SPECIAL STUDIES 

The USAF Scientific 

Advisory Board 

Its First Twenty Years, 

1944- 1964 

Thomas A. Sturm 

New Imprint by the 

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1986 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Sturm. Thomas A. 

The USAF Scientific Advisory Board 

(Special studies / Office of Air Force History) 

Reprint. Originally published: Washington, D.C. : 

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967. 

Includes bibliographical references. 

I. United States. USAF Scientific Advisory Board-- 

History. 1. Title. 11. Series: Special Studies 

(United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force 

History) 

UG633.S83 1985 358.4'07'0973 85-18826 

ISBN' 0-9 12799- 19-6 

This volume is a reprint of the February 1967 edition originally 

issued by 'k '!SAF Historical Division Liaison Office. 

- 

1 or wle by the Superintendent of Documents. U S Government Printing Office 

. Washington. D C . 20402 
FOREWORD 

One of the highest compliments a USAF research and engineering officer can receive on his work is that it met the 

standards of “the Arnold-von Karman tradition.” This allusion 

epitomizes objectivity of inquiry and thoroughness and excellence of performance. 

This documented narrative traces that proud tradition from 

its genesis through the twentieth anniversary of its creator and 

most zealous guardian-the Scientific Advisory Board to the 

Chief of StaTf and Secretary of the Air Force. Hopefully, the 

work will serve as both testimonial and concise source book on 

the invaluable contribution which this dedicated and uniquelyskilled companion-in-arms has made to the cause of American 

aerospace supremacy. 

n 

OLD BROWN 

ief of Staff Secretary of the Air Force 

iii 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Foreword .......................................................... iii 

Introduction ...................................................... vii 

PART I-A SEAT FOR MINERVA ON THE AIR STAFF ........ 1 

Chapter One: Never Again To Be Caught ................ 2 

Chapter Two: A Few Bricks for the Foundation .......... 13 

Chapter Three: Confirming the Partnership ................. 27 

PART 11-FROM DREAMS TO ENGINEERING PROBLEMS ..... 37 

Chapter Four: Out of Crisis a Tradition .................... 38 

Chapter Five : For a More Successful Marriage ............. 47 

Chapter Six: New Look at the Future ................... 66 

Chapter Seven: Eve of New Crisis ........................... 66 

PART 111-CHALLENGE FROM BEYOND THE HORIZON ...... 79 

Chapter Eight: With Survival the Goal .................... 80 

Chapter Nine: A Very Expensive Place ................... 89 

Chapter Ten: Intimate Aid on Risky Decisions ............ 101 

PART IV-NEW CARROTS FOR WINGED HORSES ............ 107 

Chapter Eleven: Hazards of the Business .................... 108 

Chapter Twelve: Keeping Competence Intact ................. 116 

APPENDICES 

A . Chart: SAB Executive and Administrative Officers ............ 133 

B . Roster: SAB Executive and Administrative Officers ........... 134 

C . SAB Membership Roster. Alphabetical ...................... 136 

Changes in Panel Structure ................................. 144 

SAB Steering and Executive Committees ..................... 153 

H . General Board Meetings (Dates and Locations) ............... 157 

I . Changes in Air Force Regulation 20-30 ....................... 159 

D . 

E SAB Membership Roster. by Assignment 145 

F . 

G SAB Membership on Division Advisory Groups 155 

. .................... 

. .............. 

J . Studies and Authors. Toward New Horizons .................. 164 
APPENDICES-Continued 

Page 

K . Register of SAB Reports ................................... 166 

Ad Hoc and Special Committee Reports ...................... 166 

Panel Reports ............................................ 171 

Aeromedical/Biosciences ............................... 171 

Aerospace Vehicles ................................... 171 

Basic Research ....................................... 172 

Electronics ........................................... 172 

Geophysics ........................................... 172 

Guidance and Control ................................. 173 

Information Processing ............................... 174 

Nuclear .............................................. 174 

Propulsion ........................................... 176 

Psychology and Social Sciences ....................... 176 

Discontinued Panels .................................. 177 

NOTES .......................................................... 179 

GLOSS.ARY ...................................................... 193 
INTRODUCTION 

General Henry H. Arnold told Dr. Theodore von Karman 

he needed him in the Pentagon during World War I1 “just to 

show the military that a college professor was good for something.” Characteristically, there was more truth than hyperbole in Arnold’s easy humor. Before the war, a near-disastrous 

gulf had opened between American men of arms and science at 

the top levels. This was Arnold’s way of announcing that he 

intended to correct that mistake within the future Army Air 

Forces. The means he chose proved eminently successful. Dr. 

von Karman and the other distinguished civilian scientists who 

answered Arnold’s call opened the way to an enduring partnership. 

The nature of its assignment and the absence of precedence 

enabled the wartime Arnold-von Karman scientific advisory 

group to initiate procedures and standards which ultimately 

became unique hallmarks of its postwar successor. The wartime 

group formed, von Karman noted, “with the idea that we needed 

a future plan, a projection into the future.” He accomplished 

the job by subdividing air science into its major parts and 

inviting the nation’s foremost authorities in these technologies 

to join him. They met frequently in joint session to discuss 

general aims and progress but pursued their individual work 

independently. And their completed product-the prestigious 

multi-volume work entitled Toward New Horizons-went directly 

to General Arnold with conclusions and recommendations unaltered to fit any advisory group or Air Force preconceptions. 

When this group transitioned to the USAF Scientific Advisory 

Board (SAB) at war’s end, its parts naturally converted to 

separate panels accustomed to having their findings forwarded 

directly to the Chief of Staff. At the same time, members 

favored continuing the wartime practice of meeting jointly to 

consider problems which cut across technological lines. Thus 

emerged the semi-annual general SAB meetings, which soon 

oii 
uiii 

developed into major forums of exchange for the daily practitioners and part-time advisors who, together, comprised the 

overall USAF research and engineering establishment. 

The wartime group operated under explicit instructions, 

but the postwar group underwent a long period of experimentation before it arrived at a satisfactory modus operandi. Perhaps the most salient lesson the SAB learned during these early 

years was that it could not survive in the form it had already 

come to regard as traditional unless it struck out on its own 

when others lagged in soliciting its services. In this regard it 

found it was no different from other Air Staff offices, despite 

its unique nature. That is, had it contented itself with resting 

on its laurels when assignments were not forthcoming, it soon 

would have atrophied, perhaps expired. Hence there emerged 

three prime initiators of SAB assignments: the Secretary and 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Air Staff and field agencies; 

and the board itself. 

No matter how carefully official statements enunciated 

board duties, they could not posr’bly encompass the SAB’s full 

role and significance. For example, Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, 

while serving as board military director, offered the additional 

observation that the board insured “that we in the USAF maintain the progressive outlook, that constant willingness to discard 

the old and try the new.” The SAB’s technical director, Mr. 

Chester N. Hasert, depicted it as “a unique organization for 

quickly assembling the best scientific brains of the country 

with a background in Air Force problems [and a] proven capability of obtaining quick answers to major policy decisions of a 

technical nature which the Air Force would be slow to achieve 

through other means.” Dr. James H. Doolittle saw the SAB as 

the organ through which “American science has an opportunity 

to know Air Force problems and assist in their solution . . . a 

public service of the highest order of importance.” General 

Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, noted what he 

regarded as the “job which in the long run is even more important than any of the others . . . the guidance [the SAB] can 

give the Air Force in the field of fundamentally new ideas.” 

Dr. Clayton S. White, chairman of the Aero-medical/Biosciences 

Panel, theorized that the Air Force did “most of the hard spade 

work on the important research and development problems” 

while the SAB served “as a sounding board and a mechanism 

for refining thinking, [for providing] inputs which make for 

‘ 
ix 

analytical thoroughness, and [for bringing] balance and wisdom to conclusions and decisions through an impartiality not 

always evidenced by those who cannot see the forest for the 

trees.” And Dr. H. Guyford Stever, in his capacity as board 

chairman, observed that the SAB served to spread “the idea of 

a positive approach to technology through the government and 

scientific community as a whole [and] that the indirect communications relationships of the SAB may well be one of its 

most important contributions to the Air Force and the Government.” 

Ample support for such estimates of the SAB’s roles and 

accomplishments in the years 1944-1964 may be found in its 

studies and in official project histories. This volume seeks to 

mold data from these works and from the board’s administrative records into a source book on SAB membership and organizational and operational turning points for these years. It 

should also make clear why, for example, the Hoover Commission in the mid-1950’s adjudged the SAB to be “the best top 

structure for tieing in of science” it had seen within the government, and why Lt. Gen. James Ferguson, board military director, 

announced in 1964 that the SAB had “grown immeasurably” 

in importance to the Air Force in recent years and portended 

to become of even greater importance in the future. 

The volume was written by Mr. Thomas A. Sturm of the 

Washington liaison office of the USAF Historical Division, Air 

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, at the suggestion 

of Colonel Robert J. Burger, Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Board. The Secretariat and author are most grateful 

to the many former and present board members and associates 

who took time from their busy schedules to review the manuscript for accuracy and clarity prior to its publication. Requests 

for further information on matters of general Air Force content discussed in the volume may be addressed to the USAF 

Historical Division. Requests for additional information on specific board projects cited in the narrative or appendices or on 

the role of particular members in those projects should be submitted to the SAB Secretariat. 

PART I 

A SEAT FOR MINERVA ON 

THE AIR STAFF 

Now I believe personally . . . that a Scientific 

Advisory Board should be effective now. . . . We 

shouldn’t forget the more remote purposes and 

the desired projection into the future. . . . But 

certainly the voice of Minerva should be heard 

on the current problems. 

-Theodore von Karman, speaking 

to the Scientific Advisory Board 

meeting of February 4, 1947. 
CHAPTER ONE 

NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 

I don’t think we dare muddle 

through the next twenty years the 

way we have . . . the last twenty 

years. I have worked with von 

Karman the last twenty years, and 

I was sometimes scared by the 

knowledge he had that we weren’t 

using . . . . I don’t want ever again 

to have the United States caught 

the way we were this time. 

-Henry H. Arnold* 

General Henry H. Arnold, wartime chief of America’s Army 

Air Forces (AAF), had full confidence in his hard-driving and 

dedicated staff of World War I1 officer-scientists and engineers 

at the Wright Field Engineering Division. Through a miracle 

of innovation and adaptation they had produced the aircraft 

and other weapons that he required for victory over the Germans 

and Japanese. Now, in the summer of 1944, with victory in 

sight, Arnold knew that this staff could also provide him with 

valid plans for a suitable postwar AAF research and development program. At the same time, he felt he needed a plam 

which looked far beyond the immediate period-a plan that first 

examined thoroughly the latest scientific advances in the air 

arms of all participants in World War I1 and then set forth 

the future steps the United States should take to develop and 

maintain the best air force in the world. To his mind, fitting 

immediate plans into such a long-range blueprint was the first 

essential step in guaranteeing his country’s continued supremacy 

in airpower.’ 

