Mosquitoes to Wolves

The Evolution of the

Airborne Forward Air Controller

GARY ROBERT LESTER

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 1997
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lester, Gary Robert, 1947–

 Mosquitoes to wolves : the evolution of the airborne forward air controller / Gary

Robert Lester.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

 1. Close air support—History. 2. Close air support—Case studies. 3. Air warfare—United States—History. I. Title.

 UG703.L47 1997

 358.4′142—dc21 97-18377

CIP 

ii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

 1 EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . . . . . 1

World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The American Experience, 1918–42 . . . . . . . . . 7

World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 2 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . 15

Early Navy-Marine Close Air Support . . . . . . . 15

Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Air Force Philosophy in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Navy/Marine Air in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 3 KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

 EMERGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Fight for Air Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Phase One—Retreat to Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Phase Two—Advance to the Yalu . . . . . . . . . 29

Phase Three—Second Retreat . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Phase Four—Main Line of Resistance

Stabilized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Phase Five—Air Pressure for Peace . . . . . . . . 30

A Substitute for Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Extemporized Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

The Need for Airborne FACs . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

iii
Chapter Page

Command and Control Support . . . . . . . . . . 37

6132d Tactical Air Control Group . . . . . . . . . 38

6147th Squadron Organized . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Immediate Air Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Mosquitoes Assigned to Divisions . . . . . . . . . 40

Mosquito Mission Expands . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The 502d Tactical Control Group . . . . . . . . . 41

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 4 MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA . . . . . . . . 45

The Role of the Mosquito . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Forward Air Controller Equipment . . . . . . . . 47

Visual Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Tactical Air Control System . . . . . . . . . . 50

Mosquito Mellow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Strike Control Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Problems Encountered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Forward Air Controller Training . . . . . . . . . . 60

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

 5 KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR . . . . . . . . . . . 65

The Argument for Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . 65

CAS along a Stabilized Front . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Radar-Controlled Air Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Communications Upgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

T-6 Upgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Operation Thunderbolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Operation Ripper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Communist Losses in the First Year . . . . . . . 70

Strategy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Pathfinder Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

The Truce Ceremony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6147th TCG Deactivated . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Joint Air-Ground Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Post Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

iv
Chapter Page

 6 VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS . . . . . . . . . 81

Wars of National Liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Developing the Counterinsurgency Force . . . . . 82

Farm Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Air Operations in 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Air Operations in 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Air Operations in 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

The Gulf of Tonkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

New Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

 7 VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS . . . . . . . 109

FACs Come of Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

FAC Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Personnel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Seventh Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

504th Tactical Air Support Group . . . . . . . . 116

Increased Manning Requirements . . . . . . . 117

Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Locating the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Visual Reconnaissance Process . . . . . . . . . 122

In-Country Operations, 1965–72 . . . . . . . . 125

Employing the FAC Force . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Navy Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

The Battle of Khe Sanh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

The Tet Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Cleared in Wet! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

 8 EXPANDING MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Air Operations in Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

USAF Controllers in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . 160

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

v
Chapter Page

 9 THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS . . . . 167

Out-Country Operations, 1964–65 . . . . . . . 167

Commando Sabre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

F-4 “Phantom” FACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

 10 VIETNAMIZATION AND AMERICAN

 WITHDRAWAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Vietnamization and Close Air Support . . . . . 202

The South Vietnamese Air Force . . . . . . . . 205

Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Lam Son 719 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Interdiction in Route Packages I and II . . . . . 212

The 1972 Spring Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Linebacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

 11 A PERSPECTIVE ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . 225

Interservice Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Airpower in Regional Conflicts . . . . . . . . . 233

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 2 Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

vi
Photographs

Page

T-6 “Mosquito” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C-47 “Mosquito Mellow” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Farm Gate Aircraft—T-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Farm Gate Aircraft—B-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Farm Gate Aircraft—A-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Farm Gate Aircraft—C-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

O-1 “Bird Dog” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

O-2 “Skymaster” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

OV-10 “Bronco” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

F-100 “Misty” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

F-4D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

F-4E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

RF-4C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

A-10 “Thunderbolt II” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

vii
About the Author

Lt Col Gary Robert Lester was born in Bristol, Connecticut,

on 3 August 1947. He retired from the US Air Force in 1992

after a 23-year career. He accrued three thousand hours as an

F-4 weapons systems officer flying F-4 Phantom II fighters.

Colonel Lester served two combat tours in Southeast Asia as a

“Fast-FAC.” Beginning in 1981, he flew operational test and

evaluation missions for advanced weapons and aircraft

systems and was an instructor at both of Air Combat

Command’s test centers. He completed his career as director,

Tactics and Test Division, 79th Test and Evaluation Group,

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

After retirement, Colonel Lester served as associate

assistant professor of World Civilization at Okaloosa-Walton

Community College and associate assistant professor of

American History and Western Civilization for Troy State

University, Florida Region.

Lester holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Wichita

State University (1969), a Master of Public Administration

degree from Golden Gate University (1985), and a PhD in

history from Florida State University (1994). He is also a

graduate of Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama.

ix
Colonel Lester is a member of the Red River Valley Fighter

Pilots Association, the Retired Officer Association, the

American Historical Association, and the Pensacola Civil War

Round Table. He currently resides in Prescott, Arizona, with

his wife Penny.

x
Preface

Comparable to twentieth century cavalry, early forward air

controllers (FAC) probed, observed, and reported enemy

activity. Flying rickety, underpowered, and unarmed aircraft,

they operated on the leading edge of ground combat. The

efficient use of airborne FACs never developed in a meaningful

way in World War II, with the possible exception of their use in

Marine amphibious operations in the Pacific. But the rugged

terrain of Korea and the jungle mazes of Vietnam restricted the

capabilities of ground controllers to identify targets, thus

expanding the need for “eyes in the air.” FAC roles changed

from those of probing, observing, and reporting, to those of

locating targets, marking them for air strikes, and taking an

active role in their destruction. This expanded mission

resulted in the inevitable evolution of FAC equipment and

responsibilities.

Interservice differences regarding the definition of close air

support (CAS) caused controversies which clouded groundsupport operations in both Korea and Vietnam. The Navy and

the Marines saw CAS as the primary mission for airpower. The

Air Force and the Army saw CAS as the last priority, to be

employed after air superiority has been gained and

maintained, supplies have been interdicted, and the enemy’s

infrastructure has been damaged.

Even the definition of what constitutes CAS was not resolved

by the services. In both Korea and Vietnam, these interservice

differences were resolved in favor of the Air Force; a Tactical

Air Control System was designed to support the Air Force’s

concept of CAS, and the FAC became a critical component of

that system.

In Korea, the FAC’s role began as an observer. It quickly

became apparent that the lack of heavy artillery early in the

conflict made aircraft bombardment necessary to support

friendly ground troops. Getting the observer above the

battlefield seemed the best way to identify threats to friendly

forces. As the North Koreans swept down the peninsula,

xi
targets of opportunity were plentiful behind their rapidly

advancing forces—and United Nations airpower was often the

only force slowing their advance. Mosquitoes were concerned

with controlling the “airborne artillery” necessary to protect

UN forces in retreat.

Entrenched UN forces at Pusan presented a new problem for

the controllers: destroy enemy equipment and supplies before

they arrived at the stagnant front. Gen Douglas MacArthur’s

successful invasion at Inchon and Eighth Army’s “breakout” at

the Pusan perimeter represented additional challenges to

FACs. The rapid offensive advance made identification of

friendly and enemy forces more difficult, and FAC

responsibilities were extended to a greater range. Lack of a

defined “bomb-line” made close control of airpower more

important.

Intervention by the Red Chinese in November 1950 turned

the conflict into a see-saw slugfest that eventually stagnated

along the 38th parallel. The “trench warfare” in Korea between

1951 and 1953 presented other challenges to airpower as the

battle lines became fixed and enemy men and equipment were

entrenched. Interdiction became airpower’s primary mission

as CAS became less effective.

Forward air controllers were disbanded during the interwar

years (1954–61) as each service competed for defense dollars

during the cold war. Strategic weapons and nuclear war on a

grand scale occupied Department of Defense thinking for

nearly a decade. If the notion of close air support and FACs

existed at all, it was a very low priority. The services competed

for nuclear submarines, strategic ballistic missile systems,

intercontinental bombers, and aircraft carriers. The concept of

a conventional confrontation in Europe was approached as

being only the beginning of what would become a global

nuclear conflict. In this environment, funding for

low-technology, light, observer-type aircraft was a low priority

indeed.

Preparing for “unconventional” war finally received attention

under the Kennedy administration. Soviet “wars of national

liberation,” announced by Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev

in 1960, were recognized as the most probable type of conflict.

In 1961, a host of World War II and Korean War aircraft were

xii
reactivated in a Vietnamese aid program known as “Farm

Gate.” These relics were soon replaced by more modern, yet

equally unsophisticated, aircraft.

The absence of both a clearly defined enemy and classic

front lines made FAC use mandatory for air strikes in South

Vietnam. FACs became the eyes of province chiefs, who had

the authority to authorize air strikes into their areas. Air

controllers became more important then ever in defining the

tactical objectives on the battlefield. The FAC motto, “We

control violence,” took on even more significance. A new

command and control network evolved to achieve objectives

and protect friendly forces from mistaken air attack.

In the north, however, sophisticated air defenses made light,

slow-moving aircraft impractical. “Fast-FACs” therefore took

up the mission of interdicting enemy supplies in areas where

lack of air superiority restricted the traditional “slow movers.”

Modern fighter aircraft now took up a FAC role and, although

not well suited for this mission, they adapted quite well. By the

end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these

FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad

weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons

systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced

ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal

capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the

Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the

concept of FAC.

xiii
Chapter 1

Evolution of Close Air Support

Close air support (CAS) of ground operations has become a

recognized element of modern warfare. As the authoritative

Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms defines it, CAS comprises “air attacks

against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly

forces and which require detailed integration of each air

mission with the fire and movement of those forces.” This

doctrine is also accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the

Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This aspect of warfare is

the modern version of one of the oldest air combat missions; it

also has become one of the most divisive topics between

soldiers and airmen.1

The use of airplanes in close support of ground troops

appeared early in aviation history, but there were problems.

The earliest attempts at influencing the outcome of a ground

battle from the air were limited by the fragility of the aircraft

and a lack of coherent ideas on its effective use. Taken

virtually for granted by troops and aviators today, the

employment of airpower in this manner has been controversial

from the time bombs were first dropped on ground combatants

during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–12.2

The air-to-ground potential of the airplane was tested in

several small wars before World War I. After an Italian pilot

dropped three small bombs on Turkish positions on 1

November 1911, the Italians continued bombing from aircraft

and airships.3 Bombing also occurred during the Balkan Wars

of 1912–13. In those wars, however, the bombing was

random, incidental, and often at the initiative of the individual

aviator.4 At about the same time, the French Army used

aircraft against rebellious tribesmen in Morocco and gained its

first experience in cooperation between air units and ground

troops.5

1
Since the emergence of strategic bombardment during

World War I, few airmen have willingly embraced what the

British called “army cooperation”; that is, to provide direct

support for the infantry. American and British aviators in

particular wanted to perform missions that did not involve

complicated liaison with ground forces, subordination of air

forces to ground requirements, or attrition of air resources in

unrewarding missions. They believed their contribution should

be through strategic bombardment, air superiority, and

interdiction.6

The history of CAS during the first four decades of the

twentieth century can be divided into three phases. The

first—World War I, especially the years 1917 and 1918—was

characterized by airpower’s rapid development and its

increasing combat potential. The second phase (the interwar

period to about 1935) was marked by limited doctrinal

discussion, restricted development, and a virtual absence of

meaningful battlefield application. During the final phase,

which continued into the opening campaigns of World War II,

there was renewed interest, considerable experimentation, and

operational experience in several minor conflicts.7

World War I

Trench warfare removed the need for the kind of air

reconnaissance that had been crucial in the early months of

World War I. The need for accurate trench maps and for

corroborating the eyewitness reports of airmen led to a rapid

development in aerial photography; the camera became as

much a part of the observation airplane as the observer’s

notebook. Extensive use of aerial reconnaissance led to the

camouflaging of important military installations—which led, in

turn, to the art of photographic interpretation.8

Trench warfare also led to the artillery-spotting airplane.

Since indiscriminate artillery barrage did comparatively little

harm to a well-sheltered enemy, a way to direct the fire onto

specific targets was sought—and the radio-equipped airplane

proved ideal. The Germans, quick to realize the specialized

nature of this work, formed 14 units exclusively for this task.

They wanted each frontline division to have its own

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

2
artillery-spotting unit. By August 1916, these units comprised

45 of 81 German observation groups.

The airplane also proved useful in determining how far the

troops had advanced during an offensive. Communications

between forward troops and their rear headquarters were often

completely severed when an attack went “over the top”—and

even when information did filter back from the fighting area, it

was often out-of-date.9

In the first part of World War I, military aviation had only

one official function: serve as the eyes of the army. During the

first weeks, however, aviators from both sides attacked

marching columns on their own initiative with whatever

weapons they happened to have. By October 1914, officials

had begun to sanction and encourage the offensive use of

aircraft.10

Air-ground communication was difficult at best. Even

though aircraft used for artillery spotting often carried

wireless transmitters, pilots commonly found it more feasible

to drop messages—and ground troops used flares and visual

displays (such as arrows laid out on the ground) to signal

aircraft.11

In 1915, a new tactical reconnaissance aircraft appeared.

Called the infantry contact patrol plane, it led to air support

along the “cutting edge” of the battle. It was charged with

following the progress of the friendly infantry and filling the

communications gaps that developed when landlines were cut

by bombardment and when backup systems (runners, dogs,

pigeons) failed. By 1916, infantry contact patrol systems were

serving both Allied and German armies.12

Early attempts at air-ground liaison on the battlefield were

plagued by a number of difficulties, most of them stemming

from the ground troops’ fear that use of flares and smoke

would advertise their position to enemy artillery. There was

less resistance to the use of panels, but compliance was far

from perfect; units exhausted from heavy engagement rarely

displayed panels.13

Since patrol pilots approaching the battlefield could identify

enemy as well as friendly positions, they soon began attacking

resistance points. Low-level air attacks gained official sanction

at the Battle of the Somme, which the British opened in July

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

3
1916. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) assigned 18 contact

aircraft for low-altitude “trench flights” with the dual purpose

of “close reconnaissance and destructive bombardment.”14

Low-flying attack units were working in close coordination

with the infantry when the great German offensive began in

March 1918.15 By the time of the Armistice, CAS experience

had yielded a number of lessons and problems, many of which

reappeared 20 years later. A major lesson was that aircraft use

had a significant effect on the morale of ground troops. An

RFC policy paper drafted in September 1916 noted that hostile

aircraft over the front affected morale “all out of proportion to

the damage” the aircraft could inflict.16

Emphasis on the airplane’s psychological impact slowed the

development of weapons that were especially suitable to

ground attack. Aircraft usually carried small bombs (under 10

pounds) and grenades, and they strafed with machine guns in

the .30-caliber/8 millimeter range. The damage these weapons

could inflict on field fortifications was negligible. Cannon and

rockets appeared in 1918, but there was little effort to exploit

their air-to-ground capabilities.17

Royal Flying Corps losses were heavy during the German

offensive of March 1918 and in the heavy fighting around

Amiens five months later. RFC Wing commander Sir John

Slessor cited the case of 80 Squadron, which conducted CAS

missions almost continuously from March 1918 until the end

of the war: “Their average strength was 22 officers, and in the

last 10 months of the war no less than 168 officers were

struck off the strength from all causes—an average of about

75 percent per month, of whom little less than half were

killed.”18 The increased danger to ground-attack aircraft led to

a search for models of aircraft that were better suited for such

combat.

Air support aircraft in 1918 had two categories of targets:

objectives along the enemy’s heavily defended front (the

“crust”) and a range of objectives extending 20 miles behind

the crust. By the end of the Great War, a considerable body of

opinion held that the chief contribution of aircraft should be

against those objectives behind the crust. Additionally,

excellent targets often lay beyond effective artillery range—

only the airplane could reach them.19

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

4
While airpower could rapidly be shifted and concentrated, it

could not easily be used on a battlefield that was unfamiliar to

the pilots or when the battle lines were shifting and

fluctuating. Experiments in centralized command encountered

opposition from ground forces—the air staff tended to see the

benefits of centralized control while the army staff tended to

focus on its shortcomings. This fundamental difference

remained one of the key problems in CAS.20 By the end of

World War I, much valuable experience had been gained in

ground-support operations. Unfortunately, many of these

hard-earned lessons were forgotten during the years of

comparative peace which followed.21

Between the Wars

Technological progress continued during the postwar

period. All-metal airframes and more efficient engines were

developed. The airplane of 1939 could boast a performance far

exceeding that of earlier aircraft; yet many of the world’s air

forces had difficulty incorporating these innovations.

Air doctrine in the interwar period rested largely on World

War I lessons. There was general agreement that the air force

now had at least two fundamental missions: win air battles

and support ground forces. However, the Royal Air Force

(RAF) and the US Army Air Corps (AAC) became convinced

that strategic bombardment was their most important mission

and they believed it could be decisive in future wars. They

viewed air superiority as desirable for intervention in a land

battle, but they did not see it as an absolute prerequisite.

However, they agreed that the overriding obligation of the air

force was to throw its strength into the ground battle at

critical times.22

The emphasis on indirect (interdiction) rather than close or

direct support resulted from two factors: (1) the perception of

the battlefield and the targets it offered and (2) the limited

offensive capability of airpower in the 1930s. The battlefield

offered small targets that were “widely dispersed and usually

dug into the ground to protect them against artillery fire.”23

Bombers of the day could attack only broad areas, hoping to

hit the specific targets within them. Most authorities

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

5
concluded that artillery could provide better accuracy, but

they agreed that a bomber force was better suited in a

surprise offensive because artillery buildups were usually

detected by the enemy.

Advocates of separate ground attack aviation argued that

only specially trained pilots, flying aircraft designed and

armed specifically for low-level attack, could offer effective

close support. Opponents argued that such units would suffer

prohibitive losses. Whether an air force provided air support

through special units or through fighter and bomber aircraft,

there was relatively little contact between the Army’s ground

forces and its Air Corps—and no day-to-day exchange on

problems that required cooperation. The mechanics of

arranging air support in peacetime often proved cumbersome

once a war began.24

In the late thirties, proponents of ground attack held that

neither air superiority nor fighter escort was a prerequisite for

rapid, shallow incursions. Low-level flight, they argued,

offered sufficient guarantee that a CAS plane could carry out

its mission and return safely.25 Diving attacks were also

under discussion, since tests conducted by the Navy

suggested that they could achieve greater bombing

accuracy.26

Technological innovation had a greater impact on weapons

than on aircraft. British wing commander Slessor, for

example, maintained that the bomb was “the weapon to use

every time.”27 Bombs used in CAS were typically small,

fragmentation-type explosives that were effective at a range of

40 to 50 yards from point of detonation. The machine gun and

the fragmentation bomb were effective against “soft” targets,

such as personnel. They could be used to harass enemy

gunners, but they could rarely knock out the guns

themselves—and they were of little value against tanks and

armored cars.

One important piece of equipment carried by CAS aircraft

was the wireless or radio set. Between the wars, the radio

telephone was increasingly used in preference to wireless

telegraphy. Still, radio communications left much to be

desired due to unreliability and limited range. Moreover, the

heavy and bulky sets were especially cumbersome to aircraft,

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

6
where weight was critical. These shortcomings showed up

quickly when the US Army Air Corps sought to perfect CAS at

the beginning of World War II.28

The American Experience, 1918–42

The US Army Air Service, a late arrival to the fighting in

France, nevertheless played a significant role at Saint Mihiel

in September 1918. In that battle, American and French air

forces concentrated 1,500 combat planes to support the

ground attack. Col William “Billy” Mitchell, Chief of Air Service

for the First Army, directed the air operations. Mitchell listed

attack on ground troops as a special mission sometimes

assigned to pursuit squadrons. The most attractive targets

were reserve troops massing for major military operations.

Mitchell believed that bombing and strafing attacks on

well-constructed positions had very little effect on either

morale or materiel.29

The notion of a specialized ground attack branch of aviation

found its most emphatic champion in Mitchell. The concept of

attack aviation led to a close identity between attack and CAS,

the practical result of which was the creation in 1921 of the

3d attack group. The idea still persisted that all aircraft might

have to be committed directly to the land battle.30 Attack

aviation was a postwar creation; it had no past, no combat

tradition, and no backlog of practical experience.

In the late twenties, the US Marine Corps flew a number of

air support missions in Nicaragua. The operation was

described during a 1929 lecture at the Army War College.

31

Airplanes served as artillery, intervened in sieges and battles

where very little space separated the contending forces, flew

escort missions for columns, and broke up enemy attempts at

ambush. In subsequent campaigns and exercises, the Marines

were to build up a sizable fund of expertise on CAS,

particularly as related to amphibious operations.32 This

experience led to adoption of a different philosophy of air

support—a difference that would manifest itself early in the

Korean War and persist into the Vietnam conflict.

When Brig Gen Henry H. Arnold addressed the US Army

War College on air warfare in the fall of 1937, he praised

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

7
Japan because “she has not assigned her air force to operate

against frontline trenches, as have the Spaniards.”33 Arnold

said that high aircraft losses result when aircraft are used

“promiscuously and indiscriminately to supplement artillery

actions on a large number of petty, heterogeneous missions.”

“Do not,” he said, “detach the air force to small commands

where it will be frittered away in petty fighting. Hold it

centrally and use it in its proper place; that is, where it can

exert its power beyond the influence of your other arms, to

influence general action rather than the specific battle.”34

In 1939, the role of attack aviation was to conduct

operations in zones that were beyond the reach of friendly

artillery. Cost was a factor in this decision and shifts in

doctrinal emphasis continued. Interdiction was a popular

concept in the Air Corps at that time, and it had its effect on

air support doctrine. Attack aircraft missions should not be

roving ones, seeking targets of opportunity. They should

instead be carefully prepared beforehand, with the unit

commander briefing the crews thoroughly before they took

off.35

The tactical successes of the Luftwaffe in France, and the

close collaboration between Germany’s ground forces and its

Stukas, led the US Air Corps to contact the Navy in June

1940; the airmen were “extremely anxious” to obtain

information on dive bombers.36 Within a month, General

Arnold had created two groups of dive bombers equipped with

an Air Corps version of the Navy’s A-24 “Dauntless.” He also

hastened the development of armor protection, self-sealing gas

tanks, and a 37 mm cannon. Most important, Arnold took

steps to provide effective air support for the armored units

that the Army was rapidly organizing.

General Arnold conferred with British military leaders in

April 1941. The British had embarked on a crash program of

tests and exercises that led to the “Directive on Close Support

Bombing” of 6 December 1940.37 A British organization, called

“Close Support Bomber Control” and staffed by both air and

ground officers, evaluated and responded to requests for air

support. Arnold sent a copy of the British plan to Army Chief

of Staff Gen George C. Marshall, recommending “strongly”

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

8
that the directive be sent to light-bomber commands and

armored divisions.38

The British scheme proved useful, but less so than a series

of tests conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, between

February and June 1941. These tests involved an armored

division, two infantry divisions, several pursuit and

light-bombardment squadrons, a parachute battalion, and

some cavalry units. The tests indicated that aviation support

involved “more centralized control” than did artillery support.

“Air Support Control” received requests for air support,

evaluated them, and ordered intervention when appropriate.

Also in 1941, the first extensive army-size exercises ever held

in the United States offered an excellent opportunity to

experiment with air support. Again, air support control

arranged for air support. This time, and for the first time, air

reconnaissance seemed to generate more profitable targets

than did ground reports.39

World War II

The Fort Benning tests resulted in Training Regulation 52

(29 August 1941), which established air-ground cooperation

parties (AGCP)—Air Corps advisers assigned to Army ground

units for advice on tactical air employment.40 Field Manual

(FM) 31-35 Aviation in Support of Ground Forces (March 1942)

amplified the role of these parties.41

James A. Huston discerned three categories of CAS in World

War II. The first category comprised large-scale operations

designed to concentrate massive firepower at a decisive

breakthrough point in the land battle. In the second category

were those special missions extending over a longer period of

time for a particular Army; for example, the protection

afforded. The third category included unsung and unheralded

specific missions that were flown at the request of ground

commanders. Ground commanders saw these missions as

bread-and-butter aspects of their own operational missions.42

As the fighting developed in Southern Tunisia in late 1942,

the relationship between air and ground forces became a

matter of concern to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Gen

Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in chief, Allied Forces

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

9
Northwest Africa. There was no centralized control of either

the tactical or the strategic air forces, and America’s air force

was more badly split than the Royal Air Force.43

Doctrine called for an air support command attached to an

army formation and directed by the ground force commander.

There was no concerted effort to gain air superiority over

the theater of operations, and the German Air Force (GAF)

controlled the air in Tunisia. Friendly losses were so high

that the mission of the air forces and the structure of the

command and control system had to change. Ironically,

Allied airpower had not only failed to achieve air superiority;

it had also failed to provide the CAS desired. German fighters,

by concentrating against small formations of US and British

fighters, made Allied air losses prohibitive. Not until the

Allies gained air superiority could they concentrate on

providing CAS.44 Air mission priorities became: (1) gain and

maintain air superiority at the front, (2) provide close support

for ground troops, and (3) interdict enemy supplies/

infrastructure.

A reorganization of airpower was approved in January 1943,

at the Casablanca Conference, with British air marshal Sir

Arthur Tedder commanding the new organization. Under

Tedder was Gen Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the Northwest

African Air Force, which consisted of Strategic Air Force,

Tactical Air Force, Coastal Air Force, and Troop Carrier

Command. All air elements were within a single structure and

capable of concentrating on the greatest challenge: gaining

control of the air and stopping the German advance.45

Naval aviation operating against targets assigned to tactical

or strategic forces also came under the theater air commander.

During the invasions of Sicily and Italy, the Tactical Air Force

commander controlled all airpower used to support the

operations.46 Even carrier forces not directly involved in fleet

air defense were under his operational control. This unity of

airpower was not only sound in theory; it stood the test of

battle and proved to be the most effective method for

controlling airpower in a theater of operations.47

As the full potential of ground-based air controllers on the

front lines became apparent, an experiment called Rover Joe

was implemented for the campaign in Italy. A veteran

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

10
fighter-bomber pilot was placed on high ground near an active

part of the Fifth Army’s front. He observed the front and

selected targets for Allied aircraft, which were assigned

directly to him in flights of four every 30 minutes. He

described targets and warned pilots about friendly troops and

enemy defenses in the area.48 Gen Mark Clark reported,

“Frequently, Rover Joe will put the bombs on targets within

1,000 yards of our troops, and not once have any of our men

been hurt.”49 Ninth Air Force employed a similar program in

the European Theater.

By the time of the Normandy invasion, numbered tactical

air commands had been created to work with each field army;

numbered air forces would work with Army groups. Gen Hoyt

Vandenberg’s Ninth US Air Force worked with Gen Omar

Bradley and the Twelfth Army Group. General Vandenberg

had three tactical air commands (TAC): IX, XIX, and XXIX.

Each worked with the field armies under General Bradley (1st,

3d, and 9th).

The British had a similar relationship between the Twentyfirst Army Group and the Second Tactical Air Force. Below the

tactical air force level, the British had an air group that was

approximately the size of a US tactical air command. Each

British and Canadian field army had an air group partner.

These similar organizations made it easier for operational

control to pass between the US Ninth Air Force and the

British Second Tactical Air Force (TAF). When British general

Bernard L. Montgomery had priority for a drive on the

northern flank, for example, units of the IX TAC were

temporarily under the second TAF.

Each tactical air command operated a joint operations

center (JOC) to provide command and control. The JOC was

run by the combat operations officer, who was an experienced

combat fighter pilot. A senior Army officer, a Naval liaison

officer (if the tactical situation so required), and various

intelligence officers followed the current air and ground

situation for the JOC.

A tactical air control center (TACC) executed the JOC’s

decisions and was responsible for all offensive and defensive

air missions within its geographical area to the range of its

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

11
radars. This organization was also used during the Korean

conflict.50

The closest thing to an airborne FAC in World War II was

the reconnaissance airplane. Modified fighters flew on

missions specifically designed to collect intelligence

information. Special tactical reconnaissance units (TRU) were

organized to perform systematic visual reconnaissance. When

a TRU aircraft discovered a target out of artillery range, it

called in strike aircraft and led them to the target (functions of

a modern-day FAC).51

Systems like Rover Joe contributed materially to the success

of air-ground operations, and doctrine absorbed these lessons.

A revised edition of FM 31-35, issued in August 1946, called

for TACPs, each composed of a FAC located near the front to

direct air strikes and an ALO collocated with the unit’s

command post, to advise the commander on the use of

airpower. The revised manual dictated that TACPs should be

assigned to each combat corps and division, and to

subordinate units. Although not entirely consistent on the

question of strike control, FM 31-35 did imply that air strikes

could be controlled by other aircraft.52

Notes

1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office

[GPO], 3 January 1972), 61; Woodford Agee Heflin, ed., The United States Air

Force Dictionary (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1956), 119–20.

2. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of

Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History [OAFH],

1990), 5.

3. Lee B. Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” in Cooling, 14.

4. Henri Mirande and Louis Olivier, Sur la Bataille: Journal d’un Aviateur

Francais a l’Armee Bulgier, au siege d’Adrianople (Paris, 1913); Kennett, 14.

5. Serge Laine, “l’Aeronautique Militaire Francaise au Maroc, 1911–

1939,” Revue Historique des Armees 5, no. 4 (1978): 107–19; Kennett, 15.

6. Cooling, 1.

7. Kennett, 13.

8. Anthony Robinson, Aerial Warfare: An Illustrated History (New York:

Galahad Books, 1982), 45.

9. Ibid., 46.

10. Peter C. Smith, Dive Bomber! An Illustrated History (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1982), 9.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

12
11. S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, the Official

History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press in cooperation with the Department of National Defense and the

Canadian government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services, Canada,

1980), 343–44.

12. Kennett, 16.

13. Georg Paul Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkrafte im Weltkrieg

(Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1920), 425; Kennett, 17.

14. H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in

the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937),

200–10.

15. Kennett, 18.

16. Jones, 473.

17. Jones, vol. 4, 434.

18. Wing Commander J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London:

Oxford University Press; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1936), 100.

19. Kennett, 25.

20. Ibid., 27.

21. Robinson, 48.

22. Kennett, 28.

23. Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the

Army, USAF Historical Study no. 92, M-U 27218, Air University Library,

Maxwell AFB, Ala.

24. Kennett, 30.

25. Air Corps Tactical School text, 1935–36, “Attack Aviation,” sec. 3, US

Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2: “The two-seater attack formation,

through its defensive fire from the rear cockpits, will be able to continue on

its mission unless opposed by greatly superior numbers of hostile pursuit

aviation.”

26. Smith, 71–72.

27. Slessor, 95.

28. Kennett, 37.

29. Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, “Provisional Manual of Operations,”

Maurer Air Service 2 (23 December 1918): 399.

30. Kennett, 43.

31. “Experiences with the Air Service in Minor Warfare,” lecture delivered

at the Army War College, 12 January 1929. Text in US Military History

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

32. Capt Charles W. Boggs Jr., “Marine Aviation: Origins and Growth,”

Marine Corps Gazette 34 (November 1950): 68–75.

33. “The Air Corps,” address to the Army War College, 8 October, 37, 10.

Text in US Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 10.

34. Ibid., 4.

35. Army War College text, 1937–1938, “Air Forces and War,” 44, US

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

13
36. Gen George H. Britt to Chief of Aeronautics Bureau, USN, letter, 8

June 1940, RG 18, Central Decimal Files, 1938–1942, Box 741, National

Archives (NA).

37. British War Office, “Directive on Close Support Bombing,” WO

106/5162, 6 December 1940.

38. Notation on Brief of Meeting, 17 April 1941, Reel 32, item 1344,

George C. Marshall papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington,

Va.

39. Comments for Critique, Second-Third Army Maneuvers, Louisiana,

September 1941, File “Maneuvers,” Box 224, H. H. Arnold Papers, Library of

Congress.

40. Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, “Close Support of the

Fifth Army” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1945).

41. Army Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces,

GPO, Washington, D.C., 9 April 1942.

42. James A. Huston, “Tactical Use of Airpower in World War II: The

Army Experience,” Military Affairs 14 (Winter 1950): 175–77.

43. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in

World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1949), 137.

44. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Air Force, January 1978), 40.

45. Arthur William Tedder, With Prejudice, the War Memoirs of Marshal of

the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), 393.

46. Craven and Cate, 496.

47. Momyer, 45.

48. “Close Support of the Fifth Army,” tab D.

49. Extract from press conference by General Clark, Commanding

General, Fifth Army, 2 October 1944; quoted in “Close Support of the Fifth

Army.”

50. Ibid., 258.

51. “Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical Air

Commands in the European Theater of Operations,” Army Air Forces

Evaluation Board in the European Theater of Operations, 1 March 1945, 27.

52. War Department FM 31-35, Air-Ground Operations (Washington,

D.C.: GPO, 2 August 1946).

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

14
Chapter 2

Close Air Support Doctrine

On the eve of the Korean War, a fundamental difference in

close air support (CAS) philosophy existed between the

Navy/Marines and the Air Force/Army. The Navy system was

subordinated to that of the Air Force during the Korean War,

but compromises were made on both sides. The philosophical

differences were not resolved in Korea, and they arose again in

the early days of Vietnam.

Fifth Air Force had made only minor changes to the system

since World War II. Except for changes in names, there was no

difference between World War II and Korean War

organizations. Fifth Air Force provided the same support for

Eighth Army in Korea as IX TAC had done for First Army in

Europe.1

Early Navy-Marine Close Air Support

The seeds of Navy CAS were planted in the 1920s during

Marine Corps action in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo;

airplanes and infantry functioned as a team for the first time

in military history.2

Navy-Marine Corps CAS was perfected during World War II.

Early in the Pacific campaign, properly controlled air attacks

would be a major asset in the successful prosecution of an

amphibious advance across the Pacific. Navy and Marine

officials believed airplanes could be a valuable “supporting

weapon” to help ground troops advance against the Japanese.

Navy-Marine doctrine had its battle test during the Tarawa

campaign in November 1943, when frontline units were

accompanied by air liaison parties. They assisted ground

commanders in selecting suitable targets and in transmitting

target information to aircraft pilots. Liaison aircraft were flown

by senior aviators who knew the ground plan and were in

radio contact with fighter-bombers. The system was improved

at Iwo Jima, but the final innovation—attack aircraft being

15
directed by frontline ground units—was not extensively used

until the Battle of Okinawa.

By the end of World War II, Navy-Marine CAS was fully

developed and battle tested. It had proved itself at Guam, at

Iwo Jima, and especially in Okinawa. Navy and Marine Corps

aircraft quickly and effectively delivered their bullets and

bombs on “close” targets under the direction of frontline

troops. This system was available and ready for use at the

outbreak of the Korean War.

Largely for economy, but also because existing fighter

aircraft were sufficiently versatile to provide either air defense

or tactical air support, the Air Force placed the air defense

command (ADC) and the tactical air command (TAC) under the

continental air command (CAC) in December 1948. The

reduced status of tactical air was not popular with the Army,

which informed TAC it was no longer satisfied with FM 31-35,

Air-Ground Operations.3 In May 1950, Maj Gen Thomas D.

White, director of legislation and liaison for the Air Force, was

told by Congress that the air support mission might have to be

given to the Marine Corps if the Air Force did not pay more

attention to it.4

Even without the significant technological developments

that were impending, the mobilization of additional Army and

Air Force units during the autumn of 1950 would probably

have forced the Air Force to reestablish a major Tactical Air

Command. On 1 August 1950, the Continental Air Command

assigned Ninth Air Force (tactical) and available

fighter-bombers, troop carriers, light bombers, and tactical

reconnaissance units to the TAC. On 15 November 1950, the

Air Force specified that TAC would “provide for Air Force

cooperation with land, naval, and/or amphibious forces.” On 1

December, it made TAC a major command directly responsible

to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.5 The vague

wording of TAC’s mission statement reflected a general

uncertainty about the Army-Air Force relationship.

Close Air Support in Korea

The battle at the Pusan perimeter revealed three differences

(philosophy, technique, and language) between the Air Force

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

16
and the Navy. Philosophical differences were at the root of the

disparity. The Air Force believed the proper priority for the

application of airpower was first on the sources of the enemy’s

war-making potential and second in the immediate battle area;

that is, (1) isolation of the battlefield should take precedence

over air strikes on the battlefield and (2) aircraft control must

never degenerate to individual ground commanders who had

limited perspectives of the battle.

The Navy never fully accepted the validity of the strategic

bombing concept—and Navy personnel doubted that

“strategic” targets could be neatly separated from “tactical”

targets. It was the Navy’s view that sufficient force of the

proper type should be applied to attain any given objective—

and CAS was regarded as indispensable for defeating the

enemy’s ground forces.6

The second major difference was in technique. Navy-Marine

CAS required that pilots be trained to recognize terrain and

understand the capabilities and limitations of ground arms.

With this knowledge and understanding, they could order

strikes very close to friendly forces. Marine pilots were

especially well trained in this respect; Air Force pilots did not

receive the same degree of training.

With regard to the control of airpower, the crux of the

difference was that the Marines had 13 tactical air control

parties (TACP) in a division: one for each battalion (nine), one

with each regiment (three), and one for the division itself. Any

of these could request and direct “close” air support. In

contrast, the Air Force provided only one TACP per regiment

(four for a division). The Marines believed the frontline

commander should be able to make his request directly to the

supporting agencies. A basic presumption was that unless

CAS was immediately available (10 to 15 minutes), its value to

the frontline commander was questionable. The Marine

controller was on the front lines with the troops. In contrast,

Air Force doctrine placed the air controller aloft in a

liaison-type aircraft with no close personal contact with the

ground commander. The Air Force emphasized central

control.7

The third difference was in the definition of “close air

support.” Each service provided CAS, but they viewed its

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

17
definition differently: “Air action against hostile ground or

naval targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require

detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and

movement of those forces.”8

To the Navy and Marine Corps, “close” is considered to be

50 to 200 yards immediately in front of friendly troops. The

Air Force considered “close” to mean within several thousand

yards of the front line . . . the distance to which field artillery

could effectively reach.9 What the Air Force defined as “close”

was given another description by the Navy: “deep.” The Air

Force did not perform what the Marines called “close” air

support.10

These differences were summarized by Lt Gen Lemuel C.

Shepherd, commanding general, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, in

1951: “We believe in providing for a small number of

on-station planes; the Air Force does not. We believe in

continuous direct communication between the frontline

battalion and the controlling air agency; the Air Force does

not. We believe that CAS of the frontline troops should take

precedence over routine interdiction missions; the Air Force

does not.”11

Air Force Philosophy in Korea

The CAS system used by the Air Force in Korea was derived

from the German technique used in World War II, in which

USAF planners saw a serious fault: The Luftwaffe was too

closely tied to ground forces. USAF and Britain’s Royal Air

Force (RAF) concluded that tactical airpower should be

controlled centrally and applied for the overall objective of

gaining control of the air. Only after control of the air had

been established should tactical air perform the secondary

role of close support.12

As for the mechanics of providing CAS, the Air Force system

depended on airborne controllers. A light liaison-type plane

would circle the frontlines area, spot enemy targets, and direct

the bombs and gunfire of other planes.13

When the Korean War began, the Air Force system of CAS

was not ready. The fundamental reason was that Washington

gave far greater importance and priority to strategic air than

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

18
to tactical air. Another factor was that training for CAS

operations was not among Far Eastern Air Force or Eighth

Army missions. No effort had been made within Fifth Air Force

or Eighth Army to erect a TAC system, train ground liaison

officers, stockpile equipment, or conduct air-ground

operations training.

Thus, the start of the Korean War saw two different systems

of CAS. The Air Force system had largely been developed in the

European theater, where the employment of aircraft was

coordinated at the Army level by two officers—one air, one

ground. Strike planes were assigned to particular missions as

approved by the joint operations center (JOC). Upon arrival at

the front, they were directed by airborne liaison-type aircraft.

CAS targets were those within the immediate battle zone

(within 10 miles). However, this system was not immediately

ready when the Korean War started.14

While there was interservice disagreement on CAS methods,

there was disagreement within the Air Force as to CAS’s

proper priority. General Vandenberg laid out his view on how

the air war should be fought: “No successful operations on the

surface can be conducted until you get air superiority. And

when you go against a hostile air force in order to gain that air

superiority, you must first destroy the enemy air force at the

place where he is most vulnerable, which is on the ground and

in his nest. . . . If you don’t do that, your attrition mounts in

arithmetical progression. Airpower . . . should go to the heart of

the industrial centers to become reasonably efficient. . . . In my

opinion, the proper way to use airpower is initially to stop the

flow of supplies and ammunition, guns, equipment of all

types, at its source. The next most efficient way is to knock it

out along the road before it reaches the front line. The least

efficient way is after it gets dug in at the front line.

Nevertheless, there are requirements constantly where the use

of airpower in close support is necessary.” For Vandenberg,

then, airpower’s priorities in Korea were (1) air superiority, (2)

interdiction, and (3) CAS.15

The Air Force could not adhere to its doctrine, however,

because the enemy’s war materiel originated in the Soviet

Union, which could not be attacked. This war materiel had to

be destroyed somewhere south of the Yalu River and, as a

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

19
rule, “the greater length of road and rail that you can get the

enemy from his main source of supply, the more advantageous

it is to the Air Force and, therefore, as you decrease it, it

becomes less advantageous. . . . As the distance between the

Yalu and our troops decreases, the effectiveness of our tactical

air forces decreases in direct proportion.”16

Gen Otto P. Weyland assumed command of the Far East Air

Forces (FEAF) on 10 June 1951. He saw airpower’s principal

task as preventing the Chinese armies from enveloping the

retreating United Nations (UN) ground forces. He therefore

ordered air interdiction strikes and concentrated CAS,

enabling friendly ground troops to withdraw into South

Korea.17

In the summer of 1950 and the winter of 1950–51, the

FEAF provided friendly ground troops with extraordinarily

large amounts of CAS. In the intervals between ground

battles, however, United Nations interdiction was directed

against the “middle miles” of the Korean transportation

system that supported the Chinese armies. Constant air

attacks against the overextended supply lines drained them of

their combat effectiveness. The massive ground attacks

mounted by the Chinese in January and April 1951 failed for

lack of logistical support.18

The Air Force feared that organizational diffusion might lead

to a loss in airpower’s inherent flexibility. Air Force thinkers

therefore questioned the wisdom of dividing airpower into

strategic and tactical arms. They also reexamined the mission

of tactical air forces. The Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground

Operations, issued in September 1950, stated that the mission

of tactical airpower was related to the strategy and maneuver

of ground forces. Late in 1950, however, the Air Force Deputy

Chief of Staff for Development suggested that tactical airpower

need not be related directly to the maneuver of friendly ground

troops. Tactical airpower, he said, might be employed directly

against enemy forces in the field without any friendly ground

forces being present. “In this new concept, tactical airpower

will be entering into direct combat with enemy ground

forces—not only supporting our ground forces in their fight

against the enemy ground forces. . . . Clearly, it is not

acceptable to relegate tactical air to only a supporting role. It

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

20
is no longer sufficient even to declare that tactical air and

ground forces cooperate equally. Rather, tactical air must now

be conceived as having a role in the battle against enemy

ground forces at times completely on its own.”19

Unable to secure additional air forces and faced with the

prospect of continuing an air war during the ground stalemate

in 1951, Weyland could see only two potential employments

for airpower: it could either be committed to close support

strikes along the front, where the enemy was dug in and

relatively invulnerable, or it could be concentrated against

interdiction targets in rear areas. Weyland favored the latter

and obtained agreement from Gen Matthew Ridgway,

commander in chief, UN Command, who was apprehensive

that the communists might take advantage of the respite in

ground fighting to build up frontline supplies for a renewed

ground offensive. Lt Gen James A. Van Fleet agreed to the

interdiction campaign, provided that his Eighth Army would

receive 96 CAS air sorties each day. Fifth Air Force and Eighth

Army then collaborated in planning a comprehensive air

interdiction campaign against North Korea’s railways. Begun

on 18 August 1951, the interdiction campaign took the Reds

completely by surprise and was initially very successful.20

In August 1952, General Clark held that any comparison

between the Army-Air Force and Marine systems of CAS was

faulty because the two systems were designed for completely

different types of functions and had different allocations of

forces.21 Fifth Air Force, Eighth Army, Seventh Fleet, and First

Marine Aircraft Wing representatives met in August 1953 to

review the war’s air-ground operations. They concluded that

“little attempt has been made . . . to reiterate previously

published doctrines and techniques which have been found

fundamentally sound and workable.”22

General Weyland knew that the outnumbered UN ground

forces in Korea never possessed a proper amount of artillery,

but believed that “FEAF and Fifth Air Force had provided

adequate CAS.”23 But FEAF’s final report contained a warning:

“Because FEAF provided UNC ground forces lavish close air

support in Korea is no reason to assume this condition will

exist in future wars.” In a future conflict, it said, the

fighter-bomber forces would be hard put to attain air

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

21
superiority—and air superiority would be more vital to the

success of all forces than close support would be.24

Navy/Marine Air in Vietnam

The interservice disagreement over CAS lingered through

the 1950s and into the 1960s, surfacing again during the

Vietnam conflict. Until July of 1966, the Navy maintained a

carrier off the coast of southern South Vietnam. Known as

Dixie Station, its aircraft were employed in III and IV Corps

under the control of the Seventh Air Force commander. They

therefore operated under the same tactical control procedures

as USAF fighters. In August 1966, the Dixie Station carrier

moved north to join the carriers at Yankee Station in the Gulf

of Tonkin. Navy and Marine Corps pilots flew predominantly in

I Corps, and a large number of the Navy’s sorties were flown

just above the demilitarized zone (DMZ ) where the enemy’s

entrenched artillery was a problem for US bases and outposts

along the southern edge of the demilitarized zone.25

When Marine ground units moved into South Vietnam in

March 1965, elements of a Marine Air Wing (MAW) moved with

them.26 The Third Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) had

reached full strength by early 1966. The First MAW provided

support for its divisions. Until February 1968, Marine air was

used almost entirely in I Corps to support the First and Third

Marine Divisions. The Marines established their own tactical

air control system. It scheduled all aircraft into each division

area on a planned flow. The system was designed for

operations in which a lack of artillery required airpower

overhead at all times, but it was a costly way to manage air

resources for sustained operations. And when the First and

Third Marine Divisions in I Corps settled down to sustained

ground combat, with the Army providing heavy artillery

augmentation, MAWs employed aviation as though they were

still conducting an amphibious operation.27 This arrangement

did not allow airpower to be concentrated on a decisive part of

the overall theater campaign.

Until 1968, Seventh Air Force had little influence on how

Marine air capability could be used to support other ground

force units. Marine sorties not used to support the Marine

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

22
divisions were made available to Seventh Air Force. But the

Marines provided few CAS sorties to the Air Force during this

period.

The issue of airpower control led to the assignment of

responsibility for controlling fixed-wing aircraft in South

Vietnam to the deputy commander for Air Operations, Military

Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV). With the buildup of

enemy forces in I Corps in 1968 and the movement of more US

Army units into the area, a change in the control of air

operations was inevitable. The commander (USMACV) had to

be able to turn to a single air commander for advice on when

and where to apply the assigned airpower. Thus, the Marine

system gave way to the Air Force system of centralized control.

Notes

1. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Air Force, January 1978), 258.

2. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea

(Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1957), 48.

3. Tactical Air Command, “Tactical Air Operations,” report to USAF

Review Board, 21 June 1949, 1–2.

4. Maj Gen Thomas D. White, memorandum to the Secretary of the Air

Force, subject: Air Support Mission, 4 May 1950.

5. History of Tactical Air Command, 1 July–30 November 1950, vol. I,

1-12; CONARC Reg. no. 26-1, Organization-Tactical Air Command, 11

August 1950.

6. Cagle and Manson, 71–72.

7. Ibid., 72.

8. Secretary of Defense, memorandum to chiefs of staff, subject: Close

Air Support, 21 April 1948. This same definition remains in Naval Warfare

Informative Publication (NWIP) 22–3.

9. Far East Air Force mission summary report, 16 November 1950.

Missions as far distant as 20 miles in advance of friendly forces were listed

as “close air support.”

10. In the period between 26 July and 3 September 1950, almost half of

the Navy’s CAS sorties were delivered outside the bomb line.

11. Cagle and Manson, 73.

12. Thus, the Army Air Force in the War Department publication FM

100-20, Command and Employment of Airpower, July 1943, para.16, stated

its opinion of close air support: “In the zone of contact, missions against

hostile units are most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in

general, least effective. Targets are small, well-dispersed, and difficult to

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

23
locate. In addition, there is always a considerable chance of striking friendly

forces. . . .”

13. Cagle and Manson, 50.

14. Ibid., 51.

15. Military Situation in the Far East, report to 82d Cong., 1st sess.,

1378–79, 1382, 1385, 1417, 1492.

16. Ibid., 1500–5.

17. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic

Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Air University, June 1971), 273.

18. Ibid., 274.

19. “What Can and Should the USAF Do to Increase the Effectiveness of

Air-Ground Operations?” Assistant for evaluation, deputy chief of staff for

development, USAF, Staff Study, December 1950, 6–7.

20. Futrell, 310–11.

21. Commander in Chief, Far East to CGs, Eighth Army, XVI Corps,

FEAF, and ComNavFE, letter, subject: Air-Ground Operations, 11 August

1952.

22. Report of Joint Air-Ground Operations Conference, Fifth Air Force,

8–22 August 1953.

23. Gen Otto P. Weyland, “The Air Campaign in Korea,” Air Force

Magazine, August 1954, 20.

24. FEAF Report, 126.

25. Momyer, 285.

26. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N. Y.:

Doubleday & Co., 1976), 109.

27. Momyer, 286.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

24
Chapter 3

Korea

Forward Air Controllers Emerge

The North Koreans anticipated no resistance from the

United States or other nations when they invaded South

Korea in June 1950. Further, they felt that any intervention

by others could not prevent them from accomplishing their

military objectives. They were wrong on both counts: FEAF,

the air component of the United States Far East Command

(USFEC), was in action over South Korea less than eight

hours after the UN voted to intervene.1

The United Nations Command (UNC) was organized soon

after hostilities began, with a mission to support the Republic

of Korea (ROK). In addition to US ground forces, the UNC

eventually incorporated ground units from Great Britain,

Canada, Turkey, Greece, Luxembourg, Ethiopia, France,

Belgium, the Philippines, Australia, Colombia, Thailand, New

Zealand, and the Netherlands. Augmenting FEAF units were

US Marine Corps and Navy air units as well as British,

Australian, South African, Greek, Republic of Korea, and Thai

air elements.

The ROK Air Force would be no help; its 16 trainers and

liaison aircraft had not a single bomb rack or machine gun

mount among them. Fortunately, the North Korean Air Force

was also weak; it numbered 62 Il-10 attack aircraft, about 70

Yak piston-engined fighters, and some support planes. Its first

combat saw its first defeat; five Yaks struck Kimpo airfield at

noon on 27 June 1950. Less than five minutes later, three

were burning on the ground. The first USAF kill was credited

to Lt William G. Hudson, an F-82G pilot of the 68th Fighter

All-Weather Squadron (FAWS). An hour later, four of eight

Il-10s were downed by F-80Cs from the 35th Fighter-Bomber

Squadron. That evening, President Harry S. Truman told Gen

Douglas MacArthur to send the Air Force and the Navy into

battle. MacArthur ordered Fifth Air Force (FAF) to hit targets

between the battle line and the 38th parallel. In less than one

25
month, the North Korean Air Force (NKAF) was obliterated and

the United States had control of the air.2

FEAF combat units consisted of 1,172 aircraft located

mainly in Japan, with single wings located on Okinawa,

Guam, and the Philippine Islands. One medium bomber wing,

one light bomber wing, and eight fighter squadrons were

committed to the Korean effort. Ten fighter squadrons

remained in defense of Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.3

The Fight for Air Superiority

FEAF began the war with 32 all-weather F-82Gs and 365

F-80Cs. From a stock of North American F-51 Mustang

fighters (World War II vintage, formerly designated P-51s) in

Air National Guard units, 145 were scraped together for

Korean service. FEAF agreed to step backwards; six of its

F-80C squadrons would convert to F-51s.

In early air fighting, the NKAF was weak, unskilled, and

inexperienced. But the Chinese began firing antiaircraft

artillery (AAA) at UN planes patrolling the Yalu area in August

1950 and, on 3 October 1950, Premier Chou En-lai said

Chinese troops would defend Korea if UN forces crossed the

38th parallel. MacArthur, however, told Truman it was very

unlikely that the Chinese would interfere. Besides, he assured

Truman, the Chinese had no air force. (FEAF had submitted

intelligence estimates crediting the Chinese with at least three

hundred combat aircraft, including jets.)

The Chinese finally yielded to UN air superiority. The UN air

forces ruled the daylight skies, throttled the flow of supplies

and war materiel, and slaughtered countless numbers of

Chinese soldiers. It was, finally, airpower that triumphed.4

With air superiority established early, the air effort was

committed to support of the hard-pressed ground forces. Close

support by air had to make up for a lack in artillery support.

Airpower enabled the ground forces to trade space for time and

prevented the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) from

accomplishing its mission.5

Consider the air war as three different, though related,

operations: the strategic bombing campaign, a short-lived

attack against short-lived targets; the interdiction campaign,

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

26
Figure 1. Korean Peninsula

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

27
which isolated the battlefield, cut supply and communications

lines, and supported the advance or retreat of UN ground

armies; and the air superiority campaign that pitted Sabres

against MiGs in aerial gunfights.6

Just as the air war can be viewed as three different

operations, the war itself can be viewed as having five different

phases. Let us now briefly examine those five phases.

Phase One—Retreat to Pusan

At the outbreak of hostilities, fighter-bomber squadrons

were deployed away from their home bases on training

exercises or joint maneuvers. Most of the pilots, having

recently survived an officer reduction-in-force from the

previous war, were experienced, stable, and seriously

aggressive. They were just getting adjusted to their new

airplanes when orders came to proceed with aircraft to bases

in southern Japan. All available fighter-bombers converged on

the Fukuoka area, where FAF established an advance

headquarters and a JOC at Itazuke Air Base, Japan.

The first fighter-bomber missions were dispatched on 28

June 1950, just three days after the war began. These

missions were in support of a hard-pressed UN Army that was

retreating toward southeastern Korea. They were mainly

armed reconnaissance missions aimed at blasting moving

columns of enemy equipment, supplies, and personnel.

Because F-51s were better suited for operating from rough

Korean fields, had more endurance at low-altitude, and used

less fuel than F-80Cs (and because F-51s and spare parts for

them were available from Air National Guard units), the

F-80Cs were replaced by F-51s.7

By mid-July, a JOC and a tactical air control center (TACC)

had been established at Taegu. Eighteen tactical air command

posts controlled strikes against the advancing enemy. Later,

airborne air controllers helped fighter-bombers find the most

lucrative targets. At best, all communication channels were

overloaded; the only control many missions had was the

information given pilots at briefings.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

28
Phase Two—Advance to the Yalu

As the UN ground forces regrouped and were resupplied at

Pusan, the North Korean forces, with their long supply lines

under attack by fighter-bombers, grew weaker. The breakout

from the Pusan perimeter and the amphibious landing at

Inchon in September 1950 set off a fast UN advance to the

Yalu. Here, as in the first phase, targets for the fighterbombers were plentiful: interdiction targets to slow down the

enemy’s progress, personnel and equipment targets to

demoralize and defeat him.

Phase Three—Second Retreat

On 24 November 1950, Eighth Army launched an all-out

attack near the Yalu River. Two days later, hordes of Chinese

counterattacked furiously on most of the western front. The

fighter-bombers devoted almost their entire effort to close

support of the hard-pressed UN ground troops. To support the

Third Marine and Seventh Infantry Divisions evacuating near

the Chosen Reservoir area and along the east coast,

fighter-bombers flew 736 combat sorties from 28 November to

20 December 1950.

Most FEAF squadrons were reequipped with F-80Cs, and

the jet proved to be a good ground-support airplane. Aircraft

control and communications gradually improved during the

first six months, even under what would normally constitute

adverse conditions. An adequate variety of VHF frequencies

reduced the early confusion that was generated by

overcrowding the air waves.

Phase Four—Main Line of Resistance Stabilized

Fighter-bomber attacks against the communists’ supply

lines permitted friendly ground forces to hold along a poorly

defined line south of the 38th parallel. Fighter-bomber units

flew reconnaissance missions. Pilots became thoroughly

familiar with their assigned areas and called in additional

aircraft when targets developed; they were able to stop the

communists’ supply effort during daylight hours. By March

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

29
1951, the UN forces were ready again to advance toward the

north and the requirement for close-support sorties increased.

Phase Five—Air Pressure for Peace

There were no significant changes in the main line of

resistance (MLR) during this period. Ground action by both

sides consisted of probing patrols and limited-objective

attacks. The communists were never able to launch another

major attack, and UN forces never attempted an offensive of

their own. The stagnant ground situation did not diminish the

fighter-bomber effort. In fact, the highest sustained sortie

rates of the war were flown in the closing months, and the

F-51s and F-80s were replaced by the fighter-bomber version

of the F-86 Sabre during the last six months of the war.

Improvements in control and communications contributed

to the increased effectiveness of the fighter-bombers. A

stabilized front permitted the installation of a complete tactical

control net as targets in the open became so rare and fleeting

that fast and dependable communications were essential for

aircraft to find them.8

A Substitute for Artillery

When Maj Gen William F. Dean’s 24th Infantry Division

engaged the North Koreans at Taejon early in July 1950, the

lightly armed American division needed effective close support

to make up for its lack of artillery. On 5 July, Gen Earl

Partridge, acting Commander of FEAF, sent a team to set up

and run a JOC at Taejon. Two TACPs had retreated from

Suwon to Taejon on the night of 30 June and were ready for

action when General Dean’s troops arrived.

During the critical days after 12 July, when the 24th

Division battled to hold Taejon, the entire FEAF—plus B-29s—

supported it. In fact, 61.5 percent of FEAF’s July sorties were

for close battlefield support. “Without question,” said General

Dean, “the Air Force definitely blunted the initial North

Korean thrust to the southward. Without this continuing air

effort, it is doubtful that the courageous combat soldiers,

spread thinly along the line, could have withstood the

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

30
onslaught of the vastly numerically superior enemy.” Dean’s

division could not hold against the five enemy divisions

attacking it, however, and the North Koreans captured Taejon

on 20 July. But the holding battle fought by the 24th Division

had given Eighth Army time to get more ground troops to

Korea. And FAF flew an average of 239 close-support sorties

each day during August, providing a brilliant example of

air-ground coordination at its best.9

Soon, the only important airfield open to the allies in Korea

was K-2 at Taegu. Only Dakotas and Mustangs could be used

there, but a Mustang squadron of the Republic of Korea Air

Force (ROKAF) flew from an airstrip at Chinhae. Flying from

the nearest air bases on Kyushu, Itazuke, and Ashiya, Japan,

F-80s could not spend more than 20 minutes over the

battlefield—but efficiency was greatly increased when the JOC

was set up.

In accordance with the theory that “effects accrue

geometrically as the force is increased arithmetically,” the Air

Force favored interdiction attacks on rear areas as the best

way to halt the North Korean offensive. But the demand for

close support intensified, and ground controllers directed fire

as close as 50 yards ahead of friendly troops while TACPs and

T-6 Mosquitoes ranged as far ahead as 10 miles.

Tactical aircraft had operated effectively against the

mechanized forces of the Axis powers in Europe, and they

were expected to do even better against the primitive Asiatic

armies. The contrary was the case, however, since the Korean

People’s Army was not dependent on mechanical transport.10

Korean laborers carried an A-frame harness on their backs.

Both North Korean and South Korean armies were able to

supply troops in rough terrain by use of the A-frame and long

columns of laborers.11

Close Air Support in Korea

CAS operations provided important fire support for UNC

ground troops. Operating under an umbrella of air superiority

(established early), UNC air operations deprived the

communists of free movement by day, forced them into a

massive program of field engineering, denied them supplies for

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

31
sustained offensives, and demoralized their troops. Three

American air organizations mounted tactical offensive air

operations: FEAF, principally FAF; First Marine Air Wing; and

the US Navy’s carrier air groups of the Seventh Fleet’s Task

Force 77. A limited number of South Korean and UN

squadrons also flew sorties under the control of FAF.

