IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 9, 2016 Session

CRESCENT SOCK COMPANY V. ROBERT H. YOE, III, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County

No. 2013-CV-297 Michael J. Sharp, Judge1

No. E2015-00948-COA-R3-CV-FILED-MAY 25, 2015

Crescent Sock Company filed this action against its Chief Executive Officer, Robert H. 

Yoe, III, the day before Crescent terminated his employment. It sought a declaratory 

judgment that Yoe’s employment contract and an agreement between Crescent and Yoe 

Enterprises, Inc., a company wholly owned by Yoe, were invalid and unenforceable. 

After a seven-day bench trial, the court found the two agreements to be valid. It enforced 

them and found in favor of Yoe and Yoe Enterprises on some of the causes of action in 

their counterclaim. The trial court awarded Yoe and Yoe Enterprises attorney’s fees of 

$765,880.77. Yoe’s employment contract, however, does not include Yoe Enterprises 

among those entitled to seek ―prevailing party‖ fees and expenses. Accordingly, we

vacate so much of the trial court’s judgment as grants attorney’s fees and litigation costs 

to Yoe Enterprises. However, we affirm the trial court’s judgment holding that Yoe is 

entitled to fees and expenses, but vacate the amount of his award. This case is remanded 

to the trial court for a hearing to determine how much of the $765,880.77 in attorney’s 

fees is properly associated with the professional services rendered to Yoe Enterprises. 

The trial court will make the same calculation with respect to the expenses. The trial 

court is instructed to subtract the fees and expenses applicable to Yoe Enterprises from 

the total fee award of $765,880.77 and the award of expenses and decree the balance to 

Yoe. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. On remand, the 

trial court is further instructed to award Yoe his reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses 

on appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Vacated in Part and Affirmed in Part; Case Remanded for Further Proceedings

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

 

1

Sitting by interchange.
2

John T. Winemiller, R. Bradford Brittian, and Ian G. McFarland, Knoxville, Tennessee, 

for appellant, Crescent Sock Company.

Gary R. Patrick, Cara J. Alday, and McKinley S. Lundy, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for 

appellees, Robert H. Yoe, III, and Yoe Enterprises, Inc.

I.

In 2000, Crescent hired Yoe to be its CEO and President, tasking him to run its 

hosiery manufacturing business. Over the next thirteen years, Crescent and Yoe entered 

into a series of contracts. On February 13, 2012, they executed one of the contracts at 

issue on this appeal, i.e., Yoe’s executive employment agreement (the employment 

agreement). It provides, among other things, that Crescent would be liable to Yoe for a 

severance payment of $2,000,000 if Yoe was fired without cause. On September 4, 2012, 

Crescent and Yoe Enterprises executed a contract (the Yoe Enterprises contract) 

providing, in pertinent part, as follows:

WHEREAS, Yoe and Crescent have from time to time 

entered into certain business agreements relative to branding 

and intellectual property rights that are not memorialized in 

the [employment agreement];

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to memorialize the prior 

business agreements concerning branding and intellectual 

property rights in a single agreement;

. . . the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as 

follows:

1. Ownership of Intellectual Property. Any and all new 

brands, and other intellectual property relating to such new 

brands, that are developed, registered, trademarked,

copyrighted, invented, started, conceived or designed by 

Crescent, Yoe and/or [Yoe Enterprises] from January 1, 2009

through the termination of Yoe’s employment with Crescent 

(the ―Intellectual Property‖) shall be 100% owned by [Yoe 

Enterprises]. Crescent covenants and agrees that, on or after 

the date of this Agreement, it shall perform, . . . any and all 

such further acts and assurances as necessary to effectuate, 

evidence and consummate the assignment of the Intellectual 

Property to [Yoe Enterprises.]
3

(Underlining, capitalization, and defined term in quotation marks, in original.)

