2017 UT App 167

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.S.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

J.R.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20170449-CA

Filed September 8, 2017

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Price Department

The Honorable Craig M. Bunnell

No. 1117628

W. Andrew McCullough, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, JILL M. POHLMAN, and 

DIANA HAGEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 J.R. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights. Mother asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the grounds for terminating her parental rights, and that 

the juvenile court did not give appropriate weight to her

fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 

management of her child. We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to 

terminate a person’s parental rights,] ‘the result must be against 
In re J.S.

20170449-CA 2 2017 UT App 167

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” In 

re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation omitted). We 

“review the juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the 

clearly erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 

P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in 

light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the 

clear weight of the evidence. See id. Further, we give the juvenile 

court a “‘wide latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived 

at’ based upon not only the court’s opportunity to judge 

credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges’ 

‘special training, experience and interest in this field.’” Id.

(citations omitted). Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s 

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not 

engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 

¶ 12.

¶3 The juvenile court found several grounds supporting the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Although Mother 

challenges the juvenile court’s subsidiary findings that she failed 

to exhibit the normal interest of a natural parent without just 

cause, and that she failed to provide a stable environment for the 

child where he was loved and protected, Mother’s failure to 

challenge all of the grounds for termination identified by the 

juvenile court, renders her challenges irrelevant. The finding of a 

single enumerated ground set forth in Utah Code section 78A-6-

507 is alone sufficient to support the termination of parental 

rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). 

Therefore, this court will affirm the termination of parental 

rights if the record supports any of the grounds identified by the 

juvenile court for terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

¶4 The juvenile court found that Mother neglected and 

abused J.S.. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(b). The juvenile court also 

found that Mother was an unfit or incompetent parent. See id.

§ 78A-6-507(1). Additionally, the juvenile court determined that 

(1) the child had been in an out-of-home placement under the 
In re J.S.

20170449-CA 3 2017 UT App 167

supervision of the juvenile court and the Division of Child and 

Family Services (DCFS), (2) Mother “substantially neglected, 

willfully refused, or [has] been unable or unwilling to remedy 

the circumstances that caused the child[] to be in an out-of-home 

placement,” and (3) “there is a substantial likelihood that 

[Mother] will not be capable of exercising proper and effective 

parental care in the near future.” See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d).

¶5 In determining whether a parent is unfit or has neglected 

a child, the juvenile court shall consider a parent’s habitual or 

excessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled substances, or 

dangerous drugs that renders the parent unable to care for the 

child. See id. § 78A-6-508(2)(c). This court has previously 

affirmed the termination of parental rights for 

methamphetamine use after the court concluded that “use of 

methamphetamines is totally, completely inconsistent with 

responsible parenting.” In re S.Y., 2003 UT App 66, ¶ 20, 66 P.3d 

601. 

¶6 The record demonstrates that Mother has an extensive 

history of drug addiction involving methamphetamine and 

marijuana. The juvenile court determined that Mother had 

ample opportunities to address her drug addiction, but that she 

failed to do so. The juvenile court found that Mother’s efforts 

“do not even come close to what would be necessary to return 

the child to [her] care.” Because “a foundation for the court’s 

decision exists in the evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s 

order finding that Mother severely neglected J.S. and was an 

unfit parent. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12. Furthermore, 

because the record supports the determination that Mother is 

unfit and neglected her child due to her habitual drug use, we 

need not address Mother’s alternative challenges to the other 

grounds supporting the termination of her parental rights. See

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1). 

¶7 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court failed to give 

appropriate weight to her fundamental liberty interest in the 
In re J.S.

20170449-CA 4 2017 UT App 167

care, custody, and management of her child. Utah law 

recognizes that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the 

care, custody, and management of their children. See In re S.F., 

2012 UT App 10, ¶ 29, 268 P.3d 831. However, the state retains a 

compelling interest in protecting children from abuse and 

neglect. See In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307, ¶ 25, 37 P.3d 1166.

Notwithstanding a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the 

custody, care, and management of his or her child, a parent 

shown by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit can be 

permanently deprived of all parental rights. See In re J.P., 648 

P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982). Recently, this court observed that 

“parental rights, although fundamental and constitutionally 

protected, are not absolute, and the State has a moral and 

statutory obligation to step in and protect children when those 

children are suffering from neglect or abuse.” In re C.C., 2017 UT 

App 134, ¶ 46. (Christiansen, J., concurring). Because the record 

contains ample evidence that Mother was unfit and neglected 

her child, the juvenile court properly concluded that there was a 

compelling interest in terminating Mother’s parental rights. See 

id.

¶8 Finally, if the juvenile court determines that there are 

sufficient grounds to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court 

must next find that the best interests and welfare of the child are 

served by terminating the parent’s parental rights. See In re 

R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 7, 991 P.2d 1118. Although Mother 

does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that it was 

in the child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights, the 

record supports the juvenile court’s determination that it was in 

the child’s best interest to do so. Because “a foundation for the 

court’s decision exists in the evidence,” we affirm the juvenile 

court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. See In re B.R., 

2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶9 Affirmed.