The Air Force provided two different types of close control:

the ground FAC of the TACP or an airborne tactical air

coordinator (A-TAC) flying in either a light observation aircraft

or a fighter-bomber.12 They guided attacking aircraft onto the

target and away from friendly troops through combinations of

voice communication, marking rockets, artillery smoke shells,

and electronic signals. Officers who directed air strikes were

pilots with prior experience in flying close-support sorties.13

The bomb line (the geographic limit for air strikes not under

positive control) tended to coincide with the outer limits of the

effective range of corps artillery. Since these limits were

normally established by the height of mountains, the ranges

were shorter than normal for heavy artillery. Nevertheless, the

bomb line normally was five to eight miles from the front lines.

The Army did not expect integrated CAS closer than this—and

the Air Force did not intend to deliver it except under

conditions of clearly marked targets and readily identifiable

friendly troop positions, positively observed direction from Air

Force ground or air controllers, near absolute safety from

friendly artillery fire, and only against targets that could not

be attacked with heavy artillery.14

Although tactical air operations gave UNC an important

advantage over its enemies, the value of CAS remained

controversial throughout the Korean War.15

The Extemporized Air War

From the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 until

the end of the year, air operations over the embattled

peninsula had all of the characteristics of a classic American

war in its early stages. Coordination between the services was

minimal while roles and missions became indistinct and

overlapping. Moreover, the lack of preparedness for war

ensured confusion, frustration, and inefficiency. Not until

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

32
January 1951 did UN air operations show a mature degree of

coordination. The first six months of the war also focused

attention upon the differences between Air Force and Marine

Corps CAS.

Verbal exchanges about CAS obscured some important facts

about the Korean air war in 1950. Among them is that air

superiority was established early, allowing Air Force planes to

fly some 41,500 interdiction and CAS sorties against North

Korean forces. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew another

13,000 sorties. Lt Gen Walton H. Walker, commander of US

Eighth Army, believed that tactical air support allowed the UN

to remain on the peninsula and then march toward the Yalu.

Tactical aviation provided the additional firepower that meant

the difference between defeat and victory.16

Maj Gen Edward Almond, MacArthur’s chief of staff and

commander of X Corps, had faith in the efficiency of

ground-based FACs. Although he recognized the utility of

airborne controllers, he regarded the ground FAC as essential

in ensuring that bombs hit enemy troops rather than friendly

ones. Almond also believed that the Air Force should dispatch

fighter-bombers to engage frontline regiments on a regular

schedule. (He did not fully appreciate all the difficulties FEAF

faced in providing timely and effective CAS in Korea.)17

FAF replaced the F-80Cs of six squadrons with the

propeller-driven North American F-51 Mustang, the all-around

workhorse of World War II. But the Mustang was a mixed

blessing—the modified F-80C or the more capable F-84E had

substantial advantages over the Mustang. The jets could

provide twice the sorties of the F-51 with only half the

maintenance time. In combat, the jets were less vulnerable to

ground fire. In 1950, Mustang losses to enemy action were

more than twice those of the jets. The jets carried the

eight-channel VHF radio while the Mustang had space for only

the four-channel radio.18 Finally, the Mustang’s liquid-cooled

engine was particularly vulnerable to ground fire.

The Need for Airborne FACs

The rough roads of Korea were very damaging to the ground

FACs’ old radio-equipped jeeps. Moreover, the TACPs could

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

33
seldom get far enough forward for maximum effectiveness

since the unarmored jeeps could not be exposed to enemy fire.

Army units were supposed to request air support missions

against specific targets through the JOC. But the 24th

Division, in retreat, could not identify enemy strong points

along the front lines. American ground troops badly needed

close support; yet jet fighters, limited to a short time at lower

altitude over the front lines, needed immediate targets.19

The technique of having a slower plane spot a target and call

in a jet to attack it was born in Korea on 9 July 1950. It was

conceived by Lt Col Stanley P. Latiolas, FAF operations officer,

when North Korean forces were battering small American and

ROK Army units. CAS was needed—in a hurry.20 On 9 July,

Lts James A. Bryant and Frank G. Mitchell brought two L-5G

liaison planes to Taejon modified with four-channel VHF

radios. Bryant and Mitchell, unable to get their radio

equipment to work, borrowed rides in two 24th Division L-17s.

Although Bryant was attacked by two Yaks over the road

between Inchon and Umsong, each airborne

controller—"Angelo Fox" and “Angelo George”—managed about

10 flights of F-80s during the day. There was some confusion,

since the fighter pilots had not been briefed to expect airborne

control, but the results brought the comment that it was “the

best day in FAF history.”21

The next day, 17 communist tanks were destroyed near

Chonui by F-80 shooting stars under the air control of Bryant

and Mitchell. Lt Col Merrill H. Carlton now took command of

this embryo unit, picked up a truckload of equipment, the

name “Mosquito,” seven new officers, and three enlisted

men.22

Lt Harold E. Morris brought a T-6 trainer aircraft to Taejon

(10 July) and demonstrated that this plane was best able to

perform airborne control. One thought was that the T-6 was

fast enough to survive enemy air attacks whereas the L-17 was

not. (North Korean Yaks had shot down several liaison-type

aircraft in the early stages of the war.) Lieutenant Colonel

Carlton, who arrived in Taejon on 11 July to direct the

airborne control detachment, appealed strongly for more of the

unarmed but speedy T-6s, each equipped with eight-channel

radio sets.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

34
The airborne controllers demonstrated their value during

their first few days of operations. They reconnoitered the front

lines, located worthwhile targets, and “talked” fighter-bomber

pilots to successful attacks against the enemy. “There was no

definite system,” said one of the early airborne controllers.

“The only thing we had was an aeronautical chart and a

radio. . . . We went into the back of the enemy lines and

reconnoitered the roads. . . . We saw some tanks, got on each

radio channel until we got fighters in the Chochiwon area and

any fighter who heard us would give us a call and we would

give them the target.”23

The outfit that did not exist on the books “chartered itself” at

Taejon airstrip. By the end of July, the handful of pilots had

flown 269 sorties and piled up 670 hours over the front.

Commendations and compliments poured in from 24th

Infantry Division and the ROK Army. As a result, Colonel

Carlton’s unit picked up administrative, intelligence,

 T-6 “Mosquito”

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

35
engineering, maintenance, and supply sections, and was given

official status.24

Immediately after concluding their missions, the airborne

controllers went into Taejon City for interrogation by the

combat operations section. They furnished current locations of

friendly and hostile troops to the combat operations officers.

On 13 July, Carlton moved the airborne control function back

to Taegu airfield, where he received additional T-6 aircraft and

more pilots. Although the organizational status of the airborne

controllers remained anomalous, they soon gained a popular

name. In a 15 July FAF fragmentary operations order (FRAG),

the airborne controllers were given radio call-signs of

“Mosquito Able,” “Mosquito Baker,” and “Mosquito How.” The

unit was commonly called the “Mosquito” squadron, the

controllers and their planes “Mosquitoes.”25

FAF’s jet fighter-bomber wings were based in southern

Japan, too far from the targets to spend much time looking for

frontline objectives. Flying from Itazuke, for example, the 27th

Wing’s F-84 Thunderjets were able to spend only 30 minutes

at the bomb line.26

Seeking to overcome this problem, the 8th and 51st Fighter

Groups staged their F-80s through Taegu Airfield. The

shooting stars usually flew a first mission from Japanese

bases, returned to Taegu for rearming and refueling, and then

flew a second mission from Taegu before returning directly to

Japan. By using Taegu for a staging base, FAF overcame many

of its operational problems—but dependence upon a single

base for such heavy operations carried an element of

calculated risk.27

Two additional factors worked together to alleviate the

F-80’s range problem. First, the airborne controllers had

enemy targets pinpointed for attack when the faster flying

F-80s arrived at the scene. Second, most of the F-80

squadrons soon secured “Misawa” external fuel tanks.

28

Beginning on 26 July, Navy and USAF pilots worked

together in support of Eighth Army. Some 60 carrier-based

pilots reported to the JOC and were sent to the frontline

Mosquitoes, who controlled their attacks. Everyone seemed

satisfied, or nearly so. For example, General Walker called for

a continuation of the fine work while Vice Adm Arthur D.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

36
Struble, commander of Seventh Fleet, reported that the

Mosquito control planes had done an excellent job but

appeared to be numerically insufficient to handle both carrier

and land-based planes. During the next three days, Task

Force 77 (which continued to support Eighth Army) effected a

workable solution to the frontline control problem. Navy

controllers joined the Mosquitoes and remained on-station

with them for up to four hours. Navy attack planes were

controlled by either Air Force or Navy controllers, whichever

were available. Navy pilots checked out with “Mellow” control

and made oral reports on their mission. When the task force

withdrew for replenishment, the Navy operations officer told

the JOC that the way Navy pilots had been employed was very

effective.29

Command and Control Support

At the outbreak of Korean hostilities, the USAF possessed

only one tactical control group (TCG). It moved quickly from

Langley AFB, Virginia, to Korea, but it was not ready to begin

operations until early October. FEAF had been committed to a

static deployment for the air defense of Japan—a mission that

required offensive tactical air operations. Nevertheless, FEAF

worked out an interim control organization for Korea with

commendable ingenuity. The Eighth United States

Army-Korea (EUSAK) made its requests for air support directly

to FAF Headquarters, which honored those requests within its

means and reported excess requirements to FEAF with an

information copy to the new FEAF bomber command. FEAF

directed the bomber command to furnish the support FAF

could not provide. General Partridge’s tactical air force

furnished most of the improvised control organization.

The control system was severely hampered by a lack of

experienced controllers and a crippling shortage of

communications channels. The JOC was relocated near

EUSAK headquarters at Taegu on 14 July. Sufficient

equipment had arrived by 19 July to establish a full-scale

JOC-TACC, except for radar and direction-finding facilities.

Advance Headquarters, FAF, opened at Taegu on 20 July,

bringing command and control together at one location. The

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

37
forward element in the control system was the TACP. Six

TACPs were flown from Japan to Korea and were on hand

when the 24th Division opened at Taejon on 4 July.

FAF would ultimately provide a minimum of four TACPs to

each division. A TACP was allotted to each ROK division and to

each ROK corps to advise the ground commanders on air

capabilities for close support. Under normal circumstances,

ground units were supposed to select targets for CAS. But

Eighth Army was often unable to identify enemy strong points.

FAF, therefore, began using T-6 advanced trainer aircraft to

spot targets behind enemy lines. It activated the 6147th

tactical control squadron, airborne, to furnish the airborne

controllers.30

6132d Tactical Air Control Group

On 23 July 1950, the 6132d tactical air control group

(TACG) took over control station “Mellow.” Its principal duty

was to supply the radio communications required by the JOC

and the Mosquitoes.

31 The 6132d also absorbed the TACPs in

Korea and assumed responsibility for providing additional

TACPs to the expanding Eighth Army. Existing doctrine

specified no set number or allocation of TACPs, so their

operations would depend on the need for CAS. In Korea,

General Partridge allocated one TACP to each US infantry

regiment and higher unit headquarters, and to each ROK

division and corps. As quickly as the Far East Air Materiel

Command could fabricate them, the 6132d group provided

additional radio-control jeeps along with radio operators and

mechanics. Some FACs were obtained from the United States

but most came from FAF’s tactical groups (which were

required to provide combat pilots initially for three weeks’

temporary duty as FACs).32

6147th Squadron Organized

The airborne controllers proved their worth from the first

day they flew over Korea, but the airborne control function

continued in an anomalous organizational status until the

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

38
“Mosquito” unit was organized on 1 August as the 6147th

tactical control squadron-airborne [TCS-A).

Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlton, the

6147th was assigned directly to FAF at Taegu airfield. Eighth

Army had begun to attach observers to the “Mosquito”

squadron in late July. Riding in the back of T-6s, these Army

observers added a ground soldier’s view to the aerial control

function. And the Mosquitoes continued to serve as the “eyes

of the JOC,” even though their primary duty was to control air

strikes. They remained on station for nearly three hours at a

time and messaged observations to the TACC. When the

reconnoitered areas were too distant from Taegu to allow

direct line-of-sight VHF communications, a plane called

“Mosquito Mellow” orbited at an intermediate point and

relayed messages to the TACC.33

General Partridge placed “considerable stress” on attaching

experienced Air Force officers to liaison duty with Eighth Army

C-47 “Mosquito Mellow”

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

39
and Task Force 77 units. Their mission was to advise the

ground-unit commander on air matters.

Immediate Air Requests

In theory, the procedure for handling requests for immediate

air support was as follows: a battalion commander prepared a

request and dispatched it through regimental headquarters to

the G-3 air officer division. G-3 assigned priorities and, after

conferring with the air liaison officer (ALO) and the artillery

coordinator, sent the requests to the JOC; the requests were

monitored by the G-3 air officer at corps headquarters, who

approved or disapproved the air strike.

In the summer of 1950, however, Eighth Army was unable

to establish this communications net. “The Army had no

equipment available,” explained the G-3 air officer at the JOC.

“We had no strike-request nets. Everything was in the United

States.”34 Regimental commanders soon learned, however,

that the TACPs could pass a mission request to a Mosquito,

who could relay the request to the TACC. This soon became

the accepted communications route for air-support requests.

Mosquitoes Assigned to Divisions

Mosquito controllers were assigned a geographical section at

first, but ground commanders soon took a proprietary interest

in the Mosquitoes and were reluctant to let the controllers out

of sight. The notion that a Mosquito “belonged” to a division

became emphatic after 12 August, when the Mosquitoes

assumed radio call-signs that coincided with division

call-signs. Thus, the Mosquito Cavalry Division called itself

“Mosquito Wildwest.” Airborne controllers were restricted to

limited areas over the front lines, and less thought was given

to the enemy’s buildup 15 to 30 miles behind the lines. Under

these circumstances, Mosquito controllers met situations in

which rights of jurisdiction came into play.35

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

40
Mosquito Mission Expands

As soon as it could obtain the necessary aircraft and

controllers, FAF assigned additional Mosquitoes to locate

targets in the enemy’s buildup areas behind the front.

Mosquito controllers working behind enemy lines reported

targets through the Mosquito relay aircraft, then controlled

armed reconnaissance aircraft as the JOC dispatched them.

In August 1950, Mosquito controllers began using

“walkie-talkie” radios to talk directly with tank columns and

forward ground patrols. As the ground columns forged ahead,

Mosquitoes hovered above them and covered the fronts and

flanks of the columns.36

Of some importance were a number of spontaneous

Mosquito attempts at psychological warfare. On 1 October, for

example, Mosquito pilot Lt George W. Nelson spotted about

two hundred enemy troops 10 miles northeast of Kunsan.

Some were in uniform, some in civilian clothes. Nelson

dropped a message to them in an improvised container, saying

that they should go to the top of a nearby hill and wait until

UN troops arrived if they wished to surrender. A second

message instructed the men to throw away their arms and

wave flags if they accepted these terms (Nelson signed the note

“MacArthur”). Soon thereafter, several flags were seen waving

on the hill. The Mosquito pilot notified the ground controller,

who sent troops forward to take the prisoners in what may

have been the first case of enemy troops surrendering to an

aircraft.37

On another occasion, a Mosquito flushed an enemy T-34

tank with a very low pass and forced it out onto an open road.

With the assistance of four F-51s, the Mosquito forced the

tank to UN lines, where it was captured. Other Mosquito pilots

experimented with various types of noisemakers designed to

terrify enemy troops, but these attempts were abandoned due

to a lack of research and development facilities. 38

The 502d Tactical Control Group

Early in the war, General Weyland, who had commanded

XIX Tactical Air Command in Europe in World War II, came to

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

41
Tokyo to assume the position of vice chief of operations, FEAF.

General Weyland brought Col James E. Ferguson to be his

deputy. At FAF headquarters, General Partridge received

similar assistance from newly arrived Col Gilbert L. Meyers,

who became FAF Deputy Commander (operations). Weyland,

Ferguson, and Meyers began organizing a doctrinally correct

and operationally effective Air Force CAS system.

On 7 October, the 6132d tactical air control group was

disbanded. Most of its personnel were used to form the 6132d

aircraft control and warning squadron (ACWS) of the 502d

TCG. One squadron manned the TACC at Seoul, the others

opened tactical air direction centers (TADC) at Kimpo, Taegu,

and Taejon. These TADCs provided radar early warning and

direction finding, but were given no responsibility for

managing the offensive fighter effort. Also in early October, the

20th Signal Company’s air-ground liaison arrived from the

United States and reported to Eighth Army. This signal

company began to furnish the long-needed tactical air request

communications net between divisions, corps, and the JOC.39

These tactical air control units greatly improved air-ground

and tactical air operations but there was still work for the

Mosquitoes. To get the T-6 controllers closer to the front, the

6147th TCS moved north from Taegu—first to Kimpo on 5

October, and then to Seoul Municipal Airfield (K-16) on 18

October.40

With his JOC at full efficiency, Colonel Meyers reinforced

the 6147th TCS and gave the 502d TCG control of the ground

TACPs. Another change affected Army liaison aircraft, whose

normal reconnaissance and artillery-spotting duties had

broadened to include requesting and directing air strikes. But

having too many spotters caused problems: one midair

collision (between an Army L-19 and a fighter-bomber) and

many near misses.41

In order to provide more controllers and a more logical

organization, FAF undertook a general reorganization of the

Mosquito and tactical air control functions. The 6147th

tactical control group (provisional) was established on 25 April

1951. It included the 6148th and 6149th TCS-A, the 6150th

Tactical Control Squadron-Ground (TCS-G), and three support

squadrons: maintenance, medical, and air base. The two air

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

42
control squadrons would provide Mosquito controllers, the

ground control squadron would provide enlisted personnel and

equipment.42 FEAF had finally developed and put in place an

efficient tactical air control system.

Notes

1. Otto P. Weyland, “The Air Campaign in Korea,” in James T. Stewart,

Airpower: The Decisive Force In Korea (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc.,

1957), 5–6.

2. David A. Anderton, The History of the US Air Force (New York:

Crescent Books, 1981), 141.

3. Weyland, 6.

4. Anderton, 146.

5. Weyland, 9.

6. Anderton, 143.

7. Col Charles G. Teschner, “The Fighter-Bomber in Korea,” in James T.

Stewart, Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea (New York: D. Van Nostrand

Co. Inc., 1957), 108.

8. Ibid., 109–13.

9. Robert F. Futrell, “The Korean War,” in Alfred Goldberg, A History of

the United States Air Force: 1907–1957 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc.,

1957), 246–47.

10. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s Press,

1964), 50.

11. William M. Cleveland, Mosquitoes in Korea (Portsmouth, N. H.: The

Mosquito Association, Inc., 1991), 200.

12. For purposes of this analysis, the term FAC refers to the Airborne

Tactical Air Coordinator. A ground FAC is a member of the tactical air

control party at the front lines.

13. War Department Field Manual 31-35, Air-Ground Operations

(Washington, D.C., 1946); Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine for

Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, 1973), 21–25.

14. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1907–1964 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

1971), 182–203; History Branch, Program Division, Combat Development

Command, US Army, “History Survey of Army Fire Support,” 18 March

1963, section I.

15. Alan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950–1953,” in J. Farmer and M. J.

Strumwasser, eds., The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller: An

Analysis of Mosquito Operations in Korea, RAND report RM 5430PR (Santa

Monica, Calif.: RAND, October 1967), 345.

16. Operations Research Office, Headquarters FEC, memorandum,

ORO-R-3 (FEC), subject: Close Air Support Operations in Korea: Preliminary

Evaluation, 1 February 1951; Headquarters FEAF, Report on the Korean

War, vol. 1, 1953, 10–12, 62–63.

KOREA: FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS EMERGE

43
17. Far East Command, memorandum, subject: Control of Tactical Air

Support, 9 June 1950, in “Korean War Miscellaneous,” RG 6, MacArthur

Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.

18. Marcelle Size Knaack, comp., Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft

and Missile Systems, vol. I, Post-World War II Fighters (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1978).

19. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea (New York: Duell, Sloan,

and Pearch, 1961), 80.

20. Cleveland, 11.

21. History of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne),

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, July 1950).

22. Cleveland, 11.

23. Futrell, The Air Force in Korea, 83.

24. Cleveland, 11.

25. History, 6147th, Barcus Board Report, bk. 2, app., Office of Air Force

History, 84.

26. Lt Col William E. Bertram to commander, 27th Fighter-Escort Wing,

letter, subject: Tactical Evaluation Board, 15 March 1951.

27. History of the 49th Fighter-Bomber Group (Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History, 1951).

28. Barcus Board Report, bk. 3, appendix, 220–21.

29. Rees, 50.

30. Cleveland, 33–34.

31. History of the 6132d Tactical Control Group (Washington, D.C.: Office

of Air Force History 1950).

32. Message AX-9684, Commanding General, Far East Air Force to

CINCFE, 29 August 1950.

33. History, 6132d.

34. Barcus Board Report, bk. 2, appendix, 84.

35. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 108–09.

36. Ibid., 164.

37. Message, AX-1769B, Commanding General, Far East Air Force, to

Headquarters, US Air Force, 2 October 1950.

38. Cleveland, 202.

39. Barcus Board Report, bk. 2, appendix, 580.

40. History, 6132d.

41. Millett, 368.

42. Lt Gen J. A. Partridge to Lt Gen J. A. Van Fleet, Commanding

General, Eighth US Army Korea, letter, subject: Joint Air-Ground

Operations Board; History, 6147th.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

44
Chapter 4

Mosquito Operations in Korea

The first comprehensive airborne forward air controller

program was developed in Korea. Initiated almost immediately

upon the outbreak of hostilities, the program grew from a

makeshift, very specialized operation to a large, generalized,

highly successful program. Within six months, the concept of

the airborne FAC had been proven and appropriate techniques

had been formulated.1 The FAC in Korea had a vital mission,

but it did not survive in doctrine or organization; it would have

to be “reinvented” a decade later in Vietnam.

The FAC concept had been partially accepted by the Air

Force prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Doctrine

permitted—but did not dictate—the use of airborne FACs in

air-ground operations. No equipment had been allocated, and

no FAC squadron had been assembled; the airborne FAC

existed only in theory.

Initially, the FAC function was strike control—matching

high-performance aircraft with fast-moving targets. To this was

soon added the responsibility for performing visual

reconnaissance (VR) over the front lines. Later, the FAC was

given the additional responsibility of calling in strike aircraft for

immediate close air support. The airborne FAC became the focal

point of the tactical air control system (TACS), but was still

considered temporary. FACs flew in improvised fighter-trainers

and grew from squadron to group size, but were still considered

transitory. In fact, the stature of the airborne FAC in Air Force

doctrine never changed from 1946 to 1966.2

The Role of the Mosquito

The first tactical FAC mission pilots were simply instructed

to make flights over the front lines, locate targets, and direct

friendly fighter attacks.3 Mosquito commander Lt Col Merrill

Carlton was more specific; in July 1950, he told his unofficial

organization that their mission was to conduct tactical

reconnaissance of frontline dispositions, monitor enemy lines

45
of communication, control air strikes near friendly troops, and

control preplanned air strikes as directed by Eighth Army.

4

The official title given the Mosquitoes was “Tactical Air

Coordinator-Airborne” (TAC-A). This was in keeping with the

terminology of Field Manual (FM) 31-35 and Air Force

doctrine, and is the title still used. In current operations,

however, they are almost exclusively called airborne FACs and

this nomenclature will be used here.

When the unit was officially formed on 1 August 1950, the

role of the Mosquito was expanded: “The mission of the

Mosquito primarily consists of providing airborne tactical air

control over the front during all daylight hours and at other

times, as directed. In accomplishing this mission, the Mosquito

directs fighter aircraft to specific targets as outlined by ground

controllers or in accordance with visual observations and on the

basis of prebriefed information. In addition, the Mosquito

performs reconnaissance flights over enemy-held territory and

acts as airborne liaison when necessary.”5

The squadron’s commitment was not the extent of its

activities, however. As new needs became apparent, the

Mosquito was called upon to perform new functions. Perhaps

most important was the expansion of his VR role. Among the

“special” missions flown by the squadron were identifying

guerrilla units, performing penetration reconnaissance deep

behind enemy lines, distributing leaflets, performing early

evening and dawn reconnaissance designed to limit North

Korean night activities, and transporting dignitaries and

correspondents.

Throughout the remainder of 1950, the flexibility of the

Mosquito was demonstrated. As the significance of the

Mosquito’s role became more obvious, planners began

including airborne FACs in ground operations. For example, a

large-scale evacuation of Chinnampo called for three T-6s to

rotate coverage,6 and a paradrop of the 187th Regimental

Combat Team was controlled by Mosquitoes.7 By October

1950, the list of “special” duties included providing

continuous cover for convoys, reconnaissance of areas behind

advancing UN lines searching for bypassed North Korean

People’s Army (NKPA) troops, directing loudspeaker-carrying

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

46
C-47 “voice” missions, covering the advances of small units,

and providing transportation for isolated ground FACs.

In November, a FAC dropped a radio by parachute to an

isolated ground controller while another picked up a member of

the Korean Military Advisory Group who was stranded at an

airstrip under heavy fire.8 By December, the capabilities of the

Mosquito had become well known. Its assignments that month

included deep reconnaissance to locate an enemy roadblock,

night reconnaissance missions to monitor nocturnal enemy

supply activities, and special weather missions.9

In five months, the Mosquitoes had gone from official

nonexistence to a position of prominence. Ground commanders

depended on them—and assumed that the Mosquitoes would fly

if any planes flew. While fighters came in spurts, the Mosquito

was on station during all daylight hours.10 The airborne FAC

had become associated with good CAS.

Forward Air Controller Equipment

When the airborne FAC was born, the first plane used was the

L-5, which was already in use by the Army for artillery spotting.

It was considered largely unsatisfactory, however, and Colonel

Carlton issued a plea for the T-6 Texan to replace the L-5. The

T-6 became the FAC aircraft for the duration of the conflict, but

discussion continued over the “dream” FAC aircraft.

While the T-6 was not ideal, it did possess many of the

characteristics of a good FAC aircraft. It was relatively simple,

easy to maintain, and durable. Modifications of the airframe

were easy, and each T-6 in the 6147th Squadron averaged

5.65 hours in the air per day in 1950, adding to the

dependability of Mosquito operations. The T-6’s low stall speed

enabled it to loiter, giving observers a better view of the battle

area. It had relatively good maneuverability and its top speed

of 210 MPH gave it some ability to respond to emergencies.

The T-6’s short takeoff roll11 made it a candidate for basing

near the front and for emergency rescues.12

One critical feature for any FAC aircraft is the wing.

Because observation of the ground is essential, the low wing of

the T-6 was considered an obstacle. Mosquito pilots frequently

did much of their visual reconnaissance in a continuous

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

47
bank.13 High-winged aircraft afforded excellent downward

visibility in level flight, but visibility was restricted in turns.14

A second critical feature is ruggedness. Since low-level

flying made FAC aircraft vulnerable to enemy fire, most

observers favored a two-engine design. They felt that the

second engine represented an additional margin of safety.15

This proposition is questionable, however, since there is no

evidence that a second engine would have saved a single FAC

casualty in 1950.

Navigational aids are also critical features in a FAC plane,

and the Mosquito mission suffered from their absence. This

problem was worse when the front lines were far from the

base and when there was bad weather. In addition, night

operations were precluded by the lack of navigational aids.

During November 1950, the weather was almost continually

poor—and one coast of Korea might be clear while the other

was overcast.16 Smoke and haze presented problems,

especially in the north, where mountain peaks eight thousand

to nine thousand feet high were often obscured.17

VHF-Omnirange (VOR) and tactical air navigation (TACAN)

were not available in 1950s Korea.

Some observers thought FAC aircraft should be armed.

Their argument was based on three factors: (1) the increasing

incidence of ground fire, (2) the cumulative frustration of

sighting transient targets when no strike aircraft were

available, and (3) the occasional success of the marking rocket

with white phosphorous warhead as an offensive weapon.

Furthermore, once the aircraft was on station, the cost of

providing a moderate offensive capability was negligible.

The potential for a limited offensive capability was

demonstrated in at least two instances. Lt Chester T. Kochan

and his observer, Lt Frank H. Armstrong, made the first claim.

They noted tracks leading to a pile of brush at the foot of a hill

and flew low to investigate. They saw a partially camouflaged

vehicle under the brush, but their radio failed and they were

unable to direct fighters to the area. “We sure hated to see the

Reds escape, so we tried an experiment,” Kochan said. “We

wondered what damage a few of our marking rockets would do

to the vehicle, so we fired five of them at the vehicle and

managed to set it afire. It sure was a pretty blaze.”18 On the

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

48
second occasion, a frustrated Mosquito pilot, unable to

contact fighters, knocked out an enemy machine gun position

with his smoke rockets.19

On the other hand, many observers argued against

ordnance on FAC aircraft. They questioned the necessity of

armed FACs, and they wondered how armament might affect

the FAC program. In the first place, they argued, FAC planes

would not be able to carry and deliver sufficient ordnance to

have significant effects. A second argument was that a strike

capability would require a more expensive and elaborate FAC

aircraft, thereby compromising its simplicity.20

On occasion, Mosquitoes made small contributions even

without ordnance. In late November 1950, Vic Cole and Lew

Neville decided to make a pass on two North Korean soldiers

crossing a river in a boat. Cole dove down to an altitude where

his prop was kicking up spray and headed right for them. “I

went right over the boat and when we looked back it was

empty,” Cole recounts. “We circled around for a while and they

didn’t get back in the boat, but hung on the side and slowly

made the shore. If they didn’t freeze, I’ll bet they had a bad

cold.”21

The discussion on arming the FAC included which types of

ordnance to use and there was general agreement the aircraft

should have machine guns. The operations research office

(ORO) suggested two .50-caliber guns with 400 rounds per

gun,22 but considered .30-caliber acceptable.23 In addition, a

light load of either bombs or rockets was recommended. ORO

suggested mixing high-velocity airborne rockets (HVAR) with

marking rockets when not carrying small bombs.

Visual Reconnaissance

The earliest phase of visual reconnaissance called for a pilot

to fly near the front in search of CAS targets. In an attempt to

systemize tactics, Mosquitoes were assigned to Army divisions.

They were to reconnoiter the area in which their division was

fighting and to coordinate strikes with a regimental or divisional

TACP. A rotation plan permitted each division to have a

Mosquito on station from sunrise to sunset.24

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

49
While both TACPs and Mosquitoes were responsible for

finding targets, they were found almost exclusively from the

air.25 In the first 18 months, 93 percent of all CAS strikes were

controlled from the air.26

Convinced that a full-scale commitment to a systematic

program of deep-penetration visual reconnaissance would be of

value, Carlton submitted a proposal to fly 90 sorties a day, 15 at

a time during all daylight hours, six operating within the bomb

line, six immediately behind enemy lines, two performing

“special” VR, and one to oversee the entire operation. The plan

was rejected.27

Although not authorized to perform “deep-penetration”

reconnaissance, the Mosquitoes conducted VR in areas

immediately behind enemy lines. All “area reconnaissance”

had to be under the operational control of the ground

commander—and commanders were reluctant to allow the

Mosquito to stray out of sight for fear their units might

suddenly need air support.28 Consequently, the enemy’s

logistics were relatively unhampered except in the immediate

vicinity of the front. The NKPA and communist chinese forces

(CCF) moved freely deep behind the front lines.

As the 6147th Squadron’s strength increased, it was able to

introduce more deep reconnaissance missions. By December

1950, Mosquitoes had begun a fledgling deep-VR program.

Mosquitoes assigned to a specific division were given greater

freedom to roam further behind the lines and special missions

were added to patrol fortuitous points of interdiction.29 The

airborne FACs saw their role develop from a limited

target-finding mission within the bomb line to a broad VR

program that supported nearly all tactical functions of the Air

Force in Korea.

The Tactical Air Control System

The TACS was the mechanism that matched targets with air

resources. The Mosquito was an emergency appendage to the

TACS and a by-product of the system’s deficiencies. The TACS

described in the 1946 revision of FM 31-35 incorporated World

War II lessons. These lessons were not always applicable to Korea,

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

50
however, where the allies depended on immediate air support

to halt a mercurial enemy advance and avert imminent defeat.

The Air Force section (combat operations) of the JOC had

control over tactical air resources. Requests coming to the

Army section (air-ground operations) of the JOC were

processed and given to the tactical air control center (TACC),

where they were matched to specific aircraft.30 Not until the

airborne FAC was given greater responsibilities did a

genuinely efficient TACS develop.

The Army was given the task of developing a CAS request

network, but it never materialized because of a lack of

communication equipment and personnel. The Air Force

attempted to establish a signal unit comprised of air liaison

officers,31 but frequent radio breakdowns caused abandonment

of the project.32

In the absence of a genuine air request network, the Army

attempted to forward requests by landline or radio over the

divisional command network or the artillery communications

network. When units were extended beyond the limits of these

systems, however, requests were relayed by Mosquitoes. This

procedure worked so well it became the standard technique

for submission of immediate CAS requests. The Army’s

inability to supply an air request network and the fact that a

large proportion of the requests originated from Mosquito

sightings, placed a heavy responsibility on the airborne FACs

to procure close support. The situation was not alleviated

until early 1952 when the Army replaced their obsolete radios

with a radioteletype system.33

Theoretically, strike aircraft were allocated by a daily

apportionment of resources called a frag order. This order

listed aircraft available for close support, interdiction,

reconnaissance, transport, airlift, search and rescue, air

defense, and tactical control. For preplanned missions, the

frag order specified the targets each aircraft was to hit. For

immediate missions, like CAS, the frag order simply stated

when the aircraft was to come on duty. These aircraft could be

scrambled by the JOC, a procedure that was supposed to give

the UN forces the flexibility to meet any contingency.

Practice fell short of theory because communications to

Japan were not dependable. Consequently, the air bases in

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

51
Japan simply scrambled one mission every 15 minutes.34 This

system left much to be desired, as the enemy sensed that the

TACS was in trouble.

35 When ground action was heavy, there

was not enough air support to go around; when the front lines

were placid, aircraft began to stack up and the TACC released

them to perform armed reconnaissance.

The problem was entirely one of communications. The

Mosquitoes served as “eyes” for the TACS and remained in radio

contact with the TACC while on station. This permitted the

center to continuously monitor the entire front and use strike

aircraft efficiently.36

Mosquito Mellow

The most significant Mosquito contribution came by

accident. In the summer of 1950, as the UN gained the

offensive and pushed deep into North Korea, direct MosquitoTACC communication became impossible. By the middle of

July, the Mosquito Squadron had determined that some

central means of communication should be established

between the frontline Mosquitoes and Mellow.

37

One T-6 named Mosquito Control was designated to serve as a

relay. Later renamed Mosquito Mellow, it flew between the front

lines and the TACC at 10,000 to 13,000 feet. Initially conceived

simply as a communications benefit, Mosquito Mellow was

quickly identified as a command and control aid that helped

compensate for an overcentralized and inflexible TACS.

The Mosquito Mellow was replaced by the C-47, which was

manned by seven controllers. One of the seven, designated

“senior controller,” had authority to divert fighters from one

TACP to another. First adopted as an experiment, the scheme

soon proved of great value: “If the Mosquito Mellow senior

controller is encouraged to divert fighters but requires

worthwhile targets, then the speed of delivering attacks

against these targets can be attained to a degree approaching

a continuous on-station system of support.”38

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

52
Strike Control Procedures

All the factors that made the FAC aircraft well suited to

airborne surveillance—low speed, high maneuverability, and

good visibility—worked toward making the high-performance

fighter ill-suited for observation. Identifying targets for the

fighter pilot was the most important Mosquito function.

Controlling a ground strike involves five distinct tasks: traffic

control, ordnance selection, target discrimination, target

marking, and bomb damage assessment.

Traffic Control

Since the Korean TACS was less than efficient, it was

impossible to regulate the arrival of strike aircraft in the target

area. If a call went out for substantial air support, dozens of

planes might appear over the target simultaneously—all with

limited fuel. Aircraft generally arrived in flights of four. The

Mosquito instructed two of them to remain at high altitude

while the second pair performed the strike, after which the

fighters exchanged roles. Finally, they strafed the target before

departing.39

When the target was especially formidable (e.g., an armored

column), it was important to get the aircraft with the greatest

effectiveness and the most appropriate ordnance on the target

first. The Mosquito customarily stacked strike aircraft in orbits

at various altitudes until it was their time to strike.40

Ordnance Selection

When a Mosquito FAC notified Mosquito Mellow of the need

for strike aircraft, he also requested preferences for ordnance.

Since it was not always possible to receive what was ordered,

the Mosquito frequently settled for anything available. When

aircraft arrived with a variety of ordnance, the FAC decided

which ordnance would be used. He generally used the

following guidelines: (1) .50-caliber and 20 mm machine guns,

plus light rockets, against buildings, trucks, vehicles, oxcarts,

troops in the open, bivouac areas, barges, mortar positions,

small villages, automatic weapons, and combustible storages

or dumps; (2) fragmentation bombs for all troop positions and

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

53
targets listed above; (3) 500-pound general-purpose bombs

and heavy rockets for tanks, bridges, railway tunnels, artillery

pieces, and antiaircraft positions; (4) 1,000-pound bombs

against major bridges and tunnels; (5) napalm against all

targets except railroad tracks. It should be noted that napalm

was considered the most effective aerial weapon and the

weapon most feared by enemy troops.41

Target Discrimination

The Mosquitoes began their operations with no procedures for

indicating target location to fighter pilots. This proved to be a

difficult problem—one that was solved only through trial and

error in combat.

The original procedure was to describe the target over the

radio, giving its position in relation to such landmarks as

roads, terrain features, and panels.42 This technique was

unsatisfactory for two reasons: (1) the fighter pilot frequently

could not find the target and (2) the process further cluttered

the already clogged communications channels.43

During the first week of airborne FAC operations, one

Mosquito’s radio went out while he was directing a strike. He

nevertheless continued to control the strike by “wagging” his

wings in a descriptive manner that identified the target for the

fighter. Thereafter, this technique was an effective substitute

for a verbal description. Some FACs executed diving passes at

the target for the fighter pilot to observe.

In another variation, the lead fighter flew on the Mosquito’s

wing toward the target. Frequently, the fighter shot his

machine guns and the Mosquito described any needed

adjustments from the impact pattern. This was an effective

technique, but it exposed two aircraft to possible ground fire.

Target Marking

Another class of techniques called for marking the target

and its environment. The first marking technique was to drop

smoke-emitting or white-phosphorus hand grenades from the

T-6, but it was extremely difficult to drop the grenade

accurately (only about 30 percent of the grenades continued to

smoke after hitting the ground) and the grenades frequently

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

54
exploded too soon.44 The Mosquitoes began carrying pistol

flares for the same purpose. The difficulties encountered were

much the same as with the grenades, however: inaccuracy

and short smoke duration.

Another target-marking method involved the use of artillery

fire. This technique had been used in World War II for Rover Joe

operations.45 A shellburst that is visible to both the controller

and the fighter pilot is used as a reference point from which the

exact location of the target may be described. The Mosquito had

to be in contact with the ground FAC, who had to be in contact

with his unit’s artillery officer—and the target had to be within

range of artillery, which was frequently not the case.

It was recommended from the beginning that T-6s be

equipped with rockets to mark targets, and the rockets began

arriving in mid-September 1950. The 2.36-inch marking

rockets were mounted by squadron personnel, who also

trained pilots in their use.46

The airborne rocket proved to be easily visible from the air,

which led to an immediate reduction in radio transmission and an

increase in bombing accuracy, which resulted in faster target

neutralization with less ordnance waste. The marking rocket also

proved to be an effective weapon in its own right, and its role in

airborne FAC operations grew quickly. In December, the second

full month of rocket use, 905 rockets were fired in combat.

Bomb Damage Assessment

Once a strike was executed, the Mosquito performed bomb

damage assessment (BDA) to determine whether the target

had been neutralized or still represented a danger to friendly

troops. The airborne FAC reached his conclusions in

conjunction with the ground-based TACP. Whether the

fighters that had just executed a strike were of further

immediate value for CAS depended on their ordnance and fuel,

and on the status of the target just attacked.

Problems Encountered

The value of visual reconnaissance as a source of intelligence

was readily apparent, but the Mosquitoes had neither the

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

55
facilities nor the staff to produce finished intelligence. Nor did

they have the equipment to communicate with potential users.

The squadron had an intelligence officer, but his main duty

was to interpret intelligence for squadron use. The Army

commander learned the results of Mosquito reconnaissance

through the ground FAC, who received his information from

the Mosquito pilot. No procedures were devised for

transmitting the Mosquitoes’ overall intelligence estimates for

the entire divisional front. The Mosquito, who was very helpful

in locating specific enemy concentrations,47 was of less value

for more comprehensive information.

The JOC had a high requirement for comprehensive,

up-to-date intelligence. But the intelligence did not always

arrive in usable form or receive the appropriate attention. And

when accurate intelligence did arrive at the JOC, it was

considered “only for statistical or historical purposes.”48 In

December 1950, the JOC promised Fifth Air Force that

intelligence information would receive both tactical and

strategic analysis.

Photographic Capability

The absence of a Mosquito photographic capability was

serious. Among the potential uses for Mosquito photographs

were crew familiarization and training, evaluation of

suspicious areas and objects, assessment of enemy tactics,

and evaluation of CAS effectiveness.

The Mosquitoes asked for hand-held cameras for the

observers. In November, photo-lab and photo-interpreter

equipment arrived;49 the cameras arrived in December. Photo

operations began in January 1951, but the results were

disappointing. Hand-holding a camera in the cockpit of a

vibrating aircraft does not produce sharply defined images.

Relations with Other TACS Elements

The Mosquito’s relationship with other TACS components

was not defined, and there were duplicating missions and

responsibilities. For example, both airborne FACs and ground

FACs had strike control responsibility. Army artillery spotters

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

56
had visual reconnaissance responsibilities, and the Army had

responsibility for the strike request system.

With both ground and airborne FACs having the function of

directing air strikes, some dissension arose.50 The Mosquitoes

conceded that the ground FAC was helpful in delineating the

front line, especially when it was fluid. On the other hand, the

ground FAC was not always easy to contact on the radio.51

Probably the most frequent cause of this inaccessibility was

that his radio gear was packed or inoperable.

The FAC radio was a heavy, jeep-mounted device that

depended on the jeep for power. Placing the jeep close enough

to the front lines for the FAC to observe air strikes meant that

it was a target for the enemy. And another problem arose

when the front was rapidly changing—boundaries became

obscured, with some areas having two FACs and others

having none.52

The biggest problem in Mosquito relations with ground

commanders stemmed from the Mosquitoes’ success. The

airborne FAC was so effective in locating and destroying

targets that he became the ground commander’s source of

tactical and emotional security; that is, the FAC became

associated with effective CAS and lost much of his flexibility.

The ground commander developed a proprietary attitude

toward “his” Mosquito, frequently refusing permission for the

Mosquito to perform deep-penetration reconnaissance

because he thought effective CAS depended on the Mosquito

being directly overhead.

Control of Navy Fighters

The Air Force was short of fighter-bombers during the

all-out defense of the Pusan perimeter. Close support had

taken priority over all other air missions, and the Navy was

asked to contribute some of their carrier-based aircraft that

were normally allocated to interdiction. The Navy initially was

reluctant, but an agreement was reached between the

Commander of the Navy of the Far East (ComNavFE) and

FEAF. Navy planes would provide CAS and be controlled by

the TACS and the Mosquitoes.

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

57
There were two major difficulties involved with TACS control

of Navy fighters: Naval fighter aircraft shared only two

channels in common with Mosquito radios53 and, more

serious, carriers launched all their aircraft in a small number

of short-duration launches. Consequently, all Navy fighters

arrived at the TACC at the same time—with limited fuel

supplies. Later, at the insistence of ComNavFE, Navy fighters

were allowed to bypass the TACC and go straight to the

Mosquitoes.

Crew Effectiveness

Although the Mosquitoes were developed for controlling air

strikes, visual reconnaissance served both Air Force and

Army. The 6147th TACS began adding Army observers within

the first month. The T-6 pilot was an experienced one; the rear

seat was occupied by an observer, ordinarily a member of the

Army, who gradually became responsible for performing visual

reconnaissance, operating the radios, and taking photographs.

Many of the observers had been light aircraft pilots or

observers in World War II. Their expertise made a significant

contribution to the Mosquitoes’ effectiveness.54 Whenever

possible, the observer worked in the areas of his parent unit.

Thus, each Mosquito crew was fully familiar with ground

operations, tactics, and fighter operations.

Initially, Mosquito crews were assigned to units over the

entire front to familiarize them with the overall area, but this

plan was soon dropped. The Mosquitoes learned that

reconnaissance pilots assigned repeatedly to the same area

could become extremely sensitive to any changes that might

indicate the presence of enemy activity.55 Crews became bored

when they looked at the same area repeatedly, however, so a

rotation scheme was devised in which each crew was assigned

two areas.

The War at Night

Reconnaissance revealed that the enemy’s logistical operations

increased at night, when the Mosquito did not fly. Mosquito

aircraft lacked basic navigational equipment and effective cockpit

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

58
heating, and the squadron did not have sufficient men or

aircraft for around-the-clock operations.

FAC Survivability

Flying over enemy territory at low speed and low altitude

was extremely risky. Twenty T-6s were lost in the first six

months of combat in Korea—one every 888.89 hours.

(Compare this with the loss every four thousand hours

experienced in South Vietnam.56) By July 1950, the

Mosquitoes were receiving highly accurate 20 mm ground

fire.57 “There was hardly a day when one of the Mosquitoes did

not return with a hole in its wing or fuselage or a bullet lodged

somewhere near the front or rear cockpits.”58 In October 1951,

flak became so heavy that Fifth Air Force began flying

flak-suppression missions to support Mosquito safety. In

December 1951, serious thought was given to using the F-51

as a FAC aircraft.59

Although they received relatively heavy casualties, the

Mosquitoes were unwilling to modify their tactics; they

assumed the attitude that danger was part of the business.

Their typical reconnaissance was performed at 1,200 to 1,500

feet at an airspeed of 120 MPH. By the end of the Korean

conflict, however, six thousand feet had been established as

the minimum safe altitude for general reconnaissance and

control. However, FACs were encouraged to drop as low as

they dared for target marking, bomb damage assessment, and

closer examination of potential targets, since little could be

seen from six thousand feet. Mosquito attrition rates for the

first six months of combat are summarized below.

Aircraft Lost Fatalities Sorties/Loss Hrs/Loss

July 2 0 134/50 335/17

Aug 5 4 206/40 555/42

Sep 3 6 471/33 1,275/58

Oct 4 2 289/25 876/15

Nov 4 4 329/25 943/42

Dec 2 0 608/00 1,612/67

Total 20 16 2,037/173 5,596/24160

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

59
Every person involved in the design of FAC aircraft

emphasized the importance of armor-plating vital areas of the

plane, the cockpit, and the engine. The T-6 was preferred for

FAC use because of its greater survivability. The L-5, used by

the Army for artillery spotting, was neither as fast nor as

rugged as the T-6. The ROKAF had some L-5s and had

incurred several losses.61 The Mosquitoes were persuaded to

experiment with the L-19 (O-1), the aircraft later used in

Vietnam, but it was slower and more delicate than the T-6.

The T-6 was not armed beyond the marking rockets,62 and

the only safety modification made was to paint the wing tips

with fluorescent paint to increase the visibility of the FAC to

the fighter pilot and reduce the possibility of collision.63 It is

generally conceded that the airborne FAC in Korea survived

only in a passive air environment. Had the UN not maintained

total air superiority, the T-6’s value would have been

significantly reduced. It is difficult to imagine an aircraft

having the performance characteristics needed by FACs that

could defend itself against attack by modern jet aircraft.

Forward Air Controller Training

In response to the expanding need for FACs in Korea, the Air

Force’s Air-Ground Operations School (AGOS) was activated in

September 1950 at Pope AFB, North Carolina. The first class

consisted of 17 students. Later that year, however, the Air

Force authorized a substantial increase for the school.

Thereafter, in both Army and Air Force, a minimum of 120

students per week were trained. The 6147th tactical control

group (TCG) received its pilots through normal replacement

channels. Observers came from Eighth Army—each division

supplied six officers or enlisted men. Many of these observers,

who served 90 days on temporary duty, requested extended

duty.

After arriving in Korea, a new pilot received a week of

intensive ground school training and approximately ten hours

of dual and solo local flying before flying a combat mission. He

then flew about eight combat missions with a fully qualified

observer before receiving a “check” mission to put him on duty

status. After 20 missions (at least), the airborne controller

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

60
went to the front as the ground-based FAC member of the

Tactical Air Control Party team. He served approximately

80 days at corps, division, or regimental level and then

completed 80 more tactical air controller missions in the

T-6.

Formal training for the Mosquitoes was initiated in May

1953, at the Combat Crew Training Center, 3600th Flying

Training Group (Fighter) Luke AFB, Arizona. All the

instructors were recent combat returnees from the

“Mosquito” group. The course was one month in duration,

with 55 hours of ground instruction and 22 training flights

in the T-6. When the cease-fire agreement was signed on 26

July 1953, the T-6 Airborne Controller course was

terminated. The 51-member class that graduated on 15

August 1953 was the last.64 AGOS was moved to the

Highland Pines Inn, Southern Pines, North Carolina, in June

1951 and remained there until January 1957, when a fire

destroyed the old inn.65 Fortunately, preparations were

already underway to move the school to Keesler AFB,

Mississippi. School and personnel records, however, had to

be painstakingly restored.

AGOS reopened at its new home in February 1957, but was

moved in 1962 to Hurlburt Field, Florida, where it continues

to take advantage of the largest Air Force reservation in the

free world—Eglin AFB. The school is subordinate to the air

warfare center (AWC), an agency of Air Combat Command. A

Navy officer and a Marine officer are permanently attached,

and Army faculty members are provided on a permanent

basis.66

A forward air controller course (FACC) was to provide a

reservoir of Air Force pilots trained in the fundamentals of

visually directing strikes against surface targets. This course

was only for rated officers in USAF, but two other courses were

offered for all services. The duration of the FACC was 10 days,

five of which were spent in the field for practical training.

Emphasis was placed on the capabilities and limitations of the

equipment, and on the problems besetting front line

commanders.

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

61
Notes

1. J. Farmer and M. J. Strumwasser, The Evolution of the Airborne

Forward Air Controller: An Analysis of Mosquito Operations in Korea, RAND

Report RM-5430PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, October 1967), iii.

2. Ibid., vi.

3. 1Lt Ko S. Samashima, interviewed by US Air Force Historical Research

Agency (USAFHRA) staff, 18 November 1950.

4. History of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne), July

1950–July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1951), 3.

5. Ibid., August 1950, 2.

6. Ibid., December 1950, 6.

7. Ibid., October 1950, 3.

8. Ibid., November 1950, 3.

9. Ibid., December 1950, 2.

10. From August through December 1950, there were only two days

when the 6147th Squadron was unable to fly any sorties, although not all

areas could be covered at all times.

11. The takeoff roll of the T-6 is seven hundred feet, as opposed to 1,800

feet for the F-51 and 3,090 feet for the F-80.

12. Standard Aircraft Characteristics: The T-6G Texan, published by

authority of the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, USAF, 12

April 1950; “Standard Aircraft Characteristics: The F-51H Mustang,”

published by authority of the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command,

USAF, 3 July 1950; “Standard Aircraft Characteristics: The F-80A Shooting

Star,” published by authority of the Commanding General, Air Materiel

Command, USAF, 25 January 1950.

13. “Edward R. Murrow and the News,” The Columbia Broadcasting

System, broadcast of 6 February 1951, reproduced in History of the 6147th

Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne).

14. Most preferred to perform VR in a continuous bank, observing that

the resultant flight path makes the aircraft a more difficult target for ground

fire.

15. W. L. Whitson et al., Preliminary Evaluation of Close Support

Operations in Korea (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, February

1951),184–85.

16. History of the 6147th, November 1950, 29.

17. Supplement to History of the 6147th, P. II.

18. William M. Cleveland, Mosquitoes in Korea (Portsmouth, N. H.: The

Mosquito Association Inc., 1991), 71.

19. Ibid., 257.

20. Farmer and Strumwasser, 76.

21. Cleveland, 79.

22. Whitson, 184.

23. Ibid., 177.

24. History of the 6147th, August 1950, 1–2.

25. Whitson, 11.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

62
26. “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1

November 1950–30 June 1952,” USAF Historical Study No. 72, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., Air University, 1 July 1955, 195.

27. Ibid., September 1950, 4–5. Although the reasons for rejection were

not explicitly stated, it is safe to assume that shortage of men and

equipment was the cause.

28. Lt Col Merrill H. Carlton, interviewed by USAFHRA staff, 17

November 1950.

29. History of the 6147th, December 1950, 10–11.

30. Farmer and Strumwasser, 32–33.

31. Lt Gen J. A. Partridge points out that a signal unit was sent from the

US for the Eighth Army after he briefed Army Chief of Staff Gen J. Lawton

Collins on the matter when he was visiting Eighth United States Army in

Korea headquarters. There is no indication that such a unit was ever

provided for X Corps.

32. “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 25

June–1 November 1950,” USAF Historical Study No. 71, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

Air University, 1 July 1952, 27.

33. “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1

November 1950–30 June 1955,” USAF Historical Study No. 72, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., Air University, 1 July 1952, 86.

34. Whitson, 191.

35. USAF Historical Study, no. 71, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University, 28.

36. One squadron of F-51s was stationed in Korea. In addition,

Japan-based fighters often landed in Korea if they were low on fuel. These

aircraft were refueled and rearmed (giving the operation the nickname “R&R

missions”), and immediately flew a second mission before returning directly

to Japan.

37. Farmer and Strumwasser, 36.

38. Carlton interview, 2–3.

39. Whitson, 176.

40. Theoretically, the aircraft are prepared to repel hostile air attacks at

higher altitudes. However, as General Partridge points out, enemy air was a

minimal threat. In fact, no allied aircraft were ever attacked by hostile

planes while engaged in close support. Actually, the jets were instructed to

orbit at high altitudes to conserve fuel.

41. Farmer and Strumwasser, 42.

42. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea (New York:

Duell, Sloan and Pearch, 1961), 181–85. Panels are colored cloths laid on the

ground or worn on the backs of advance troops, visible to the pilot, marking

the location of the front. Panels were, of course, most important when the

front was fluid—precisely the time when they were least faithfully displayed.

43. Carlton interview, 15.

44. “The Standing Operating Procedure of the 6147th Tactical Control

Squadron,” in History of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne)

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History).

MOSQUITO OPERATIONS IN KOREA

63
45. Samashima interview, 4.

46. History of the 6147th, October 1950, 9.

47. Ibid., December 1950, 18–20.

48. History of the 6147th, December 1950, 13.

49. Supplement to History 6147th Tactical Control Squadron, 11.

50. History of the 6147th, November 1950, 33–34.

51. Because the ground FAC is relevant to this study only insofar as he

relates to the airborne FAC, no detailed evaluation of his operations is

contained here. It should, however, be pointed out that both Army and Air

Force personnel voiced nearly unanimous praise of the invaluable

contributions made by ground FACs to the success of the air-ground effort.

52. Supplement to History of the 6147th, 11.

53. “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1

November 1950–30 June 1952,” 195.

54. Supplement to History of the 6147th, 11. Although the Navy had 12

or more VHF channels, including the guard or emergency channel, while Air

Force aircraft had four or eight, only two of these channels were common

between the services.

55. History of the 6147th, 8–11. Beginning 21 August 1950, pilots were

rotated back to their parent units elsewhere in the theater after 50 missions,

generally flown in less than two months. Notwithstanding this policy, some

officers chose not to rotate after their 50th mission, but remained with the

Mosquito squadron even during the most intense combat of the war.

56. J. I. Edelman et al., Airborne Visual Reconnaissance in South

Vietnam RAND Report, RM-5049-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

September 1966), 31.

57. History of the 6147th, July 1950, 14.

58. Ibid., August 1950, 2.

59. “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1

November 1950–30 June 1952,” 195.

60. Farmer and Strumwasser, 65.

61. History of the 6147th, July 1950, 5–6.

62. Many FACs said they felt safer in an unarmed plane, reasoning that

if enemy ground troops know an aircraft has no offensive capability, they

will be less likely to fire at it. This idea was also supported in Vietnam by the

experiences of laser “illuminators” who received very little ground fire

compared to fighter-bombers who pointed their noses at the ground to

deliver the laser-guided weapons. The illuminators maintained level

left-hand turns to fire the laser.

63. Supplement to History of the 6147th, 195.

64. Cleveland, 56.

65. Ibid., 37.

66. Air-Ground Operations School, “Introduction Pamphlet,” 1994.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

64
Chapter 5

Korea

The Stagnant War

Chinese intervention in Korea in November 1950 sent shock

waves through the United Nations Command (UNC) and

spread quickly to Washington, bringing fundamental changes

to American policy. As Eighth Army rose from the ashes of its

defeat above the 38th parallel, the Truman administration

reverted to its original aim: restoring the Republic of South

Korea along its prewar border. Hoping to avoid a higher

involvement with both China and the Soviet Union, the

administration limited the war. The limitation included air

operations.1

The Argument for Interdiction

In early 1951, Far East Air Force Bomber Command and

Fifth Air Force, reinforced with air strikes from Task Force (TF)

77, began a systematic attack on the communists’ supply

lines throughout Korea. Between January and June 1951,

FEAF aircraft flew 54,410 interdiction sorties and 22,800

close air support sorties. On the day he assumed command of

FEAF, Gen Otto P. Weyland wrote Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt

S. Vandenberg that Korea offered an unparalleled opportunity

to show how tactical airpower could win a conventional war.

The Air Force, he said, should “fully exploit its first real

opportunity to prove the efficacy of airpower in more than a

supporting role.” He thought the Korean experience might

provide positive guidance for USAF’s force structure and help

formulate concepts for the defense of western Europe. That

experience, Weyland believed, should come in a massive

commitment to interdiction, not to CAS.2

CAS along a Stabilized Front

FEAF was to learn that the communist logistics system and

field forces could be difficult to destroy. Night, poor weather,

65
and mountainous terrain gave the communists ample

opportunity to seek concealment and cover from air attacks.

The Chinese proved adept at hiding in caves and tunnels,

using natural and man-made camouflage, and digging deep

defensive positions. Russian-style mechanized formations and

massed artillery positions virtually disappeared from the

battlefield in 1951. Major Chinese assaults occurred almost

always at night, and they accepted casualties that would have

staggered a western army. The communists’ tactical

adaptations placed new demands on UNC’s target acquisition

and air direction system.

Radar-Controlled Air Strikes

In the first six months of 1951, FEAF made major reforms

in improving the efficiency of CAS. At FEAF Commander Lt

Gen George Stratemeyer’s insistence, the Air Force increased

its commitment to remotely controlled bombardment. The

502d Tactical Control Group (TCG) received ground radar

teams, and its B-29s and B-26s were given improved terminal

guidance systems. FEAF also improved the accuracy of its

level bombing by using bombs that could be guided by the

bombardier. But these bombs were in short supply and

subject to electronic eccentricities; they had less impact on

operations than did proximity-fused bombs. By May 1951,

FEAF was employing portable ground radar sets and

proximity-fused bombs with increasing effectiveness.

Nevertheless, the tactical air control party (TACP) Mosquito

system remained intact.

Communications Upgrades

Defects in communications procedures and equipment were

at the heart of the CAS problem. The Air Force therefore

developed a better jeep, a new radio, and a more powerful

generator to run both the radio and a homing beacon. The

eight-channel (ARC-3) and four-channel (SCR-522) radios

gave the FAC increased capability to talk with aircraft. They

also gave Mosquitoes and fighter-bombers their first

dependable linkage. Also, TACP ties to air liaison officers

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

66
(ALOs) improved in late 1951 when the new radios were

installed.3

Tactical air direction nets were increased from four to eight.