On September 3, 2013, Crescent filed this lawsuit asking the trial court to declare 

the employment agreement and the Yoe Enterprises contract invalid. The next day, 

Crescent fired Yoe without cause. The trial court found as follows regarding the 

circumstances of Yoe’s termination:

The court finds that on September 4, 2013, Mr. Yoe was fired 

from Crescent, along with five (5) other employees who were 

referred to as the ―FITS Team.‖ The court finds that when 

Mr. Yoe was fired, Crescent’s attorneys met him at the 

business, along with a police officer. Mr. Yoe was simply 

served with a copy of the lawsuit filed by Ms. Allen and Ms. 

Boyd,2 which had been filed on September 3, 2013. After 

being served, Mr. Yoe was forced to leave the business 

without being able to retrieve his personal computer or his 

other personal belongings.

(Footnote added.)

Yoe answered and filed a counterclaim against Crescent and a third-party 

complaint against Allen and Boyd.3 The counterclaim sought relief in Yoe’s name and in 

the name of Yoe Enterprises. The filing of the counterclaim prompted Crescent to file an 

―amended and restated complaint‖ stating that ―[f]or the purpose of correcting the record, 

Plaintiff hereby amends its complaint to formally add YOE ENTERPRISES . . . as a 

Defendant in this matter.‖ (Capitalization in original.) Following an unsuccessful 

attempt at mediation, the court heard the case at a bench trial in late September 2014 that 

lasted seven days. In a well-written, thorough fifty-four-page opinion and order, the trial 

court found that ―Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] have established that the contracts in 

question are enforceable contracts.‖ In accordance with the Yoe Enterprises contract, the 

trial court held that three brands of socks created and developed during Yoe’s tenure with 

Crescent, FITS®, Jacks, and Game Knits®, along with associated intellectual property 

rights, were all owned by Yoe Enterprises. The court also initially found and held that 

Crescent had an exclusive license to produce socks under these three brands. 

 

2 Cathy Allen and Sandra Boyd are members of the Burn family, which has owned and 

controlled Crescent since its inception in the early 1900s. Allen was Vice President and 

Treasurer, and assumed the role of President and CEO upon the termination of Yoe. Boyd was 

Corporate Secretary and became Chief Operating Officer after Yoe’s termination.

3

The third-party claims are not at issue on this appeal.
4

Yoe and Yoe Enterprises disputed the trial court’s ―exclusive license‖ decree. 

They moved to alter or amend the judgment in order ―to request the clarification or 

revision of a single finding of fact‖ ‒ the court’s finding that ―Crescent has the exclusive 

ability to manufacture the FITS brand socks. . . .‖ They asserted that the proof at trial 

established that Crescent was to have the continuing exclusive right to manufacture the 

FITS brand socks only if Yoe voluntarily left Crescent. The trial court agreed with the 

counter-plaintiffs, stating in its modified judgment, as follows:

The court finds that the parties agree[d] that Crescent would 

have the exclusive ability to manufacture the FITS brand

socks only if Mr. Yoe left Crescent voluntarily apart from the 

wishes of Ms. Boyd and Ms. Allen. Because the court finds 

that Crescent terminated Mr. Yoe’s contract, the court finds 

that Crescent does not have the exclusive right to manufacture 

the brands owned by [Yoe Enterprises].

On January 14, 2015, Yoe and Yoe Enterprises filed a motion seeking 

discretionary costs of $28,058.44. In the same motion, they sought ―other litigation costs 

and expenses of $108,833.43‖ under the terms of the employment agreement, which 

provides that ―the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, 

costs, and expenses from the adverse party.‖ In opposition, Crescent argued that an

award of attorney’s fees was not appropriate, and asserted, in the alternative, that Yoe 

should not be awarded 100% of his attorney’s fees because he did not prevail on all of the 

causes of action in the counterclaim. Crescent also argued that Yoe Enterprises was not 

entitled to any fees or expenses because it is not a party to the employment agreement

and, hence, not a party to the ―prevailing party‖ provisions. The trial court awarded Yoe 

and Yoe Enterprises all of the attorney’s fees billed to them for the case, i.e., a total of 

$765,880.77. The court also awarded Yoe and Yoe Enterprises discretionary expenses of 

$28,058.44 and ―prevailing party‖ expenses of $108,833.43.4 Crescent timely filed a 

notice of appeal. 

