If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

STEVEN R. LILLY,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

January 17, 2019

v No. 338677

Wayne Circuit Court

GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD 

COMPANY,

LC No. 16-001908-NO

Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and RIORDAN and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right a final judgment following a jury trial on plaintiff’s action 

under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 USC 51 et seq. We affirm but order 

remittitur.

I. BASIC FACTS

Plaintiff alleged that his early-onset osteoarthritis (“OA”) requiring bilateral hip 

replacement was due to repetitive cumulative trauma he experienced during his decades working 

as a carman for defendant. Plaintiff argued that defendant failed to provide him with a safe 

working environment. In contrast, defendant argued that plaintiff was provided a safe working 

environment and that plaintiff’s OA was attributed to a congenital hip condition known as 

femoral acetabular impingement (FAI). The jury found for plaintiff. The trial court denied 

defendant’s many post-trial motions. Defendant now appeals by right.1

II. PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS

 1 Plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal on certain evidentiary rulings. However, because we affirm, 

we do not need to address plaintiff’s cross-appeal.
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Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motions 

to exclude Dr. Robert Owens Andres as an expert in ergonomics and biomechanics and Dr. 

Robert Samuel Widmeyer as an expert in orthopedic surgery. We disagree.

We review the circuit court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome 

falling outside the range of principled outcomes. We review de novo questions of 

law underlying evidentiary rulings, including the interpretation of statutes and 

court rules. The admission or exclusion of evidence because of an erroneous 

interpretation of law is necessarily an abuse of discretion. [Elher v Misra, 499 

Mich 11, 21; 878 NW2d 790 (2016) (quotation marks and footnotes omitted.]

“When a party files a FELA case in state court, we apply federal substantive law to 

adjudicate the claim while following state procedural rules.” Hughes v Lake Superior & 

Ishpeming R Co, 263 Mich App 417, 421; 688 NW2d 296 (2004) (citation omitted). MRE 702 

and MCL 600.2955 govern the admissibility of expert witness testimony. 

MRE 702 provides:

If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the 

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 

reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 

methods reliably to the facts of the case.

The trial court’s role is that of a gatekeeper and it may “admit evidence only once it ensures, 

pursuant to MRE 702, that expert testimony meets that rule’s standard of reliability.” Gilbert v 

DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782; 685 NW2d 391 (2004), citing Daubert v Merrell 

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993).

Similarly, MCL 600.2955 provides, in relevant part:

(1) In an action for . . .injury to a person or property, a scientific opinion rendered 

by an otherwise qualified expert is not admissible unless the court determines that 

the opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact. In making that 

determination, the court shall examine the opinion and the basis for the opinion, 

which basis includes the facts, technique, methodology, and reasoning relied on 

by the expert, and shall consider all of the following factors:

(a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing and 

replication.

(b) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review 

publication.
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(c) The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing the 

application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and whether the 

opinion and its basis are consistent with those standards.

(d) The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis.

(e) The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within the 

relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, “relevant expert 

community” means individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of study and 

are gainfully employed applying that knowledge on the free market.

(f) Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that field 

would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered.

(g) Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside of the 

context of litigation.

Not all seven factors are relevant in every case. Elher, 499 Mich at 27. While each factor is to 

be considered by the trial court, not every factor must favor the proffering party. Chapin v A & L 

Parts, Inc, 274 Mich App 122, 137; 732 NW2d 578 (2007).

Additionally, a trial court’s inquiry when determining admissibility of expert witness 

testimony is not “whether an expert’s opinion is necessarily correct or universally accepted. The 

inquiry is into whether the opinion is rationally derived from a sound foundation.” People v 

Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), quoting Chapin, 274 Mich App at 139.

“[T]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper does not require it to search for absolute truth, to admit 

only uncontested evidence, or to resolve genuine scientific disputes.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 

217, quoting Chapin, 274 Mich App at 139. Instead, the focus is on the scientific validity of the 

expert’s method, not the correctness or soundness of the expert’s testimony.” Unger, 278 Mich 

App at 217–218 (citation omitted), quoting Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 

US 579, 590; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). 

