1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___
____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: Ju ly

5, 201 6 4 N O. 33, 639 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v

. 8 JO HN MONAFO, 9 D ef

en da nt- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF CH AV ES C OUN TY 11 Fr eddie J. R om ero, Distr ict Judge 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 W alter H art, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 for Appellee 17 Bennett J. Ba

uer, Chief P ublic Defe nder 18 Matthew J. O’ Gorm an, A ssistant Appellate D efender 19 San ta Fe, NM 20 fo r Appe llant19 T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n st at es that the sto p o ccu rr ed on D ec em

be r 11, 1 20 2010

. 1 OPIN ION 2 KEN NED Y, Judge. 3 { 1} Im

m ediately after relea sing D efendant from a traff ic stop, office rs twic e pulled 4 him ove r to i nve sti gate own ers hip of avan he w as tow ing

. A s ar es ult , D ef en dant 5 en te re d ac ondi tio na l pl ea to unlaw fu l tak ing of a m oto r ve hic le , re se rv ing his r igh t 6 t o co ntest the constitu tionalit y of the second stop and search of a rece ipt bo o k . We 7 ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t the se co nd sto p w as suf fi ci en tly a tte nua te d f

ro m the 8 fi rs t. T he de puty ’ s r ev ie wof the e nti re r ec ei pt b ook, how ev er , wa s no t c om ple te ly 9 jus ti fie d b y

th e li m it edex te nt of De fen da nt ’s con se nt to sea rch

. 10 I. BACKGRO UND 11 { 2} O n Ju ly

1, 20 11 , D ef

en da nt, Joh n M ona fo , w as dr ivi ng a f la t- be d to wtr

uc k, 12 towing a van in Chaves County , N ewMexico

. De putyJam es See ly stopp ed 13 De fendant, believing De fendant had com m itted a traff

ic violatio n. The reasons for,

1 14 and facts of, that stop ar e not m aterial to this appeal. At som e poin t, F rancisco Castro 15 ar ri ve d a t the sc en e of

his ow n a cc or d. I n a side c onve rs at ionw itha nothe r of fi ce r on 16 the scene, Castro stated that he owned the van on the truck and that he had not g iven 17 perm issio n for any one to r em ove it from his property

. It seem s from the record that 18 thi s c onve rs at iontoo k pl ac e w hil e D ep uty S ee ly w as de al ing w ithD ef

en da nt.20 Inor de r to p ro m ote c lari ty , w e fo llo wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s le ad in re fe rr ing to 2 21 the se ite m s as the r ec ei pt, a nd r ef er to the boo k inw hic h it , a nd o the rs li ke it , is ke pt 22 as the r ec ei pt b ook. 2 1 { 3} De putySee ly , a pparently unawar e of Ca stro’ s conversation with t h e other 2 officer on scene, r eleased D efendant from the stop. De putySee ly

began driving aw ay 3 fr om the sc en e. O nc e on the ro ad , he re ce ive d a dis pa tc h fr om the scen e inf orm ing 4 himo f C a str o’ s c l a i m s r e gar di ng t he van, a nd he r e tur ne d t o t he sc e ne j us t as 5 De fendant wa s pulli ng ou t onto the road. De p uty See ly activated his em ergency 6 light s, and D efendant pulled ov er imm ediately , stop ping onlya short distance aw ay 7 fro m wher e h e h adin it ia ll y

be en st op pe d. 8 { 4} A ft er co nve rs ing w ithCa str o and the oth er of fi ce rs on the sc en e, D ep uty S ee ly 9 ap pr oa ch ed

D ef en da nt’ s dr ive r’ s si de doo r an d aske d De fe ndant for a “ bil l of la din g” 10 or “ m anifest” for the van. De fendan t re t riev ed a re ceipt bookcontaining several 2 11 re ce ipt s, ope ne d it

to the one r el ev an t t o th e va n, an d gave it to D ep uty

S ee ly

. D ep uty 12 Seely inqui red about Cheri L oy a, the indiv idual w ho, according to the bill, consented 13 to t h e re m o v al of the van, and he requested a check of the driver’ s license num ber 14 lis te d in the bil l. D ep uty Se el y the n le ft the dr ive r’ s sid e door a nd w al ke d to w ar d th e 15 re ar of the tr uc k w he re tw o oth er of

fi ce rs w er e standi ng. T oge the r, the of fi ce rs f ir st 16 scrutinized the inform ation on the bill, eventually looki ng throu gh the oth er e ntries 17 in the receipt book and find ing anot her entry authorized by Ms. Loy a. The signatu res 1 8 o n t h e t w o b i l l s ap p e a r e dd i f f e r e n t , d e s p i t e a l l e g e d l y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e s a me 19 ind ivi dua l. D ep uty

S ee ly the n dis co ve re d th at the dr ive r’ s li ce nse num

be r lis te d inthe3

1 rece ipt for the van belong ed t o a w om an with a diff erent nam e and address than 2 Loy a’ s. De puty Seely arre sted D efendant for the unlawful taking o f a v eh i cle, 3 contrary

to NMS A 1978, § 30-16D-1 (2009). 4 A. Pr ocedur al History 5 { 5} T ra ff

ic vio la tio ns ari sin g f

ro m the f ir st s top w er e ch ar ge d se pa rate ly fr om the 6 unl aw fu l t ak ing of

ave hic le c ha rg e ar isi ng f ro m the se co nd s top

. D ef

en dant 7 pr oc ee de d pr o se in both c as es . H av ing be enc onvi ct ed of the tra ff ic vio la tio ns i n 8 m ag istrate co urt, D ef

en da nt ap pe al ed tho se co nvi ct ion s, on w hic h he w as a cquit te d, 9 af te r a de nov o tr ia l i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt. 10 { 6} Inthi s c as e, Defen da nt file d am oti on t o su ppr es s th e co nte nts of

the r ec ei pt 11 book

. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on, c onc lud ing that once D ef en da nt g av e 12 D ep uty

