SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1687-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM E. HINES,

a/k/a BILL HINES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Argued December 2, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez, Geiger, and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-01-

0140.

Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel 

and on the brief). 

Nicole Handy, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Nicole Handy, of counsel and on 

the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 24, 2020
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PER CURIAM

Defendant William E. Hines appeals from a November 15, 2018 judgment 

of conviction and sentence. After reviewing the record in light of the 

contentions on appeal and the applicable law, we affirm.

A jury indicted defendant of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) 

and (2) (count one); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count two); and fourth-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count three). 

The case proceeded to trial in September 2018. The State presented the 

following evidence. Defendant intermittently stayed in the one-bedroom 

apartment in Burlington Township leased by his mother, Nancy Allen, and her 

longtime boyfriend, Scott Willis. When staying there, defendant would sleep in 

the living room. The three had a tumultuous relationship, which eventually led 

to the stabbing death of Willis at the hands of defendant. 

On August 19, 2009, Allen called the police on Willis for domestic 

violence, and five days later, on August 24, 2009, Allen called the police on 

defendant for threatening to kill both Allen and Willis if Allen remained in a 

relationship with Willis after the August 19 altercation. Willis was charged with 

harassment, simple assault, and terroristic threats and defendant was charged 
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with terroristic threats, but all the charges were eventually dropped. Allen again 

called the police on Willis on October 16, 2013, this time because Willis 

allegedly stood over Allen with a knife and screamed, "if I were someone else, 

I'd kill you." 

On Sunday, October 29, 2017, Allen and Willis woke up at about 8:00 

a.m. to do their customary weekend cleaning of the apartment. While defendant 

was sleeping on a foldout chair in the living room, Willis directed defendant to 

leave the area so that Willis could vacuum. Defendant refused because he did 

not feel well, and Willis and defendant got into "a heated argument." Allen then 

entered the living room and told Willis and defendant to settle down. The 

argument ended; Allen and Willis retreated to their bedroom to watch television. 

Shortly thereafter, Allen went into the kitchen to make breakfast while 

defendant laid on the living room floor. Willis joined Allen in the kitchen to eat 

breakfast, and then they returned to their bedroom. 

About twenty minutes after the argument ended, Willis briefly left the 

apartment to take out the trash. At that point, defendant entered the bedroom 

and told Allen, "mom, I'm going to kill him." Allen told defendant he was acting 

crazy and, after returning to the apartment and hearing this statement, Willis 
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replied, "this guy is really out of his mind. He wants to hurt me and he wants to 

hurt you." No immediate verbal or physical altercation ensued. 

Shortly thereafter, Willis decided to take a shower. He reentered the 

bedroom, took off his clothes, wrapped himself in a towel, and walked to the 

bathroom. While Willis was in the shower with the bathroom door closed but 

unlocked, defendant retrieved a red-handled steak knife from the kitchen and 

entered the bathroom. After seeing defendant enter the bathroom with a knife, 

Allen quickly went to the bathroom and witnessed defendant repeatedly stabbing 

Willis in the bathtub. Allen tried to stop defendant both verbally and physically, 

but defendant pushed Allen away and continued to stab Willis. Allen was 

eventually able to get defendant to stop the attack and told Willis to close and 

lock the bathroom door. 

After ceasing the attack, defendant told Allen he was acting in selfdefense and he would "get him." Allen called 911 and told defendant to leave 

the apartment. Allen noticed a severe cut on defendant's hand and a red-handled 

knife in his back pocket. 

Allen testified that she did not see Willis attacking defendant or Willis 

holding any weapons. Willis was rushed to the hospital but died a few days 

later, having sustained approximately ten to fifteen wounds. 
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At the close of the State's case, defendant unsuccessfully moved for 

judgment of acquittal under R. 3:18-1. The court found the evidence presented 

by the State established that defendant "stabbed the victim while he was in the 

shower. The victim died as a result thereof." Hence, "the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant"

was guilty of murder and the weapons offenses. 

Defendant testified in his own defense. He stated that Willis instigated 

him on the day of the killing by telling defendant "[he] should get up, [he had] 

no right to be sleeping. [He] don't have a job. [He was] in [Willis's] way, things 

of that nature." Defendant also testified that during their exchange in the living 

room, he used his phone to play recent recordings that Allen and Willis could 

hear of Willis having conversations with women in an attempt to meet them. 

Defendant stated that the recordings made Allen "quite upset" and "infuriated"

Willis." 