A. ANDRES

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to exclude 

Andres from testifying. Andres received an undergraduate degree in Engineering Science from 

the University of Michigan (“UM”) in 1973, a Master’s degree from UM in 1976, and PhD in 

bioengineering from the UM in 1979. His PhD was funded by NASA and the National Institutes 

of Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”). Andres did one year of post-doctoral work and 

was a lecturer at UM for four years. He left in 1984 to work in a joint appointment at the 

Department of Exercise Science and Industrial Engineering at the University of Massachusetts 

until 1992. In 1993, Andres incorporated his business – Ergonomic Engineering, Inc. He 

assisted companies whose employees had an occurrence of muscular or skeletal injuries. Andres 

published approximately 50 peer review publications. 

Andres estimated that he had been in railroad yards more than 150 times and had 

conducted 29 site inspections for carmen over the years. In fact, Andres received funding from 
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the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) to perform research on the effects of walking on 

different sized rocks. Andres’s June 22, 2016, report concluded:

The following conclusions have been reached based on my review of the 

material and my education, training, experience, and background in ergonomics 

research and the practice of ergonomics with industrial clients:

Performing the job tasks of carmen/car inspectors generally exposes 

workers to certain ergonomic risk factors (i.e. lifting, walking on uneven surfaces, 

kneeling and squatting) which generally have been associated with (among other 

injuries and/or illnesses) cumulative trauma disorders of the lower extremities and 

specifically the hips. Based on what I have learned and observed, including my 

knowledge and analysis of Mr. Lilly’s work, during the relevant time period, 

generally Mr. Lilly was exposed to repetitive work in several of his job tasks (e.g. 

walking on uneven surfaces, squatting or kneeling to replace brake shoes, 

crawling under cars to chalk tail pin retainer bolts, coupling air hoses). This 

repetitive work required awkward postures of the lower extremities and involved 

the exertion of forces to climb, lift, push, pull, and carry.

Generally, to mitigate the effects of certain ergonomic risk factors for 

cumulative trauma disorders of the lower extremities, it is recommended by 

OSHA, the AAR, NSC, NIOSH, and GAO[

2

], and me in my industrial practice, 

that a company:

1. Perform an ergonomic screening or job analysis to prioritize jobs 

for intervention. Based on the materials I have seen at this point, 

during the relevant time period, [defendant] generally did not 

perform such an ergonomic screening or job analysis to prioritize 

jobs for interventions.

2. Implement engineering (preferably) or administrative controls to 

decrease worker exposure to ergonomic risk factors by reducing 

force exertion requirements, improving working positions to 

reduce awkward posture, or improving working conditions like the 

walking surfaces. Based on the material I have seen, during the 

relevant time period, [defendant] generally did not implement such 

engineering and/or administrative controls. Crew sizes were 

decreased, no systematic walkway maintenance programs were 

implemented, and a tool to make it easier to couple air hoses in 

cold weather (Mertin’s bar) was not provided.

 2 At a separate motion hearing, the trial court ruled that some of these entities could not be 

referenced and should be redacted from Andres’s report.
-5-

3. Administer the following ergonomic training to its employees: 

ergonomic risk factors for the lower extremity and early signs and 

symptoms of musculoskeletal disorders. Based on the materials I 

have seen, during the relevant time period, [defendant] generally 

did not administer such ergonomic training in the following regard: 

Mr. Lilly was not trained to recognize lower extremity ergonomic 

risk factors, and he was not told about early signs and symptoms of 

musculoskeletal disorders.

Generally, to treat and control certain lower extremity work-related 

musculoskeletal disorders of a non-traumatic origin, it is recommended by OSHA, 

the AAR, NSC, NIOSH, the GAO, and me in my industrial practice, that a 

company implement the following medical management program: utilize 

symptom surveys, and encourage early reporting of signs and symptoms. Based 

on the materials I have seen, during the relevant time period, [defendant] 

generally did not implement such a program in that they never administered 

symptoms surveys nor did they encourage the early reporting of signs and 

symptoms.