S ee ly the r ec ei pt b ook, D ep uty S ee ly “ ce rt ai nl y[ w as ] able to ge t i nto the 13 ite m s th at

he ha [d ] in his ha nds. ” D ef en da nt a lso f

ile d am oti on t o di sm iss , w hic h th e 14 district court characte rized as a F oul en fon t m o t i o n p u r s u a n tto Sta te v . F oul en fon t , 15 1995 -N MCA -028, 119 N. M. 788, 895 P. 2d 13 29. D efendant’ s m otion suggest ed that 16 the van did

not qua lif y a s a“ ve hic le ” or

“ m oto r ve hic le ” unde r Se ct ion30- 16D -1 , a nd 17 ins te ad w as a“ nonr ep ai ra ble ve hic le ” out sid e the pur vie wof the statut e ch ar ge d. 18 A ft er ahe ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on to di sm iss , r ea soni ng tha t the 19 fa ct s c oul d f

it ei the r de fi nit ion , a nd c onc lud ing th at it wa s f or the j ur y to de ci de 20 whi ch de fin it io n was ap pl ic ab le in th is cas e.4

1 { 7} D ef

en da nt a cquir ed

c ouns el w ho f

ile d anothe r m oti on t o su ppr es s, a sse rt ing 2 tha t a ll ev ide nc e obt ai ne d th ro ugh the se cond st op s houl d be sup pr es se d, a s no 3 attenuation existed between the fir st illegal sto p and the sub sequentlyacquired 4 ev i d en ce. T he district court held a hearing on the m otion . D eny ing Defe ndan t ’s 5 m oti on t o su

ppr es s, the dis tr ic t cour

t hel d that suf

fi ci en t att enua tio n exis te d be ca use 6 of Castro’ s “ fortuitous arr ival.” D efendant ultim ately en tered a conditi onal plea, 7 re se rv ing the r igh t t o a ppe al pr ev iou s orders of the dis tr ic t c ourt. D ef en da nt t im el y 8 fi le d anot ic e of

appe al

. 9 II. DISC US SION 10 { 8} D ef

en da nt c ont es ts the dis tr ic t cour t’ s deni al of

both m oti ons to s uppr es s and 11 ins ist s tha t the va n in que sti on is not a“ ve hic le ” w ith in the de fi nit ionpr ovi de d inthe 12 Motor Vehicle C ode (the Code). De fendant asks that we su p p re s s all evidence 13 obt ai ne d a s ar es ult

of the se co nd sto p, or , in the al te rn at ive , supp re ss a ll co nte nts of 14 the re ce ipt book as ide fr om the re ce ipt fo r the van. D ef en da nt r eque sts sup pr es sio n 15 ba se d onala ck of atte nua tio n be tw ee n the sto ps and an im pe rm iss ibl e ex pa nsi on o f 16 the sc ope of

D ef en da nt’ s c onse nt. T he S ta te ur ge s th at suf fi ci en t a tte nua tio n e xis ts 17 be tw ee n th e sto ps t o j ust if y a dm itt ing e vid en ce obt ai ne d duri ng the se co nd s top

. 18 A . Su pp re ssi on of Ev id en ce Ob ta in ed D ur in g S ec on d St op 19 { 9} Whe n rev ie w ing adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of am oti on t o su

ppr es s, appe llate 20 courts draw all rea sonable inferences in favor of the district c ourt’ s ruling and d efer 21 to the dist rict court’ s finding s of fac t, so long as they are suppo rted by

subst antial14 T houg h im m at er ia l t o our co nsi de ratio n of thi s c as e, we no te that a 3 1 5 “ r e g r e t t ab l e ” m i s t a k e o f l a w o n t h e o f f i c e r ’ s p a rt m a y n o t i n v a l i d a t e a t r a f f i c sto p 16 un de r th e Fo ur th Am en dm en t. He ien v. N. C. , ___ U

. S. ___ , ___ , 135 S

. Ct

. 530 , 540 17 (2 01 4)

. 18 T he S ta te a sse rt s th at D ef en da nt “ in n o w ay ” pr ovi de d th e tr ial co urt w ith 4 19 not ic e tha t he w as m ak ing a rg um en ts unde r the state c onst itu tio n, or that D ef en dant 20 sim ply did not pr es er ve his c la im s un de r the state co nst itu tio n. A c los e re vie wof the 21 re co rd

does no t, how ev er , sup port the S ta te ’ s a sse rt ion s. I n f ac t, the r ec or d r ev ea ls 22 facts so contrary to the State’ s assertion that we ca ution counsel to th orough ly review 23 the record bef

ore m aking bo ilerplate assertions regarding preservation of Ar ticle II, 24 Se ct ion10 c la im s. D ef en se c ouns el not onl y sta te d th at the a rg um en t w as be ing m ad e 25 under Article II, Sec t i o n 1 0 , but also q uoted po rtions of G arc ia , 200 9- N MS C- 046, 26 127 N

. M. 695 , 986 P

. 2d 4 91, w hic h he bel ie ve d su ppor te d th e int er

pr et at ionthat i s 27 nowpr of

fe re d onappe al

. 5 1 ev id en ce. Se e Sta te v . M urr y , 2014-NMC A- 021, ¶ 10, 318 P. 3d 18 0

. Ra t h er than 2 being lim ited to the r ec o rd m ade on a m otion to supp ress, appellate courts “ m ay 3 reviewthe entire re cord to determ ine whether there w as sufficient evid ence to suppo rt 4 the trial court’ s denial of the m otion to supp ress.” Sta te v . J ohns on , 19 96 -NMCA5 117, ¶ 21, 122 N

. M. 713 , 930 P

. 2d 1 165 (c iti ng State v. M artin ez , 198 0- N MS C- 066, 6 ¶ 16, 94 N .M. 436, 612 P.2d 228 (hol ding that appellate co urts consid er the e ntire 7 re co rd on a ppe al , not

j ust e vid en ce pr es en te d du ri ng a sup pr es sio n he ar ing , in 8 affir m ing th e denial of a m otion to supp ress)). 9 { 10} The pa rt ie s do not dis put e the inv al idi ty

of D ep uty S ee ly ’ s f

ir st s top of 10 De fendant, a s found b y the district court. Rather, the parties disag re e o n the effe ct 3 11 that the first, u

nc on st itutio nal stop h as on sub sequent events. Def endant argues, under 12 the F ourth A m en dm en t of the U nit ed