Defendant testified that after this exchange, Willis went to the kitchen to 

retrieve a knife and used it to threaten defendant. Defendant then retrieved a 

knife of his own for protection and went to confront Willis while he was in the 

shower because "[he] figured [he] had to do something." 
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Defendant stated that when he opened the bathroom door to confront 

Willis, Willis was facing the mirror above the sink countertop, where Willis had 

a knife. Defendant testified that Willis saw defendant coming and grabbed the 

knife from the countertop and swung it toward defendant, striking defendant's 

hand. Defendant stated that he grabbed the knife that Willis used and used it to 

defend himself, stabbing Willis. He then dropped the knife to the bathroom 

floor and left the apartment at Allen's insistence. 

Defendant stated that at the time of the incident, he was 5'7" and 150 

pounds, while Willis was about six feet tall and 200 pounds. Allen had 

previously testified that Willis weighed 300 pounds. 

On rebuttal, the State presented evidence that, contrary to defendant's 

testimony, the stabbing took place while Willis was in the bathtub. The State 

also presented a recorded conversation between defendant and Allen while he

was in jail, during which he said that she could ignore the subpoena or "plead 

the Fifth" at trial. 

The trial court instructed the jury on passion-provocation and selfdefense, based primarily on the model jury charges. The parties agreed to the 

jury charges. As to self-defense, the judge said: 

If you find that the defendant with a purpose of 

causing death or serious bodily harm to another person 
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provoked or incited the use of force against himself in 

the same encounter, then the defense is not available to 

him.

If you find that the defendant knew that he could 

avoid the necessity of using deadly force by retreating, 

provided that the defendant knew he could do so with 

complete safety, then the defense of self-defense is not 

available to him.

In your inquiry as to whether the defendant who 

resorted to the use of deadly force knew there was an 

opportunity to retreat with complete safety and that 

such an opportunity was available, you may consider 

the total circumstances, including the attendant 

excitement accompanying the situation. 

The court also instructed the jury that the State had the burden to prove "beyond 

a reasonable doubt that [] defendant knew he could have retreated with complete 

safety." 

Relevant to this appeal, the court did not provide the additional instruction

contained in footnote four of the model jury charge, which states: "An exception 

to the rule of retreat, however, is that a person need not retreat from his or her 

own dwelling, including the porch, unless he or she was the initial aggressor. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i)." Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Justification –

Self Defense in Self Protection (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)" at 3 n.4 (rev. June 13, 2011). 

The jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. 
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At the sentencing hearing on November 15, 2018, the State requested the 

judge to sentence defendant to life as a persistent offender. Defense counsel

argued that defendant, who was thirty-five years old, should be sentenced to the 

mandatory minimum of a thirty-year sentence, subject to a thirty-year period of 

parole ineligibility. 

The trial court found aggravating factor three (risk defendant will 

reoffend), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). Defendant had at least twelve prior adult 

arrests, suggesting he would likely reoffend. 

The trial court also found aggravating factor six (prior record), N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(6). Defendant was previously convicted of theft by unlawful taking, 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance, criminal sexual contact, and 

criminal restraint, had at least three municipal court convictions, and two 

violations of probation. 

The court further found aggravating factor nine (need for deterrence), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The court noted the violent nature of the crime 

committed and the need to keep defendant from harming others, as well as the 

need to deter others from committing similar crimes. 
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As to mitigating factor three ("defendant acted under a strong 

provocation"), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3), the court found that outside of a few 

unfavorable words toward defendant, Willis did nothing to provoke him. 

Regarding mitigating factor five (victim induced or facilitated defendant's 

conduct), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(5), the court found that Willis "certainly didn't 

stab himself. He wouldn't have participated in a crime to harm himself." 

As to mitigating factor eight ("defendant's conduct was the result of 

circumstances unlikely to recur"), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), the judge concluded

defendant's "prior record indicates that there is every likelihood that if released, 

he would commit another offense." Furthermore, since his release from prison 

in 2013, defendant had been arrested four times and convicted of simple assault. 

Therefore, "defendant's criminal history reveals an increasing frequency of 

contact with the law and an escalation of violent behavior." 

The court did not consider mitigating factor four ("substantial grounds 

tend[ed] to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish 

a defense"), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4). 

The court "conclude[d] that the aggravating factors clearly and 

substantially outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors. On count one, the court 

sentenced defendant to a life term, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), 
10 A-1687-18T4

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and appropriate penalties and assessments. The court 

merged counts two and three into count one and declined to impose an extended 

term. This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises two points for our consideration:

POINT I

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND 

A FAIR TRIAL BY A FAULTY SELF-DEFENSE 

JURY CHARGE -- EXACERBATED BY 

PROSECUTORIAL ERROR -- WHICH 

ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT 

DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO RETREAT IN HIS 

OWN DWELLING. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. 

Const. art. 1, pars. 1, 9, and 10. (Not Raised Below.) 

POINT II

THE IMPOSITION OF A LIFE SENTENCE WAS 

MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND UNDULY 

PUNITIVE WHERE DEFENDANT RAISED A BONA 

FIDE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.