II.

Crescent raises the following issues on appeal:

 

4 At some places in the record, these two figures are shown as $25,808.14 and 

$111,083.43. We have used the amounts that we believe are correct. If they are not, the trial 

court on remand can state what it finds the amounts to be.
5

1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding certain 

intellectual property to Yoe Enterprises, including several 

trademarks that the parties agree are owned by Crescent.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Crescent’s 

license to manufacture socks under the brands owned by Yoe 

Enterprises became non-exclusive when Crescent terminated 

Yoe’s employment without cause. 

3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Yoe attorney’s 

fees and litigation expenses.

4. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Yoe Enterprises

attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 

III.

In this non-jury case, our standard of review is de novo upon the record of the 

proceedings below; however, the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as 

to the trial court’s factual determinations, a presumption we must honor unless the 

evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Wright v. City of Knoxville, 

898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). There is no presumption of correctness as to the trial 

court’s legal conclusions. Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 

1996).

IV.

A.

In its first issue, Crescent challenges the following portion of the trial court’s 

ruling:

Based upon [Yoe’s] research and development, Yoe 

Enterprises, Inc. obtained a patent [for] the ornamental design 

for a toe seam and portion of a sock for the FITS® brand, and 

Patent No. D670,900 (see trial exhibit 67). Furthermore, Mr. 

Yoe obtained other intellectual property rights associated with 

the FITS®, Jacks and Gameknits brands, including trademark 

rights, domain rights and copyrights as to color, appearance, 

technology, packaging, and knitting machine specifications. 

(Exhibit 68). The court finds that all of these intellectual 
6

property rights are in the name of [Yoe Enterprises]. (Exhibit 

68).

(Emphasis added.) As can be seen, the court referenced trial exhibit 68, which is a chart 

listing trademarks, copyrights, and patents owned by Crescent and by Yoe Enterprises. 

Crescent interprets the trial court’s statement that ―all of these intellectual property rights 

are in the name of [Yoe Enterprises]‖ to mean that the court held that all of the 

intellectual properties listed on exhibit 68 are owned by Yoe Enterprises. We think the 

correct interpretation of the above paragraph is that all intellectual property rights 

associated with the FITS®, Jacks and Game Knits® brands are owned by Yoe 

Enterprises. In fact, the parties agree that the first six items listed on exhibit 68 are 

owned by Crescent. Yoe and Yoe Enterprises do not dispute the assertion in Crescent’s 

brief that ―the first six trademarks listed on Trial Exhibit 68 are trademarks unrelated to 

the FITS, JACKS, and GAME KNITS brands [and] are identified as trademarks 

registered in Crescent’s name.‖ (Capitalization in original.) Lest there be any question 

about this matter, the trial court on remand is instructed to enter an order reciting that 

Crescent owns the first six trademarks listed on trial exhibit 68.

B.

Crescent next argues that the trial court erred in holding that Crescent’s license to 

produce socks under the brands owned by Yoe Enterprises became non-exclusive when 

Crescent fired Yoe. This issue requires us to interpret the terms of the parties’ written 

agreements. As we observed in Wager v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. E2006-

01054-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4224723, at *10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Nov. 30, 2007), 

another case involving an executive employment contract and involuntary termination,

[i]n interpreting the contract, we must keep in mind several 

basic tenets of contract law. For instance, the language in 

dispute must be examined in the context of the entire 

agreement. Cocke County Bd. of Highway Comm’rs v. 

Newport Utils. Bd., 690 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tenn. 1985). ―All 

provisions of a contract should be construed as in harmony 

with each other, if such construction can be reasonably made, 

so as to avoid repugnancy between the several provisions of a 

single contract.‖ Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 119 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Also, words must be given their usual 

and ordinary interpretation. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. 

v. Bishops Gate Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1986). ―A strained construction may not be placed on 

the language used to find ambiguity where none exists.‖ 
7

Farmers-Peoples Bank v. Clemmer, 519 S.W.2d 801, 805 

(Tenn. 1975).