In addition, the 6147th TCG changed Mosquito Mellow from a

T-6 to a specially equipped C-47 that carried a 20-channel

VHF radio. To improve TACP assignment and training, FAF

sent ground personnel to the 6147th TCG. In addition, the

tours of pilot-FACs with ground units increased from three

weeks to eight. FAF eventually received enough radars and

trained personnel to establish a tactical air direction center

(TADC) with each American corps headquarters, and to

establish a radar site in each corps area.4

T-6 Upgrades

Like the control party’s jeep, the T-6 trainer aircraft was not

entirely adequate as a Mosquito control vehicle. By the

summer of 1951, the Mosquito planes were seldom permitted

to penetrate more than two miles into enemy territory—

instead, the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron’s (TRS)

RF-51s sought targets behind enemy lines. FAF gave some

thought to employing F-51s as Mosquito planes, but found it

impossible to get additional communications equipment into

the Mustangs.5 On the other hand, the T-6 was too “hot” to

operate from an average ground division’s light aviation

airstrip. At Eighth Army’s suggestion, the 6147th group tested

L-19 aircraft as control planes in July 1951 but rejected them

as being too vulnerable to enemy ground fire.6 The T-6 would

continue as the vehicle for the airborne coordinator, but FAF

continually worked to adapt it to its mission. Initially,

Mosquito controllers “talked” fighter pilots to their targets. By

the summer of 1951, however, the T-6s were using 2.25-inch

aircraft rockets to designate ground targets.7

Operation Thunderbolt

The high degree of cooperation between FAF and Eighth

Army meant that air resources could be centered wherever

Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, UNC Commander, thought

necessary. Thus when American I and IX Corps initiated

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

67
“Operation Thunderbolt,” FAF’s close support centered behind

these two corps. To cover the advancing task force, Mosquito

controllers moved from Taegu West Airfield (K-37) to the old

airstrip at Taejon (K-5). Now, closer to the fighting, the

Mosquitoes could remain over the ground troops for up to

three hours. They were equipped with infantry radios so they

could communicate with ground patrols.

In preparation for the drive northward, the 6147th

Squadron put aloft a C-47 airborne relay aircraft with 20

channels of VHF communications. This “Mosquito Mellow”

maintained a station 20 miles behind the front lines and

passed messages between tactical air control parties, airborne

controllers, fighter-bombers, and the “Mellow” station of the

TACC.8 As “Operation Thunderbolt” thrust northward against

two divisions of the Chinese Army, the American I and IX

corps received effective close support. Air strikes softened

points of enemy resistance almost as fast as they developed.

When American ground troops began to move north and

northwest of Suwon on 30 January 1951, Mosquito

controllers sighted larger concentrations of enemy troops. On

3 February, Capt Edwin “Duffy” LaVigne, flying “Mosquito

Cobalt,” located a large body of enemy troops opposing the US

25th Division. Within two hours, Captain LaVigne had

directed 10 flights of fighter-bombers against enemy positions

in the Anyang-Inchon-Yongdungpo area.

Lavigne and his observer, Capt John H. Hargreaves, then

proceeded on a reconnaissance for additional targets 25 miles

behind enemy lines. The unarmed T-6 fuselage and tail

suffered major damage from 20 mm antiaircraft (AAA) fire.

Lavigne and Hargreaves dauntlessly made several passes at

extremely low altitude to positively identify enemy gun

positions for a flight of Navy Corsairs. One of the Corsairs was

damaged by AAA fire. Hearing the fighter pilot declare

“Mayday,” the Mosquito escorted the damaged fighter back to

friendly territory. Mosquito Cobalt then returned to the AAA

position with a second flight of Corsairs and made several

more passes, pointing out additional AAA locations. These

missions resulted in neutralizing an enemy stronghold and

destroying the guns that had hit the Mosquito.9

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

68
On 6 February, Capt Dorrence E. Wilkinson, flying

“Mosquito Cobalt” in support of the US 24th Division, located

a large number of hostile troops in the vicinity of Yangpyong.

After directing four F-84s, six F-4Us, and six B-26s in attacks

against these troops, he estimated that the air strikes caused

at least three hundred casualties.

On 12 February, when the Reds attacked South Korean

troops (ROK) north of Hoengsong, “Mosquito Liberator” flights

were overhead to direct close support for a withdrawal of

friendly forces. During the morning, the Mosquito Liberator

(piloted by Lt Aubrey C. Edinburgh) found bands of up to 400

enemy soldiers moving by daylight. The Mosquito directed five

flights of F-4Us, F-80s, F-84s, and F-51s in napalm and

rocket attacks. Later in the day, the relief Mosquito Liberator

(piloted by Lt Charles R. Wilkins) found a ROK battalion cut

off by enemy roadblocks. This Mosquito controller directed

three flights of fighter-bombers in attacks that allowed the

friendly battalion to break out of the encirclement.10

Operation Ripper

On 7 March, General Ridgway ordered the US IX and X

Corps to attack northward in central Korea. Called “Operation

Ripper,” this attack was designed to create a bulge east of

Seoul from which UN forces could envelop the capital city.

“Operation Ripper” had one feature of significance to close

support management: FAF was able to assign fighter flights to

prebriefed TACPs, enabling the fighters to carry maximum

ordnance selected for a particular target and range. Until now,

squadrons had sacrificed ordnance for extra fuel—which

would be needed if the fighter-bombers missed a CAS

employment and had to continue north to seek an armed

reconnaissance objective.11

Quite suddenly, on the night of 14 March, communist

forces abandoned Seoul without a fight. On the next day,

Eighth Army drove into Hongchon in central Korea. FEAF

airmen flew more than 1,000 sorties every day as the Reds

broke cover and retreated.12

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

69
Communist Losses in the First Year

In the first year of fighting, and especially during April and

May of 1951, the communist armies in Korea suffered

tremendous losses: 163,130 enemy soldiers were in UNC

prisoner-of-war camps, and intelligence estimated that the

North Koreans and Chinese had sustained 863,949 battle

casualties. Altogether, the communists lost almost 1.2 million

soldiers through capture, battle loss, and nonbattle causes.13

FEAF airmen flew 223,000 sorties to drop 97,000 tons of

bombs and 7.8 million gallons of napalm, fire 264,000 rockets

and 98 million rounds of ammunition, and transport 176,000

tons of cargo and 427,000 passengers and evacuees. FEAF’s

combat sorties inflicted 120,000 troop casualties and

destroyed or damaged 391 aircraft, 893 locomotives, 14,200

railroad cars, 439 tunnels, 1,080 rail and road bridges,

24,500 vehicles, 1,695 tanks, 2,700 guns, and 125,000

buildings. FEAF strategic bombers also neutralized the 18

major strategic targets in North Korea.

In that year, FEAF lost 857 officers and airmen—187 killed,

255 wounded, 412 missing, and three known to be prisoners

of war. FEAF also lost 247 aircraft: 188 fighters, 33 bombers,

nine transports, and 17 other planes. FEAF’s combat record

was enviable.14

Strategy Changes

The summer of 1951 ushered in a new phase of the war.

Both the enemy and the UNC abandoned their identical

political objectives of unifying Korea by force, and both gave

up their military objectives of capture and control. For both

sides, political and military objectives became one—an

armistice on favorable terms. UNC air forces were to deny the

enemy the capacity to sustain further decisive ground attack,

maintain maximum pressure on North Korea, and create a

situation conducive to a favorable armistice; the ground forces

were to stabilize and maintain a strong defensive line.

It did not take the enemy long to realize that UNC ground

force strategy was following the same defensive pattern as his

own. He probed with patrols and launched relatively heavy

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

70
limited attacks to secure defensive posts and salients. The

UNC Army also kept up its patrols and counterattacks while

friendly air forces roamed the front lines, attacking targets of

opportunity. Under attack, the enemy began an extensive

effort to construct heavy bunkers, underground supply

centers, trenches, tunnels, and well-protected artillery and

mortar positions. CAS became less effective as the enemy

supplies and equipment were stockpiled, allowing strong

attacks supported by heavy artillery fire.

UNC ground forces called for more close aerial support, but

CAS had already reached a point of diminishing returns. A

greater CAS effort would have cut heavily into the more

effective attacks in the rear areas—a concept that was difficult

for the Army to understand. Nevertheless, FEAF and FAF

made every effort to provide adequate CAS whenever ground

forces were actively engaged.

In a static situation, CAS is an expensive substitute for

artillery fire. It pays its greatest dividends when the enemy’s

sustaining capability has been crippled and his supply lines

cut by interdiction. Decisive effects can then be obtained as

the close support effort is massed in coordination with

determined ground action. In the autumn of 1951, it would

have been folly to have failed to concentrate the bulk of the air

effort against interdiction targets in the enemy’s rear areas.

CAS substituted for artillery in some cases; at other times it

was used extensively on marginal targets. About 30 percent of

all sorties flown during the last two years of the war were

flown in close support—a factor that cut heavily into the force

which could interdict in rear areas when it should have been

the Air Force’s aim to reduce enemy firepower before it got to

the front rather than try to destroy it after it arrived.15 Yet,

between July 1951 and July 1953, the Air Force flew 155,000

interdiction sorties and approximately 47,000 CAS sorties.

The same relative emphasis applied to Navy carrier missions

and the First Marine Air Wing.

16

FAF allocated only 96 CAS sorties per day, an effort that

reflected doubts about the relative effectiveness of CAS against

a heavily fortified front that bristled with strong

concentrations of AAA. Communist flak often drove Mosquito

flights above six thousand feet, which made CAS look like an

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

71
inefficient use of airpower.17 By 1953, Air Force forward air

controllers (FAC) controlled about one sortie per month for

each TACP. Communist flak took its toll: aircraft losses per

wing normally ran about four per month, pilot losses per

squadron about two per month.18

By the spring of 1953, CAS operations along the main line of

resistance (MLR) had become routine, although incremental

improvements continued. Artillery suppression operations

developed to a new level of effectiveness and, in April 1953,

UNC aircraft flew four thousand CAS sorties with the loss of

only one aircraft to ground fire. Both Air Force and Marine

Corps air-ground controllers worked on refining radar-guided

missions, especially for night operations.19

Pathfinder Operations

Recognizing that the Mosquito controllers were extremely

vulnerable to hostile ground fire, FAF began experiments with

a “pathfinder” fighter-bomber technique in July 1952. A flight of

two experienced pilots left the tactical airdrome ten minutes

ahead of the main fighter-bomber strike, reconnoitered the

assigned target, and subsequently marked the objective by

making the first attack. This relieved the Mosquito FAC of targetmarking responsibility in high-threat areas. After tests in

January 1953, the Eighth Fighter-Bomber Wing recommended

that pathfinder aircraft be used on all large-scale close-support

strikes.20

During the last year of the Korean War, seventeen USAF

wings operated in direct support of the fighting: three B-29

wings, seven F-84 and F-86 wings, two B-26 wings, four troop

carrier wings, and one reconnaissance wing—a sizable portion

of USAF’s ready fighting forces.21

As renewed fighting broke out on 15 and 16 June 1953, the

Mosquitoes broke all previous records on sorties flown during

any two-day period in the war. Gen S. F. Anderson, FAF

commander, commanded the Mosquito Group’s effort in

stopping the June 1953 communist offensive. In two days,

Mosquito pilots, with fewer than 40 aircraft, directed 332

flights of fighter-bombers against enemy targets for a

combined total of 1,632 aircraft.22

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

72
After three years of hard fighting in Korea, the combatants

ended up only a few miles from where they had started on 25

June 1950. But final peace had not come to Korea; only a

truce was signed.

The Truce Ceremony

In a special signing hut erected by the communists at

Panmunjam, UN representatives and North Koreans began

signing the Armistice that would end the fighting at 1001 on

27 July 1953. Eighteen copies, nine for each side, were passed

rapidly back and forth across an intervening table while the

two chief negotiators signed their names. They finished in 10

minutes and, without speaking, strode out through separate

doors. There was none of the thrill and drama of other

armistices—this 1953 meeting was a formal and correct

tableau by officers who stared through each other when they

could not turn their backs. They signed agreements that were

reached after history’s longest truce talks: 575 bitter meetings

spread over two years and 17 days.

1Lt Chester L. Brown of the 6149th TCS flew the last

mission flown by a Mosquito. It was Lt Brown’s 110th mission

as a close support combat pilot. “I am very proud,” he said, “to

have the honor to be the last one to fly. I have thought for

some time the truce would be signed. Now I can go home to my

wife and children. I know there must be a lot of happy wives

and parents back in the states now that the truce has been

signed.” The final results, tallied on 28 July 1953, are listed

below.

Combat hours flown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,747,114 

Effective sorties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,554 

Tank divisions destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Artillery pieces destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 

Vehicles destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,079 

Locomotives destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

Bridges destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8423

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

73
6147th TCG Deactivated

By the end of the Korean War (July 1953), Mosquito pilots and

observers had flown 40,554 effective missions. The 6147th TCG

had received two US presidential unit citations and one Korean

presidential unit citation. It had also received coverage by Milt

Caniff in his “Terry and the Pirates” comic strip. There was talk of

designing a new Mosquito aircraft, but the 6147th TCG was

moved to Kimpo airfield, and gradually lost its full combat

capability. The unit dropped one of the two Mosquito squadrons

and assumed housekeeping responsibility for the airfield.

On 23 June 1956, 6147th TCG became the 6147 Air Base

Group (ABG). When the last Mosquito squadron—the 6148th

TCS—was then discontinued, the demise of the airborne

controllers was aptly worded in the unit’s history: “The

Mosquitoes fulfilled their job and have a history to be proud of.

The success of this organization, born of a wartime necessity, is

a tribute to the courage, ability and resourcefulness of the men,

both former and present.” Thus, the USAF airborne controller

became a “peacetime casualty.”24

Joint Air-Ground Doctrine

At the end of the Korean war, a joint air-ground operations

conference representing Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine

Corps met in Seoul and recommended that, in future

operations, integration of all services should be secured by an

organization and system similar to what finally developed in

the last month of the Korean hostilities. The conference also

pointed out the need for a joint air-ground doctrine that would

encompass all services.25

Since it cost far more to deliver aerial bombs than to fire

artillery shells, the routine use of airpower as artillery

constituted a severe expense to American taxpayers. In times

of emergency, however, working in cooperation with friendly

artillery, close-support aircraft proved very effective in

breaking up the communists’ human-wave ground attacks.

FAF and Eighth Army worked out techniques whereby friendly

artillery could continue to fire upon the enemy during air

strikes without endangering close-support aircraft.26

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

74
While fully appreciating the Mosquitoes’ achievements, most

observers recognized the risks in using these slow, unarmed,

trainer aircraft in future battles. In the future, airborne

controllers would fly high-performance aircraft and would

operate from fighter-bomber bases. Employing “pathfinder”

techniques, these experienced fighter-bomber pilots could lead

other jets to close-support targets. In Korea, the Mosquitoes

directed most CAS strikes against targets that a FAC on the

ground could not observe. Thus, many FACs spent their

three-month ground tours without controlling an air strike. As

a result, FAF stipulated that FACs would have to control at

least one strike per month in order to maintain their

proficiency. Despite the fact that FACs on the ground were not

effective, Eighth Army required a TACP for each infantry and

tank battalion, regiment, and division. On 2 July 1953, Air

Force and Army agreed that the Army would provide the

equipment and enlisted personnel, and the Air Force would

continue to furnish the FAC. Since Air Force and Marine

Corps agreed that a FAC had to be a pilot of flight-leader

proficiency, the Army requirement of 15 FACs per division

would have been extremely expensive in Korea.27

The Air Force’s declining interest in CAS did not escape the

Army. After the failure to draft a joint statement on CAS

operations, the Army announced in January 1955 that the

principles of the Joint Training Directive had already been

repudiated by the Air Force and therefore did not bind the

Army. The final irony was that the Army Chief of Staff who

found the doctrine so defective was none other than General

Ridgway. Perhaps it was especially appropriate that Eighth

Army’s most famous commanding general would declare void

the Korean War’s doctrine of CAS. For all practical purposes,

the Army and the Air Force agreed not to agree on what part

CAS would play in future war.28

Post Korea

After Korea, the Air Force was once again without

personnel, organization, or equipment for airborne FAC

operations. When United States Strike Command (STRICOM)

was formed, its manual on Joint Task Force Operations

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

75
became air-ground operating doctrine; it ignored the Korean

experience. Echoing Field Manual (FM) 31-35, it stated,

“Tactical Air strikes may be controlled visually by a TACP or

electronically by an air support radar team (ASRT).” Later, the

manual permitted the use of airborne FACs, which it referred

to as tactical air coordinator, when other control means “are

not capable of directing operations.” In STRICOM doctrine, the

airborne FAC was a temporary device to be used a little at a

time rather than in a comprehensive program—and he had to

be a fighter pilot flying in a two-seat fighter aircraft.29 These

characteristics were repeated in the Tactical Air Command

Manual (TACM) on the TACP; Air Force doctrine on the

airborne FAC had not changed significantly from 1946 to

1966.

Although the airborne FAC’s stature in doctrine did not

materially change, its history in the Korean War was strikingly

different from its history in Vietnam. In Korea, the program

started quickly and sustained itself until peace was restored.

In Vietnam, the program started rather slowly and then

experienced a steady decline as resources were diverted to

other areas and other uses.30

The Mosquito program in Korea benefited from a fortuitous

set of circumstances. The people who initially staffed the

6147th Squadron showed initiative and a willingness to

experiment. Their ability to improvise saved the program from

collapse due to improper equipment and a myriad of other

technical problems. They found enough adaptable equipment

to maintain the program. Without the T-6, for example, the

Mosquito probably would never have lasted. The fact that

General Partridge and his staff were enthusiastic about the

program probably resulted in the diversion of topnotch

personnel and equipment to the squadron. The existence of a

front line made possible large payoffs from a rather small

operation that could be accomplished by relatively few planes

and people. Finally, the fact that there was a front line made

possible an immediate assessment of CAS effectiveness.

In South Vietnam, circumstances were different. Since there

was no front line, an airborne FAC program had to cover more

territory—virtually the whole country. The minimal airborne

FAC program was much larger in South Vietnam than in

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

76
Korea, and the absence of a front line made assessment of

combat effectiveness more difficult. Because effectiveness

could not be measured and defeat was never imminent, Air

Force enthusiasm for the FAC program was never as high in

Vietnam as it was in Korea.

In South Vietnam, as in Korea, total air superiority was

easily maintained. Given this passive air environment and the

FAC’s ability to find targets, communicate within the TACS,

and increase the accuracy of close support, it seems

surprising that a large operation did not immediately come

into existence and play an important role. Perhaps an even

more important lesson is that the Air Force failed to translate

the Mosquito success into organization, personnel, and

equipment for future use. Thus, “reinvention” of the solution

was necessary each time the problem appeared.

Several factors were involved in the airborne FAC program’s

failure to survive the interwar years. Air Force interest in

strategic forces was one major consideration. There was a

general feeling in the military—both Air Force and Army—that

nonnuclear limited wars would not occur without immediate

escalation. There was also interservice competition to

“maximize firepower”— thus, a lack of interest in light aircraft

by an Air Force wrestling with the problems of missile forces

and space stations.31

As the benefits of visual control and reconnaissance were

recognized in Vietnam, the ALO/FAC program was expanded

to provide airborne controllers for Army units and to provide

province-wide coverage. The South Vietnam conflict required

an effort that would effectively cover the whole country, and

that effort was a major deterrent to an early, effective,

airborne FAC system in South Vietnam.

As the Vietnam conflict progressed, however, USAF doctrine

began to change. TACM 2-4, Tactical Air Control Party (May

1965), recognized the airborne FAC:

The FAC(A) may control fighter aircraft from any type aerial vehicle,

provided it carries communication equipment which will allow direct

contact between the FAC(A), the TACP at or adjacent to the requesting

unit and the fighter aircraft. It could be a high performance fighter

or a helicopter. Target location will primarily dictate what type aircraft

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

77
will be selected. A helicopter will do the job well when elevation over

friendly territory will provide the FAC visual contact with the selected

target. Where the target is deep or on a reverse slope in territory

occupied by the enemy, selection of a high performance aircraft will

enhance the success of the strike and greatly increase the survivability

of the FAC(A).32

Thus, between the two conventional wars, there was a time

for forgetting and a time for relearning. The relearning began

to show up as the beginning of a new doctrine. By the early

1960s, the airborne FAC had begun to reassert his role.33

Notes

1. Alan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950–1953,” in Benjamin F. Cooling, Case

Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History [OAFH], 1990), 373.

2. Commanding General Far East Air Force (FEAF), memorandum to

chief of staff, USAF, subject: “Requirements for Increased Combat

Effectiveness,” 10 June 1951; Headquarters FEAF, Report on the Korean

War, I, OAFH, 82–83; Headquarters FEAF, “Weekly Intelligence Roundups,”

April–May 1951, OAFH; Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in

Korea (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearch, 1961), 313–72.

3. Millett, 375–376.

4. “The Tactical Air Control System,” in FEAF, “Report on the Korean

War,” vol. II, USAF Historical Study No. 154, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air

University, 81–91.

5. History of the Deputy for Operations, Fifth Air Force (Washington,

D.C.: OAFH, 1951).

6. History of the 6147th Tactical Control Group, May–July 1951

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1951).

7. History of the Office of Operational Engineers, FAF, May–November

1950 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1951); History of the 6147th, May–July

1951.

8. History of the 6147th, January 1951.

9. William M. Cleveland, Mosquitoes in Korea (Portsmouth, N. H.:

Mosquito Association, 1991), 81.

10. History of the 6147th, February 1951.

11. History of the 27th Fighter-Escort Wing, March 1951 (Washington,

D.C.: OAFH).

12. History of the 6147th, March 1951; Weekly Activities Report, 27th

Fighter-Escort Wing, 12–18 March 1951.

13. Far East Command, Intelligence Summary no. 3214, 28 June 1951,

OAFH.

14. Far East Air Forces, public release no. 976, 22 June 1951, OAFH.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

78
15. Otto P. Weyland, “The Air Campaign in Korea” in James T. Stewart,

Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co.

Inc., 1957), 20.

16. Millett, 384.

17. Far East Air Force, “Report on the Korean War,” vol. I, 96–97.

18. 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing, “History Report,” October 1951–July

1953, and 36th Fighter-Bomber Group, “History,” July 1951–March 1952,

USAF Historical Research Agency (USAFHRA).

19. Millett, 392.

20. History FAF, July–December 1952, 72; 18th Fighter-Bomber Group,

“Tactical Doctrine,” 25 July 1953, USAFHRA; Capt E. J. Delia, Adjutant,

Eighth Fighter-Bomber Wing to Commanding General FAF, letter, subject:

Mission Summary, 17 January 1953.

21. Stewart, 286.

22. Cleveland, 146.

23. Ibid., 257–259.

24. Ibid., 57.

25. Report, Col W. J. Yates, chairman, subject: Joint Air-Ground

Operations Conference held at Headquarters FAF, Seoul, Korea, August

1953, 22–23.

26. Futrell, 707.

27. Ibid.; message, DA-942830, DEPTAR to CINCEUR and CINCFE, 2

July 1953.

28. Headquarters USAF, Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine for

CAS (Washington, D.C.: OAFH) 31–33; Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,

Doctrine vol. 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1971), 203–7; Gen

Otto P. Weyland, USAF, “The Air Campaign in Korea,” Air University

Quarterly Review 6 (Fall 1953): 3–28.

29. “Joint Task Force Operations,” (Draft), Headquarters, United States

Strike Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.: 15 April 1964, 52.

30. J. I. Edelman et al., Airborne Visual Reconnaissance in South

Vietnam, RAND Report RM-5049-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: September

1966.)

31. J. Farmer and M. J. Strumwasser, The Evolution of the Airborne

Forward Air Controller: An Analysis of Mosquito Operations in Korea, RAND

Report RM-5430PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1967), 82–83.

32. TACM 2-4, “Tactical Air Control Party,” May 1965, OAFH.

33. Col Thomas M. Crawford Jr., The Airborne Forward Air Controller—

Peacetime Casualty, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College Professional Study,

No. 3894.

KOREA: THE STAGNANT WAR

79
Chapter 6

Vietnam

The Advisory Years

The end of the French war in Indochina (1954) was marked

by the Geneva Accord. It provided for an International Control

Commission (ICC) to operate under the purview of the United

Nations. ICC would be chaired by the USSR and Great Britain,

and it would have military members from India, Poland, and

Canada. The duties of ICC were to see that the provisions of

the Geneva Accord were carried out. France’s withdrawal left a

considerable vacuum, since the Vietnamese had not been

trained for positions of leadership. They were ill-equipped to

defend their own government against an increasingly

aggressive minority within the country.1

Wars of National Liberation

In 1961, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev

proclaimed that “Wars of National Liberation” would be the

wars of the future. Later that year, President John F. Kennedy

met the Soviet leader at Vienna. There followed a vigorous

reexamination of US military strategy.

2 Kennedy directed that

US forces having special counterinsurgency skills be

developed. The intention was for US specialists to provide

training and assistance to the South Vietnamese.

This reorientation of US defense priorities prompted

considerable debate about how best to cope with

unconventional wars. In the Army, most believed it necessary

to create forces that were specifically trained and organized for

counterinsurgency activities. In the Air Force, many believed

that existing tactical forces could adjust without major

changes while others argued that the Air Force should build a

special force.3

81
Developing the Counterinsurgency Force

A number of technical studies determined that certain

propeller-driven aircraft could be put in combat-ready

condition quickly. Consequently, the T-28 was modified to

deliver bombs.

Another vintage aircraft, the B-26, had been useful in the

Korean War and a number of them were still in storage.

However, considerable work was needed to restore them to

operational condition. Originally designed as an attack aircraft

with weapons to be delivered level or in a slight dive, the B-26

was not stressed for dive-bombing in which three or more “Gs”

are common. Nevertheless, a decision was made to modify a

limited number of these World War II aircraft for

counterinsurgency missions.

The final elements of the counterinsurgency force were the

tried and proven C-47 and a courier manufactured by Helio

Aircraft Corporation. These aircraft were modified for

psychological warfare roles: delivering leaflets and

broadcasting taped messages through a loudspeaker system.

In addition, a flare-dispensing rack was installed in the C-47

to provide illumination at night.4

Farm Gate

In the fall of 1961, it looked very much as though the

government of South Vietnam was in danger of collapsing from

massive Hanoi-based infiltration.

5 Shortly after President

Kennedy took office, he sent Vice President Lyndon B.

Johnson to Saigon to talk with South Vietnamese President

Ngo Dinh Diem. As a result, a mobile control and reporting

post (CRP) was dispatched from the 507th Tactical Control

Group, Shaw AFB, South Carolina, to Tan Son Nhut Air Base

(AB) outside Saigon. USAF’s overt participation in Vietnam

began when the CRP became operational on 5 October 1961.6

The Air Force combat detachment that Kennedy ordered to

Vietnam on 11 October 1961 had its roots in a small, secret

organization created in the late 1950s when Gen Curtis E.

LeMay was Vice Chief of Staff. In March 1961, LeMay

responded to the president’s instructions to examine how each

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

82
Figure 2. Vietnam

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

83
service could best contribute to counterinsurgency warfare.

Tactical Air Command (TAC) was directed to form a small,

elite, volunteer unit that would use older conventional aircraft

in support of ground forces.7

The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS)

(nicknamed Jungle Jim) was born at Eglin AFB, Florida, on 14

April 1961. Commanded by Col Benjamin H. King, the unit

had 124 officers and 228 airmen, sixteen C-47s, eight B-26s,

and eight T-28s. The squadron’s mission was to train South

Vietnamese air forces in counterinsurgency and assist their

operations.8 Members of the 4400th CCTS (called Air

Commandos) were volunteers. They were above average in

physique, hardiness, and sense of adventure. The picturesque

Air Commando uniform was personally picked by LeMay.

Each volunteer was interviewed and approved by Colonel

King, and those who completed training were certified

emotionally mature, highly motivated, and stable.

Unfortunately, they were not attuned to teaching members of

other cultures or to performing a training mission—they were

combat oriented.

Two of the three types of Jungle Jim aircraft were

extensively modified. The T-28 received armor plating and

carried 1,500 pounds of bombs and rockets plus two

.50-caliber machine guns, each with 350 rounds. Even when

fully loaded, the aircraft could speed at 160 knots (190 MPH)

to a target 200 miles away and return. The C-47 (redesignated

SC-47 after modification) boasted twice the normal fuel load, a

stronger landing gear suited to dirt strips, and JATO racks for

operating on short fields. The B-26 twin-engine attack

bomber, carrying six thousand pounds of bombs and rockets

plus machine guns, needed no modification once restored to

operational condition. When fully loaded, it had a combat

radius of 400 miles at a normal speed of 200 knots (240

MPH)—and it could loiter 30 to 45 minutes. The B-26 was

designed for a glide bomb-delivery pattern, not for divebombing.9

On 24 August 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

suggested to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara that an

air interdiction campaign be waged on the trails over which

the Vietcong were being supplied.10 On 5 September,

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Farm Gate Aircraft—T-28

Farm Gate Aircraft—B-26

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

85
Farm Gate Aircraft—A-19

Farm Gate Aircraft—C-47

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

86
McNamara informed the three service secretaries he intended

to establish an experimental command as a laboratory; later

that month, a detachment of the 4400th became operationally

ready. If moved to Vietnam, it would acquire counterinsurgency experience and train the Vietnamese.11 President

Kennedy authorized deployment of the Jungle Jim squadron

to Vietnam “to serve under the Military Advisory and

Assistance Group (MAAG) as a training mission and not for

combat at the present time.”12

But the 4400th was “designed to fight.” It had been “singled

out” for deployment because its combat capacity and

involvement would shore up “South Vietnamese sagging

morale.”13 The president now enunciated a new mission

statement for Jungle Jim: to train Vietnamese airmen while

working with and supporting the special forces that had been

sent in five months earlier. One of Jungle Jim’s objectives was

to forge counterinsurgency tactics—and it was capable of

using sod runways to operate austerely in remote areas. It

could conduct strike, reconnaissance, and airlift missions; fly

close support for ground troops; air-drop small forces (up to

company-size); deliver supplies; and perform medical

evacuations.14

Support arrangements were made, and a tent camp was

readied for the detachment’s arrival at Bien Hoa Airfield. At

Eglin, the task force received its formal name: Detachment 2A,

4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (and its code name,

“Farm Gate”).15

Farm Gate departed Florida on 5 November 1961. Four

SC-47s flew to Clark AB, Philippines, and eight T-28s were

disassembled in California and ferried to Clark. After

reassembly, Colonel King led the T-28s to Tan Son Nhut. The

detachment became operationally ready on 16 November,

though another week passed before the last of the SC-47s and

T-28s arrived. Farm Gate also accepted four B-26s that had

previously been sent to the Far East. These light bombers

reached Bien Hoa near the close of December.16

At Bien Hoa, the Farm Gate detachment found a run-down

French air base with a flight surface consisting of a single

pierced-steel-plank runway, 5,800 by 150 feet. About 700

South Vietnamese soldiers defended the airfield. Farm Gate

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

87
worked with the two mobile CRPs at Tan Son Nhut and

organized a tactical air control system (TACS).17

Members of Farm Gate thought they were to conduct

combat operations while training South Vietnamese; that was

how General LeMay had briefed Colonel King, who was willing

to make his unit combat-capable. In early familiarization

flights, T-28 crews followed Vietnamese fighter-bombers to

targets, observed their attacks, and, when authorized, fired on

targets. The men of Farm Gate were highly motivated and

eager to fight.18 On 16 November, however, Farm Gate was

tasked with conducting training and pilot upgrade for the

Vietnamese. President Kennedy advised that the unit was

“training Vietnamese aircrews and supporting Vietnamese

operations against the Vietcong.”19

Morale was lowered from the beginning because of mission

uncertainties and the absence of combat. Pilots had expected to

carry an air offensive to the Vietcong. Instead, they trained and

supplemented the Vietnamese Air Force, seeking to evolve

techniques for what McNamara described to the press as “not

full-scale warfare but guerrilla warfare.” Early Farm Gate

operations tended to be improvised and experimental rather

than systematic.20

Farm Gate also acquired the mission of supporting the Army

Special Forces and their Civilian Irregular Defense Group. C-47s

operated under an ad hoc system free of MAAG and Vietnamese

Army control.21 While valuable, these missions were not what

Farm Gate wanted to do. Gen Emmett O’Donnell, commander of

PACAF, permitted Farm Gate to fly combat missions “with at

least one South Vietnamese national aboard any aircraft.” On 6

December, the Joint Chiefs granted formal authority for Farm

Gate aircraft to fly combat if Vietnamese were aboard for

training.22 Together, Vietnamese and Americans were to destroy

Vietcong lifelines and support bases. From Bien Hoa, Tan Son

Nhut, and combat air bases at Da Nang and Pleiku, air

operations provided photo reconnaissance, surveillance,

interdiction, and close support of ground operations.23

McNamara wanted all flights confined to South Vietnam.

Stressing the difference between “riding double” combat

training missions and operational missions, he stressed that

combat missions be confined to solely “important jobs.” In

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88
other words, according to McNamara, “Jungle Jim is to be

used for training and operational missions in South Vietnam

with Vietnamese riding rear seats.”24 Combined crews on

combat missions would provide training and allow the

Vietnamese to fly these missions alone as soon as possible.

The possibility of an independent American combat role came

to an end early.25

Command Structure

From 1955, the United States was directly involved in

organizing and training Vietnamese units. The South

Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), a very small element of their

armed forces, had to be built from the bottom up. VNAF’s

organization, inherited from the French, was considerably

different from USAF’s arrangement for fighting a theater war.

With the introduction of Farm Gate T-28s and B-26s, it became

increasingly apparent that a USAF command structure was

required to control American flying units. Even though Farm

Gate units were restricted to combat training missions, it was

inevitable that these missions would involve actual combat.26

Further, Farm Gate was providing more and more close air

support—and air cover for convoys, which were being

ambushed with increasing frequency. Since the VNAF could

not meet all these requirements, Farm Gate’s mission directives

provided for its employment in emergency situations.27

President Kennedy expanded the training and advisory

forces in Vietnam at the same time the Farm Gate project was

activated.28 The airlift force was increased, the Ranch Hand

(defoliation unit) detachment was expanded, additional control

facilities were dispatched, and more FACs with liaison aircraft

were assigned. The MAAG was reorganized and expanded to

control the rapidly growing US commitment. On 8 February

1962, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was

formed with Gen Paul D. Harkins as commander. General

Harkins formally separated advisory activities from training

and operational activities. In essence, MACV became the

headquarters for combat operations.29

Early in 1962, General LeMay recognized that the

insurgency in South Vietnam demanded a more imaginative

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89
employment of airpower. On 23 April, he talked with General

Harkins about making airpower more responsive.30 The

command system, LeMay said, was too cumbersome; requests

for air cover and for strikes against the enemy’s ambush forces

were being processed too slowly. He emphasized that airpower,

called in quickly enough, could make ambushes very costly.

Proper use of the TACS and a more direct method of

processing requests would eliminate delays, LeMay argued. He

also pointed out that more airmen were needed on the MACV

staff to improve the effectiveness of Farm Gate units and to

create a better understanding among Vietnamese officers on

the use of airpower. To provide significant convoy protection,

support for civilian irregular defense groups, and CAS for

major ground operations, airpower would have to be centrally

and efficiently controlled—which it could be, using the

facilities of the already established TACS.

31

The tactical air control system had proven its worth in World

War II and Korea. An air operations center (AOC) afforded

centralized planning, direction, and control. Supporting it was a

reporting center for radar and other warning services. In

addition, each major ground command area contained

subordinate air support operations centers and warning posts.

PACAF and Thirteenth Air Force planned such a system for

Vietnam in December 1961. An air operations center for

overall control at Tan Son Nhut supported the III Corps

Tactical Zone headquarters. Subordinate air support

operations centers at Da Nang and Pleiku served the I and II

Corps headquarters. Secretary McNamara rejected the idea of

phasing in this system slowly and directed that it be

established at once.32

Air Operations in 1962

The system began operating on 13 January 1962. In a move

designed to avoid striking innocent targets, President Diem’s

prior personal approval was required for all air strikes. Gen

Bollen H. Anthis, MACV air component commander, briefed

Diem and stressed how the system’s instant information on

enemy and friendly air activities led to a quick response.

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90
Persuaded, Diem permitted the joint operations staff to

authorize air strikes without his direct approval.

Forward air controllers were on USAF organizational charts

in 1962, but just how to use them was an undetermined

issue. There was no clear-cut front line. A FAC on the ground,

in a guerrilla/friendly mix-up or obscured in the dense jungle,

would have no better view of the situation than an ordinary

rifleman. In late 1961, Maj Douglas Evans and Capt Tom

Cairney received orders to fly with the VNAF. They became the

first American FACs in Southeast Asia.

33

A number of junior Vietnamese officers were acting as FACs

and as air liaison officers (ALO) with ground forces. They were

hesitant to control strikes or give advice to ground commanders.

Lacking authority and seemingly uninformed, these young

officers appeared merely to transmit requests for information to

their headquarters over unsecured communications networks.

Five additional USAF FACs arrived on 15 February 1962. They

were pilots who were highly qualified to direct strike aircraft

from observation planes. The initial USAF ALOs got to Vietnam

in April 1962.34

At first, the USAF controllers were attached to those

Vietnamese ground forces judged likely to engage the enemy.

Since President Diem wanted rated Vietnamese observers to

control strikes, the Americans worked as assistant ALOs. They

also flew the L-19 for the Vietnamese FACs and served as duty

officers in the air operations center.35 The inexpensive L-19 was

the ultimate in maintenance simplicity. Its simple, fixed landing

gear of spring steel could handle rough fields as well as rough

landings. Normal cruise speed was 90 to 100 MPH and, with

flaps, it had a stall speed as low as 55 MPH. With that

combination, pilots could work from a 1,000-foot strip or a dirt

road.36

Crippling the TACS was the limited and failure-prone

communications between centers and airfields. PACAF

therefore obtained newly developed high-frequency, singlesideband radios for long-distance voice and teletype channels.

But when these radios reached Clark on 30 December 1961,

problems arose immediately: Operators in the small mobile

vans sweltered as temperatures often soared to 130 degrees,

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

91
atmospheric conditions caused poor transmission, and

extensive use cluttered the frequency bands.

In January 1962, USAF planners were convinced they had

solved the problem of creating a “clear, realistic, jointly agreed

concept for the elimination of Vietcong influence.” Their idea

called for a quick reaction force of Vietnamese airborne troops,

lifted and supported by US or Vietnamese transport and strike

aircraft.37

Precise targeting was required, and guerrilla warfare blurred

distinctions. Insurgents disguised themselves as civilians,

found shelter among the populace, and depended on innocent

civilians for food and other items. President Diem emphatically

insisted that airmen exercise utmost care to avoid angering

the people by injuring innocents. In fact, carelessness during

an air strike could lead to a prison sentence.38 Thirteenth Air

Force therefore asked Pacific Air Force (PACAF) to lay down

rules of engagement for Farm Gate. The request was referred

to commander-in-chief Pacific (CINCPAC) for resolution; Adm

Harry D. Felt stressed caution.

Because of this cautious approach, more than half of the

T-28s flying strike missions in 1962 returned with unused

ordnance. One USAF FAC said he saw Vietnamese troops after

an engagement “put 60 artillery rounds into a village for no

apparent reason and kill women and children.” Yet, he knew of

no instance when “we indiscriminately went into any area and

just for the heck of it bombed and strafed.”39 During the night of

1 March 1962, the Vietcong stormed an outpost about 30 miles

north of Saigon in War Zone D. The call for help flashed to the

AOC and thence to Farm Gate. An SC-47 flare-ship and two

T-28s carrying napalm, rockets, and .50-caliber machine guns

scrambled, with radar at Tan Son Nhut vectoring them to the

scene. The T-28s pummeled the enemy under the light of

blossoming flares, the assault was broken off, and the outpost

held. Five enemy bodies were found the following day, along with

evidence that more had been wounded.

While lapses in coordination and communications marred

some operations, overall results in 1962 infused optimism. On

4 March, a Vietnamese L-19 discovered a company of Vietcong

(50 to 70) near the bend of a river 30 miles northeast of Tan

Son Nhut. Vietnamese Skyraiders (AD-6) scrambled within 15

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

92
minutes, armed solely with 20 mm cannon since the planes

were forbidden to carry bombs. Asked to assist, Farm Gate

flew a series of strikes at Vietnamese request. Reports the next

day claimed 50 to 60 Vietcong dead.40

USAF pilots could return fire against “a known source” in

self-defense, but they rarely knew a source’s exact location. In

the daytime, Farm Gate planes could not fire unless under

positive control of a Vietnamese FAC, and cooperation with

Vietnamese L-19 controllers was frequently difficult. In

addition, elaborate reconnaissance and target marking alerted

the Vietcong to impending strikes. This impeded action

against an already elusive foe.41

Air strikes near friendly troops called for cooperation

between air missions and ground units. As in Korea, TACPs

came to be used. The Air Force supplied a seasoned fighter

pilot to serve as the ALO member of the control party. The

Army furnished vehicles and mechanics, radio gear and

operators. A radio jeep carried the ALO and Army members of

the control party. The vehicle’s radios linked the FAC and the

strike pilots with ground and air units. The control party’s

work was thwarted whenever the jeep was slowed or stopped

by damaged roads, ambushes, jungles, or swamps.42

A further frustration was the meager experience of the

Vietnamese in coordinating air-ground operations. The

shortage of L-19 pilots prevented the assignment of ALOs to

ground units. The foremost need was to secure sufficient

two-man L-19 crews (pilot and observer) to place strike aircraft

on the target. So in lieu of an ALO, the Vietnamese sometimes

designated an L-19 crew to serve as a FAC for a ground unit.

The pilot and observer reported to the unit, received briefings

on the planned action, and became familiar with the terrain.

The crew then returned home to conduct other air control and

reconnaissance missions. On the day of the operation, the

L-19 crew flew back and controlled air strikes for the ground

unit.

Unable to operate at night, L-19 crews flew in daytime,

usually at three thousand to five thousand feet, far too high

for good surveillance and target marking. The air observer

marked targets for fighters by radio direction or hand-thrown

smoke grenade, commonly by both methods. Criticism and

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

93
penalty awaited an L-19 crew if ground fire damaged the

plane. The observer was subject to severe punishment if he

erred in marking a target and friendly casualties resulted.43

To communicate with ground troops, L-19s carried Army

radios lashed to their back seats. Because the plane could

power only its own radios or the Army radio, the crew could

not converse with strike aircraft and ground forces at the same

time. The ground units wanted man-pack radios that could

mesh with existing UHF/VHF airborne sets. No such radios

were obtainable in 1962. Complications of this sort paled

beside the general insufficiency of the L-19s. They were often

simply unavailable. In April, for example, Farm Gate pilots

arrived over a target and could see a firefight on the ground

but the Vietnamese controller never arrived.44

In late 1962, President Diem reorganized the South

Vietnamese military. He divided Vietnam into four corps

tactical zones, created the new IV Corps in the Mekong Delta,

and established the capital military district around Saigon.

Combined VNAF-USAF staffs in the direct air support centers

(DASC) formed a link in the tactical air control chain. In

theory, the DASCs would cover changing areas of

responsibility as the battlefield situation progressed. In South

Vietnam, however, the DASCs remained fixed in specified

regions. A DASC was collocated with the Tactical Operations

Center in each of the four Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN) Corps: at Da Nang (I Corps), Pleiku (II Corps), Bien Hoa

(III Corps), and Can Tho (IV Corps). The DASCs served as

regional extensions of the TACC, receiving and coordinating

requests for CAS within their areas of responsibility and

working with the TACC to meet tactical air priorities. Corps

tactical zone commanders were given greater responsibilities

as part of a new National Campaign Plan. They exercised

operational control not only over their ground forces but over

supporting Vietnamese Air Force elements.

Air Operations in 1963

In 1963, the Air Force regularized the status of its units in

Vietnam. CINCPAC Adm Harry Felt spurned the principle that

USAF personnel sent to the country had to have prior

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

94
counterinsurgency training. Farm Gate, he said, was flying

conventional missions and airmen could be assigned on a

routine basis. This cleared the way for doubling the number of

aircrews and maintenance men, and it raised the sortie rate by

25 or 30 percent. Felt also wished to boost the number of

liaison aircraft and FACs by two squadrons. This, he said,

would be the key to a successful national campaign plan.45

In early February, General LeMay pressed for putting US

markings on Farm Gate aircraft. He said, “Current

classification restrictions on Farm Gate are considered

unnecessary. Actual operation is well known through SVN

(South Vietnam) and classification has become an

administrative burden.” Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

however, continued to accent the American role as “strictly

limited to advisory, logistic, and training functions.”46

Over the first half of 1963, Vietnamese L-19s (O-1s) escorted

truck convoys and trains while strike aircraft covered convoys

transporting high-priority cargoes. Vietnamese and USAF

planes flew close to 1,000 sorties in these missions. The

Vietcong ambushed no surface forces having air cover but

were quick to attack transportation that had no aerial

escort.47

Farm Gate gained fresh aircraft in January 1963: five T-28s,

ten B-26s, and two C-47s. By February, Farm Gate had 42

planes and 275 men. By June, MACV had 16,652 people,

4,090 of them Air Force. On 8 July, Farm Gate at Bien Hoa

became the 1st Air Commando Squadron (Composite). As 1st

Air Commando Squadron, Farm Gate contained two strike

sections. The first section consisted of ten B-26s with 23 crews

(pilot and navigator) and two RB-26s (reconnaissance version);

the second had thirteen T-28s with two crew members per

aircraft. There were also two support sections, one with four

psychological warfare couriers and the other with six C-47s.

The remaining eight B-26s were in detachments at Plaice and

Soc Trang.48

Air Force and Vietnamese pilots faithfully followed the rule

that air strikes had to be handled by a Vietnamese FAC (a

precaution against indiscriminate bombing). Crews staging

from forward airfields were encouraged to fly low and seek out

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

95
the enemy. Before they could attack, however, they needed a

Vietnamese airborne FAC.49

The Air Force’s 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS)

was activated at Bien Hoa in July 1963, but the new unit’s

aircraft and crews trickled in. Four O-1s and 22 crews were on

board by July; the remaining 18 planes arrived on the USS

Card in August. Since Americans were forbidden to direct air

strikes, 11 seasoned Vietnamese observers were integrated

into the squadron. Operational in September, the unit

furnished more and more FACs and ALOs for the National

Campaign Plan. Its primary mission was to train Vietnamese

pilots in FAC, visual reconnaissance, combat support, and

observer procedures. The aim was to replace pilots taken to fill

fighter cockpits. The squadron was to remain in Vietnam for

one year, then turn its O-1s over to the Vietnamese.50

After 25 officers and 69 airmen had completed training (in

July and August), they opened the Nha Trang center in

September. Trainees took one month of preflight instruction

and three months of flight training that included 80 hours of

actual flying. Vietnamese liaison pilots in sufficient numbers

were ready for combat in early 1964.51

In September, Lt Col David S. Mellish, III Corps ALO,

received authorization to start an air interdiction program.

Vietnamese province chiefs certified certain areas as free of

friendly people. The AOC scheduled air strikes, under FACs,

into these regions. This interdiction paid off in Tay Ninh and

Phuouc Thanh provinces during October, but the Vietcong

learned to disperse and take cover as soon as the O-1s

dropped smoke grenades to mark targets for the strike

planes.52

The 19th TASS was fully operational by 15 September. The

unit, commanded by Lt Col John J. Wilfong, kept sixteen O-1s

at Bien Hoa and six at Can Tho. By year’s end they had flown

3,862 sorties: 483 FAC, 1,221 visual reconnaissance, and

1,518 combat support liaison. The “prompt response and

can-do attitude” of the crews bred a huge demand for their

services. The Americans met with limited success, however, in

trying to augment rather than replace Vietnamese liaison

operations.53 A few USAF pilots who flew with Vietnamese

FACs realized they had been doing a boring and thankless job

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

96
for many years with no end in sight. The average Vietnamese

pilot saw the law of averages working against him and was

reluctant to fly below two thousand feet. If he mistakenly

directed an attack on friendly people, criminal prosecution

awaited him. The prevailing American view saw Vietnamese

crews as unaggressive and unreliable. By October, this

disapproval was being expressed by the overwhelming

sentiment that “Americans must run things.”54

As sorties swelled to meet Vietcong attacks, premission

briefings were seldom practical. Responding to numerous

requests, Vietnamese FACs frequently flew many miles into

unfamiliar areas. They radioed ground units to find the

locations of friendly and enemy troops and then marked the

targets for strike crews. Air Force officers repeatedly urged the

Vietnamese to attach ALOs and FACs to divisions so they

could be familiar with local conditions. The VNAF declined,

citing the scarcity of qualified officers, the failure of the young

O-1 “Bird Dog”

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

97
ones to work well without close supervision, and the discord

between air and ground officers.55

By the end of 1963, the government’s military offensive was

collapsing and the Vietcong were seizing the initiative.

Nevertheless, the limited number of USAF and Vietnamese

aircraft had scored some tactical gains in the face of severe

handicaps.56 President Kennedy, on 14 November, announced

that Rusk and McNamara were going to Honolulu for a

meeting to size up the situation and identify how to intensify

the struggle and end American involvement. “Now,” the

president said, “this is our objective—to bring Americans

home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as

a free and independent country, and permit democratic forces

within the country to operate.” But the assassination of

President Kennedy in November 1963 signaled the end of one

era and the beginning of another.57

Air Operations in 1964

Four days after taking office, President Johnson reaffirmed

American objectives in Vietnam. The United States would help

the republic win the war against the externally directed and

sustained conspiracy, assist the government in developing

public support, and keep US military and economic aid at the

same level. “This is a Vietnamese war,” the president said,

“and the country and the war must in the end be run solely by

the Vietnamese.” He reiterated the October 1963 pledge to

withdraw some Americans. Yet, at the same time, he

instructed the State Department to prepare a white paper

documenting Hanoi’s control of the Vietcong and its supply of

them through Laos. He further solicited plans for stepped-up

clandestine warfare and for cross-border incursions into Laos

to check infiltration.58

Between January and May 1964, Hanoi sent an estimated

4,700 troops into South Vietnam. Formerly, most of the

infiltrators had been ethnic southerners; now there were

growing numbers of native northerners, many of them in the

North Vietnamese Army. Formerly, the Vietcong had relied on

French and American weapons, chiefly from stockpiles

captured before 1954 in Indochina and Korea; by 1964, most

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98
of their weapons were of Chinese origin, brought by land and

sea from North Vietnam.59

On 22 January 1964, the JCS proposed a ten-point program

of “bolder actions to arrest SVN’s military/political decline.”

The proposal amounted to a virtual takeover of the war from

the Saigon government through overt and covert bombing in

North Vietnam, large-scale commando raids, mining the sea

approaches, ground operations into Laos, and extended

reconnaissance over both Laos and Cambodia. The plan also

called for committing more US forces to support combat in

Vietnam.60

The decision to focus on the battle inside South Vietnam

underscored the demand to relax the rules of engagement for

air operations. On 27 March, MACV authorized strike aircraft

to operate to the border if the border could be identified from

the air. Elsewhere, they could fly as close as 200 meters when

directed by a FAC or five thousand meters without one.

However, they were forbidden to fire across or violate the

frontier without diplomatic clearance. The State Department

sympathized with the JCS stand for hot pursuit into

Cambodia under certain conditions, but resisted any easing of

those restrictions. State’s position governed in 1964.61

“The word for the Air Force in Vietnam,” MACV Air

Commander Gen Bollen H. Anthis wrote in November 1963, “is

austerity.” War-weary air commando aircraft, a fledgling VNAF,

and a slow air request network made it difficult to seize combat

opportunities.62 The USAF 34th Tactical Group was scheduled

to phase out of Vietnam. Withdrawal would begin in mid-1964

with the departure of the 19th TASS (which furnished FACs).

The 1st Air Commando Squadron, due to receive the first two of

18 rebuilt B-26Ks in June, was scheduled to leave in mid-1965.

Farm Gate’s B-26s were nearly worn out but 2d Air Division (AD)

expected them to survive with careful flying. The new

Vietnamese 518th Fighter Squadron got A-1Hs in March 1964.

Also that month, the 716th Composite Reconnaissance

Squadron received eighteen RT-28s and three RC-47s. During

the second quarter of 1964, USAF T-28s were replaced on a

one-for-one basis with dual-piloted A-1Hs.63

By 1964, Vietnamese and American aircraft comprised only

about one-half of the requested support. The reasons lay in air

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

99
request network troubles and the rising damage to planes

from Vietcong ground defenses. On 11 February, after the

wing of a B-26 broke off in flight at Eglin AFB, all B-26s in

Vietnam were taken out of combat. They were then restricted

to only straight and level flight with the lightest ordnance

loads.64 The uncertain combat worthiness of the old B-26s led

PACAF to suggest deploying a squadron of the 3d Bombardment

Wing’s B-57s from Japan to Bien Hoa. Their jet speed spelled a

swifter response to air support requests.65

At least 1,546 air strike requests were received in the first

three months of 1964. Of the 424 not honored, 230 were due to

a shortage of planes. But these figures did not present a true

picture because ground commanders and FACs disliked filing

new requests after having been turned down.

Gen Joseph H. Moore, Second Air Division commander,

wanted to enlarge the TACS by adding an air request

communications network that would be manned and operated

by the Air Force. It would resemble the US Strike CommandTactical Air Command system that had been worked out during

maneuvers in the United States. General Moore hoped to

eliminate the long delays encountered in passing air requests up

through channels over Vietnamese army communications.66 The

proposed network would enhance USAF advice at lower ground

echelons. An Air Force pilot and two radio operators would man

TACPs at all levels down to battalion. They would process air

support requests, provide advice, and direct CAS strikes. To man

this countrywide setup, 2d Air Division drew pilots from the 19th

TASS. Moore envisioned a continuing need for Vietnamese

controllers, but he saw no reason why Air force controllers and

Army and Vietnamese forward air guides could not coordinate

their efforts to designate targets for air strikes.67

Lt Col John M. Porter, commander of the 1st Air Commando

Squadron (ACS), led the original flight of six A-1Es from the

Philippines to Bien Hoa on 30 May. The next day, A-1Es flew

their maiden strike sorties. Col William E. Bethea, who assumed

command of the 34th Tactical Group in June, was impressed by

the plane’s large and varied ordnance capability, short takeoff

roll, extremely long range, and good loitering. But the A-1E’s

normal cruising speed of 155 knots (185 MPH) prevented a rapid

response, and the aircraft could barely defend itself in aerial

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100
combat. Nevertheless, 1st ACS soon had twelve A-1Es and the

T-28s were retired. On 30 June, the 34th Tactical Group

began transition training for Vietnamese pilots.68

The natural environment of Vietnam worked against ground

TACPs. Their bulky radio gear was hard to transport through

the jungle. It was sometimes impossible to direct an air strike

safely from the ground. Mountains and heavy vegetation

hampered the ground view, and the flat ground of the delta

offered no elevation for observation. Numerous tree lines and

canal ridges also obstructed the view.

By mid-1964, it was generally agreed that ground TACPs

could not replace airborne control even though the plodding

Vietnamese O-1s (L-19s) and their often indifferent observers did

not provide effective air support. Strong pleas to prevent the

demise of the 19th TASS proved futile; the unit remained under

orders to transfer its aircraft to the Vietnamese.69 Also by 1964,

FACs had become a prime source of intelligence about the

enemy.

The Gulf of Tonkin

On 2 August 1964, the USS Maddox reported that North

Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked it while it was on

patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. The attack was apparently in

retaliation for US-sponsored South Vietnamese raids along the

North Vietnamese coast. Two nights later, the Maddox and a

second destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy reported additional

enemy attacks against them. On 5 August, President Johnson

ordered a retaliatory strike against North Vietnamese coastal

torpedo bases and an oil storage depot. On 7 August, the

president proposed and Congress adopted the Gulf of Tonkin

resolution, which authorized him to use all measures—

including the commitment of US armed forces—to assist

South Vietnam in defending its independence and territory.

President Johnson then approved emergency actions to

move additional forces into Southeast Asia. Six F-102 jet

interceptors of the 509th Fighter Squadron flew from Clark to

Da Nang. Six others from the 16th Fighter Squadron at Naha

AB, Okinawa, touched down at Tan Son Nhut. Eight F-100s of

the 615th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), on rotational

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

101
deployment at Clark, went to Da Nang. Thirty-six B-57s of the

Eighth and Thirteenth Bomber Squadrons deployed to Bien

Hoa. Six RF-101s out of Kadena and Misawa air bases, Japan,

augmented reconnaissance planes at Tan Son Nhut. The

405th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) sent ten F-100s from Clark

to Takhli, Thailand. Eight KB-50s from PACAF’s 421st Air

Refueling Squadron moved from Yokota to Tan Son Nhut and

Takhli. Eight F-105 jet fighters of the 36th TFS flew from

Yokota to Clark, then to Korat in Thailand, on 9 August.70

Forty-eight C-130 transports from the 314th, 463d, and

516th Troop Carrier Wings arrived at Clark and Kadena

between 9 and 21 August. For in-flight refueling, Strategic Air

Command (SAC) furnished forty-eight KC-135 jet tankers that

operated mainly from Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii and

Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. SAC further formed a task

force of eight KC-135s at Clark.72 On 6 August, General Moore

created a 2d Air Division command post at Tan Son Nhut,

separate from the combined Vietnamese-USAF air operations

center. He began to tie together all USAF units in the area.

On 8 August, at the height of the crisis, PACAF issued orders

to inactivate the 19th TASS. Gen William C. Westmoreland

expressed surprise, and requested that he be allowed to retain

the unit. In lieu of giving the O-1 liaison planes to the

Vietnamese, creation of the 116th Liaison Squadron was

proposed. Westmoreland requested that U-17A aircraft be

purchased to equip that unit. Defense Secretary McNamara

approved on 25 September,72 and the 19th TASS was

reactivated at Bien Hoa on 31 October. MACV recommended 30

more planes for it and each of the four Vietnamese liaison units.

Until support could be restored, the 34th Tactical Group

possessed twenty-four O-1s and only twelve pilots. A

detachment of O-1Fs remained at Bien Hoa to train newly

graduated Vietnamese pilots.73

New Demands

By the end of 1964, the North Vietnamese had begun to

escalate the war in South Vietnam.74 Engagements were now

approaching those of battalion-size units. With the

appearance of regular North Vietnamese troops in South

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

102
Vietnam, aircraft encountered heavier ground fire in all corps

areas with a sharp increase in I and II Corps. Whereas most of

the ground fire had previously been .30-caliber, .50-caliber

now became more frequent. This stronger firepower required

most aircraft to change to higher operating altitudes. Aircraft

operating below two thousand feet expected to encounter some

ground fire. In approaching most airfields, aircrews could

expect spasmodic ground fire. This was also true after dark on

the approaches to most of the larger airfields; for example, Tan

Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang. Aircraft losses increased

significantly during this time.75

The USAF controller with the 14th Regiment at Tra Vinh

was Capt Lloyd E. Lewis. Receiving an O-1 and a Vietnamese

observer in September, he began flying day-long surveillance

missions in coordination with the Vinh Binh province

commander. The result was an appreciable decline in Vietcong

activity. Friendly ground forces became more productive, as

did interdiction targeting and air strikes.76

In September, William B. Graham and Aaron H. Katz of

RAND studied the use of USAF ALOs and FACs on constant

visual reconnaissance and strike control. They gathered data

for a new concept they called the “Single Integrated Attack

Team.” The idea was presented in Saigon, Hawaii, and

Washington D.C. in October, then in a RAND report. The

theory favored small and closely coordinated air and ground

strike forces as the best counterinsurgency weapon. O-1 crews

would carry out continuous and extensive airborne

surveillance and strike control. They would work with Special

Forces ground teams who would hold Vietcong groups long

enough for aircraft to strike them. Unfortunately, the concept

was better-suited to an insurgency in its initial stages than to

the field warfare the Vietcong were beginning to wage.77 The

continuous surveillance concept could not be properly set in

motion during the winter of 1964–65 due to the dearth of

aircraft and forward air controllers.

On 9 March 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that US

aircraft could be used for combat operations in South

Vietnam. No strikes were permitted from Thai airfields and

American aircraft could not accept missions that the VNAF

could carry out. But the planes now boldly displayed US

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

103
insignia, and a Vietnamese airman was no longer required to

be aboard in combat.

Despite a sizable increase in personnel and aircraft between

1955 and 1965, the US advisory mission failed to end Hanoi’s

support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos. The

decision early in 1965 to replace advisors with combat troops

recognized two facts that had become clear: infiltration into

South Vietnam was growing rather than slowing, and the

government of South Vietnam could not cope with the

situation. US policy makers saw the confluence of these two

factors bringing defeat to the South unless a new approach

was taken. Thus, the purely advisory function was abandoned

in favor of direct US air and ground participation. The USAF

units in place early in 1965 formed the nucleus for the coming

buildup.78

Notes

1. Maj Gen T. R. Milton, “Air Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia,” Air

University Review XV (November–December 1963): 3.

2. Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of

How the Johnson Policy of Escalation in Vietnam Was Reversed (New York:

David McKay Co., 1969), 13.

3. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Air Force, January 1978), 9.