In summary, for all of the reasons cited above, it is my opinion that 

[defendant] failed to provide Mr. Lilly with a reasonable safety and health 

program that dealt with ergonomic issues that met standard industry work 

practices, and, as such, failed to provide Mr. Lilly with a reasonably safe work 

place. 

Defendant’s primary argument in the trial court and on appeal is that Andres could not 

define a threshold level of exposure, which would determine whether and when a carman would 

develop hip OA. A similar argument was rejected in Hardyman v Norfolk & Western R Co, 243 

F 3d 255, 265 (CA 6, 2001). In that case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that requiring a plaintiff to 

establish “a dose/response relationship or threshold level in a situation where there has been no 

scientific study conducted specifically on railroad brakemen [would] essentially . . . foreclose 

plaintiffs from recovering for [carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”)] against negligent employers 

unless their particular job has been the subject of a national, epidemiological study on CTS.” It 

follows that requiring such evidence regarding hip OA would be unduly burdensome on a 

plaintiff. Here, Andres’s opinions were based on peer-reviewed articles addressing the risks 

associated with repetitive tasks. Andres’s methods could be tested but the industry worked to 

suppress publication of such results. Andres’s opinion that cumulative trauma is associated with 

the risk of OA is generally accepted by the scientific community and other courts have endorsed 

Andres’s methodology. There was support for his theory that plaintiff’s hip OA was the result of 

cumulative trauma. 

In Dixon v Grand Trunk Western RR Co, 259 F Supp 3d 702 (ED Mich 2016), this same 

defendant raised a number of similar arguments where the plaintiff claimed that his knee OA was 

the result of his working conditions. The defendant argued that there was a lack of scientific 

foundation supporting the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony regarding causation. The United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, citing Hardyman, determined that 

expert witness opinions on causation were properly admitted because the plaintiff’s expert spoke 
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with the plaintiff, evaluated the plaintiff’s work history and medical history, and then, relying on 

the expert’s expertise, determined “those motions [performed by the plaintiff in the course of his 

employment with defendant] could likely cause the sort of OA from which [the plaintiff] 

suffers.” Id. The same is true here. Andres’s opinions were rationally derived from a sound 

foundation. He interviewed plaintiff, considered plaintiff’s medical records, case materials, 

scientific literature, and other material concerning exposure to ergonomic risk facts. There was 

no reason to inspect plaintiff’s jobsite because Andres properly relied on plaintiff’s self-reported 

history. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to strike 

Andres’s testimony.

B. WIDMEYER

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to exclude 

Widmeyer from testifying. Widmeyer is a board certified orthopedic surgeon. He was licensed 

to practice in Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, and Maryland and had been qualified to testify as 

an expert in repetitive trauma in each of those states. Widmeyer treated a number of railroad 

workers for acute injuries over the years. He first learned of the concept of cumulative trauma 

injury in medical school in 1964. Widmeyer personally examined plaintiff and reviewed all of 

his records. Widmeyer also reviewed deposition transcripts and plaintiff’s job description. He 

made the following observations:

The first is there is no question at all that Mr. Lilly’s work tasks during his 

decades of employment with the Railroad have far exceeded the limits that his hip 

joints could withstand. As a result at a very young age he has experienced 

progressive and complete destruction of his hip joints from those activities . . .

He is clearly unable to do his regular work and the restrictions placed on 

him by his orthopedic surgeon will remain permanent. 

He has no other risk factors that would contribute to the early destruction 

of the joints such as family history of arthritis, any underlying arthritic or other 

disease processes, and he has had no specific acute trauma to either hip joint from 

a single event, merely the repetitive overactivity of the joints placed under an 

abnormal strain and in unusual positions.

His situation is very simplistic. His activities with the Railroad have been 

entirely responsible for the destruction of his hip joint, and therefore all of the 

treatment of hip joints related to his Railroad employment, and any future 

treatment that he may require regarding his hip joints will be related to his 

employment with the Railroad.