* * *

―The cardinal rule for interpretation of contracts is to 

ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that 

intention consistent with legal principles.‖ Rainey, 836 

S.W.2d at 118. Of course, the ―intention of the parties‖ refers 

to their intention when the contract was made, not their 

desired interpretations after a dispute arises. The court will 

look to the material contained within the four corners of the 

contract to ascertain its meaning as an expression of the 

parties’ intent. Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975). 

Therefore, if a contractual clause, read in the proper context, 

unambiguously mandates a particular result, we will not 

disturb that result merely because it may be harsh for one 

party or the other. 

* * *

―Any number of papers may be taken together to make out 

the written expression of the contract of the parties, provided 

there is sufficient connection between the papers.‖ 

Springfield Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 

293 S.W.2d 189, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956). ―When the 

parties’ agreement is contained in more than one document, 

all the documents should be considered together.‖ Ewing v. 

Smith, No. 85-294-II, 1986 WL 2582, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

M.S., filed Feb. 26, 1986).

Regarding the issue of the exclusive or non-exclusive nature of a license, a Federal 

Circuit Court has explained the general rule as follows:

Determining whether a licensee is an exclusive licensee or a 

bare licensee is a question of ascertaining the intent of the 

parties to the license as manifested by the terms of their 

agreement and examining the substance of the grant. The use 

of the word ―exclusive‖ is not controlling; what matters is the 

substance of the arrangement. Because patent rights are 
8

rights to ―exclude others,‖ see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), a 

licensee is an exclusive licensee only if the patentee has 

promised, expressly or impliedly, that ―others shall be 

excluded from practicing the invention‖ within the field 

covered by the license. Put another way, an exclusive license 

is ―a license to practice the invention . . . accompanied by the 

patent owner’s promise that others shall be excluded from 

practicing it within the field of use wherein the licensee is 

given leave.‖ Thus, if a patentee-licensor is free to grant 

licenses to others, licensees under that patent are not 

exclusive licensees.

* * *

To qualify as an exclusive license, an agreement must clearly 

manifest the patentee’s promise to refrain from granting to 

anyone else a license in the area of exclusivity.

Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis 

added; internal citations omitted). We agree with the Federal Court’s analysis. ―[A]

transfer of patent rights that is silent on whether or not the patent owner retains the right 

to grant other licenses to the patented inventions in the area of exclusivity grants a 

nonexclusive license.‖ Buckhorn Inc. v. Orbis Corp., No. 3:08-CV-00459, 2009 WL 

2176056, at *4 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 21, 2009) (citing Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1484-

85). 

In this case, on December 14, 2007, Crescent and Yoe executed an amendment to 

Yoe’s then-existing employment agreement5that provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Whereas it is acknowledged:

There are no longer opportunities for [Robert H. Yoe, III] to 

make large monies from:

1. the sale of Crescent

2. the increases in the net worth of Crescent

3. bonuses resulting from Crescent net income

 

5 Although this agreement was executed well before the execution of the two agreements 

Crescent sought to invalidate, the parties agree, and the trial court held, that the amendment was 

valid and pertinent to the licensing issue.
9

And where the executive board would like to make the job 

exciting and potentially financially rewarding for Bob and for 

the (Burn) family

The Executive Board has taken the below steps to align the 

short term and long term financial interests of Crescent 

stockholders and those interests of Bob’s.

Any and all new brands & related materials: developed, 

registered, trademarked, copyrighted or otherwise started and 

or designed by Crescent in years 2009 through Bob’s 

employment:

will be owned in full and completely by Yoe Enterprises. (At 

the time of this signing, none of these ―new brands‖ have 

been trademarked.)

[Yoe Enterprises] will license the ―brands‖ to Crescent for 

$1.00 a year.

* * *

IF Bob leaves the company apart from the wishes of Sandra 

[Boyd] and Cathy [Allen] without a mutually approved 

license agreement.