4. Ibid., 251.

5. Milton, 4.

6. Momyer, 170.

7. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The

Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History

[OAFH], 1981), 79.

8. Lt Col M. M. Doyle, interviewed by TSgt Robert J. O’Neill, 16 February

1963.

9. History of the 2d Advanced Echelon (ADVON), November 1961–October

1962 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 8; John W. R. Taylor, ed., Combat Aircraft

of the World (London: Ebury Press, 1969), 491–92.

10. Assistant Director for Joint Matters, Directorate of Operations, USAF

(AFXOPJ), Book of Actions in Southeast Asia (SEA), item IV-B (Washington,

D.C.: OAFH), 961–64.

11. Ibid., Item III-B, 21–22.

12. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.

Kennedy,1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 84.

13. History of the Director of Plans, USAF, 1 July–31 December 1961, vol.

22 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1962), 78.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

104
14. Brig Gen Benjamin H. King, interviewed by USAFHRA staff, 4

September 1962; History of the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC), 27

April–31 December 1962 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1963), 1–10.

15. Director of Plans, USAF, memorandum, subject: briefing on Jungle

Jim, 16 October 1961.

16. History, SAWC, April–December 1962, 12–13.

17. Message, Detachment 9, 2d ADVON to PACAF, 21 November 1961.

18. History, 2d ADVON, 8–9; Victory B. Anthony, The Air Force in

Southeast Asia: Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961–70

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH, March 1973); Message, CINCPAC to chief,

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Vietnam (VN), 16 November

1961.

19. Message, CINCPAC to chief, MAAG, VN, 16 November 1961.

20. Message, CINCPAC to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 13 March

1963.

21. Paul S. Ella, Richard P. Joyce, Robert H. Williams, and William

Woodworth, “US Army Special Forces and Similar Internal Defense Advisory

Operations in Mainland Southeast Asia, 1962–67,” Research Analysis

Corporation, June 1969, 117.

22. Message, JCS to CINCPAC, 6 December 1961; History of CINCPAC

Command (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1961), 190–91.

23. History, CINCPAC Command, 1961, 171.

24. Message, PACAF to chief of staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), 17

December 1961.

25. Message, Thirteenth Air Force to PACAF, 28 December 1961, CSAF

to PACAF, 23 March 1963, and JCS to CINCPAC, 26 December 1961.

26. Gen William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday & Co., 1976), 110–11.

27. Momyer, 67.

28. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Popular Library,

1971), 55–58.

29. Momyer, 68.

30. Corona Harvest Report, “USAF Activities in Southeast Asia,

1954–1964,” bk. 1, OAFH, 41.

31. Momyer, 73.

32. Futrell, 105–6.

33. Maj Douglas K. Evans, “Reinventing the FAC: Vietnam, 1962,” Air

Force Magazine, February 1980, 72.

34. Futrell, 106.

35. Ralph A. Rowley, USAF FAC Operations in Southeast Asia,

1961–1965 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, January 1972), 15, 18, 24–25;

History, 2d ADVON, 97.

36. Evans, 74.

37. Director/Plans, US Air Force, memorandum to chief of staff, Air

Force, 1 March 1962.

38. Rowley, 19.

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

105
39. End of Tour reports, Lt Cols M. M. Doyle and John P. Gilbert,

February 1962–August 1963.

40. History, 2d ADVON, November 1961–October 1962.

41. Message, 2d ADVON to Thirteenth Air Force, 21 April 1962, and

PACAF to CINCPAC, 8 May 1962.

42. Futrell, 143.

43. History, 2d Air Division, 1, 110.

44. MACV, Summary of Highlights, 8 February 1962–7 February 1963,

133–34, OAFH.

45. Quoted in message, PACAF to CSAF, 1 January 1963.

46. Message, CSAF to JCS, 8 February 1963, PACAF to CSAF, 20

February 1963, and 2d Air Division (AD) to PACAF, 18 February 1963;

History, SAWC, January–June 1963, 166.

47. History, 2d AD, January–June 1964, VI, Doc 31; Message, 2d AD to

Thirteenth Air Force, 15 November 1963.

48. History, SAWC, January–June 1963, II, Item 74, and July–December

1963, 119; History of the Thirteenth Air Force, January–June 1963

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1963), 72.

49. History, 2d AD, January–July 1964, IV, 13–14; 2d AD, Regulation

55–5, 22 January 1963.

50. Futrell, 168.

51. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 22 March 1963, 29 September 1963, and

5 October 1963, MACV to CINCPAC, 3 October 1963, PACAF to 2d AD, 30

October 1963, CINCPAC to CSAF, 15 March and 11 May 1963.

52. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 10 January 1964, and III ASOC to 2d AD,

5 February 1964.

53. “Combat Operations, Nineteenth TASS, 31 December 1962,” in

History, Thirteenth Air Force, July–December 1963, III, Doc 80; Message, 2d

AD to PACAF, 5 October 1963.

54. End of Tour reports, Lt Col David Mellish, 15 January 1964, and Maj

John G. Schmitt Jr., 2 September 1963.

55. End of Tour report, Maj John G. Schmitt, 18 September 1963.

56. Message, MACV to JCS, 13 June 1964, and JCS to CINCPAC, 1

November 1963.

57. Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, 846.

58. History, Director of Plans, USAF, July–December 1963, 65.

59. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: Harper &

Row, 1965), 153–54.

60. Book of Actions in SEA, 1961–1964, Item VI-1.

61. Message, MACV to 2d AD, 27 March 1964, JCS to CINCPAC, 12 May

1964, MACV to 2d AD, 29 October 1964 and 20 November 1964.

62. Gen Bollen H. Anthis to Smart, letter, 25 November 1963.

63. Message, PACAF to CSAF, 9 November 1963; History, PACAF,

January–June 1964, I, pt. 2, January 1964.

64. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 10 January and 21 February 1964;

History, 2d AD, January–June 1964, II, 28.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

106
65. History, PACAF, January–June 1964, I, pt 2, January 64; message,

2d AD to Thirteenth Air Force, 23 January 1964.

66. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 12 April 1964.

67. Message, 2d AD to Thirteenth Air Force, 2 March 1964, to CSAF, 15

April 1964, to PACAF, 20 April 1964, and PACAF to Thirteenth Air Force, 8

May 1964.

68. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 4 June 1964; History, PACAF, January–

June 1964, “Weekly Activity Report,” 26 June–3 July 1964.

69. History, PACAF, January–June 1964, I, pt 2.

70. Futrell, 229.

71. Book of Actions in SEA, Item III-P; Message, JCS to CINCPAC, 5

August 1964; History, TAC, July–December 1964, IV, Doc 4; History, 401st

Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), July–December 1964 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH,

1965), 33–34. The Thai government approved the movement of additional

USAF forces into Thailand but was reluctant to have combat sorties flown

from the country. The Thais finally agreed to the latter if they were

absolutely necessary and if their bases were not publicly revealed.

72. Message, MACV to CINCPAC, 11 August 1964, and CSAF to PACAF,

29 August 1964.

73. History, PACAF, July 1964–June 1965, III, October 1964.

74. Working Paper for Corona Harvest Report, “Out-Country Air

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965–31 March 1968,” bk. 1, 16.

75. Momyer, 263.

76. End of Tour report, Lt Clare C. Eaton, undated.

77. William B. Graham and Amron H. Katz, SIAT: The Single Integrated

Attack Team, A Concept for Offensive Military Operations in South Vietnam

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1964).

78. Futrell, 240.

VIETNAM: THE ADVISORY YEARS

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Chapter 7

Vietnam

Slow FAC Operations

With the enemy infiltrating throughout the country, the

problem of minimizing civilian casualties was critical. Because

there were no front lines, except for the 17th parallel which

arbitrarily separated South Vietnam from North Vietnam, the

enemy was apt to be anywhere—a distinguishing

characteristic of this war in contrast with World War II and

Korea. In those wars, once the aircraft passed the bomb line,

aircrews could assume that anything moving was a legitimate

target. In Vietnam, however, towns and villages were struck

only when the enemy used them as supply points or for

bivouacking troops. Civilians were not the target, of course,

but civilian casualties were a collateral effect of attacks

against the military targets.1 In Vietnam, all villages and

towns were in the combat zone. We had no way of telling

whether there were enemy forces in the villages unless the

villagers were willing to come forward and report them.

FACs Come of Age

To minimize attacks against civilians, forward air controllers

became the fundamental means through which all strikes

were controlled. With the deployment of the first Farm Gate

detachment in 1961, the policy that strike aircraft would be

under the control of a FAC became firm.2 All Farm Gate

aircraft were controlled by Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)

forward air controllers (FAC), but the shortage of VNAF pilots

and the lack of trained FACs created an unsatisfactory

condition.

As Farm Gate aircraft assumed more missions and as the

demand for CAS increased, the need for US FACs became

apparent. With the requirement to have a FAC control for all

air strikes, an expanded force was needed and time was

critical. The inability of VNAF to satisfactorily do the job

resulted in the deployment of the USAF 19th Tactical Air

109
Support Squadron (TASS) in June 1963.3

 This unit had

twenty-two L-19s and 44 pilots; its role from the outset was

not only to control air strikes but to develop information about

the enemy through daily visual reconnaissance.4

No target was attacked without obtaining permission of the

Vietnamese province chief as well as US and Vietnamese

military authorities at corps level. Assistance for the strike

pilots was provided by the FAC—an Air Force pilot who flew

low and slow in a Cessna O-1 Bird Dog to find targets. No

target was attacked unless a FAC verified it as legitimate. The

FAC guided the fighters into the target area, described the

target or marked it with a smoke rocket, observed the strikes,

and reported the results.

FACs represented a cross section of the Air Force’s fighter

pilot population. Most were captains. They were generally

young, highly trained, and rated as combat-ready in a current

fighter. They had three characteristics in common: (1) they all

had an abundance of what Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of the

Air Force, described as “political sophistication”; (2) they were

highly competent professional pilots with a thorough

background in strike fighter tactics, ordnance, and

ordnance-delivery techniques; and (3) they had an intense

desire to do their job properly. All were keenly aware of their

responsibility to determine which targets were bombed and

which were not. Everyone had an intense desire to ensure that

innocent people were not harmed.

The FAC corps spent much time in the air. One hundred

hours per month was the maximum flying time officially

allowed. Many reached this figure every month, and the

pressure of combat pushed most over the limit at least once. A

FAC flight usually lasted more than three hours, which was

the endurance level of his Bird Dog.5

FAC Aircraft

It was difficult to find a suitable aircraft for the FAC. After

Korea, no special FAC aircraft appeared because it was

assumed that the FAC would be ground-based. Therefore, few

airframe choices were available when the value of the airborne

FAC became evident. The Army provided some L-19s (renamed

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

110
the O-1) from its inventory in 1963, but the aircraft was not

ideal for FAC operations: It did not have all types of radios; it

was restricted at night, and in bad weather it was highly

vulnerable in a hostile environment; it was underpowered; and

it had poor capabilities for marking targets. Yet, despite these

drawbacks, everyone seemed enamored of the O-1. Its

endurance, easy maintenance, and ability to operate from

primitive strips helped make the O-1 easy to operate and fun

to fly. The replacement O-2A Super Skymaster brought some

improvement, especially in better power performance, but it

had about the same strengths and weaknesses as the O-1.6

The introduction of the O-2A did not significantly change

basic FAC tactics, but it did increase his effectiveness through

greater speed, more marking devices, and better night

operations.7

The search for an aircraft to fill the FAC mission led

inevitably to questions regarding the development of a

specially designed FAC aircraft. This, in turn, touched on the

related issue of arming the FACs. Experience in South

Vietnam showed that many small enemy groups discovered by

FACs disappeared between the sighting and the arrival of

strike aircraft. One Air Force study found that 50 percent of all

troops-in-contact incidents ended within 20 minutes and

involved fewer than 10 enemy soldiers. Another study revealed

that in one four-month period during 1970, 54 percent of

fleeting targets detected by FACs at night were not struck

because no firepower was available. But the question was

raised: “What if the FACs were armed?”

As early as 1965, 2d Air Division rejected suggestions to arm

FAC aircraft. Apparently, the deciding factor was the

belief—influenced by experiences in World War II—that an

armed FAC would be tempted to act like a fighter pilot instead

of a FAC. In May 1968, however, USAF Headquarters directed

Tactical Air Command (TAC) to test the concept of the armed

FAC. These tests were linked to the theory of “phased

response,” which sought to give some measure of immediate

CAS until strike aircraft could arrive.8 Neither the O-1 nor the

O-2A was deemed suitable for these tests, principally because

of their vulnerability. TAC agreed to test the OV-10 Bronco.

Upon careful consideration, including analysis of both the

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

111
tactical air command tests (“Combat Cover”) and its own test

(“Misty Bronco”), Seventh Air Force began using armed FACs

flying OV-10s in June 1969.

One distinct advantage of the OV-10 was its

maneuverability and evasive action capability when receiving

ground fire. Though the O-1 could make tighter turns, it really

only changed direction without making a great deal of progress

over the ground. The OV-10 had a much greater climb

capability and could maneuver evasively while gaining

altitude.9 It also had these advantages: two engines; better

visibility; four rocket launchers; faster response because of

higher speed (cruise, 180 knots; dive, 400 knots); and

night/all-weather operations. The largest disadvantage was

aircrew discomfort due to inadequate cockpit ventilation and

the aircraft’s greenhouse-like canopy.10

Equipped with two 7.62 mm machine guns and four rocket

pods, the OV-10 offered limited but highly responsive

firepower. During the “Misty Bronco” test period (4 April–13

June 1969), OV-10 pilots handled 78 of 98 requests for CAS

by themselves in an average response time of seven minutes.

O-2 “Skymaster”

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

112
Some operational problems developed when the OV-10 was

burdened with external fuel tanks in efforts to extend its

range, but it performed the armed FAC role admirably in the

permissive air environment of South Vietnam. Seventy-four

percent of OV-10 responses came in five minutes or less.11 In

the words of one Air Force study, “arming the FAC increases

overall tactical effectiveness.”12

The OV-10’s in-country operations consisted primarily of

visual reconnaissance and CAS for US Army units. Secondary

missions included radio relay, convoy escort, air-ground

coordination, and artillery adjustment. The 19th TASS,

located at Bien Hoa Air Base, received the majority of OV-10s.

They were dispersed to the tactical air control parties (TACP)

that supported 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division,

199th Light Infantry Brigade, and 1st Air Cavalry Division.

The 20th TASS at Da Nang used its OV-10s to support the

OV-10 “Bronco”

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

113
America Division and 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division

(mechanized). Forward operating locations were located at

Quang Tri, Chu Lai, and Pleiku.

Personnel Requirements

In January 1965, there were only 144 USAF pilot FACs in

Southeast Asia. They were joined by 68 VNAF FACs,13 but this

number could not support the rapid buildup of American and

free world forces. The FAC shortage caught the attention of

Gen Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Soon after his March 1965 visit to Vietnam, the JCS approved

134 additional USAF FAC authorizations and raised the TASS

from one to four. In June 1965, the Air Force activated the

20th, 21st, and 22d TASSs. They were manned by

September.14 It also increased the FAC school’s output,

ordered into production the OV-10 counterinsurgency aircraft,

and refined FAC tactics to meet the needs of the junglecovered terrain of Vietnam.

A problem that emerged with the arrival of US Army troops

in 1965 involved ground-based USAF FACs coming into South

Vietnam while FACs supporting Army of the Republic of

Vietnam (ARVN) units operated chiefly from the air. It took

experiences like those faced in Operation Harvest Moon (a

combined US Marine Corps [USMC]/ARVN operation in the

Song Ly valley between 8 and 15 December 1965) to hasten

the evolution to an almost exclusively airborne FAC role. Early

in the week-long action, when a four-man USMC ground-air

controller unit was unable to contact its air support center,

USAF airborne FACs were called in to help direct air support

strikes. After that, there were few preplanned groundcontrolled air strikes.15

With the move to airborne FACs, the ground commander

needed a pilot with experience to advise on the best use of air

support. Consequently, air liaison officers (ALO) were assigned

to advise ground commanders. Also, as a member of the

TACP, the ALO acted as ground FAC when circumstances

dictated.

The agreement for air-ground coordination signed by the Air

Force and the Army in March and April had a direct impact on

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

114
FAC resources in Southeast Asia (SEA).16 It specified that

TACPs be assigned to Army units (battalion through field army

level).17 Unfortunately, the Air Force had not maintained a

FAC force sufficient to fulfill this agreement. To do so would

require a doubling of FAC levies.18 By 31 December 1965, the

Air Force had 224 FACs assigned to SEA and additional

temporary duty FACs manning another 49 TACPs.

TAC furnished and trained the bulk of the FACs, and it

supplied most of the fighter pilots for the Vietnam War. But

with the increase in fighting, a pilot shortage emerged. An

obvious solution was to train more pilots. However, it took

almost three years to train a fighter-qualified pilot, give him

one year of experience, and put him through FAC training.

Relaxing the fighter-pilot qualification for FACs seemed the

ready answer, but it was a step TAC was reluctant to take.19

To stretch its meager FAC resources, TAC deployed barely

enough to permit one to each US Army battalion—a violation

of the Air Force’s agreement with the Army to furnish two.20

The Army insisted that ATC furnish 90 FACs for the 45

battalions programmed to be in-country21 by 30 April. In May

1966, Pacific Air Force (PACAF) reported to Headquarters

USAF that five hundred FACs would be needed to fill all

quotas under the Army/Air Force agreement.22

Setting a quota for FACs was one thing; filling it was quite

another. A shade over half of the FACs authorized were in

place by October 1966, with the Air Force hard-pressed to

satisfy the remaining minimum needs. Despite the joint

agreement, scarcity forced the pooling of FACs at brigade level.

They then deployed to battalions when they were needed.

Pooling had its advocates. An air liaison officer with the 3d

Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, deemed pooling better than

parceling out FACs piecemeal. He saw it as easing the

shortage and giving the FAC force more flexibility.23

Seventh Air Force

As more US units moved into Vietnam, 2d Air Division

expanded to become Seventh Air Force on 1 April 1966.24

Three months later, Gen William W. Momyer replaced Lt Gen

Joseph H. Moore as the unit’s commander. At that time, and

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

115
until the Tet offensive of 1968, all air operations within South

Vietnam were flown by units based in South Vietnam or on

carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although Momyer had

operational control of all USAF units in Thailand, he didn’t

employ them in South Vietnam until January 1968. Thai

leaders were concerned about the international political

implications of allowing US aircraft based in Thailand to

provide CAS to ARVN divisions in South Vietnam. Seventh Air

Force had authority to use Thailand-based units if the

situation in South Vietnam became critical. Beginning with

the Tet offensive, Seventh Air Force commanders used

Thailand-based units as needed.

The command and control system facilitated the

employment of airpower wherever it was needed. Seventh Air

Force’s aircraft in South Vietnam and Thailand were based

throughout the theater; no target was ever more than a few

minutes away from strike aircraft.25 Additionally, KC-135

tankers made it feasible to use fighters from one end of the

country to the other.

By early 1967, hundreds of thousands of troops were

in-country. Seventh Air Force was well established by this

time to support these US, ARVN, Korean, and Australian

ground forces in all of the four corps areas. Centralized control

of airpower was the only feasible means by which each of

these ground forces could get air support when needed.26

504th Tactical Air Support Group

The 504th tactical air support group (TASG) was the parent

organization for all FACs assigned to Southeast Asia. It

received approximately 80 new FACs per month to replace

those that rotated. A large, sprawling, and complex

organization, the group was responsible for ground

communication equipment, flying safety, standardization,

personnel manning, and logistical support. By October 1968,

the TASG had 2,971 personnel; 668 were FACs.

The 504th TASG had operational units at 70 locations. The

group was involved in-country with seven direct air support

centers (DASC). Assigned ALO/FACs worked with two field

force headquarters, 10 Divisions, 34 Brigades, and 119

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Battalions. In supporting the ARVN, ALO/FACs worked with

four Corps Headquarters, 10 Divisions, 43 Provinces, and 63

Special Forces camps. Personnel of the 504th TASG also

operated out-country.

The five TASSs within the 504th were located as follows:

19th TASS at Bien Hoa; 20th TASS at Da Nang; 21st TASS at

Nha Trang; 22d TASS at Binh Thuy; and 23d TASS at Nakhon

Phanom, Thailand. Essentially, the mission of these

squadrons was to provide the TACPs with personnel and

logistical support. The 504th TASG accounted for a third of

the total combat time flown in Southeast Asia in 1967 and

1968. Their 325 aircraft (O-1, O-2, and OV-10) averaged

26,000 hours per month. In 1968, the Group averaged 29,000

flying hours per month.

Increased Manning Requirements

In October 1968, a survey team was sent from PACAF to

Southeast Asia to determine FAC manning requirements. It

examined both in- and out-country commitments, and

determined that 835 FAC-qualified pilots were needed through

February 1969. The team then decided that the requirement

could be cut to 736 through better use of the 612 FACs on

hand (as of November 1968).27 Even so, there was still a

shortage of 124 assigned FACs.

A bright spot in the survey team’s report concerned the use

of navigators as FACs. The 23d TASS received its first

navigators in early 1967 and trained them in the OV-10.

Navigators became most useful in base defense and in the

strike control and reconnaissance (SCAR) of the out-country

war. They performed visual reconnaissance, target-spotting,

and navigation while the pilot flew the plane and controlled air

strikes. Navigators in the FAC force enjoyed over 100 percent

manning (45 functioning, 40 authorized). The PACAF team

suggested that navigator assignments be upped to 69 so that

FAC requirements could be pared to manageable levels.28

Two events abetted efforts to ease the FAC shortage—the

November 1968 bombing halt and, later, the scaling down of

American participation in the war. The 504th TASG29 hoped

for a fully manned FAC force by March 1969.30 For one thing,

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the bombing halt applied solely to North Vietnam (only a small

part of the total FAC force operated there). Moreover, the halt

canceled few sorties. Air activity expanded in South Vietnam

and Laos, creating a corresponding need for additional FACs.

But the demand tapered off as some US ground troops

prepared to leave SEA. In June 1969, the 504th TASG

attained 84 percent manning with 660 of the 791 FACs

authorized. This was well ahead of the 70 percent manning

average over the past four years.31 In August 1969,

commander in chief, Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF) forecast a

need for 831 FACs through June 1970.32 It decreased this to

761 in December as US troop withdrawal was accelerated. The

504th TASG then experienced 100 percent manning for the

first time.33

Qualifications

The one year of fighter pilot experience required for FACs

hindered FAC manning. Nevertheless, some advocates deemed

the required experience desirable. The fighter-pilot FAC knew

strike aircraft capabilities intimately, and he knew the effects

of different types of ordnance on any given target. Hence, he

was well-equipped for advising the Army ground commander.

Others insisted that a FAC could do just as good a job without

fighter experience. They suggested dropping or relaxing the

fighter-pilot requirement in order to produce more FACs.

Debate flourished from 1965 to 1970.

The supporters of fighter experience were adamant in their

position. On 20 January 1967, Maj Gen Thomas G. Corbin,

special air warfare center (SAWC) commander, informed Gen

Gabriel P. Disosway, TAC commander, that assignment of

inexperienced pilots to FAC duty could be detrimental and

dangerous to the air war. He said it could lead to errors in

judgment, needless casualties, and a loss in overall

effectiveness.34 Maj Lawrence L. Reed, a FAC with over 1,100

combat hours, thought nonfighter pilots required more

training and more time to match the skill of experienced

fighter pilots. Also, a nonfighter pilot could not speak with

“complete authority based on personal experience” to those he

advised.35 The deputy director, direct air support centers

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(DASC) Alpha, declared in December 1967, that a FAC without

fighter experience could not be completely confident in

counseling ground commanders. He warned that poor advice

would erode the FAC’s status and weaken the Air Force

position on CAS.36

There were those who strongly believed “performance of

nonfighter trained personnel . . . reportedly met the demands

of the SEA operation and has been comparative to those with

fighter qualifications.”37 In 1968, Maj Kenneth A. Kirkpatrick,

chief of Air Operations for 504th TASG, said that fighter

experience gave a FAC deeper insight into weapons effects and

some techniques of aircraft control. Nevertheless, it was the

pilot’s personal qualifications that really counted; a FAC

without fighter experience could become a competent and

well-qualified controller in three months.

Other FACs sounded a like theme: a controller could spend

years as a fighter pilot and be no more skilled in controlling

aircraft than a nonfighter pilot. Fighter experience was helpful

for the first month or two, after which it was no great

advantage—more time spent in FAC aircraft would probably

have been more beneficial. Fighter experience was a luxury

requirement levied to give the Army more confidence in USAF

CAS.38 Additionally, evidence at Headquarters USAF disclosed

no great performance difference between FACs with fighter

backgrounds and those without.39 Gen Albert P. Clark, TAC

vice commander, believed that leadership qualities were, in the

long run, more important than background. Competence, he

said, could be acquired through time and experience.40

As early as October 1965, the Air Force recognized that

something had to be done to shore up the FAC force. The

major commands (PACAF, TAC, and USAFE) were tasked to

consider relaxing the requirement for tactical fighter

experience. The three commands hesitated to remove it

entirely. PACAF did agree to use previously qualified fighter

pilots as FACs until currently qualified ones arrived. On 12

October, after considering the commands’ misgivings,

Headquarters USAF waived the one year of operational

experience requirement and approved assignment of combat

crew training course graduates directly to FAC duty. The Air

Staff assured TAC that FAC positions would be filled with

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experienced fighter pilots to the “maximum extent possible.”41

The waiver lifted the burden at first, but the swell of US

ground forces in SEA during 1966 forced a search for more

FACs.

During March 1966, a worldwide tactical fighter symposium

developed workable criteria for assigning FACs to units

according to their experience and training. The conferees

believed that the waiver of the fighter experience qualification

hinged on the type of duty performed. If, for example, the FAC

acted as an air liaison officer, fighter experience would help

him in advising ground commanders. The Army and Air Force

wanted fighter-qualified FACs for American units because

their main job was controlling strike aircraft near friendly

ground troops. In contrast, USAF FACs with ARVN units spent

much time on visual reconnaissance and liaison, little on

controlling air strikes. Few VNAF air controllers had fighter

backgrounds. The symposium suggested that the Air Force

assign some nonfighter pilots to FAC duty with ARVN, VNAF,

and in the out-country war. FACs performing SCAR and

interdiction in the out-country war operated in areas of few

friendly troops and civilians. Consequently, FACs without

fighter experience could be used.42

Rules of Engagement

Before 1965, the rules of engagement (ROE) allowed VNAF

observers/FACs to control air strikes while limiting the USAF

FACs to advice only. These rules were later relaxed to keep

pace with the expanding US troop commitment, but they still

required the FAC/strike team to avoid injuring

non-combatants.43

In 1966, a major revision in ROE specified that all targets

selected for attack had to be approved by either the

Vietnamese province chief or a higher authority. The single

exception was in MACV-designated areas declared free of

friendly forces and civilians. Control of USAF air strikes in

support of US Army forces was confined to Air Force FACs

except when no USAF FAC was available; a VNAF FAC could

be used then. If no FACs were available, a ground commander

or US pilot supporting the operation could designate targets.

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Such tight restrictions on air strikes against known or

suspected enemy targets in populous areas reflected the deep

desire of US officials to protect noncombatant civilians and

their property.

Similarly, the controller and the ground commander

meshed their efforts to prevent accidental attacks on friendly

forces. The FAC needed to know intimately the action

occurring below and to secure the ground commander’s

permission before clearing strike aircraft onto the target.

Ground troops marked their own positions as often as

necessary for each flight of strike aircraft. The ground

commander checked the FAC’s target-marking. If he found it

to be inaccurate, the target was marked again.

The ROE stipulated that a VNAF observer/FAC accompany

the Air Force controller whenever USAF aircraft supported

ARVN troops. The VNAF FAC could break off an air strike

anytime the situation warranted. As a further safeguard, the

FAC was required to keep either the target or the

target-marker constantly in view. He was also to know at all

times where the friendly troops were.

Locating the Enemy

The FAC’s effectiveness lay in his ability to direct air strikes

and inhibit enemy movement. But first, he had to find the

enemy. To do this, the FAC needed to know the enemy’s

habits, how he traveled and subsisted, and how he employed

tactics. Much of this information came from aerial

reconnaissance, which accounted for up to 60 percent of a

controller’s flying time.

Gen William M. Westmoreland sensed a need for organized

visual reconnaissance geared to the expanding war. On 2

June 1965, he directed that a program for repeated

reconnaissance of all corps areas be established.

Subsequently, each corps area was divided into sectors44 that

an O-1 could cover in two hours. Each corps commander

worked with his air liaison officer to obtain daily

reconnaissance of topographical features and problem areas.

One O-1 operated in every sector, more than one in sectors

requiring close coverage. Scanning the same sector day after

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day enabled the O-1 crew to detect anything different or

unusual. The visual reconnaissance program operated jointly

because no single service could muster sufficient O-1s to do

the whole job. At the program’s start, O-1s numbered 376:

152 Army, 110 Air Force, and 114 VNAF. However, Army O-1s

were less available and not so widely dispersed as those of the

Air Force because the Army used O-1s for battlefield

reconnaissance and artillery adjustment. And since VNAF

O-1s covered mainly the Saigon area, the brunt of visual

reconnaissance responsibility fell to USAF FACs.45

The widely dispersed FACs were in excellent position to gather

countrywide reconnaissance information. Notwithstanding, the

shortage of O-1s and controllers ruled out complete coverage of

South Vietnam. Some areas received little or no coverage while

others received too much.46 By 1968, however, the shortage of

aircraft and controllers had been mostly overcome and single

management of air support established. From then on,

single-management visual reconnaissance coverage of South

Vietnam was more balanced.47

Visual Reconnaissance Process

The best way to get an idea of the difficulties encountered in

visual reconnaissance (VR), especially over a crowded rural

area, was to go along on a mission. You might ask, “How can

you possibly tell the Vietcong from the friendlies?” J. S. Butz

Jr. had the best answer: “We can’t. Look for yourself. It’s just

about like flying over Manhattan Island at one thousand feet

and trying to pick out all the Italians.”

A FAC gathered information in three ways. One was by

discovering that people were shooting at him. (The FAC left

open the two back windows of his O-1. At one thousand feet,

he could hear shots fired from the ground; these were

presumed to be unfriendly.) Another method was to spot

evidence that the Vietcong were in the vicinity or had been

there recently. A third method was to actually catch the

Vietcong at work.48

South Vietnam challenged the FAC with topography ranging

from unbroken jungle to plains, mountains, and cleared

farmland. Once the jungle vegetation bloomed, the double-and

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triple-canopied foliage prevented the FAC from seeing the

ground at all from fifteen hundred feet. He either had to dip

lower, endangering himself and the aircraft, or concentrate on

the open areas—and the Vietcong shunned open areas,

preferring the jungle or the marshes of the delta.49

If the FAC gleaned the basics of reconnaissance in FAC

school, he arrived at expertise through field experience. It took

him at least a month to master VR techniques and learn his

assigned sector thoroughly. Even then, he had to have a

significant number of missions behind him before he could

spot an object with the naked eye from fifteen hundred feet—

unless the object moved.50 To counter Vietcong infiltration,

the controller needed to know when the villagers ate and slept,

their work schedules and habits, how they traveled, and how

many were in a given location. He, likewise, required

information on the latest locations of friendly and enemy

troops. Since he could not trust the maps completely, he

memorized landmarks such as roads, trails, streams, villages,

and structures.51

FAC operations varied widely in the four corps areas and in

the various Army units. Some of the differences were dictated

by the terrain or peculiar conditions of the locality. Others

were due simply to the preference of the Army commanders.

Many different flight techniques were used. In the

pancake-flat delta, in the southern part of the country, most

FACs stayed at twelve hundred feet or higher. They reasoned

that if they got very low, they would offer too much target to

the Vietcong.

In the rubber plantations and jungle terrain north of

Saigon, the FACs often flew right on the treetops. Here, a man

on the ground has only one chance to hit a FAC—and he must

fire straight up. The chances of scoring a hit were slim.

In the mountainous country of the north, FACs usually

traveled in pairs, one at three hundred feet and the other well

over one thousand feet. FACs flying in the deep valleys could

not be tracked by radar, and their radios often were

ineffective. When a FAC was flying in one of those valleys, his

only link with friendly forces—and his only chance for

rescue—lay with the FACs flying above.52

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Seventh Air Force set up priorities to satisfy needs. Top

priority went to VR requests from ground commanders; these

consumed a great deal of controller time. FACs spent any

remaining time controlling air strikes or flying area

reconnaissance. They covered vital coastal regions at least

twice a day and other critical areas at least once. Noncritical

areas got attention about every three days. Because the enemy

liked to move at night, most reconnaissance took place at

dawn or at dusk, when the FAC had a better chance of

catching the enemy breaking/making camp or preparing a

meal.

Once airborne, the FAC kept radio contact with both the

TACP and ground units in the surveillance area. The

controller usually started reconnaissance at the point of

reported enemy activity and fanned out from there. He flew

irregular patterns to keep the enemy from predicting his

route. A complete sector search commonly consumed more

than two hours. Maj John F. Campbell, 22d TASS, said a

thorough search of his sector took from six to eight hours,

with several O-1s being used.53

Flying below fifteen hundred feet improved sector coverage,

but there were drawbacks—overall view was reduced and the

chances of being shot down increased. Hence, FACs flew

below fifteen hundred feet only when ground fire was unlikely

or there was an emergency. To support troops in contact with

the enemy, for example, they would fly at treetop level.54

The value of VR obviously depended on the controller’s

experience and the area surveyed. Targets were difficult to

locate in the thick jungles of South Vietnam’s central

highlands, so the FAC’s chief value was in harassment. The

enemy, never knowing whether he had been seen, was forced

to stay hidden—and hiding sapped his effectiveness. (In

contrast, the controller could easily monitor enemy

movements in the open areas of southern South Vietnam.)

Visual reconnaissance reports were filed quickly when the

FACs landed. If the information was needed immediately, the

controller radioed it in for a quick response. Oral reports

excelled written ones; the FAC could broaden his account and

clear up cloudy details.

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Laboratory and field research invented new ways to locate

the enemy, but none were completely successful. They

included side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared

radar/optics, lasers, “people sniffers,”55 and photography.

Some FACs took along their own cameras as an aid. Despite

film-processing delays, Seventh Air Force established a small,

experimental, hand-camera program in April 1967.

From 1968 onward, an intensive VR effort forced the enemy

to stop nearly all daytime movement. Even then, he seldom

escaped the surveillance of Army patrols and special forces

units. As enemy activity accelerated, the Air Force extended

reconnaissance into the hours of darkness. The O-1 was of

little value at night, except for harassment. On the other hand,

combining the O-2A, OV-10, and FAC-carrying flareships

produced excellent results. The total visual reconnaissance

effort accounted for over 60 percent of all targets generated in

South Vietnam.56

In-Country Operations, 1965–72

As airpower in Vietnam escalated dramatically in 1965, the

Tactical Air Control System progressed to a highly workable

operation. The introduction of jet aircraft, combined with the

large influx of US forces, created a growing need for close air

support. In-country strike sorties increased from 2,392 in

January to 7,382 in June and to 13,274 in December 1965.

By 1966, in-country strikes were averaging fifteen thousand

sorties per month.

Quick reaction and responsiveness were the primary

concerns of the USAF in 1966. Diverting aircraft already

airborne to targets of higher priority was accomplished

through a separate immediate air request network. The FAC

played a key part in this procedure. The Air Force/Army

Agreement of March–April 1965, with the provision that the

Air Force provide vehicles, communications, and FACs, did

much to facilitate the rapid reaction needed in CAS requests.

During the late 1960s, the Air Force FAC held one of the

most hazardous jobs in Vietnam. He lived with the ground

forces in far from ideal conditions, and he was required to

represent the Air Force in a variety of situations. Professional

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competence, flexibility, and clear thinking were necessary

talents. He was required to fly an aircraft that was marginal

under combat conditions, downright dangerous in bad

weather or at night.57

Because there was no forward edge of the battle area

(FEBA), a very firm system of target identification and strike

control was essential. The airborne FAC evolved as the most

effective way to achieve this. Ground FACs were seriously

restricted by the triple canopy of foliage prevalent in much of

Vietnam. In late 1966, FACs became engaged in practically

every type of ground operation. They operated in the central

highlands, delta lowlands, below the demilitarized zone (DMZ),

in the monsoon rainy season, and in special actions.

In addition to mounting attacks against the Americans,

Vietcong troops had made impressive gains in the jungles of

the II Corps area by 1965. On 19 February, General

Westmoreland—invoking authority given him three weeks

earlier to use jet aircraft under emergency conditions—sent 24

Air Force B-57s against the Vietcong Ninth Division’s base

camp deep in the jungles of Phuoc Long province along the

Cambodian border. Two days later, an Army special forces

team and a civilian irregular defense group (CIDG) company

were caught in a communist ambush at the Mang Yang pass

on Route 19. US helicopters moved in, supported by F-100

and B-57 strikes, and successfully evacuated 220 men who

might otherwise have been lost.58

The events of February 1965 marked a turning point in the

war. Washington officials no longer talked about withdrawing

American military advisors; they now recommended

deployment of additional US forces to Southeast Asia. A

campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam was being

readied, and major restrictions on air strikes in South

Vietnam were lifted. On 6 March, Westmoreland received

authorization to use US aircraft whenever the VNAF could not

timely respond. In addition, the requirement that USAF planes

carry Vietnamese crewmembers was dropped.

Vietnamese markings were removed from US aircraft in

March 1965. Major US forces were brought in, and USAF

airborne FACs were permitted to mark targets and direct

strikes. Nevertheless, all air strikes still had to have at least

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the tacit approval of the Vietnamese government (through the

Joint General Staff and the Tactical Operations Center in

Saigon).

Three categories of FAC missions developed. One mission

was to support forces from other countries (US, Korean,

Australian, and Thai). A second was to either work with

specific Vietnamese contacts (ARVN units and local officials) or

to cover a certain geographical area. The third mission was to

support out-of-country operations.59

As American ground forces increased, so did US airpower. In

February 1965, Strategic Air Command (SAC) deployed two

B-52 squadrons to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, for

possible use over South Vietnam. In April, the Air Force

activated four O-1 squadrons in South Vietnam. The first US

Marine F-4Bs arrived at Da Nang on 12 April and immediately

began flying CAS missions. A number of Air Force tactical

fighter and bomber squadrons also deployed to Vietnam on

temporary duty (later made permanent). In October 1965, the

first of five F-100 squadrons moved to Bien Hoa and Da Nang.

They were followed in November by F-4C Phantoms of the 12th

Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Cam Ranh Bay and by

experimental AC-47 gunships from Tan Son Nhut. By year’s

end, the Air Force had more than five hundred aircraft and

21,000 men at eight major bases in South Vietnam. The

deployment of USAF, Navy, and Marine units to Southeast

Asia in 1965 represented the greatest gathering of American

airpower in one locality since the Korean War. More than

142,000 USAF combat sorties were flown and more than

56,000 tons of munitions were dropped on enemy targets. The

joint USAF-VNAF effort accounted for an estimated fifteen

thousand enemy dead and thousands of other casualties in

1965.

During 1966, American troop strength reached 385,000.

The allies also were bolstered by the arrival of a second Korean

infantry division and additional Australian and New Zealand

forces. Air equipment arriving in South Vietnam included an

F-5 squadron, two F-4 squadrons, and additional AC-47

gunships.

The only significant enemy success in 1966 occurred in

March in the Ashau valley when a Special Forces camp was

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overrun. Located astride a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail two

miles from the Laotian border and 60 miles southwest of Da

Nang, the camp was defended by 219 Vietnamese irregulars

and 149 Chinese Nung mercenaries assisted by 17 American

Special Forces advisors. Before dawn on 9 March, an

estimated two thousand North Vietnamese regulars opened an

attack on the outpost. Due to poor weather, only 29 sorties

were flown on the first day.

On 10 March, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched

repeated assaults against the camp under cover of a thick

overcast which hid the tops of the surrounding hills and

mountains. Almost miraculously, an A-1E pilot made his way

into the valley through an opening in the cloud cover. Other

aircraft followed him down and flew 210 strikes, temporarily

slowing the enemy attack. According to one American survivor

of the battle, tactical air crews tried to hold off the enemy by

flying under such dangerous conditions that they “had no

business being there.” General Westmoreland later called the

air support “one of the most courageous displays of

airmanship in the history of aviation.” The camp commander,

Capt Tennis Carter, US Army, estimated that the A-1E pilots

of the 1st Commando Squadron killed 500 enemy troops

outside the camp walls.

During the day’s action, Maj Bernard C. Fisher became the

Air Force’s first Medal of Honor recipient in Southeast Asia

when he made a daring rescue of a downed fellow pilot, Maj D.

Wayne Myers. Myers’ badly damaged A-1E had crash-landed

on the camp’s chewed-up airstrip. Major Fisher made a quick

decision to try to rescue Myers. Covered by his two wingmen,

Fisher landed his A-1 on the debris-strewn runway, taxied its

full length, spotted Myers at the edge of the strip, picked him

up, and took off through a rain of enemy fire.

Of the 17 Americans involved in the confrontation, five were

killed and the others wounded. Only 172 of the camp’s 368

Vietnamese and Nung defenders survived the evacuation. The

North Vietnamese suffered an estimated eight hundred

deaths, most from air strikes.

The increasing effectiveness of airpower in 1966 was in

large measure the result of improved tactics and weapons.

Airborne FACs developed an effective system of VR. Assigned

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to specific geographic areas, they were able to identify changes

in the landscape below that might indicate the enemy

presence. Night reconnaissance was enhanced by several

research and development programs and by refinement of

existing instrumentation. The starlight scope, for example,

amplified starlight and moonlight, enabling its operator to see

movement on the ground. Infrared viewers were also used for

night aerial reconnaissance. Munitions introduced included

cluster bomb units (CBU), each of which contained several

hundred bomblets, and a delayed-action bomb that could

penetrate heavy tree cover. Another tactic of importance was

the employment of AC-47 gunships for night hamlet defense.

Their ability to remain aloft for many hours—and to respond

quickly to calls for CAS—proved indispensable to hundreds of

besieged posts, villages, and hamlets.

Communist military experts from China, Cuba, and North

Korea visited South Vietnam in the spring of 1967 and

concluded that time was no longer on Hanoi’s side. North

Vietnamese forces had not won a single major battle in almost

two years. US firepower, especially tactical air, had decimated

their main force’s strength. Desertion was rampant and the

Vietcong infrastructure was being destroyed. Against this

background, Gen Vo Nguyen Giap and other North

Vietnamese officials flew to Moscow. Subsequently, the

Soviets sent more planes, high-altitude missiles, artillery, and

infantry weapons. They also provided factories, means of

transportation, petroleum products, iron and steel, nonferrous

metal equipment, food, and fertilizer. The number of Soviet

vessels reaching North Vietnamese ports rose from one

hundred twenty two in 1966 to one hundred eighty five in

1967.60

Employing the FAC Force

Between 1965 and 1968, 65 to 70 percent of Seventh Air

Force strength was employed on preplanned missions. The

Army conducted search and destroy operations for which air

support was planned in detail. Additionally, fighters were

scheduled into areas at frequent intervals to handle targets of

opportunity. These preplanned strikes provided air support for

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all aspects of the operation and ensured that airpower was

available to handle those parts of the action in which artillery

was insufficient.

The air effort not committed to preplanned missions was

used for “immediate” or troops-in-contact (TIC) situations. All

ground operations were designed to find the North Vietnamese

and force an engagement in which allied superior firepower

could be employed. After contact with the enemy had been

established, allied ground forces would pull back a sufficient

distance to allow artillery and airpower to be used without

restraint. The Army would then attack with reaction forces,

fighters would be diverted from preplanned missions, and

aircraft being held on ground alert would be scrambled.

On a given day in South Vietnam, Seventh Air Force flew

about three hundred preplanned sorties, the Marines in I

Corps another two hundred, and the VNAF one hundred. The

number of aircraft on ground alert varied according to the

number of ground contacts expected throughout the country.

On average, 40 aircraft were held on alert—and scrambled

three or four times a day. In a typical day, day in and day out,

750 to 800 sorties were flown in support of ground forces.

Because the tactical air control system spanned the country,

all combat aircraft were under positive control.

When ground alert aircraft were launched, backup forces

were brought to alert status to replace them. In a matter of

minutes, a major air effort could be applied to any area. For

missions already airborne and diverted, it took 15 to 20

minutes to get fighters into an area and in contact with the

FAC. The time it took to put munitions on a target was

determined by the speed with which the FAC could get

clearance from the ground force commander. If the FAC had

received prior clearance, it required only a matter of minutes

to mark the target. To save time, the FAC briefed the fighter

pilots while they were still some distance from the target. All

that remained was for the fighters to visually acquire the

target.61

Ground alert aircraft normally took 35 to 40 minutes to get

bombs on the target.62 (It took 40 minutes in the Korean War

and about 45 minutes in World War II). When a faster reaction

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was needed, it was provided by either diverted aircraft or

airborne alert aircraft.63

Despite complex procedures that involved many

communication links, layers of coordination, and delivery of

ordnance close to friendly forces, response times to requests

for immediate assistance evolved to produce a general formula:

20/40. This guideline meant that “immediates” would be

answered within 20 minutes (by airborne aircraft being

diverted from lower-priority missions) or 40 minutes (by

scrambling aircraft on the ground). By 1968, ground

commanders had incorporated the 20/40 formula in their

planning. As a follow-up to this process of classifying response

times, a joint Army-Air Force study group in 1972 set the

criteria that at least 50 percent of the requests for immediate

air support should be answered within 15 minutes, 75 percent

within 20 minutes, and 100 percent within 40 minutes.

A proficient FAC had to be “a politician, administrative

officer, radio operator, and effective weapons controller.”64 The

best FACs had four attributes in common: (1) knowledge of

standard procedures; (2) an understanding of the capabilities

and limitations of strike aircraft; (3) special techniques, such

as briefing methods or marking targets; and (4) familiarity with

the various types of ordnance.

Gunships: An Alternative To Quick Response

In seeking an alternative FAC aircraft, the Air Force turned

to an unlikely source. Transport aircraft were modified as

gunships for an unprecedented role of quick-reacting close air

support. With longer and relatively less expensive loiter times,

the gunships filled a gap in tactical air capabilities—especially

at night.65

The AC-47, the first of the “new” gunships, arrived with the

4th Air Commando Squadron in late 1965. It carried its own

flares and three mini-guns. Each could fire six thousand

rounds per minute. The aircraft lived up to its call-sign

(Spooky), and the performance of the mini-guns prompted its

fire-breathing nickname, taken from a popular song, “Puff, the

Magic Dragon.” The mission of the AC-47s was almost

exclusively for CAS at night. Within the first year of operation,

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131
“Spooky” defended five hundred outposts. In one 90-day

period (July-September 1966), AC-47s claimed to have spoiled

166 enemy night attacks.

Success with the AC-47 led to the development of the

Gunboat (later Gunship II) program, which involved arming

C-119s and C-130s. In using these larger, faster transports,

the Air Force sought to overcome some of the weaknesses of

the AC-47 (slow reaction time, poor cockpit visibility, and

aircraft vulnerability).66

With their tremendous rate of firepower, the gunships

proved effective in the CAS role, although their relatively slow

airspeed and poor maneuverability rendered them unsuitable

for some phases of close air support. When used at night or in

bad weather to defend isolated outposts, the gunships played

a key role. One Air Force study calculated a 24-minute average

response time for gunships as compared with a 40-minute

average for jet aircraft.67

Navy Participation

Although most of the Navy’s tactical strike aircraft flew

interdiction missions in North Vietnam, the Navy did

participate in some CAS in the south. In fact Westmoreland,

who had been impressed with the capabilities of carrier-based

aircraft for close air support, requested that the Navy

establish a carrier-based “Dixie” station similar to the

“Yankee” station in the northern Gulf of Tonkin. By June

1965, the Dixie station (100 miles southeast of Cam Rahn

Bay) and the Yankee station required five carriers each. After

1965, however, the number of Navy CAS sorties, most of

which were either in the delta (IV Corps) or integrated with

Marine ground operations in I Corps, steadily decreased. In

December 1966, the Navy flew only three CAS missions

(compared to 5,120 by the Air Force; 312 by the VNAF; and

265 by the Marine Corps). In December 1967, the totals were

one by the Navy; 8,526 by the Air Force; 775 by the Marines;

326 by the VNAF; and 142 by the Royal Australian Air

Force.68

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

132
The Battle of Khe Sanh

By 1968, more than 486,000 Americans—56,000 of them

USAF personnel—were in South Vietnam. During this

climactic year, the Air Force flew 840,117 combat sorties in

support of allied ground forces. The OV-10A made its

appearance, as did low-light television equipment and

laser-guided bombs.

As the year 1967 closed, another unilateral cease-fire was

declared by the United States; the North Vietnamese and

Vietcong used the occasion to strengthen their positions. This

time, however, the communists had several clear objectives

designed to draw international attention to their ability to

thwart American military power. The first move was to squeeze

the US military base at Khe Sanh, a remote outpost off the Ho

Chi Minh trail in the northwest corner of South Vietnam. The

communists intended to repeat their decisive defeat of the

French at Dien Bien Phu by concentrating their forces at Khe

Sanh and strangling the base. Unlike the 1954 battle,

however, the communists had to face an effective air resupply

system and the combined firepower of land-based US Air Force

units and carrier-based US Navy squadrons. The Johnson

administration, determined that Khe Sanh would not fall,

provided heavy support for the beleaguered troops and

resumed raids on North Vietnam.69

Cargo carriers were in the minority around Khe Sanh. On a

typical day, three hundred and fifty tactical fighters would hit

enemy positions while sixty B-52s from Guam carried out

carpet bombing missions. About 30 FACs would be working

the strikes, marking targets and calling in specific aircraft. A

dozen RF-4Cs would race low across the battlefield, cameras

rolling. At night, AC-47 gunships used their batteries of

mini-guns to shatter the enemy. They also served as night

FACs and battlefield illuminators.

All incoming tactical aircraft reported to the airborne battle

command and control center (a C-130 in orbit above the area)

and were assigned to a specific FAC. The FAC brought in each

individual strike; often, aircraft were stacked in holding

patterns up to thirty-five thousand feet, waiting to drop their

ordnance.70

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

133
During the 78-day siege, which began on 22 January1968,

six thousand Marines and South Vietnamese Rangers stood

against an enemy force three times that number. By the time

the siege was broken, tactical aircraft had flown almost

twenty-five thousand sorties and expended more than

ninety-five thousand tons of ordnance under the direction of

nearly 1,600 FAC sorties. The Air Force contributed about 75

percent of that total in a joint effort with Marine and Navy

aircraft. The after-action estimate of fifteen thousand enemy

killed led one State Department official to describe Khe Sanh

as “the first major ground action won entirely, or almost

entirely, by airpower.”71 The Khe Sanh siege illustrates the

effectiveness of close air support.72

Maj Gerald T. Dwyer flew his O-1 in support of the defense

of Khe Sanh. Flying as Nail 55, he was on a combat mission

over the extreme western end of the Ashau valley on 21 May

1968. Suddenly, a 37 mm projectile struck his aircraft and

blew off one of the wings. As the aircraft began to tumble,

Major Dwyer released the aircraft’s entry door and dove out

the open hole. He pulled the ripcord and was rewarded by the

shock of an opening parachute. While in his descent, Dwyer

received small arms fire from enemy troops on the ground. He

landed without injury and discarded his parachute to begin

evasion. Within minutes, he was being pursued by five heavily

armed enemy soldiers. He made contact with search and

rescue forces on his survival radio, but antiaircraft (AAA) fire

was too intense for a helicopter pickup. Major Dwyer

continued to evade through the jungle until he was instructed

to ignite a smoke-flare in preparation for helicopter pickup.

His pursuers attacked him with rifle fire, pistol fire, and hand

grenades. He killed three of the attackers with his .38-caliber

revolver and the remaining two were dispatched by an air

strike. Dwyer was then rescued by helicopter. It was the

second time in two months that he had been shot down.73

The Tet Offensive

As if to test America’s commitment, the North Vietnamese

launched their strongest offensive on the morning of 31

January 1968. During the cease-fire for Tet (the Buddhist new

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

134
year) celebrations, Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops

sneaked into Saigon and other key points for a series of

well-orchestrated attacks on American and South Vietnamese

installations.74

In simultaneous attacks throughout South Vietnam, they

struck at 36 of 44 provincial capitals and hamlets. The initial

fury of the attack enabled the attackers to seize temporary

control of 10 provincial capitals. They succeeded in

penetrating Saigon, Quang Tri City, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and

Kontum City. However, except for Hue, which took several

weeks of fighting to clear, the enemy troops were ousted in two

or three days. Most of the 23 airfields that were attacked were

soon back in full operation.

Outside the cities, USAF crews launched heavy attacks

against communist forces. FACs remained aloft around the

clock, directing strikes at enemy storage areas and troop

areas, and providing CAS for allied units in contact with

Vietcong and NVA forces.75

Cleared in Wet!

There was nothing a fighter-pilot-turned-FAC would rather

do than catch a large Vietcong force in the open. But this

rarely happened. Many a FAC served his year’s tour in

Vietnam without ever participating in a major battle. An

average FAC might see clearly identifiable Vietcong troops only

three or four times in a year. A typical FAC mission went like

this.

“Peacock, this is Sabre 21. Are we cleared to FAC freq?

Over.”

“Roger, Sabre 21. Contact Cider 45 on 301.5. Your

rendezvous—340, 25 miles off channel 107.”

“Sabre 21 Flight—let’s go 301.5.”

“Sabre 22.”

“Hello, Cider 45. This is Sabre 21.”

“Sabre 21, this is Cider 45. Read you loud and clear. How

me?”

“Cider, you’re five square. Want our line-up?”

“Rog . . . ready to copy.”

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

135
“Sabre 21 is a flight of two F-100s, mission number 2311.

We’re carrying eight 117 slicks, point oh-two-five, and 1,600

rounds of mike-mike.”

“Rog, Sabre. I copy. Ready for target info?”

“Rog.”

“OK, your target is a known VC location. We got some

mortar fire out of here last night. Also, there is at least one .50

cal in the vicinity. I’m not being shot at now, but the FAC up

here this morning took a hit. So you can expect auto weapons

fire. Copy?”

“Rog. Sabre 21 copies.”

“OK, the friendlies aren’t too close to this target. There is a

fire-support base about 700 meters southwest of the target.

When you get below the clouds, you’ll be able to see it on a

bald hilltop. Target elevation is 2,700 feet. We’ve got a pretty

stiff wind from the east, about 15 knots on the surface and at

2,000, and 20 knots at 5,000 and 7,000. Copy?”

“Rog. Do you have a preferred run-in heading?”

“Rog, Sabre . . . I don’t want you to overfly friendlies. Make

your runs from southeast to northwest, breaking right after

your drop. That way, bomb smoke won’t obscure the target on

your run-in heading. Over.”

“Rog, Cider 45 . . . I understand—friendlies 700 meters to

our left as we attack from southeast to northwest . . . break

right. I’m down below the clouds at the rendezvous point.

Don’t have you in sight. I think I have the fire-support base in

sight. Over.”

“Rog, Sabre . . . I’m about one k north of that and I see you.

I’m at your three o’clock low. I’m rocking my wings. Over.”

“This is Sabre 21. Have you in sight. We’re ready to go to

work.”

“Stand by, Sabre. I’m getting final clearance from the Army

on FM.”

“Standing by.”

“OK, Sabre. We’re ready now. If you have me in sight, the

target is just off my right wing. Call me when you want a

mark.”

“Rog, Cider. I’m turning base now—go ahead. Sabre Flight,

set ‘em up hot—arm, nose, and tail.”

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

136
“Sabre 21, my smoke rocket is away. I’ll hold to the south. I

have you in sight. Do you see my smoke?”

“Rog. I have your mark. Am I cleared in wet?”

“You are cleared in wet. Hit ten meters to the right of my

mark.”

“Understand cleared in wet. I have you in sight. You want

me to hit ten meters northeast of your mark. Two away. Sabre

21 is off right.”

“Good hit, lead. Two, do you have lead’s bomb?”

“Rog. I see it.”

“OK, move yours up the hill 20 meters.”

“Rog. Understand 20 meters at 12 o’clock.”

“That’s right. I have you in sight, on base. You are cleared in

wet.”

“Rog, Cider. I understand cleared in wet. I have you in sight

to my left . . . Two away—off right."

“OK. Good hit . . . outstanding. Now, Sabre Flight, hold high

and dry while I take a look.”

“This is Sabre 21 . . . high and dry.”

“Sabre 22, high and dry.”

“Cider 45, this is Dusty 41. We’re over rendezvous.”

“Dusty 41, this is Cider 45. Stand by—I’m working another

set of fighters. How much loiter time do you have?”

“Cider, this is Dusty. We’re fat; we can wait quite a while.”

“Good . . . I should be able to work you in shortly.”

“Cider, this is Sabre . . . they’re shooting at you. I see flashes

right below you.”

“Rog, Sabre. I hear ‘em and I see it now. If you’re ready, I’ll

plunk a mark in there and you guys can shake ‘em up a little.”

“Rog . . . mark.”

“Marks away. Hit my smoke, Sabre!”

“Rog. Sabre 21 is out of position. If you’re right, 22, go on

in.”

“Sabre 22, turning in. I have the smoke . . . I have the FAC.”

“Rog, 22. I have you in sight. Cleared in wet.”

“Cleared in wet. I can see the flashes just right of your

mark.”

“Rog. Go get ‘em boy.”

“One away . . . off right.”

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

137
“OK, good; excellent! Lead, if you have two’s bomb in sight,

put yours right in the same place.”

“OK . . . lead’s turning final. Have you in sight.”

“Outstanding hit, lead. That should get some results. Go

high and dry and watch me. I’ll go over the area again and see

if I can draw more fire.”

“Roger . . . have you in sight.”

“Sabre, this is Cider. You really creamed them. Through the

hole you blew in the trees, I can see the remains of a gun

position, a beat-up quad .50, and one body. Let’s put your last

two bombs between this position and the original target. About

half way. Want another mark?”

“This is Sabre 21. Yes, if you have enough rockets left to

mark for the next flight.”

“OK, Sabre. I’ll save my rockets and drop a smoke can. Have

you got me?”

“Rog . . . turning base. I see the smoke just starting to

appear.”

“OK, Sabre lead, put your last bomb 20 meters at 12 o’clock

to the smoke . . . and two, put yours 20 at six. I have you,

lead; you’re clear in wet.”

“Rog, cleared wet—20 at 12, that is, to the northwest . . .

one away—off right.”

“Right where I wanted it. Hey, lead, you got a big secondary

with that one!”

“Cider, this is 22 turning in. Am I cleared?”

“Right, 22. Forget my last instruction. Put your bomb right

in lead’s smoke. Let’s see if we can get another secondary.”

“Rog. Am I cleared wet? Cider 45, this is Sabre 22, am I

cleared wet?. . . Sabre 22 going through dry."

“Sabre 22 . . . Cider 45 here. Sorry about that, but the Army

had me tied up on the other radio. Save your last bomb a

minute. Go high and dry. They say they have spotted

something. I’m going to drop another smoke can where I think

they want your last bomb. I’ll get confirmation from them

before I clear you to drop. Do you copy?”

“Rog. I’ll stand by. I’m high and dry.”

“Sabre, my mark’s away. Do you have it?”

“Rog.”

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

138
“OK, stand by one . . . OK, that’s near where they want it.

Hit ten short—that’s ten meters southeast. Copy?”

“Rog . . . 10 at six o’clock.”

“Rog. I have you on base. You’re cleared in wet.”

“Understand, cleared wet. One away and off to the right.”

“Beautiful, 22—you guys are really sharp today. That’s all

your hard stuff, isn’t it?”

“Cider 45, this is Sabre 21 . . . right, we’re clean of bombs.

You want our 20 mike-mike?”

“No, Sabre. I’ve got Dusty standing by to come in. Check

with Peacock on your way home. Somebody will be needing

your guns. I’m going in to get your BDA now.”

“Rog. You’re covered, Cider.”

“Sabre 21, Cider 45.”

“Go ahead, Cider. Ready to copy.”

“OK, Sabre. Your target coordinates were Yankee Alpha 360

080. Your rendezvous time was 10, you were on target from 15

to 33. You put 100 percent of your bombs on target. Really

outstanding bombing—all within 10 meters. Target coverage

was 60 percent due to its large area. On the first bomb, I can

see nothing but smoke and foliage. However, with the other

bombs, I’ll give you one gun position destroyed, one automatic

weapon destroyed, and one KBA confirmed. I’ll add two more

KBA estimated. And, oh yes, one large secondary explosion

and secondary fire with black smoke. Copy?”