To help him get the “best brains available” to head the longrange study project, General Arnold, as he related in his memoir 

Global Mission, turned to his close friend Dr. Robert Millikan 

*In address to Scientific Advisory Group, January 9,1945. 

See notes on page 179. 

2 
NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 3 

of the California Institute of Technology. What he hoped to 

find, he told Millikan, was a man with sufficient stature to attract to the project “practical scientists and engineers” who 

were expert in sonics, electronics, radar, aerodynamics, and other 

aspects of science that portended to influence future aircraft 

development.* 

Arnold wrote that he and Millikan discussed the matter at 

some length. However, other evidence suggests that their final 

choice-Dr. Theodore von Karman, director of Caltech’s famed 

Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory-was a foregone conclusion, subject only to Millikan’s willingness to lose von Karman 

for a while and the latter’s willingness to serve. Dr. Frank L. 

Wattendorf, former student and long-time associate of von Karman, afforded the best evidence for this view, noting that the 

scientist and the general had been close friends since the early 

1930’s when Arnold was a major in command of March Field, 

California, and von Karman the head of Caltech’s Rocket Research Project (forerunner of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory). 

After he moved to Washington in 1936 as Assistant Chief of 

the Air Corps, Arnold retained a personal interest in von Karman’s jet propulsion and rocket motor experiments, visiting 

the Caltech facilities many times. When in 1938 Arnold, now 

chief of his service, required technical counsel for overcoming 

opposition to his 2 ssuming control of research and development 

vital to the Air Corps mission, he solicited von Karman’s aid. 

Their success, Wattendorf recalled, “broke loose the major facility construction and expansion of Wright Field, starting with 

the 20-foot, 40,000 horsepower wind tunnel, and encompassing 

all the laboratories.” In 1940 von Karman accepted appointment as part-time consultant to Arnold and special advisor at 

Wright Field. Among his many contributions to air power 

about this time were his studies on the Bell XS-1 which later 

became the first manned aircraft to break the sound barrier. 

So confident did Arnold become in von Karman’s judgment 

and counsel and so easily did they work together that from this 

time, according to Wattendorf, whenever Arnold needed a quick 

answer to a particularly tough scientific problem he often circumvented normal staff channels with a direct query to von 

Karman.3 Thus, it appears logical to assume that he must also 

have planned to call on von Karman for the long-range study 

from the moment he conceived the idea. 

In any event, Dr. Millikan sanctioned the move and Dr. 

See notes an page 179. 
4 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

von Karman accepted.* The initial appointment, issued October 

23, 1944, read that von Karman would act as expert consultant 

on scientific matters relating to aeronautical engineering in the 

AAF, detailed to the Eglin Field Proving Ground Command 

in Florida. This enabled von Karman to enlist an initial cadreconsisting of Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Dr. Wattendorf, and Dr. 

Vladimir K. Zworykin-to explore projects underway in the research and testing center at Eglin. Here, in a month-long stay, 

they established contacts for securing a flow of information on 

current research projects. They also witnessed launchings of 

“Chinese copies” of German V-1’s. From their observations and 

discussions at Eglin they formed a general concept of the substance of the long-range study and drew up a list of the types 

of experts the group would need.4 

Meanwhile, General Arnold formally established the group 

in a memo to von Karman on November 7, 1944, noting his 

conviction that the future security of the nation rested in part 

“on developments instituted by our educational and professional 

scientists.”5 Soon after, Arnold’s deputy, Lt. Gen. Barney M. 

Giles, announced von Karman’s appointment as Director of an 

AAF Long Range Development and Research Program.6 On 

December 1, 1944, Giles announced the official establishment of 

the AAF Scientific Advisory Group (SAG), noting that it was 

attached directly to Arnold’s office with the mission of assembling and evaluating facts on long-range research and development in the AAF and preparing special studies on scientific 

and technical matters pertinent to airpower.? 

During this time, Dr. von Karman continued to build the 

SAG staff. In discussions with the members, General Arnold 

explained in greater detail what he had in mind. He asked 

them to forget the past, to use current equipment merely as a 

*At the time of the Arnold-Millikan meeting, von Karman was in a 

sanatorium at Lake George, New York, which he entered in July 1944 to 

convalesce from an illness. Wishing to broach the matter directly but 

having little time to spare, Arnold asked von Karman to meet him at 

LaGuardia Airport where Arnold had a short layover during an official 

trip to Canada. Von Karman complied and they talked in an automobile 

on the airfield. According to Mr. Lee Edson, who assisted von Karman 

with his autobiography, von Karman was hesitant at first. He was not 

certain he should leave his work at the university or that he would fit 

into the Pentagon style of things. Arnold assured him of Millikan’s favorable reaction, dispelling the first uncertainty. On the second, Arnold apparently assured him that if ever the occasion demanded he would personally see to it that the Pentagon fitted its style to von Karman’s. 

See notes on page 179. 
NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 5 

point of departure for their boldest predictions, and to concentrate on manned and unmanned supersonic airplanes, smaller 

but more powerful bombs, air defense needs, communications 

possibilities, and all other phases of aviation that could affect 

“the development and employment of air power to come.” In 

short, he wanted them to look 20 years into the future and prepare a workable guide for the air leaders who followed him.* 

Organizationally, the SAG divided into two groups : permanent consultants who worked full-time in the Pentagon and 

others who continued at their regular employment but were on 

call as required. Dr. Dryden served as deputy technical director 

and Colonel Frederic E. Glantzberg as deputy military director. 

A secretariat of military officers handled administrative duties. 

Total manning eventually included some 30 civilian scientists, 

about a dozen military personnel, and a clerical staff.* At the 

outset, the full group-permanent and part-time consultantsmet monthly to exchange views on their studies of where the 

AAF currently stood in relation to research and development 

possibilities and to formulate ways and means of proceeding 

with its long-range recommendations. 

The full group met first on January 9, 1945, again on 

February 7, on March 7, and on April 3.t Dr. von Karman explained that their objective in these meetings included a search 

for ways “to secure scientific insight in a standing Air Force . . . to secure the interest of the scientists of the nation to help the 

future Air Force . . . and to educate the people of the nation 

that for our security we must have a strong Air Force.”9 

In late April 1945, Dr. von Karman and six SAG colleagues 

departed for Europe to familiarize themselves with the latest 

scientific thinking and to integrate this thinking into the AAF’s 

future plans.’” They spent two months abroad, interrogating 

top foreign scientists, including captured German scientists, and, 

in general, carrying out Arnold’s wishes that they “observe, 

correlate and draw deductions from all possible enemy developments in being or under consideration . . . [and] of exercising 

imagination and scientific genius in recognizing possibilities 

which may develop from facts so collected.”ll On his return, Dr. 

von Karman gave SAG members an extemporaneous account 

of some of their experiences and findings. The trip was timed 

*See Appendix J for the names of members and contributors to the 

+All of the SAG meetings convened in the Pentagon, 

See notes on page 179. 

work of the SAG. 
d USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

well, he said, since VE-Day came a few days after they arrived 

in Europe making it possible for them to visit most places of 

value. They had no electronics experts with them so their studies concentrated mostly on aerodynamics, missiles, and engines. 

They found Braunschweig, with its numerous laboratories for research in airplane design, ballistics, engines, and jet propulsion 

especially interesting. The many German engineers and professors of aeronautical engineering who were still there had provided occupation authorities much information, especially on jet 

propulsion and guided missiles. Von Karman noted that while 

much of the documentation had been destroyed at Braunschweig 

“95 per cent [of the data had been duplicated and] came out 

in very funny places-salt mines, wells, old shafts, or just buried 

in the backyard-and after some pressure and decent handling 

of the people, more and more of them came out every day.” 

They also visited Gottingen, another primary aeronautics center. While Braunschweig and Gottingen eventually went over 

to the British, United States authorities had them about six 

weeks and were able to provide the SAG with many important 

itims, including microfilm records. After Gottingen, von Karman and his colleagues visited England where the Royal Air 

Force briefed them on its progress with jet propulsion and missiles. Finally, they visited aviation laboratories and factories in 

Switzerland and Bavaria.*12 

Many significant developments in American aviation had 

their genesis in SAG proposals submitted during and follawing the European trip. For example, Dr. Dryden’s missile report set the stage for much that was initiated in this area 

in the years immediately following the war. On recommendation of Mr. George S. Schairer (forwarded by urgent cable 

from Volkenrode, Germany), B-47 design shifted from straight 

to swept wing. Dr. Wattendorf‘s June 1945 recommendation 

for a new aerodynamic and propulsion center became the founding document for the Arnold Engineering Development Center 

project. Finally, Dr. von Karman’s timely recommendations sent 

*Dr. von Karman also spent about two weeks in Russia on invitation 

of Russian scientists. At one affair, he said, “all the professors of the 

military academy were there in general’s uniform and all the big doctors 

in general’s uniform.” He noted that the members of the academy got 

the highest food ration in the whole country. “My feeling isn’t that bread 

and meat should be the reward,” he said, “but on the other hand I think 

it is quite a good idea, because in most of the capitalistic countries the 

people believe that a professor should lead a frugal life.” 

See notes on page 179. 
NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 7 

directly to General Arnold beginning in May 1945 on the handling and processing of captured German scientific documents 

and equipment assisted greatly in reclaiming these invaluable 

tools for AAF postwar study and use.* Von Karman also successfully urged many prominent scientists to come to the United 

States and assisted in establishing programs (such as PAPERCLIP) for actually getting them to their new homes.I3 

Dr. von Karman incorporated the findings from the European trip into a report titled Where We Stand which he submitted to General Arnold on August 22, 1945. He tried to 

show in this report “the main fields in which significant advances have been made and . . . ‘where we stand’ with some indications as to ‘where we shall go.’” He also identified the following as new aspects of aerial warfare which he felt the AAF 

had to recognize as “fundamental realities” in future planning :la 

Aircraft, manned or pilotless, will move with speeds far beyond the 

velocity of sound. 

Due to improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion, and electronics control, unmanned devices will transport means of destruction to targets 

at distances up to several thousands of miles. 

Small amounts of explosive materials will cause destruction over 

areas of several square miles. 

Defense against present-day aircraft will be perfected by targetseeking missiles. 

Only aircraft or missiles moving at extreme speeds will be able to 

penetrate enemy territory protected by such defenses. 

A perfect communication system between fighter command and each 

individual aircraft will be established. 

Location and observation of targets, take-off, navigation and landing 

of aircraft, and communication will be independent of visibility and 

weather. 

Fully equipped airborne task forces will be enabled to strike at far 

distant points and will be supplied by air. 