THEN Crescent has the right to accept or reject a 

manufacturing/sourcing agreement with terms that would 

allow them exclusivity to providing socks at 5% Royalty fee. 

(Underlining and capitalization in original; bullet points in original omitted.) 

The Yoe Enterprises contract executed on September 4, 2012, which reaffirms that 

―[a]ny and all new brands, and other intellectual property relating to such new brands, 

that are developed . . . by Crescent, Yoe and/or [Yoe Enterprises] from January 1, 2009

through the termination of Yoe’s employment with Crescent . . . shall be 100% owned by 

[Yoe Enterprises],‖ sets forth a royalty payment schedule providing that Crescent will 

pay one dollar in 2013 and 2014, and 5% of net sales in 2015 ―and thereafter.‖ The only 

provision containing the term ―license‖ in this agreement states as follows:
10

Licensing. On or before 1 year after the execution of this 

Agreement, [Yoe Enterprises] and Crescent will enter into an 

agreement for licensing/manufacturing/sourcing relative to 

the Intellectual Property . . .

(Underlining in original.) As Crescent recognizes in its brief, ―there was no evidence at 

trial that any such future agreement was ever prepared, let alone executed.‖ 

Nothing in the employment agreement, the Yoe Enterprises Contract, or the 2007 

amendment supports a conclusion that Yoe or Yoe Enterprises intended to grant Crescent 

an exclusive license in the event Yoe’s employment was involuntarily terminated. The 

2007 amendment, which the trial court found to be determinative on this question, 

explicitly provides that Crescent would be granted an option ―to accept or reject a 

manufacturing/sourcing agreement with terms that would allow them exclusivity‖ only if 

Yoe left the company ―apart from the wishes of‖ Boyd and Allen, the individuals who, on 

behalf of Crescent, ultimately fired him. The evidence fully supports the trial court’s 

determination that Crescent does not have an exclusive license.

C.

Crescent argues that the trial court erred in awarding Yoe his attorney’s fees. The 

employment contract contains the following fee-shifting provision:

12. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

a. Any claim or controversy arising out of or related to this 

Agreement (a dispute) shall be resolved as set forth in this 

Paragraph 12.

b. Either party may give the other party written notice of a 

request for resolution of a ―dispute‖ (a Request). For the next 

20 days, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith (with 

whatever advisors they desire, at their own expense), in an 

effort to resolve the dispute amicably and expeditiously.

c. In the event the Dispute is not resolved within the 20 day 

period, the parties shall participate in non-binding mediation 

in McMinn County, Tennessee, pursuant to such rules as the 

parties may agree.
11

d. In the event the dispute is not resolved by mediation within 

an additional 60 days, the parties may within 10 days, agree 

in writing to submit the ―Dispute‖ to binding arbitration in 

accordance with the rules to be agreed upon by the parties in 

such writing.

* * *

f. In the event the parties do not agree to arbitrate the 

―Dispute‖ with the 10 day period, then either party may 

commence litigation to resolve the ―Dispute‖ in a state or 

federal court located in Knox County, Tennessee, with 

respect to which each party hereby irrevocably consents and 

submits to the exclusive jurisdiction thereof.

g. If any civil action at law or equity, including any action for 

declaratory relief, is brought to construe, enforce or interpret 

the provisions of the Agreement pursuant to Paragraph 12 (f), 

the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable 

attorney’s fees, costs and expenses from the adverse party.

Regarding venue, the employment agreement also provides:

This ―Agreement‖ shall be governed, construed, and enforced 

in accordance with the laws of the State of Tennessee, and the 

parties agree that any judicial proceeding hereunder shall be 

held in the state o[r] federal courts located in McMinn 

County, Tennessee.