“Rog.”

“You guys really did a job. The Army commander down here

has been into my ear on the other radio. I think you did a lot

more damage than I can see and give you credit for. The

Army’s going into the area today. I’ll pass on any extra BDA

they come up with.”

“Thanks a lot, Cider 45. We’ll appreciate that. It was a

pleasure working with you. If you’re clear of the target area,

we’ll leave your freq.”

“Sabre 21. Let’s go channel 5.”

“Sabre 22.”

“Dusty 41, this is Cider 45. I’m ready to copy your line-up.”

And so it went for FACs providing close air support.76

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

139
Notes

1. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Office

of Air Force History [OAFH], January 1978), 266.

2. Corona Harvest, “USAF Activities,” 2–19, 2–20.

3. Ibid., vol. 2, bk. 2, 6–34.

4. Momyer, 267.

5. J. S. Butz Jr., “Forward Air Controllers in Vietnam—They Call the

Shots,” Air Force and Space Digest, May 1966, 60–62.

6. USAF FAC Operations in Southeast Asia, 6–7, 51–52 (Washington,

D.C.: OAFH, January 1972), 6–7, 51–52; The Air Force in Southeast Asia:

Tactics and Techniques of Close Air Support, 1961–1973 (Washington, D.C.:

OAFH, February 1976), 102–7.

7. Maj Richard M. Atchison, “The Slow Mover FAC Over the Ho Chi Minh

Trail: 1965–1972,” Headquarters PACAF, Working Paper, CHECO Project, 3

February 1975, 11.

8. The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactics and Techniques of CAS,

120–31. The concept of phased response was first suggested in Nov 1966 by

the joint Army-Air Force Tactical Air Support Analysis Team. This study also

reported that 24 percent of troops-in-contact incidents lasted longer than 20

minutes but still involved small enemy contingents. Strike aircraft arrived in

time to attack these targets but often wasted firepower in the “overkill” of

small enemy groups. Only 23 percent of troops-in-contract incidents were

rated as “large.” This study indicated that many FACs were jerry-rigging

grenade launchers and machine guns to their wing struts. Capt Donald R.

Hawley created the “Hawley Cocktail” by placing live grenades in peanut

butter jars and throwing them out his aircraft window.

9. Maj James B. Overton, Seventh Air Force, interviewed by Maj John T.

Sutphen, Introductory Evaluation Team (Combat Bronco), 19th TASS, 504th

TASG, undated.

10. Ibid., FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in South Vietnam,

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO report, 31 January 1969, 22–23.

11. “Summary of Misty Bronco Operations, April–June, 1969,” 30–31,

OAFH.

12. Walter Andrews, “OV-10s 5-Minute Response,” Armed Forces

Journal, 6 September 1969, 15.

13. History of the Second Air Division (2d AD), July–December 1964, III

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 27–28.

14. History of Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, 1965 (Washington,

D.C.: OAFH), 46–48; Headquarters USAF draft report, “Effective SEAsia

Tactics (TACS),” 1969, 3–1. Including the 19th TASS, the squadrons were at

these locations in South Vietnam: Bien Hoa (19th), Da Nang (20th), Pleiku

(21st), and Binh Thuy (22d). In September 1966, the 21st TASS moved from

Pleiku to Nha Trang.

15. Overton interview, 31–32; Kenneth Sams, Operation Harvest Moon

(Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 3 March 1966); TAC/TAWC report

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

140
“Forward Air Control Operations in Southeast Asia,” 1 January 1965–31

March 1968, and 10 November 1969, III, 5e.

16. Team Report, “Requirements for ALO/FAC/SCAR/Navigators and

Aircraft in SEA,” PACAF, 22 November 1968, 3 (hereinafter referred to as

SEA FAC.

17. Under the agreement, the TACP at battalion level consisted of one

ALO, one FAC, vehicles, and communications personnel and equipment.

The TACP at brigade, division, and, if required, corps and field army level,

comprised one or more ALOs, vehicles, and communications personnel and

equipment. (Hereinafter, the term FAC will denote a “FAC,” “ALO,” or “strike

control and reconnaissance (SCAR)” pilot. The semantic problem of “FAC”

versus “SCAR” is well documented in Maj A. W. Thompson, “Strike Control

and Reconnaissance (SCAR) in SEA,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO,

22 January 1969).

18. “Effective SEAsia Tactics,” 1–65.

19. History, TAC, January–December 1965, I, 329–30.

20. “Effective SEAsia Tactics,” 3–1.

21. “In-country” is that part of the Southeast Asian conflict within South

Vietnam; “out-country” that part outside of South Vietnam, i.e., Laos and

North Vietnam.

22. History, PACAF, January–December 1966, 397–98.

23. Overton interview, 32–33; SEA FAC Requirements, 3.

24. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950–69 (Washington,

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), 64.

25. William W. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975: An

Analysis of Its Role in Combat, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol

3, monograph 4 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office [GPO],

1977), 33.

26. Ibid., 274.

27. SEA FAC Requirements, 15; talking paper, Deputy Director

Director/Strike Forces, Director/Operations, subject: FAC and Strike

Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) Working Group, 18 August 1969.

28. SEA FAC Requirements, 5; Thompson, SCAR in SEA (Headquarters

PACAF, Project CHECO, 22 January 1969), 75–76.

29. Activated in December 1966, the 504th TASG provided

administrative, maintenance, and supply support for the FAC program.

30. History, 504th TASG, July–September 1968, I, 7–8.

31. Officer Manning Analysis for June 1969–December 1970, , AFMPC;

Message , 504th TASG to Seventh Air Force, 301414Z June 1969, subject:

ALO/FAC and Aircraft Status Report as of 27 June 1969; History, 504th

TASG, April–June 1969, 11.

32. Message , CINCPACAF to Seventh Air Force, 131943Z, August 1969,

subject: FAC/ALO Requirements.

33. History, 504th TASG, July–September 1969, I, 12, October–

December 1969, I, 10.

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

141
34. Maj Gen Thomas G. Corbin, SAWC commander, to Gen Gabriel P.

Disosway, TAC commander, letter, subject: Quality of FAC Trainees, 20

January 1967.

35. Maj Charles O. Lescher Jr., “Forward Air Controller Selection Criteria

and Vietnam Tour Length,” thesis (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and

Staff College), June 1968, 35.

36. Thompson, 18.

37. Quoted in History, TAC, January–December 1965, I, 332.

38. Thompson, 18–21. It was mentioned at an ALO/FAC training

conference that one reason for the fighter-experience requirement was to

keep the Army out of the airborne FAC program since the requirement did

not make that much difference after a FAC gained experience. PACAF

ALO/FAC Training Conference Report, 3 September 1968), atch. 2, 2–3.

39. William G. Greene, operations analyst, to Maj George Partridge,

Air-Ground Control Branch Director of Operations, letter, subject:

Comments on Working Copy of the Draft Report by the FAC and SCAR

Working Group, 4 August 1969.

40. Visual Reconnaissance (VR) in SEA, 1 January 1962–31 March 1968

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 76–77.

41. History, TAC, January–December 1965, I, 332–33.

42. William G. Greene to Maj George Partridge, letter, subject:

Comments on working copy of draft report by the FAC and SCAR Working

Group, 4 August 1969.

43. Maj John Schlight, “Rules of Engagement: Continuing Report, 1

January 1966–1 November 1969,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 31

August 1969, 37–40.

44. Thompson, 60–62. From 214 sectors at the program’s start, the

number rose to 225. Sector size ranged from as big as a province (open

terrain) to only a few square miles (densely populated or jungle areas).

45. Working paper 66/11, “Seventh Air Force, An Evaluation of the

Visual Reconnaissance Program in South Vietnam,” 20 September 1966,

5–12, OAFH; J. I. Edelman et al., Airborne Visual Reconnaissance in South

Vietnam RAND Report RM-5049-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1966),

2–4; Thompson, 65–66.

46. Only 65 percent of VR sectors were covered daily. J. I. Edelman et

al., Airborne Visual Reconnaissance in South Vietnam , RAND Report

RM-5049-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1966), 2–4.

47. Lt Edward P. Brynn, “Reconnaissance in SEAsia, July 1966–June

1969,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 15 July 1969, 27–28.

48. Butz, 62–63.

49. Maj Louis Seig, “Impact of Geography on Air Operations in SEA,”

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 11 June 1970, xi, 11–14, 29–30.

50. A former FAC said a man could stand motionless under a tree in full

view of the aircraft and go unseen.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

142
51. Working Paper 66/11, Seventh Air Force, 20 September 1966, 5–12;

Lt Col George I. Wilkins, “The FAC Factor in South Vietnam,” thesis

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College), November 1970.

52. Butz, 66.

53. 504th TASG Manual 55-3 “Forward Air Control Tactics,” 1 March

1970, 2-1, 2-2.

54. Maj John F. Campbell, 22d TASS ALO/FAC, interviewed by Ralph

Rowley, 4 January 1972. Major Campbell was an ALO/FAC with ARVN in

Kien Phong Province, IV Corps, during 1969.

55. The “people sniffer” (airborne personnel detector [APD]) detected

human waste by processing air samples chemically.

56. “VR in SEA,” 1 January 1962–31 March 1968, 9.

57. Overton, November 1968, 5–7.

58. Ralph A. Rowley, “The In-Country Air War, 1965–1972,” in Carl

Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–73

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1977), 33.

59. John J. Sbergo, “Southeast Asia,” in Benjamin Cooling, ed., Case

Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: OAFH,

1990), 435–36.

60. Rowley, 44.

61. Momyer, 278.

62. Command and Control, bk. 2, p. 2 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 4–20.

63. Momyer, 278.

64. United States Air Force, Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine

for Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, March 1973), 53.

65. Sbergo, 436.

66. Jack S. Ballard, The Development and Employment of Fixed-Wing

Gunships (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1982), 23, 55. This study quoted from

the Seventh Air Force operations order on the primary purpose of the AC-47:

“To respond with flares and firepower in support of hamlets under night

attack, supplement strike aircraft in the defense of friendly forces, and

provide long endurance escort for convoys”.

67. O. D. Cunningham Jr., “Close Air Support Aircraft,” Special Study,

M-41780-68 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College), 1–2.

68. Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1984), 272. These figures were for actual “close air

support” sorties. The Department of Defense kept records for “attack”

sorties, which were defined as including “strike, armed recce, flak

suppression, interdiction, close air support, and direct air support sorties.”

69. Anthony Robinson, Aerial Warfare: An Illustrated History (New York:

Galahad Books, 1982), 286.

70. David A. Anderton, The History of the US Air Force (New York:

Crescent Books, 1981),188–89.

71. Air Force Policy letter for commanders, Supp., 9 September 1973,

OAFH, 23.

VIETNAM: SLOW FAC OPERATIONS

143
72. Ronald Brown, USAF course outline, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War

College, 40.

73. Atchison, 12.

74. Robinson, 286.

75. Rowley, 52–56.

76. F. D. Henderson, “Cleared in Wet!”, Air Force Magazine, August

1968, 38–40. For those not familiar with the terms, the following

explanations are offered. “Peacock” is the call sign of a Combat Reporting

Center (CRC) in South Vietnam, which controls all tactical aircraft in its

area. Peacock’s instructions pertain to a tactical air navigation (TACAN) fix,

on a compass heading of 340 degrees from the CRC at a distance of 25

miles. “Sabre 21” is the call sign of the flight leader, or “lead” with Sabre 22,

his wing man, being second, or “two,” in the flight. (A four-plane flight would

be made up of lead, two, three, and four.) “Cider 45” is the call sign of the

FAC, who must mark all ground targets and approve each specific bomb or

strafing gun. A “wet” run is one in which weapons may be fired. If no

clearance is obtained from the FAC, the pilot must make his run “dry.” The

term 117 slicks, point oh-two-five refers to the M-117 general-purpose

750-pound bomb with low-drag fins, fuzed to detonate .025 seconds after

impact. “Mike-mike” is phonetic for mm, or millimeter. The F-100

Supersabres on this mission carry four 20 mm cannon, each loaded (in this

instance) with 400 rounds. To avoid excessive radio interference, Army units

normally employ FM equipment while Air Force aircraft use VHF and UHF

radio. The FAC plane is equipped with all three types.

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Chapter 8

Expanding Missions

During the peak years of the Vietnam War (1965–70), the

controller’s responsibilities steadily expanded. Night

operations, for example, triggered a search for new ways to

find, mark, and strike targets. It eventually spawned the

starlight scope, lasers, new flare techniques, and a tighter

FAC-gunship relationship. Mounting enemy aggressiveness

sparked an upturn of both in-country and out-country

interdiction.

Night Operations

The step-up in enemy night activity in 1965 stimulated

development of new tactics and equipment. Night air

operations were difficult under the best conditions but

decidedly worse in bad weather and over jungle/mountainous

terrain. Darkness held other drawbacks; for example, vertigo

and spatial disorientation of crew members, difficult and

dangerous rendezvous between FAC aircraft and fighters, and

difficulty in marking targets accurately enough to separate

friendly from enemy troops.

Marking

The enemy took advantage of the FAC’s difficulty in

identifying friendly positions at night, but ingenuity came to

the rescue. During an Ia Drang valley operation in 1965, one

FAC suggested that the ground commander fill empty 105 mm

howitzer casings with sand-soaked JP-4 (jet fuel). Then, when

the enemy attacked, these improvised torches would be put at

the four corners of the perimeter and lit. The ground

commander said, “Gee, then they’ll know where we are.” The

controller replied, “When they hit you they [already] know

where you are. Give us a chance to find out where you are,

too.” The torches were an excellent reference, enabling fighters

to drop ordnance as close as 50 yards from the perimeter. A

like method had 50-gallon drums cut in half and filled with

145
jellied gasoline mixed with sand. Trip-flares were attached so

the enemy would trigger them and light up the drum torches.

The ensuing fires enabled fighters to drop napalm and FACs to

give strike corrections. Also, US Army troops adopted the

Vietnamese trick of pointing flaming arrows toward enemy

positions.

Frequently, a ground commander lacked the means and/or

time to mark his perimeter with torches. Under such

circumstances, air support was available only under a full

moon and a cloudless sky. Starting in 1965, however,

flareships overcame this drawback. Dropping flares commonly

deterred the enemy from attacking or caused him to break off

an ongoing attack.

Marking targets under flarelight was difficult, however. The

2.75-inch white phosphorous (WP [willie-pete]) marker

rocket—a mainstay for daytime FAC operations—worked

poorly at night, especially against moving targets. The rocket’s

smoke lasted only two or three minutes and easily drifted

away from the target. The controller could not divert his

attention for even an instant, or he would miss the rocket’s

short impact flash and have to mark again. The ideal marker

would have been a long-burning, high-intensity flare, fired as

a rocket and capable of illuminating a target even in bad

weather—but no such marker existed.1

For night target-marking, the Air Force introduced ground

marker logs. Although an excellent reference for directing air

strikes, the markers at times could not be seen in

mountainous or heavily forested areas. Moreover, the enemy

created confusion by setting ground fires of his own. The FAC

countered with brighter, longer-burning, red/green logs.2

The M-151 WP rocket came into service in 1968. Although

superior to the 2.75-inch rocket, the M-151 had a short

burn-time and was hard to see from the air.3 Air Force testing

for an improved marker rocket continued through 1970, but

with marginal success.

Starlight Scope

Flarelight alerted the enemy, curbed his movement, and

canceled surprise. To sidestep these shortcomings, the Air

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Force experimented with various infrared sensing devices,

low-light-level television (LLLTV), and other light-intensifying

instruments. The US Army had developed several items for

night detection. Of these, the Air Force selected the starlight

scope for testing in 1965. Using the starlight scope at night,

the FAC could see objects invisible to the naked eye; for

example, people moving, canals, tree lines, buildings, roads,

trucks, and sampans. However, this capability vanished when

clouds obscured the moon and stars.4

Initial testing of the starlight scope utilized the O-1 Bird

Dog. The O-1’s small rear cockpit, however, cramped the scope

operator and restricted coverage. Since the operator held the

scope in his hands, aircraft vibration caused additional

problems. Further, distortion caused by the cockpit window

affected the scope picture.5 Despite these snags, however,

controllers found the starlight scope helpful for night visual

reconnaissance.

The O-2A Super Skymaster began flying combat missions in

1967. Evaluation of the aircraft, which extended until the

spring of 1968, included finding the right starlight scope. The

Air Force’s new Eyeglass, an early front-runner, gave a superb

view under bright moonlight/starlight. From up to four

thousand feet altitude, the scope detected truck and boat

traffic; from up to one thousand feet, it picked out people.6

Equipped with a smaller version of the Eyeglass scope, the

OV-10 Bronco was no match for the Super Skymaster at night.

From 29 October to 15 December 1969, the 23d TASS at

Nakhon Phanom tested a modified starlight scope fitted with a

binocular viewer and mounted in the Bronco’s camera port.

Although the test turned out well, the required high-cost

modifications prompted the Air Force to put Pave Spot in the

OV-10s instead.7

Interdiction in South Vietnam

In 1965, the Air Force launched interdiction operations

against the complex of lacing roads, rivers, trails, and passes

known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. The bulk of the air strikes

took place out-country, but some hammered enemy supply

routes in central South Vietnam. Throughout the 1960s,

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Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army forces received supplies

over roads that sliced across the Cambodian and Laotian

borders.8

Seventh Air Force sustained the interdiction campaign

throughout 1969 and 1970, but could not neatly coordinate

the in-and out-country operations. Even so, interdiction

achieved considerable success. While the enemy’s movements

were not entirely checked, he was kept off balance. This

allowed the South Vietnamese forces to shake off the shock of

the Tet offensive and stride toward Vietnamization.9

Rocket Watch

By 1965, North Vietnamese were concentrating on

hit-and-run attacks against outposts, airbases, and urban

centers.10 The attackers favored mortars and rocket

launchers, since both could be easily assembled and

dismantled. The guerrillas could be packed and gone before

being located. Due to dense foliage and darkness, finding

these attack teams from the ground was impossible. Airbases

like Da Nang proved particularly vulnerable because they

lacked covered revetments to protect the parked planes. On 15

July 1967, the enemy rained rockets on that base from as far

away as seven miles. The assault killed eight Air Force

personnel and caused $1.5 million damage to 43 USAF and

Marine Corps aircraft. These hit-and-run mortar/rocket

attacks peaked just before the Tet offensive of 30 January

1968. To weed out enemy rocket sites around Da Nang, MACV

organized a night watch in February 1968. During the first

week, FACs found and directed air strikes or ground sweeps

against 32 rocket positions. Around-the-clock rocket watch of

Saigon began in March 1968.11

Combat Skyspot

Rains, low-hanging cloud cover, and the Vietcong’s

exploitation of darkness hindered the Air Force’s harassment,

interdiction, and CAS operations. On clear nights, or when

cloud cover was not a factor, flareships, in conjunction with

fighters or gunships, could harass and interdict the enemy or

provide CAS. Even with ceilings below five hundred feet, FACs

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could, at times, drop below the clouds and maintain visual

contact with the ground. Fighter pilots, flying five times as fast

and with one-fourth the maneuverability, had a definite

problem with low ceilings and poor visibility. Dive bombing

was limited and shallow dive angles did not offer satisfactory

results.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was using a ground-based

radar/computer system called Radar Bomb Scoring

(designated MSQ-77), which predicted the exact point of

impact of a bomb drop. Tests conducted in 1965 used F-100s

to deliver live ordnance. Factors such as altitude, wind speed,

aircraft speed, temperature, and ordnance characteristics

were introduced into the computer. The pilot was given

heading, altitude, and airspeed instructions, and was told

when to release his ordnance.

Six Combat Skyspot sites were established in Southeast

Asia—five in Vietnam and one in Thailand. The system was

deployed to Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Dong Ha, Dalat, Binh Thuy, and

Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. All sites were operational by the

spring of 1967.12 Under radar control from these locations,

Combat Skyspot was used by fighters and bombers during

adverse weather or at night. Additional uses of the system

included harassment and interdiction of enemy forces and

lines of communication, support of special forces, support of

rescue and resupply operations, and the plotting of newly

discovered targets and directing strikes against them.13

To understand the rhythm of the war’s course in Vietnam,

one must be familiar with the ebb and flow of the annual dry

and wet monsoons. The dry monsoon extends from

mid-October to mid-May while the rainy season runs from

mid-May to mid-October in most of Indochina, but there are

variations to this pattern in the northern part of South

Vietnam—Military Regions I and II, in particular. High

mountains shield the coastal plains from the rains brought by

the wet monsoon. These provinces get most of their annual

rain during the dry monsoon in the form of a persistent drizzle

accompanied by treacherous fog. During these conditions,

overland movement was slow and flying was hazardous, even

by helicopter.

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Nevertheless, the dry monsoon generally meant favorable

weather for offensive operations. During the wet monsoon, the

North Vietnamese would send troop reinforcements, war

materiel, and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail to their

base areas just north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and in

Laos and Cambodia. US and South Vietnamese forces

attacked enemy troops before they reentered South Vietnam.

Air Operations in Laos

Out-country FAC operations received far less publicity than

those in South Vietnam. Even so, Air Force FACs were widely

used in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh trail and to some extent

for support of Laotian ground troops. They also saw service

over North Vietnam, mostly in its southern panhandle near

the DMZ.

The steady flow of North Vietnamese troops over the Ho Chi

Minh trail into South Vietnam spurred the US government to

secure Laotian Prince Souvanna Phouma’s approval for USAF

reconnaissance flights over Laos. These operations, started in

1964, revealed a continuing enemy buildup. The Royal Laotian

Government (RLG) then authorized interdiction programs in

both northern and southern Laos. The first of these Air Force

strike operations (Barrel Roll) took place on 14 December

1964.14

FAC operations in Laos began as the result of a massive

enemy attack on the Plei Me special forces camp in the Central

Highlands of South Vietnam. The attack, begun on 19 October

1965, lasted ten days. Allied forces flew 696 day and night

strike sorties that resulted in 326 known killed and an

estimated seven hundred more dead and carried away. A

Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV ) study team

was formed in November to determine the best way to intensify

the interdiction effort in Laos. From this study came the Tiger

Hound Task Force, which began operations in December

1965. The Task Force was charged with conducting a Laotian

interdiction campaign using a combination of airborne FACs

and tactical strike aircraft.15

This mission of controlling air strikes in Laos carried with it

a tremendous responsibility. Political considerations required

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150
that rules of engagement be more carefully applied here than

in South Vietnam. For instance, napalm could not be

expended in Laos unless authorized by the US Embassy in

Vientiane. Night attacks on fixed targets were not authorized.

Bombing was prohibited except as specifically approved by the

Embassy. Flights under FAC control would not expend

ordnance if the target was in doubt, if instructions were in

question, or if the flight leader so directed. Campfires and

civilian structures could not be attacked, and FACs and strike

aircraft had to be under the positive control of a ground

radar.16

On 10 March 1967, Seventh Air Force designated the A-1E,

A-26, T-28, C-47, C-123, and C-130A as substitute FAC

aircraft for operations outside South Vietnam. Specific

guidelines governed their use. T-28s and A-1Es, for example,

flew in pairs and acted as FACs for one another. If they flew

singly, both crewmen needed to be FAC-qualified before

directing their own strikes. The A-26 was allowed to furnish its

own controller support if a navigator was in the crew (a FAC

flew with the A-26.)17

Slow movers could generally work in poorer weather

conditions, and they had longer loiter times; fast-mover FACs

could range farther afield, react faster, and operate in more

hostile environments. Each type had a place in the scheme of

the air war. In March 1965, the air activity over the Kingdom

of Laos was divided into two separately commanded programs:

(1) interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail, code-named Steel

Tiger; and (2) CAS and interdiction in support of Laotian

ground forces, mostly in the northern part of Laos,

code-named Barrel Roll.18

Interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh Trail

When one looks at a map of Central and Southern Laos,

there is a tendency to associate the neatly drawn routes with

the two-lane paved or gravel roads found in the rural United

States. For the binocular-equipped FAC in his small aircraft,

nothing could be further from the truth. Several of the routes

had been built by the French. These roads were surfaced with

hard-packed gravel and, in some cases, asphalt or concrete.

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But the majority of the infiltration route structure was strictly

single-lane (in rare cases, two-lane) dirt roads which had been

hacked out of the dense jungle. There was no neatly groomed

shoulder adjacent to the routes and, in many cases, the trees

were so thick and tall that you had to be directly over the road

to see it. In several areas of Laos, the road just disappeared

into the thick, triple-canopy jungle.

Because of the extensive number of route segments

available to the enemy and the fleeting nature of the targets, a

“choke point” concept of operations was recommended by the

FACs in 1966. The “Choke Point” concept involved

FAC-directed air strikes designed to crater and make

impassable certain vulnerable route segments. These

segments were located in narrow valleys with very steep sides,

along the steep sides of cliffs, and at fords of streams and

rivers. As long as these choke points were under constant

observation both day and night, the concept was effective. But

the North Vietnamese, feeling the effects, began to apply

countermeasures.

The North Vietnamese deployed increasing numbers of AAA

weapons along the route structure. In addition, they increased

their use of camouflage to conceal supplies and make fords.

But their most effective tactic was to move their supplies at

night.19

The bulk of air strike control during daylight hours over

Laos fell to FACs carrying the call signs of Nail, Covey, and

Raven. The Nail FACs were from the 23d TASS at Nakhon

Phanom, Thailand; the Coveys from the 20th TASS at Da

Nang; and the Raven FACs, designated Detachment 1 of the

56th Special Operations Wing, at Udorn but actually dispersed

at several sites throughout Laos. The Nails and Coveys flew

O-2s after 1967; the Ravens continued to fly O-1s.20

The first Steel Tiger strikes—initiated a month after the start

of Rolling Thunder—were directed against enemy personnel

and supplies moving into the Laotian panhandle or into South

Vietnam through the DMZ. Steel Tiger’s mission

complemented Rolling Thunder. In both campaigns, political

considerations were dominant and air strikes were limited in

scope. The United States’ primary concern was to avoid

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152
involving Communist China and the Soviet Union in the war

while maintaining the “neutral” status of Laos.21

Air Force and Navy strikes concentrated on cutting roads

and bombing “choke points” along routes leading from the Mu

Gia and Nape passes, two principal entry points from North

Vietnam into Laos. They also attacked trucks, bridges, troops,

and storage areas. The Air Force averaged nine to ten sorties

per day. By mid-1965, despite poor weather, Air Force and

Navy pilots were flying more than one thousand Steel Tiger

sorties per month—but not without incident, as demonstrated

by the experience of one unnamed FAC.

This particular FAC flew the OV-10, a rigid-wing aircraft

that has very little padding and no “cushion effect.” These

factors combined to produce a painful posterior after a typical

four-hour mission. Many OV-10 crews used an unauthorized

rubber “donut” inflated just enough to absorb the vibration.

This FAC was on his first operational mission, which was

usually accompanied by a doubling of the respiratory rate and

a firm intention of not going to the hottest spot in your

assigned sector just to practice AAA evasive maneuvers.

As the FAC was building his confidence, a flight of Navy A-7

aircraft checked in on his radio frequency. Their task was to

strike a ford at the “Dog’s Head” in Ban Kari Pass. The Dog’s

Head was not only the hot spot of the new FAC’s sector—it was

the hottest area in Steel Tiger. The FAC began weaving his way

toward Ban Kari at an altitude previously thought

unattainable in a fully loaded OV-10. The lead A-7 pilot

described the ground fire they were receiving: “FAC, I’ve never

seen it so bad. This is my third cruise over here and I’ve never

seen flak as thick as this. Man, you ought to see the stuff

coming up from the ground.”

The FAC’s respiratory rate tripled and a cold sweat beaded

on his forehead. He arrived over the target and informed his

Navy companions that since the ford was visible, “there will

only be one marking pass.” He then rolled his aircraft and

dived toward the target. As he stabilized to fire a marking

rocket, the Navy leader began calling out, “FAC, you’re getting

hosed! It’s all around you!”

The FAC fired his rocket and began a “maximum G” pull-off

while jabbing at the rudder pedals to randomly change

EXPANDING MISSIONS

153
attitude and direction. There was a tremendous explosion just

as the “G” forces began to affect his vision. The cockpit filled

with smoke and he knew he had been hit. But the aircraft was

still controllable and the FAC headed for an isolated area

adjacent to the pass.

Another FAC from the bordering sector joined him and

inspected the aircraft for damage. There was no exterior

damage and no indication of engine malfunction. The

“wounded” FAC then found the “hit.” He had pulled so many

“Gs” coming off the rocket pass that the rubber donut had

exploded under the weight of his body. The resultant white

cloud of talcum powder and the abrupt change in seating

height, coupled with the observations of the Navy strike pilot,

logically added up to battle damage. A sheepish but much

wiser FAC returned to base to face inquiries about what it was

like to take a “near miss” from an exploding large-caliber

projectile.22

Tiger Hound

As the southwest monsoon subsided in late 1965, the

communists stepped up their infiltration. As a result,

American and Laotian authorities agreed to concentrate

airpower on a segment of the Ho Chi Minh trail most

contiguous to South Vietnam. Air Force Col John F. Groom

drew up the plans for the new air campaign. Nicknamed Tiger

Hound, it began in December 1965. Tiger Hound required

more resources than the Air Force had employed in Laos up to

that time. An airborne battlefield command and control

system (ABCCC) was established. C-47s were used initially,

but were replaced later by C-130s. Air Force O-1s and A-1Es,

along with Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) T-28s, served as

FAC aircraft. RF-101s and newly arrived RF-4Cs, equipped

with the latest infrared and side-looking radars, also were

employed for target detection. UC-123 spray aircraft defoliated

jungle growth along roads and trails to improve visibility. The

principal strike aircraft were B-57s, F-100s, F-105s, and

AC-47 gunships. Substantial Marine, Navy, and Army air

forces were also involved in the operation.

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154
Cricket

In January 1966, the Air Force launched another campaign

in Laos. Called “Cricket,” it involved the use of O-1 and A-1E

aircraft, based at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base

(RTAFB) near the Laotian border. The 0-1s and A-1Es would

fly visual reconnaissance or serve as FACs in the northern

Steel Tiger and southern Barrel Roll sectors. In the Barrel Roll

area, the primary mission was to support friendly ground

units; in Steel Tiger, it was armed reconnaissance. Air Force

aircraft ranged outward 300 nautical miles from Nakhon

Phanom, concentrating on roads south of Mu Gia pass.

Laotian observers flew with some of the FACs to validate

targets before F-100s, F-105s, and AC-47s were allowed to

strike. The FAC pilots worked with both ground liaison officers

and road reconnaissance teams to pinpoint targets inside

Laos. Although Cricket was a minor operation, it proved quite

effective in destroying or damaging enemy trucks and

supplies.

To maintain an umbrella of airpower over the Ho Chi Minh

trail, USAF commanders tried new tactics and new aircraft

with special equipment. They also inaugurated the practice of

having FAC pilots fly over “target boxes” in the same

geographic area daily. This procedure enabled the FACs to

become familiar with the terrain and aided them in detecting

enemy positions. The use of additional ground reconnaissance

teams led to the discovery of numerous concealed targets.

The most effective “truck killers” were the AC-119 and

AC-130 gunships, the B-57, a few C-123s equipped with

special detection devices, and the A-26. Carrying flares and

detection devices, these aircraft flew mostly at night when

truck travel was heaviest. They also served as FACs, calling in

fighters for additional strikes. Other aircraft with a FAC

capability included Air Force A-1Es, Navy P-1s, and Laotian

T-28s. In 1967, O-2s began replacing O-1s and the Air Force

introduced the larger OV-10 aircraft in 1968. Nighttime

detection capability was enhanced by the Starlight Scope.

During the last two months of 1967, an important advance

was made in the ability to detect enemy movement. This was a

rudimentary, air-supported electronic antiinfiltration system

EXPANDING MISSIONS

155
comprised of “strings” of seismic and acoustic sensors dropped

from aircraft. These devices, planted along a number of

infiltration roads and trails, picked up the sounds of enemy

vehicular traffic. The information was transmitted to a

high-flying EC-121, which retransmitted it to an infiltration

surveillance center at Nakhon Phanom. The antiinfiltration

detection system had a succession of nicknames, Igloo White

being best known and most enduring.23

Commando Hunt

On 31 March 1968, President Johnson ordered an end to all

bombing of North Vietnam above the 19th parallel. In

November 1968, on the basis of an “understanding” reached

with Hanoi, Johnson ended all attacks on North Vietnam. As a

result, enemy infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh trail became

heavier than ever and Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps

forces launched a new air campaign called Commando Hunt.

Its major objectives were to destroy supplies being moved

down the trail, to tie enemy troops down, and to further test

the sensor system’s effectiveness. Initial operations were

confined roughly to a 1,700-square-mile sector of Laos. The

Air Force employed an array of FAC, strike, and

reconnaissance aircraft, B-52s, C-130 ABCCCs, and AC-47

and AC-130 gunships. The gunships proved especially

valuable in interdicting enemy truck traffic. As the pace of the

aerial assault quickened, the number of tactical sorties rose

from 4,700 in October to 12,800 in November and 15,100 in

December 1968.

Commando Hunt II began in May 1969, coinciding with the

beginning of the annual southwest monsoon and the usual

reduction in enemy movement over southern Laos. American

pilots continued to harass or hamper the efforts of the

communists to repair roads and trails washed out by floods.

Within North Vietnam, the enemy assembled more manpower,

trucks, and watercraft, and stockpiled supplies near the

Laotian border. The next infiltration surge through Laos would

begin after the monsoon abated. Commando Hunt III,

launched as the dry season began in November 1969,

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156
witnessed more intense air operations against an expanded

southward flow of enemy troops and supplies.

During the annual May to October monsoon in 1971,

Commando Hunt operations diminished and the North

Vietnamese maintained an above normal level of activity in

southern Laos. By late 1971, about 344 antiaircraft guns and

thousands of smaller automatic weapons defended vital points

along the trail. With the outset of the dry season in late 1971,

the communist threat again was formidable. To counter it, the

Air Force launched Commando Hunt VII and extended it

beyond the Steel Tiger area of southern Laos. However, there

were fewer US aircraft available for Laos because of competing

requirements in both Cambodia and North Vietnam, where

“protective reaction” strikes had been resumed, and because

there were budget cutbacks and withdrawals of US air and

ground units. When Commando Hunt VII operations were

completed at the end of March 1972, US tactical aircraft had

flown 31,500 sorties.24

Air Operations in Barrel Roll

The northern operations known as Barrel Roll primarily

supported friendly government ground forces—the Royal

Laotian Army and neutralist troops to be sure, but especially

the army of Maj Gen Vang Pao (five thousand CIA-trained

tribesmen of the Meo, a mountain people living in Laos).

In the advisory years, the Air Force had deployed

Detachment 6, First Air Commando Wing, to Udorn, Thailand.

Two of its major objectives were to establish a T-28 flight

checkout program for Laotian pilots and to assist with aircraft

maintenance. Forty-one airmen with four aircraft began

operations at Udorn in April 1964. As support of friendly

ground operations increased, Air Force personnel were

assigned to work as ground controllers or forward air guides

in Laos because few Laotians could speak English and none

were familiar with directing air strikes. In early 1965,

Detachment 6 began training English-speaking Lao and Meo

personnel to direct air strikes from the ground; USAF airmen

withdrew from this role.

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In addition, the Air Force assigned FACs to Royal Laotian

Army units and Vang Pao’s forces in an effort to overcome the

language barrier between them and the strike aircraft crews.

Operating under the designation of Raven, these FACs flew

O-1s, U-17s, and T-28s on six-month tours of duty. As

necessary, the Air Force deployed a C-47 airborne battlefield

command and control center to the area.25

The White House felt that Vietnamization was proceeding

too slowly and that the South Vietnamese Army would not

bridge the gap left by the US troop withdrawals. Airpower

bridged that gap, adding another political dimension to the

B-52. It became one of the cornerstones of US policy in

Indochina, buying time for Vietnamization and Richard M.

Nixon. Like Vang Pao, the White House put inordinate faith in

airpower.

On 21 February 1973, less than a month after North

Vietnam and the United States signed a cease-fire agreement,

the Laotians followed suit and bombing operations in Laos

were promptly halted. Laos bombing was renewed only two

days later, however, at the request of the Vientiane

government; the North Vietnamese had already committed

cease-fire violations. On 23 February, B-52s launched an

attack against enemy positions near Paksong on the Bolovens

Plateau. A subsequent cease-fire infringement brought the

Stratofortresses back for a strike south of the Plain of Jars in

April. With this strike, nine years of USAF operations in Laos

came to an end.

The Ravens

Pilots in the “other war” (support for Laotian military

operations) were military men who flew into battle in civilian

clothes—denim cutoffs, T-shirts, cowboy hats, and dark

glasses. They fought with the discarded obsolete aircraft of an

earlier era, and they suffered the highest casualty rate of the

Indochinese War—as high as 50 percent. Every man had a

price on his head—and every man was protected by his own

personal bodyguard. Each pilot was obliged to carry a small

pill of lethal shellfish toxin, especially created by the CIA,

which he had sworn to take if he ever fell into the hands of the

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

158
enemy. Their job was to fly as the winged artillery of warlord

Vang Pao who led an army of mercenaries in the pay of the

CIA. They operated out of a secret city hidden in the

mountains near the Red Chinese border.

Raven was the call-sign that identified these fliers of

America’s “Secret War” in Laos, and no name was more fitting.

In the early days, when the program was haphazard, a

standard form of recruitment was for a Raven to approach a

like-minded colleague still in Vietnam. Things became more

structured later, but the type of individuals recruited never

altered. They were always men who enjoyed a maximum of

flying and a minimum of administration—and they tended to

be the very best pilots.

Vang Pao provided men, known as Backseaters or Robins,

who advised the Ravens on terrain and identified friendly

versus enemy areas for them. The Backseaters/Robins were

the only targeting authority the Ravens had to consult in

northern Laos. (All other Laos targets had to be cleared by

American Amb William Sullivan.)26

The initial US advisors in Laos assisted the Royal Laotian

Air Force (RLAF).27 Air Force FACs entered the picture in 1964

to aid CAS for the Laotian Army. In 1965, they began training

indigenous Laotians as FACs. They occasionally “flew right

seat” in Air America aircraft, helping the RLAF strike pilots

find and hit enemy targets.28

The control of airpower in Laos evolved on a trial-and-error

basis. In the early days of the war, it was managed by a

half-dozen sheep-dipped,29 nonrated Air Commandos who flew

with Air America pilots in Pilatus Porters. They marked targets

by dropping smoke canisters out of the window. Often, they

talked fighters onto the target by describing the scenery:

“Drop your bombs two hundred yards north of that gnarled

tree.”30

The Ravens were created in 1966 with rated Air Force

officers who had at least six months’ experience in Vietnam.

They suffered growing pains during 1967 and early 1968.

There were never enough men or aircraft to manage the

ever-increasing use of US air. (There had been only four

Ravens for all of Laos until 1966; by 1968, there were only six.

EXPANDING MISSIONS

159
This number slowly grew, but there were never more than 22

Ravens at any one time.)31

Early Raven operations flew directly in the face of Air Force

doctrine and Gen William W. Momyer, who wanted an all-jet

Air Force and was committed to employing state-of-the-art

aircraft in Vietnam. There had been an acrimonious

interagency debate over whether propeller or jet planes should

be used in Vietnam, with the Air Force arguing that jets were

better for close air support than slower, prop-driven aircraft.

USAF knew this was nonsense but did not want to end up,

after what was expected to be a short guerrilla-type war, with

an inventory of prop planes. Taking the long view, the Air

Force wanted jets to match the Russians; it fought for their

use in the Vietnam War.32

Sullivan had different ideas for Laos and set about cobbling

together a force of propeller aircraft. His earlier job in

Washington had given him easy access to Robert S.

McNamara, whom he persuaded to initiate Farm Gate. “The

gang that tumbled into Nakhon Phanom was a pretty wild

bunch,” Sullivan remembered fondly. This odd mixture of men

and machinery grew to become an entire wing, officially

designated as the 56th Air Commando Wing; unofficially, it

was called Sullivan’s Air Force.

33

A Raven team normally operated from a forward operating

base. While the airman stayed on the ground to handle

communications for the Laotian troop commander, the FAC

either borrowed an O-1 or flew with an Air America pilot. A

Laotian commonly went along to interpret the controller’s

conversations with the ground commander and the strike

pilots.

Air Force colonels who interviewed new pilots for the Raven

program had no clear idea of what the mission involved—and

much of the data is still guarded today. A large number of the

documents and oral histories that relate to the activities of the

Ravens will remain classified until after the year 2000.34

USAF Controllers in Cambodia

Even though USAF controllers monitored incursions of

Operation Daniel Boone reconnaissance teams into Cambodia,

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

160
they seldom crossed the boundary themselves. An exception

occurred in April 1970 when the United States and South

Vietnam mounted a campaign into Cambodia against North

Vietnamese positions. Seventh Air Force firmed up CAS plans

on 27 April. Assigned to South Vietnamese ground units, the

FACs adhered to normal rules of engagement. They operated

in both aircraft and radio jeeps. The 19th TASS backed up

operations in southern Cambodia; 20th TASS in the northeast;

22d TASS in the eastern portion; and 23d TASS in the

northwest.35

To safeguard the lives and property of noncombatants on

this operation, FACs controlled all air strikes. In addition, a

special task force (with an ALO and a TACP attached) helped

coordinate air support. An O-2A FAC (call-sign Head Beagle)

flew out of Di An, climbed to eight thousand feet, and circled

south just inside the South Vietnam border. Head Beagle took

fighter handoffs from the DASC and passed them on to other

controllers. He harmonized all CAS in Cambodia, shifting

strikes quickly to points needing them most, and CAS was

exceptional throughout the campaign.36

Route Packages

USAF and Navy participation in Rolling Thunder was

coordinated through “route packages.” Elements of Seventh

Air Force operated from bases in South Vietnam while Task

Force 77 chose a point in the Gulf of Tonkin code-named

Yankee Station. Usually, at least two aircraft carriers

supported operations over North Vietnam while a single carrier

supported operations in the south.

President Johnson reserved the right to select targets and

launch times in the north, and American forces were

continually given limited objectives. As a result, operational

effectiveness was impaired.

Route Package I, assigned to Seventh Air Force, covered an

area from the DMZ to just above the 18th parallel. Since

MACV had initially considered this area an extension of the

ground battle zone, operations there were directed by MACV.

Task Force 77 controlled Route Package II, an area from the

18th parallel to just below the 19th parallel, and from the

EXPANDING MISSIONS

161
coast to the Laotian border. The most significant target in

Package II was the Vinh area and the logistical activities

surrounding it. Coastal shipping and traffic were also major

target systems. However, all of the major passes leading from

North Vietnam into southern Laos were on the southern edge

of Route Package I; none were in Route Package II.

The Navy also controlled Route Package III, which was the

largest area but which had less significant targets. Barthelemy

Pass, however, was a major target because most of the

supplies supporting the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese

forces in the Plain of Jars came through that area. Seventh Air

Force covered this pass and most of the movements leading

into it; the Navy covered the eastern end of the area.

Route Package IV, an active area, was assigned to the Navy.

Few of IV’s targets were restricted. The most important targets

were the rail and road networks and the bridge at Thanh Hoa.

In addition, Nam Dinh was a major railyard and marshaling

area for logistics. Enemy fighters used Bai Thuong, the only

all-weather airfield in the area, as a staging field.

The Air Force was responsible for Route Package V, which

was twice the size of any other area. It contained most of the

railroads in the northwest and the lines-of-communication

(LOCs) supporting North Vietnamese forces in northern Laos.

Package V was bounded on the east by a line along 150′30′′

longitude, on the west by the Laotian border, on the north by

the Chinese border, and on the south by an imaginary

extension of the northeast rail line until it intersected the

Laotian border.

By far the most important of all route packages was Route

Package VI. Most of the targets were in this area, and enemy

defenses there were the strongest. Package VI was divided

between the Air Force and the Navy along the northeast rail

line. Using the railroad as a dividing line gave the least chance

for error if pilots from either Seventh Air Force or TF-77 should

stray and be assumed hostile. The package was bounded on

the west by 150′30′′ longitude and on the south by a line just

south of Nam Dinh.

Almost all missions into Route Packages V, VIA, and VIB

required extensive planning to minimize exposure to probably

the most heavily defended area on earth and to achieve a high

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

162
degree of coordination among support forces. The more

complex the defenses, the greater the need for planning.37

Strike aircraft taking off from bases in Thailand and from

carriers would routinely check in with the ABCCC. The

ABCCC could either reaffirm their targets or assign new ones.

At the same time, the ABCCC would notify high-speed FACs

that strike aircraft would report to their control. From that

point, the mission resembled any other FAC-controlled strike.

Dividing North Vietnam into route packages compartmentalized airpower and reduced its capabilities. As expressed

by Arthur William Tedder in World War II, “Air warfare cannot

be separated into little packets; it knows no boundaries on

land or sea other than those imposed by the radius of action of

the aircraft; it is a unity and demands unity of command.”38

Air Strikes on North Vietnam

On 1 November 1968, President Johnson ordered a halt to

all bombing north of the DMZ—but a divided American

electorate did not reelect him. A few days after the election,

President-elect Nixon announced plans to reduce American

troop involvement in Vietnam. Nixon kept his promise to

implement the plan; by the end of 1969, sixty-nine thousand

American troops were out of Vietnam. However, Nixon also

responded to renewed Vietcong attacks on Saigon by ordering

B-52s to bomb their sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Meanwhile, American airpower was called on to make

selective strikes at North Vietnamese targets in response to

attacks on unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. In February

1971, stepped-up strikes were launched against SAM sites

and their support units. By August, petroleum storage areas

were on the target list. In September, a major raid was

directed against Dong Hoi (north of the DMZ). The NVAF was

ready for the challenge, however: Its older MiG-17 fighters

were augmented by newer MiG-19 and MiG-21 interceptors.

The North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) fighter pilots grew

bolder and became more successful in attacking American

aircraft, which were still operating under restrictions against

pursuing MiGs back to their bases. That restriction was lifted

in November 1971.39

EXPANDING MISSIONS

163
Notes

1. Lt Col Philip R. Harrison, “Impact of Darkness and Weather on Air

Operations in SEA,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 10 March 1969,

37. These fire arrows could be made of many materials. Metal gas cans filled

with gasoline-soaked sand were often used. When ignited, they were easy to

see at night.

2. History of Tactical Air Command (TAC), January–June 1966, I,

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History [OAFH]), 276.

3. 504th TASG Manual 55–3 , 1 March 1970, 14–2, 14–3.

4. History of the 504th Tactical Air Support Group (TASG),

July–September 1970, I (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 29; 504th TASG Manual

55–3, 1 March 1970, 14–4.

5. Capt Dorrell T. Hanks Jr., “Riverline Operations in the Delta, May

1968–June 1969,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 31 August 1969,

38.

6. “Operational Test and Evaluation Stabilized Night Observation Device

(Eyeglass),” TAC-TR- 67-109, TAC/SAWC, Eglin AFB, Florida, undated.

7. Tactical Air Command, TR-67-274, “OV-10 Category III Test and

Evaluation,” L-1, L-2. A night observation device with boresighted laser

target designator (LTD). The LTD used a laser to direct a light beam onto the

target so the proper sensors could track, or “home,” on the reflected energy.

8. C. William Thorndale, “Interdiction in Route Package One, 1968,

17–18, Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO.

9. Kenneth Sams et al., “The Air War in Vietnam, 1968–1969,” 35–36,

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO; Thorndale, 117–19.

10. John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, “The Vietcong,” Office of

ACS/G-2, USA, 2d rev., November 1965, chap. IV.

11. History, 504th TASG , July–September 1968, I, Doc. 6; C. Thorndale,

“Defense of Da Nang,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 31 August

1969, 13–14.

12. Operation plan (OPLAN), Seventh AF, operation order (OPORD),

“Combat Sky Spot,” 439–67, 10 March 1967.

13. Maj Richard A. Durkee, “Combat Sky Spot,” Hickam AFB, Hawaii,

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 9 August 1967, 7.

14. Senate Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and

Commitments Abroad, Testimony of Amb William H. Sullivan, 28 October

1969, in Hearings before the, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Kingdom of Laos, pt. 2,

20–22, 367–71, 376–77, 476. Hereinafter cited as Sullivan Testimony.

15. Maj Richard M. Atchison, “The Slow Mover FAC Over the Ho Chi

Minh Trail, 1965–1972,” Working Papers, 3 February 1975, 4–5, OAFH.

16. Warren A. Trest “Control of Air Strikes in SEA, 1961–66,”

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 1 March 1967, 62.

17. Message, Seventh Air Force to Chief, Joint US Military Assistance

Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI), USAF Command Post, 100840Z March

1967, subject: FAC Aircraft and Crew Requirements.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

164
18. The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers, vol. III (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1971), 279.

19. Atchison, 8–9.

20. Melvin F. Porter, “Control of Air Strikes–January 1967–December

1968,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 30 June 1969, 23.

21. Jacob Van Staaveren, “Interdiction in the Laotian Panhandle,” in

Carl Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973:

An Illustrated Account (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 977), 101.

22. Atchison, 33–35.

23. Van Staaveren, 104–9.

24. Jscob Van Staaveren, in Gene Gurney, ed., Vietnam, The War in the

Air, A Pictorial History of the US Forces in the Vietnam War—Air Force, Army,

Navy and Marines (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985), 218–26.

25. Carl Berger, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: An

Illustrated Account, 1961–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History), 121.

26. Christopher Robbins, The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America’s

Secret War in Laos (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1987), 219. Air Force

histories for this period are entitled “The Administration Emphasizes Air

Power” (1969) and “The Role of Airpower Grows” (1970).

27. Nearly all these early advisors worked for Air America, a civilian

contract air operation. A USAF special air warfare unit (Detachment 6, 1st

Commando Wing) deployed to Udorn, Thailand, in December 1962. It

comprised 41 men and 4 T-28s. The men flew with Lao pilots and taught

them counterinsurgency tactics. In addition, Detachment 6 could help out

the RLAF in an emergency by covert action or furnishing aircraft.

28. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The

Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1981), 439–45; Sullivan

Testimony, 456–57.

29. Sheep-dipped: A complex process in which someone serving in the

military seemingly went through all the official motions of resigning from the

service. The man’s records would be pulled from the personnel files and

transferred to a special top secret intelligence file. A cover story would be

concocted to explain the resignation, and the man would become a civilian.

At the same time, his ghostly paper existence within the intelligence file

would continue to pursue his Air Force career: when his contemporaries

were promoted, he would be promoted, and so on. Sheep-dipped personnel

posed extremely tricky problems when they were killed or captured. There

would be all sorts of pension and insurance problems, which was one of the

reasons the CIA found it necessary to set up its own insurance company.

30. Charlie Jones (one of the original Butterflies), interviewed by

Christopher Robbins, 15 March 1985.

31. Robbins, 49–50.

32. Robert Comer, “Was Failure Inevitable?,” in W. Scott Thompson and

D. D. Frizzel, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane Russak, 1977),

269.

EXPANDING MISSIONS

165
33. Sullivan’s Air Force organized at Nakhon Phanom airport, Thailand,

8 April 1967. Redesignated as Special Operations Wing, 1 August 1968.

34. Robbins, 2.

35. Maj David I. Folkman Jr. and Maj Philip D. Caine, “The Cambodian

Campaign, 29 April–30 June 1970,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO,

1 September 1970, 11–14.

36. Ibid., 11–15; Lt Col J. F. Loye Jr. and Maj Philip D. Caine, “The

Cambodian Campaign,1 July–31 October 1970,” Headquarters PACAF,

Project CHECO, 31 December 1970, 23–24, 33–35.

37. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

OAFH, January 1978), 91–97.

38. Arthur William Tedder, Air Power in War, The Lees Knowles Lectures

for 1947 (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1947), 91.

39. Anthony Robinson, Aerial Warfare: An Illustrated History (New York:

Galahad Books, 1982), 287–88.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

166
Chapter 9

The Fast Forward Air Controllers

When the ban on US use of jet aircraft was lifted in 1965,

F-100 Super Sabres and F-4 Phantoms began air strikes.

These high-performance aircraft carried the close air support

load, pounding enemy ground targets. The F-100, with

multiple combinations of weapon loads, and the F-4, which

could carry up to twelve thousand pounds of ordnance,

brought with them a formidable increase in firepower.1

Modified versions of two other jets eventually made their

way into the war: the F-5 (modified T-38) and the A-37

(modified T-37). Each was highly maneuverable and easily

maintained, and most Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) trainees

had trained in the unmodified versions.2 The A-7D was

introduced toward the end of the war, and even the

sophisticated F-111 made a brief appearance.3

The high-performance jets were not ideal for CAS. The

relatively short loiter times due to fuel limits and restricted

maneuverability because of large turn radii represented major

drawbacks. In addition, the high speeds that resulted in quick

response times turned into weaknesses once the jets arrived

at the target. Jet pilots encountered difficulty acquiring small,

fleeting targets in densely canopied jungles at high speed.

Also, the same engines that produced those high speeds

consumed excessive fuel at low altitude.4

Out-Country Operations, 1964–65

Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, commander-in-chief, Pacific

(CINCPAC), was impressed with the high-level national

interest in the armed reconnaissance program. He gave the

maiden mission to the F-105 Thunderchiefs of the 80th

tactical fighter squadron at Korat Air Base, Thailand. Sharp

selected a section of Route 8 for an armed reconnaissance

sweep and the Nape road bridge as a backup target for

unused ordnance. A 15-plane force took off from Da Nang on

14 December 1964. Three RF-101s served as pathfinders and

167
damage-assessment craft. Eight F-100s flew combat air patrol

to guard against MiG interference. Four F-105s carried

750-pound bombs, 2.75-inch rockets, and 20 mm

ammunition. The mission achieved limited results. Short on

fuel, the F-105s made a hurried attack on the bridge and

missed it.

Navy planes flew on 17 December. Four A-1Hs escorted by

eight F-4Bs conducted armed reconnaissance of Routes 11

and 12, with the Ban Boung Bau road bridge as the alternative

target. The aircraft failed to damage the bridge but destroyed

eight buildings. The next mission sent four F-100s of the

428th Tactical Fighter Squadron along Route 8 on 21

December 1964. Lightly armed, the fighters became

disoriented after receiving heavy antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

fire, ran low on fuel, and failed to find any secondary target.5

Reports on the first two USAF missions disturbed Gen Curtis

E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff. He sent word to Maj Gen

Joseph Moore, 2d Air Division Commander, that he expected

better performance.

To prepare for a fourth mission, the 44th TFS deployed six

F-105s from Okinawa to Da Nang. Four of them reconnoitered

Route 23 on 25 December 1964, with a strike against the

military barracks at Tchepone, Laos. The operation went well,

though the bombing was inaccurate. During a fifth mission on

30 December, four Navy A-1Hs struck the Tchepone military

camp.6

On 13 January 1965, the target was the Ban Ken bridge, the

most important potential target on Route 7. Aerial photos

showed 34 antiaircraft guns (37 mm and 57 mm) in place. The

planners scheduled an RF-101 as pathfinder and a second for

bomb damage assessment, eight Super Sabres to carry cluster

munitions for flak suppression and 16 Thunderchiefs from the

44th and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons as strike aircraft.

The Sabres flew at low levels to knock the gun sites out with

cluster bombs, then eight Thunderchiefs attacked the bridge

with 750-pound bombs. This was followed by another eight

Thunderchiefs, each loaded with six bombs and two Bullpup

air-to-ground missiles. An Air America C-123 served as

airborne control for rescue helicopters.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

168
The F-100s pummeled the gun positions, but some

continued firing anyway. The first wave of F-105s cut the

bridge with their 64 bombs. The F-100s and the second wave

of F-105s made multiple runs on the gun sites; one

Thunderchief was downed, an F-100 on its fifth pass was shot

down, and four other aircraft were damaged. General Moore

said the losses were due to poor judgment and suggested that

the attackers should have broken off the engagement after the

bridge was knocked out.7

Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder

On 24 January 1965, Moore advised Gen William C.

Westmoreland that the fastest way to bolster airpower was to

make full use of the Air Force resources that were available.

Moore believed that jets should be used to fly missions in

South Vietnam, that the requirement to carry a Vietnamese

observer on operational missions should be dropped, and that

helicopters should be removed from air bases to allow an

expansion of facilities.8

The Joint Chiefs approved using jets in strike roles in South

Vietnam if these strikes could not be carried out by

Vietnamese A-1s. According to this formula, jet strikes were

authorized solely to save American lives or to spoil Vietcong

attacks—and then only if a corps commander, the Vietnamese

Joint General Staff, and MACV thought the action necessary.9

On 7 February 1965, Vietcong mortar squads and

demolition teams attacked the small US advisory detachment

in II corps, four and one-half miles north of Pleiku. They also

struck Camp Holloway, headquarters of the US Army 52d

Aviation Battalion (also near Pleiku). The assaults killed eight

Americans and wounded 104, destroyed five Army helicopters

and two transports, three USAF O-1s, and one Vietnamese

O-1. Moreover, the attacks damaged the main building of the

advisory detachment.10

President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered an instant response

and, that afternoon, US Navy, South Vietnamese, and USAF

planes hit an enemy military barracks near Dong Hoi in an

operation called Flaming Dart. At the same time, Pacific Air

Force (PACAF) air transports lifted US Marine Corps light

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

169
antiaircraft missile units from Okinawa to Da Nang and

evacuated US dependents from South Vietnam.11 On 13

February 1965, Johnson approved measured and limited air

attacks in North Vietnam; but the Rolling Thunder air

campaign was delayed for two weeks by bad weather and

political turmoil in Saigon.12

Rolling Thunder was the first of two major American

campaigns against North Vietnam. It ran from 13 February 1965

until 31 October 1968, at which time President Johnson

imposed a total bombing halt in the North. While Rolling

Thunder brought devastation closer to Hanoi, and raised the

cost of supporting and supplying the insurgency in the South,

critics held that it did not always roll and was not consistently

thunderous.

The rules about which targets could be attacked were

constantly changing. For a time, decisions as routine as the

ordnance to be carried on a mission were made from as far

away as the White House. For most of the three and one-half

years of the campaign, it was permissible to engage the

enemy’s growing MiG force in the air but MiGs could not be

attacked on the ground. And, even in the air, North

Vietnamese fighter commanders often seemed to outthink and

outfight their American counterparts.

The enemy had the advantage of fighting over his home

ground, often in poor weather (which favored the defender)—at

least during the April-to-October monsoon season. He was

backed by a staggering array of radar-directed AAA and

surface-to-air missiles supplied by the Soviets.

In the south, tactics were devised to make best use of

ground-to-air communications and of FACs flying O-1s and

O-2s to identify, pinpoint, and mark targets such as Vietcong

troop concentrations. Combat jet aircraft exposed themselves

to small arms, 37 mm cannon fire, and shoulder-mounted

SAMs. Fighter pilots sometimes returned from missions not

knowing what had been hit. The struggle in the south was

bitter and difficult, but no MiGs challenged US command of

the air in the south.13

The employment of jets marked the end of the long US

advisory phase and the beginning of direct and open American

action in the Vietnam war. On 1 March 1965, the new

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

170
commander in chief of the Vietnamese armed forces, Maj Gen

Tran Van Minh, established the Vietnamese Air Force air request

network as the primary source of immediate air support for all

military operations. He further removed the restriction that only

a Vietnamese FAC could mark targets for air strikes.14

Commando Sabre

Stiffening enemy defenses in the panhandle of North

Vietnam and southern Laos made it extremely dangerous for

the “slow mover” FACs. On 17 May 1967, therefore, Seventh

Air Force Commander, William W. Momyer approved

Operation Commando Sabre—a test of the F-100F’s ability to

fly armed reconnaissance and FAC missions.15

Several features favored the F-100F. Good speed and

maneuverability helped it survive in high-threat areas. The jet

was equipped with two rocket launchers for target marking

and a 20 mm cannon that was well suited for armed

reconnaissance. External fuel tanks (and in-flight refueling)

stretched operating time and, finally, the view from both front

and back seats was fairly good.

F-100 “Misty”

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

171
The Commando Sabre mission (call-sign Misty) was

assigned to Detachment 1 of the 416th TFS, 37th Tactical

Fighter Wing, at Phu Cat Air Base, Vietnam, on 28 June 1967.