S ta te s C onst ituti on a nd A rt ic le I I, S ec tio n 10 13 of the Ne w Me xico Const itutio n, that all evidence obtained sub sequent to th e initial 418 N ewMe xic o c as e lawis inc onsist en t r eg ar din g w he the r “ al l t ai nt” m ust be 5 19 re m ov ed , o r whe the r pur gin g th e ev ide nc e of the “ pr im ar

y ta int ” is s uf

fi ci en t. 20 Co m pare e. g. , State v. Prince , 200 4- N MC A -1 27, ¶ 20, 136 N

. M. 521, 101 P

. 3d 3 32 21 (holdin g consent m

ust be purged from

all taint) wi th e

. g. , State v. W agon er , 200 1- 22 NMC A- 014, ¶ 22, 130 N. M. 274, 24 P. 3d 3 0 6 (n o t i n g that evidence unassociated 23 with the “prim ary

taint” m ay

be adm issib le).

6 1 sto p s h o u l d be supp ressed under the “ fruit of the poison ous tree” doctrine, as there 2 wa s no attenuation betwee n the uncons titutio nal stop and the evidence in this case. 3 The State ar gu e s t hatt he e vi de nc e n e e d no tb e e xc l ud e d a s t he “ f r ui t ” o f a n i l l e ga l 4 se arch

. 5 1. Fr uit of t he P oisonous Tree D octrine 6 { 11} T he “ fr

uit of the poisonous tre e” doc tr ine pr ovi de s f or sup pr es sio n of 7 “ ev ide nc e tha t is obt ai ne d not onl y ‘ dur ing ’ but ‘ as a dir ec t re sul t of ’ an unlaw fu l 8 se iz ur e” wh en th ere a re t wo d is ti nc t i nv es ti ga to ry sei zu res by the po li ce. Se e G arc ia , 9 2009 -N MS C- 046, ¶

23. T he m ai n in qu iry u nd er this doc tr ine is “ ‘ w he the r . . . the 10 evidence t o which in stant objec tion is m ade h as b een com e at by exploit ation of that 11 illegality or i nstead by m eans sufficiently distin guish able to be purged of the prim ary 1 2 t ai n t .’ ” W

ong Sun v. United States , 371 U. S. 471, 488 (196 3). I n order to be purged 5 13 of ata int of ini tia l i lle ga lity , “ the re m ust be abr eak inthe c au sa l c ha in be tw ee n th e 14 illegality

and the co n sent.” Sta te v . M ont el eo ne , 2005-NMC A- 129, ¶ 17, 138 N. M. 15 544, 123 P

. 3d 777. A br eak in the ca usa l ch ai n, or atte nua tio n, f ro m ini tia l i lle ga lity 16 pr ovi de s an e xc ep tio n to the f ru it of the poi sono us tre e d oc tri ne ’s bar to a dm itt ing 17 ev id en ce l eg al ly ob t ai ne d t hr ou gh pa st po li ce i ll eg al it ie s. Se e id. A tte nua tio n is7

1 m easu red us in g thre e fa ct or s: ( 1) the te m por al pr oxi m ity

of the il le ga l st op and the 2 co nse nt, (2 ) the pr es en ce of int er ve nin g cir cu m stanc es , an d (3) the f la gr an cy of the 3 of fic ia l m i s c o n d u c t. Se e B row n v . I ll. , 422 U

. S. 590 , 603 -0 4 ( 1975 ); M ont el eo ne , 4 20 05 -NMCA- 12 9, ¶ 1 7. 5 2. At tenu ation Un der the Four th A m endm ent 6 { 12} Re gard ing the f

ir st Brown f

a c t o r , t h e t w o s t o p s w e r e v e ry c l o s e i n b o t h t i me 7 an d pla ce . T he ini tia l, ill eg al sto p fi nis he d le ss than a m inu te be fo re D eput yS ee ly 8 sto ppe d D ef

en da nt f or a se co nd tim e. H ow ev er , the f ir st s top ha d f

ini she d, D ep uty 9 Seely had left, De fendant had put h is car in m otion to leave, and Castro’ s story had 1 0 n o ty e tg i v e n r i s e t o ar e qu e s tt o d e t a i n h i m a g a i n . A s s u c h , t h e f

i rs t Br own f

ac tor 11 w ei ghs onl y

sli ght ly in D ef en da nt’ s f av or if a t all

. T his se gue s ne at ly

int o th e se co nd 12 Brown fac tor, by

which w e lo ok at whether ther e w as an intervening event th at 13 is ol at edDefen da nt fro m th e co erci ve effec ts of t he ori gi na l i ll eg al st op . See U nited 14 Sta tes v . G re

gory , 79 F. 3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996 ). De fendant argues that there w as 15 no int ervening event, in sistin g that Castro’ s arrival was no t adequate t o constit ute an 16 int er ve nin g c ir cu m stanc e. I n our vie w , an oth er , m or e per sua siv e, fa ct le nds its el f to 17 our conclusio n that an intervening event occurre d in thi s case. 18 { 13} T he part ie s are in ag re em en t tha t D ep uty S ee ly r el ea se d Defen dant f

ro m the 19 fi rs t st op. T he y dis ag re e, how ev er , on w he the r D ef en da nt’ s a ct ion s ina tte m

pti ng t o 20 le av e cr eate d su ff

ic ie nt at te nu ationbe tw ee n th e fi rs t and s ec ond sto p. I t hard ly 21 m atte rs he re , a s D ep uty S ee ly him se lf ha d de pa rt ed

the sto p pr ior

to D ef en dant.8

1 D ef en dant b eg andr ivi ng aw ay f ro m the sc en e, tho ugh he did

not ge t f ar be fo re be ing 2 sto ppe d f

or the se co nd t im e. Be ca

use D ep uty

S ee ly ’ s r el ea se of

Defendan t, a nd 3 D ef en dant’ s de pa rt

ur e re sul tin g f

ro m tha t re le as e, oc curr ed a ft er the il le ga l st op b ut 4 prior to the second sto p and Def endant’ s consent , we co nclude it cons titutes an 5 in te rv en in g circ um st an ce un de r th e Fo ur th Am en dm en t. Se e, e . g. , G re gory , 79 F