I.

In Point I, defendant argues that a faulty self-defense jury charge, 

exacerbated by prosecutorial error, denied him due process and a fair trial. He 

asserts that the State's summation and a significant portion of its proofs focused 

on defendant's opportunity to leave the apartment when Willis took out the trash 

or got into the shower. Defendant contends the jury may well have found self-
11 A-1687-18T4

defense inapplicable because defendant did not retreat from the apartment. We 

are unpersuaded by this argument. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 provides the following guidance on self-defense: 

a. Use of force justifiable for protection of the person. 

Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 

2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward another person 

is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that 

such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 

protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 

such other person on the present occasion. 

b. Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.

. . . .

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this 

section unless the actor reasonably believes that such 

force is necessary to protect himself against death or 

serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if: 

(a) The actor, with the purpose of causing death or 

serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against 

himself in the same encounter; or

(b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of 

using such force with complete safety by retreating 

. . . , except that: 

(i) The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, 

unless he was the initial aggressor . . . .

In order to succeed on a self-defense claim where the defendant used 

deadly force, the jury must find that: (1) the defendant had an honest and 
12 A-1687-18T4

reasonable belief that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself 

or herself from serious bodily injury or death, and (2) the defendant did not 

provoke the attacker. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) and (b)(2)(a); State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. 

Super. 57, 66-69 (App. Div. 2015). Whether the defendant's belief was 

reasonable is measured by what the jury, not the defendant, considers reasonable 

under an objective standard. State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 16 (1968). Accord State 

v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 356-57 (2013). 

"The home is accorded special treatment within the justification of selfdefense." State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 319 (2020). If the alleged assault 

occurred outside the defendant's dwelling, the jury must also find that the 

defendant was unable to retreat with complete safety. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b); 

State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 175 (2008); State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 

467 (1997). Conversely, if the alleged assault occurred in the defendant's 

dwelling, the duty to retreat does not exist, so long as the defendant did not 

provoke the attacker. Montalvo, 229 N.J. at 320. 

Jury instructions "must provide a 'comprehensible explanation of the

questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable 

to the facts that the jury may find.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 

157, 181-82 (2012)). In essence, the court's instructions on the law are a
13 A-1687-18T4

"roadmap" for the jurors. State v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171, 192 (2019). "[W]ithout 

an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations." State 

v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990). 

The pertinent model jury charge makes clear that the "castle" doctrine 

must guide jurors in their deliberations over a defendant's assertion of selfdefense when the defendant had been attacked in his or her own dwelling. See

Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Justification - Self-Defense in Self Protection 

(N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)" at 3 n.4 (rev. June 13, 2011). The model charge includes an 

important proviso in footnote 4 that cautions that: "An exception to the rule of 

retreat, however, is that a person need not retreat from his or her own dwelling, 

including the porch, unless he or she was the initial aggressor." Id. at 3 

(emphasis added) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i)).

Defense counsel did not raise an objection to the absence of this 

potentially critical portion of the charge. The question is whether this purported 

flaw in the charge was "plain error" or instead was merely harmless. State v. 

Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004). 

"Plain error refers to any error 'clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result.'" Montalvo, 229 N.J. at 320-21 (quoting R. 2:10-2). When a defendant 

asserts plain error arising from a flawed jury instruction that was not objected 
14 A-1687-18T4

to below, he or she must establish: (1) "legal impropriety in the charge 

prejudicially affecting [his or her] substantial rights" and (2) an error 

"sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince 

the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an 

unjust result." State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006) (quoting State v. 

Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969)). Stated another way, the flawed jury instruction 

must "raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it 

otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). 

The first part of this two-part test—legal impropriety in the charge—is 

contested by the State. It contends that the self-defense charge as given was 

proper. We must therefore determine whether the jury should have been advised 

that, unless the State proved he was the initial aggressor, defendant had no duty 

to retreat in his own residence. 

The second part of the test concerns whether the alleged error was harmful 

or harmless. In that vein, we must heed the well-settled maxim that errors in a 

jury charge in a criminal case are generally regarded as "poor candidates" for 

the application of the harmless error doctrine "and are ordinarily presumed to be 

reversible error." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997) (citing State v. 
15 A-1687-18T4

Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522 (1994)). See also State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 

495 (2019) (reaffirming this longstanding principle). 

If there is a rational basis for it in the record, self-defense must be charged. 

See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984) (stating that "if any evidence raising 

the issue of self-defense is adduced, either in the State's or the defendant's case, 

then the jury must be instructed" on that defense). In deciding whether 

defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a specific defense, the evidence is 

"viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant." State v. Galloway, 133 

N.J. 631, 648-49 (1993) (citing State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 617 (1987)). 