Seventh Air Force furnished the detachment with liberal

guidelines and authority to freely experiment.16 Misty FAC

volunteers had to be flight leaders with at least one hundred

strike missions in Southeast Asia and one thousand total

flying hours. The initial duty tour was 120 days or 75

missions, whichever came first. Twelve of the first 16

volunteers from F-100 units in South Vietnam lacked

controller experience. The remaining four (fighter-qualified

controllers from the 504th Tactical Air Support Group) would

instruct the others, using F-100Fs borrowed from in-country

fighter squadrons.17

Training

Initially, the Misty volunteers practiced air refueling and

operating at various airspeeds and altitudes.18 Next, they

learned how to locate gun emplacements, bunkers,

camouflaged trucks, and trails. Instruction in FAC

communications, visual reconnaissance procedures, and

strike control followed. The Misty controllers discovered that

the F-100F’s greater speed dictated adjustments in procedures

because they had less time to locate targets. The jet FAC had

to do in seconds what the O-1 or O-2 FAC would take a

minute to complete.

Two days of ground training included the rules of

engagement, escape and evasion, map-reading, tactics, and

enemy order of battle. The Misty volunteers flew the first six

missions as observers while the instructors in the front seat

went through FAC procedures. The students alternated

between front and rear seats until the twelfth mission, when

they received their flight check. Full qualification was obtained

after 20 sorties.19

Tactics

Except for deviations dictated by greater speed, jet

reconnaissance and strike control tactics were the same as

the slow tactics. The Misty FAC set a minimum of 4,500 feet

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

172
in high-threat areas, descending lower solely to investigate

suspicious targets.20 He preferred to fly at 540 MPH (450

knots indicated air-speed [KIAS]) or above—seldom under 450

MPH (400 KIAS). Whenever cloud cover fell below seven

thousand feet, the Misty discontinued reconnaissance and

strike control because his silhouette against the clouds aided

enemy gunners. Unless absolutely necessary, the controller

never made more than a single pass over a potential target.

Nor did he go in immediately after a strike to perform battle

damage assessment; he returned later for that purpose.21

As the only FACs who could survive in certain hostile areas,

the Misties stressed reconnaissance over strike control.

Having found it difficult to locate jungle roads and trails from

4,500 feet, they secured permission to “recon” at 1,500 feet. In

rare instances, they also flew below hilltop level and into

valleys to identify targets.

In reconnoitering roads and trails, the FAC generally flew a

series of “S” maneuvers back and forth across the road—never

presenting a predictable pattern. Upon spotting something

suspicious, he continued on until he was out of range. He then

turned in a wide circle, dropped as low as possible, and came

back at right angles to the road.22 Even when flying low, the

controller had difficulty finding well-camouflaged trucks. The

infiltration routes contained numerous points where vehicles

could hide under trees. In fact, a truck could move down the

entire length of the Ho Chi Minh trail and never be detected

unless something went wrong—a breakdown in an open area,

poor camouflage, or traveling at the wrong time of day.

Once the Misty FAC located a target, he called for a slow

FAC to come in. If enemy defenses were too strong for the slow

FAC, the Misty controlled the air strike. He contacted the

fighters and furnished them the rendezvous point. Join-up

usually occurred above twenty thousand feet. After discussing

target information and tactics, the FAC helped the fighter

pilots locate the target. He then marked it, firing an extra

rocket at each end of the target area. Since marker-rocket

motors differed in performance and there were sudden shifts

in F-100F airspeed, the Misty often launched several rockets,

using the closest one as the reference for directing air strikes.

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When the fighters had completed their passes, the controller

let the area “cool off” before going in to assess bomb damage.23

Effectiveness and Expansion

Misties met with little opposition during their first weeks of

operation, but this “honeymoon” ended abruptly on 5 July

1967. A FAC drew heavy fire while directing a flight of F-105s

against truck traffic in the North Vietnamese panhandle near

Quang Khe (close to the coast in Route Package I). Antiaircraft

artillery fire became common after that.24 Nevertheless, the

Misties fared better than expected. In July 1967, they flew 82

missions and directed 126 strikes against targets that

stemmed almost exclusively from their own reconnaissance.

They discovered 150 truck parks, bridges, fords, and spots

suitable for road interdiction25 in hostile areas where most

other FAC aircraft could not go. The results grew more

impressive as the fast FACs sharpened their ability to locate

targets.

Commando Sabre FACs first tasted large-scale action in

September and October 1967. All through the summer, the

North Vietnamese had pounded positions at Con Thien, Gia

Linh, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha with artillery barrages from

across the DMZ. To blunt these attacks, a six-week campaign

called Operation Neutralize started on 12 September.26 O-2A

FACs controlled air strikes south of the DMZ while the Misties

worked north of it.27 Operation Neutralize statistics showed

that strikes flown by fighters under Misty control were twice as

effective as those flown without them.28 General Momyer was

impressed with the Commando Sabre operation. On 13

November 1967, he extended it into the Steel Tiger area of

Laos—an area that was too deadly for slow FACs.29

Steel Tiger

When Momyer ordered Commando Sabre into Steel Tiger,

his staff weighed the pros and cons of moving the Misty

detachment from Phu Cat to Da Nang. Flying out of Da Nang

would increase the time for the Misties to operate in their

assigned area by 45–50 minutes. In addition, they could

receive up-to-date intelligence from the 366th Tactical Fighter

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Wing there. This contrasted with the stale intelligence

(36-hours old) at Phu Cat, which impelled the Misties to lean

heavily on their own reconnaissance. Moreover, Misty FACs

could coordinate more easily with the fighter crews at Da

Nang, who flew out-country strikes. Despite these advantages,

however, Seventh Air Force took no action at this time. It did

move the detachment later— in May 1969—but to Tuy Hoa,

not Da Nang.30

The Misties found the AAA fire lighter in their Laotian

operating areas than over southern North Vietnam. They

therefore “reconned” at 1,500 feet and went down to five

hundred feet in some areas. Area Echo in Steel Tiger, adjacent

to the North Vietnamese border, contained the Ho Chi Minh

trail’s two major passes—Mu Gia and Ben Karai. The Misties

concentrated on the roads leading away from these passes.31

Starting 1 July 1968, the Misties engaged in Operation Thor, a

one-week rerun of Operation Neutralize. On 14 July, they joined

in a 30-day US effort to stop supplies from flowing through

Route Package I. The Misties concentrated the fighter strikes

against roads that, if plugged, would impede the movement of

supplies. Misty reconnaissance and strike control helped to slow

daytime truck traffic in southern North Vietnam to a trickle. But

the enemy worked furiously at night to open the roads, and the

chokepoints had to be hit repeatedly.32

On 7 March 1968, Misty FACs discovered an active SAM site

in the southern portion of North Vietnam. They controlled 14

strike flights while being fired upon by numerous AAA guns,

and they successfully avoided one SAM launch. Smoke and

devastation made it impossible to determine how many SAM

positions were destroyed. Bomb damage assessment (BDA)

included one 57 mm AAA site silenced, two SAMs and two

SAM transporters destroyed, three pieces of SAM support

equipment destroyed or damaged, 36 trucks destroyed or

damaged, 16 secondary explosions, and seven fires.

Two weeks later, a Misty crew discovered a convoy of 150 to

175 trucks that were unexpectedly “uncovered” as a result of

improved weather conditions. These trucks were lined up

bumper-to-bumper on a hilly secondary road in the northern

portion of Route Package I. The Misty FACs stopped the

convoy by damaging the lead trucks with strafing passes and

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marking rockets while calling for strike aircraft. Controlled by

four Misties, strike aircraft destroyed or damaged 79 trucks.33

The first of five successful rescue combat air patrols

(RESCAP) that were controlled by Misty crews was flown in

June. During the late afternoon of 8 June, an F-105

Thunderchief was downed by AAA south of Dong Hoi. The pilot

ejected in a heavily defended area but managed to evade North

Vietnamese soldiers while unsuccessful attempts were made

to rescue him that afternoon. The following morning, Misty

crews reinstated the RESCAP and directed strikes against the

many active AAA sites. An F-4C was hit by AAA and the crew

ejected over the Gulf of Tonkin, where they were picked up by

helicopter. By late afternoon, threatening AAA sites had been

either destroyed or silenced and a rescue helicopter had

picked up the downed pilot.34

Night Operations

While planning the RESCAP operation, Seventh Air Force

decided to evaluate the F-100F in a night role. On 11 June 1968,

two veteran Commando Sabre pilots from the 3d TFW were

selected to conduct the test from Bien Hoa—Capts Donald W.

Sheppard and James E. Risinger. These pilots flew one night

mission on 13 June and another the next night. Impressed with

the aircraft’s potential for night reconnaissance, they

recommended further testing. Accordingly, Seventh Air Force

planned to operate at night in Route Package I. For illumination,

the SUU-25 flare dispenser with eight flares was fitted to the

F-100F.

The Misties flew 46 night sorties in Route Package I between

12 July and 18 August. The FACs discovered that the enemy

liked to travel during moonless nights and in bad weather.

Massed in hidden parks along the highways, his trucks did

not move until after dark. They would push through Route

Package I the first night and converge at staging areas where

they would spread out under the thick jungle overhang and

try to make it into Laos the second night. To counter attacks

on choke points, the communists waited until a major

movement was ready. And even then, they opened only

essential roads.

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176
Misty night controllers also discovered the mystery of a

missing bridge. Route 101 crossed the Song Troc River at

Phoung Choy, a major bottleneck 21 miles northwest of Dong

Hoi. Day reconnaissance showed no bridge spanning the river at

this point; nevertheless, trucks were seen rolling down the

highway. The puzzle was solved one night when a Misty FAC

saw the North Vietnamese float a huge pontoon bridge from a

cave several thousand yards away and place it across the river.

The Misties also learned that they could scarcely see the

soft-glowing blue headlights of enemy trucks from above five

thousand feet.35

Seventh Air Force stopped jet night FAC activity in Route

Package I on 16 October 1968; problems had begun to outweigh

achievements. Even under flarelight, it was extremely difficult to

detect the smoke of marker rockets. Moreover, flares could not

be accurately aimed and their light eliminated the element of

surprise. Also, the F-100F Super Sabre carried too few flares.

Further, the F-100F’s navigation systems (TACAN/ADF) had

proved unreliable below ten thousand feet in Laos and North

Vietnam. (The FAC frequently had to rely on pilotage36 for

orientation, rendezvous, and target location.)37

Other elements also figured in the decision to discontinue jet

night FAC activity. The chance of midair collision increased

during darkness and the Misty controller had to clear strike

aircraft into the target area one at a time. Because the FAC

needed to fly higher for safety, the quality of his reconnaissance

suffered. Further, the starlight scope was bulky and unwieldy,

its operation was disturbed by the cockpit lighting, and its

narrow field of vision disoriented the operator. A final factor

contributing to the decision was that the use of the F-100Fs for

night FAC duty limited their day activity.38

On 30 November 1968, Seventh Air Force opened up Steel

Tiger to Commando Sabre operations and began Misty night

operations over Laos. There was a compelling need for

around-the-clock coverage of the enemy’s road network. The

Misties would fly night missions only when ground fire grew

too intense for the slower FAC aircraft. Along with ABCCC

control and radar flight-following, they required an approved

working altitude, ranging from ground level to twelve

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177
thousand feet.39 All these conditions could not be met,

however, and the Misties flew on waivers.

On 19 February 1969, Misty operations in Laos became a

twilight affair. The first of two sorties took off one hour before

sunrise; the second, one hour after sunset. Keeping to a

minimum altitude of three thousand feet, the Misty FACs used

flares and the starlight scope; they employed minimum

maneuvering.40 Twilight operations ended in December 1969,

owing largely to a shortage of jet aircraft.41

Coordination with Slow Movers

Jet and slow-mover FACs cooperated because they often

worked in the same areas. Each kept track of the other by

constant radio contact. Since the jet’s speed allowed only a

swift glance at suspected targets, he turned to the slow mover

for closer inspection. Similarly, when the slow mover

encountered heavy AAA fire, he called the “fast FAC.”

Enlarging the Commando Sabre Role

Commando Sabre lent itself easily to auxiliary roles: search

and rescue, artillery spotting, weather reconnaissance,

hunter-killer, and photo reconnaissance.

Search and Rescue. About 25 percent of the first 93 Misty

FACs were shot down at some time, but most were recovered.

Commando Sabre’s efforts to aid downed jet FACs led to a

deeper involvement in search and rescue (SAR). Upon

receiving word of a lost aircraft, the ABCCC called for Misty

help. A Misty controller then searched for the missing crew

members. After locating them, he would occupy the enemy

with machine gun and rocket fire while the rescue helicopter

picked up the airmen, staying on the scene until the rescue

was concluded.42

Artillery Spotting. Before 1967, slow-mover FACs in South

Vietnam had done much artillery spotting and fire control for

the Army. From 1967 onward, however, an increase in Navy

offshore shelling of coastal targets in North Vietnam fueled the

need for artillery adjustments. This job fell to the Misties,

since the area was too dangerous for slow-movers. Hence, a

few days before Operation Sea Dragon began on 1 June 1968,

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several Commando Sabre pilots visited the cruiser SS Saint

Paul to discuss their support. As Sea Dragon unfolded, Air

Force-Navy coordination went very well and Misty controllers

adjusted artillery fire with accuracy. Their Sea Dragon exploits

behind them, Misty FACs found themselves in much demand

by the Navy for artillery spotting.43

Weather Reconnaissance. Weather played a key part in the

success of tactical air operations. When a target was under the

influence of bad weather, the strike was aborted unless the

aircraft had all-weather equipment or was under control of

ground radar. Seventh Air Force required FACs to keep an

almost continual watch over weather conditions in the target

areas, and the Misties proved very adept at weather

reconnaissance. This was largely due to their high speed, which

allowed them to experience the target area weather just as the

fighters would. Misty controllers filed weather reports routinely,

along with mission reports. If faster action was dictated, they

called in the report while en route to home base.44

Hunter-Killer Teams. The Air Force had first tried the

hunter-killer concept in the Korean War. Its debut in

Southeast Asia linked a slow-mover FAC with a fighter.

Greater exploitation came later, with the jet FAC. During April

1969, hunter-killer teams of Misties and F-100 fighterbombers from Phu Cat flew test missions in the Laotian

panhandle. The results outran expectations.45

Hunter-killer teams operated only with Seventh Air Force and

Royal Laotian Government approval, and only in areas free of

friendly troops. During a typical mission, the Misty “hunter”

rendezvoused with the strike aircraft and flew to a

reconnaissance area. The “killer” jet trailed three miles behind

and five thousand to seven thousand feet above the FAC, who

kept a running commentary on his position. If the strike aircraft

lost sight, the FAC turned on his lights or lit his afterburner.

Once the hunter pinpointed targets, he flew the marking pass

and the “killer” pilot attacked. The hunter-killer team worked

best when the “killer” pilot was a former jet FAC; he knew Misty

tactics, the area, and the names of reference points.

A common problem for the hunter-killer team was the

struggle of the ordnance-laden “killer” aircraft to keep up with

the Misty. The killer pilot generally flew at higher altitudes

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where the thinner air permitted greater airspeed. Looking

down, however, he had difficulty seeing the hunter aircraft

whose camouflage blended with the landscape beneath. Bad

weather and the hunter’s constant maneuvering to confuse

the enemy compounded the identification problem.46

Nevertheless, Seventh Air Force enthusiastically endorsed the

hunter-killer team as one of the best means for catching the

enemy by surprise.

Photo Reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance crept into

Misty operations when the rear-seat pilot started taking

pictures of selected targets with a hand-held camera.

However, the cramped cockpit made it hard to maneuver the

camera for good coverage.47 In the summer of 1969, the

Misties engaged in a photo experiment with RF-4Cs (call sign

Yo-Yo) of the 460th tactical reconnaissance wing at Tan Son

Nhut. The Misty FAC located targets and the RF-4C

photographed them and rushed the film back for processing.

This experiment did not work as hoped, chiefly because Misty

units and Yo-Yo units were located on separate bases—an

arrangement that precluded effective coordination. In

addition, the photo results were filtered through three distinct

intelligence channels before arriving at Seventh Air Force

Headquarters for analysis.

Meanwhile, the Misties modified a specially built camera

fitted with a pistol grip and a plug for an electrical connection.

This allowed the rear-seat pilot to take quality pictures. In

fact, this “armpit” camera secured the first clear photos of the

water route over which the enemy floated petroleum-filled

pigskins from the DMZ to Tchepone.

48

Phasing Out

When the Commando Sabre program was started in 1967,

plans already existed to phase out the F-100 by 1970. Seventh

Air Force therefore framed plans early in 1968 for an F-4

fast-FAC program.49 Several problems dogged the Misty

operations. The F-100F lacked a radar-warning receiver that

would detect imminent SAM or AAA attacks, and it lacked

electronic countermeasure pods to counter them. The Misty

FAC sensed no danger until alerted by the ABCCC, ground

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180
radar, or other aircraft. Even then, he was in no position to

direct strikes against the SAM/AAA sites unless he could see

them.50 In addition, the underpowered F-100F was vulnerable

to ground fire during evasive maneuvers.51 Perhaps the

greatest limitation, however, was the insufficient number of

aircraft on hand. The Misties scarcely knew daily how many

F-100Fs they could muster, since the number varied with

fighter training demands.52

Despite these drawbacks, Commando Sabre underlined the

worth of the jet FAC and forged the basic tactics that were

carried over to F-4 FAC operations. On 14 May 1970, when the

last Misty mission flew, the F-4 program was well underway.

F-4 “Phantom” FACs

On 1 January 1968, Seventh Air Force received

authorization to try the F-4 Phantom in a FAC role. The 12th

Tactical Fighter Wing readied an F-4D for testing in Steel Tiger

and Route Package I. The test aircraft carried two 370-gallon

external fuel tanks, two rocket launchers, and a 20 mm gun

pod. A Misty FAC rode in the Phantom’s rear seat during the

test. By 20 March, 10 missions had been completed. Though

impressed with the overall F-4D performance, the Misty FACs

F-4D

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noted several shortcomings. The engine intakes obstructed the

view from the back seat; a 60-degree bank was required to

restore it. More air refueling was required for the F-4D to

remain on-station as long as the F-100F—and the F-4D had a

lower turn rate and a larger turn radius than the F-100F.

Also, the F-4D was a bigger target and its twin J-79 engines

provided a smoke trail for enemy gunners.

Still, the pluses of the F-4D outweighed the minuses. Two

engines allowed an airspeed of 400-450 knots to be

maintained, reducing the chances of being shot down.

Navigation aids and radar warning equipment were superior,

and it was equipped with an airborne intercept radar for

in-flight refueling rendezvous. In addition to regular FAC

armament, the aircraft could carry a wide variety of ordnance.

Lastly, it was located with the F-4 strike aircraft it

controlled.53

Before settling on the F-4D as a controller, Seventh Air

Force evaluated the F-105F “Thunderchief” (Wild Weasel) in

June 1968; it was unsatisfactory in the FAC role. The view

from its rear seat was extremely poor, it maneuvered

marginally whenever airspeed slipped below four hundred

knots, and it burned too much fuel. Furthermore, exposing

the F-105F, a costly and limited resource, to increased ground

fire in the FAC role could not be justified. General Momyer

therefore directed that “a couple of F-4s from the 366th” (at

Da Nang) be used to start a program.54

Stormy FACs

The 366th Tactical Fighter Wing and the Misty FACs had

the F-4 controller program readied by 12 August 1968.

Student pilots assigned to it were volunteers of flight-leader

caliber with at least 20 combat missions in Route Package I

and not less than nine months remaining to serve in-theater.

Duty tour with the 366th detachment (call-sign Stormy) was

90 days or 50 missions—later rising to 125 days or 75

missions. The first two volunteers, F-4 aircraft commanders,

flew five sorties from Phu Cat in the rear seat of the F-100F.

They then occupied the front cockpit of the F-4 on three

missions with a Misty instructor in the back seat, completing

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182
training on 26 August. On 2 September, they flew their

maiden FAC missions in Route Package I.55

Stormy operations resembled those of Commando Sabre;56

but Stormy FACs were collocated with their strike units,

which allowed them to receive their intelligence firsthand. The

Stormies flew two sorties per day, performing reconnaissance

at 4,000-4,500 feet and at 400-knot minimum airspeed. To

assess bomb damage, they made a single pass at five

thousand feet and five hundred knots.57

The unceasing demand for night surveillance of enemy

roads and trails swayed Seventh Air Force to conduct a

Stormy night experiment in Laos. Beginning on 24 October

1968, F-4Ds flew one sortie each night. Enthusiastic

controllers pushed for more, but Seventh doubted the

program’s soundness because moonless or cloudless nights

severely hampered reconnaissance. In addition, when trucks

on the ground turned off their lights, the Stormies had

difficulty finding them again. To Seventh, armed night

reconnaissance seemed preferable since targets could be hit at

once. Safety was a gnawing concern as well, because the

blacked-out strike aircraft and the Stormies risked colliding

(of the first eight night sorties the Stormies flew, six

near-misses occurred). Also, the Stormies’ day/night schedule

sliced deeply into FAC training time. These concerns led

Seventh Air Force to halt the Stormy night program

temporarily.58

In April 1969, night Stormy operations were resumed in

Laos. This time, the Stormies flew two sorties a night. They

used the starlight scope, and they received flare support from

C-123 “Candlesticks” and C-130 “Blindbats.” Day tactics

governed, but the FAC kept his dive angle on marking passes

to no steeper than 30 degrees.

The Stormy operation changed with experience. In May

1969, the sortie rate climbed to three per day and the number

of FAC pilots grew to ten. The small F-4D detachment moved

directly under the 366th Wing’s Deputy Commander of

Operations (DO) in July, improving coordination with the

fighter squadrons in the wing.59 Like the Misties, the F-4Ds

worked with the RF-4Cs of the 460th Wing and were affected

by the same spotty coordination and slow film-processing.60

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The Stormies handled strike control for tactical fighters

supporting the 1970 incursion into Cambodia and continued

to shoulder the bulk of the FAC load there.61

Wolf FACs

Other F-4 units became interested in the stormy operation.

Early in October 1968, Capt Richard G. Mayo (a Stormy FAC)

briefed wing operations officers of Seventh Air Force at

Bangkok, Thailand. As a result, Col Slade Nash, Eighth

Tactical Fighter Wing DO, requested permission to employ an

F-4D FAC element in his wing. He assured Seventh Air Force

the aircraft were available and could be used without straining

other missions. He received authorization on 26 October.62

In the Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing, the F-4 FAC Section

(called Wolf) worked directly for the DO with a status

comparable to the wing fighter squadrons. To ensure a smooth

flow of information, the Wolf office was located in the

Intelligence Division. Maj Benjamin R. Battle, the first Wolf

commander, handpicked every pilot for the initial program.

The first five Wolf crews, volunteers from all the fighter

squadrons, represented a cross-section of experience.63 All

pilots had at least three months of out-country combat

experience, came highly recommended by their commanders,

and were approved by the DO.64

Training began on 12 November 1968. By month’s end, five

crews were qualified. Each crew member flew 10 sorties in the

F-4. Two were in the backseat behind Major Battle (or his

operations officer), the remainder in the front seat with an

instructor in the rear cockpit. The Wolf controllers received

night orientation flights in the O-2A and the C-130 Blind Bat.

To take advantage of this new fast-FAC concept, the Eighth

TFW hosted a “FAC-IN” on November 25-26 to exchange ideas

and information and to standardize procedures. Misty (F-100),

Stormy (F-4D), Covey (O-1), Nail (O-2), Snort (OV-10) and

Blind Bat (C-130) FACs were represented. Many ideas and

recommendations to improve mission effectiveness were

discussed, and problems affecting FAC operations were

forwarded to higher headquarters.65

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In December 1968, Wolves started flying day missions of

three and one-half hours in Steel Tiger. The first crew arrived

early in the afternoon; the second, two hours later. Seventh Air

Force authorized a third sortie in January 1969 to spread

the patrol into the early evening hours.66

The communists felt the jet FACs’ sting and replied with

stepped-up ground fire. Flying below five thousand feet

quickly became hazardous and fatiguing. The jet controller

maneuvered constantly during visual reconnaissance. He

invited battle damage if he stayed below four thousand feet

very long, doubled back to circle a target, slowed down, or flew

a predictable pattern for more than 10 seconds. Wolf FACs

were accordingly advised to do visual reconnaissance during

their first 45 minutes in the area (when they were fresh), then

mix the remaining time with reconnaissance and strike

control.

Col Dave Yates, former Wolf and Tiger FAC, describes the

life of a Forward Air Controller in the Vietnam war:

The advantage we had (over the F-100 and the A-4) was power; we had

a lot of it in the F-4—and two people. Two people was a tremendous

advantage when you had to write down all the data of an air strike,

sometimes on the side of your canopy in grease pencil.

When I got to Wolf ‘FACing,’ in a much larger area, [I found that] you

were not considered experienced until you had 60 missions. We flew

with an old head with over 60 missions on our first 40 missions. We

worked four or five different areas. When the war opened up, in the

last five months of my tour, we carried maps for northern Laos, MRI,

Packs I through IV, and even Pack VI. The hottest place we went to

was Military Region I after the North raided South Vietnam, north of

Da Nang to the DMZ. The heavy SAMs, the AAA fire, and the SA-7s we

encountered were the heaviest I had ever seen.

In the last four months of my tour, we lost five Wolf crews of the seven

we had. There was no “exposure” rule at Ubon, and I got hit four days

straight and was counseled for “bad form.” I was shot down on my

37th mission as a Tiger (on 6 May 1970) and was one of the reasons

Korat had the rule about being over-exposed (three hits or 40 missions

and you were out). The statistics, for Wolfs at least, were [that] you had

an 85 percent chance of being shot down in 100 missions.

A Wolf mission started at 3 a.m., takeoff at 7 a.m., and flew four or

five hours. Then we spent two hours to debrief and then developed

targets for the next day. We arranged the schedule so you flew the

next later mission each day. You flew the 7 a.m. takeoff one day, the

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185
next day you flew the 10 a.m. takeoff. We took off at three-hour

intervals throughout the day. You would go through that schedule

until you covered the whole day and then start the cycle again after a

day off. A work day was 14-16 hours, so the day off was a pretty quick

drunk, then sleep.67

The soaring demand for Wolf controllers forced the fighter

crews to orbit longer, waiting for the FAC to be brought in. To

ease this delay, Seventh Air Force let strike aircraft be their

own FACs in areas of the eastern Laotian panhandle that were

free of friendlies. However, the Wolf FAC still made sure the

target was positively identified and enemy defenses

pinpointed. A review of attack procedures followed and the

strike leader took charge. This freed the Wolf FACs for extra

reconnaissance and strike control.68

Targets for all-weather strikes were selected from

reconnaissance during good weather; the groundwork for

bad-weather strikes was laid by a series of missions run while

the weather was good. The radar site at Hue Phu Bai plotted

fighter flight paths and the pilot verified his position. When the

weather turned bad, flights under this radar control could

strike these areas with a high degree of confidence. Good radar

coverage of Route Package I and parts of Laos as far north as

Mu Gia Pass was available. During the 1968–72 campaign,

long-range navigation (LORAN)69 became the preferred

technique for all-weather bombing in Laos and Route Package

I.70

LORAN techniques offered two advantages: the accuracy

was better than ground-directed radar, and a formation could

bomb at the same time as the leader for better bomb spacing.

A formation of four to eight aircraft could bomb with only one

or two Wolf aircraft having LORAN equipment. Thus, in bad

weather on 21 September 1971, using LORAN as a guide, one

hundred and ninety-six F-4s in two waves struck five targets

35 miles above the DMZ. More than two thousand 500-pound

bombs and three thousand cluster-bombs were dropped on

petroleum and logistical storage areas and military barracks.71

This strike was a significant advance in the use of large

numbers of fighters against targets that would normally not

have been struck due to bad weather. Seventh Air Force

reported excellent target coverage with major damage to the

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186
target area. This mission developed and confirmed the

all-weather techniques that were used against targets in Route

Package VI in 1972.

Tiger Forward Air Controllers

The success of the Misties, Stormies, and Wolves impressed

the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat AB, Thailand; in

January 1969, it sought approval to use some of its F-4Es as

FACs in Barrel Roll.

72 Wing intelligence pointed out that the

beefed-up enemy defenses had rendered a large part of that

area risky for the O-1 Raven controllers. After securing

Seventh Air Force’s approval in February for one FAC sortie a

day in Barrel Roll, the 388th gave its new venture the call-sign

“Tiger” and sent volunteers from its 469th TFS to Ubon to

check out with the Wolf FACs. By 19 March, the Tigers were in

operation.73

The Tiger FACs were the first jet controllers to see duty in

the Barrel Roll area of Laos. Their commander found that

being a member of the Barrel Roll Working Group 74 helped

cement good relations with the Raven FACs. Basing the Tigers

with the strike crews of the 388th Wing also smoothed

coordination. One F-4E feature proved a boon in Barrel

Roll—the inertial guidance system that automatically

determined the plane’s position. For example, when the sole

TACAN channel in Laos was lost with the fall of Lima Site 36

(northeast of the Plain of Jars) on 1 March 1969, Tiger visual

reconnaissance and strike control continued—even in

marginal weather. Moreover, the thrust and range of the F-4E

surpassed those of earlier F-4 models (and it carried an

internal cannon).75

The Tigers made their mark in March 1969 during

Operation Rain Dance when General Vang Pao’s forces went

on the offensive against communist troops on the Plain of

Jars. USAF and RLAF fighters attacked the roads and trails

leading into the Plain. Between 17 March and 7 April, the

Tigers flew two sorties per day on reconnaissance, strike

control, weather recce, and BDA missions.76

By July, the Tigers were so immersed in strike control that

they seldom did visual reconnaissance. To remedy this,

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187
Seventh Air Force hiked the sortie rate to four missions a day.

In October, the entire FAC program suffered when tanker

support was reduced. (It was restored three months later, in

January 1970.) Misties, Stormies, Wolves, and Tigers

continued directing air strikes, forcing the enemy to build

bypasses around closed portions of his roads. Such

achievement exacted its price—five F-4Es suffered heavy battle

damage from September to December 1969.77

Korat F-4s were the E models. The E was nose-heavy and you had to

fly fast, maybe 50-100 knots [faster] than in a D, to stay alive and not

dig-in during turns. The advantage of the F-4D was its turn capability

with the same power—and the airplane was lighter. But then you

strapped a gun-pod on, so you ended up with increased drag. There

were tradeoffs. There was a definite difference between doing

reconnaissance at 450 knots and 500 knots. I preferred the D.

In the Tiger tour, we worked a rather small area of Barrel Roll in

northern Laos. There were very few active routes and we were limited

away from slow-moving controlled areas where there were

troops-in-contact. This kept us in the heavy-shooting areas. We went

to the same areas every day, with a few incursions into other areas.

Occasionally, when we had a big mission, we would go into North

Vietnam ahead of everyone else to take a look around and mark

targets.

F-4E

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

188
You were permitted to use the gun as a Tiger FAC for two reasons:

troops-in-contact and a SAR effort. In fact, I was shot down in a

troops-in-contact situation while directing strikes of F-105s. We did

have a slow FAC working with us, and we never talked to anyone on

the ground. In SARs, we did talk to the survivors and put in strikes.

In the Tiger FAC program, we did a mixture of FAC and armed

reconnaissance missions. Along with our ability to work close to the

ground, find targets, and stay alive single-ships, we also had the

ability to shoot the gun, which happened to be the weapon of choice for

troops-in-contact and SARs. When you worked with someone and they

went down, the first thing they needed was to have the area around

them cleared. You would locate the downed crew and clear the area

with a couple of bursts and convince the enemy that the fighters

overhead were armed.78

Falcon/Laredo—FAC/Reconnaissance Teams

In February 1969, shortly after Seventh Air Force

authorized the Tiger program, the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn developed a significant fast FAC

concept. It called for an RF-4C to orbit an assigned area

searching for targets and photographing enemy positions.

Another fast FAC (F-4D) carried out visual reconnaissance at

the same time. When the controller spotted something

suspicious, he requested photo coverage from the RF-4C.

RF-4C

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189
The photo reconnaissance crew (call-sign Atlanta), upon

locating a lucrative target, called in the FAC to control strikes

against it. The scheme also included photo coverage of

FAC-directed attacks.79 The 432d Wing proposed the plan to

Seventh Air Force on 19 March 1969 and received quick

approval.80

The 432d TRW established the Falcon FAC unit at Udorn in

April, structured after the Wolfs at Ubon. The first five crews,

having received checkouts from Stormy and Misty controllers,

flew their maiden missions in Steel Tiger on 8 April.81 They

became the first jet FACs to work for a tactical reconnaissance

wing. They and the Atlanta photo recce crews formed a

close-knit team. A chief advantage for the Falcons was access

to fresh intelligence from rapidly developed photos.82

The Vulcan cannon on the RF-4C was replaced by a glass

nose enclosure that housed camera equipment. The “clothes

rack” on the top of the fuselage behind the rear cockpit

indicates that this RF-4C was also equipped with the ARN-92

long-range-navigation (LORAN) system.

A general operational pattern emerged from the first joint

Atlanta/Falcon mission on 26 April 1969. As soon as the

Atlanta RF-4C landed at Udorn, its film was speedily

processed and rushed to the Wing Intelligence Division for

evaluation and target selection. At a joint preflight briefing,

Falcon and Atlanta air crews pinpointed targets and discussed

surveillance tactics.83 Both aircraft took off together. The

Falcon headed for a tanker, the Atlanta to the target area for a

look at the weather. Upon receiving a weather briefing from

the Altanta crew, the Falcon FAC determined the sequence for

hitting the targets. The Atlanta took prestrike photos of the

first target and, as the fighters attacked, moved on to

photograph other targets. The photo recce crew then returned

to take poststrike pictures of the targets. If the mission was

mainly for visual reconnaissance, the Falcon FAC planned it

and the Atlanta crew flew as an escort.

The Atlanta/Falcon team yielded more strikes per sortie

than other jet controller programs. In fact, its BDA tripled

Seventh Air Force averages. This success rested largely on the

Atlanta’s picture-taking, which reduced visual reconnaissance

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

190
time. Hence, the Falcon FAC could concentrate on strike

control.84

The increase of enemy activity in Barrel Roll

(July-September 1969) swamped the Tiger controllers. They

asked for assistance from Atlanta/Falcon teams and the 432d

Wing replied with four sorties daily. Then, as the Laotian

government counteroffensive (About Face) gained momentum,

the Atlanta/Falcon effort centered in Barrel Roll. Two sorties a

day continued there, even after About Face was completed;

four sorties returned to Steel Tiger.85

Laredo FACs (F-4Es from the 432d TRW) developed a

variation of the Misty hunter-killer concept. Dubbed “Snare

Drum,” this operation employed formations of 16 to 20

fighter-bombers. In September 1969, Laredo controllers led

three of these special missions. The Air Attaché in Vientiane

reported that one of them (comprising 20 aircraft) decimated

one thousand enemy troops who were massed in the target

area.86

The Atlanta/Falcon teams found targets not detected before.

For example, their dawn-to-dusk coverage in Steel Tiger and

Barrel Roll uncovered 102 new targets in November 1969 and

another 172 the next month. The crews often risked going in

below four thousand feet—and, as a result, suffered 21 cases

of battle damage between October and December.87 Seventh

Air Force then ordered the FAC/Recce crews to remain above

4,500 feet—but they still located more targets than other FAC

units.

Night Owls

All jet FAC units had at one time or another tried night

programs with differing degrees of success. Nonetheless,

Seventh Air Force in October 1969 again opted for night FACs

to block enemy truck traffic at selected points along the roads

leading from the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. It therefore

established an F-4D controller unit (call-sign Night Owl) in the

8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon. These FACs led

fighter-bombers (loaded with laser-guided bombs) to the

chokepoints. They would remain in the area, dropping flares

and bringing in more air strikes to stop road repair teams.

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

191
Most Night Owls were equipped with a laser target designator

to provide laser illumination and guidance for five hundred-,

one thousand-, and two thousand-pound laser bombs.88

Night Owl operations began on 18 October after a four-night

test. The Night Owl aircraft carried two flare dispensers, three

rocket launchers, and three cluster bombs. The FAC

dispensed flares at random in an effort to deny the enemy an

opportunity for road repair.89

For the Owl FACs, the LORAN was a pretty effective way of finding

targets. When they ‘canceled’ fast-FACs but still wanted the mission

flown, they gave me a backseater that was not trained in FACing but

was an expert with a LORAN bird. He could find targets. He could get

to an area and he had all the numbers and data he needed, although

the LORAN botched up the back seat—he was not able to look forward

and see people [who were] shooting at us.90

The danger to the Night Owls outweighed any requirement

to slow road repair, however. The FACs could not work in

marginal weather or in the mountains. In the first month, two

F-4Ds crashed, with crews aboard, while making marking

passes during bad weather; moreover, the AAA fire intensified.

These and other dangers induced Seventh Air Force to

conclude the Night Owl operation in January 1970.91

From the first Misty sortie in July 1967, the jet FAC

program proved it could control strike aircraft in heavily

defended areas. By 1970, the program’s refinements included

hunter-killer teams, photo recce/FAC support, weather

reconnaissance, day and night operations, and artillery

spotting. At the same time, jet-FAC/strike pilot coordination

improved through briefings, conferences, and exchange

programs.92

Statistically, jet-FAC duty ranked among the most

hazardous in Southeast Asia—yet volunteers were always

available. Between July 1967 and July 1970, 42 jet-FAC

aircraft were shot down. This loss rate of 4.37 per one

thousand sorties far surpassed that for other flight duty.

Seventy percent of the losses took place below 4,500 feet,

where AAA fire was devastating (30 aircraft down). Jet-FAC

losses soared during the last six months of 1969 (14 planes)

and on through early 1970. Nevertheless, Seventh Air Force

deemed the program too vital to terminate.93

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

192
Fast-FAC Expansion

When air strikes against North Vietnam resumed in April

1972, the fast-FAC operation expanded significantly. The major

effort was directed against enemy lines of communication and

defensive positions in Route Package I. The operation compiled

an impressive record of bomb damage assessment between April

and November 1972, when a FAC conference produced

standardized pilot selection and training programs.

The conference also produced target priorities for the

renewed bombing campaigns, the two primary objectives being

interdiction of the enemy’s lines of communication and a “Gun

Kill” program designed to reduce the enemy’s defensive

capability to protect his roads. Of the 3,594 targets destroyed,

1,322 (37 percent) were fleeting targets (trucks, tanks, missile

transporters) whose mobile characteristics required immediate

strike. Eighteen percent of the targets destroyed and 25

percent of those damaged represented enemy defenses (SAM/

AAA/Heavy field guns for coastal defense). When only night

operations were considered, the results were even more

significant: Fleeting targets represented 64 percent of those

destroyed and 91 percent of those damaged. These figures rise

to 81 percent in the destroyed category and 100 percent in the

damaged category for fast-FAC-directed strikes.

Between April and November 1972, 24 USAF aircraft were lost

in Route Package I. Twelve of these losses were fast FACs—a

disproportionate number of losses. Losses due to AAA

represented over half of the total and nearly 67 percent of the

fast-FAC totals. (The fast-FACs experienced prolonged exposure

to AAA.)

The most significant changes in the renewed air offensive

involved the advent of the two-ship FAC operation and the Pave

Wolf concept of the Eighth TFW. The Pave Wolf program

equipped the fast-FAC with Paveway laser illuminator capability,

with which he could act as target illuminator for laser-guided

ordnance throughout his time on station. Paveway-equipped

aircraft were used on 30 to 50 percent of the Wolf FAC sorties.

Use of the laser produced a 50 percent BDA increase per sortie.

In addition, instant BDAs were made by the FAC laser

operators (the F-4 weapons systems officers [WSO]).

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

193
The fast-FAC mission was a key element in the employment

of tactical airpower in a conventional conflict. The conference

recommended that the fast-FAC program be retained after

Vietnam. Additionally, the conference recommended a formal

training course with the ultimate objective of maintaining two

or three trained and current FAC aircrews in each fighter

squadron.94 These suggestions were not followed after US

hostilities ended in early 1973; the fast-FAC concept went the

way of the FAC concept in general.

Forward Air Controller Comparison

There were several marked similarities between the

Fast-FAC Program in Vietnam and the Mosquito Operation in

Korea. In Korea, the function for which the airborne FAC was

initially conceived was strike control—matching

high-performance aircraft with fast-moving targets. To this

was added the responsibility for performing constant visual

reconnaissance over the entire front line. Because of poor

communications in Korea and no effective ABCCC capability,

the FAC was normally delegated the additional responsibility

of calling for strike aircraft for immediate CAS. Given these

three functions (visual reconnaissance, strike aircraft

procurement, and strike control), the airborne FAC became

the focal point of the tactical air control system. Because he

monitored all ground activity, discovered virtually every target,

and procured aircraft for all immediate CAS strikes, the

airborne FAC gave the TACS flexibility and accuracy.

The same could be said of the fast-FACs. They performed

the same functions, but against well-camouflaged and fleeting

targets. Jet-FACs also procured aircraft through the more

sophisticated ABCCC.

The Mosquito program’s success resulted from a fortuitous

set of circumstances. Initiative and a willingness to experiment

were characteristics of the Mosquito squadron’s original staff.

Their equipment was improper and inadequate, but they

found enough adaptable equipment to maintain the program.

Without the T-6, for example, the Mosquito program would

probably never have lasted. The same might be said of the

original Misty pilots and the F-100F aircraft.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

194
In Korea, General Partridge and his staff at Fifth Air Force

were enthusiastic about the program. They provided top-notch

personnel and equipment to the Mosquito squadron. General

Momyer and his staff at Seventh Air Force had a similar

enthusiasm for the Misty FAC program and, later, for

fast-FACs in general.

In Korea, the fact that there was a front line made possible

on immediate assessment of the effectiveness of the

Mosquito-controlled air strikes. Ground was gained if the air

strike was successful. This kind of analysis provided a graphic

demonstration of the Mosquitoes’ effectiveness. The absence of

a front line in Vietnam made assessment of combat

effectiveness more nebulous. One must develop inferences and

other means to evaluate the effectiveness of an interdiction

program in a high-threat environment. Nevertheless, judging

from fast-FAC BDA alone, the program must be considered a

success.

Fast-FAC operations proved the ability of jet-FACs to

accomplish the mission in a high-threat environment. One

reason for the success of fast-FAC operations was the fact that

aircrews performed reconnaissance on the same area daily.

Their familiarity with the roads and defenses proved

invaluable in locating concealed targets. Another reason for

success was the amount of time available in the interdiction

area. Because of fuel requirements, a heavily loaded aircraft

could not perform armed reconnaissance very long. The

F-100F did not consume fuel as rapidly as strike aircraft, but

F-4s consumed fuel rapidly at low altitude. Still, it was more

economical to refuel a single FAC aircraft than an entire flight

of strike aircraft.95

Both the Mosquito operation and the Fast-FAC program had

vital missions. The necessary organization, equipment, and

training were developed for both, enabling them to fulfill those

missions.

Notes

1. Tactical Air Command, Cost Effectiveness of Close Support Aircraft

(Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Va.: USAF, TAC, 1965), 2.

2. The F-5A flew its first strike in October 1965; the A-37 was introduced

in July 1967.

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

195
3. William W. Momyer, “Close Air Support Tactics and Techniques,”

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History [OAFH]), 139–41.

4. Myron W. Crowe, The Development of Close Air Support, thesis

(Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, June 1968), 45; O. D. Cunningham,

Close Air Support Aircraft, special study (Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command

and Staff College),16 May 1960. This 1960 study concluded that

high-performance aircraft were not best suited for the CAS mission.

5. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The

Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1981), 256–57.

6. Message, Second Air Division (2d AD) to 23d ABG, 24 December 1964

and to 80th tactical fighter squadron (TFS), 25 December 1964, and chief of

staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), to PACAF, 24 December 1964; Robert

T. Helmka and Beverly Hale, “USAF Operations from Thailand,” 1964–1965,

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 10 August 1966, 81–82.

7. Message, Detachment 2, 18th Fighter Tactical Wing, to 2d AD, 18

January 1965, 2d AD to PACAF, 17 January 1965, Thirteenth Air Force to

PACAF, 27 January 1965, and 2d AD to CSAF, 15 March 1965; Helmka and

Hale, 61–65, 123.

8. Message, 2d AD to PACAF, 28 January 1965.

9. Ibid., Joint Chief of Staff to commander-in-chief Pacific (CINCPAC), 27

January and 4 February1964; History of Second Air Division (2d AD),

January–June 1965 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1965), II, 29.

10. Report of Investigation, “Pleiku Incident,” by board of officers to

investigate incident at Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)

compound and Camp Holloway, Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 16

February 1965.

11. History, 2d AD, January–June 1965, 22–26.

12. Futrell, 266.

13. Robert F. Dorr, McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (London: Osprey

Publishing Limited, 1984), 54–55.

14. Monthly Evaluation Report, MACV, March 1965, annex B, OAFH, 23.

15. History of Commando Sabre Operations, April–June 1969

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH, 1969), vi.

16. Lt Col John Schlight, “Jet Forward Air Controllers in SEAsia

1967–1969,” Headquarters PACAF, project CHECO, 15 October 1969, 2–3,

10–11; Report, Seventh Air Force, “Commando Sabre Operations,” 31 July

1967.

17. Maj A. W. Thompson, “Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) in

SEA,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 22 January 1969, 41–44.

18. Schlight, 3–4.

19. Maj Merrill A. McPeak, Director/Plans, 31 tactical fighter wing (TFW),

interviewed by USAFHRA staff , 22–23 March 1971. McPeak was an F-100F

Misty FAC at Phu Cat, South Vietnam (20 December 1968–31 May 1969)

and Tuy Hoa, South Vietnam (1 June 1969–15 November 1969).

20. History of 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (Washington, D.C.: OAFH,

1967), 21; Schlight, 1967–69, 4.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

196
21. History, Commando Sabre, July–September 1967, 23.

22. July–September 1968, 14–23, January–March 1969, 12–13, April–

June 1969, 10.

23. History, Commando Sabre, October–December 1968, 16. The pilot

and pilot-observer of the F-100F learned to work well together. The

rear-seat observer did most of the searching during VR, plotting and

recording the targets sighted. Using the hand-held camera, he also snapped

pictures of permanent and semipermanent targets such as truck parks and

bridges. After both crew members verified potential targets, the rear-seater

requested strike aircraft from the ABCCC. The pilot handled the

rendezvous, marked the target, and controlled the strike while the

pilot-observer monitored. One man could do the entire job but two made

it a great deal easier.

24. Schlight, 6.

25. History, Commando Sabre, 31 July 1967; Schlight, 5.

26. Operation Neutralize: The Pattern is Set, Headquarters PACAF,

Project CHECO, June 1969, 1–2.

27. Schlight, 7–8.

28. Operation Neutralize, 20–21, 24–25, 34; Lt Col Herbert Brennan,

Assistant DCS/Operations, 366th TFW, interviewed by Warren A. Trest, 30

September 1967.

29. History, 35th TFW, October–December 1967, 1; History, Commando

Sabre, July–December 1968, vi.

30. One reason was that the 366th TFW had set up its own F-4 FAC

detachment (the Stormies) at Da Nang.

31. History, 37th TFW, October–December 1967,1, 15.

32. Schlight, 14, 15.

33. History, 37th TFW, January–March 1968, 20–21.

34. Col Stanley M. Mamlock, Use of the Jet Fighter Aircraft as a Forward

Air Control Vehicle in a Non-Permissive Environment, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air

War College study, April 1970, 62–63.

35. History, Commando Sabre, July–September 1968, 30–38; Capts

Donald W. Sheppard and James E. Risinger, 3d TFW, letter to

Director/Tiger Hound and Tally Ho Division, Seventh Air Force, subject:

Inflight Evaluation of PVS-3 Night Starlight Scope, 16 June 1968.

36. Navigation by reference to checkpoints.

37. Staff Summary Sheet, Seventh Air Force, “Misty Night Missions,”

September 1968; 37th TFW to Seventh Air Force, 14 December 1968, letter,

subject: “Commando Sabre Night Operations, October 1968.”

38. Night ground fire downed one Misty aircraft on 16 August and

another the next night. These losses influenced the decision to discontinue

night operations.

39. 37th TFW to Seventh Air Force, 1 October 1968, and 9 April 1969,

letter, subject: Special Operational Historical Report, 9 April 1969, 1–2.

40. History, 37th TFW, April 1969, 1–2, and Commando Sabre,

January–March 1969, 12, April–June 1969, 9, October–December 1969, 9.

THE FAST FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

197
41. History, Commando Sabre, January–March 1970, 7.

42. Lt Col Benjamin R. Battle, interviewed by USAFHRA staff, 8 April

1971. (Battle was the first Wolf FAC Commander, Eighth TFW, Ubon,

Thailand.

43. History, Commando Sabre, July–September 1968, 25–26; History,

37th TFW, October–December 1968, 19.

44. History, 37th TFW, October–December 1968, 18.

45. Schlight, 29–30.

46. History, 37th TFW, “Misty,” April–June 1969; Schlight, 32; McPeak,

interview.

47. Thompson, 44.

48. History, 366th TFW, July–September 1969, 20–22.

49. History, 31st TFW, April–June 1970, 37, 39; History, Commando

Sabre, 1 April–15 May 1970, 1, 6; Seventh Air Force Deputy

Commander/Operations to Seventh Air Force DCS/Plans, letter, subject:

Misty FAC Operational Requirement, 15 March 1968.

50. Schlight, 9; 37th TFW to Seventh Air Force, letter, subject:

Commando Sabre Operations, 12 August 1968.

51. History, Commando Sabre, 31 July 1967.

52. Col Heath Bottomly, memorandum to Gen Norman O. Sweat, Deputy

Director/Plans, Seventh Air Force, 5 January 1968.

53. TACLO Activity Report 17, 15 September 1968, 4–5; 366th TFW to

Seventh Air Force, letter, subject: End of Training Comments/

Recommendations of 366th TFW, 20 August 1968; 37th TFW to Seventh Air

Force, letter, subject: Report of FAC Training, 37th TFW, 20 August 1968.

54. Staff Summary Sheet Tactical Intelligence Division, Seventh Air

Force, “Increased FAC Sorties for Operation Thor,” 30 June 1968, OAFH;

Schlight, 23.

55. TACLO Activity Report 18, Seventh Air Force TAC et al., 16–30

September 1968; 366th TFW to Seventh Air Force, letter, 20 August 1968;

37th TFW to Seventh Air Force, letter, subject: Report of FAC Training, 37

TFW and 366 TFW, 26 August 1968; History, 366th TFW, July–September

1968, 20.

56. Each F-4D could carry two 370-gallon fuel tanks on its outboard

stations, an SUU-23 gun pod for the 6-barrel, 20 mm cannon on the

centerline, two LAU-59 rocket pods at the inboard stations, and a wing root

the point at which the wing joins the fuselage) camera. The pilot also carried

a 35 mm Pentax hand-held camera.

57. 366th TFW, OPlan 10-68, 15 September 1968, Project CHECO,

24–25.

58. Message, 366th TFW to Seventh Air Force, November 1968, subject:

Stormy Night Operations.

59. History, 366th TFW, April–June 1969, 21–27 and July–September

1969, 20.

60. History, 366th TFW, July–September 1969, 20–22.

61. Ibid., April–June 1970, 14, and July–September 1970, 27.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

198
62. End of Tour (EOT) Report, Col Charles C. Pattillo, commander,

Eighth TFW, July 1968–May 1969, and Col Slade Nash, Deputy

Commander/Operations and Vice Commander, Eighth TFW

(October–December 1968.

63. History, Eighth TFW, October–December 1968, I, 22.

64. Battle interview; Nash, EOT Report; History of the Eighth Tactical

Fighter Wing, October–December 1968 (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 22.

65. History, Eighth TFW, October–December 1968, vol. I, 23–24. The

Eighth Wing later used a navigator FAC in the rear seat of the F-4D. He

underwent the same training as the pilot FAC, except for flying the aircraft.

66. Pattillo, EOT Report, 23; Nash, EOT Report, 17. The Wolf F-4Ds

added an ALQ-87 ECM pod and LAU-3 rocket pods to its inboard stations.

For night work, a SUU-42 flare pod (16 flares) replaced the left outboard fuel

tank, and a 600-gallon fuel tank went on the centerline.

67. Col Dave “Scud” Yates, interviewed by author, 24 August 1994.

68. History, Eighth TFW, January–March 1969, 23–25, 73–74; Battle

interview.

69. ARN-92 LORAN-equipped F-4Ds were available in limited numbers in

the Eighth TFW, Ubon Air Base, Thailand.

70. Momyer, 219.

71. Working paper for Corona Harvest Report, “USAF Air Operations

Against North Vietnam, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972,” Headquarters PACAF,

Project CHECO, 42–43.

72. Message, 388th TFW to Seventh Air Force, January 1969, subject:

F-4E Tiger FAC Program; History, 388th TFW, January–March 1969, 42.

73. Pattillo, EOT Report; History, 388th TFW, January–March 1969,

42–43.

74. Other members came from Seventh Air Force, Air Attaché, Laos,

Task Force Alpha, the Royal Laotian Government, and the Royal Laotian Air

Force.

75. History, 388th TFW, January–March 1969, 42–44, July–September

1969, I, 61; 88th TFW, Oplan, 1 March 1969, 301–69; EOT Report, Col A. K.

McDonald, commander, 388th TFW, December 1968–June 1969; EOT

Report, Maj John F. O’Donnell, 388th TFW Tactics Office, subject: Tiger FAC

Program. The F-4E FAC configuration kept outboard stations clean. The left

inboard station carried rocket pods and the right one held a Nellis camera

pod with fore-, aft-, and side-looking 16 mm cameras. A KB-18 camera

nestled in the right forward missile bay; a 600-gallon fuel tank on the

centerline.

76. History, 388th TFW, April–June 1969, I, 52–53.

77. Ibid., October–December 1969, I, 49–50, and January–March 1970, 84.

78. Yates interview.

79. Ibid., April–June 1969, I, 13; 432d TRW to Seventh Air Force, letter

subject: Falcon FAC Report, 24 May 1969.

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199
80. Message, Seventh Air Force to 432d TRW, 190501Z, Mar 69, subject:

Request for Approval of F-4 FAC Program; History, 432d TRW, April–June

1969, I, 13.

81. Message, Seventh Air Force to 432d TRW, 230656Z May 69; History,

432d TRW, April–June 1969, I, 13; Message, Seventh Air Force to 432d

TRW, subject: FAC Certification.

82. Message, Seventh Air Force to 432d TRW, 240200Z Apr 69, subject:

RF-4C Visual Reconnaissance Program; History, 432d TRW, April–June

1969, I, 13–14.

83. “History, Current Operations Division, 432d TRW,” April–June 1969,

OAFH, 1–3, 14; Schlight, 31–32.

84. Schlight, 31–32.

85. History, 388th TFW, July–September 1969, I, 63; History,432d TRW,

July–September 1969, I, 18–20; History, Eighth TFW, April–June 1969, I, 24;

Col Walter L. Bevan Jr., Director/Combat Ops, Seventh Air Force, to 432d

TRW Commander, letter, 3 July 1969; Message, 388th TFW to Seventh Air

Force and 432d TRW, 250915Z July 1969, subject: Tiger FAC/Atlanta VR

Barrel Roll. The Falcon’s call sign in Barrel Roll became Laredo; the

Atlanta’s, Bullwhip. The Laredos directed 146 strikes during operation

About Face.

86. History, 432d TRW, July–September 1969, I, 25. Political sensitivity

in Laos ruled out the use of B-52s in Barrel Roll at the time.

87. Ibid., October–December 1969, I, 19–20, and Doc. 34,

January–March 1970, I, 18.

88. History, Eighth TFW, January–March 1970, I, 103–4. Paveway II—a

laser device for directing ordnance to the target after release from the

aircraft. Specially equipped F-4Ds with laser designators were used in the

Night Owl, Wolf, and Laredo programs.

89. History, Eighth TFW, October–December 1969, I, 55–57, and History,

497th TFS, October–December 1969, 9–13; Schlight, 33–34.

90. Yates interview.

91. History, 497th TFW, October–December 1969, 9–13, and History,

Eighth TFW, October–December 1969, i, 56, January–March 1970, I,

103–104.

92. Schlight, 34; History, Eighth TFW, April–June 1970, I, 31, and July–

September 1970, I, 23, April–June 1970, 1, 17, and July–September 1970, 1–2.

93. History, Commando Sabre, 1 April–15 May 1970, 6–13, History, 31st

TFW, April–June 1970, I, 39, and History, Eighth TFW, April–June 1970, I,

31–33.

94. History, Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, January–December 1972, vol.

II, appendix v, support doc (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 45; Minutes, “Fast

FAC Conference,” OAFH, 1–15.

95. Maj Charles M. Summers, “Interdiction Concepts and Doctrine: 1954

through 1968,” thesis (Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College),

May 1969.

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Chapter 10

Vietnamization and American Withdrawal

President Richard M. Nixon brought a new approach to the

war: pursuit of victory while withdrawing ground troops. To

accomplish this, he continued the dishonest policy of his

predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson. As a result, Nixon generated

distrust, drove some elements of the antiwar movement into

terrorism, and degraded the nation’s armed forces. Early in

1969, the commitment of American combat troops was

reduced and the air war was stepped up by subterfuge. The

ploy most commonly used was the “protective reaction strike”:

American aircraft loaded with bombs and rockets would fly

over North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; at the first sign of

hostile intent—detecting a radar being switched on, for

example—they would unload their ordnance.

Much of South Vietnam was heavily bombed, efforts to

bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail were increased, and North

Vietnam was regularly attacked up to 50 miles north of the

demilitarized zone (DMZ). The bomb tonnage dropped on

Southeast Asia from 1969–72 surpassed the American

bombing effort in both major theaters in World War II.1 During

this period, attention turned to close air support (CAS)

missions.

2

The objective of the 1968 Improvement and Modernization

Program (Vietnamization) was to stabilize the war. The military

rationale implicit in the “Nixon Doctrine” rested on the

assumption that US airpower, technical assistance, and

economic aid could provide sufficient support for South

Vietnamese ground forces to keep the Saigon, Phnom Penh,

and Vientiane regimes in power against determined attacks by

their enemies.3 The military forces of Laos and Cambodia

showed little substantial strength, however, and even the

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) did not demonstrate

extended self-sufficiency against the enemy’s best forces. The

official American hope was that enough time could be gained

to permit these armies to consolidate into effective fighting

forces. It was assumed that “Vietnamization” would succeed in

201
South Vietnam, and that similar transformations could occur

in Cambodia and Laos if military disaster was averted long

enough.

Vietnamization was a slow and often faltering process in

South Vietnam; elsewhere in Indochina, it was even slower

and less promising. ARVN’s rebuilding program was made

possible by the protection offered by US ground forces between

1965 and 1970. That protection was not available in

Cambodia and Laos, where the local armies compiled a very

poor performance record.4

Vietnamization and Close Air Support

In 1963, most of the training provided to Vietnamese Air

Force (VNAF) personnel was accomplished in the United

States. This method was very expensive, however, and the

Advisory Group continually strove to expand in-country

training. As a result, in-country training at the VNAF Air

Training Center increased by five hundred percent between

1963 and 1968. The basic airman in the VNAF was an

enlistee, not a draftee, and was a junior high school graduate.

When he completed basic training, he was given an aptitude

test and assigned to an appropriate technical school.

Following technical training, he was assigned to a VNAF wing

where he entered on-the-job training to a higher skill level.

The VNAF officer cadet was required to have a first

baccalaureate degree, which was equivalent to a US high

school diploma. This educational requirement, along with very

strict physical standards, made it difficult for the VNAF to

recruit the high number of pilot cadets it needed.5

The Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)

estimated that Vietnamization of the war would take five

years. In April 1969, however, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird

directed that the schedule be accelerated to less than three

years. Faced with a deadline of December 1971, USAF and

VNAF leaders moved to bolster the Vietnamese structure and

personnel associated with the close air support system. They

emphasized four areas: (1) accelerate VNAF efficiency through

early unit activation and transfers; (2) assign Vietnamese to

US units; (3) move training for VNAF personnel from the

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202
United States to South Vietnam; and (4) improve VNAF

equipment.

The VNAF forward air controller program realized some

gains under American tutelage. The VNAF also made some

progress in its aircraft inventory. By December 1970, the

VNAF had grown to nine tactical air wings, 40,000 personnel,

and approximately 700 aircraft (A-1Hs, A-37s, F-5s, AC-47s,

O-1s, and AC-119s). The original plan called for building a

VNAF force of 45 operational squadrons; by early 1973, the

actual number was 54.6 In terms of numbers of aircraft, it had

emerged as the fourth largest Air Force in the world—behind

Communist China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.7

Nevertheless, serious problems continued to plague the VNAF.