. 3d 6 at 980 ( ac know le dgi ng tha t a ct s su cha s is sui ng M ira nda w ar

nin gs , te lli ng the 7 de fe ndant h e is f

re e to le av e, an d advis ing the de fe ndant tha t he m ay r ef use c onse nt 8 “ m ay sa tis fy the re qui re m en t of int er ve nin g c ir cu m stanc es ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks 9 an d c itatio n om itt ed )) ; cf

. W ong Sun , 371 U

. S. at 491 (c onc lud ing tha t r el ea sin g th e 10 pe tit ion er

on h is o w n r ec ogni zanc e re nde re d “ the co nne ct ion be tw ee n the ar re st and 11 the [e vid en ce ]

. . . ‘ so a tte nua te d a s to dis sip at e the ta int

. ’ ” ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks 12 an d c itatio n om itt ed ))

. T he se co nd Brown factor ther efore we ighs in the State’ s favor. 13 { 14} T o fu lf

ill the thi rd B row n fa ct or , D ef en da nt w oul d have to es ta bli sh p ur pose fu l 14 an d f la gr an t of

fi ci al m is co nductw he re : ( 1) the im pr opr ie ty w as obv iou s, or

the 15 of fi ci al kne w his c ondu ct

w as li ke ly

unc onst itu tio na l bu t c ont inu ed non ethe le ss; or 16 (2) th e m is co nd uc t was in ve st ig at ory in de si gn an d p ur

po se . Uni te d S ta te s v. S impson , 17 439 F.3d 490 , 496 (8th Cir. 2006 ); Brown , 422 U

. S. a t 60 5. T he re is no e vid en ce of 18 m iscondu ct w ith regard to Castro’ s arrival at the scene, and Def endant concedes that 1 9 the dis tr i c t c o u rt ’ s f

i n d i n g t h a t C a s t r o ’ s a rr i v a l w a s f o rtu i t o u s a n d u n a n t i c i p a t e d is 20 supp orted by the evidence. De fendant hints at purposeful inv estigatory m iscondu ct20 A s su ppor t fo r thi s co nte nti on, D ef

en da nt poi nts to the le ngth of the de te nti on 6 21 and the nature of t h e traf fic citations issued, as evidence that De putySee ly wa s 22 fi shi ng f

or a ddi tio na l vi ola tio ns. 9 1 in the f ac ts of the fi rs t st op. W e ha ve pr ev iou sly a ff irm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n 6 2 reg ard in g th e fir st st op in a m em or an du m op in io n, Sta te v . M

onaf o , N o . 3 2 , 3 1 5 , me m. 3 op. (N .M. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012 ) (non-precedential), based n o t o n intentio nal 4 m i s co n du ct b u ta mis t a k e o f l a w . It i s n o tn ec es s ar y h er e t o t ak e u p De fe n d an t ’s 5 in vi ta ti on to re-v is it th e fac ts an d l eg al is su es pre se nt edth erei n. 6 { 15} T houg h D ep uty

S ee ly ’ s m ist ak e of law in m ak ing the fi rs t stop of D ef en dant 7 m ay ha ve be enobj ec tiv el y

unr ea sona

ble , a n u nr easonable m ist ak e al one is not 8 su ffi ci en t t o e st ab li sh fla gr an t m is co nd uc t i n a n a tt en ua ti on an al y si s. E.g. , United 9 Sta tes v . B arnu m , 564 F

. 3d 96 4, 973 ( 8thCi r. 200 9) ( co nc lud ing that a tr af fi c sto p 10 ini tiate d a s part

of pa tr ol b ut b as ed

on an un re as ona

ble m ist ak e w as not

the ty pe of 11 bla tantl y

unc onst itu tio na l or

f la gr an t be ha vio r co nde m

ne d in Brown ); United States 12 v. He rrera-Gonzalez , 474 F. 3d 1105, 1113 (8th C ir. 2007 ) (concluding that wh ere 13 po li ce co nd uc t was a “ m is ta ke n e xe rci se of o the rw ise le git im at e pol ic e inves ti ga ti on ,” 14 se iz ur e w as “ m or e inn oc uous than dam nin g” ); United States v. G reen , 111 F

. 3d 5 15, 15 523 (7 th C ir

. 199 7) ( co nc lud ing vio la tio n w as not f la gr an t w he re the re w as no 16 ev ide nc e of ba d fa ithpol ic e co nduc t) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . B oone , 62 F

. 3d 3 23, 325 ( 10th 17 Ci r. 199 5) ( ac know le dgi ng tha t, w he re a n of fi ce r act ed up on m ist ak enbe lie f in 18 vio la tin g th e Fo urth A m en dm en t, such c ondu ct did not r ise to the le ve l of

f la gr an t 19 m isc ondu ct

in atte nuatio n ana lys is) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . P im en tal , 645 F

. 2d 8 5, 86- 8710

1 (1st Cir. 1981 ) (c onclud ing th at w here an officer acted on a m istaken belief that 2 consent had b een given, a F ourth Am endm ent violatio n was not flagrant m iscondu ct). 3 T he ex cl usi onary ru le ex ist s to disc our ag e pol ic e m isc ondu ct