That said, "the prejudicial effect" of the flawed instruction "must be 

evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances–including . . . whether the 

weight of the evidence was overwhelming." State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 

551 (2014) (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979)). Absent 

objection by the defendant, we will uphold a jury verdict despite a flawed jury 

instruction if the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that a 

reasonable jury would not have reached a different verdict even if it received a 

correct instruction. See Macon, 57 N.J. at 336 (explaining that to constitute 

plain error, there must be "a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury 

to a result it otherwise might not have reached").
16 A-1687-18T4

Here, the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, including the use 

of deadly force, but omitted instruction on the exception to the duty to retreat 

under the castle doctrine. Essentially, defendant argues that the jury was left 

with the impression that he was obligated to retreat from the apartment he lived 

in even if not the initial aggressor. 

Applying these principles, we find no plain error "clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to defendant, a reasonable jury could find defendant was the initial 

aggressor. Defendant himself testified that after his argument with victim 

ended, over thirty minutes had passed before he entered the bathroom. Indeed, 

defendant testified that in the time between the verbal argument and the 

stabbing, the victim made breakfast, watched television, and took out the trash. 

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he could have left the 

apartment or called the police when Willis entered the bathroom to take a 

shower. Coupled with defendant's statement to Allen that he was going to kill 

the victim, the evidence in this case is overwhelming that any provocation from 

the verbal argument had dissipated and that he was the initial aggressor. 
17 A-1687-18T4

Given these controlling facts, the absence of a jury instruction about the 

exception to the duty to retreat under the castle doctrine was harmless. We 

affirm defendant's conviction. 

II.

In Point II, defendant argues that his life sentence was manifestly 

excessive and unduly punitive because he raised a bona fide claim of selfdefense and acted under a strong provocation. He contends that a thirty-year 

term with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibilty is more than adequate given 

his age. We are unpersuaded. 

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, the most serious offense 

under our criminal code. The sentencing range for murder is thirty years to life 

imprisonment, subject to the mandatory periods of parole ineligibility and parole 

supervision required by NERA. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a), 

(c), (d)(1). Because NERA declares that a "sentence of life imprisonment shall 

be deemed to be 75 years," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b), a defendant convicted of 

murder, who is sentenced to life imprisonment, "is ineligible for parole for sixtythree years and nine months. State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 105 (App. 

Div. 2011). A trial court has no discretion on the imposition of the NERA parole 
18 A-1687-18T4

ineligibility term. State v. Johnson, 376 N.J. Super. 163, 168-69 (App. Div. 

2005). 

Defendant was sentenced to life, subject to the parole ineligibility period 

mandated by NERA. The court noted that defendant "will not be parole eligible 

until he is 97 years old." Defendant does not claim that his sentence is illegal 

or unconstitutional. 

"An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence 

is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 

(2018). We "must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing 

guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors 

were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record'; or (3) 'the 

application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial 

conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting State v. Roth, 

95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). 

"[M]itigating factors that are suggested in the record, or are called to the 

court's attention, ordinarily should be considered and either embraced or 

rejected on the record." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010) (citing 

State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504-05 (2005)). A trial court need not, however, 

"explicitly reject each and every mitigating factor argued by a defendant." State 
19 A-1687-18T4

v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010). Where the aggravating factors 

predominate, the sentence imposed will lean "toward the higher end of the 

range," giving appropriate weight to all the factors. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 

64-65 (2014) (citation omitted). 

Defendant argues that his sentence is manifestly excessive and unduly 

punitive. This argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Suffice it to say, the judge's finding of aggravating factors 

three, six, and nine were amply supported by the record. Defendant had four 

prior indictable convictions on three different sentencing dates. In light of 

defendant's prior record and his escalating violent behavior, we have no 

occasion to disturb the judge's findings that: there was a substantial risk 

defendant would commit other offenses; defendant's prior record was both 

extensive and serious; and there was a need to deter defendant and others from 

committing the crime of murder. 

The record also fully supports the judge's finding of no mitigating factors. 

The jury rejected defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense. The record 

supports the judge's conclusion that defendant did not act under a strong 

provocation, that the victim did not facilitate the commission of the crime, and 
20 A-1687-18T4

that defendant is likely to commit another offense if released. The aggravating 

factors obviously outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors. 

The judge also considered the real-time consequences of the life sentence 

under NERA. The judge noted because defendant must serve eighty-five percent 

of seventy-five years under NERA, "[i]t is unlikely defendant will ever be 

released from prison, given his present age." 

As the judge adhered to the sentencing guidelines and defendant's

sentence is not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive and does not shock the 

judicial conscience, we perceive no basis to disturb defendant's sentence. 

Affirmed.