After examining how the United States currently stood in relation to German advances in such areas as supersonic flight, 

pilotless aircraft, and jet propulsion, he concluded that the 

“German achievements [were] not the result of any superiority 

in their technical and scientific personnel . . . but rather due 

to the very substantial support enjoyed by their research in- 

*A similar SAG scientific search group, which Dr. von Karman was 

unable to accompany, went to India, China, and Japan in August-December 

1945 on General Arnold’s request. Their reports, which appeared as Far 

East Air Force Technical Intelligence Reports, also exerted considerable 

influence within AAF scientific circles in the immediate postwar years. 

See notes on page 179. 
8 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

stitutions in obtaining expensive research equipment, such as 

large supersonic wind tunnels, many years before such equipment was planned in this country.”I5 

Upon completion of the Where We Stand volume, Dr. von 

Karman acted to expedite completion of their major projectthe long-range study. The Japanese surrender in mid-August, 

and the emergence of a school of thought in the War Department that postwar long-range military research should be centralized and placed under civilian control similar to the way it 

was during the war made it necessary that they bring this 

work to a close as swiftly as possible. Opposed to the centralized concept, von Karman called on his colleagues at a late 

August 1945 meeting to complete their individual studies in 

short order so that the overall work could play a part in resolving “the question of how research and development should be 

secured for the services and how research and development 

should be divided between the Army and Navy on one side 

and the civilian agencies on the other.”*la To accomplish this, 

he suggested they greatly modify their plans. Originally, they 

had planned a main body “based on functional aspects of science 

in the Air Forces” followed by “a scientific analysis of the 

problems written as one text.” In lieu of the textbook approach, 

he proposed a series of monographs introduced by a short summary volume.“ 

The SAG members adopted his proposal and, over the next 

three months devoted themselves to preparing the individual 

monographs while von Karman concentrated on synthesizing 

their broad recommendations into an introductory volume. In 

the first weeks of December, they rushed their labors to a close 

*President Roosevelt asked Dr. Vannevar Rush, head of the War 

Department’s Office of Research and Development during the war, to 

propose a postwar national scientific research program. After the President’s death, Dr. Bush (in a report titled Science: The Endless Frontier, 

dated July 5, 1945) recommended creation of the National Science Foundation 

(NSF). As depicted in the report, the NSF would handle the major longrange military basic research projects, with the services performing just 

that research necessary to refine existing weapons. Dr. von Karman (as 

he noted in an interview with Air Force historian Mr. Samuel Milner in 

July 1960) immediately protested this view. Accordingly, General Arnold 

had Brig. Gen. Lauris Norstad discuss the matter with Bush. As von Karman 

recalled, Bush informed Norstad that he had been misunderstood, that the 

services could still carry out basic research on future weapons within logical 

limitations. Accordingly, von Karman and his colleagues proceeded on this 

assumption in their studies. 

See notes on page 179. 
NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 9 

and, on the 15th, von Karman presented to General Arnold 

the completed work-a series of 33 volumes titled Toward New 

Horizons. The first volume, written by von Karman, contained 

a discussion of the relation between science and aerial warfare, 

an analysis of the main research problems of the Air Force 

(from the point of view of its functions) and recommendations 

on organization of research. The 32 accompanying monographs 

treated detailed research programs in specific fields.ls In them, 

von Karman later informed Arnold, the SAG scientists “attempted to combine a bold, forward-looking attitude with scientific soundness and appreciation of practical limitations.”*lB 

In his introductory volume-titled Science, the Keg to Air 

Supre?nacy-Dr. von Karman called attention to the increasing 

scientific and teqhnological nature of warfare. Victory or defeat in the first world war had been decided mainly by human 

endurance. While the superiority of Allied tanks and the blockade of German shipping contributed greatly to German defeat, 

the main factor in the decision was “the complete exhaustion 

of human endurance on the German side.” The second world 

war was far different, having from the beginning a technological character. Germany’s overwhelming technological preparation, von Karman wrote, 

secured her first brilliant successes on the European continent. The 

shortcomings of the Luftwaffe in strategic bombing and the lack of 

experience of the German Army and its consequent poor preparation 

for amphibious operations caused the attack against England to be 

stillborn. The mounting tide of Allied, especially American, 

air power became finally the main factor in Germany’s defeat. Even 

in the East, although the bravery and endurance of the Russians 

were perhaps the most important factors in stopping the German 

Army, the Russian march of victory to the West could not have 

been achieved without technological superiority, due partly to Russian and partly to American production. 

Another new element in the second war, he noted, “was the 

decisive contribution of organized science to effective weapons.” 

While science had played a role in all wars since time immemorial, never before had such large numbers of scientific workers 

“been united for planned evaluation and utilization of scientific 

ideas for military purposes.” Thus, World War I1 had made, 

obvious that future warfare would have a primarily scientific 

character, and Toward New Horizons attempted “to formulate 

some of the consequences of this conception for the [future] 

Air Forces.”20 

*See Appendix J for a listing of the studies. 

See notes on page 179. 
10 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Dr. von Karman organized his introductory volume into 

three parts. The first-after dismissing the argument currently held in some quarters that atomic weapons would negate 

the need for large military forces in the future-concluded 

that among its future tasks the Air Force would have to reach 

and hit remote targets swiftly and with great power, secure 

air superiority in any future war, transport large forces of men 

and arms swiftly to any point on the globe, and defend the United 

States against other air forces. Von Karman made the point 

here that “only an air force which fully exploits all the knowledge and skill which science has available now and will have 

available in the future, will have a chance of accomplishing 

these tasks.” The second part distilled and synthesized the key 

principles and proposals contained in the supporting monographs and sought to estimate future Air Force research and 

development needs in relation to missions. The final part summarized the SAG’S recommendations on the “organizatory character” of future Air Force research and development requirements-the fundamental principles which should govern the 

organization of Air Force research, the extent to which the 

Air Force should cooperate with scientific institutions and industry, the facilities that the Air Force would require, and the 

scientific training of Air Force officers.21 

Throughout this first volume, von Karman stressed time 

and again his conviction that the future Air Force had to be 

equipped-physically, intellectually, and psychologically-to 

gear operational planning to scientific development. He warned 

that it would not be possible to relegate scientific problems and 

officers to one niche and military problems and officers to 

another, noting that “scientific results cannot be used efficiently 

by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists 

cannot produce results useful for warfare without an understanding of the operation.”22 He charged Air Force leadership 

with the task of creating and maintaining a climate of mutual 

respect and cooperation between the scientists and military 

planners, en joining them to remember “that problems never 

have final or universal solutions, and only a constant inquisitive 

attitude toward science and a ceaseless and swift adaptation to 

new developments can maintain the security of this nation 

through world air supremacy.”2S 

General Arnold distributed copies of the report among Air 

Staff members in early January 1946, hailing it as “the first 

See notes on page 179. 
NEVER AGAIN TO BE CAUGHT 11 

of its kind ever produced” and an excellent guide for research 

and development planning in the coming years.24 In May 1946, 

Air Materiel Command (AMC) chief Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, 

having been asked to evaluate and comment on the report, said he 

fully endorsed “the basic principles of the responsibilities of the 

Air Forces in the scientific domain” set forth in Dr. von Karman’s 

introductory volume. These stipulated that the Air Force (1) 

had fundamental responsibility for insuring that the nation was 

prepared to wage effective air warfare, (2) had to call on all 

talents and facilities in the nation and support the development 

of facilities and creative work of scientists and industry, (3) 

required the means of recruiting and training personnel who had 

full understanding of the scientific facts necessary to procure 

and use equipment which was more advanced than that used 

by any other nation, and (4) had to be authorized to expand 

existing Air Force research facilities and create new ones to 

perform its own research and also to make such facilities available to Scientists and industrial concerns working on Air Force 

problems. These particular principles were fundamental, General Twining said, and if the Air Staff implemented just this 

much of the report initially the AAF would have laid a sound 

foundation for the future.25 

By mid-1946, AMC and Headquarters AAF staffs were 

hard at work drawing up detailed plans for implementing the 

salient recommendations of the report.26 The fact that approval 

for many of these plans was either delayed for long periods or 

never forthcoming did not detract from either the value or the 

reputation of the report. The timeliness of its appearance, the 

impeccable reputations of its authors, the objectivity and directness of its approach and language, and, above all, the genuine 

and inspiring claim it made on all Americans, civilian and military, to share the task of keeping America supreme in the air 

assured its immediate and lasting success. It became the lodestone and the touchstone for Air Force research and development, a final arbiter of argument, a main source for inspiration 

and motivation. One top Air Force figure ascribed the report’s 

enduring reputation to “the unqualified confidence and support” 

which it engendered from the start among scientists and industry in Air Force research and de~elopment.?~ Another noted 

20 years later that in re-reading the report at that time he was 

astonished at the validity of its predictions.2n From such tributes are legends formed, and as long as there remained a U.S. 

See notes on pages 179 and 180. 
I2 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Air Force the documents listed under the title Toward New 

Horizons promised to stand among the other respected pillars 

of that service’s heritage, tradition, and pride. 
CHAPTER TWO 

A FEW BRICKS FOR THE 

FOUNDATION 

I believe the Air Force is a high 

building constantly adding new 

construction. If we can put in a 

few bricks, especially in the lower 

levels which carry the weightif we can help build the foundation-we will be very happy. 

-Theodore von Karman* 

Having finished the work.for which they had come together 

and with the war done and demobilization the order of the day, 

the Scientific Advisory Group prepared to disband. The members met for the last time in the Pentagon on February 6, 1946, 

where General Arnold thanked them for their services and expressed the hope that they, and their colleagues in the universities and industry, would help the Air Force “continue its advance and preeminence” in the peacetime years ahe8d.l Maj. 

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, recently appointed to the new office of 

Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development, also 

addressed them, inviting their continued interest in the scientific problems of the postwar Air Force. On March 1, Dr. von 

Karman resigned his government position, formally ending the 

pro ject.2 

Meanwhile, a seed planted in the summary volume of Toward New Horizons for establishing a scientific advisory group 

on the peacetime AAF staff had already taken firm root. Herein 

Dr. von Karman and his colleagues had proposed the formation 

of a permanent advisory council of eminent civilian scientists 

to report directly to the AAF commander on important techno- 

‘kDuring discussion at an April 7, 1949, SAB meeting. 

See notes on page 180. 