. Appl ic at ionof the r ule 4 w he n po lic e ac tio n, tho ugh er ro ne ous , w as not

und er ta ke n inaf

la gr an t and 5 purpos eful violation of th e suspect’ s protected rights do es nothin g to further that 6 purpos e. Thus, absent any evidence of bad fa ith , k

no w l e dg e , or investig atory purpose, 7 w e co nc lud e tha t D ep uty Se el y ’ s fi rs t sto p of D ef en da nt, w hil e a Fo urth A m en dm en t 8 vio la tio n, w as ne ith er fla gr an t no r pur

pose fu l m isc ondu ct

f or pur pose s of our 9 atte nuatio n ana ly sis

. T he thi rd Brown fac tor therefore we ighs in favor o f the State

. 10 { 16} W eighing the three Brown fa ct o rs t o g et h er , we co n cl u d e th at D e fe n d an t ’s 11 Fourth Am endm ent claim m ust fail. A s such, w e turn to a n an al ysis of w hether 12 D ef en dant f ar es be tte r unde r A rt ic le II , Se ct ion 10 o f the N ewMe xic o C onst itu tio n. 13 3. A tt en ua ti on U nd er A rt ic le II, S ec ti on 10 14 { 17} De fendant sugg ests that und er A rticle II , S ection 10, we shoul d afford the third 15 Brown fac tor “ little or no value.” In support of this p ositio n, D efendant argues that 16 the third factor em

bodi es the purpose of the exclusion ary rule under the United States 17 Co nst itu tio n and tha t i t di ff er s so sig nif

ic an tly f ro m the purpos es dr ivi ng the 18 ex cl usi onary ru le in N ew Me xic o th at the thi rd Brown fa ct or is r en de re d su pe rf luo us. 19 Und er t h e fa ct s of this case, e ven if we we re to assum e argu en do De fe n d an t ’s 20 an al y sis is co rr ec t, he w oul d no t pr ev ai l; w e the re fo re do n ot n ee d to a ddr es s 21 Defen da nt ’s con te nt io n.11

1 { 18} Re m ovi ng c onsi de ratio n of the thi rd Brown fa ct or w oul d re sul t in an ana ly sis 2 based solely

on the tem

poral proxim ity

and intervening event fac tors alone because, 3 as D ef en dant c la im s inhis br ie f, tho se fa ct or s “ ha ve m or e to do w ithe sta bli shi ng a 4 ca usa l c onne ct ion ” an yw ay . H er e, the te m por al pr oxi m ity

of the il le ga l a ct s and the 5 ev ide nc e soug ht t o be sup pr es se d is a m inute at be st. H ow ev er , the int er ve nin g e ve nt 6 of De fendant’ s release and his beg innin g to leave we ighs s tronglyin the State’ s favor, 7 j ust a s it did in the F ourth A m en dm en t ana ly si s. See S tate v. He rnan dez , 199 7- 8 N MC A -0 06, ¶

34, 122 N

. M. 809 , 932 P

. 2d 4 99 ( fi ndi ng n o a tte nua tion w he re the 9 de fe ndan tw a s i n c o n s t a n tc u s t o d y b e tw e e n t h e i l l e g a l d e t e n t i o na n dh e r g i v i ng 10 co nse nt t o se ar chde spi te no i nde pe nde nt j ur isd ic tio n on the pa rt of the pol ic e to d o 11 so). Follo wing De fendant’ s propos ed interpretation of atten uation, we are therefor e 12 le ft t o b al an ce t he se two fact or s, n ei th er o f whi ch weig hs in fav orof De fen da nt

. 13 { 19} E va lua tin g a tte nua tio n is ahig hly f ac t- spe ci fi c pr oc es s. I n Sta te v . F igu er oa , 14 w e not ed th at ev alua tin g in te rv en ing c ir cu m stanc es w as li m ite d to the f ac ts o f the 15 ca se : “ A dif

fe re nt re sul t m ay oc cur w he re an of fi ce r is care fu l to c le ar ly

e sta bli sh a 16 tr an sf orm at ionin the e nc ount er . ” 2010 -N MC A -0 48, ¶ ¶ 33, 35, 148 N

. M. 811 , 242 17 P. 3d 378. An officer could not m ore clearly im press upon a su spect that his encou nter 18 w ithapol ic e of

fi ce r ha s te rm ina te d th ana llo w ing him to le av e, as D ep uty

S ee ly did 19 here. Thoug h De fe ndant’s f reedom to leave the stop was short-lived, he w as 20 unqu es tio nably

r el ea se d f

ro m the e nc ount er , a nd ha d pu t hi s tr uc k inm oti on t o le av e 21 w he n D ep uty

S ee ly w as c al le d ba ck

to the sc en e. H er e, w he re the re w as ac om ple te12

1 end to the f

irst stop and a clear beginn ing to the subs equent stop, a ttenuation betwee n 2 t h e t w o s t o p s , i n b o t h t i me a n dp u r p o s e , i s c o mp l e t e . T h e s h o rta mo u n to f t i me 3 be twee n t he two is no t s ig ni fic an t t o o uran al y si s h ere. 4 { 20} T ak ing a ll of

the c ir cu m stanc es sur

ro undi ng the inc iden t into co nsi de ratio n, 5 id

. ¶ 33, w e co nc lude tha t the e xis te nc e of a n in te rv en ing e ve nt o utw ei ghs the 6 im portanc e of

a ny te m por al pr oxi m ity

und er the f ac ts o f thi s c as e be cau se the 7 a t t e nu a t i o n a n a l ys i s i s , ab o v e a l l , a i med a tp r e v e n t i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n o f a n i l l e g a l i t y. 8 W ong Sun , 371 U

. S. a t 48 8. N ot o nly is the re no evi de nc e of

suc h e xpl oit at ionin thi s 9 ca se , D ep uty

S ee ly ’ s r el ea se of

D ef en da nt i s e vid en ce that he ha rb or ed no e xpe ct at ion 10 th athe wou ld an y

lo ng er o bt ai n a ny evi de nc e “ as a di rect res ul t o f” t he fir st st op . Id

. 11 at 485

. T hus , De pu ty Se el y r et ur ne d D ef en da nt t o th e posi tio n th at he w oul d have 12 be en in ha d hi s rig ht s n ot be en vi ol at ed , i.e. , tr aveling do wn the road of his own f ree 13 w ill , be fo re the se co nd s top