Widmeyer testified that there were peer review journal articles and trade publications that 

supported the concept of cumulative trauma disorder as a cause of arthritis. Widmeyer testified 

that “repetitive injury has been going on forever and it still is.” Widmeyer had opportunities to 

observe carmen performing their tasks in railroad yards. He also had an opportunity to walk on 

mainline ballast. The ballast put undue stress on the lower extremities. Likewise, kneeling and 
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twisting extended the joints past the neutral position and caused torqueing. Specifically, in terms 

of plaintiff, Widmeyer calculated over his 15 years working as a carman, plaintiff performed four 

million squats inspecting railcar and six million squats inspecting the autorack, which was 

“excessive and repetitive.” 

Plaintiff, whom Widmeyer personally examined, was not obese or overweight. He was 

relatively young at age 54. Widmeyer concluded that “the massive overuse of his hip joints in 

abnormal positions with abnormal loadings day after day after decade after decade simply wore 

the joints down.” As for the theory that plaintiff suffered from FAI, Widmeyer opined that 

plaintiff would have had problems much sooner if he had FAI. Widmeyer believed that it was a 

contributing cause of plaintiff’s problems and that he had it at the time he had his arthritis. 

However, while defendant’s expert suggested that the FAI caused the osteoarthritis, it was 

Widmeyer’s opinion that the OA caused the impingement. Plaintiff had a gradual destruction of 

the hip joints and the cartilage wore down. 

As with Andres, the trial court properly concluded that Widmeyer’s testimony was not 

based on junk science. Widmeyer spoke with plaintiff, evaluated plaintiff’s work history and 

medical history, and then, relying on his own medical expertise in treating patients with OA, 

determined that plaintiff’s work tasks during his decades of employment with defendant far 

exceeded the limits that his hip joints could withstand. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to strike 

Widmeyer’s testimony.

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND JNOV

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s case should have been dismissed, given the absence of 

evidence that defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff’s work environment was 

unreasonably unsafe. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decisions on a motion for a 

directed verdict and a motion for JNOV. A directed verdict is appropriate only 

when no factual question exists on which reasonable jurors could differ. The 

appellate court reviews all the evidence presented up to the time of the directed 

verdict motion, considers that evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, and determines whether a question of fact existed. In reviewing 

the decision on a motion for JNOV, this Court views the testimony and all 

legitimate inferences drawn from the testimony in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. If reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different 

conclusions, the jury verdict must stand. [Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich 

App 673, 681–82; 696 NW2d 770, 776 (2005) (citations omitted).]

Under FELA:

Every common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person 

suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier ... for such injury or death 

resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 

employees of such carrier. [45 USC 51.]
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“[W]hen Congress enacted FELA in 1908, its attention was focused primarily upon 

injuries and death resulting from accidents on interstate railroads. Cognizant of the physical 

dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, 

Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of the human overhead of doing business 

from employees to their employers.” Consol Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532, 542; 114 S Ct 

2396, 2403–2404; 129 L Ed 2d 427 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To effectuate 

this remedial goal, “a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA.” Id. FELA’s language 

on causation is “as broad as could be framed,” and “the test of a jury case is simply whether the 

proofs justify with reason the conclusion that the employer negligence played any part, even the 

slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” CSX Transp, Inc, v 

McBride, 564 US 685, 691–692; 131 S Ct 2630; 180 L Ed 2d. 637 (2011) (citations omitted). 

“A railroad has a duty to use reasonable care in furnishing its employees with a safe place 

to work.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R Co v Buell, 480 US 557, 558; 107 S Ct 1410; 94 L Ed

2d 563 (1987). The FELA is not, however, a workers’ compensation statute; rather, the basis of 

an employer’s liability “is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur.” Gottshall, 512 US at 

543. What constitutes negligence under the FELA is a federal question that “generally turns on 

principles of common law.” Id. 

To prevail under the FELA, a plaintiff need not show that the employer had actual notice 

of a dangerous condition in the workplace. Szekeres v CSX Transp, Inc, 617 F3d 424, 430–431 

(CA 6, 2010). “The law is clear that notice under the FELA may be shown from facts permitting 

a jury to infer that the defect could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care or 

inspection.” Id. at 430. 