The FACs, for instance, lacked sound training and received

less-than-enthusiastic support from the ARVN.

There were two categories of VNAF FACs: those trained and

certified by the VNAF and those trained and certified by the

US Air Force. All combat-ready observers were qualified to

control VNAF air strikes, but the emphasis in their training

had been in controlling propeller-driven aircraft. The VNAF did

not have the capability to train FACs for the control of US

fighter strikes.8 But the Improvement and Modernization

Program was determined to make the VNAF self-sufficient;

there was a need to upgrade and certify VNAF FACs and

ALOs.

The joint plan called for three stages of training. During the

first, the USAF ALOs at corps, division, and province levels

would develop the capacity of the VNAF ALOs to direct tactical

air operations and to advise the ARVN commanders on air

support of their troops.9 During the second stage, the

emphasis would be on training and certifying VNAF FACs to

USAF standards. In the third stage, the VNAF would assume

the ALO and FAC functions completely. There were no target

dates, but the turnover was to be as fast as possible.10

Command and control arrangements for CAS increasingly

came under Vietnamese control after 1969. Assessing the role

of CAS in the war remains elusive because the standards of

evaluation were imprecise. One measure was its impact on the

way the war in South Vietnam was fought. Within this

context, CAS operations seemed to have a profound effect. Of

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203
course, CAS alone could not guarantee that enemy assaults

would always be turned away. Experience in prior wars

showed that tactical air units could have only a temporary

effect. There is some evidence that friendly ground forces did

not maintain contact with the enemy as vigorously as in

previous wars,11 but CAS played such a prominent role in

South Vietnam that it affected the basic assumptions about

the conduct of the war.

By early 1970, there had been substantial progress in the

FAC and ALO upgrade program. Against an authorization of

152 crews on 31 March 1970, the O-1 “liaison squadrons” had

139 observers qualified as FACs for VNAF strikes and 140

combat-ready pilots.12 Forty-two pilots and 39 observers had

also qualified as FACs for US and Australian air strikes, with

10 more in training.13 From 505 strikes flown by VNAF FACs

during January 1969, the number rose to 1,083 during

December. During the same period, the percentage of FAC

sorties flown by the VNAF increased from 10 percent to 26

percent.

Vietnamization of the FAC program and the tactical air

control system had not been completely accomplished by

1971. The VNAF depended on USAF advisers until US force

withdrawals compelled reliance on their own resources.

Similarly, when ARVN commanders could no longer call upon

Americans, they turned to the VNAF.14 On 11 May 1971, Air

Force controllers were ordered to stop performing FAC duties

in support of ARVN ground operations. This prompted the

Vietnamese Air Force to move toward full acceptance of its

role.15

When joint USAF-VNAF control of the tactical air control

center stopped in June 1971, the Vietnamese Air Force used

its TACC to coordinate air activity. Three months later, all of

its direct air support centers (DASC) were self-sufficient and

positioned with ARVN tactical operations centers in the

military regions. The radio request network, which was

patterned after the US Air Force’s, also began to work.16

Problems remained, however.

A few diehard ARVN commanders complained of

unresponsive air support and distrusted the young, lowranking VNAF FACs. Many Vietnamese pilots continued to

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

204
look down on controller duty; the more experienced ones

shunned it. The TACS sometimes sent too much air support to

some FACs while cutting others short. There was poor target

planning, with the DASC holding back sorties until a forward

air controller had found a target. Nevertheless, coordination

was a far cry from the chaos of two years earlier. By 1972, it

had become clear that the Vietnamese Air Force could do its

job adequately.

Before the 1968 Improvement and Modernization Program

began, the Air Force believed that four liaison squadrons could

meet VNAF FAC needs. During 1968, however, the number

rose to seven; in 1971, to eight. The first seven units (25 O-1s

each) were combat-ready by 30 June 1972; the eighth by the

end of 1972.17

In March 1972, the Vietnamese Air Force conducted over 90

percent of all in-country tactical air strikes. The Tactical Air

Control Parties (TACP) worked at ARVN division level. At the

DASCs, the US Air Force maintained token advisory elements

(called tactical air support divisions) for dovetailing American

air support with the VNAFs. These advisers, and the few

remaining Air Force TACPs, were disbanded in 1973. The

Vietnamese Air Force now ran the whole show.

The South Vietnamese Air Force

The South Vietnamese Air Force was created in July 1955

with 32 planes inherited from the French. As the level of

combat increased, the United States began supplying aircraft

of all types. Initially, the only strike aircraft in VNAF were

propeller-driven A-1s. The first jets, a squadron of F-5

Freedom Fighters, entered the inventory in 1967. In 1968, the

first A-37 light-attack jets were turned over from the US Air

Force. The major goals for 1971 were to increase the rate at

which helicopter units were turned over to VNAF and to add a

squadron of C-123 providers to improve VNAF’s airlift

capabilities.18 To help fill a gap in VNAF’s ability to operate at

night, AC-47 gunships were replaced by the more effective

AC-119s in 1972.19 VNAF’s personnel strength in 1968 was

less than twenty thousand; by the end of 1971, its strength

was about fifty thousand.

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205
VNAF attack sorties increased slowly—from two thousand

per month in 1968 to about three thousand per month by the

end of 1971. Sorties within South Vietnam dropped sharply

when air activity in Cambodia began in April 1970, suggesting

that VNAF was operating close to its maximum capability.

VNAF’s sortie rate remained unchanged during the February

1972 escalation by US fighter-bombers in South Vietnam.20

Though the aircraft inventory was augmented rapidly, there

was no suggestion that VNAF could take over all the functions

performed by US airpower when the Americans totally

withdrew.

During low US activity, the VNAF flew most of the

fighter-bomber attack sorties within South Vietnam. In

November 1971, for example, VNAF flew 2,745 sorties while

US aircraft flew only 218.21 One should not infer that

Vietnamization of the air war progressed at anything like the

rate of Vietnamization on the ground. These figures apply to

South Vietnam when ground fighting there was low; moreover,

they take no account of B-52 activity, for which the VNAF had

no equivalent.

The role envisaged for VNAF by US policy makers was

affected by several considerations. Though VNAF pilots were

very effective in daylight bombing (many had been flying

combat for ten years, while the tour of duty for US pilots was

often only one year), their nighttime and all-weather

capabilities lagged behind. A training program in radar

bombing was designed to overcome this deficiency, but

maintenance of the more sophisticated avionics was a

problem for the Vietnamese.22

The jets delivered to VNAF—the A-37 (developed specifically

for counterinsurgency) and the F-5 (developed for Third World

Air Forces)—lacked the capability to suppress surface-to-air

missiles and to institute sophisticated electronic countermeasures. Because of this, they were not suited for operation

in areas of significant antiaircraft defense. Their ordnancecarrying capacity and range were relatively low. Thus, the

VNAF was prepared primarily for in-country activity in

support of troops in combat. It could not conduct any

significant long-range strategic operations or offer close

support to troops far from the borders of South Vietnam.

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206
With A-1s, A-37s, and gunships, it was possible to conduct

interdiction within South Vietnam and on sections of the Ho

Chi Minh trail so long as ground defenses remained minimal.

Some token participation in the trail bombing was announced

late in 1971: “The Vietnamese Air Force will be flying over the

more benign areas near the southern panhandle. They will be

flying with us, using AC-47s and AC-119s and maybe a few

fighter-bombers too. . . . But they will never be able to build up

the capability to do all that the United States Air Force has

been doing in Laos.”23

Since VNAF was being geared to fight an air war in which

complete air superiority was assumed, this superiority had to

be maintained by US aircraft operating from Thailand and

from carriers.24 VNAF’s limited air-to-air capability rested on a

squadron of twenty-five F-5 Freedom Fighters (supplemented

after 1973 by the newer F-5E). In this category of jet fighters

and interceptors, VNAF was more than matched by the North

Vietnamese Air Force, whose inventory included 91 MiG-21s

in addition to 166 MiG-17s and MiG-19s.

25

According to one military spokesman, “austerity was the

name of the game in Vietnamization.”26 The South Vietnamese

economy made VNAF incapable of substituting for US

airpower. By December 1971, the US Air Force had reduced its

inventory of fighter and strike aircraft in South Vietnam to 277

(from a high of 737 in June 1968). The number of USAF

personnel in-country also declined dramatically—from the

1968 peak of 54,434 to 28,791 at the end of 1971. By then,

the Vietnamese Air Force was responsible for 70 percent of all

air combat operations.27

Cambodia

The situation in Cambodia worsened as the US forces were

deeply involved in carrying out an orderly, phased withdrawal.

By April 1970, about 115,000 American servicemen (60,000

Army, 55,000 Marine) had been withdrawn from South

Vietnam. The flow of replacements to remaining American

units was also greatly curtailed. Roughly one-fourth of the

Army’s combat forces and one-half of the Marine combat units

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207
in Vietnam were included in the initial phase of American

withdrawal.

Concurrent with these troop withdrawals, substantial

reductions in US tactical air and B-52 operations were

ordered. These reductions, coupled with Defense Secretary

Melvin Laird’s October 1969 order to Gen Creighton Abrams to

cease all offensive operations by American ground forces,

meant that US air strikes had become in reality Abrams’

strategic reserve in Vietnam. He used them skillfully and with

devastating effect. The probability of offensive operations by

US ground forces in Vietnam seemed remote.28 President

Nixon’s decision to send forces into Cambodia was made late

in April 1970, after a week of furious consultations.29

In August 1969, the Cambodian parliament elected a new

government headed by Lt Gen Lon Nol, the Army Chief of Staff.

During the next several months, Nol and Prince Norodom

Sihanouk tried unsuccessfully to secure international

assistance in removing the North Vietnamese troops and the

Vietcong from Cambodian soil. In March 1970, while Prince

Sihanouk was visiting Europe, the Cambodian government

boldly demanded withdrawal of all North Vietnamese. On 18

March, Lon Nol announced the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk

and the establishment of the Khmer Republic. Sihanouk

subsequently formed a government-in-exile in Peking. The Lon

Nol government soon found itself threatened by an estimated

40,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops; Lon Nol

appealed for arms assistance. By 20 April 1970, enemy forces

had taken control of large areas of the country and had cut

roads within 15 miles of Phnom Penh. This apparent threat

triggered an American-South Vietnamese invasion of

Cambodia to root out and destroy communist forces there. The

operation was essential to safeguard the withdrawal of

American forces from South Vietnam under Nixon’s

Vietnamization policy.

The operation began on 24 April when USAF and VNAF

tactical aircraft launched strikes against enemy targets in

Cambodia. On 29 April and 1 May, 48,000 South Vietnamese

and 42,000 American troops drove across the border. The

initial tactical air strikes, like the operations of the ground

troops they were supporting, were limited to areas within 18

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

208
miles of the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border. In addition

to the numerous tactical sorties, there were hundreds of B-52

strikes against enemy positions inside Cambodia. By 29 June,

all American and most South Vietnamese troops had

withdrawn from Cambodia. They had killed more than 11,300

enemy troops and captured 2,300 others.

On 30 June 1970, the day after the allied withdrawal, Air

Force tactical aircraft began flying air strikes against enemy

forces west of the Mekong River, which were menacing the

town of Kompong Thom. When attempts by Lon Nol’s forces to

advance overland to the town failed, USAF crews turned their

attention to roads leading from enemy-occupied Laos toward

Kompong Thom. This interdiction attempt failed, however,

because flat terrain permitted enemy troops to bypass cratered

segments of the highway. Aerial efforts to defend Kompong

Thom finally bore fruit; between 31 July and 9 August 1970,

182 fighter-bomber and 37 gunship strikes forced the enemy

to fall back. But language problems developed during this

operation.

Some Cambodian officers understood English, but few

Americans could speak the local languages. Since the nearest

thing to a common tongue was French, in a carryover from

colonial days, the Air Force used French-speaking volunteers

to fly with FACs and serve as interpreters. The Cambodians

also made an effort to find and assign English-speaking

officers as forward air guides with infantry units, thereby

permitting direct communication between Cambodian ground

commanders and Air Force FACs.30

The Cambodian operation, termed an “incursion” by the

Nixon administration, triggered massive antiwar sentiment

and civil disorders in the United States, culminating in the

Kent State tragedy on 4 May 1970. The cross-border

Cambodian action also marked the beginning of a series of

congressional resolutions and legislative initiatives that

severely limited the executive power of the president. Congress

forbade the use of American advisers in Cambodia and limited

US military aid to Cambodia. By the end of 1970, Congress

had prohibited the use of funds for any American ground

troops operating outside Vietnam.

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209
Repercussions from the Cambodian operation became a

major factor in accelerating the withdrawal of US forces.

Congressional defense budget reductions and lowered draft

calls made it mandatory that US troop strength in Vietnam be

rapidly reduced. Meanwhile, General Abrams felt a strong

sense of camaraderie with the Air Force as the ground forces

were reduced. The bond became even stronger as Abrams had

to rely more and more upon B-52 strikes and tactical air

support.31

Lam Son 719

In February 1971, the South Vietnamese Army, with heavy

US air support, invaded Laos in the region of the Ho Chi Minh

trail. This invasion provided a dramatic lesson that illustrates

three important points about the trail. First, the fact that an

attempt at ground interdiction was made at all reflects the

difficulty of impeding the flow of men and supplies down the

trail by air action alone. Second, the stiff resistance with

which enemy forces met the invasion was an indication of the

value they attached to this supply line. Third, the fact that the

incursion, which reached as far west as Tchepone, did not

significantly reduce the volume of supplies underscored the

effectiveness of this diffuse system of jungle paths.

The objectives of the 1971 Laotian operation were to seize

the logistic complex at Tchepone, interdict the trail, and

destroy the logistic facilities in the area. A successful

campaign, it was hoped, might buy as much as two years

since the enemy would need about one year to rebuild his

logistic structure to support an offensive in the following dry

season (October 1972–May 1973). Many US strategists

considered trail interdiction a prerequisite for the success of

Nixon’s Vietnamization policy.32

The ground operation would have to be conducted solely by

South Vietnamese troops. Moreover, no American advisers

were permitted to accompany ARVN units into Laos. US forces

were, however, allowed to support Lam Song 719 with tactical

air, helicopters, and long-range artillery operating from South

Vietnamese bases.33

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210
The Lam Son invasion of Laos was launched on 8 February

1971. South Vietnamese troops—drawn from ranger, airborne,

and ARVN infantry divisions—fought for the first time without

US advisors. The Air Force operated a tactical air control

system from the DASC collocated with the US XXIV Corps

forward command post at Quang Tri. It also provided most of

the O-2 and OV-10 FAC aircraft. English-speaking Vietnamese

flew with the Air Force FACs and aboard C-130 command

posts to bridge language difficulties. Other participating USAF

aircraft included F-100s, F-4s, AC-119s, AC-130s, and B-52s.

Also supporting the operation were RF-4Cs for

reconnaissance, A-1Es for rescue missions, and KC-135s for

air refueling. C-130, C-123, and C-7 transports airlifted more

than 30,000 tons of supplies during the invasion. Faced with

mounting personnel and equipment losses, Lt Gen Hoang

Xuan Lam, commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut

short the operation. In the hasty retreat that followed, with

many personnel being evacuated by helicopter, the South

Vietnamese abandoned large quantities of armor, tanks,

trucks, and other military hardware. Intense enemy ground

fire shot down or seriously damaged scores of helicopters,

leading to panic among many ARVN troops. Under massive

tactical and B-52 air cover, virtually all South Vietnamese

troops were extricated by 24 March. A number of ground

reconnaissance units fought a rear guard action as Lam Son

719 officially ended on 6 April. American air support had been

massive: More than eight thousand tactical air sorties and

20,000 tons of ordnance.34

Domestic reaction was not as sharp as in May 1970 during

the Cambodian incursion. Nevertheless, during and well after

the operation, efforts to limit the president’s discretionary

power to conduct military operations escalated in the

Congress. Pressure from the media also intensified. Six weeks

of demonstrations in Washington against US involvement in

the war culminated on 1 May 1971 with a deliberate effort to

bring the federal government to a halt. Meanwhile, a

successful pacification program was evolving under MACV and

the South Vietnamese government. Military operations in

support of pacification focused on attacking the enemy’s

Achilles’ heel—his logistic system.

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211
As 1972 approached, MACV and the Vietnamese Joint

General Staff worked overtime to get the nation’s defenses in a

better state of readiness to meet the next North Vietnamese

invasion. It was expected to come in January or February 1972,

and to hit hardest in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

An important element of the Vietnamization program entailed

a large expansion of the regular South Vietnamese forces, which

increased by almost one-third (from 825,000 to over a million),

while Saigon’s paramilitary forces almost tripled in size (from 1.3

million to 4 million). Most of the paramilitary increase was in the

People’s Self-Defense Forces, which were armed with primitive

weapons and had no organized units.

The program for the regular forces included a strenuous

effort to build greater capabilities for air, naval, artillery,

logistic, and other support activities. This effort involved

training thousands of pilots, mechanics, navigators,

engineers, and others needing advanced skills. Large numbers

of US aircraft, naval vessels, armored vehicles, and artillery

pieces were turned over to the South Vietnamese.

The US advisory structure was also being rapidly reduced. By

mid-1972, advisors were assigned only at ARVN’s corps,

division, and province levels. But the advisory effort enjoyed the

highest priority for quality personnel, a status it had not always

enjoyed.35 The Nixon administration was also attempting to get

serious negotiations underway with North Vietnam.

Interdiction in Route Packages I and II

The air war over North Vietnam can be characterized as two

main campaigns (Rolling Thunder and Linebacker) with a

42-month bombing halt separating the two. The campaigns

had essentially the same objective—to reduce to the greatest

extent possible North Vietnam’s capability to support the war

against South Vietnam. That was to be accomplished through

three basic tasks: (1) the destruction of war-related resources

already in North Vietnam; (2) the reduction or restriction of

North Vietnamese assistance from external sources; and (3)

ultimately, the interdiction or impeding of the movement of

men and materials into Laos and South Vietnam. Each air

campaign concentrated on these objects.36

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212
In preparation for a new offensive in 1972, the North

Vietnamese continued to pour forces into the area above the

DMZ. Special strikes against them, which began in a very

limited way, expanded. On 30 December 1971, 1,000 sorties

were flown against 41 targets in Route Package I. From

January 1971 until March 1972, Americans conducted more

than three hundred strikes south of the 20th parallel. These

missions in southern North Vietnam were controlled by the

fast-FACs. In addition to striking SAMs, AAA, and MiG

airfields, many missions targeted supply concentrations in the

central parts of Route Packages I and II. By the size of these

concentrations of supplies, it was apparent that the South

Vietnamese could be overrun by a superior force in the

northern provinces if those supplies were not reduced. But

these special strikes became principally a political tactic

rather than a military maneuver. As a military action, they

were insufficient to substantially reduce the buildup. They

were used instead to threaten the North Vietnamese with

resumed bombing above the 20th parallel if they did not stop

their obvious preparations to mount a major offensive.37

The 1972 Spring Offensive

Despite public expressions of confidence in the progress of

Vietnamization, the US government recognized that, without

US airpower, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces would have

only a minimal chance of staving off defeat if the North

attacked in force. For that reason, US airpower did not

dwindle as fast as ground forces during the American

withdrawal. The tactical airpower available for a major

contingency did decrease, however, even in the face of the

enemy buildup.38

By the spring of 1972, the Nixon administration still hoped

to end the war through negotiations. The United States

therefore kept a tight rein on its principal bargaining

card—airpower. Hanoi, on the other hand, was thinking in

terms of another military offensive. By late 1971, evidence had

begun to accumulate that Hanoi was planning a large-scale

invasion of South Vietnam. Gen John D. Lavelle,

39 who in

August 1971 had succeeded Gen Lucius Clay Jr., requested

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213
the recall of certain USAF units to the theater (Operation

Constant Guard). North Vietnam had assembled a force of

about 200,000 men for a push into the South.40 On 30 March

1972, the North Vietnamese launched a large, three-pronged

invasion spearheaded by tanks and mobile armor units.

Once the invasion began, the need for massive tactical

airpower support for South Vietnam became critical. Few people

had expected the NVA to throw almost their entire strength into

the attempt to defeat South Vietnam outright. NVA’s use of

armor in such massive numbers and in some of the locations

chosen was also a surprise. The ARVN was on the verge of

collapse and needed aid desperately; the aid came in several

forms.

Most of Constant Guard’s aircraft were F-4s, but others

were F-105s and EB-66s. In the largest single unit move in

TAC history, an entire fighter wing, the 49th tactical fighter

wing (TFW), deployed to Takhli, Thailand. Another extensive

deployment was the buildup of the carrier fleet from three to

six carriers off the coasts of Southeast Asia. The Marines also

deployed a large contingent of fighter-bombers to Da Nang and

Bien Hoa during the second phase of the air buildup. The

Strategic Air Command buildup assumed awesome

proportions as B-52s and KC-135 tankers were deployed to

several bases in Thailand and the western Pacific.

The third phase of US air deployments in 1972 was closely

tied to the continued drawdown in South Vietnam. The 366th

TFW and the USMC Marine Air Group (MAG) 15 redeployed,

with almost all assets going to Thailand. An entirely new base,

Nam Phong, was opened to bed-down the Marines. American

personnel in Thailand at the end of July totaled nearly fifty

thousand, most of them airmen. There were nearly 850 US

planes in the country, creating the strongest striking force the

United States ever had in Southeast Asia.41 This bolstered

force attacked enemy units with 12,000 sorties per month.

Linebacker

Against the massive invasion of South Vietnam, President

Nixon ordered renewed bombing of North Vietnam by both

tactical aircraft and B-52s. On 8 May 1972, he authorized the

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

214
mining of harbors and river inlets in North Vietnam to prevent

the rapid delivery of replacement arms, munitions, and other

war essentials from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

This latest interdiction campaign against North Vietnam

continued throughout the summer and early fall of 1972.42

During this offensive, fast-FACs were often diverted from their

primary missions in Route Package I to lead search-andrescue (SAR) missions for downed American crew members in

Route Packages V and VI.

By June 1972, the North Vietnamese had begun

withdrawing from some of their advanced positions. By

summer, the battles of An Loc and the highland regions were

largely over. Attention then turned to the northern provinces,

where the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had seized

considerable amounts of South Vietnamese territory. Peace

talks resumed in Paris on 13 July. In the ensuing weeks,

Saigon’s forces, heavily supported by US and VNAF air strikes,

continued their offensive against the 200,000 enemy troops

who had seized control of large portions of the countryside.

While the North Vietnamese offensive continued, US ground

forces proceeded with their withdrawal. The last American

combat troops departed the country in August 1972, leaving

only about 40,000 American support personnel in South

Vietnam. The period had seen a significant demonstration of

at least marginally successful Vietnamization. During the

heavy fighting in 1972, General Abrams emphatically stated,

“By God, the South Vietnamese can hack it!” He remained

confident of the ARVN’s ability to stop the NVA, albeit

immeasurably helped by heavy US air support and US

advisors on the ground.43

On 23 October 1972, when it seemed the Paris talks were

leading to an agreement to end the war, the United States

again halted air operations above the 20th parallel. Soon after,

however, the negotiations stalled amid indications that Hanoi

might renew its offensive in South Vietnam. Nixon therefore

ordered a resumption of air strikes above the 20th parallel.

There followed a final 11-day bombing campaign, nicknamed

Operation Linebacker II, which became the heaviest aerial

assault of the war. The Air Force dispatched F-105s, F-4s,

F-111s, and—for the first time, B-52s—over the heavily

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215
defended enemy capital and the adjacent port of Haiphong.

The tactical aircraft flew more than one thousand sorties, the

B-52s about 740—mostly against targets previously on the

restricted list: rail yards, power plants, communications

facilities, air defense radars, Haiphong’s docks and shipping

facilities, fuel storage, and ammunition supply areas.

During the strikes into Route Package VI, US support forces

ran at a ratio of about four to one.44 The plan for all linebacker

force compositions centered around the type and degree of

threat expected at the target area. As a rule, high SAM threat

areas called for chaff, ECM, and SAM-suppression aircraft.

The support package grew larger when combat air patrol

flights (MIGCAP) and escorts were added for protection against

MiGs.45 The number of aircraft varied with each mission,

depending upon the targets, the extent of the threat, and

whether common support aircraft could be used to cover

separate missions with closely scheduled times-on-target. A

typical linebacker mission involved about 30 strike aircraft

and as many as 80 support aircraft.

Linebacker planners had to overcome the formidable North

Vietnamese air defense system during both day and night

bombing operations. The USAF daily attacks were divided into

two distinct, highly compressed operations: a daylight force

comprised solely of F-4 and A-7 strike aircraft, and a nighttime

force that incorporated F-111 strikes and B-52 sorties. The

night B-52 strikes and the daylight tactical strikes had

separate support packages. Naval air strikes around Haiphong

were coordinated with the Air Force effort.46

The North Vietnamese responded by launching most of their

inventory of about one thousand SAMs and opening up a

heavy barrage of AAA fire against the attackers. Of 26 aircraft

lost, 15 were B-52s that were downed by SAMs. By 28

December 1972, the enemy defenses had been all but

obliterated. During the last two days of the campaign, the

B-52s flew over Hanoi and Haiphong without suffering any

damage.

On 30 December 1972, Nixon announced that negotiations

between Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and North Vietnam’s

representative, Le Duc Tho, would resume in Paris on 8

January 1973. While the diplomats talked, American air

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

216
attacks were restricted to areas below the 20th parallel.

Linebacker Operations from May 1972 through January 1973

are summarized below.

Linebacker provided USAF an excellent opportunity to

demonstrate the totality of its strike capability. Linebacker I,

which had lasted for six months, was an interdiction

campaign directed primarily against the North Vietnamese

supply system. Linebacker II was aimed at sustaining

maximum pressure through the destruction of major target

complexes in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.48

On 15 January 1973, the United States announced an end

to all mining, bombing, shelling, and other offensive action

against North Vietnam. A nine-point cease-fire agreement was

signed on 23 January. In addition to the cease-fire, the

agreement provided for the return of all American and allied

POWs within 60 days, establishment of a commission to

supervise truce and territorial disputes, the right of the

Vietnamese people to determine their own future peacefully, a

promise of US economic aid, and an affirmation of the

neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. The United States tacitly

recognized the presence of about 100,000 North Vietnamese

troops still entrenched in northern South Vietnam.49

Linebacker was deemed a success: The targets selected were

destroyed, the stalled peace talks were jarred back into

USN

Attacks

USMC

Attacks

USAF

Attacks

Total Sorties B-52

Sorties

May ’72: 3,920 23 1,919 5,862 10,982 1

Jun ’72: 4,151 34 2,125 6,310 12,121 271

Jul ’72: 4,175 8 2,310 6,493 12,879 308

Aug ’72: 4,746 38 2,112 6,896 13,316 572

Sep ’72: 3,937 102 2,297 6,336 13,233 411

Oct ’72: 2,674 84 2,214 4,999 11,368 616

Nov ’72 1,716 79 1,606 3,401 8,909 846

Dec ’72 1,383 119 1,548 3,050 7,894 1,381

Jan ’73: 863 50 716 1,629 6,731 53547

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motion, and the final agreements were signed in January

1973.50

The United States continued to fly combat missions in

Cambodia throughout the first half of 1973. A Wolf FAC

piloted by Maj Jerry Cox, with Capt Wade “Mother” Hubbard

in the back seat, was shot down on 26 May 1973 near Kratie,

Cambodia. Rescued within four hours, they are considered the

last combat loss and recovery of the war in Southeast Asia.

Major Cox was interviewed by the author on 27 July 1994.

Herewith, his account of the shootdown:

Gary (Lester) and I were at Ubon Air Base, Thailand, with the 308th

Tactical Fighter Squadron. Kissenger and the boys in Washington had

“ended the war in Southeast Asia,” but we were still flying missions in

Cambodia. On 26 May, Wade Hubbard and I were flying an F-4D as an

escort for Wolf 05 (we were Wolf 06). We were working an area in

southern Cambodia along Route 13, which extended from the

highlands of South Vietnam through Laos to the town of Kratie,

Cambodia.

Our role was to protect the FAC we were working with. We had bombs

on board, and we had a laser guidance system known as the ZOT—a

laser designator located in the rear cockpit of the F-4. The back-seater

would direct laser energy at the target while a companion aircraft

dropped a bomb that followed the signal to the target.

We had gone to the tanker for a full load of fuel and were back in the

target area before noon. It was a beautiful day for flying. We had put a

2,000-pound bomb on a wooden bridge near Kratie and were back to

confirm the hit when we experienced a severe thump. The right

floorboard in the front cockpit blew out as debris and smoke came in. I

thought we had been hit just once, but we had actually been hit four

times.

I was thinking, “OK, we have to get the airplane to a safe area.”

Knowing that Udon was two hundred miles to the northwest, I turned

the F-4 in that direction as the cockpit instruments began to fail. Both

fire lights were on, and the heat indicators were maxed out at 1,000

degrees. The plane’s systems began to fail and the cockpit filled with

smoke. The Ram-dump didn’t clear the smoke, but I figured if I kept

the sun in the top of the cockpit, my wings would be level.

I hit the panic button, which jettisoned the external fuel tanks and

bombs. I could hear John Miller on the radio, but did not know

whether my transmissions were being received. I dialed an emergency

squawk on the IFF, but was not sure that the system was working. I

told Mom what was going on, and that I intended to fly as far as the

F-4 would go or until it blew up. Hubbard said, “I’ll stay with you.”

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

218
As it turned out, we didn’t fly very far. All the cockpit gauges failed and

the rudder peddles fell out of the airplane. John Miller was telling me

to jump out as he described the condition of the F-4 from an external

view. The fire continued to grow worse in the front cockpit, but being

caught on the ground in Cambodia was not a comforting thought.

POWs never came back. What was happening was near panic on one

side of my mind, slow motion on the other.

The control stick burned loose and was detached from the airplane. I

dropped it down the hole that was now boiling flame by my right leg.

John Miller was yelling, “Get out, get out—you’re going to hit the

ground.” I told Hubbard, “OK Mom, we have to jump out now,” as I

pulled the lower ejection handle. The rear seat should eject first,

followed by the front seat in four-tenths of a second.

Mom ejected, but my seat failed to eject. The front cockpit was

completely engulfed in flames. Molten metal was spattering against me

as the F-4 burned itself up. I felt a sharp pain in my right arm and

looked down to see a large blob of molten metal slide down into my

glove. I pulled the manual release handle and somehow managed to

push the canopy enough for the 600 MPH airflow to rip it and me out

of the airplane.

When the ejection seat stabilized, I went from a very chaotic

environment to an almost serene one. Wind force had pushed the

oxygen mask over my eyes, but I managed to pull it down so I could

see. Then the Martin-Baker seat exploded into a parachute. I looked

up and saw some rips in it just before large swinging motions

caused it to become violent. I reached behind me and pulled loops that

cut four shroud lines, spilling air out of the back and stabilizing the

chute.

I saw my airplane in flames, other F-4s flying around, and, in the

distance, Hubbard. Below, I saw the Mekong and a village about a

mile to the east. My problem then became one of getting as far away

from the village as possible. I pulled on the front risers and gained

about a half-mile by gliding west. When I hit the top canopy of jungle, I

sailed through cleanly. I then found myself hanging about 40 feet from

the ground in the second canopy with my chute tangled in a tree.

I took a couple of deep breaths, then took out the tree-lowering device

and wrapped it around the chute harness. Now I had to release the

shoulder risers. I was apprehensive, to say the least. I released the

right riser and dropped a couple of feet. When I released the left, I hit

the tree and lost my grip. I fell the 40 feet to the ground and

discovered the true meaning of pain. I thought I had broken my back.

My fear of being caught was tremendous. I got up on my knees, the

seat kit still strapped on. The slow motion part of my mind kicked in,

even though I was near panic. I took off the chute gear, opened the

seat kit, and cut the survival kit loose. I took the compass out of the

VIETNAMIZATION AND AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL

219
survival kit and waited for the needle to settle on north. After sending a

radio message that I was on the ground, I gathered up my gear and

headed west. After walking about one kilometer, I stopped to assess

where I was. I sent another radio message and again got no response.

I could hear airplanes circling overhead, but the aircrews couldn’t see

me under the jungle canopy. I moved a bit further west and found a

place to hide. If I stood up, I could see 40 or 50 yards in every

direction. I had a badly burned right leg and was losing a great deal of

fluid. I was in a great deal of pain from the fall, but I knew I had to get

some sort of covering on my leg. And, realizing that my .38-caliber

revolver was no match for an AK-47, I decided against a shoot-out with

the bad guys.

I waited for the Jollys to come from Ubon. It did not seem to be going

the smooth way the Air Force always talked about. I have said that I’d

take luck over skill anytime, and that was the case when an OV-10

flew overhead. I grabbed my survival radio and told him where I was.

He found me quickly, then just as quickly found Hubbard. About 40

minutes later, I heard the helicopters. One asked for smoke. I popped a

smoke signal, but the smoke traveled on the ground about 50 meters

before rising up through the canopy. I told the chopper guy I was

about 50 meters west of the smoke, but he didn’t hear me.

I gathered up my gear and moved as fast as I could to the chopper’s

area. I saw a paramedic lower himself to the ground, but he couldn’t

hear me. I scared him when I fell out of the brush behind him and I

thought for an instant he might shoot me. He recognized me as the

man he was after, however, and didn’t pull the trigger.

A forest penetrator was lowered from the helicopter and we strapped

ourselves in for the trip back through the canopy. I lost still more skin

on that trip. The paramedic got into the chopper, then turned me

around backward and yanked me in. I was on the floor, holding on to

the penetrator for dear life. Another paramedic kneeled down and

spoke in my ear: “OK major, you can turn loose now.”

Four hours had transpired from shoot-down to pick-up. When a

paramedic looked at my leg, he painted it with a vile, blackish

substance. What had been a numb leg now became a violently painful

one. Back at Ubon, I was not in the best of all possible conditions.

Mom Hubbard, however, hadn’t even a scratch. He became famous for

being the only person ever to jump out of the back seat of a ZOT

airplane.51

The last US air strike occurred in Cambodia on the morning

of 15 August 1973. When Capt Lonnie O. Ratley returned the

A-7 Corsair to its home base in Thailand, he marked an end to

the nation’s longest war.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

220
It had been a war of attrition and the United States had

achieved only a stalemate. By any measurable terms, the

United States came out of Vietnam in far worse shape than

when it entered—and that is one of the definitions of defeat.

The costs—in lives, careers, broken homes, inflation, and

taxes—were great. The effect of the war was seen daily in

almost every home in America. It was a cruel lesson in fighting

the wrong war in thewrong place at the wrong time.

Notes

1. Geoffrey Perret, A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to

Vietnam—the Story of America’s Rise to Power (New York: Random House,

Inc., 1989), 527–28.

2. John J. Sbergo, “Southeast Asia,” in Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed.,

Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History [OAFH]), 464.

3. Sir Robert Thompson’s concept of achieving a “stable war.” US News &

World Report, 1 November 1971.

4. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Indochina

(Boston: Beacon Press, Air War Study Group, Cornell University, 1972),

186–87.

5. “Vietnamese Air Force forward air controller operations in South

Vietnam, September 1961–July 1968,” Headquarters PACAF, Project

CHECO Support Documents, Annex I, 1.

6. Ralph Rowley, “Tactics and Techniques of Close Air Support

Operations, 1961–1973,” thesis (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College1976),

128–33.

7. Gene Gurney, Vietnam: The War In The Air (New York: Crown

Publishers, Inc., 1985), 207.

8. Lt Col Albert H. Wuerz, Chief of TACS programs, Operations Plans,

AFGP, interviewed by J. T. Bear, 15 February 1970.

9. Training Plan, VNAF/7AF/AFGP, subject: “VNAF TACS ALO/FAC

Upgrading Plan,” March 1969.

10. Wuerz interview.

11. Lt Gen Julian J. Ewell, Papers, 80, US Army Military History

Institute (AMHI).

12. James T. Bear, “VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program,”

Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 5 February 1970, 39.

13. Maj Jack H. Taylor, AFGP/ODC, interviewed by J.T. Bear, 8 April

1970.

14. Bear, VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program, 34–35, 39;

Brig Gen Walter T. Galligan, Director/TACC, Seventh Air Force, to Deputy

Director/TACC, Seventh Air Force, letter, subject: Vietnamization of the SEA

TACS, 7 July 1970.

VIETNAMIZATION AND AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL

221
15. Maj David H. Roe, et al., “The VNAF Air Divisions Reports on

Improvement and Modernization,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 23

November 1971, 10–11.

16. History, Pacific Air Command (PACAF), July 1969–June 1970

(Washington, D.C.: OAFH), 154o, 154p; Roe, 80; debriefing , Lt Col Russell

B. Ruonavaara, 10 May 1972 [Ruonavaara was Ops Off, 20th TASSq (April

1971–April 1972)].

17. “USAF Management Summary for SEA,” 19 February 1971, 55, 13

March 1970, 2–46, 2–47, 2–51, 2–52, 17 December 1970, 54, OAFH; I DASC

to Chief, Air Force Advisory Team 1, letter, subject: Phase-out of US FACs in

ARVN System, MR-1, 10 January 1971.

18. For a history of VNAF, see “Vietnamization’s Impact on the Air War,”

Vietnam Feature Service (TCB-089), January 1971.

19. John L. Frisbee, “USAF’s Changing Role in Vietnam,” Air Force

Magazine, September 1971, 44.

20. Washington Post, 11 February 1972.

21. Ithaca Journal (AP), 8 December 1971. (The DOD figure for US sorties

that month was actually 366.)

22. Littauer and Uphoff, 175.

23. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney (unknown title), New York Times, 12

December 1971.

24. Kenneth Sams, “How the Vietnamese Are Taking Over Their Own Air

War,” Air Force Magazine, April 1971, 30.

25. William Beecher (unknown title), New York Times, 26 January 1971.

26. “How the Vietnamese Are Taking Over," 29.

27. Rowley, 64.

28. Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25-Year War, America’s Military Role in

Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 99–100.

29. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown &

Co., 1979), 258–59.

30. Carl Berger, “Air War in Cambodia” in Gene Gurney’s, Vietnam: The

War in the Air (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985), 249–50.

31. Palmer, 102–03.

32. “Laos: April 1971,” Staff Report, Subcommittee on US Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Committee on Foreign Relations, US

Senate, 3 August 1971, 9, 22. See also “Igloo White,” Air Force Magazine,

June 1971, 48.

33. Palmer, 109.

34. Jacob Van Staaveren, “The Air War Against North Vietnam,” in Gene

Gurney, Vietnam, The War in the Air (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc.,

1985),114–16.

35. Palmer, 115.

36. “Linebacker II USAF Bombing Survey,” Headquarters PACAF, Project

CHECO, April 1973, 1.

37. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

OAFH), 217.

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

222
38. Capt Charles A. Nicholson, “USAF Response to the Spring 1972

North Vietnamese Offensive: Situation and Redeployment,” Headquarters

PACAF, Project CHECO, 10 October 1972, 65.

39. Gen John Lavelle was recalled from his post in April 1972, charged

with having authorized certain “protective reaction” strikes beyond those

permitted by the rules of engagement. He was succeeded as Seventh Air

Force commander by Gen John W. Vogt.

40. Van Staaveren, 154.

41. Nicholson, 65–66.

42. Rowley, 64–65.

43. Palmer, 121–122.

44. Corona Harvest, “USAF Air Operations Against North Vietnam, 1

July 1971–30 June 1972,” Headquarters PACAF, 8 June 1973, 150.

45. Calvin R. Johnson, “Linebacker Operations: September–December

1972,” Headquarters PACAF, Project CHECO, 19.

46. Karl J. Eschmann, Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids Over

North Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1989), 30.

47. History, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, January

1972–March 1973, I (Washington, D.C.: OAFH), B–19.

48. Col William F. Shackelford et al., “Eleven Days in December:

Linebacker II” study (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1977), 101.

49. Van Staaveren, in Gurney, 154–59.

50. Eschmann, 203.

51. Col Jerry Cox, interviewed by author, 27 July 1994.

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Chapter 11

A Perspective on Close Air Support

Among military men, it is commonplace to speak of

interservice operations as difficult to execute. Differences in

equipment, doctrine, attitudes, and outlook inhibit and

complicate harmonious interaction. Past success, however,

has shown that these difficulties can be overcome with

determination, effective procedures, and proper training. In no

area of interservice operations has this phenomenon been

more pronounced than in close air support (CAS).

The history of CAS since World War I is marked by tragedies

such as lives lost, unduly protracted conflict, and victory

deferred because both air and ground officers have too often

failed to benefit from experience garnered and recorded by

earlier generations. This repeated pattern of behavior gives

credence to the observation that the only thing we learn from

history is that we do not learn.

Interservice Cooperation

The Joint Chiefs of Staff define CAS as air action against

hostile targets that are close to friendly forces. These

operations require meticulous coordination for each air strike,

but close support can better be understood when placed in

the broader context of Air Force roles and missions as a

whole. Strategic airpower seeks to influence the war by

destroying the enemy’s military, political, and economic base

for waging war. Tactical airpower seeks to influence the battle

indirectly by interdiction and directly by CAS. Interdiction

involves air strikes at some distance from the point of

engagement to prevent or inhibit the flow of men and material

to the battle front. CAS, on the other hand, involves direct

intervention at the forward edge of battle. In World War I, this

could mean strafing a line of trenches with machine gun fire.

In World War II, it might mean bombing an enemy gun

position on a reverse slope masked from friendly artillery. In

Vietnam, it could mean flying cover for a column of trucks. All

225
successful air operations, however, whether strategic or

tactical, rest ultimately upon air superiority; the freedom to

operate, even if only locally and temporarily, without effective

interference from the enemy.

Tactical airpower has three functions: (1) It must be ready to

fight for air superiority, intercepting and destroying enemy

aircraft that seek to drive off friendly air or harass ground

units; (2) at the same time, tactical airpower must be prepared

to isolate the battlefield through interdiction strikes; and (3)

tactical airpower must provide close support assistance to

ground troops in the battle. Which role airpower will perform

at any given time depends upon the shifting tides of battle.

In each major conflict in which the United States has

engaged in the twentieth century, procedures were eventually

developed to deliver close support with considerable success.

The question is not one of asking if effective close support is

possible; the real issue is why such procedures are not put

into effect at the very outset of engagement.

Probably no factor colors the performance of CAS more than

the attitudes brought to it by the air and ground personnel

involved. Airmen, especially since the US Air Force achieved

independence in 1947, tended to see every bid by the Army to

attain a larger share of control in close support as a

threatening encroachment upon their hard-won and

long-delayed autonomy. While the airmen’s insistence upon

retaining ultimate control is certainly valid, their zeal for

autonomy has inhibited effective execution of the CAS

mission. Another basic attitude shaping Air Force practice is

the belief that tactical air should give the interdiction mission

a higher priority than close support. In terms of damage

imposed weighed against risk, the interdiction mission has

usually outweighed close support in the Air Force view.

Unfortunately, the effects of interdiction are indirect,

delayed, and long-range, and thus difficult to measure against

the losses and frustration of the ground commander. The

character of close support makes aircraft especially vulnerable

to ground fire. To identify an enemy target with assurance and

be sure that he is not hitting friendly troops, a pilot is under

pressure to come down to lower altitudes. The lower he flies,

the greater the risk. The increased risk often makes a dubious

MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

226
trade-off for the damage inflicted. This makes interdiction, in

Air Force eyes, more profitable than close support. From the

perspective of the ground force, the problem presents an

entirely different face. Whenever aircraft fail to arrive in

response to a ground request, the reaction is almost certain to

be irritation.1

Improved command at the top will not solve the problem of

close support without similar developments at the lower end

of the chain of command. The British showed the way in

North Africa and the Americans perfected their system after

moving into Italy. The challenge was how to help the fighter

pilot locate targets with sufficient precision to make the kill

without harming friendly troops. The problem had a two-fold

solution: Pilots, serving as FACs on the ground in radioequipped jeeps, relayed requests from the ground troops and

talked aircraft onto targets. When the terrain prevented this,

airborne controllers in light liaison planes performed the same

service.

Whether ground-based or airborne, the essence of the FAC

lay in his ability to meld the point of view of the ground troops

with a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of

airplanes. By the end of World War II, a reasonably effective

system for providing CAS had been established and codified

as official doctrine in Field Manual 31-35, “Air Ground

Operations,” issued in 1946. It was based largely on the

experience of Ninth Air Force in working with the 12th Army

Group in Europe. This was an important body of experience,

but it failed to provide guidance to the Navy and Marine

Corps.

Competition in close support from Marine Corps aviation in

Korea proved painfully embarrassing to the Air Force because

of the Marines’ superior performance. Marine flyers were

specialists in close support; it was their mission, they were

trained for it, and their equipment was optimized for the role.

By the time the shooting stopped in Korea, Air Force

organization and procedures were also highly effective. One

might reasonably assume that this would provide a basis for

the distillation of improved doctrine and a determination in

the Air Force not to repeat the neglect of close support that

A PERSPECTIVE ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

227
had followed World War II. Unfortunately, this was not the

case.

When US forces again went into action in Southeast Asia,

the Air Force was once more unprepared to provide the kind of

close support the ground units required. The Army still

argued that ground commanders should have operational

control of aircraft assigned to the close support mission. A

new generation of leaders, with little knowledge of the past,

fought over the same old issues. These leaders eventually

perfected a workable organization with appropriate

procedures, but there were years of delay and a great deal of

friction that might have been avoided if the experiences of

World War II and Korea had been remembered. In Vietnam,

dedicated and conscientious individuals had to establish a

viable organization and sound procedures just as their

predecessors had to do.

Again, the end of the Vietnam War saw forward air

controllers (FAC) and the CAS mission languish from low

priorities and lack of funds. Little was accomplished for nearly

20 years. America’s involvement in the Grenada and Panama

invasions did not generate a need for CAS or FACs. Ground

support in these actions was provided by C-130 gunships and

Army attack helicopters.

In the 1991 Gulf War, the need for FACs was somewhat

limited. The desert environment created a problem opposite to

that encountered in Vietnam: targets were too easy to find.

The Air Force found that many “previously killed” targets were

being struck a second and third time. To prevent this, the

“Killer Scout” program was conceived. Killer Scouts were

experienced F-16 and A-10 pilots whose mission was to

identify previously destroyed targets in their assigned areas.

They also validated “live” targets and assisted fighter pilots in

distinguishing these from “dead” ones. Again, as in previous

wars, the Killer Scouts were “invented” to solve a problem

created by the environment in which the war was fought.

The current joint doctrine for close air support is outlined in

a number of sources, including Tactical Air Command

Pamphlet (TACP) 50-28 and Army Field Manual (FM) 90-20.

The concept, known as J-Fire, outlines the requirements for

air support, a joint tactical air strike request format, a format

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for briefing CAS pilots, the structure of communications

networks, and weapons data.

J-Fire is applicable to the tactical forces of the Army, Marine

Corps, Navy, and Air Force. It is a US unilateral-only

document, but it includes NATO formats. Intended primarily

for use by members of battalion-level combat units, it contains

procedures and information for coordinating artillery/mortar

fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. It describes the duties of all

liaison elements, and it contains risk-estimate distances for

weapons employment.2

Devising workable structures and effective procedures to

ensure a smoothly functioning close support system has been

the principal challenge, but other elements were involved—

notably, the three classes of equipment required to effectively

accomplish the mission: aircraft, ordnance, and communications.3

Aircraft

Ground officers urged the development of specialized

aircraft to perform CAS. Continual development of

high-performance aircraft after the mid-1950s widened the

gap between the characteristics best suited to the support

function and those appropriate for air superiority. Higher

speeds of the more sophisticated aircraft impair the ability of

an observer to identify targets on the ground and increased

fuel requirements means reduced loiter time, which means

longer periods when ground troops lack air support. The

advocates of specialized aircraft have also argued that

low-performance aircraft, suited for CAS, are less costly and

could be procured in large numbers—but all these arguments

in favor of low-performance aircraft presuppose air

superiority.

Characteristics of importance in any FAC aircraft include

these: excellent cockpit visibility; communications equipment

sufficient for simultaneous voice contact with friendly ground

forces, strike aircraft, and controlling agencies; the ability to

operate from short, unimproved airfields under austere

maintenance and support conditions, and the capability to

accurately and positively mark targets for strike aircraft. This

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229
capability should be adequate for use by the most advanced

ordnance delivery system of the strike aircraft. For example, if

strike aircraft have laser seekers or carry laser-guided

ordnance, then the FAC aircraft should have a laser target

designator. In addition, FAC aircraft should have the ability to

detect, identify, track, and mark targets at night. It should

also provide crew protection against small arms fire and a

system for rapid emergency crew egress under uncontrolled

flight conditions.4

The high-wing L-5 had excellent visibility, but its inability to

carry adequate communication equipment and its lack of

defensive armament limited its value as a FAC aircraft when it

was used early in Korea. At the same time, pilots of

high-performance F-80 jets found it difficult to identify ground

targets. This led to use of the sturdy T-6, which was slow

enough to give pilots time to search the terrain and heavy

enough to carry communications equipment that permitted

talk with ground commanders and fighter aircraft. But the

low-wing T-6 had less visibility than the high-wing L-5.

When US troops became engaged in Vietnam, the question

of finding a suitable aircraft for close support surfaced again.

The L-5 had become the L-19, rechristened O-1, and the jets

were F-100s and F-4s—but the story was the same. The O-1

was easy to maintain and afforded good visibility, but it was

underpowered, unarmed, and lacked adequate capacity for

communication. The more modern F-100s and F-4s guzzled

fuel, lacked loiter time, and were too fast for observers to see

fleeting targets.

In 1969, four years after US units began fighting in

Vietnam, the Air Force finally discovered the OV-10. This

twin-engine plane carried four machine guns and four rocket

pods, which allowed it to provide immediate response as a

forward air controller. It was designed to pursue a fleeting

target that would disappear before a jet fighter could arrive,

but the OV-10 could not survive against North Vietnamese

jets. While it proved to be highly effective, it was largely limited

to in-country operations in areas made safe by a protective

umbrella of friendly jets.5

In March 1977, the Air Force introduced the A-10

“Thunderbolt II” into the inventory and A-10 units today

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230
provide much of the FAC support. Armed with a 30 mm

“Avenger” seven-barrel cannon, the A-10 can also carry a

variety of munitions to support close air support. Funding was

terminated in 1983; the last of 713 A-10s was delivered in

March 1984.6

Ordnance

Any consideration of ordnance for close support must

account for the relationship between the ordnance and the

aircraft carrying it. Five-hundred-pound bombs were available

when US troops went into combat in Korea, but the F-80 jets

were not equipped with pylons to carry them. The air

superiority mission had a higher priority. The Air Force

designates a pilot an ace after five kills in air-to-air combat,

where high speed and maneuverability are essential. Pylons

and ordnance slow a fighter and limit its maneuverability. Five

air-to-ground support operations might well be of crucial

A-10 “Thunderbolt II”

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231
importance to the success of the battle on the ground, but

they will never make a pilot an ace.

Conventional ordnance, such as five hundred-pound

bombs, machine guns, and napalm, was the ordnance of

choice until late in the Vietnam War when all jet fighters could

carry a variety of weapons. The introduction of laser-guided

bombs and advanced air-to-surface missiles increased the

accuracy of fighter attacks and made CAS more efficient.

Long-range navigation systems (LORAN) and ground-based

radar direction enabled fighters to attack targets at night and

in marginal weather. Advanced navigation and bombing

systems that use global positioning system (GPS) data make

today’s fighters far more effective in conventional ordnance

delivery than even the F-4s were 20 years ago.

Communications

Communication is another material factor in CAS. Because

coordination of air and ground operations is vitally important,

communication is of central concern. Today, communication

means electronics.

Remarkable technical strides had been made in radio by the

outbreak of World War II, but radio still suffered from serious

defects. Air Corps planes participating in the Louisiana

maneuvers had to convert their radios to Army frequencies to

permit air-ground coordination. In doing this, they lost their

ability to communicate at long range. Disoriented pilots found

themselves unable to communicate with their airbase. In

short, the evidence pointed to surprising delays in recognizing

the importance of providing easy communications between all

echelons and services that were expected to cooperate.

Lack of money to develop adequate communications

equipment was the reason offered to explain the shortcomings

in this area. But when funds are lavished on the armed forces

in wartime, it is harder to explain the delays to upgrading

communications capabilities. In the Southwest Pacific during

World War II, Army units with high-frequency radios could not

communicate with Navy fighters equipped with very

high-frequency radios until suitable equipment was obtained

late in the war.

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232
After the experience of three wars, the problem resurfaced

during the Mayaguez incident in 1975. When Cambodian

Communists attacked a US freighter, rescue operations

disclosed that the problem of interservice communication still

had not been resolved.7

Personnel

The availability of qualified pilots is another dimension of

the problem in CAS. Because the production of trained pilots

has borne a relationship to the number of aircraft available, a

shortage of pilots has seldom been the weak link in the early

days of a conflict. When pilots are used as ground FACs,

however, the situation changes drastically. With appropriate

training, individuals without pilot wings can do the job.

The confidence level of the pilot is raised when he knows

that he is being directed by one who may be swapping roles

with him in a few days. There is also much to be said for

having pilots know the ground personnel they are supporting.

A substantial case can also be made for using other trained

personnel. With the cost of training a modern jet pilot at one to

two million dollars, it may not be cost effective to assign pilots

to ground controller duty. To be fully effective, a controller

must operate closely with the ground unit being served. Would

it not be better military economics to risk pilots in

fighter-bombers rather than on the ground performing a role

that might be performed by a less expensive officer? The

British practice in World War II was to use Army officers

rather than pilots as ground controllers. Their success

suggests a precedent worth investigating.

Perhaps the most important question remains to be answered:

Is CAS by high-performance Air Force aircraft a viable mission in

an era of precision-guided munitions? The historical record

cannot answer that question, but it can provide the context

within which new experience may produce a solution.

Airpower in Regional Conflicts

The advances in military technology since World War II have

given American presidents a substantial independence from

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233
Congress and the public in waging war. The development of

airpower—its present responsiveness to centralized control, its

remoteness from the tide of the ground battle, and its vast

destructive force—has created an opportunity for American

presidents to conduct war without reference to the wishes of

the body politic. The reason is simple: War from the air is not

very tangible to the average American.

Air warfare is cheap in terms of American lives. Two men

flew an F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber that carried 12,000

pounds of explosives. Six men formed the flight crew of a B-52

Stratofortress that lifted 108 five-hundred-pound bombs to

30,000 feet. The dollar cost of an air war is not perceptible to

the citizenry. The relatively low cost of air action tends to

become lost in huge defense budgets. Furthermore, presidents

can swiftly escalate an air war without arousing much public

attention. Airpower can be turned on and off, up or down,

with a simple order from the White House. Air warfare is

perceived by the American public only intermittently,

whenever a presidential administration varies a pattern of

raids.

Official accounts of US air activity in Vietnam naturally laid

heavy stress on the close-support function. A rather

surprising picture emerged. Close air support constituted a

small fraction—below 10 percent—of US fixed-wing air activity

in Vietnam.

8 In view of the large-scale US air effort, US ground

forces would expect to get all the CAS they wanted. Had there

been a need, close support could easily have been increased.

The real question, however, was different. Given that less than

10 percent of the sorties satisfied the close-support

requirement, what were the other 90 percent being used for?

They fell into the wide and diffuse category of interdiction,

9

supported largely by the Fast-FAC program in the out-country

war.

Current High-Risk Strategy

The United States has a consistent history of underestimating

in peacetime the forces that it will require in war. The Persian

Gulf War, for example, ultimately required a third more fighter

forces than the strategy had estimated. It required most of

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234
USAF’s best aircraft and the largest coalition air fleet since

World War II. RAND corporation analysts, studying regional

conflict, discerned a pattern of imperfect US forecasts: peak

US deployments needed to fight in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq

“exceeded planner’s prewar expectations by a factor of two in

critical areas.”

The danger of global war has diminished, but there has been

a corresponding increase in the probability of regional conflict.

It is clear that the new world order is characterized by

instability, regional power struggles, and violence that were

restrained when the superpowers exerted more influence.

A few years ago, it was considered almost eccentric to worry

about North Korea as a military threat; nobody is smirking

today. A few years ago, before the breakup of the Warsaw Pact

and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospects of

near-term conflict in Europe were rated as virtually nil; few

would make that judgment today, having seen the relentless

animosity unleashed in the Balkans and the tensions at play

among the new nations of the former USSR. Nor does it take a

hyperactive imagination to conceive of trouble originating

in—or spreading from—the old Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1976 and continuing into the 1980s, the Air

Force officially was building toward a force of 40 combatcoded fighter and attack wings. A somewhat arbitrary goal, it

represented a compromise between official requirements and

available budgets. The requirement actually indicated by

analysis was about 44 wings. In 1987, the Air Force dropped

its goal to 37 wings—but said it would concentrate on

supporting those wings properly. In February 1991, the

Pentagon announced plans to again reduce USAF fighter

structure—this time to 26 wings. In March 1993, the

Pentagon’s annual budget announcement said the base force

would be reduced to 24.3 fighter wings, the only major

force-structure change announced by Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin. The Bottom-Up Review, in late 1993, dropped the

fighter force structure to its lowest point yet—20 combatcoded fighter and attack wings. Fiscal Year 1994 was a

benchmark: The active duty fighter fleet slipped below 1,000

aircraft. A-10 forces comprised one active duty squadron and

one reserve squadron (about 48 aircraft).

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235
RAND said, “Historically, the Air Force has deployed an

average of ten fighter wings (about 30 squadrons) to the three

major post-World War II conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq”

(Korea-July 1953 [10.4 Wings], Vietnam-December 1968 [10.6

Wings] and Desert Storm-February 1991 [10.6 Wings]).10

Future Trends

The Air Force has embarked on a major campaign to make

space systems a key part of its fighting force. The focal point of

this effort is Air Force Space Command’s Space Warfare

Center at Falcon AFB, Colorado. The origins of the center and

its mission date to early 1991 and the Persian Gulf War.

Shortly after the war ended, Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force

Chief of Staff, announced that USAF should seek to control

and exploit both air and space.

In the Gulf War’s aftermath, analysts focused on major

deficiencies in the service’s ability to make high-quality space

information available to aircrews and ground unit

commanders. Brig Gen David L. Vesely was the Space Warfare

Center’s (SWC) first chief. According to him, there was little

tactical warning in the Gulf War. The reconnaissance data

that arrived was of little use—and during mission execution,

information flow was almost nonexistent.

The principal mechanism for increasing the service’s

operational use of space is an initiative known as TENCAP

(tactical exploitation of national capabilities). The program

dates to the early 1970s, but only recently has it gained

serious attention. TENCAP is divided into six programs

(code-named Talon). GPS information is integrated into

military survival radios, making it easier to rescue downed

airmen and providing satellite targeting data to cockpits in

near real time.

The intelligence community acknowledged the need for

greater operational input and Gen Charles A. Horner, former

commander of US Space Command, developed an integrated

priorities list for intelligence systems.

In the mid-1980s, another stimulus arose from Air Force

efforts to provide near-real-time information to the cockpit.

The Soviet Union deployed mobile nuclear missiles, presenting

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Air Force officials with a huge targeting problem. To solve it,

the Air Force launched a number of highly classified initiatives

to deal with strategic relocatable targets (SRT). Before the SRT

program evaporated with the Cold War, it had revealed the

difficulty of linking satellite data to airborne systems. Today’s

mobile missile targets are difficult to detect. During the Gulf

War, for example, the Air Force was frustrated in its efforts to

locate Iraqi Scud launchers.

TENCAP has an ambitious agenda. Its goal is to harness

space-based assets to service pilots in fighters, bombers, and

airlift cockpits (Talon Shooter), battlefield command and

control (Talon Command), mission planners (Talon Ready),

and special operations forces (Talon Night). In addition, the

program is investigating support systems such as

communications (Talon Touch) and new technologies (Talon

Vision).

The first TENCAP product to make the transition to the

acquisition community is a six-layer system that provides

near-real-time intelligence updates for aircrews en route to a

target. The multisource tactical system (MSTS) provides

multispectral imagery from satellites, digital charts and

elevation maps, satellite intelligence (including signals

intelligence) on air- and ground-based threats, and real-time

data from the Global Positioning System.