. Whe n D ef en da nt w as sto ppe d th e se co nd t im e, the ba sis 14 fo r th e st op was u nr el at edto th e fi rs t en co un te r as if t he fir st ha d n o t oc cu rred

. See 15 W agon er , 200 1- N MC A -0 14, ¶ 30 ( sta tin g purp ose of

state ex cl us ionar

y r ule is 16 accom

plish ed by

“ doin g no m ore than r eturn the parties to wher e they stood before 17 the r igh t w as vio la te d. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ))

. Be ca use 18 De fendant does not prevail on this is sue, w e need not address the State’ s additio nal 19 arg u m en t that evidence obtained d uring the second stop sh ould not be excluded 20 because of the independent so urce doctrine.13

1 B. C on se ntt o S ea rc h th e R ec ei ptBo ok 2 { 21} H av ing c onc lud ed that e vid en ce obt ai ne d duri ng the se co nd stop ne ed not be 3 ex cl ude d a s f

ru it of apoi sono us tre e, w e ne xt ad dr es s D ef en da nt’ s a sse rt ionthat the 4 dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de ny ing his m oti on to suppr es s the co nte nts of the r ec ei pt b ook, 5 save the sing l e rece ipt for the van that he was tow ing. The State a sserts that 6 D ef en dant c onse nte d to D ep uty S ee ly ’ s se ar chof

the e nti re r ec ei pt b ook by handi ng 7 it ove r dur ing the sto p w ith out qua lif y ing or li m iti ng tha t c onse nt. 8 { 22} The scope of

ac on se ns ua l s e a r c h i s de f i ne d by , a nd

l i m i t e d t o, t he a c tua l 9 co ns en t g iv en . Sta te v . G arc ia , 1999 -N MC A -0 97, ¶ 9, 127 N

. M. 695, 986 P. 2d 4 91. 10 T he sc ope of

c onse nt i s an ob

j ec tiv e inquir

y , c onstra ined bythe bounds of 11 reas on ab le ne ss . State v. M osley , 2014 -N MCA -094, ¶ 24, 335 P. 3d 24 4. Courts m ay 12 re ly on s oc ia l no rm s w he n de te rm ini ng “ w ha t a r ea sona ble pe rs on w oul d have 13 un de r st oo d by

t he e xc hang e b e t w e e n t he o f f i c e r a nd t he s us pe c t .” Garcia , 199 9- 14 N MC A -0 97, ¶ 9. Co urts m ust a lso c onsi de r “ w ha t a

pol ic e of fi ce r co uld

r ea sona bly 15 interpret the consent to encom pass.” Id

. ¶ 13 ( int er na l quot at ion m ar

ks and c itatio n 16 om it te d) . A sear ch is in va li d i f it ex ceed s t he sco pe of t he co ns en t g iv en . Id

. ¶ 9. 17 { 23} T he e vid en ce sho w s th at D ep uty S ee ly appr oa ch ed

Defend an t’ s tr

uc k and 18 re que ste d do cu m en ta tio n sp ec if ic to the van intow : “ Can y ou s how m e a bil l of 19 lading again? Your m anifest to pick this up? ” D efendant com plied. While look ing at 20 the r ec ei pt s pe ci fi c to the van, D ep uty S ee ly que sti one d D ef

en da nt a s to the 21 inf orm at ionit

c ont ai ne d and r an a ch ec k on the dr ive r’ s li ce nse num be r lis te d onthe1 7 W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e S t a t e ’ s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t c o n s e n t m u s t b e e x a c t l y

a nd 7 18 co nc lus ive ly

li m ite d, r equir ing suc h aqua lif ic at ion se em s unre al ist ic in l igh t of the 19 stark rea lity

that such statem ents could g ive rise to the “ susp icious” or “ furtive” 20 be ha vi or th at of

te n gi ve s ri se to pro ba bl e cau se or r eas on ab le su sp ic io n. See State v. 21 Leyv a , 201 1- N MS C- 009, ¶ 24, 149 N

. M. 439, 250 P. 3d 8 61 ( quot ing United States 22 v. B room

fie ld , 417 F. 3d 65 4, 65 5 (7th Cir. 2005) (“ Whether y ou stand still or m ove, 23 dr ive above , be low , or at the spe ed li m it, y ou w ill be de sc ri be d by the pol ic e as a ct ing 24 susp iciouslyshoul d they wish to stop o r ar

rest y ou.”))

. 14 1 re ce i p t . St i l l h o l d i n g t h e re ce i p t b o o k , Dep u t y Se el y wa l k ed aw ay fr o m De fe n d an t ’s 2 dr ive r’ s sid e door , j oin ed tw o othe r of

fi ce rs a t the r ear of

the tr uc k, a nd b eg anle af

ing 3 thr oughthe r ec ei pt b ook. 4 { 24} T h e S t a t e a s k s u s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t D e f e n d a n t ’ s f

a i l u r e t o l i m i t o r qu a l i f

y his 5 co nse nt c onst itu te s abr oa d, sw ee pin g st at em en t of c onse nt tha t en co m

pa sse d th e 6 en tir e re ce ipt

boo k. W e de cl ine to dr awsuc h ac onc lus ion un de r th e fa ct s of thi s 7 7 case. De putySee ly

m ade a specif

ic request t o see the re ceipt for a specific vehicle, 8 an d De fe ndant com

pli ed w ith tha t re que st by ope nin g the re ce ipt boo k to the r el ev an t 9 p ag e. A r ea s o n ab l e p er s o n i n t h at s i tu at i o n w o u l d h av e u n d er s t o o dDe fe n d an t ’s 10 co nse nt t o have be en lim ite d to tha t spec if ic pa ge or doc um en t. It w as not r ea sona ble 11 fo r Se el y to ass um e tha t phy sic al poss es sio n of the re ce ipt book , w hic h w as giv ento 12 fa ci lit at e a cl ose ins pe ct ionof the inf orm at ionon the r ec ei pt, al lo wed hi m to fl ip 13 thr oughthe e nti re re ce ipt book an d exa m ine the co nte nts of al l pa ge s. D ep uty S ee ly 14 asked onlyfor the single rece ipt r ather than the e ntire rec eipt boo k, and he re ceived 15 the specific page he r equested. W e theref ore conclude that Def