Reasonable foreseeability of harm . . . is indeed an essential ingredient of 

FELA negligence. The jury, therefore, must be asked, initially: Did the carrier 

fail to observe that degree of care which people of ordinary prudence and sagacity 

would use under the same or similar circumstances? In that regard, the jury may 

be told that the railroad’s duties are measured by what is reasonably foreseeable 

under like circumstances. Thus, if a person has no reasonable ground to 

anticipate that a particular condition . . .would or might result in a mishap and 

injury, then the party is not required to do anything to correct the condition. If 

negligence is proved, however, and is shown to have played any part, even the 

slightest, in producing the injury, then the carrier is answerable in damages even 

if the extent of the injury or the manner in which it occurred was not probable or 

foreseeable. [CSX Transp, 564 US at 703–704 (footnotes, citations and quotation 

marks omitted).]

“The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, 

when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with reason 

make the inference” that the negligence of an employer played any part in causing the injury at 

issue. Rogers v Missouri Pacific R Co, 352 US 500, 508; 77 S Ct 443; 1 L Ed 2d 493 (1957). 

The trial court correctly determined that knowledge was a matter for the jury to decide. 

In his report, Andres opines that:
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The [Association of American Railroads (“AAR”)] also evaluated an 

ergonomics process to advance safety at the railroads (Ergonomics Programs at 

Heavy, Industrial Corporations, AAR Research and Test Department, by P. 

McMahan and G. Page, February, 1994). The process involved six major 

elements:

1. Define and design the work processes,

2. Worksite analysis and monitoring,

3. Analysis of possible problems and solution options,

4. Implementation of solutions, 

5. Training and education, and 

6. Medical management. 

Andres then reviewed the commonly accepted ergonomic risk factors for the lower extremities 

and how OA has been associated with occupational activities like those plaintiff experienced. 

Andres noted that defendant could have screened for the presence of known risk factors, but 

failed to do so. In fact, the industry resisted ergonomics. Andres concluded that defendant: (1) 

failed to perform a systemic worksite analysis as part of a comprehensive safety and health 

program taking ergonomics into consideration; (2) failed to implement systematic hazard 

prevention and control as part of a comprehensive safety and health program taking ergonomics 

into consideration; (3) failed to provide medical monitoring of employees for musculoskeletal 

disorders and intimidated those from reporting early signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal 

disorders, thereby failing to implement a medical management program with ergonomics in 

mind; and, (4) failed to provide effective training to understand what cumulative trauma was or 

to recognize early signs. He concluded that defendant “failed to provide Mr. Lilly with a 

reasonable safety and health program that dealt with ergonomic issues that met standard industry 

work practices, and, as such, failed to provide Mr. Lilly with a reasonably safe work place.” 

The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict and JNOV, 

leaving the issue of notice for the jury to decide. 

IV. PRECLUSION

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s ballast claims were precluded by the Federal Railway 

Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 USC 20101 et seq. We disagree.

“Whether a federal law preempts a state law or precludes another federal law is a 

question of law which we review de novo.” Nickels v Grand Trunk W RR, Inc, 560 F3d 426, 429 

(CA 6, 2009).

Defendant relies primarily on the Nickels decision. The plaintiffs in Nickels each claimed 

that the defendant railroads failed to provide a safe working environment by using large mainline 

ballast underneath and adjacent to tracks with heavy foot traffic. Nickels, 560 F 3d at 428. The 
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district courts granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs’

FELA claims would undermine the FRSA’s express intent to achieve national uniformity in 

railroad safety regulations. Id. The Sixth Circuit had to examine the interplay between FELA 

and FRSA, both of which are designed to promote railway safety. FELA provides work safety to 

railroad employees while FRSA seeks to promote safety in every area of railroad operations to 

reduce accidents. Id. at 429. The FRSA contains a preemption clause in order to ensure that 

“[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety . . . shall be nationally uniform to the 

extent practicable.” 49 USC 20106(a)(1). The preemption clause provides that the states may 

regulate railroad safety “until the Secretary of Transportation . . . prescribes a regulation or 

issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.” 49 USC § 20106(a)(2). As 

to ballast, the FRSA provides:

Unless it is otherwise structurally supported, all track shall be supported by 

material which will—

(a) Transmit and distribute the load of the track and railroad rolling equipment to 

the subgrade;

(b) Restrain the track laterally, longitudinally, and vertically under dynamic loads 

imposed by railroad rolling equipment and thermal stress exerted by the rails;

(c) Provide adequate drainage for the track; and

(d) Maintain proper track crosslevel, surface, and alinement. [49 CFR 213.103.]