The system debuted on a C-141 transport during exercise

Bright Star ‘94 in Egypt. It was demonstrated on C-141,

C-130, and KC-135 aircraft on relief missions over

Bosnia-Herzegovina. For now, multisource tactical system

(MSTS) is more appropriate for heavy-lift aircraft, which have

sufficient space for the unit’s twelve-inch computer monitor.

The program office hopes that advances in flat-screen

technology—now being pursued separately under the Talon

Vision program—will make the gear suitable for fighters.

The Air Force is separately studying the feasibility of putting

a high-speed mini-super-computer on board fighters under

the Talon Lance project. The computer would work 10 to 30

times faster than existing aircraft processors and would

reduce the load of raw data for pilots to handle.11

When this system is successfully introduced, perhaps in

eight years, it may eliminate the need for traditional airborne

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237
FACs. CAS target information from ground commanders, or

interdiction target information from a command network,

could be fed through satellites and broadcast directly to fighter

cockpits. Codes would ensure that the information was

coming from a valid source. Inertial navigation systems

onboard fighters would use positioning data from the GPS.

Target location would also be GPS-derived. The pilot would

depart an initial point (IP), also selected through the GPS

system. His heads-up-display (HUD) aiming index would

automatically be positioned over the target location on the

ground. Before beginning his attack, he could verify the target

with a photograph broadcast directly to the cockpit. This

photo could come from either satellite imagery or a remotely

piloted vehicle. With this information, a successful attack

would be possible without voice communication or target

marking.

Col Dave Yates gives his views on the proper use of FACs

and his thoughts concerning their future:

I do not think it’s the smartest thing in the world to work for the Army

commander who needs you. If the theater commander has charge of

everybody and knows that air superiority and SEAD (suppression of

enemy air defenses) are accomplished before interdiction and close air

support, that allows the system to work. If you gave close air support

back to the Army, somebody still has to be the air component

commander who knows about air in particular. The theater

commander must understand the use of this artillery piece called air.

Army commanders grow up from grunts and Air Force commanders

grow up from fighter pilots. They do not know much about each other.

We need to grow up together again.

I do not know [whether FACs have a future role]. As long as we can put

up remote sensors, maybe not. That is where it’s going with technology

in the next 10 years. The Army commander will be able to put [up]

little remote airplanes that give him viewing sensors to locate targets.

Those targets are identified and their coordinates are passed via

satellite to an F-16. The F-16 goes to an IP (a point from which to plan

an attack), which is pointed out by the same satellite. He pops up and

rolls in for his attack and the diamond on his HUD (heads-up display)

is on the target. If he also had a picture sent to him, which will be here

in a few years, he could identify the target. All this information is

coming through data links and if the fighter pilot knows the ground

commander sent it, he can drop on that target.

Will the manned FAC still have a mission? I do not know. Remote

vehicles are doing nearly everything today. Remote vehicles are going

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to do air-to-air before long. We are right now finding targets via

sensors, photo, IR, and airborne sensors at long range and passing

this data through satellites, down to a fusion center and up to

airplanes in the air. No words are passed. We are now at the point we

can actually do that. Sensors go off on a launch warning and an F-16

within range is alerted. Will there always be FACs? I do not know, but

we are [having] less need for them. The FAC in desert Iraq was much

different [from] the FAC in the trees of Vietnam.12

Conclusion

Airpower is economical, flexible, and unobtrusive. In this

capsule statement are contained many of the aspects of

airpower that make its use so attractive. The direct costs of

delivering a ton of ordnance by air are lower than for other

methods. The air war delivered about the same tonnage of

munitions as the ground war in Indochina while accounting

for no more than one-third of the total cost. More important,

the number of American lives lost in the air was less than 10

percent of the total.

The deployment of airpower is flexible and can be very

unobtrusive. Aircraft can be based far from the scene of

action. They need not take war correspondents or television

crews with them on their missions. Their destinations may

remain obscure, their targets unpublicized. Airpower can be

turned on and off quickly and quietly; no mobilization or draft

calls need disturb the peace of the voters.

Escalation is an easy—even attractive—course of action.

Because airpower is remote and indirect, and because it is

relatively economical, it appears reasonable to apply more

airpower when success is elusive. If the ultimate objectives

remain out of reach, policy makers are likely to escalate the air

war, applying “more of the same medicine.” Escalation is

easier when there is no fear of retaliation in kind by the other

side. So, in the use of airpower against a weaker nation, there

need be no thought of possible retribution.

The costs of war accumulate, but its successes do not. One

can win a battle, even many battles, and yet lose the war. This

dictum applied with special force to airpower in Indochina.

The ultimate goal of the struggle there was political, not

military.13 Yet airpower is far from being an instrument of

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239
political persuasion. It can force people to move, even remove

them from the scene, but it cannot win allegiance from them

or establish the legitimacy of a regime. Even as an instrument

of coercion, it is deficient because its effects are intermittent. It

can disrupt economic, social, and political activity, but it

cannot enforce desired behavior like ground forces can.

Military gains obtained through airpower are difficult to

translate into political objectives. The CAS mission is an

exception, however; its effects are short-term and immediate.

Friendly lives are at risk and tactical military objectives can

either succeed or fail based on airpower’s effectiveness.

According to Col Charles Varvi, who served as a FAC in both

Korea and Vietnam, there is no more important mission for a

fighter pilot, especially in a troops-in-contact situation, than

close air support. Colonel Varvi began his FAC career as a

peacetime Mosquito pilot in 1954 Korea. When he retired in

1982, he had flown the T-6G, the O-1, the OV-10, and the

F-4D/E.

In comparing Korea and Vietnam, Colonel Varvi said the two

conflicts were very different. “In Korea, you generally had a

line with the friendlies on one side and the enemy on the

other. You could have a ground FAC moving with a battalion

or division even though the lines were fairly fluid. But in

Vietnam, there were no lines; it was airlifting GIs into the

jungle and extracting them by helicopter. I think the airborne

FAC in that environment was essential while a ground FAC

was extremely limited.”

He was enthusiastic about the F-4 as a FAC aircraft,

“especially in an extremely hostile environment like Laos,

where the Ho Chi Minh trail was lined with all kinds of

weapons. It had a two-man crew, it was fast, it could climb in

the blink of an eye, and it carried a wide range of ordnance. I

thought it was an excellent airplane for that role.”

Asked about his view of the FAC’s role today, Colonel Varvi

said he thinks the mission remains basically the same. “The

things that influence the FAC mission are the type of terrain

you are flying over, the kind of battle you are fighting, and

what the threat is. Technology today gives us the capability to

remove very specific targets. The potential today is enormous.

Whether to turn over this mission [forward air control] to the

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240
Army is a matter of Air Force and Army doctrine. If the Air

Force doctrine of air superiority, interdiction, and CAS has not

changed, then the Air Force needs to retain the mission.”

“The bottom line of the FAC mission was to help the troops

on the ground. You know, it’s unfortunate that a fighter jock

cannot hear the conversation between the FAC and the ground

commander. There are times the ground commander pleads

for help. When fighters show up, they do not hear these

conversations. They hear the FAC, but the fighters do not hear

the desperation in the voice of troops asking for help. I told my

pilots there was only one time I wanted to see them hang it out

for God and country, and that is when they were being

controlled by a FAC in a troops-in-contact situation. I

believe there is no more important mission for a fighter

pilot.”14

Notes

1. I. B. Holley, “A Retrospect on Close Air Support” in Benjamin F.

Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington,

D.C.: Office of Air Force History [OAFH], 1990), 535–38.

2. Tactical Air Command Pamphlet (TACP) 50-28, J-Fire, July 1989.

3. Holley, 542–45.

4. Corona Harvest Report, “Command, Control, Communications,”

Volume I (August 1970), 2-52–53.

5. Holley, 545–46.

6. Michael J. H. Taylor, Jane’s World Combat Aircraft (Jane’s Information

Group, London, 1988), 295.

7. Holley, 549–51.

8. Official data for 1968, 1969, and 1971. During these periods the

percentages of total attack sorties devoted to close air support were,

respectively, 8 percent, 5 percent, and 6 percent. Summaries, Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Office of Information, Saigon.

9. Neil Sheehan, The War in Indochina, Raphael Littauer and Norman

Uphoff, eds., Air War Study Group, Cornell University Press (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1972), 55.

10. John T. Correll, “The High-Risk Military Strategy,” Air Force

Magazine, September 1994, 37–40.

11. David J. Lynch, “Spacepower Comes to the Squadron,” Air Force

Magazine, September 1994, 66–70.

12. Col David Yates, vice-commander, Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB,

interviewed by author, 24 August 1994.

13. Adm U.S.G. Sharp, commander in chief, Pacific wrote: “In

coordination with our military operations, the task of nation building in

A PERSPECTIVE ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

241
South Vietnam, the ultimate goal of our struggle, received its full share of

attention.” Report on the War in Vietnam (United States Government

Printing Office, 1968), 9.

14. Col Charles Varvi, interviewed by author, 9 August 1994.

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242
Bibliography

All the armed services have published histories of their

Korean and Vietnam War service. The Air Force archives of the

USAF Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Air University

(AU), Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, contains the

single most important set of documents on the Korean and

Vietnam air wars.

Headquarters US Air Force, Far East Command, Far East

Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force organized studies during and

after the Korean war. These studies provide a core of data and

analysis (often conflicting) on CAS operations. Most of them

are now part of the individual command records stored at the

Historical Research Agency.

The private papers of many of the senior officers of Far East

Command/United Nations Command provide important

information and personal attitudes toward the CAS question.

For the US Air Force, see the collections at the Historical

Research Agency for Gen Earle Partridge, commanding general

of Fifth Air Force (1950–1951); Lt Gen George Stratemeyer,

commanding general of Far East Air Forces (1950–1951); and

Gen Otto Weyland, vice commander and commanding general,

Far Eastern Air Forces (1950–1954). The oral memoirs of

Generals Partridge and Weyland add division detail to their

diaries and correspondence.

The operations of the Air Force’s tactical air controllers

(airborne) are described and analyzed in a number of sources.

Of particular value is William Cleveland’s “Mosquitoes in

Korea, 1950–1953,” published by the 6147th Tactical Control

Group Association.

For the Vietnam era, two general classifications of Air Force

documents are particularly pertinent: “Corona Harvest”

collections and Project CHECO Reports (contemporary

historical examinations of current operations). These

collections examine the full range of Air Force experiences in

Southeast Asia.

Interviews and end-of-tour reports by the participants in the

war proved to be a valuable source of information. Certain

research studies (available at the Air University Library,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama) by officers at the professional service

243
schools provide important information about CAS in

Southeast Asia. Finally, guides to both civilian and military

periodical literature offer hundreds of published articles about

CAS. Most of these proved of only marginal use in this study,

however.

Unit histories and Korean War era studies were all classified

“Secret” until 1984 when they were declassified under the

30-year rule. Unit histories from both wars contain the

pertinent letters, memos, and messages that shaped the unit

history during the reporting period (either quarterly or twice a

year, depending on the command level of the unit). Corona

Harvest, Project CHECO Reports, Vietnam era unit histories,

interviews, end-of-tour reports, and studies were classified up

to Top Secret until 1993, when an accelerated declassification

program made much of this material available. By January

1994, all material cited here had been declassified.

244
Cited References

Books

Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Tactics and Techniques of

Night Operations, 1961–1970. Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History, 1973.

Anderton, David A. The History of the US Air Force. New York:

Crescent Books, 1981.

Ballard, Jack S. The Development and Employment of

Fixed-Wing Ships. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1982.

Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia:

An Illustrated Account,1961–1973. Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1977.

Cleveland, William M. Mosquitos in Korea. Portsmouth, N.H.:

The Mosquito Association, Inc., 1991.

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed. Case Studies in the

Development of Close Air Support. Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1990.

Dorr, Robert F. McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II. London:

Osprey Publishing Limited, 1984.

Eschmann, Karl J. Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air

Raids Over North Vietnam. New York: Ivy Books, 1989.

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea. New

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearch, 1961.

———. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking

in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960. 2 vols., Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University,

June 1971.

———. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The

Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1981.

———. The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950–1953.

Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.

Goldberg, Alfred. A History of the United States Air Force:

1907–1957. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957.

Gurney, Gene, ed. Vietnam, The War in The Air. New York:

Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985.

245
Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Nightmare. New York:

Harper & Row, 1965.

Hoopes, Townsend. The Limits of Intervention. New York: David

McKay Co., 1969.

Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point. New York: Popular

Library, 1971.

Kissinger, Henry A. The White House Years. Boston: Little,

Brown & Co, 1979.

Littauer, Raphel, and Norman Uphoff, eds. The Air War in

Indochina. Cornell University: Air War Study Group,

1972.

Momyer, William W. Airpower in Three Wars. Washington,

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, January 1978.

———. The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975. No publisher

data, Air University Library, Documents Section, M-S

42229-41, 10 September 1975.

Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War, America’s Military Role in

Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Perret, Geoffrey. A Country Made by War. New York: Random

House Inc., 1989.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.

Kennedy,1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1962.

Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 1964.

Robbins, Christopher. The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in

America’s Secret War in Laos. New York: Crown

Publishers, Inc., 1987.

Robinson, Anthony. Aerial Warfare: An Illustrated History. New

York: Galahad Books, 1982.

Rowley, Ralph A. USAF FAC Operations in Southeast Asia,

1961–65. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,

January 1972.

Stewart, James T. Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea. New

York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957.

Thompson, W. Scott, and D. D. Frizzel, eds. The Lessons of

Vietnam. New York: Crane Russak, 1977.

246
USAF FAC Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961–65.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, January

1972.

Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City,

N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1976.

Articles and Periodicals

Andrews, Walter. “OV-10s Five-Minute Response,” Armed

Forces Journal. 6 September 1969.

Beecher, William. (Unknown title). New York Times. 26

January 1971.

Berger, Carl. “The Air War in Cambodia.” In Vietnam, The War

in the Air. Edited by Gene Gurney. New York: Crown

Publishers, Inc., 1985.

Butz, J. S., Jr. “Forward Air Controllers in Vietnam—They Call

the Shots.” Air Force and Space Digest, May 1966.

Correll, John T. “The High-Risk Military Strategy.” Air Force

Magazine, September 1994.

Evans, Douglas K., Maj, USAF. “Reinventing the FAC:

Vietnam, 1962.” Air Force Magazine, February 1980.

Frisbee, John L. “USAF’s Changing Role in Vietnam.” Air Force

Magazine, September 1971.

Henderson, F. D. “Cleared in Wet!” Air Force Magazine, August

1968.

Holley, I. B. “A Retrospect on Close Air Support.” In Case

Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Edited by

Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History.

“Igloo White.” Air Force Magazine. June 1971.

Ithaca Journal, 8 December 1971.

Johnson, Earl D. “Department of the Army.” Air Force

Magazine, October 1953.

Kennett, Lee. “Developments to 1939.” In Cooling.

Lynch, David J. “Spacepower Comes to the Squadron.” Air

Force Magazine, September 1994.

Millett, Alan R. “Korea, 1950–1953.” In The Evolution of the

Airborne Forward Air Controller: An Analysis of Mosquito

Operations in Korea. Edited by J. Farmer and M. J.

Strumwasser. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1967.

247
Milton, T. R., Maj Gen, USAF. “Air Power: Equalizer in

Southeast Asia,” Air University Review XV (November–

December 1963).

Sams, Kenneth. “How the Vietnamese Are Taking Over Their

Own Air War.” Air Force Magazine, April 1971.

Sbergo, John J. “Southeast Asia.” In Cooling.

Sheehan, Neil. “The Air War in Indochina.” In The Air War in

Indochina. Edited by Raphel Littauer and Norman Uphoff.

Cornell University: Air War Study Group, 1972.

Thompson, Robert. “A Stable War.” US News & World Report, 1

November 1971.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. “Interdiction in the Laotian

Panhandle.” In The United States Air Force in Southeast

Asia: 1961–1973. Edited by Carl Berger. Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977.

———. “The Air War Against North Vietnam.” In Gurney,

Gene.

“Vietnamization’s Impact on the Air War.” Vietnam Feature

Service, January 1971.

Washington Post, 11 February 1972.

Weyland, Otto. “The Air Campaign in Korea,” Air Force

Magazine, August 1954.

Whitney, Craig. (Unknown title). New York Times. 12

December 1971.

Official Documents

Contemporary History of Effective Combat Operations

(CHECO) Reports

Atchison, Richard M. The Slow Mover FAC Over the Ho Chi

Minh Trail, 1965–1972. 3 February 1975.

Bear, James T. VNAF Improvement and Modernization

Program. 5 February 1970.

Brynn, Edward P. Reconnaisance in SEAsia, July 1966–June

1969. 15 July 1969.

Durkee, Richard A. Combat Skyspot. Headquarters PACAF,

9 August 1967.

Folkman, David I., and Philip D. Caine. The Cambodian

Campaign, 29 April–30 June 1970. 1 September 1970.

248
Hanks, Dorrell T. Riverline Operations in the Delta, May

1968–June 1969. 31 August 1969.

Harrison, Philip. Impact of Darkness and Weather on Air

Operations in SEA. 10 March 1969.

Helmka, Robert T., and Beverly Hale. USAF Operations from

Thailand, 1964–1965. 10 August 1966.

Johnson, Calvin R. Linebacker Operations: September–

December 1972. June 1973.

Loye, J. F., and Philip D. Caine. The Cambodian Campaign 1

July–October 1970. 31 December 1970.

Nicholson, Charles A. USAF Response to the Spring 1972 North

Vietnamese Offensive: Situation and Redeployment. 10

October 1972.

Overton, James B., Maj, USAF. FAC Operations in The Close

Air Support Role in South Vietnam. 31 January 1969.

Porter, Melvin F. Control of Airstrikes–January 1967–December

1968. 30 June 1969.

Roe, David, H., Maj, USAF, et al. The VNAF Air Divisions

Reports on Improvement and Modernization. 23 November

1971.

Sams, Kenneth. Operation Harvest Moon. Headquarters

PACAF. 31 January 1969.

Schlight, John, Lt Col, USAF. Jet Forward Air Controllers in

SEAsia, 1967–1969. October 1969.

Seig, Louis. Impact of Geography on Air Operations in SEA. 11

June 1970.

Thompson, A. W., Maj, USAF. Strike Control and

Reconnaissance (SCAR) in SEA. 22 January 1969.

Thorndale, C. William. Interdiction in SEAsia, November

1966–October 1968. March 1969.

———. Defense of Da Nang. 31 August 1969.

Trest, Warren A. Control of Air Strikes in SEA, 1961–1966. 1

March 1967.

United States PACAF. Operation Neutralize. June 1968.

Corona Harvest Reports

Command and Control, 1969.

Command, Control, Communications. Volume I, August 1970.

249
Out-Country Air Operations, Southeast Asia. 1 January

1965–31 March 1968. May 1968.

Out-Country Report. September 1966.

USAF Activities in Southeast Asia,1954–1964. Undated.

USAF Air Operations Against North Vietnam. 1 July 1971–30

June 1972. 1973.

RAND Reports

Edelman, J. I., et al. Airborne Visual Reconnaissance in South

Vietnam. RM-5049-ARPA, RAND. September 1966.

Farmer, J., and M. J. Strumwasser. The Evolution of the

Airborne Forward Air Controller; An Analysis of Mosquito

Operations in Korea. RM-5430PR, October 1967.

Graham, William B., and Amron H. Katz, SIAT: Single

Integrated Attack Team, A Concept for Offensive Military

Operations in South Vietnam. 4400-PR, 1964.

Unit Histories

Commander in chief, Pacific Command. 1961.

Commando Sabre Operations. April–June 1969; July–

September 1967, July–September 1968; July–December

1968; January–March 1969; April–June 1969; October–

December 1968; October–December 1969; January–March

1970; April–June 1970.

Deputy of Operations, Fifth Air Force. December 1951.

Director of Plans, USAF. July–December 1961; July–December

1963.

Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing. July 1968–May 1969; October–

December 1968; January–March 1969; October–

December 1969; January–March 1970; April–June 1970;

July–September 1970.

Fifth Air Force. July–December 1952.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 1965.

Office of Engineering, Fifth Air Force. May–November 1950.

PACAF. January–June 1964; July 1964–June 1965; January–

December 1966; July 1969–June 1970.

Second Air Division. January–June 1964; July–December

1964; January–June 1965.

250
Second Echelon Division. November 1961–October 1962.

Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force. January–December 1972 and

support documents.

Special Air Warfare Center. April–December 1962; January–

June 1963; July–December 1963.

Tactical Air Command. 1 July–30 November 1950. Volume I;

July–December 1964; January–December 1965.

Thirteenth Air Force. January–June 1963; July–December 1963.

18th Fighter-Bomber Wing. October 1951–July 1953.

27th Fighter-Escort Wing. March 1951.

31st Tactical Fighter Wing. April–June 1970.

35th Tactical Fighter Wing. October–December 1967.

36th Fighter-Bomber Group. July 1951–March 1952.

37th Tactical Fighter Wing. July–September 1967; October–

December 1967; January–March 1968; July–September

1968; October–December 1968; April–June 1969.

49th Fighter-Bomber Group. February 1951.

366th Tactical Fighter Wing. April–June 1969; July–September

1969; April–June 1970; July–September 1970.

388th Tactical Fighter Wing. January–March 1969; April–June

1969; July–September 1969; October–December 1969;

January–March 1970.

401st Tactical Fighter Wing. July–December 1964.

432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. April–June 1969;

July–September 1969; October–December 1969; Current

Operations Division. April–June 1969.

497th Tactical Fighter Wing. October–December 1969.

504th Tactical Air Support Group. July–December 1968;

July–September 1969; October–December 1969.

6132d Tactical Air Control Group. July–August 1950;

September–October 1951.

6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Airborne). July 1950–July

1951 and supplements.

Letters

Anthis, Gen Bollen H. To Gen Jacob E. Smart, 25 November

1963.

Bertram, Lt Col William E. To commander, 27th FighterEscort Wing, 15 March 1951.

251
Bevan, Col Walter L., Jr. Director of Operations, Seventh Air

Force. To 432d TRW Commander. Subject: Not given, 3

July 1969.

Commander in Chief, Far East. To commanding general,

Eighth Army, XVI Corps, FEAF. Subject: Air-Ground

Operations, 11 August 1952.

Corbin, Thomas G., SAWC Commander. To Gen Gabriel P.

Disosway, Tactical Air Command Commander. Subject:

Quality of FAC Trainees, 20 January 1967.

Delia, E. J. Capt., Adjunct, Eighth Fighter Bomber Wing. To

commanding general, FAF. Subject: Mission Summary, 17

January 1953.

Deputy Commander for Operations, Seventh Air Force. To

Plans, Seventh Air Force. Subject: Misty FAC Operational

Requirement, 15 March 1968.

Galligan, Walter T., Maj Gen. Director TACC, Seventh Air

Force. To Deputy Director, TACC, Seventh Air Force.

Subject: Vietnamization of SEA TACS, 7 July 1970.

Gleason, Robert L., Lt Col. To Col Ray Bowers, Office of Air

Force History. Subject: Not given, 30 December 1971.

Greene, William G., Operations Analyst. To Maj George

Partridge, Air-Ground Control Branch, Director of

Operations. Subject: Comments on Working Copy of the

Draft Report by the FAC and SCAR Working Group, 4

August 1969.

I DASC. To Chief, Air Force Advisory Team1. Subject:

Phase-out of US FACs in ARVN System, 10 January 1971.

Partridge, George, Maj. To Lt Gen J. A. Van Fleet, CG EUSAK.

Subject: Joint Air-Ground Operations Board, no date

given.

Sheppard, Donald W., and James E. Risinger, Capts, Third

TFW. To Director, Tiger Hound and Tally Ho Divisions,

Seventh Air Force. Subject: In-flight Evaluation of PVS-3

Night Starlight Scope, 16 June 1968.

37th TFW. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Not given, 14

December 1968.

———. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Commando Sabre Night

Operations, October 1968.

252
———. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Special Operational

Historical Report, 9 April 1969.

———. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Report of FAC Training,

20 August 1968.

———. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Report on FAC Training,

26 August 1968.

———. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: End of Training

Comments/Recommendations of 366 TFW, 20 August

1968.

366th TFW. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Not given, 20

August 1968.

432d TRW. To Seventh Air Force. Subject: Falcon FAC Report,

24 May 1969.

Memorandums

Bottomly, Col Heath. To Gen Norman O. Sweat, Deputy

Director for Plans, Seventh Air Force. Subject: Not given, 5

January 1968.

Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC. To Chief of Staff, USAF. Subject:

Control of Tactical Air Support, 9 June 1950.

Commanding General, Far East Air Forces. To Chief of Staff,

USAF. Subject: Requirements for Increased Combat

Effectiveness, 10 June 1951.

Director of Plans, USAF. To Chief of Staff, USAF. Subject:

CINCPAC Briefing on Jungle Jim. 16 October 1961.

———. To Chief of Staff, 1 March 1962.

White, Thomas D., Maj Gen. To Secretary of the Air Force.

Subject: 4 May 1950. Not given.

Messages

Chief of Secretary of the Air Force. To JCS, 8 February 1963.

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. To Joint Chiefs of Staff,

8 February 1963.

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. To Pacific Air Force, 24

December 1964.

Commander in chief, Pacific Command. To Chief, Military

Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 16 November 1961.

———. To Defense Intelligence, 13 March 1963.

253
———. Commander in chief, Pacific Command. To Chief of

Staff, United States Air Force, 15 March and 11 May

1963.

———. To Seventh Air Force, 13 August 1969.

2d Air Division. To Pacific Air Force, 10 January; 21 February;

and 12 April 1964.

Detachment 2, Eighteenth Tactical Fighter Wing. To 2d Air

Division, 18 January 1965. 2d Air Division. To Pacific Air

Force, 22 March 1963; 29 September 1963; 5 October

1963.

Detachment 9, 2d Air Division. To Pacific Air Forces, 21

November 1961.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. To commander in chief, Pacific

Command. 26 December 1961.

———. To commander in chief, Pacific Command. 1 November

1963. Pacific Air Force. To 2d Air Division, 30 October

1963.

———. To commander in chief, Pacific Command. 12 May 1964.

———. To commander in chief, Pacific Command 27 January

and 4 February 1964.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. To commander in

chief, Pacific Command, 3 October 1963.

———. To Joint Chief of Staff, 13 June 1964.

———. To 2d Air Division, 27 March 1964.

———. To 2d Air Division, 29 October 1964 and 20 November

1964.

———. To commander in chief, Pacific Command, 11 August

1964. 2d Air Division. To Pacific Air Force, 18 February

1963.

Pacific Air Force. To commander in chief, Pacific Command, 8

May 1962.

———. To Chief of Staff, Air Force, 1 January 1963.

———. To Chief of Staff, Air Force, 20 February 1963.

———. To Thirteenth Air Force, 8 May 1964.

Seventh Air Force. To CHJUSMAGTHAI, 10 March 1967.

———. To 432d TRW, 19 March 1969.

———. To 432d TRW, 19 March 1969.

———. To 432d TRW, 23 May 1969.

254
———. To 432d TRW, 24 April 1969. 2d advanced echelon. To

Thirteenth Air Force, 21 April 1962.

Thirteenth Air Force. To Pacific Air Force, 27 January 1965.

2d Air Division. To Pacific Air Force, 10 January; 21 February;

and 12 April 1964.

———. To Thirteenth Air Force, 23 January 1964.

———. To Thirteenth Air Force, 2 March 1964. To Chief of

Staff, 15 April 1964. To Pacific Air Force, 20 April 1964.

———. To 23d air base group, 23 December 1964.

———. To 80th tactical fighter squadron, 25 December 1964.

———. To Pacific Air Force, 17 January 1965.

———. To Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 15 March

1965.

———. To Pacific Air Force, 28 January 1965.

366th Tactical Fighter Wing. To Seventh Air Force, 10

November 1968.

388th Tactical Fighter Wing. To Seventh Air Force, 5 January

1969.

———. To Seventh Air Force and 432d TRW, 25 July 1969.

Manuals and Regulations

2d Air Division Regulation 55–5. 22 January 1963.

504th Tactical Air Support Group Manual 55–3. 1 March

1970.

Continental Air Command Regulation 26–1. OrganizationTactical Air Command. 11 August 1950.

Operations Order (OPORD) 439–67. Combat Skyspot. 10

March1967.

Tactical Air Command Manual 2-4. Tactical Air Control Party.

May 1965.

Tactical Air Command Pamphlet (TACP) 50–28. J-Fire. July

1989.

“Joint Task Force Operations” (Draft). HQ US Strike

Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.,15 April 1964.

255
Studies

“Close Air Support Operations in Korea: Preliminary

Evaluation,” Operations Research Office, HQ FEC,

February 1951.

“Cost Effectiveness of Close Support Aircraft,” Langley AFB,

Va., 1965.

Eckhardt, George S. “Command and Control, 1950–1969,”

Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1974.

“Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine for Close Air

Support.” Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History,

March 1973.

“Linebacker II: USAF Bombing Survey.” Headquarters PACAF,

April 1973.

“The Tactical Air Control System,” in “Report on the Korean

War,” II. Maxwell AFB., Ala., Air University Library,

Documents Section, M-U 35961-1, September 1954.

“The Vietcong,” John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare.

November 1965.

Whitson, W. L., et al. “Preliminary Evaluation of Close Support

Operations in Korea,” Operations Research Office, Far

East Command. 1 February 1951.

Other Documents

AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961–64.

Far East Air Force Mission Summary. 16 November 1950.

Headquarters, Far East Air Force “Weekly Intelligence

Roundups.” April–May 1951.

Korean Evaluation Report. Volume III: “Operations and

Tactics.”

Weekly Activities Report, 27th Fighter-Escort Wing. 12–18

March 1951.

Weekly Activity Report, PACAF. June 26–3 July 1964.

Unpublished Materials

Air War College and Air Command and Staff School Studies.

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

256
Brown, Donald R. “Guide for Case Study: Tactical Air in

Limited War.” Air University Library, Maxwell, AFB, Ala.,

undated.

Crawford, Thomas M. “The Airborne Forward Air Controller—

Peacetime Casualty.” Air University Study No. 3894, Air

War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., undated.

Crowe, Myron W. “The Development of Close Air Support.” Air

War College Thesis, June 1968.

Cunningham, D. D. “Close Air Support Aircraft.” Special

Study, Air Command and Staff School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

16 May 1960.

“Effective SEAasia Tactics (TACS),” Headquarters USAF, draft,

1969.

Ella, Paul S.; Richard Joyce; Robert H. Williams, and William

Woodworth. “US Army Special Forces and Similar Internal

Defense Advisory Operations in Mainland Southeast Asia,

1962–67.” Research Analysis Corporation, June 1969.

Lescher, Charles O., Jr., Maj, USAF. “Forward Air Controller

Selection Criteria and Vietnam Tour Length.” Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College Thesis, June

1968.

Momack, Stanley M. “Use of the Jet Fighter Aircraft as a

Forward Air Control Vehicle in a Non-Permissive

Environment.” Research Study, Air War College, April

1976.

Operational Test and Evaluation Stabilized Night Observation

Device (Eye Glass),” Test Report, Special Air Warfare

Center. Eglin AFB, Fla., undated.

Shackelford, William F. “Eleven Days in December: Linebacker

II.” Air War College Research Study, Air University,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1977.

Staff Study, Assistant for Evaluation. DCS/Development

USAF, subject: “What Can and Should the USAF Do to

Increase the Effectiveness of Air-Ground Operations?,”

December 1950.

Summers, Charles, M., Maj, USAF. “Interdiction Concepts and

Doctrine: 1954 through 1968.” Air Command and Staff

Thesis, Air University, Maxwell, AFB, Ala., May 1969.

257
“Tactics and Techniques of Close Air Support Operations,

1961–1973.” Office of Air Force History, 1976.

“United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 25

June–1 Nov 1950.” USAF Historical Study No. 71, 1 July

1952.

“United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict.”

USAF Historical Study No. 72, Maxwell AFB, Air

University Library, Documents Section.

Wilkins, George I. “The FAC Factor in South Vietnam.” Air War

College Study, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

November 1970.

End of Tour Reports

Doyle, M. M., Lt Col, and John P. Gilbert. February

1962–August 1963.

McDonald, A. K., Col, commander, Eighth TFWg. July 1969.

Mellish, David S., Lt Col. 15 January 1964.

Nash, Slade, Col, Deputy Commander for Operations and Vice

Commander. Eighth TFW. January 1969.

O’Donnell, John F., Maj, 388th TFWg Tactics Officer. Subject:

Tiger FAC Program, April 1969.

Pattillo, Charles C., Col, commander, Eighth TFW. June 1969.

Ruonavaara, Russell B., Lt Col, Operations Officer, 20th TASS.

10 May 1972.

Schmitt, John G., Maj. 2 September 1963.

Tompkins, Gary R., Capt. 18 October 1967.

Other Documents

Air-to-Ground Operations School, Introduction Pamphlet.

1994.

Freedman, Roswell and Ronald Brown. “The Evolution of

Interdiction.” USAF Course Outline, Air War College.

USAFHRA, undated.

“Laos: April 1971.” Staff Report, Subcommittee on US Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Committee on

Foreign Relations, US Senate, 3 August 1971, GPO.

MACV Summary of Highlights. February 1962–February 1963.

“Summary of Misty Bronco Operations, April–June 1969.”

258
TACLO Activity Report 17. 15 September 1968.

———18. 30 September 1968.

USAF Management Summary in SEA. 19 February 1971.

Yates, W. J., Col, chairman. Report. Subject: “Report on Joint

Air-Ground Operations Conference held at Headquarters

Fifth Air Force, Seoul, Korea, 8–22 August 1953.

Related Sources

Books

Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A. Manson. The Sea War in

Korea. Annapolis: Md.: United States Naval Institute,

1957.

Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate, eds. The Army Air

Forces in World War II, Vol. 2; Europe: Torch to Pointblank.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949.

“German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army.” USAF

Historical Study, Air University Library, Documents

Section, M-U 27218, 1962.

Jones, H. A. The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part

Played in the Great War by The Royal Air Force. Volume 2

of 6. London, Clarendon Press, 1922–1937.

Knaack, Marcelle S., comp. Encyclopedia of US Air Force

Aircraft and Missile Systems. vol I: Post-World War II

Fighters. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1978.

Mirande, Henri, and Louis Olivier. Sur la Bataille, Journal d’un

Aviateur Francais a l’Armee Bulgare, Au Seige d’Air

divisionrianople. Paris, 1913.

Neumann, Georg P. Die Deutschen Luftstreitkrafte im

Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1920.

Slessor, J. C. Air Power and Armies. London, Oxford

University Press, reprinted by AMS Press, New York,

1936.

Smith, Peter C. Dive Bomber! An Illustrated History. Annapolis,

Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Standard Aircraft Characteristics: The T-6G Texan. Air Material

Command. US Air Force, 12 April 1950.

259
———. The F-51H Mustang. Air Material Command, USAF. 3

July 1950.

———. The F-80A Shooting Star. Air Material Command,

USAF. 25 January 1950.

Taylor, John W. R., ed. Combat Aircraft of the World. London:

Ebury Press, 1969.

Taylor, Michael J. H., ed. Jane’s World Combat Aircraft.

London: Jane’s Information Group, 1988.

Tedder, Arthur William. Air Power in War. London: Hodder and

Stroughton, 1954.

———. With Prejudice, the War Memoirs of Marshall of the

Royal Air Force. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.

The Accomplishments of Airpower in the Malayan Emergency

(1948–1960), Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies

Institute, Air University, May 1963.

Wise, S. F. Canadian Airmen and the First World War (The

Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force). Vol. I,

Toronto: 1980.

Articles and Periodicals

Boggs, Charles W. “Marine Aviation: Origins and Growth,”

Marine Corps Gazette 34 (November 1950).

Huston, James A. “Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II:

The Army Experience,” Military Affairs,14 (Winter 1950).

Laine, Serge. “l’Aeronautique Militaire Francaise au Maroc

(1911–1939),” in Cooling.

Madelin, Ian. “The Emperor’s Clothes Air Support,” Air

University Review (November–December 1979).

Official Documents

Air Forces and War. Text for Army War College Course,

1937–1938. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Military History

Institute, undated.

Attack Aviation 1935–1936. Air Corps Tactical School Text,

United States Air Force Historical Research Agency

(USAFHRA), undated.

260
Aviation in Support of Ground Forces. War Department Field

Manual 31-35, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing

Office, 9 April 1942.

Close Support of the Fifth Army. Headquarters, Mediterranean

Allied Air Forces, 1945, Maxwell AFB., Ala., USAFHRA.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms—JCS Publication I.

Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 3 January

1972.

Directive on Close Support Bombing, British War Office, WO

106/5162, 6 December 1940.

Heflin, Woodford Agee, ed., The United States Air Force

Dictionary. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1956.

Mitchell, William. “United States Army, Provisional Manual of

Operations,” 23 December 1918.

Tactics and Techniques Developed by the United States Tactical

Air Commands in the European Theater of Operations.

Army Air Forces

Evaluation Board in the European Theater of Operations,

March 1945.

The Employment of Combat Aviation. Tentative text, USAF,

April 1939.

War Department Publication: Field Manual 100-20. “Command

and Employment of Air Power.” July 1943.

261
Index

12th Tactical Fighter Wing: 127, 181

17th parallel: 109

187th Regimental Combat Team: 46

18th parallel: 161

199th Light Infantry Brigade: 113

19th parallel: 156, 161

19th Tactical Air Support Squadron: 110

19th TASS: 113, 117, 161

1Hs: 203

1st Air Cavalry Division: 113

1st Air Commando Squadron (Composite): 95

1st Brigade: 114

1st Commando Squadron: 128

1st Infantry Division: 113

20/40 formula: 131

20-channel VHF radio: 67

20th parallel: 213, 215, 217

20th Signal Company: 42

20th TASS: 113, 117, 152, 161

20th, 21st, and 22d TASSs: 114

21st TASS: 117

22d TASS: 117, 124, 161

23d TASS: 117, 147, 152, 161

24th Division L-17s: 34

24th Infantry Division: 30, 35

25th Infantry Division: 113

27th Wing: 36

2d Air Division: 111, 115

35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron: 25

366th Tactical Fighter Wing: 175, 182

366th TFW: 214

388th Tactical Fighter Wing: 187

38th parallel: 25–26, 29, 65

3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division: 115

3d TFW: 176

263
416th TFS: 172

428th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 168

432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing: 189

4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron: 84

44th and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons: 168

44th TFS: 168

45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron’s (TRS) RF-51s: 67

460th tactical reconnaissance wing: 180

469th TFS: 187

49th tactical fighter wing: 214

4th Air Commando Squadron: 131

502d Tactical Control Group: 66

502d TCG: 42

504th tactical air support group: 116, 172

504th TASG: 118

507th Tactical Control Group: 82

51st Fighter Group: 36

56th Air Commando Wing: 160

56th Special Operations Wing: 152

5th Infantry Division: 114

6132d aircraft control and warning squadron (ACWS): 42

6132d tactical air control group (TACG): 38

6147th Squadron: 47, 76

6147th tactical control group: 42, 60

6147th tactical control squadron, airborne: 38

6147th TCG Deactivated: 74

6147th TCG: 67

6149th TCS: 73

68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron (FAWS): 25

80 Squadron: 4

80th tactical fighter squadron: 167

8th Fighter Group: 36

8th Tactical Fighter Wing: 191

A-10: 230

A-1: 128, 154, 168, 169, 203, 211

A-37: 167, 203, 206

A-4: 185

A-7: 167, 220

264
Abrams, Gen Creighton: 208, 210, 215

AC-119: 203, 205

AC-47: 127, 129, 131, 133, 154, 203, 205

Advance Headquarters, FAF: 37

advances in military technology: 233

AGOS: 61

Air America: 159, 168

Air Combat Command: 61

Air Commando: 84

air defense command: 16

Air Force doctrine: 241

Air Force Space Command: 236

Air Force/Army Agreement of March–April 1965: 125

air liaison officer (ALO): 40

Air mission priorities: 10

air operations center: 90

air superiority: 22, 77, 231

Air Support Control: 9

air warfare center: 61

airborne FAC: 45, 74

airborne tactical air coordinator (A-TAC): 32

air-ground controllers: 72

air-ground coordination: 232

Air-Ground Operations School (AGOS): 60

airpower’s priorities in Korea: 19

Allied Forces Northwest Africa: 10

Almond, Maj Gen Edward: 33

ALO/FAC program: 77

America Division: 114

American I and IX Corps: 67

American policy: 65

Americans worked as assistant ALOs: 91

Anderson, Gen S. F.: 72

Anthis, Gen Bollen H.: 90

antiwar movement: 201, 209

Anyang-Inchon-Yongdungpo area: 68

Area Echo: 175

armed FACs flying OV-10s: 112

Armistice: 4, 73

Armstrong, Lt Frank H.: 48

Army 52d Aviation Battalion: 169

Army observers: 39, 58

265
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN): 94, 201

Army War College: 7

ARN-92: 190

Arnold, Brig Gen Henry H.: 7, 8

artillery-spotting airplane: 2

Ashau: 127, 134

Ashiya: 31

Aspin, Les: 235

ATC: 115

Atlanta/Falcon team: 190

Atlanta: 190

B-26: 66, 69, 72, 82, 84, 87, 95

B-29: 30, 66, 72

B-52: 133, 158, 163, 211, 216

B-57: 154

Bai Thuong: 162

Balkan Wars: 1

Ban Kari Pass: 153

Bangkok: 184

Barrel Roll Working Group: 187

Barrel Roll: 150, 157, 187–188

Barthelemy Pass: 162

Battle of Okinawa: 16

Battle of the Somme: 3

Battle, Maj Benjamin R.: 184

battles of An Loc and the highland regions: 215

Ben Karai: 175

Bien Hoa: 87, 176, 214

Blind Bat (C-130): 184

bomb damage assessment (BDA): 55

bomb tonnage: 201

Bosnia-Herzegovina: 237

Bottom-Up Review: 235

Bradley, Gen Omar: 11

Bright Star ‘94: 237

British, the: 2, 233

Brown, 1Lt Chester L.: 73

Brown, Dr. Harold: 110

Bryant, Lt James A.: 34

Bullpup: 168

Butz, J. S., Jr.: 122

266
C-119: 132

C-123 Candlesticks: 183

C-130 Blindbats: 183

C-130, C-123, and C-7: 211

C-130: 132, 133, 154, 211, 237

C-141: 237

C-47: 47, 52, 67, 68, 82, 84, 154, 158

Cairney, Capt Tom: 91

Cam Rahn Bay: 132

Cambodia: 126, 150, 163, 184, 201, 208

Camp Holloway: 169

Campbell, Maj John F.: 124

Carlton, Lt Col Merrill H.: 34 39, 45, 47

carrier-based pilots: 36

Carter Capt Tennis: 128

CAS: 18, 19, 31

at night: 131

coordinating requests for: 94

effectiveness: 66, 76

in Cambodia: 161

sorties: 71

Casablanca Conference: 10

Characteristics of importance in any FAC aircraft: 229

China: 65

Chinese intervention in Korea: 65

Chinese, the: 26, 66

Chinhae: 31

Chinnampo: 46

Chochiwon: 35

choke point concept of operations: 152

Chonui: 34

Chosen Reservoir: 29

Chu Lai: 114

CINCPAC: 92, 167

CINCPACAF: 118

Clark, Gen Albert P.: 119

Clark, Gen Mark: 11

Clay, Gen Lucius Jr: 213

cluster bomb units: 129

Cole, Vic: 49

Combat Crew Training Center: 61

Combat Skyspot: 149

267
Combined VNAF-USAF staffs: 94

Commander of the Navy of the Far East (ComNavFE): 57

Commando Hunt: 156

Commando Sabre: 171, 178

Communist Losses in the First Year: 70

comparing Korea and Vietnam: 240

Constant Guard’s aircraft: 214

continental air command: 16

Control of USAF air strikes: 120

control station Mellow: 38

controlling strike aircraft near friendly ground troops: 120

cooperation between FAF and Eighth Army: 67

cooperation with Vietnamese L-19 controllers: 93

Corbin, Maj Gen Thomas G.: 118

counterinsurgency activities: 81

Covey (O-1): 152, 184

Cox, Maj Jerry: 218

Cricket: 155

Da Nang: 113, 167–168, 174, 185, 214

DASC: 94, 116, 204, 211

Dean, Maj Gen William F.: 30

deep reconnaissance: 50, 57

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 82, 90, 92, 94

Dien Bien Phu: 133

Disosway, Gen Gabriel P.: 118

Dixie station: 22, 132

DMZ: 22, 126, 150, 163, 180, 185–186, 201, 213

Dong Hoi: 163, 169

dry monsoon: 149

Dwyer, Maj Gerald T.: 134

EC-121: 156

Edinburgh, Lt Aubrey C.: 69

Eglin AFB: 61, 84

Eighth Army: 21, 29, 31, 33, 36, 46, 60, 65, 69

Eighth Fighter-Bomber Wing: 72

Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing: 184

Eighth United States Army-Korea (EUSAK): 37

Eisenhower, Gen Dwight D.: 9

En-lai, Premier Chou: 26

EUSAK headquarters at Taegu: 37

268
Evans, Maj Douglas: 91

Eyeglass scope: 147

F-100: 127, 149, 154, 167, 169, 171, 176, 179, 185, 194, 230

F-105: 154, 167–169, 174, 176, 189

F-111: 167, 216

F-16 and A-10 pilots: 228

F-4 and A-7 strike aircraft: 216

F-4 FAC Section: 184

F-4 Phantom: 69, 127, 167–168, 180–181 183, 185–188, 230, 240

F-5: 167, 203, 206–207

F-51 Mustang: 26, 28, 33, 41

F-80: 230

F-80C: 26, 28, 31, 33, 36

F-82G: 25–26

F-84 and F-86 wings: 72

F-84: 33, 36, 69

F-86 Sabre: 30

FAC:

aircraft, design of: 60

concept: 45

corps: 110

effectiveness: 121

in Korea: 45

shortage: 114

Survivability: 59

FAC/Reconnaissance Teams: 189

FAF: 32

Falcon AFB: 236

Falcon FAC unit: 190

Falcon/Laredo: 189

Far East Air Force Bomber Command: 65

Far East Air Forces: 20, 25–26, 32, 57, 66, 70

Far East Air Materiel Command: 38

Farm Gate: 87, 95, 109

Fast-FAC program: 195, 234

Felt, CINCPAC Adm Harry: 92, 94

Ferguson, Col James E.: 42

Field Manual 31-35, Air Ground Operations: 227

Fifth Air Force: 21, 25, 56, 65

Fifth Army: 11

fighter-bombers: 28

269
first American FACs in Southeast Asia: 91

First and Third Marine Divisions: 22

first comprehensive airborne forward air controller program: 45

first Farm Gate detachment: 109

First Marine Air Wing: 21, 32, 71

first USAF kill: 25

Fisher, Maj Bernard C.: 128

flak-suppression missions: 59

Flaming Dart: 169

Fleet Marine Force Pacific: 18

Fleeting targets: 193

Fort Benning tests: 9

Forward Air Controller Comparison: 194

forward air controller course: 61

French Army: 1

Fukuoka area: 28

G-3 air officer: 40

Geneva Accord: 81

Giap, Gen Vo Nguyen: 129

GPS information: 236, 238

Great Britain: 81

Groom, Col John F.: 154

ground commander: 57

ground controllers: 233

Guam: 16

Gulf of Tonkin: 22, 116, 132, 161, 176

Gulf War: 228

Gun Kill program: 193

Gunboat (later Gunship II): 132

Haiphong: 216

Haiti: 15

Hanoi: 82, 170, 215

Hargreaves, Capt John H.: 68

Harkins, Gen Paul D.: 89

Helio Aircraft Corporation: 82

history’s longest truce talks: 73

Ho Chi Minh: 173

Ho Chi Minh trail: 128, 133, 147, 150, 154–155, 175, 201, 207,

210, 240

Hoengsong: 69

270
Hongchon: 69

Horner, Gen Charles A.: 236

Hubbard, Capt Wade: 218

Hudson, Lt William G.: 25

Hue Phu Bai: 186

hunter-killer teams: 179

Hurlburt Field, Florida: 61

Huston, James A.: 9

I and II Corps headquarters: 90

I Corps: 22

Ichon: 34

I Corps: 132

II Corps: 126

III and IV Corps: 22

III Corps Tactical Zone headquarters: 90

immediate CAS requests: 51

Inchon: 29

Inertial navigation systems: 238

infrared radar/optics: 125

interdiction campaign: : 65, 71, 148, 217, 234

International Control Commission (ICC): 81

interservice communication: 233

Iraqi Scud launchers: 237

Itazuke Air Base, Japan: 28, 31

IV Corps: 132

Iwo Jima: 15

jet FAC: 172, 192

J-Fire: 228

JOC: 19, 56

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 82, 133, 163, 169, 201

joint air-ground operations conference: 74

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 114, 169, 225

joint doctrine for close air support: 228

Joint General Staff: 127

joint operations center: 11

Jungle Jim: 84, 87, 89

KC-135: 116, 211, 237

Kennedy, John F.: 81–82, 87–89

Khe Sanh: 133–134

271
Khmer Republic: 208

Khrushchev, Nikita: 81

Killer Scout program: 228

King, Col Benjamin H.: 84, 88

Kirkpatrick, Maj Kenneth A.: 119

Kissinger, Henry A.: 216

Kochan, Lt Chester T.: 48

Kompong Thom: 209

Korat Air Base: 167, 185, 188

Korea: 228

Korean Military Advisory Group: 47

Korean People’s Army: 31

Korean War: 15, 18

Kratie, Cambodia: 218

Kunsan: 41

Kyushu: 31

L-17: 34

L-19 (O-1): 42, 60, 67, 91, 93, 95, 110, 230

L-5: 34, 47, 60, 230

Laird, Melvin: 202, 208

Lam Son: 211

Lam, Lt Gen Hoang Xuan: 211

Langley AFB: 37

Laos: 118, 150, 155, 201, 207, 210, 240

Laredo FACs: 191

lasers: 125

Latiolas, Lt Col Stanley P.: 34

Lavelle, Gen John D.: 213

LaVigne, Capt Edwin Duffy: 68

LeMay, Gen Curtis E.: 82, 88–89, 95, 168

Lima Site 36: 187

Linebacker: 212

LORAN: 186, 190, 192

low-light-level television: 147

Luftwaffe: 8, 18

Luke AFB: 61

MAAG: 89

MacArthur, Gen Douglas: 25

MACV: 90, 148, 150, 161, 169, 211

Mang Yang: 126

272
Marine Corps aviation in Korea: 214, 227

Marines in I Corps: 130

marking rockets: 55

Marshall, Gen George C.: 8

Mayaguez incident: 233

Mayo, Capt Richard G.: 184

McNamara, Robert S.: 84, 90, 160

McPeak, Gen Merrill A.: 236

Medal of Honor: 128

Mekong River: 209

Mellow control: 37

Meyers, Col Gilbert L.: 42

MiG force: 28, 163, 170, 207

MIGCAP: 216

Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG): 87

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV): 23, 89, 202

Minh, Maj Gen Tran Van: 171

Misawa external fuel tanks: 36

Misty: 172, 174–175, 184, 191

Mitchell, Col William Billy: 7

Mitchell, Lt Frank G.: 34

mobile nuclear missiles: 236

Momyer, Gen William W.: 115, 160, 171, 195

Montgomery, British general Bernard L.: 11

Moore, Lt Gen Joseph H.: 115, 168–169

Morocco: 1

Morris, Lt Harold E.: 34

Moscow: 129

Mosquito: 38

aircraft: 58

Cavalry Division: 40

commander: 45

flexibility of: 46

Mellow: 52, 67

operation: 195

planes: 67

squadron: 36

unit: 39

Wildwest: 40

Mosquito-TACC communication: 52

Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes: 153, 155, 175, 186, 191

multisource tactical system: 237

273
Myers, Maj D. Wayne: 128

Nail (O-2): 152, 184

Nakhon Phanom: 147, 155

Nam Phong: 214

Nape: 153

Nash, Col Slade: 184

National Campaign Plan: 94

Naval fighter aircraft: 58, 132, 168

A-1H: 168

A-24 Dauntless: 8

A-7: 153

CAS: 15

Corsairs: 68

P-1: 155

Navy/Marines: 15

near-real-time intelligence: 237

Nelson, Lt George W.: 41

neutrality of Laos and Cambodia: 217

Neville, Lew: 49

Night air operations: 129, 145, 176, 191

Ninth Air Force: 11

Nixon, Richard M.: 158, 163, 201, 208, 214–215

NKPA and communist Chinese forces: 50

Nol, Lt Gen Lon: 208

North Korean Air Force (NKAF): 25–26

North Korean People’s Army (NKPA): 26

North Vietnam: 201

North Vietnamese panhandle: 174

North Vietnamese: 170

northern Laos: 185

Northwest African Air Force: 10

O-1 Bird Dog: 110, 121, 147 154, 158, 169–170 230, 240

O-1 Raven controllers: 187

O-1, O-2, and OV-10: 117

O-2: 111, 147, 170, 174, 211

observers: 60

O’Donnell, Gen Emmett: 88

Okinawa: 16, 168

Operation:

Daniel Boone: 160

274
Harvest Moon: 114

Linebacker II: 215

Neutralize: 174

Rain Dance: 187

Ripper: 69

Sea Dragon: 178

Thor: 175

Thunderbolt: 68

operations research office (ORO): 49

Ordnance Selection: 53

OV-10: 111, 113, 133, 147, 211, 230, 240

PACAF: 88, 90, 92, 115, 117, 169

Pacific campaign: 15

pacification program: 211

Panmunjam: 73

Pao, Maj Gen Vang: 157

Paris talks: 215

Partridge, General: 30, 38, 42, 76, 195

Pathet Lao: 162

Pave Spot: 147

Pave Wolf: 193

people sniffers: 125

People’s Self-Defense Forces: 212

Persian Gulf War: 234

Phnom Penh: 201, 208

Photo reconnaissance: 180

photography: 125

Phouma, Souvanna: 150

Phoung Choy: 177

Phu Cat: 174, 179

Phuoc Long: 126

Pilatus Porters: 159

Plain of Jars: 162

Plei Me: 150

Pleiku: 114, 169

political and military objectives: 70

Pope AFB: 60

previously killed targets: 228

psychological warfare: 41

Pusan perimeter: 16, 29, 57

275
Quang Tri: 114, 211

Radar Bomb Scoring: 149

radar bombing: 206

radar-guided missions: 72

Ranch Hand: 89

Ratley, Capt Lonnie O.: 220

Raven: 152, 158–159, 187

RB-26: 95

reconnaissance wing: 72

Reed, Maj Lawrence L.: 118

regular South Vietnamese forces: 212

Republic of Korea (ROK): 25

Republic of South Korea: 65

RESCAP: 176

rescue combat air patrols: 176

RF-101: 154, 167–168

RF-4C: 133, 154, 180, 189, 211

Ridgway, Gen Matthew B.: 21, 67, 69, 75

Risinger, James E.: 176

ROK Air Force: 25

ROK Army: 35

Rolling Thunder: 152, 170, 212

Route Package:

I: 161, 213

II: 162

III: 162

IV: 162

V: 162

VI: 162, 216

I and II: 213

V and VI: 215

Rover Joe: 10

Royal Laotian Government: 150, 179

rules of engagement: 120

Rusk, Dean: 95

Sabres: 28

Saigon: 82, 92, 123, 201, 212

satellite targeting data: 236

SC-47: 84, 87, 92

search-and-rescue (SAR) missions: 178, 215

276
Seoul: 42, 69, 74

Seventh Air Force: 22, 112, 115, 124, 129, 172, 175, 179, 180–181,

183–184, 186

Seventh Fleet: 21, 37

Task Force 77: 32

Seventh Infantry Division: 29

Sharp, Adm Ulysses S. G.: 167

Shaw AFB: 82

Shepherd, Lt Gen Lemuel C.: 18

Sheppard, Donald W.: 176

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom: 208

SLAR: 125

Snare Drum: 191

Snort (OV-10): 184

Song Ly: 114

Song Troc River: 177

South Vietnamese Air Force: 89

Soviet Union: 65

Soviets, the: 129, 170

Spaatz, Gen Carl A.: 10

space systems: 236

Space Warfare Center: 236

special air warfare center (SAWC): 118

SS Saint Paul: 179

starlight scope: 129, 147, 155, 178, 183

Steel Tiger: 152, 174, 181, 185

Stormy FACs: 183–184

Strategic Air Command: 127, 214

Strategic airpower: 225

strategic relocatable targets (SRT): 237

Stratemeyer, Lt Gen George: 66

strike control and reconnaissance (SCAR): 117

Struble, Vice Adm Arthur D.: 37

Sullivan, William: 159–160

Super Sabre: 167, 177

SUU-25 flare dispenser: 176

Suwon: 30, 68

T-28: 82, 84, 87, 92, 154, 158,

T-34 tank: 41

T-6: 31, 34, 38–39, 46–47, 55, 58, 60, 67, 76, 194, 230, 240

T-6 Airborne Controller course: 61

277
TAC: 50, 52, 90, 115

TACAN/ADF: 177

TACAN: 187

TACC: 204

TACP: 38, 50, 66, 93, 115, 205

Tactical Air Command: 16, 84

tactical air control center (TACC): 11, 28

Tactical Air Control Party team: 61

tactical air control system: 88

Tactical Air Coordinator-Airborne (TAC-A).: 46

tactical air direction centers: 42

tactical air navigation (TACAN): 48

tactical airpower: 20, 225

Tactical Operations Center; 94

in Saigon: 127

tactical reconnaissance units: 12

TADC: 67

Taegu: 28, 36, 68

Taejon: 30, 34, 68

Takhli, Thailand: 214

Talon:

Command: 237

Lance: 237

Night: 237

Ready: 237

Shooter: 237

Touch: 237

Vision: 237

Tan Son Nhut: 82, 87, 90, 92

Tarawa: 15

Target Discrimination: 54

Task Force 77: 37, 65, 161

Tchepone, Laos: 168, 180, 210

TENCAP: 236

Tet offensive: 116, 134

Thailand: 184, 207, 220

Thanh Hoa: 162

Third Marine Amphibious Force: 22

Third Marine Division: 29

Thirteenth Air Force: 90, 92

Tho, Le Duc: 216

Tiger Hound: 150, 154

278
Tiger: 185, 187

troop carrier wings: 72

troops-in-contact: 241

Truce Ceremony: 73

Truman, President Harry S.: 25

Tuy Hoa: 175

Twelfth Army Group: 11

two-ship FAC operation: 193

U-17: 158

Ubon: 185

UC-123 spray aircraft: 154

Udorn, Thailand: 157

Umsong: 34

UN air superiority: 26

UN Command: 21, 25, 65

UNC Army: 71

United Nations: 81

United States Far East Command (USFEC): 25

United States Strike Command (STRICOM): 75

US:

25th Division: 68

Army Air Corps: 5

Army Air Service: 7

Embassy in Vientiane: 151

IX and X Corps: 69

Marine Corps: 7

military strategy: 81

XXIV Corps: 211

USAF doctrine: 77

USAF units in Thailand: 116

USSR: 81

Van Fleet, Lt Gen James A.: 21

Vandenberg, Gen Hoyt: 11, 19, 65

Vang Pao, General: 187

Varvi, Col Charles: 240

Vesely, Brig Gen David L.: 236

VHF-Omnirange (VOR): 48

Vienna: 81

Vientiane: 201

Vietcong: 84, 92, 123, 169

279
infiltration: 123

infrastructure: 129

Ninth Division: 126

Vietnam: 225

Vietnamese:

Air Force: 167, 171

FACs: 91

L-19: 92

operations against the Vietcong: 88

Skyraiders (AD-6): 92

Vietnamization: 201

VNAF FACs: 204

VNAF observer/FAC: 121

Vulcan cannon: 190

Walker, Lt Gen Walton H.: 33, 36

War at Night, The: 58

weather reconnaissance: 179

Westmoreland, Gen William C.: 121, 126, 128, 132, 169

wet monsoon: 149

Weyland, Gen Otto P.: 20–21, 41, 65

Wheeler, Gen Earle G.: 114

White, Maj Gen Thomas D.: 16

Wilkins, Lt Charles R.: 69

Wilkinson, Capt Dorrence E.: 69

Wolf: 184–186,

World War I: 1, 225

World War II: 2, 9, 225

X Corps: 33

Yaks: 34

Yalu: 20, 26, 29, 33

Yangpyong: 69

Yankee Station: 22, 132, 161

Yates, Col Dave: 185, 238

280
Mosquitoes to Wolves

The Evolution of the

Airborne Forward Air Controller

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Preston Bryant

Copy Editor

Lula Barnes

Cover Art

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and

Prepress Production

Linda C. Colson