endant’ s consent was 16 lim ite d to the r ec ei pt f or the van, an d that

S ee ly im pe rm iss ibl y

e xpande d th e sc ope15

1 of that consent. As such, the contents of the receipt b o o k , an d evidence obtained 2 the re fr om , sho uld

be sup pr es se d. Howe ve r, be ca use D ep uty

S ee ly obt ai ne d th e 3 re ce ipt w ithD ef

en da nt’ s c onse nt , t he sin gle r ec ei pt f or the van ne ed

not be 4 supp re sse d. 5 { 25} T ha t sai d , o u r

d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e r e c e i p tb o o kd o e s n ot 6 rem ove De puty Seely ’ s probable cause for ar rest, as it appears f

rom the evidence that 7 D ep uty S ee ly r an a chec k onthe ( ult im at el y f al se ) dr ive r’ s li ce nse num be r on the 8 re ce ipt be fo re f lip pin g th ro ugh the re st of the re ce ipt boo k. T hus, w he n D ep uty S ee ly 9 dis co ve re d tha t the lic en se num be r did not m at ch the na m e an d a ddr es s gi ve n onthe 10 re ce ipt , he ha d pr ob ab le c au se to be lie ve D ef en da nt h ad

c om m itt ed af el ony a nd 11 ex ig en cy

co ul d b e p res um ed

. Se e Ca m pos v. Sta te , 1994-NMS C-012, ¶ 14, 117 N. M. 12 155, 870 P

. 2d 1 17 ( sta tin g that fo r a w ar rantl es s arre st t o be r ea sona ble , the a rr es tin g 13 officer m

ust have probabl e cause and som e exigency m ust exist ; wher e an offic er 14 “ observes the person arrested com m itting a fe lony , e xigency will be pre sum ed”); 15 Sta t e v . Pa a n anen , 2015-NMS C-031, ¶ 26, 357 P.3d 958 (hold ing th at “ there ar e 1 6 o t h ers i tu at i o n s i n wh i ch an ex i g en cy n o tn ec es s ar i l y amo u n t i n g t o an i m m i n en tt hreat 17 of danger, escape, or lost evidence will b e s u fficient to re nder rea sonable a 1 8 w a rr a n t l e s s p ub l i c a rr e s t s up p o rt e d b y p r o b ab l e c au s e u n d e r t h e t o t a l i t yof the 19 ci rc um st an ces ”); S ec tio n 30 -1 6D -1 (A ) (l ist ing the “ ta kin g of ave hic le or

m oto r 20 ve hi cl e” as a fel on y

off en se ).16

1 C. De finition of “Veh icle” Un der N M SA1978 , § 66-1-4. 12(B) (2007, am ende d 2 2016 ) 3 { 26} D ef

en da nt’ s a

ppe al al so ra ise s the que sti on of w he the r the te rm s “ ve hic le ” or 4 “ m oto r ve hic le ” can be int er pr et ed to co ve r the van in vol ve d inthi s c as e. D ef en dant 5 first raised this issue in hi s pro se m o tion to dism iss, w hich the dist rict court 6 interpreted as a m otion under F oul en fon t , 1995-NMC A- 028, ¶ 5 (deem ing it p roper 7 fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt t o di sm iss c ri m ina l c ha rg es on p ur el y le ga l g rounds w he n th e 8 distri c tc ourta ss um e s t he f a c t s un de r l y i ng t he c har ge s a r e t r ue )

. T he d i str i c tcourt 9 de ni edth e m ot io n, d eem in g t he is su e a q ue st io n o f fac t fo r th e jury t o de ci de

. See 10 State v. H

ughey , 2007 -N MS C- 036, ¶ 11, 142 N

. M. 83, 163 P. 3d 470 (st at ing the r ule 11 tha t “ w he re am oti on i nvol ve s f ac tua l m atte rs th at are not ca pable of r es olu tio n 12 w ith out

atr ial on th e m er its , the tr ia l c ourt l ac ks the auth or ity to gr an t the m oti on 13 prior to trial”). If the State c ould rea sonablyassert th e availabil ity of additional 14 ev id en ce, p ret ria l d is m is sa l u nd er Ru le 5-6 01 (B) NM RA is in ap pr op ria te

. Stat e v. 15 Gom ez , 200 3- N MS C- 012, ¶ 7, 133 N

. M. 763 , 70 P

. 3d 7 53. W e re view is su es of 16 st atut ory in te rp ret at io n d e n ov o. Sta te v . Ca rbaj al , 2002-NMS C-019, ¶ 3, 132 N. M. 17 326, 48 P

. 3d 6 4. Whe n astatut e “ spe ci fi ca lly de fi ne s ate rm , w e int er

pr et the statut e 18 acco rd in g t o t ho se de fin it io ns , bec au se th os e d efi ni t i on s re fle ctleg is la ti ve in te nt .” 19 Sta te v . Sm ith , 20 09 -NMCA- 02 8, ¶ 1 3, 1 45 N.M. 75 7, 2 04 P.3d 12 67

. 20 { 27} D ef

en da nt a sse rt s th at

the van inque sti on i n th is c as e is a “ nonr ep ai ra ble 21 ve hic le ” unde r the Co de , S ec tio n 66 -1 -4

. 12( B) , r athe r than a“ ve hicl e” or “ m oto r 2 2 ve hic l e ” a s n a m e di n S e c t i o n 3 0

- 1 6 D

- 1

. T h e S t a t e a s s e rt s t h a tt h e v a n s a t i s f i e s t he2 0 T h e C o d e r e qu i r e s n o n r e p a i r ab l e v e h i c l e c e rt i f i c a t e s , w h i c h i s a“ v e h i cl e 8 21 ow ne rs hip doc um en t c onsp ic uous ly la be le d ‘ N O N RE PA IR