Citing Lane v RA Sims, Jr, Inc, 241 F 3d 439, 443 (5th Cir 2001) and Waymire v Norfolk 

& W Ry Co, 218 F 3d 773, 776 (7th Cir 2000), the Sixth Circuit confirmed that the uniformity 

demanded by the FRSA can only be achieved if the regulations are applied similarly to FELA 

claims. Nickels, 560 F 3d at 430. The Court added that although “Lane and Waymire addressed 

FELA claims of unsafe train speed in light of FRSA speed-limit regulations, the FRSA’s concern

for uniformity leads us to reach the same conclusion regarding ballast regulations. And while 

railroads may face a lesser likelihood of state-law claims alleging negligent ballast composition, 

any exposure to conflicting standards undermines uniformity.” Id. Therefore, “the plaintiffs’

claims are precluded by the FRSA if they would have been preempted if brought by a nonemployee under state law.” Id. 

The Nickels Court concluded that regulation 49 CFR 213.103 covered the subject matter 

of the plaintiffs’ claims. It noted that “[r]ather than prescribing ballast sizes for certain types or 

classes of track, the regulation leaves the matter to the railroads’ discretion so long as the ballast 

performs the enumerated support functions. In this way, the regulation substantially subsumes 

the issue of ballast size.” Nickels, 560 F3d at 431. The Court further noted that there need not 

be any inconsistency for pre-emption to apply: “the fact that track stability and safe footing are 

not mutually exclusive does not mean that § 213.103 has not covered the subject of ballast size. 

Preclusion and preemption under the FRSA are not limited to situations where the federal or 

state standard is incompatible with a regulation.” Nickels, 560 F3d at 431–432.

As the parties note, Nickels has not been uniformly applied, with some courts following 

Nickels and other declining to do so. Plaintiff notes that, regardless, Nickels has been abrogated 
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by POM Wonderful LLC v Coca-Cola Co, 573 US 102; 134 S Ct 2228; 189 L Ed 2d 141 (2014). 

However, even if we found that POM had no impact on Nickels, defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this issue. Specifically, plaintiff never alleged that defendant used improper ballast. Instead, 

the issue was raised by defendant’s motion in limine and further addressed by their own expert. 

Plaintiff’s counsel did not reference ballast in his opening or closing statements. While there 

was testimony of the difficulty on walking on different sized ballasts, the focus at trial was 

whether squatting, bending, kneeling, and awkward positions placed undue weight on plaintiff’s 

hips, contributing to his hip OA. Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to provide a reasonably 

safe workplace for reasons beyond the issue of ballast. Plaintiff did not suggest that the ballast 

was inappropriate; he suggested that defendant failed to provide a reasonable safety and health 

program that dealt with ergonomic issues. The trial court instructed the jury regarding plaintiff’s 

theory of the case: 

Plaintiff, Steven Lilly, alleges that Defendant, Grand Trunk Western 

Railroad Company, at the time and place in question was negligent in the 

following particulars.

That Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company through its employees or 

agents failed to provide Plaintiff Steven Lilly with a reasonably work safe place 

by failing to implement a reasonable safety and health program that dealt with 

ergonomic issues that met standard industry work practices.

Including but not limited to a failure to perform an ergonomic screening or 

job analysis, failing to increase engineering or administrative controls, to decrease 

worker exposure to ergonomic risk factors.

Failing to train employees on ergonomic risk factors of the lower 

extremities, and early signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal disorders, and by 

failing to provide appropriately empowered and appropriate tools to perform his 

work task in a reasonably safe manner. 