The first court action addressing the parties’ disputes was Crescent’s filing of a 

complaint in the trial court, the McMinn County Chancery Court. The employment 

agreement makes alternative dispute resolution optional; the first step towards ADR 

would be that ―[e]ither party may give the other party written notice of a request for 

resolution‖ of a dispute. (Emphasis added.) Crescent obviously elected not to pursue this 

route, but rather proceeded directly to court. Still, Crescent argues that Yoe did not 

follow the steps for ADR to which he agreed in section 12 of the employment agreement, 

and, as a consequence, is not entitled to seek attorney’s fees and expenses against 

Crescent. Furthermore, Crescent asserts that, since Yoe did not commence litigation in 

Knox County pursuant to paragraph 12(f), he thereby forfeited his right to seek attorney’s 

fees and expenses. Yoe responds by pointing out that if he had filed in Knox County, his 

action, in all likelihood, would have been dismissed pursuant to the prior suit pending 
12

doctrine, ―which dictates that a case is subject to dismissal if there is a prior lawsuit 

pending involving the same parties and the same subject matter.‖ West v. Vought 

Aircraft Indus., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tenn. 2008). Yoe also asserts that his 

counterclaim was compulsory in nature under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.01, such that he was 

required to raise his claims in response to Crescent’s McMinn County Chancery Court

lawsuit. The trial court held that Crescent waived the Knox County venue requirement

by electing to file in McMinn County, and that the provision in the agreement that in 

―any civil action‖ the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses 

was applicable and enforceable. We agree with the trial court. This litigation ended up 

in McMinn County because Crescent – totally on its own – decided to pursue relief in 

that venue. Yoe did not violate the terms of section 12 of the employment agreement by 

not pursuing ADR or by filing the counterclaim in the trial court.

Crescent next argues that Yoe should not be awarded all of his attorney’s fees

because he did not prevail on all of his claims in the counterclaim. In his September 19, 

2013 counterclaim, Yoe asserted causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit,

and unjust enrichment. In his amended counterclaim filed January 10, 2014, he added 

claims for ―misfeasance,‖ negligence, misappropriation/conversion of the FITS® brand, 

and breach of a ―duty to perform with due care.‖ The amended counterclaim was brought 

on behalf of both Yoe and Yoe Enterprises. Yoe and Yoe Enterprises later voluntarily 

dismissed all of their causes of action except for Yoe’s claims for breach of contract,

quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, and Yoe Enterprises’ claim for breach of 

contract. After the trial court entered its initial post-trial order, Crescent argued that Yoe 

was not entitled to recover fees and costs related to his nonsuited causes of action. The 

trial court held as follows in its final judgment:

The court has already found that the employment contract is 

valid and enforceable, and the executive employment 

agreement is valid and binding. The court has also found that 

the business agreement is valid and enforceable. Based upon 

all of the above, the court has already found that attorney[’]s 

fee[]s should be awarded in this matter. The court finds that 

the real issue is whether the attorney fee[]s involved are

reasonable and necessary, under all of the facts and 

circumstances in this case. This court has reviewed the 

litigation costs and charges and expenses, including the

attorney[’]s fee[]s incurred against the plaintiffs[’] claim. 

This court has also given great consideration to the amount of 

time spent by Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises]’ attorneys, and 