A BL E ’ iss ue d to the 22 owner[ .] ” Se ction 66 -1-4.12(C)

. 17 1 de fi nit ion of “ ve hic le ” unde r the Co de

. S ec tio n 30 -1 6D -1 (A ) pr ohi bit s th e unl aw fu l 2 ta kin g of a ve hic le or m oto r ve hic le

. I t de fi ne s an un law fu l t ak ing a s “ a pe rs on t ak ing 3 an y ve hic le or

m oto r ve hic le a s de fi ne d by the Mo tor

V eh ic le Co de

. . . int en tio na lly 4 and without consent of the owner .” Id

. The Code defines a “ vehicle” as “ every device 5 in, upo n or

by w hic h any

pe rs on o r pr ope rty is or m ay be tr an spor te d or dr awn up on 6 a h i g h w a y , i n c l u d i n g a n y f r a m e , c h a s s i s , b o d y o r u n i t i z e d f r a m e a n d b o d y of

a ny 7 vehicle or m otor vehicle, except devices m oved exclusi vely by hum an power or used 8 exclusivelyupon stati o n ar y rails or tra cks[.] ” N MSA1978 , § 66-1-4. 19(B) (2005). 9 The Code defines a “ m otor vehicle” as “ every vehicle that is self-propelled and every 10 vehicle that is propelled by electric power obt ained from batteries or f

rom overhead 11 tro ll ey

wire s, b ut no t o pe rat edup on rai ls [.]” NMSA 197 8, § 66 -1 -4 .11 (H) (2 01 5) . A 12 “ nonr ep ai ra

ble ve hic le ” is “ a ve hic le of aty pe oth er w ise sub j ec t t o r eg istratio n th at : 8 13 (1) has no resale value e xcept as a source of parts or scr ap m etal” and has been 14 “ ir re ve rs ibl y

de sig na t[ ed ] ” as suc h; o r (2) ha s be enstr ipp ed a s ar es ult

of the ft a nd 15 “ ha s li ttl e or no re sa le va lue oth er than its w orth as a sour ce of a ve hic le ide nti fi catio n 16 nu m be r th atco ul d b e u se d i ll eg al ly[.] ” Sec ti on 66 -1 -4 .12 (B)( 1) -(2 ). 17 { 28} The e vidence contained in the record r eveals that Castro purchased the van 18 knowing th at its engine was not working, but with an ey e towar d m aking repairs that 19 w oul d e ve ntu al ly

r en de r it ope ra

ble

. T he van ha d asm as he d w ind ow , w as m iss ing18

1 headlight s, and the previous owner had used it for part s . Th e State asserted that 2 Ca str o m ay

ha ve c ha nge d hi s m ind

r eg ar din g th is i ssu e, but

be fo re a ct ing to fi x or

sti p 3 the van, the van w as taken from his poss ession without his consent. The S tate further 4 poi nte d ou t in its m oti on tha t the re w as no “ nonr ep ai ra ble ve hic le c er

tif ic at e” f or the 5 ve hic le in que sti on. 6 { 29} Ba se d onthe f

ac ts i n th e re co rd , t hi s is a m atte r to b e re sol ve d by the f ac t7 fi nde r dur ing tr ia l. T he statut or y de fi nit ion s an d the li m ite d e vid en ce pr es en te d pr ior 8 to tr ia l re ve al that the f

ac t- fi nde r co uld

r ea sona bly c onc lud e tha t the van w as ave hic le 9 or a nonrepairable vehicle. Because it is not clear what evidence could be presented 10 at tr ia l or how the fa ct -f

ind er w oul d w ei gh the ev ide nc e pr es en te d, it is i na ppr opr ia te 11 fo r th is Co ur t to sp ecu la te as t o t he ou tc om e o f th is fact ua l i ss ue . See Hughey , 200 7- 12 N MS C- 036, ¶

16 ( “ It is th e ro le of

the f ac t[ -] fi nde r to j udge the c re dib ili ty of 13 witnesses and determ ine the weigh t of evidence. ”). W e theref ore af firm the district 14 co urt’ s de nia l of

D ef en da nt’ s m oti on. 15 III. CON CLU SION 16 { 30} T he re w as suf

fi ci en t a tte nua tio n be tw ee n th e fi rs t and sec ond sto p to pur ge a ny 17 ta int r es ult ing f

ro m the il le ga l f

ir st s top

. E vid en ce obt ai ne d f ro m the r ec ei pt b ook, 18 ex ce pt the r ec ei pt f

or the van, how ev er , m

ust be ex cl ude d bec au se D ep uty S ee ly onl y 19 obt ai ne d c onse nt f

or the re ce ipt al one . A s such , fl ipp ing thr oughthe r es t of the r ec ei pt 2 0 b o o kwa s an i m

p er m i s s i b l e e x p an s i o n o f t h e s co p e o f D ef en d an t ’s co n s en t . We 21 part ia lly

r ev er se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s den ia l of D ef en da nt’ s m oti on t o su

ppr es s th e19

1 re ce ipt boo k, e xc lud ing that gr eate r portio n of the boo k oth er

tha n the r ec ei pt r el ev an t 2 to the ve hic le in que sti on, pe rm itt ed by D ef en da nt’ s c onse nt. Ba se d onthi s r ev er sa l, 3 we rem and to the dis trict court to aff ord Defen dant a chance to w ithdraw his plea, 4 sh ou ld he de em it prud en t to do so . Se e Sta te v . H odge , 199 4- N MS C- 087, ¶ 20, 118 5 N

. M. 4 1 0 , 8 8 2 P

. 2 d 1 ( s t a t i n g t h e r u l e t h a t i f a d e f

e n d a n t p r e v a i l s o n ap p e a l , he is 6 allowed to w ithdraw his plea). 7 { 31} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

8 9 R OD ERIC K T . KE N N ED Y , Ju dg e

10 WE CO NCUR:

11

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 12 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e

13

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 14 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e