¶ 52 Miller has recently been expanded to apply to those over 18. Our supreme court has 

acknowledged that young adults, at least those who were 20 years of age or younger at the time 

of their crimes, may still rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the 

rule in Miller to support as-applied challenges to life sentences brought pursuant to the Illinois 

proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 

118151, ¶ 44 (19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from raising claim in 

postconviction proceedings that sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him), and People v. 

Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (as-applied, youth-based sentencing claim of 18-year-old 

defendant was “more appropriately raised” in postconviction proceedings where a factual record 

could be developed)). See also People v. Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 172809, ¶ 16 (our supreme 

court has “opened the door for young adult offenders to demonstrate that their own specific 

characteristics at the time of their offense were so like those of a juvenile that the imposition of a 

life sentence, absent the safeguards established in Miller, violates the proportionate penalties 

clause”); People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (“Illinois courts typically consider 

the sentencing claims of young adults under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the 

eighth amendment”).

¶ 53 Nevertheless, in this case, defendant was 22 years old at the time he committed the 

offenses, which is well past the 18-to-21-year-old group of defendants who have successfully 

asserted as-applied Miller-based claims under the proportionate penalties clause. See People v. 

Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶ 27 (observing that the Miller-based protections “were 

applied to under-18-year-olds and which have been arguably extended in some cases and statutes 
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to under-21-year-olds”). Defendant fails to provide any authority where a 22-year-old offender 

received the special considerations set forth in Miller. “[Defendant] can point to no case in which 

an Illinois court has recognized that a life sentence imposed on a young adult—21 or older as 

[defendant] was—is unconstitutional as applied to that offender under the proportionate penalties 

clause or the eighth amendment.” People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33. “The 

evolving science on brain development may support such claims at some time in the future, but 

for now individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for 

purposes of a Miller claim.” Id. “While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line 

there is in keeping with other aspects of criminal law and society's current general recognition 

that 21 is considered the beginning of adulthood.” Id. ¶ 34.

¶ 54 Even so, defendant had a Miller compliant sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing 

before Judge Zelezinski, for this 22-year-old adult, defendant had the opportunity present any 

and all evidence he believed mitigated his offense. Defense counsel zealously represented 

defendant in this respect. As demonstrated by the record, Judge Zelezinski properly considered 

all mitigation where he explicitly considered defendant's social history, education, criminal 

history, family life and potential for rehabilitation but still sentenced defendant to 126 years in 

prison. Judge Boyd then presided over defendant's re-sentencing hearing and significantly 

reduced the defendant's sentence by 56 years to an aggregate term of 70 years, noting that he 

read Judge Zelezinski's sentencing transcript. While Judge Boyd agreed with many of the 

aggravating factors Judge Zelezinski relied on, he also found that the 126-year sentence to be 

“essentially the death penalty," and he resentenced defendant to just ten years over the minimum. 

As in People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, appeal denied, 98 N.E. 2d 28 (2018), cert 

denied 139 S. Ct. 291 (2018), the trial court in this case had before it the trial testimony, the 
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evidence, defendant’s presentence investigation, and the sentencing arguments of the parties 

before it sentenced defendant. Further, defendant's age was the driving force behind Judge 

Boyd's substantial reduction in defendant's sentence. As a result, the trial court considered the 

same factors the Holman court found to be constitutionally consistent with Miller. 

¶ 55 In short, defendant was afforded the opportunity to develop a factual record in an effort to 

show that his specific characteristics were so like those of a juvenile that the sentence imposed 

violated the proportionate penalties clause, absent the safeguards set forth in Miller. Given this 

extensive factual record and our analysis set forth above, defendant's sentence does not shock the 

moral sense of the community in violation of the proportionate penalties clause. 

¶ 56 We also reject defendant’s argument that his 70-year sentence is excessive. The trial 

court must consider both the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's rehabilitative 

potential at sentencing. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A trial court’s sentencing decision is granted 

considerable deference and we will only disturb that sentence if we find the trial court has abused 

its discretion. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). This is because the 

sentencing court is better situated to consider the “defendant's credibility, demeanor, moral 

character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36.

¶ 57 The seriousness of a defendant's crime is the most important consideration at sentencing. 

People v. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170886, ¶ 51. The sentencing court will be presumed to have 

considered all relevant factors in mitigation, “absent some indication to the contrary other than 

the sentence itself.” People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 45 (2006). Mitigating factors such as 

rehabilitative potential are not entitled to greater weight than aggravating factors. Alexander, 239 

Ill. 2d at 214 (citing People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 261 (1995)). The reviewing court should 

not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court when weighing factors in mitigation 
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and aggravation. People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 21. 

¶ 58 As discussed, the record in this case clearly demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in crafting defendant’s 70-year sentence. Defendant was initially sentenced to an 

aggregate term of 126 years in prison. In calculating that sentence, Judge Zelezinski stated that 

he had reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report which detailed defendant’s social life,

education, criminal background, amongst many other things. In mitigation, the court considered 

defendant’s supportive family life and noted that nothing extremely aggravating came from

defendant’s educational, family or financial background. The court also considered the lack of 

defendant’s adult and juvenile background and noted that defendant received boot camp for his 

prior felony conviction, which had the goal of giving offenders without extensive backgrounds, 

or youthful offenders, a “chance to go along life without committing further crimes.” The court

specifically considered defendant’srehabilitative potential finding such potential was “nil.” Then, 

at defendant’s resentencing hearing, JudgeBoyd significantlyreduced the defendant’s sentence by 

56 years to an aggregate term of 70 years, to be served at 85%. Judge Boyd specifically noted that 

he read Judge Zelezinski’s sentencing transcript but did not want defendant to spend the rest of 

his life in jail. The court carefully considered all of the necessary factors in arriving at a 70-

year sentence. 

¶ 59 Defendant lastly argues that his conviction for armed robbery must merge into his 

conviction for aggravated kidnapping since it is a predicate felony; his aggravated kidnapping 

convictions must merge into each other where they are based on the same act; and the one 

remaining aggravated kidnapping conviction must merge into one of the aggravated criminal 

sexual assault convictions based on kidnapping where it is a predicate, aggravating felony, 

thereby reducing his sentence to an aggregate term of 63 years. 
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¶ 60 Defendant has acknowledged that he forfeited his one-act, one-crime argument by failing 

to raise it before the trial court, but he seeks review under the plain error doctrine. The plain error 

doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error “(1) when ‘a clear or obvious 

error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the 

scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,’ or (2) when ‘a 

clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 

defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness 

of the evidence.’ ” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Our supreme court has previously 

explained that one-act, one-crime violations fall within the second prong of the plain error 

doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it challenges the integrity of the judicial process. 

People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488, 493 (2010); see also People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 168 

(2009). Despite the forfeiture, we will address defendant's argument under the second prong of 

the plain error doctrine. However, we must first consider whether a one-act, one-crime error 

occurred. 

¶ 61 In People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977), our supreme court held that a criminal 

defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on 

precisely the same physical act. In making that determination, this court has long followed a twostep analysis. People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996). First, the court ascertains whether 

the defendant's conduct consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Id. If it is determined 

that the defendant committed multiple acts, the court then moves to the second step and 

determines whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. Id. To determine whether 

one offense is a lesser included offense of another, we apply the “ ‘abstract elements’ ” approach. 

People v. Reveles-Cordova, 2020 IL 124797, ¶ 13. “This approach requires the court to examine 
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the statutory elements of the two offenses.” Id. “ ‘If all of the elements of one offense are 

included within a second offense and the first offense contains no element not included in the 

second offense, the first offense is deemed a lesser-included offense of the second.’ ” Id. 

(quoting People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (2010)). “In other words, it must be impossible to 

commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense.” Id. If none of the 

offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple convictions are proper. Id. Whether a 

violation of the rule has occurred is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. 

Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 105 (2008).

¶ 62 The State concedes, and we agree, that defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping 

in count 113 should merge into his aggravated kidnapping conviction in count 118 where they 

are based on the same act of transporting F.J. from her house and secretly confining her in her 

car. However, the State argues that defendant's remaining conviction for aggravated kidnapping 

in count 118 does not violate the one act, one crime doctrine and is proper. 

¶ 63 Defendant argues that he may not be convicted of both armed robbery and aggravated 

kidnapping and the aggravated sexual assaults predicated on those crimes. In his motion to cite 

additional authority, defendant argues that People v. Reveles-Cordova, 2020 IL 124797, supports 

his position. In Reveles-Cordova, our supreme court was charged with determining how the 

abstract elements test applied to the offense of home invasion when the defendant was charged 

with criminal sexual assault and home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault. The 

court held: 

“Proof of criminal sexual assault is a necessary element of proof of home invasion 

predicated on criminal sexual assault. All the elements of criminal sexual assault are 

included in the offense of home invasion predicated on criminal sexual assault, and 
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criminal sexual assault contains no element not included in home invasion. It is 

impossible to commit home invasion predicated upon criminal sexual assault without 

committing criminal sexual assault. As such, criminal sexual assault is a lesser-included 

offense of home invasion.” 2020 IL 124797, ¶ 21. 

¶ 64 We find that Reveles-Cordova does not support defendant’s assertion that his aggravated 

kidnapping and armed robbery convictions should be vacated as lesser included offenses of the 

aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions. Reveles-Cordova is inapplicable to defendant’s 

armed robbery conviction as none of the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts of which he 

was convicted are premised upon robbery or armed robbery. In addition, in this case, defendant 

was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault predicated on kidnapping, but 

he was not convicted of the offense of kidnapping. Rather, he was convicted of the separate 

offense of aggravated kidnapping. As such, unlike Reveles-Cordova, defendant’s aggravated 

kidnapping conviction contains an element not included in the aggravated criminal sexual 

assault, the use of a “dangerous weapon other than a firearm to wit: a bludgeon.” Accordingly, 

defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping remains unchanged. 

¶ 65 CONCLUSION

¶ 66 Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 67 Affirmed. 

¶ 68 JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring: 

¶ 69 I join the majority’s judgment and its reasoning save for paragraphs 53-55. 

¶ 70 I remain of the view that retrospectively analyzing a young adult’s sentencing hearing for 

compliance with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) neither makes sense nor is required under 

People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 47 (“For juvenile defendants ***any inquiry into the Miller

factors is backwards-looking”) (emphasis added). As this court has elsewhere explained, we 
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cannot determine whether a sentencing hearing complies with Miller unless we can be sure the 

trial court was thinking of the young adult in front of them as a juvenile for constitutional purposes. 

See e.g., People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52; cf. also People v. Thompson, 2021 IL 

App (1st) 180297-U, ¶ 49 (Hyman, J. dissenting) (“I fail to see how a trial court could possible 

have viewed the relevant sentencing facts in their proper constitutional scope when the law 

applying Miller principles to young adults through the proportionate penalties clause was and still 

is not settled.”). 

¶ 71 Accepting the majority’s premise, however, I am still not at all convinced that Romaine’s 

sentencing proceedings were compliant with Miller under Holman. At Romaine’s sentencing 

hearing, his counsel did not mention his age, let alone argue that the constitutional protections 

afforded to juveniles under Miller should apply to him under the proportionate penalties clause. 

The trial court similarly made no mention of Romaine’s age in explaining the factors that mitigated 

his sentence. Romaine’s boilerplate motion to reconsider his sentence made no mention of his age, 

Miller, or the proportionate penalties clause. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence, 

Romaine’s counsel similarly made no argument about extending Miller protections to him as a 

young adult. Finally, after granting Romaine’s motion to reconsider and recrafting his sentence, 

the trial court again did not account for Romaine’s age or view his rehabilitative potential through 

any constitutional lens. 

¶ 72 Of course, the trial court need not recite “magic words” reflecting its understanding of 

Romaine’s youth. See People v. Lusby, 2021 IL 124046, ¶ 33. Nonetheless, to be Miller-compliant, 

it was obligated “to consider the defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances in mitigation.” 

Here, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court, aside from its awareness of Romaine’s 

chronological age, considered his youth as mitigating. 
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26 

¶ 73 Of course, this analysis assumes Miller applies to Romaine. And here is where my 

company rejoins the majority. The majority correctly finds that Romaine had the opportunity to 

argue that Miller should apply to him as a young adult. At the time of Romaine’s sentencing 

hearing, the theory of invoking the proportionate penalties clause to protect young adults under 

Miller was nascent, to be sure, but those arguments had already percolated to our supreme court 

the year before in a different procedural context. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151. So the 

majority correctly finds Romaine’s claim fails for lack of factual development; in other words, the 

same reason that the majority should refrain from finding his sentencing was Miller compliant. 

¶ 74 I join the majority’s judgment with two additional understandings. First, nothing in this 

order precludes Romaine from developing a proportionate penalties clause argument against his 

sentence in postconviction proceedings either with new evidence or through a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48. Second, should Romaine pursue 

this relief, the court considering his claims should not feel bound by the majority’s dicta musing 

that Miller’s cutoff under the proportionate penalties clause is 21 years old. No decision from our 

supreme court sets a cutoff, and the relevant social science presented in other cases suggests 

juvenile brain development may continue until age 25. See People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 

110580-B, ¶¶ 55-56, appeal allowed, No. 125124 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2020).

¶ 75 Because Romaine has not factually developed his claim that Miller should apply to him as 

a young adult, I join the majority’s judgment. Because after acknowledging the lack of factual 

development, the majority speculates about how the law applicable to juveniles would apply to 

Romaine’s current sentencing proceedings, I do not join its reasoning.