the complexity of the issues involved and the sheer amount of 

time spent to review the thousands of pages of documents. 
13

The court has also given great consideration to the sworn 

affidavit of attorney Sam Elliott and his statements based 

upon his review of the requests for attorney[’]s fee[]s, 

including but not limited to, the time spent, the hourly billing

rate for both Mr. Patrick and his firm as well as Mr. Jenne and 

his firm. Based upon all of the above, this court finds that the 

attorney[’]s fee[]s requested by Mr. Patrick and Mr. Jenne are 

reasonable, given all of the facts and circumstances in this 

case.6

Specifically, the court finds that there is a common core 

running throughout the entirety of this case. The court finds 

that the elements were so intertwined that there would be no 

way to reasonably determine which specific parts of any 

specific deposition may have been used regarding some 

issues but not others. In fact, given the nature of the case, this 

court has no way to determine which specific part of a 

deposition may have been used and/or why it was used. The 

court has no way to break down how much was spent 

addressing this specific individual claims based upon any 

certain or particular part of the various discovery that was 

taken in this case. The court simply finds that there is a 

common core of issues in the various claims that w[ere] tried 

in this case. The court finds that the use of discovery and the 

various parts of discovery are a part of the strategic plan of 

any counsel in preparing his or her case for trial. Therefore,

based upon the fact that there is a common core running 

throughout the entirety of this case, the court finds that the 

entirety of the attorney[’]s fee[]s charged by Mr. Patrick as

well as Mr. Jenne is reasonable, given all of the facts and 

circumstances present in this case. Therefore, the court finds 

that the motion for attorney[’]s fee[]s and expenses in the

total amount of $765,880.77 is reasonable and shall be 

awarded.

(Footnote added.)

 

6 Crescent does not contest the reasonableness of the fees or whether the work was 

necessary.
14

The United States Supreme Court addressed an argument similar to Crescent’s, 

i.e., that Yoe was not the ―prevailing party‖ on every one of his claims, and therefore 

should not recover all of his fees, in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983), 

stating:

In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly 

different claims for relief that are based on different facts and 

legal theories. In such a suit, even where the claims are 

brought against the same defendants—often an institution and 

its officers, as in this case—counsel’s work on one claim will 

be unrelated to his work on another claim. Accordingly, 

work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have 

been ―expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.‖ 

The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties 

requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had 

been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be 

awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.

. . . In other cases the plaintiff’s claims for relief will involve 

a common core of facts or will be based on related legal 

theories. Much of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to 

the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the 

hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit 

cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the 

district court should focus on the significance of the overall 

relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation.

Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney 

should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will 

encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, 

and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced 

award may be justified. In these circumstances the fee award 

should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to 

prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants in 

good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired 

outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to reach 

certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. 

The result is what matters.
15

(Internal citations and footnotes omitted); see also Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 

F.3d 802, 822-23 (6th Cir. 2013). Tennessee courts have applied this result-oriented 

―common core of facts‖ analysis in several cases. State Auto Ins. Co. v. Jones Stone 

Co., No. M2009-00049-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4841080, at *10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App., 

filed Dec. 15, 2009); Brunsting v. Brown, No. M2000-00888-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 

1168186, at *6-8 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Oct. 4, 2001); Lowe v. Johnson Cnty., No. 

03A01-9309-CH-00321, 1995 WL 306166, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed May 19, 1995).

In the present case, we agree with the trial court that the issues involved with the 

claims raised by Yoe were closely intertwined and involved a common core of facts. 

Furthermore, it is clear that Yoe obtained an excellent and successful result at trial. 

Under these circumstances, we affirm the judgment that Yoe is entitled to the entire 

amount of his attorney’s fees and costs under the employment agreement. 

D.

The trial court held that ―Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] are entitled to recover 

their attorney’s fees.‖ It ordered Crescent to pay the entire attorney’s fee bill rendered to 

Yoe, a total amount of $765,880.77. All the parties are in agreement, however, that the 

employment agreement providing for attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party was 

between Yoe and Crescent, and, therefore, Yoe Enterprises is not entitled to an award of 

its attorney’s fees and expenses under that agreement. Although Yoe Enterprises is a 

corporation wholly owned by Yoe, it and Yoe are legally distinct from one another, and 

have been treated as such throughout this litigation. The counter-plaintiffs’ counsel listed 

Yoe Enterprises as a separate counter-plaintiff, and brought distinct claims on its behalf, 

as distinguished from those asserted by Yoe. The attorneys for the counter-plaintiffs also 

achieved success on behalf of Yoe Enterprises, as it prevailed on its claim related to 

intellectual properties owned by Yoe Enterprises. 