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue regardless of whether the FRSA precluded 

reference to ballast size and suitability. 

V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

A. STANDARD OR REVIEW

“We review a trial court’s decision regarding jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” 

Alfieri v Bertorelli, 295 Mich App 189, 196; 813 NW2d 772 (2012). “An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled 

outcomes.” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010). 

“[J]ury instructions must be reviewed as a whole, rather than extracted piecemeal to 

establish error in isolated portions.” Hill v Sacka, 256 Mich App 443, 457; 666 NW2d 282 

(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “There is no error requiring reversal if, on balance, 

the theories of the parties and the applicable law were adequately and fairly presented to the 
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jury.” Id. at 457–458. Reversal is not required unless failing to do so would be “inconsistent 

with substantial justice.” MCR 2.613(A). 

B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED PRE-EXISTING CONDITION

Defendant argues that the trial court impermissibly failed to instruct the jury about the 

effect of plaintiff’s pre-existing FAI. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give defendant’s requested 

instructions because defendant’s expert testified that plaintiff’s alleged pre-existing FAI would 

have resulted in his hip OA regardless of what he did at work. Therefore, defendant denied 

playing any part in causing plaintiff’s injuries. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that it 

could not find for plaintiff if it did not first conclude that defendant’s negligence caused or 

contributed to his injury. The trial court instructed the jury:

In order to prove the essential elements of Plaintiff Steven Lilly’s claims 

against Defendant, Grand Trunk Western Railroad Inc, Plaintiff Steven Lilly has 

the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in this case the 

following facts. 

First, that Defendant Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc was negligent in 

one or more of the particulars alleged.

And 2, that Defendant Grand Trunk Western Railroad’s negligence caused 

or contributed in whole or in part to some injury and consequent damage 

sustained by Plaintiff, Steven Lilly. 

The jury was, therefore, equipped with the knowledge that defendant could not be negligent if it 

did not cause plaintiff’s injury.

C. SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ON DOSE RESPONSE

Defendant argues that the trial court’s instruction concerning dose response was harmful 

error and that the jury should have been allowed to consider the lack of a dose response 

relationship. We disagree.

At plaintiff’s request, the trial court instructed the jury:

A plaintiff does not have the burden of proving causation by producing 

medical studies involving railroad workers or studies which establish a base level 

of exposure which will cause a worker to develop a medical condition when that 

level will always vary from individual to individual.

Stated more succinctly, Plaintiff does not need to prove a dose response 

relationship. 

Defendant takes this opportunity to repeat the causation arguments previously rejected. 

Defendant’s primary argument in the trial court was that plaintiff could not define a threshold 
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level of exposure where a carman would develop hip OA. A similar argument was rejected in 

Hardyman. In that case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that requiring a plaintiff to establish “a 

dose/response relationship or threshold level in a situation where there has been no scientific 

study conducted specifically on railroad [brakemen would] essentially . . . foreclose plaintiffs 

from recovering for [carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”)] against negligent employers unless their 

particular job has been the subject of a national, epidemiological study on CTS.” Hardyman, 

243 F 3d at 265. It follows that requiring such evidence regarding hip OA and an instruction 

thereon would have been inappropriate. 

D. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on assumption of the 

risk because assumption of risk is not a defense under FELA. We disagree.

45 USC 54 clearly provides that assumption of the risk is not a defense to a FELA action. 

The statute provides:

In any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the 

provisions of [FELA] to recover damages for injuries to . . . any of its employees, 

such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in 

any case where such injury . . . resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of 

any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; and no employee shall be 

held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation 

by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees 

contributed to the injury . . .of such employee. 

However, FELA does allow for an employer to argue that a plaintiff’s own negligence 

contributed to his or her injury, and that any jury award should be reduced by that amount. 45 

USC 53 provides:

In all actions . . . brought against any such common carrier by railroad 

under ... any of the provisions of [FELA] . . . the fact that the employee may have 

been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages 

shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence 

attributable to such employee.

Therefore, plaintiff cannot be found to be negligent for continuing his work even if he is aware 

of defendant’s negligence, but plaintiff can be found contributorily negligent. 