13 
14 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

logical developments and promising scientific research. They 

recommended that men invited to serve on this council be thoroughly familiar with the work and needs of the Air Force but 

have their main interest outside the Air Force, be “experts with 

broad experience in the various branches of science involved,” 

and provide a cross section of the nation’s scientific th~ught.~ 

Dr. von Karman later personally endorsed and expanded on the 

proposal to General Arnold, indicating his “strong belief” that 

the AAF commander would need frequent and valid scientific 

advice, and a group of distinguished scientists on ready call 

could best provide it. As von Karman first envisioned the 

group, it would consist of 10-15 part-time consultants supported 

by a full-time staff of a military director (preferably a 

brigadier general), a civilian scientist or an officer with scientific training to serve as secretary, and clerical personnel. One 

of the scientists would serve as chairman and spend several 

days a month with the full-time staff.4 

General Arnold had circulated the proposal among his staff 

for comment.: Although fully supporting it, Arnold nevertheless felt that with his retirement imminent his replacement 

should decide whether or not to bring civilians of the high order 

contemplated into intimate involvement with the Air Force’s 

daily affairs. If Arnold had any serious doubts on the matter, 

his generals quickly dispelled them. As General LeMay expressed it, the wartime SAG “rendered such signal service to 

the Army Air Forces during the war that it has made obvious 

the necessity for continuation of such a service as an essential 

part of Headquarters staff planning.”6 Accordingly, LeMay and 

von Karman met to work out the details for activating the 

group.*’ 

They submitted their plan to General Carl A. Spaatz (soon 

to replace General Arnold) on January 9, 1946. It differed from 

von Karman’s earlier ideas on several key points. First, it proposed a considerably larger group calling now for a chairman and 30 members. Also, it did not provide for a military 

director as such but called on the Deputy Chief of Air Staff 

for Research and Development to serve as ex-officio member, 

perform liaison with the Air Staff, provide one of his civilian 

*Much credit for the rapid transition of the group from a wartime to 

peacetime structure belonged to Colonel Roscoe C. Wilson (later Lt. Gen. 

and board military director) who represented General LeMay in the 

detailed planning for the changeover. 

See notes on page 180. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 25 

scientists as the group’s secretary, and furnish clerical and other 

administrative support. Finally, it aligned the membership into 

panels devoted to specific technological areas.8 

On February 13, 1946, exactly one week after the wartime 

group’s terminal meeting, General LeMay took the first step 

toward activating the permanent group by requesting permission to transfer the wartime group’s functions, and civilian position allotments to his ~ffice.~ The request was approved and 

the move completed on February 28.1° Meanwhile, Dr. von 

Karman and his former SAG colleagues had drawn up a recommended membership, to whom General Spaatz on March 14 

issued formal letters of invitation. In soliciting their assistance, 

Spaatz noted that “the success of the Air Forces in the recent 

war was due, in large measure, to the integration of our scientif ic, industrial and military resources [and] future security 

will, in turn, depend on the degree to which we are able to 

continue this intimate, constructive relationship.” The new 

group-to be called the Scientific Advisory Board (SABIwould help to insure the survival of this relationship by affording the Air Force “guidance jq the planning and programming 

of research and development activities.” 

During the next three months, membership on the new 

SAB was established and, on June 17, 1946, it convened for 

the first time. On all major counts, it was manned, structured, 

and administered according to the von Karman-LeMay plan. 

Membership totalled 30, including von Karman who had accepted 

General Spaatz’ invitation to be the first chairman. Of the 30, 

over two-thirds had served on the wartime group. The rest 

were equally regarded in their fields and equally familiar with 

military research and development needs. * 

The members spent the first two days of their week-long 

first meeting in the Pentagon establishing their organization 

and procedures and becoming acquainted with the overall postwar AAF program. In his welcoming remarks General Spaatz 

assured them that the AAF intended to “pay close attention to 

all your advice which we hope will be as critical as you can 

make it in order to keep us on the right path.”1f Dr. von Karman 

then explained appointment and tenure policies and the panel 

structure. Orginally, he and General LeMay had wanted to 

*See Appendix C for names and tenure of office of SAR members 

from 1946-1964. Appendix E indicates members’ panel assignments for 

those years. 

See notes on page 180. 
16 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

limit tenure to two-years, with one half of the initial board 

receiving only one-year appointments to allow the start of an 

annual 50 per cent rotation. In the end, however, they had invited all members to join for one-year only, abandoning the 

rotation plan for fear it would be too restrictive. The policy 

adopted set no limitations on the duration of membership. Board 

officers would review the roster annually and re-issue invitations 

to those individuals whose services the AAF continued to require 

and who were agreeable to remaining ab08rd.I~ 

All but Dr. von Karman were assigned to one of five panels. 

The Aeromedicine and Psychology Panel had four members with 

Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace I1 as chairman. The Aircraft and 

Propulsion Panel had seven experts in airplane and engine design, propulsion, and materials under Dr. C. Richard Soderberg’s chairmanship. Eight experts on molecular and nuclear 

energy-producing materials under Dr. Lee A. Dubridge’s chairmanship staffed the Fuels, Explosives, and Nuclear Energy 

Panel.* Five guidance authorities under the leadership of Dr. 

Dryden made up the Guidance of Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft 

Panel. The Radar, Communications, and Weather Panel contained experts from each of these technological areas with Dr. 

Zworykin as chairman. The arrangement was far from perfect, 

Dr. von Karman pointed out, possessing several incongruities 

and overlappings. But it was a start and necessary modifications would be made in the future.l+ 

In answer to some members who feared that the SAB 

might degenerate into five seminar groups concerned only with 

items within the bounds of their disciplines, Dr. von Karman 

pointed out that assignment to a single panel was not intended 

to restrict members of different panels from working together. 

*Dr. von Karman explained the rationale for joining these subjects 

into one panel at this time as follows: “From a scientific point of view . . . there is no great difference between electronic reaction, which is called 

molecular, or between nuclear reaction. And from the practical point of 

view, I think it is advantageous to put these topics together because the 

whole procedure in atomic development is yet in flux, so it is perhaps 

too early to make one separate panel for molecular energy only. I thought 

it would be better, for the time being, to get together nuclear energy with 

explosives and fuels. Also many questions are similar. After all, the 

questions of terminal ballistics, the science of destruction, even if the 

scale is different, are similar for ordinary bombing and bombing by 

atomic bomb. Also, other questions, for example, theory explosion waves, 

have some scientific foundation and require the same methods of investigation in both cases.” 

See notes on page 180. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 17 

General LeMay agreed, intimating that he felt most of the problems anticipated at that time would work themselves out as 

the SAB gained experience. “The panels as organized,” he said, 

ought to be able “to handle the best of questions that we will 

be asked to solve. However, there may be some come up that 

fit into no particular panel, and possibly another committee 

will have to be appointed at the time or the board can consider them as a whole body and work on them.”15 

Board management was vested in an Executive Committee consisting of Dr. von Karman, General LeMay, and the 

panel chairmen. General LeMay and his staff would call problems to the attention of the Executive Committee who would 

then assign them to a panel, a special SAB committee, or even 

to outside scientists. The Executive Committee would meet 

every second month; the full board twice a year; and the 

panels as necessary.* Dr. Ralph P. Johnson, civilian scientist 

in General LeMay’s office, was designated to serve as the interim SAB secretary pending assignment of a permanent secretary.l6 

Following the two days at the Pentagon, the members flew 

to Wright Field where, on June 19, General Twining and his 

AMC staff discussed both the fiscal year 1947 AAF research 

and development program and the broad aspects of future planning and then provided an inspection tour of the physical plant. 

In the following two days they met as panels to receive detailed briefings and as a board to draft reports on the five-day 

meeting.’? 

On August 19, Dr. von Karman forwarded the finished 

report to General LeMay. Consisting of a summary backed 

up by detailed panel papers, the report included among its 

many findings an endorsement of a draft directive prepared by 

LeMay’s office for implementing within the AAF the War Department’s recently enunciated policy on research and development in the postwar services. Von Karman hailed the new 

policy, which separated research and development contracts 

from procurement contracts, “as a very important step for 

utilizing scientific talent and facilities available throughout the 

*The board never instituted this ambitious Executive Committee 

meeting plan. For the first years, the Committee convened immediately 

prior to or during the semi-annual full board meetings and in occasional 

emergency session. Later, as noted in a subsequent chapter, meetings 

were stepped up to four per year. 

See notes on page 180. 
18 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

country for solution of scientific and technical problems facing 

the Air Forces.”* They strongly supported the AAF requirement for a special air engineering center (which in 1950 became 

fact as the Arnold Engineering Development Center) including 

the construction of facilities there for research in transonic 

and supersonic speed ranges.? 

The SAB also concurred in the current and planned distribution of research and development funds, recommending only 

that meteorological research be given a larger share. They 

approved Wright Field‘s close collaboration with industry but 

suggested that AMC offices rely less on industry program suggestions and more on their own researches, particularly in the 

aerodynamic and propulsion areas. Finally, they noted that the 

reforms proposed in Toward New Horizons for the acquisition 

and administration of military and civilian technical personnel 

in the AAF had not been implemented. It was important, Dr. 

von Karman reiterated, that these men be given the opportunity 

to keep pace with the programs of scientific research through 

study in civilian institutions and opportunity to do individual 

research in AAF laboratories.’* 

General LeMay forwarded the SAB report to General 

Spaatz on August 29, recommending that Spaatz approve and 

authorize its implementation. Spaatz did so on September 4, 

adding, however, that the recommendations, had to be carried 

out “within current budgetary and Headquarters AAF policy 

 limitation^."^^ Thus General Spaatz had confirmed his pledge 

to back the board but it was equally clear that under existing 

circumstances the AAF would be hard-pressed to enact any recommendation which required extra funds or extensive revision 

of current forces. 

Meanwhile, the SAB members had dispersed and, despite 

their ambitious planning during the June conference, failed to 

convene either by Executive Committee or panel for the remainder of 1946. The simple truth was that no one called on them 

to do anything. In late December 1946, Dr. von Karman 

*This eventually became Air Force Regulation 80-4. One key Air Force 

leader later remarked that the document “would have probably remained 

in coordination stage for many more months were it not for strong support 

from the Board.” 

+General Twining later said that “the leadership of Dr. von Karman 

and your Board in the early days of the Arnold Engineering Development 

Center was perhaps the major factor in the^ establishment of that important facility.” 

See notes on page 180. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 19 

checked on the current state of affairs. He found that Dr. 

Johnson (and Mrs. Marie Roddenberry, who served with the 

original SAG then transferred to the SAB as its only full-time 

employee and performed services far transcending her assignment as administrative assistant) had compiled Air Staff and 

AMC comments on the August report. This had been the extent 

of activity, however. Von Karman complimented them on their 

work to General LeMay but noted that such a small staff could 

not possibly hope to adequately handle board affairs. He asked 

that a proper secretariat be established soon, to include as a 

minimum, a senior officer “for contact and coordination with 

AAF and outside agencies,’’ a junior officer or civilian with 

a scientific background for handling technical matters, and a 

clerk to relieve the administrative assistant from stenographic 

and typing duties.20 

Soon after, Dr. Johnson put the matter even more strongly 

to General LeMay, noting that the AAF had to decide soon 

how it was going to handle and employ the SAB or risk demeaning or even destroying its potential value. Calling the 

board together once or twice a year, presenting it with problems 

and inviting comments, then placing it on call for consultation 

between sessions caused the AAF little work and still gave the 

AAF, in Dr. Johnson’s words, the “apparent benefit of advice 

from a group of experts as to the health of the research and 

development program.” But this practice had some serious disadvantages, too. Unless board members kept continuously informed on AAF activities and plans-which they had not 

been able to dq since their June meeting-they would have only 

an imperfect background for judging the adequacy of programs examined in their infrequent periodic meetings. Also, 

by failing to observe a regular procedure for bringing specific 

problems to SAB’s attention-which had been the case since 

the June meeting-the Air Staff was likely to fail to solicit 

advice when it could be most available and helpful. Finally, 

Dr. Johnson warned, if these practices persisted, board members, finding their role relatively passive, might suspect that 

they were being used merely for ornament-that the AAF was 

primarily interested in citing SAB before the Congress or Bureau of Budget and less concerned with help the board could 

give. However false this opinion might be, it could obviously 

do the AAF much harm if it grew among board members and 

they passed it on to their associates.21 

See notes on page 181. 
20 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Dr. Johnson pointed out that von Karman’s ideas for employing the board called for more effort on the AAF’s part, but 

were in keeping with the Air Staff policy set forth in early 

1946. This statement had envisioned “continuous active cooperation between the AAF and the Board, with a flow of general 

information and specific problems from the AAF to the Board 

and a flow of suggestions and advice from the panels and 

individual members of the Board to the AAF.”2 Admittedly, 

money and manpower were currently very hard to get. But 

AAF statisticians had estimated that the Board, as currently 

operated, cost only about $60,000 per year and the AAF would 

be money ahead if it paid the additional nominal amount required to give the board adequate administrative support. If 

this could not be done, Dr. Johnson concluded, then perhaps 

the board should be considered a “dangerous luxury” and 

dropped rather than run the risk of exposing the AAF to 

charges that the SAB was mere window-dressing and only a convenient, prestigious means for rubber-stamping what the AAF 

wanted in the way of new facilities and equipment. 

Thougk he did not say so directly, Dr. Johnson obviously 

favored the second plan of action. “The Board members are 

not essentially of the elder statesman type,” he said.22 

Their collective opinion on broad policy questions is valuable as a 

sample of the opinion of the country’s scientific and technical talent 

on such questions, but their chief potential value to the AAF lies in 

their background of detailed knowledge which can be applied to detailed scientific and technical problems confronting the AAF. The 

best utilization of this asset would occur if each Board member were 

personally acquainted with the men in the AAF who are concerned 

with his particular field of competence, and could keep contact with 

these men and their problems by direct correspondence and occasional 

visits. The regular meetings of the board would then be an occasion 

for bringing the collective wisdom to bear on general policy questions; the SAB office in Headquarters AAF would monitor and 

assist the Board-AAF cooperation but would not need either to control 

it or to keep it stimulated artificially. 

Acting on von Karman’s and Johnson’s urgings, General 

LeMay in February 1947 requested an additional officer allocation for his office to serve as SAB secretary, asking that 

the incumbent have a scientific or technical background and 

experience in AAF research and development.23 He was successful in his bid and Major Donald M. AIexander assumed the 

position in April. 

See notes on page 181. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 21 

Meanwhile, the board met for the second time on February 

4-5, 1947. The meeting followed the same general pattern as 

the first, with the same merits and defects. Internally, SAB 

officers filled the few resignations submitted and expanded the 

membership slightly to staff a sixth panel called Weather and 

Upper-Air Research, under Dr. Henry G. Houghton’s chairmanship. The panel with which Weather formerly had been linked 

became the Electronics and Communications Panel and Dr. 

Dubridge accepted its chairmanship following Dr. Zworykin’s 

resignation from the board. Finally, Fuels switched to the 

Aircraft, Propulsion and Fuels Panel, which remained under 

Dr. Soderberg’s chairmanship, and the former panel became 

simply Explosives and Nuclear Energy with Dr. Robert H. 

Kent replacing Dr. Dubridge as chairman. 

As in their 1946 meeting, SAB members received Air Staff 

briefings on AAF research and development plans then, in 

plenary and panel sessions, framed their report on these plans 

which Dr. von Karman sent to General LeMay on May 20, 

1947.24 Two of their recommendations concerned queries which 

General Spaatz personally posed in late 1946. One dealt with 

the development of a continental air defense system. Since it 

would be a costly undertaking, Spaatz said, the AAF wanted 

an air defense system which met immediate needs yet was flexible enough to allow continuous upgrading in step with latest 

technical advances. On SAB’s recommendation, the AAF asked 

RAND for a comprehensive study of this subject. On Spaatz’ 

second request, which concerned the extent of AAF responsibility for research and development of systems affecting AAF 

operations, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk asked the National Research 

Council, of which he was chairman, to study a portion of the 

problem while Dr. William J. Sweeney solicited the viewpoint 

of private industry on the matter. 

Other major SAB recommendations called for (1) increased 

emphasis, to include actual experimentation, on missile guidance systems, (2) continued emphasis on integration of missile 

and warhead designs “especially in the initial formulation of the 

military characteristics themselves,” and (3) continued emphasis on advanced research projects. On the latter point, Dr. von 

Karman noted that in the face of current budget reductions 

“it may seem natural to eliminate the most visionary and most 

advanced ideas, on the basis that such research takes a long 

time to bring results and because they make it difficult to meet 

See notes on page 181. 
22 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

the obvious needs of the immediate future.” He advised the 

AAF to keep in mind, however, 

that while the more conventional ideas have a chance of survival 

without the active support of the AAF-because of their applications to commercial aviation, and to other armed forces-the really 

visionary and advanced ideas must depend upon the AAF as the 

only source of support. This point of view should be kept in mind 

in the difficult situation of stretching inadequate funds over a wide 

field. It can be successfully applied only with the utmost efforts 

in coordination with other agencies. 

Generals LeMay and Spaatz approved the report and directed 

that appropriate agencies act on it insofar as funds and policies 

permitted.25 

The AAF had again demonstrated its pleasure with the 

board’s proceedings, but the board itself did not share this view. 

As Dr. von Karman explained, “no work was foreseen for the 

members of the board [and] . . . most of the members felt 

that they were called in to learn something and then give their 

approval to a program already completely prepared before it was 

presented to the board, without the cooperation of the board.”26 

Dr. Johnson indicated that his impression was about the same: 

members were generally dissatisfied with meeting sporadically 

for a smattering of information and a chance to render off 

the cuff opinions and wanted to be more 

Originally, Dr. von Karman had planned a second meeting in 

1947, but the involvement of top officers in problems arising from 

unification of the services followed by the need to organize the 

new U.S. Air Force caused him to cancel the meeting. By September, he felt sufficiently discouraged by the lack of board activity 

during these months to write Major Alexander that “if we shall 

continue . . . the members should be asked to make some positive 

contributions.”2H By early 1948, as noted later, he was even more 

discouraged. Fortunately, the new USAF had reached a point 

of stability where it could commence to accord the board the attention and support it required if it were to survive. 

Much of the credit for this increased recognition belonged 

to Lt. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie. On October 10, 1947, in the 

Air Staff reorganization which followed unification, the position 

of Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development 

was abolished and its functions, including SAB administration, 

assumed by the new Directorate of Research and Development 

under Craigie.29 In the change it appeared that the SAB had 

i 

See notes on page 181. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 23 

been demoted one echelon in the Air Staff hierarchy, since 

Craigie’s office was one of several directorates within the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel. However, subsequent events 

proved this was neither the intent nor the effect of the change. 

From the moment he assumed office, General Craigie evidenced his determination to seek greater employment of SAB’s 

talents. Early in January 1948, he indicated to AMC his concern over the fact that “the services of the board in the past 

have not been utilized to the maximum advantage.” Either 

persons at the research and development working level were not 

familiar with the SAB’s functions or they mistakenly assumed 

that the board existed solely for the personal use of the Chief 

of Staff and that all matters referred to it had to originate 

with him. Craigie informed AMC that the SAB wanted to be 

put to better use and invited questions or problems that the 

board could assist on. Maj. Gen. F. 0. Carroll, AMC’s Director 

of Research and Development, agreed with these observations. 

He suggested that the board issue a statement of policy, indicate 

the type of work it could handle, and detail procedures for 

seeking its assistance. He also pointed out that the Air Staff 

statement affixed to past SAB recommendations that they had to 

be implemented within current budgetary and policy limitations 

had made it “impossible for the board and AMC to achieve the 

more worthwhile advances desired.”30 

Soon after, General Craigie informed Dr. von Karman 

that he was “aware of the dangers of having the board considered a ‘showpiece’ or ‘rubber-stamp’ for already established programs and policies” and informed him of his exchange with 

General Carroll. He then suggested that the board, as a start 

toward resolving these problems, issue an official statement of 

purpose and explain its manner of 0peration.3~ 

On March 17-18, 1948, von Karman and Craigie called a 

third board meeting in the Pentagon with the primary intent 

of finding ways and means to energize the organization. Dr. von 

Karman did not mince words in informing the members of his 

discouragement over the past months. “When I arrived here 

and talked with General Craigie, I told him that because we had 

a group which perhaps contributed something-not very muchto the problems of the military establishment, it does not necessarily follow that ib should be continued or should be further 

developed if they (the military establishment) do not feel it is 

necessary and if we do not feel it is necessary.’’ However 

See notes on page 181. 
24 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Craigie had convinced him that the Air Force now, more than 

ever, desired to retain the board’s guidance and help. On rem 

flection, von Karman now saw the goals of the SAB as somewhat different than they were a few years ago. “I believe that 

there is a necessity for coordination of what I would call the 

‘normal scientific life’ in the research laboratories of the universities, and one which meets the needs of national defenseto find means which allow a combination of both activities,” he 

said. In amplification of this point, he said he believed “that 

we are here to do what you might call ‘crystal gazing’ . . . and 

attempt to foresee what will happen in ten years. Some of the 

problems the board should embrace are . . . current scientific 

problems. We should also establish a certain procedure which 

will make it possible for the military establishment to use the 

services of the individual board members for urgent problem~.”~~ 

Proceeding along Dr. von Karman’s guidelines, the membership, in the March 1948 meeting, initiated a host of significant procedural changes. Agreeing that they had been too passive in the past, they formed several standing committees and 

directed them to study various key Air Force projects which 

they felt required expert advice. Dr. William R. Sears (chairman), Dr. Nicholas J. Hoff, Prof. Courtland D. Perkins, and 

Dr. Wattendorf formed one committee to study both the Arnold 

Engineering Development Center (AEDC) interim plan and the 

personnel policy for staffing the center. Drs. Houghton (chairman), Nathan M. Newmark, and Louis N. Ridenour formed 

another to review the organization and functions of the newlyestablished basic research office at Wright Field.* A third 

committee of Drs. Hoff (chairman), Sears, and H. Guyford 

Stever set out to work with AMC and Headquarters USAF to 

examine the proper organization and utilization of technical intelligence. Drs. John P. Markham (chairman), Kent, and Duncan P. MacDougall formed a fourth committee to plan the establishment of a Society for Military Sciences. A committee of 

Drs. Sears (chairman), Dr. Hoff, Prof. Perkins, and Drs. 

Hsue-shen Tsien, and Wattendorf agreed to draw up a recommended program for future use of the XS-1 research aircraft. 

Finally, a sixth committee of Drs. Dubridge (chairman), Pol 

E. Duwez, Joseph Kaplan, Irving Langmuir, and Prof. Perkins 

addressed themselves to an evaluation of the adequacy of Air 

Force administration of Project RAND.33 

*See note, page 31. 

See notes on page 181. 
A FEW BRICKS FOR THE FOUNDATION 25 

To make SAB services more available to field agencies, 

the Executive Committee prepared for circulation a listing of 

members willing to serve as special consultants and sanctioned 

their invitation to AMC and other Air Force agency meetings. 

The only proviso placed on the procedure was that the agencies 

would forward to the SAB secretariat a copy of the invitation 

and a report of the findings of the meetings. In this regard, 

SAB officers subsequently met with AMC laboratory and division chiefs and discussed the procedure in further 

The members also acted to eliminate the criticism that 

board meetings in the past had given too little time to panel 

discussions and to problems at the working level. For the next 

meeting they decided to assign the first day to individual panel 

discussions with interested Air Force officers. The morning 

of the second day would be devoted to panel reports to the full 

membership. In the afternoon they would hear presentations 

from Air Force representatives or SAB members on matters 

not covered in the earlier sessions. When circumstances required, they would extend meetings into a third day but only 

those members with a direct interest in the subject matter to 

be discussed would attend.35 

Finally, members recommended that the board‘s roles and 

missions be widely publicized primarily through publication of 

an Air Force directive and concurred in the selection of Dr. 

Dryden as deputy SAB chairman.*36 

Two other major defects in SAB administration now remained, but these required General Spaatz’ direct concurrence 

before the board could eliminate them. One concerned SAB’s 

organizational place on the Air Staff. Although formed to serve 

the Chief of Staff, the board appeared on the chart as a function of an office at the directorate level. While this might 

seem a picayune point, General Craigie noted that it sometimes 

led “to considerable confusion within the Air Force, the military establishment, and among the board members themselves 

concerning the location and status of the board in the organization of Air Force Headquarters.” The organization chart 

*In explaining the establishment of this position to the members, 

General Craigie noted that it would put the board “in a little better 

position” on those occasions when SAB representation at important Air 

Staff meetings was desirable and the chairman could not attend. After 

agreeing that Dr. Dryden was “a very acceptable individual,” they 

broached the subject of his appointment “late this noon at luncheon 

where he had little time to defend himself.” The position was subsequently renamed “vice chairman.” 

See notes on page 181. 
26 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

ought to reflect the relationship between the board and the 

Office of the Chief of Staff, he felt, both to maintain SAB 

prestige and confirm the Air Force’s high regard for it. Moreover, “those agencies . . . concerned with research and development would recognize the fact that the recommendations 

submitted by the board are of significant importance an‘d consequently merit thoughtful c~nsideration.”~’ 

In early April, Dr. von Karman put the problem a little 

more directly to General Spaatz, observing that “a board of 

this nature can be of maximum value to the Air Force if it is 

a board of the Chief of Staff and is responsible directly to the 

Chief of Staff.” Von Karman also broached the second administrative defect at this time-the continued lack of a military 

director. His solution was to appoint the Director of Research 

and Development to this position inasmuch as this officer was 

“in contact with all scientific institutions and organizations, 

both military and civilian, and is consequently immediately 

aware of the scientific problems with which the Air Force may 

have to cope and which should be brought to the attention of 

the board for their advice and recommendations.” Recognizing 

that this was not in keeping with “proper channels of command,” 

von Karman recommended that the Director of Research and 

Development, while acting as SAB military director, have direct 

access to the Chief of Staff.J8 

In response, General Spaatz invited his deputy, General 

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, General Craigie, and Dr. von Karman 

to discuss these and other board affairs with him on April 15, 

1948. At this significant meeting, Spaatz concurred fully with 

their recommendations. The SAB would be part of the Office 

of the Chief of Staff, the Director of Research and Development 

would be the military director and report directly to the Chief 

of Staff on SAB matters, and all board recommendations would 

go directly to the Chief of Staff, a point never precisely established earlier.30 

Later that month, Maj. Gen. William F. McKee, Assistant 

Vice Chief, announced the transfer of the SAB secretariat to 

the office of the Chief of Staff and impressed on all offices 

and agencies the importance of cooperating with and aiding 

the board in its mission.4o On May 14, 1948, the terms of the 

Spaatz-von Karman understanding received official promulgation in Air Force Regulation 20-30.* 

*See Appendix I for an account of the major provisions of AFR 

See notes on page 181. 

20-30, as amended and revised over the years. 
CHAPTER THREE 

CONFIRMING THE PARTNERSHIP 

In my experience, [the Ridenour 

Report] is the first civilian report 

that has ever been acted on by 

a military organization when they 

didn't have to. They are usually 

filed in the wastebasket. 

-James H. Doolittle" 

The secretariat received its own manning table for the first 

time concurrent with its transfer from the Directorate of Research and Development to the office of the Chief of Staff in 

April 1948.t' In the summer of that year, Lt. Col. Teddy F. 

Walkowicz replaced Major Alexander as SAB secretary. Shortly after; Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt succeeded General Craigie as 

Director of Research and Development and SAB military director.++ 

In the fall of 1948, Dr. von Karman and the new SAB military officers reviewed the record of the board to date with the 

purpose of identifying and removing any further obstacles to 

efficient operation. They concurred in recent suggestions that 

general board meetings ought to concentrate less on formal 

briefings and more on creating an atmosphere in which members 

and Air Force leaders, engineers, and scientists might communicate informally. This would permit the SAB to become more 

intimately acquainted with spheres of activity where its unique 

capabilities could be applied and, hopefully, give the board the 

*In remarks at a meeting of SAB officers with the Air Staff, January 

30, 1950. 

+Initial manning of the secretariat consisted of one military officer, 

a civilian administrative assistant, and a civilian typist. 

++Colonel Walkowicz served as a military staff member on the wartime 

Scientific Advisory Group. He subsequently served as board member 

(1959, 1961-1962) following his resignation from the Air Force. 

See notes on pages 181 and 182. 

27 
28 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

reputation it would like to establish “of being of the greatest 

service and of the smallest nuisance to those who benefit by 

[its] activities.”’ They used this approach in the November 

16-18, 1948 meeting, inviting key Air Force research and development specialists and allowing them time for a frank and 

informal exchange of information and viewpoints. The procedure proved highly satisfactory and became the hallmark of 

most future board meetings. As Dr. von Karman observed, “by 

having eliminated the window dressing, so to speak, of a lot of 

speeches or presentations and having really gotten down to 

where the pick and shovel boys do their work . . . we have 

gotten more out of it than in prior meetings.”3 

A second matter of concern was that too many Air Force 

officers still were not convinced of the propriety of having “a 

bunch of civilians tell the Air Force what to do.” The new 

SAB regulation (AFR 20-30) had helped to dispel some of this 

notion. The board officers now proposed to give the SAB secretary some assistance to free him for further educating the rank 

and file of the Air Force on SAB functions and objectives. 

Too, they felt that SAB members could help by striving to 

“brush wings” often with high-ranking Air Force members and 

so better understand “the plans and apprehensions-even the 

daydreams-of high staff officers about the future.” TO assist 

in e8tablishing this rapport, they thought that SAB officers 

ought to sit in on key Air Staff meetings and also meet 

ockasionally with top officers at informal luncheons and dinnem4 In the spring 

of 1949, the secretariat received permission to employ a civilian 

assistant secretary and acquired Mr. B. J. Driscoll’s services. 

And, from 1949 on, luncheon meetings between SAB members 

and the Chief of Staff and other top military officials became 

a regular feature of SAB procedure. 

In their final and most significant finding, von Karman, 

Putt and Walkowicz agreed that “a large reservoir of potential 

utility of the SAB to the USAF remains untapped” and that 

to date SAB impact on the developing Air Force was slight. 

The major problem continued to be that SAB recommendations, 

after approval by the Chief of Staff, were dispensed for action 

without indication where this should take place. And, as noted 

earlier, the approval always carried the budgetary and policy 

These proposals, too, were soon acted on. 

~ 

See notes on page 182. 
CONFIRMING THE PARTNERSHIP 29 

restrictive provisos.* Obviously, if approved SAB recommendations were to succeed, they had to be “accompanied by a 

definite indication of the level of authority on which action 

should be taken,” and AMC had to be freed to at least seek alteration of funding and policy limitation^.^ On this problem, 

General Vandenberg, the newly appointed Chief of Staff, gave 

his personal support in early 1949. After approving the SAB 

recommendations of the November 1948 meeting, Vandenberg 

notified his deputies and the AMC commander that they were 

to use these “in all cases . . . as guides in long-range USAF 

planning’’ and advise him personally whenever a strong SAB 

recommendation was not or could not be implemented. He also 

directed each deputy to henceforth furnish the SAB a summary 

of actions taken on all its recommendations.6 

The new procedure did not ensure that budgetary and 

policy restrictions would no longer thwart the implementation 

of SAB recommendations. “Even the objective advice of an 

eminently qualified group which has only our best interests at 

heart cannot, for practical reasons, always be followed immediately,” Vandenberg said.‘ However, the new procedure did 

fix responsibility on top officers either to act on SAB recommendations or to apprise the Chief of Staff and the board 

chairman of the problems which prevented such action. 

Two additional important changes occurred in SAB procedures in late 1948. In one, Lt. Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw, 

successor to General Twining as AMC commander, established 

an office on his staff specifically as a point of contact on SAB 

affairs. Its duties were to distribute and follow up on SAB 

reports, seek SAB assistance on special AMC problems, and 

coordinate with the secretariat whenever AMC invited SAB 

members to serve as consultants.Y In short, it further advanced 

the recent drive to establish greater rapport and understanding 

*They cited two consequences of this procedural weakness. In one instance, SAB had recommended that the AMC Power Plant Laboratory do 

a small amount of basic research despite the serious budgetary restrictions 

currently hampering such work. In other words, the proposal clearly called 

for a readjustment of the Air Force budget to give more funds to the 

project. However, it went to AMC with the usual “within current budgetary 

and Headquarters policy limitations” restriction. This, of course, ended the 

matter. In another instance, the SAB recommended a reorganization of the 

AEDC and its staffing with competent scientific personnel. Headquarters 

USAF tacked on the same restriction and sent the recommendation to 

AMC where it eventually ended up in the hands of an engineer at the 

working level as a reference document. 

See notes on page 182. 
30 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

between SAB and AMC personnel. Dr. von Karman expressed 

his pleasure on this step, noting to board members that “heretofore you have been something nebulous so they couldn’t quite 

visualize how you were going to help them. I think they felt 

a little strange about this high-powered group that was going 

to criticize them and tell them how to do their job. I think we 

have gone a long way toward eliminating that . . . [and] are 

going to see much improvement in the fut~re.”~ General Chidlaw concurred, noting that AMC was “fully aware of the potential value of the SAB . . . and most anxious to realize this 

potential to the fullest extent.”1° 

In a second change, the Air Force for the first time offered 

contracts to SAB members to reimburse them for board or AMC 

consultant duty. To date, members had received only per diem 

and travel expenses. Now, each would receive a contract for 

$50 (in addition to per diem and travel) for each day of consultative service, including that performed at home. General Chidlaw deemed the innovation a progressive move, feeling the 

program would “enhance the value of the Board to the USAF 

as [among its other advantages] it will permit sending . . . studies . . . to interested members for thorough analysis prior 

to board considerations.”l’ Dr. von Karman accepted the change 

“with some hesitation, and only with the provision that individual board members could refuse compensation if they so 

desired.”I2 Since it continued in effect over the ensuing years, 

the change obviously proved a satisfactory one, enabling the 

Air Force to feel free to solicit the services of many members, 

particularly those from the universities for whom board and 

special consultative duty might otherwise have worked a financial hardship. About half the board members accepted such 

payment during the first year (fiscal year 1949) and over 

the following years. 

In summary, the many changes introduced in late 1948 

and early 1949 effected a rejuvenation in SAB procedures and 

spirit. The consensus was that for the first time since it formed 

in 1946 the board was geared, administratively and conceptually, 

to become the organization visualized in its charter.I3 Needed 

now was a major assignment whereby the SAB might demonstrate the value which its officers and the top command were 

certain it offered. Such an assignment was not long in coming, 

emanating in large part from the report of the SAB’s November 1948 meeting. Many of the recommendations in the report 

See notes on page 182. 
CONFIRMING THE PARTNERSHIP 31 

concerned the need to improve Air Force research and development facilities and practices, including several for enhancing 

the prestige and influence of the research and development 

staff in Headquarters USAF.*14 As General Putt later described 

the nature of the problem, it was part and parcel of the same 

battle which “Dr. von Karman and the SAB have been fighting 

. . . since 1945 when he and General Arnold personally took 

the matter up.”13 After General Vandenberg read the November 1948 report he met with von Karman and Putt to discuss 

the problem. 

As a result of the report and the conference, General Vandenberg decided to call on the SAB at its spring 1949 meeting 

for a comprehensive review of Air Force research and development. When, at the last minute, he was called to an urgent 

meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vandenberg asked his 

deputy, General Muir S. Fairchild, to present his request. At 

this meeting on April 7, Fairchild read them the talk Vandenberg had intended to deliver personally. “The United States 

Air Force is well aware that continued technical superiority 

is one of the vital decisive elements in modern air power,” 

Vandenberg wrote. “I am determined that our research and 

development activities shall have adequate support in funds, 

facilities, and properly-trained personnel, and that the USAF 

shall continually increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our 

:NEarlier in 1948 the SAB convinced the Air Force of the need for an 

office devoted exclusively to basic research. As noted by General Craigie 

(in a December 1965 note to the SAB Secretary) the Navy had had for 

many years the Office of Naval Research which “deservedly enjoyed a fine 

reputation.” Dr. von Karman and General Craigie, beginning in the summer 

of 1947, strongly supported creation of a similar agency on the Air Staff. 

Though no one disputed the need for the office, AMC felt it ought to 

control the function. That command’s wishes prevailed and, in February 

1948, an office with basic research as its primary duty was established 

within AMC’s Engineering Division. In February 1949, as the Office of 

Air Research, it was moved from under the Engineering Division to a position paralleling it with Lt. Gen. (then Colonel) Leighton I. Davis at its 

head. Though the new office failed to achieve the degree of independence 

which the SAB had visualized it was a significant step toward an improved 

program. And, as such, General Craigie noted, “it was an important 

contribution to Air Force research on the part of Dr. von Karman and 

the SAB.” (An excellent account of the actions taken over the years 

on behalf of creating an effective USAF basic research program may be 

found in the Headquarters, Office of Scientific Research history for 

January-June 1964, Chapter 11, Organizing for Research, 1944-1951 : The 

Founding of the Office of Scientific Research, by Mr. Nick Komans). 

See notes on page 182. 
32 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

development work on new aircraft, missiles, and air defense 

systems.”16 

Of the SAB-USAF relationship, Vandenberg said, “We 

have hurdled many difficult and pressing operational problems 

[together] during the few years since the end of the war.” He 

now proposed that they “take an equally critical look at our 

equally-important long-range technical objectives.” Specifically, he asked the board to give him its “frank and objective advice” for drawing up an “ultimate plan” for Air Force research 

and development facilities. The plan, he said, ought to explore 

every facet of the problem. He particularly wished to make 

certain “that personnel and administrative policies and practices are adopted which will insure that our facilities are given 

proper leadership [and are] staffed by competent military and 

civilian technical per~onnel.’”~ 

Dr. von Karman expressed the board’s gratitude “to hear 

the needs of research and development so clearly defined by the 

highest command in the Air Force” and assured General Fairchild that the SAB would “go into these difficult problems very 

carefully.”’* Later that month, von Karman reiterated to General Vandenberg his pleasure “over the opportunity to contribute toward the solution of problems which will influence substantially the development of the Air Force . . . and national 

security for many years to come.” He noted that he and 

General Putt had “explored thoroughly” the various possible 

methods of handling the project and had decided to create a 

small working group of SAB members and other prominent 

experts.’$ As finally selected, the group consisted of two SAB 

members-Dr. Ridenour, who accepted the chairmanship, and 

Dr. Wattendorf-and seven non-SAB members-Dr. James G. 

Baker, Dr. James H. Doolittle, Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Carl 

F. J. Overhage, Dean Ralph A. Sawyer, Prof. John M. Wild, 

and Mr. Raymond J. Woodrow.* 

Officially designated the “SAB Special Committee on 

Research and Development Facilities, Budget and Personnel,” 

but quickly dubbed the Ridenour Committee, the group convened for their first meeting in the Pentagon on July 11, 1949.T 

General Vandenberg greeted them, expressing his pleasure at 

*Drs. Baker, Doolittle, and Overhage later accepted SAB membership. 

fDr. Ridenour noted at one meeting that he preferred to regard the 

group as the Doolittle Committee, with himself serving as chairman of the 

Doolittle Committee. 

See notes on page 182. 
CONFIRMING THE PARTNERSHIP 33 

getting this “outside help in things that we are not competent 

in ourselves” and noting that “we realize, probably more than 

even you think, that we lack many aspects of the kind of help 

you can give us.” He also informed them that he had given 

the Air Staff carte blanche “to get the answers to any of the 

problems that you people want within our competence.” The 

Air Force, he said, had “no traditions or any inhibitions, because 

we are a new Department [and] we would like to start off 

research and development on the proper foot, and I think that 

with the advice and assistance of this group we should be able 

to do that.”20 

General Vandenberg then proceeded to “get a few things 

off [his] chest,” as he expressed it, concerning the status of 

Air Force research and development and possible measures to 

strengthen it. As he saw it, after World War 11, “everything 

went down hill so fast that the first thing we had to pay attention to was to get a sort of fire-bucket brigade ready in case 

something should break.” He believed the Air Force had done 

well, meeting the Russians head-on during such crises as the 

Berlin blockade and managing to carry out the tasks at hand 

despite funding, personnel, and equipment handicaps. In short, 

he said, “we have gotten our people together now to the point 

where we feel that we have a force-in-being; therefore, our 

thought naturally turns to ‘where do we go from here?”’ This 

question had three important facets: (1) how could the Air 

Force’ acquire and retain capable scientists, (2) how should 

development be fitted into plans and operations, and (3) what 

was a proper distribution of research and development funds. 

To help decide these issues he wanted the Ridenour Committee 

to “give us a picture of what we ought to be doing but what 

we are not doing. I think that you can decide best how to 

present the problem so that we know what the problem is and 

how we can lick it, [and] . . , if it contains the answer that we 

are after, we will carry on from there.”21 

The committee devoted the next six weeks to exploring the 

problem, meeting about twenty times at a dozen Air Force and 

other military and government centers across the country.22 Dr. 

Doolittle (in what Dr. Ridenour dubbed his “dandy little pep 

talk”) emphasized why it was so important that the Air Force 

build up an adequate research and development capability as 

quickly as possible and generally described the tenor of the committee’s approach. “I feel that the only thing that is going to 

See notes on page 182. 
34 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

keep us out of war is our technological advantage,” Doolittle 

said. “It is far better to keep out of war than to win a war. 

If we permit a potential enemy to get ahead of us technologically . . . that is the surest way to start a war. I feel that the time 

has come to make some sacrifice from today’s continuing emergencies in order to prepare for tomorrow’s eventualities-to jar 

loose some funds, some competent personnel from the daily requirements in order to prepare for tomorrow’s requirements.23 

The committee finished its report in mid-September and Dr. 

von Karman sent it to General Vandenberg on the 21st. Organized into ten chapters introdwced by a summary section and 

supported by six appendices, the study as one general officer 

later described it, “really summarized in beautiful English 

some of the feelings that many of us had had for some time . . . that we needed a new organizational emphasis laid upon [Air 

Force research and development] .”24 In Dr. Ridenour’s words, 

the studjr’s major recommendations called for “the establishment of a Research and Development Command separate from 

the Materiel Command, and . . . some reorganization . . .-in the 

[Air Staff] to set off the function of research and development 

from the logistics-procurement, mobilization, and supplyfunctions.” These recommendations were predicated on the 

committee’s belief, Ridenour continued, that “the time has 

now come to put part of the effort available to the Air Forcethe word ‘effort’ comprising the usual things, namely men, 

money and work-put part of the effort not on the Air Force 

in being, the Air Force of today, but on the Air Force of tomorThe committee refrained from getting too deeply into the 

details of reorganization, purposely choosing to leave this to 

a board of officers meeting under Air University auspices. 

The reasoning here, General Putt explained, “was that where 

this committee is very competent to determine what is wrong 

with research and development . . . and can point out possible 

solutions or ways that they think solutions might be achieved, 

[they are very reluctant] to tell the military that this is the 

way they will draw their organization chart.”26 The committee 

also offered only general answers to Vandenberg’s questions 

on facility development and on the methods for “insuring the 

most effective interaction between technical development, on the 

one hand, and plans and operations on the other.” They entailed too large an assignment for the committee to pursue 

row.”% 

See notes on page 182. 
CONFIRMING THE PARTNERSHIP 35 

in detail within its time allocation.2i Subsequently, in accordance with Dr. von Karman’s promise at this time, other SAB 

committees and panels pursued these subjects.* 

The report circulated throughout the Air Force and evoked 

an instant and not surprising furor. General Putt observed 

that “it started some very deep thinking,” demanding “a new 

concept, a new religion, on the part of those people who are in 

the top positions that have been making the final decisions 

which have vitally affected research and development in the 

Air Force.”2s The culmination came on January 23, 1950, when 

the Air Force established the office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff /Development on the Headquarters USAF staff and the 

Air Research and Development Command (ARDC).29 The Directorate of Research and Development and the Directorate of 

Requirements (from DCS/Operations) transferred as the major 

elements of the new major staff office. Maj. Gen. Gordon P. 

Saville assumed the new deputy position, and General Putt 

remained the Director of Research and Development. 

For the SAB, this complete acceptance by USAF top officials 

of its kecommendations on this critically important issue, an 

acceptahce which Dr. Doolittle hailed as unprecedented in military-civilian relations, dispelled any lingering doubts members 

may have had as to their value to the Air Force.? The report 

also spread the SAB’s name and purpose among a gratifyingly 

large Air Force audience. 

In May 1950, General Vandenberg asked the SAB to do a 

complementary study on Air Force medical research and development. He suggested that the group formed for this purpose 

seek “to determine whether we were doing a proper job, whether 

we were organized to carry out this job, and, particularly, . . . whether the existing organization was geared for the new and 

larger responsibilities we would have as an independent Air 

Because several of the persons most competent to perform this study were out of the country, the SAB delayed action 

on the request. The committee finally chosen consisted of Drs. 

*Dr. von Karman appointed a Facilities Committee in late 1949 with 

Dr. Markham, chairman, and Drs. Hoff, Lovelace, Stever, and Wattendorf 

members, replacing the AEDC standing committee (see Chapter Two) 

which had played such an instrumental role in the establishment of AEDC. 

Dr. von Karman explained that problems concerning the AEDC could be 

handled henceforth by ARDC and that the SAB Facilities Committee would 

expand its scope of concern to include all USAF facilities. 

?See Dr. Doolittle’s comment at the beginning of this chapter. 

See notes on page 182. 
36 USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Lovelace, chairman, Edward J. Baldes, Donald W. Hastings, 

Kaplan, and Shields Warren, who were SAB members, and six 

non-SAB members.* 

Convening for the first time on October 9, the Lovelace 

Committee subsequently investigated the state of Air Force medical programs and resources within the U.S. and submitted a 

report in December 1950.:” General Vandenberg directed that it 

be implemented the following March.32 As comprehensive in 

scope as the Ridenour Report, the Lovelace Report soon became 

the bible of Air Force medical research and development planners. The buildup of personnel staffs and facilities for promoting research, teaching, and improved practices in aerospace 

medicine which took place in the early 1950’s owed much of 

its direction to this report. 

Meanwhile, the board acted to improve its own capability 

to treat problems falling within the overall category of “human 

resources.” In 1949, the Aeromedicine and Psychology Panel 

invited several social scientists to join it, changing its name to 

the Aeromedicine and Social Sciences Panel at this time. However, as the Lovelace Report soon confirmed, the clinical aspect 

of aerospace medicine was of sufficient magnitude of itself to 

demand the full attention of one panel. Consequently, after 

examining several alternatives the SAB decided to relegate 

strictly clinical matters to an Aeromedicine Panel, under Dr. 

Lovelace’s chairmanship, and to create a separate Social Sciences Panel. In February 1950, General Vandenberg invited 

Mr. Charles Dollard to chair the new panel, noting that it 

would assume cognizance over such areas as sociological, social 

psychological, and cultural anthropological programs, non-clinical psychological research, research in psychometrics, aptitude 

and proficiency tests, training, and training devices, military 

management, leadership, morale, psychological warfare, and 

strategic intelligence.3::’ This action increased the number of SAB 

panels from six to seven. The number rose to eight soon after 

when the Aircraft, Propulsion and Fuels Panel divided into two 

under the chairmanship of Dr. Sears (Aircraft) and Dr. Soderberg (Fuels and Propulsion). 

*Of the non-members, Drs. Loren D. Carlson, Paul M. Fitts, and John 

B. Hickam later accepted board membership. The others were Drs. R. Lee 

Clark, Jr., Magnus I. Gregorson, and John H. Lawrence. 

See notes on page 182. 
PART I1 

FROM DREAMS TQ 

ENGINEERING PROBLEMS 

When we started these activities in the beginning of 1944, General Arnold emphasized that 

he did not want the board to be concerned 

with any of the current projects which at that 

time were being carried out for immediate 

purposes. He wanted us to look into the future. 

Now since 1944 and 1945 several changes have 

occurred . . . the things that we were talking 

about . . . were mere dreams at that time, but 

they are facts now. Many of these vague ideas 

have since become engineering problems. 

-Theodore von Karman, 

in speaking to members 

of the Scientific Advisory Board Executive 

Committee, March 1948. 
CHAPTER FOUR 

OUT OF CRISIS A TRADITION 

The board’s effectiveness, at the 

highest policy-making level in the 

Air Force, is the result of our joint 

recognition of the ever-increasing 

importance of science to Air War 

. . . . I have long watched the results of your studies take effect in 

the Air Force. . . . When you act as 

a group and recommend on major 

questions that require my personal 

action I will, of course, always 

be interested in your opinions and 

give them my most serious personal 

attention. Together in this partnership . . . we must achieve the vital 

task of providing the Air Power 

which stands between us and destruction. 

-Nathan F. Twining* 

Whatever fancies the United States may still have harbored in 1949 that it could reduce its military forces to their 

traditionally small cadres and continue to rest confident that 

its freedoms were adequately safeguarded disappeared after the 

Russians successfully tested a nuclear device in August of that 

year. The test dispelled another chimera: the Russians were 

not the scientific unsophisticates many had supposed them to 

be.t Even those who had faced up to the harsh reality that the 

nation’s supremacy in these weapons would not go unchallenged 

for long were surprised by the rapidity with which the Russians 

~ ~ 

*In address to the SAB, October 19, 1953. 

+As Dr. Doolittle expressed it (in an interview for the USAF Video 

Historical Documentation Program in June 1965), until this time the world 

had mistakenly viewed the Russians as “agrarians with long beards who 

went about with their shirttails hanging out their trousers.” 

38 
OUT OF CRISIS A TRADITION 39 

unlocked the atom’s secrets. Clearly, the United States now 

had to push its own weapon development timetables ahead or 

risk coming out second best in the deadly race for nuclear 

supremacy. 

The SAB’s .immediate reaction to the Russian nuclear success, as Dr. von Karman noted at the November 1949 meeting 

of the SAB Executive Committee, was “to get people who were 

more intimately connected with atomic problerns.”l Soon after, 

General Fairchild involved the board directly in the crisis by 

calling for an emergency session and requesting assistance in 

strengthening the nation’s air defenses. Until the Russian 

atomic test, the Air Force had frequently expressed concern 

but not undue alarm over its inability to create even a minimal 

air defense of the nation’s people and industries. It was 

doubtful that anyone, including the Russians, would dare launch 

an air attack so long as the Strategic Air Command retained 

its overwhelming nuclear retaliatory advantage. Now that the 

advantage was disappearing, the Air Force felt obliged to press 

harder for air defense. First, however, it needed a sound plan 

of action, and General Fairchild asked the SAB to help draft 

such a plan.2 

SAB officials discussed the issue at length and, on November 29, 1949, Dr. von Karman forwarded their recommendations 

to Generals Fairchild and Vandenberg who promptly approved 

them3 Accordingly, the SAB formed the Air Defense System 

Engineering Committee (ADSEC) and assigned it the task of 

developing “equipment and techniques-on an air defense system basis-so as to produce maximum effective air defense for 

a minimum dollar investment.” The committee also set out to 

“help determine quantitative, factual data concerning current 

and future operational techniques and equipment” and, hopefully, suggest means that “would help improve the operational 

effectiveness of the existing Air Defense Command.” Since 

ADSEC would work closely and frequently with an experimental unit of the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, the 

SAB staffed it with “eminent scientists who could conveniently 

assemble regularly and on short notice, at that fa~ility.”~ Subsequently, Dr. George E. Valley accepted chairmanship, with 

Dr. Allen F. Donovan, Dr. Charles S. Draper, Dr. Houghton, 

and Dr. Stever as members. Two non-SAB scientists, Dr. John 

Marchetti and Dr. George C. Comstock, joined them. 

See notes on page 183. 
?10 USAF’ SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 

Beginning their work in December 1949, the Valley Committee “worked diligently and with considerable success” for the 

next two years.5 At the peak of their labors, members met every 

Friday with government and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) scientists at the Cambridge facility. As Dr. 

Valley described their operations, they functioned as informally 

as possible, making most of their recommendations verbally 

to the Air Force officials who sat with them. Their recommendations were then “translated into action by the Air Staff 

and pertinent field commands through the coordination of the 

[SAB] Military Secretary.”6 After the Air Force and MIT, 

acting on ADSEC and SAB recommendations, created the Lincoln Laboratory there was no further need for the committee 

and on Dr. Valley’s recommendation, the SAB formally dissolved 

it in January 1952. 

ADSEC’s role in strengthening the nation’s air defenses 

was a very significant one and its members showed the way 

“to many promising developments in this field,” General Vandenberg wrote Dr. Valley. General Twining later added his 

compliments, noting he was “satisfied that our best minds are 

[now] working hard on air defense and I think the board can 

well be proud of its activities.”? 

Meanwhile, President Truman had committed American 

military forces to stopping Communist aggression in Korea. 

Whereas the Russian atomic test had stimulated considerable 

conc‘ern among U.S. military departments, the nation as a whole 

had failed to appreciate the Soviet ability to master modern 

sciences and engineering. As a result, American military activity in the months immediately following that event continued 

to steadily decline. This trend was abruptly reversed when 

the North Korean Communist regime attacked the Seoul government. Congress promptly authorized a massive budgetary increase for military research and development as well as for 

operations. With its new Air Research and Development Command still in a formative stage, the Air Force turned to the 

SAB for help in allocating wisely its share of this increase. As 

a result, most of the SAB activity during the next year, as one 

report noted, “was pointed directly toward supporting the augmented USAF Research and Development program resulting 

from our commitment in Korea and the increased probability 

that we would be committed elsewhere.”* 

SAB’s first important undertaking following the outbreak 

See notes on page 183.