None of the proof regarding attorney’s fees contains any differentiation with 

respect to fees attributable or charged to Yoe, as opposed to Yoe Enterprises. All of the 

bills and documentation treated the case as if the attorneys had only one client; Yoe and 

Yoe Enterprises were not billed separately. At oral argument, counsel for the counterplaintiffs stated that they in reality had just one client, Mr. Yoe, which is somewhat 

understandable given that he is the only natural person in the case and he wholly owns 

Yoe Enterprises. But the fact remains that Crescent agreed to pay attorney’s fees to Yoe

in the event he prevailed against it in a legal dispute; it never agreed to pay the fees of

Yoe Enterprises. Counsel also argues that it is impossible to go back and separate the 

time spent for his individual claims from the time spent for Yoe Enterprises’ claims. 

While it may be difficult, it is not impossible. In any event, to force Crescent to pay the 

entire bill of $765,880.77 would be indulging in the fiction that all of the work done by 
16

Yoe Enterprises’ attorneys on its behalf was provided gratis, which is neither logical nor 

just. Consequently, we remand for a determination of the amount of attorney’s fees 

attributable to the work done for Yoe Enterprises. Yoe Enterprises is not entitled to 

recover the amount of those fees from Crescent.

The trial court also awarded Yoe and Yoe Enterprises certain litigation expenses:

[T]he court finds that Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] incurred 

expert witness fees for depositions and for this trial.

Specifically, Mr. Yoe employed an accountant, Mike 

Costello, . . . who testified on behalf on Mr. Yoe and [Yoe 

Enterprises] as their accounting and valuation expert. The 

court found in it[]s final order that Mr. Costello engaged in an 

extensive review of the financial records of Crescent and all 

costs associated with the FITS product development. Mr. 

Costello was deposed by Crescent prior to the trial, and Mr.

Costello testified extensively at the trial as an expert witness. 

The court finds that Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] are 

entitled to these expert witness fees for depositions and for 

trial, as well as trial preparation/non-testimony time. With 

regard to other litigation costs and expenses, the court finds 

that pursuant to the terms of the provisions of the February 

15, 2012 executive employment agreement, the prevailing 

party is entitled to receive the costs and expenses of the 

litigation from Crescent, including all expert witness fees 

pursuant to the contractual provision in the February 15, 

2012 executive employment agreement. The court finds that 

Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] incurred expert witness fee 

expenses for the time spent by Mike Costello and his review 

of the books and the records of Crescent, his preparation of 

his expert report and his preparation for deposition and trial. 

Mr. Yoe and [Yoe Enterprises] are entitled to recover these 

expenses. 

(Emphasis added.) Again, because Yoe Enterprises is not a party to the employment 

agreement, it is not entitled to recover its share of the litigation expenses.7 

 

7

The award of discretionary expenses was pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04 and not the 

―prevailing party‖ provisions of the employment agreement.
17

On remand, the trial court should determine the proper amount of attorney’s fees 

and litigation expenses attributable to Yoe Enterprises to be deducted from the total

award of fees and expenses made by the trial court. 

Yoe argues that he is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal. Because Yoe is the 

primary prevailing party on appeal, we agree. On the other hand, under the analysis 

discussed above, Yoe Enterprises must bear the costs of its attorney’s fees and expenses

on appeal. In summary, the trial court shall take evidence and determine the proper 

amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be allocated to Yoe Enterprises both at trial and on 

appeal. We recognize that this will not be an easy task and may result in a number that is 

imprecise, but, as discussed in this opinion, it is our view that justice requires such an 

effort under these unusual circumstances. 

V.

We vacate so much of the trial court’s judgment as grants attorney’s fees and 

litigation costs to Yoe Enterprises. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Yoe is 

entitled to fees and expenses, but vacate the amount of the award. This case is remanded 

to the trial court for a hearing to determine how much of the fees and expenses awarded 

to Yoe and Yoe Enterprises is applicable to the professional services rendered to, and 

expenses of, Yoe Enterprises. Once this has been determined, the trial court will deduct 

that found amount from the total fee and expenses and award the balance to Yoe. At the 

hearing on remand, the trial court will determine, and award to Yoe, his fees and 

expenses on appeal. Except as addressed in this opinion, the trial court’s judgment is 

affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed equally to Crescent Sock Company and Yoe 

Enterprises, Inc. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the 

mandate of this opinion.

_______________________________

 CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE