[Cite as State v. Sweeting, 2019-Ohio-1970.] 

 

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded in C-170513; Appeal 

 Dismissed in C-170512 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 22, 2019 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Defendant-Appellee. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 vs. 

DEIONANDREA SWEETING, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-170512 

 C-170513 

TRIAL NO. B-1700599 

 O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2 

ZAYAS, Judge.

{¶1} On February 1, 2000, in Michigan, defendant-appellee Deionandrea 

Sweeting was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct, fourth-degree 

misdemeanors. He served three years in prison and was required under Michigan 

law to register as a sex offender quarterly for 25 years. He moved to Ohio in 2006. 

The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office classified Sweeting as a sexually-oriented 

offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law. After Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh 

Act, the Hamilton County sheriff notified Sweeting that he was classified as a Tier III 

sex offender and lifetime registrant. 

{¶2} Sweeting filed a petition to contest reclassification in the Hamilton 

County Court of Common Pleas in the case numbered SP-0800428. He also filed in 

that case a motion to terminate his registration requirement on the basis that he had 

“completed the 10 year registration, and finish[ed] the Sex Offender Program.” 

Ultimately, on February 7, 2011, the trial court in the case numbered SP-0800428 

entered an order determining that Sweeting was classified as a sexually-oriented 

offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law, which required him to register 

annually for ten years. The order noted that Sweeting had been released from prison 

in Michigan on August 2, 2003, “triggering the period of registration for the 

underlying charges of his reporting requirement.” The trial court went on in its 

order to find that Sweeting had been incarcerated various times in Ohio, which tolled 

the reporting requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(D), and therefore, 

Sweeting was required to register annually “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that any 

additional periods of incarceration would toll the reporting requirements. 

{¶3} On February 3, 2017, in the present case, Sweeting was indicted for 

failing to provide periodic verification of his current address on or about December 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3 

27, 2016. Sweeting filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his tenyear duty to register had expired, which the trial court granted. The trial court also 

entered an order captioned “Entry Denying Motion for Credit of Time and Terminate 

Registration,” which in the body states that the “motion is well taken, and is herein 

GRANTED.” The state has appealed from the order granting the motion to dismiss 

the indictment in the appeal numbered C-170513 and from the order on the credit of 

time and the termination of the duty to register in the appeal numbered C-170512. 

{¶4} The state’s first assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in 

granting Sweeting’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The state argues that 

Sweeting already sought and obtained out-of-state registration credit in the case 

numbered SP-0800428, and that the trial court in that case correctly applied former 

R.C. 2950.07(D)’s tolling provisions and calculated Sweeting’s registration credit. 

Further, the state argues that the court’s order in that case required Sweeting to 

register “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that since Sweeting was indicted for failing 

to register on or about December 27, 2016, the trial court in the present case clearly 

erred in dismissing the indictment. 

{¶5} In the case numbered SP-0800428, Sweeting filed a petition for 

reclassification under former R.C. 2950.09(F) and a motion to terminate his 

registration requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(E). In his motion to 

terminate his registration requirement, he requested credit for the time he had 

registered in Michigan and argued that he had completed his registration 

requirement. The court ultimately granted Sweeting’s petition for reclassification, 

entering an order classifying him as a sexually-oriented offender. The court’s order 

also addressed the credit against his registration period that Sweeting had requested. 

The court applied R.C. 2950.07(D) and determined that Sweeting had a duty to 

register “once per year, until at least May 7, 2017.” The order also stated, “Any 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4 

additional periods of incarceration will toll reporting requirements according to 

[former R.C.] 2950.07(D).” 

{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “In our jurisprudence, there is a 

firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are meant to be just that—

final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 

Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22. Collateral estoppel, also 

known as issue preclusion, “precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been 

‘actually and necessarily determined in a prior action.’ ” Fort Frye Teachers Assn., 

OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 Ohio St.3d 283, 2004-Ohio-2947, 809 

N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 10, citing Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 

(1989), quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 

443 N.E.2d 978 (1983). 

{¶7} The court’s determinations as to the amount of registration credit to 

which Sweeting was entitled and the length of his remaining reporting period were 

actually litigated and determined in the case numbered SP-0800428 and were valid 

and necessary parts of the court’s final judgment in that case. Therefore, Sweeting is 

precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging them in the present case. 

{¶8} Because the court in the case numbered SP-0800428 ordered that 

Sweeting’s registration period runs “until at least May 7, 2017,” the trial court in the 

present case erred in dismissing the indictment, which alleged that Sweeting had 

failed to verify his current address in December of 2016. The first assignment of 

error is sustained. 

{¶9} The state’s second assignment of error alleges, “The trial court erred to 

the extent that its ‘entry denying motion for credit of time and terminate registration’ 

indicates that the motion is granted.” The court’s order states in the caption that the 

motion is denied, but states in the body that it is granted. The record shows that the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5 

trial court overruled the motion. The court stated, “So your two motions to credit 

time, denied. I’m dismissing your case. * * * I’m just dismissing this charge that he’s 

got in case number B-1700599. If he still has to register, that’s not – I didn’t order 

anything on that. I’m just dismissing this charge. That’s all.” The state is not 

aggrieved by the court’s order overruling the motion, and therefore, cannot appeal 

from it. See Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 140 Ohio St. 160, 

42 N.E.2d 758 (1942), syllabus (“Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by 

the final order appealed from.”); Young v. UC Health, West Chester Hosp., LLC, 

2016-Ohio-5526, 61 N.E.3d 34, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). The state’s appeal from the court’s 

order overruling the motion must be dismissed.1

{¶10} In the appeal numbered C-170513, the judgment of the trial court 

dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with law and this opinion. The appeal numbered C-170512 is 

dismissed. We point out that the entry appealed from in C-170512 contains a clerical 

error in the body that should be corrected by the trial court. 

Judgment accordingly. 

MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date. 

 1 We note that the state filed a motion, which this court granted, for leave to appeal from the trial 

court’s order “to the extent that the entry grants the defendant’s motion.” A review of the record 

shows that the trial court overruled the motion in its entirety. Therefore, the state is not an 

aggrieved party and there is no basis on which the state may prosecute an appeal from the court’s 

order.