“The statutory elimination of the defense of assumption of risk, when read to the jury in 

FELA cases where that ‘defense’ has been neither pleaded nor argued, serves only to obscure the 

issues in the case.” Heater v Chesapeake & Ohio R Co, 497 F 2d 1243, 1249 (CA 7, 1974) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, where the issue of assumption of risk has been 

raised, and the jury might face confusion regarding the difference between contributory 

negligence and assumption of risk, the assumption of risk jury instruction is properly given in 

FELA cases. Tersiner v Union Pacific R Co, 947 F 2d 954 (CA 10, 1991).
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The assumption of risk jury instruction was properly given by the trial court where 

defendant raised the issue during trial. During cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that 

the physical tasks came with the territory of being a carman. Defendant appeared to suggest that 

plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily accepted a dangerous condition. 

VI. DAMAGES

Defendant argues that the jury ignored the trial court’s instruction to reduce their verdict 

to present day value. Defendant maintains that the trial court should have granted defendant’s 

motion for new trial and reduced the verdict to present value in the final judgment. We agree.

Excessive damages “influenced by passion or prejudice” can form the basis of a new 

trial. MCR 2.611(1)(d). “Alternatively, a trial court may offer the prevailing party an 

opportunity to consent to judgment in the highest amount the court finds is supported by the 

evidence.” Heaton v Benton Const Co, 286 Mich App 528, 538; 780 NW2d 618 (2009). “This 

Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for remittitur or a new trial for an abuse 

of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that is 

outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id.

During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel discussed the total economic loss plaintiff 

had suffered :

But Column 3, all right, Column 3, is what Mr. Lilly’s past wage loss is. 

And if you add up those, and if you need a calculator, we can get you a calculator. 

But if you add up 51 to 55, you’re going to come up with $252,502.

And if you calculate his future wage loss from 2017 ‘til the time he’s 65, 

you’re going to come up with a total of $1,015,285. That’s the economic loss. 

That’s the total economic loss. 

And when discussing Question #4 of the Verdict Form during closing arguments, plaintiff’s 

counsel urged:

Four, what is the total amount of Plaintiff’s damages that he has 

sustained? Well I suggest to you that 1,015,285 is the economic loss. I suggest to 

you that $1,500,000 is the compensation for the loss of his health, the loss of his 

vitality, the loss of his involvement with his family.

So if you add those two up you’ve got 1.5 million and you’ve got 

$1,015,285, and I could do it on the pad but I’s, I’ll do it in my head, okay. It’s 

$2,515,285. 

The trial court then instructed the jury:

If you find that Plaintiff Steven Lilly is reasonably certain to lose earnings 

in the future, then you must determine the present value in dollars of such future 

damages since the award of future damages necessarily requires that payment be 
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made now in one lump sum, and Plaintiff Steven Lilly will have use of the money 

now for a loss that will not occur until some future date. 

You must decide what those future loses [sic] will be and then make a 

reasonable adjustment for current value. 

The jury calculated plaintiff’s damages at $2,515,285. The jury verdict form did not ask 

the jury to provide separate awards for economic and non-economic damages. It simply 

provided: “QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages plaintiff has 

sustained?” The jury answered $2,515, 285.

“[T]he adequacy of the amount of the damages is generally a matter for the jury to 

decide.” Heaton, 286 Mich App at 538. “[A] verdict should not be set aside merely because the 

method the jury used to compute damages cannot be determined.” Id. Here, there is no room for 

guesswork. Clearly, the method the jury utilized was that suggested by plaintiff’s counsel –

adding economic damages ($1,015,285) to non-economic damages ($1,500,000) for a grand total 

of $2,515, 285. The jury obviously failed to follow the trial court’s instruction to reduce 

damages to present value. The award should be reduced to reflect plaintiff’s expert’s

conclusions that plaintiff’s loss of future earnings – reduced to present value – is $947,355 –a 

difference of $67,930. Pursuant to MCR 2.611(E)(1), the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to reduce the award.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to grant remittitur. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola