IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KRENAR HOXHA, :

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

TROY LEVI, : No. 05-1211

Respondent. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Schiller, J. May 25, 2005

Krenar Hoxha (“Hoxha”), a naturalized citizen living in the United States with his wife and

child, is due to be extradited to his country of birth, Albania, where he will stand trial for murder.

Presently before this Court is his habeas corpus petition, which seeks to block that extradition. For

the following reasons, the petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Hoxha was born on March 26, 1970 in Albania and became a naturalized United States

citizen on January 17, 2002. (Compl. ¶ 6, attached as Ex. A to Habeas Pet.) Albania seeks to try

Hoxha for the murders of husband and wife Ilmi and Roza Kasemi, and their son, Eltion Kasemi.

(Compl. Ex. B.) According to the Complaint, Ilmi Kasemi and Hoxha’s sister, Mimoza, were

involved in a relationship which ended because Hoxha’s parents disapproved of it. (Compl. ¶ 4(a).)

Hoxha soon learned that, although both Ilmi and Mimoza married other individuals, the two had

rekindled their love affair. (Id. ¶ 4(a-c).) Seeking revenge, Hoxha broke into Ilmi’s home and shot

Ilmi, Roza, and Eltion, killing all three. (Id. ¶ 4(d-f).) Ilmi’s surviving daughter, Matilda, witnessed

the shootings. (Id. ¶ 4(g).) After the killings, Hoxha rushed to his cousin’s home and asked him to

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hide the murder weapon, which was later recovered by Albanian police. (Id. ¶ 4(h).) Ballistics

confirmed that the firearm seized by the police matched the bullets found at the crime scene. (Id.

¶ 4(i).) 

Hoxha was tried and convicted in absentia by the Court of First Instance of Judicial Circle

Fier (“Court of First Instance”). (Habeas Pet. ¶ 4; see also Statement of Albanian Prosecutor General

Theodhori Sollaku, attached to Compl. as Ex. B.) Although he was sentenced to life in prison, his

conviction was overturned by the Appeal Tribunal of Vlore because he did not receive notice for the

aggravated circumstances. (Compl. Ex. B; see also Gov’t Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Habeas Pet. Ex.

B [hereinafter “Gov’t Resp.”].) After the second examination of the case, Hoxha was sentenced to

twenty-two years, a sentence that was later reduced to fourteen years and eight months. (Compl. Ex.

B.) The case ended up back before the Appeal Tribunal of Vlore, which overruled the decision of

the Court of the First Instance Court and returned the case to the same court but with another panel.

(Id.; see also Gov’t Resp. Ex. B.) Eventually the case came before the Albanian Supreme Court,

which sent it back for retrial in the same court but with different judges. (Compl. Ex. B.; see also

Gov’t Resp. Ex. B.) The record indicates that the latest ruling occurred on June 25, 2004, when the

Appeal Tribunal of Vlore ordered a retrial in the Court of First Instance but with another group of

judges, due to Hoxha’s absence from his first trial. (Habeas Pet. ¶ 5 & Ex. B; see also Gov’t Resp.

Ex. B.) Specifically, the Appeal Tribunal of Vlore noted that “[Hoxha] was denied the constitutional

right to be called and to attend the proceedings,” thereby rendering “the procedural acts of the

adjudication of the first instance and the decision [] absolutely invalid, thus making the entire

judicial process inexistent [sic].” (Id.; see also Habeas Pet. ¶ 5 & Ex. B.) 

Albania seeks Hoxha’s extradition pursuantto an extradition treaty between the United States

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and Albania (the “Extradition Treaty”). Under the terms of the treaty, which has been in force since

1935, the two countries have agreed to “upon requisition duly made as herein provided, deliver up

to justice any person who may be charged with, or may have been convicted of, any of the crimes

or offenses specified in Article II of the present treaty . . . .” (Gov’t Resp. Ex. D, Art. I.) Persons

charged with or convicted of murder are explicitly subject to extradition. (Id., Art. II, 1.) On

October 1, 2004, the Albanian Embassy submitted a diplomatic request with supporting

documentation to the United States seeking Hoxha’s extradition. (Habeas Pet. ¶ 7; see also Compl.

Ex. B.) This constitutes “requisition duly made as herein provided.” (See Gov’t Resp. Ex. B

(certification of Marcie B. Ries, Ambassador of the United States of America).) On November 9,

2004, Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Reuter of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a warrant

for Hoxha’s arrest, and Hoxha was arrested the next day. (Habeas Pet. ¶¶ 1, 7 & Ex. A; see also

Gov’t Resp. at 2.) 

On January 19, 2005 and February 4, 2005, extradition proceedings were held before the

Honorable Jacob P. Hart, a magistrate judge of this Court, with Hoxha represented by counsel.

During the first round of proceedings, Judge Hart examined two issues. First, he determined that

the Extradition Treaty was valid based upon representations from the United States government that

Albania has honored the terms of the treaty and that the State Department also intends to adhere to

its terms. (R. at 3 (Jan. 19, 2005 Extradition Hr’g Tr.).) Second, he turned to the question of

whether Albania had probable cause to believe Hoxha is guilty of the crimes charged. After setting

forth the legal standards of probable cause, Judge Hart expressed serious concerns over the failure

of the Albanian authorities to present a single sworn document that would help establish probable

cause. (Id. at 4-6.) Judge Hart therefore provided the Government two additional weeks to develop

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evidence sufficient to establish probable cause, without which he would order Hoxha’s release. (Id.

at 11.) When the proceedings continued two weeks later, Judge Hart found that Hoxha was charged

with extraditable offenses within the meaning of the Extradition Treaty, and that, based in part of

the newly-provided affidavit of Albanian prosecutor Ardian Visha, probable cause existed to believe

that Hoxha committed the crimes for which Albania sought his extradition. (Certification of

Extraditability and Order of Commitment, dated Feb. 9, 2005, attached as Ex. A to Gov’t Resp. at

2-3; see also (R. at 35-37 (Feb. 4, 2005 Extradition Hr’g Tr.).) A copy of Judge Hart’s Order

permitting extradition was to be forwarded to the Secretary of State and Hoxha was committed to

the custody of the United States Marshal pending disposition by the Secretary of State. (Gov’t Resp.

Ex. A at 3-4.) Hoxha filed his habeas petition on March 13, 2005, and the Government was enjoined

from deporting Hoxha until further order of this Court. (See Court Order of Mar. 16, 2005.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Extradition Process

A foreign country may seek extradition from the United States only if there is a treaty

between the requesting country and the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976); Matter of

Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 129 (D.N.J. 1987). The requesting country must submit its

request to a state or federal court, which then determines whether the fugitive is subject to extradition

and, if so, orders the fugitive’s commitment and certifies the supporting record to the Secretary of

State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. A fugitive is subject to extradition if probable cause exists to believe that

the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997).

Ultimately, however, the decision to actually extradite a fugitive lies within the power of the

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executive branch, as it is the Secretary of State who makes the final decision whether to surrender

the fugitive to the requesting state. Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 129-30 (“The decision to surrender the

fugitive then rests in the discretion of the Secretary of State.”) (emphasis in original) (citing

Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 & n.20 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Sidali, 107 F.3d

at 194 (“Because the power to extradite derives from the President's power to conduct foreign affairs,

extradition is an executive, not a judicial, function.”). In sum, as explained more fully below, the

judicial branch and the executive branch have clearly delineated functions in the extradition process;

the judicial branch determines whether the individual is subject to extradition while the executive

branch is charged with the decision of whether to extradite. 

B. Habeas Review of an Extradition Order

An extradition order is not a final order of a district court and therefore may not be appealed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Bogue, Crim. A. No. 98-572-M, 1998 WL 966070,

at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998). Although an extradition order may be challenged via a habeas corpus

petition, the scope of review is extremely limited. “Habeas corpus is available only to inquire

whether the magistrate [judge] had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and,

by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there

was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.” Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312

(1925); see also Sidali, 107 F.3d at 195. It is within this framework that this Court shall consider

Hoxha’s habeas petition.

Wisely, Hoxha does not attack the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. A magistrate judge

may conduct extradition proceedings if authorized to do so by a court of the United States. 18

U.S.C. § 3184. Local Rule 72.1 of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania provides this authorization.

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Bogue, 1998 WL 966070, at *1. Nevertheless, Hoxha makes three arguments that must be

addressed. First, he claims that probable cause did not exist. Second, Hoxha asserts that the

Extradition Treaty between the United States and Albania is no longer in force and, therefore, that

the United States is under no duty to grant Albania’s request for Hoxha’s surrender. Hoxha

concedes that, provided the extradition treaty between the United States and Albania is valid, “the

charges [murder] are listed as offenses which qualify as extraditable.” (Mem. of Law in Supp. of

Habeas Pet. at 7.) Finally, Hoxha claims that if extradited, he will face reprisals and death at the

hands of Albanian authorities. He claims that his extradition should therefore be barred by Article

III of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of

Punishment, of which the United States is a party. 

1. Probable Cause

When determining whether probable cause exists in the context of an extradition proceeding,

courts apply the identical standard used in federal preliminary hearings. Sidali, 107 F.3d at 199

(citations omitted). Under that standard, the burden rests with the government to present “evidence

sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a

reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” Id. In making this determination, the sufficiency of the

evidence for conviction purposes is not to be examined; the Government has met its burden if the

evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe the fugitive

is guilty and thus hold him for trial. Id. (“The role of the magistrate judge in an extradition

proceeding is, therefore, ‘to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the

accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a

conviction.’”) (quoting Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922)); see also Gouveia v. Vokes, 800

Case 2:05-cv-01211-BMS Document 5 Filed 05/25/05 Page 6 of 14
7

F. Supp. 241, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Extradition of Chan-Seong I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1161

(D. N.M. 2004). The habeas court does not sit to superimpose its view of the record on that of the

extradition magistrate. Bogue, 1998 WL 966070, at *2 (citing Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312).

Therefore, the writ will not issue if the magistrate relied on competent evidence sufficient to support

the conclusion that a reasonable person would believe the petitioner guilty. Bogue, 1998 WL 966070,

at *2.

Hoxha’s argument on the issue of probable causerelies on the purportedly recanted statement

of Daut Hoxha, Hoxha’s cousin. According to that statement, Hoxha arrived at Daut’s home

immediately after committing the killings. (Habeas Pet. Ex. I.) Hoxha was holding a plastic bag that

contained a gun. (Id.) Daut took the bag with the gun and Hoxha headed back toward his house.

(Id.) Several hours later, Hoxha returned to Daut’s home and asked for the gun so that he could

throw it in the Gjanica River. (Id.) Hoxha and Daut then headed to a nearby village where Daut’s

cousin, Fetah, lived. (Id.) When they arrived at Fetah’s home, Daut hid the gun in a sofa. (Id.)

Daut’s statement goes on to recount the bitter family history that led to the killings and also states

that Hoxha informed Daut, “you will hear later what I have done.” (Id.) Hoxha argues that any

evidence tying him to the killings flows from the statements of Daut, his sister, and his wife, which

were the product of torture and have since been recanted. (Mem. of Law in Support of Habeas Pet.

at 7-8.) 

In finding probable cause existed, however, Judge Hart assumed that Daut’s statements

implicating Hoxha were untrue. (R. at 35 (Feb. 4, 2005 Extradition Hr’g Tr.).) In other words,

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1

 It is for this reason that Hoxha’s argument that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly refused

to allow live testimony from witnesses in Albania is both unpersuasive and irrelevant. The

credibility of witnesses and relevant facts are matters to be determined by an Albanian court. See

Matter of Sidona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“The rule is that the accused has no

right to introduce evidence which merely contradicts the demanding country's proof, or which

only poses conflicts of credibility.”). Rather than permissibly seeking to explain the evidence put

forth by the Albanian authorities, Hoxha seeks to try this matter in the United States by

contradicting the evidence against him. This he may not do. Id. (noting it would contradict

purpose of extradition treaties if requesting country were required to conduct a full trial in United

States and could only obtain extradition after a full trial in this country). Furthermore, even

accepting certain testimony as recanted, probable cause exists to certify Hoxha as extraditable. 

2

 Also challenged are the declarations of Bajame Hoxha and Adriana Hoxha. Bajame,

Daut’s wife, asserts that after she heard Daut and Hoxha enter her home in the early morning

hours of the night of the killings, she returned to the house a few hours later to find a plastic bag

in the corridor of her home. Adriana Hoxha, Daut’s sister, claims that the morning after the

killings, she heard a conversation between Daut and Hoxha in which Hoxha told Daut that he

would later learn what Hoxha has done. (See Habeas Pet. Exs. F & G (recanting prior

declarations).) Even discounting all three declarations, however, probable cause exists. 

Furthermore, the recantations raise credibility issues best left to the Albanian judicial system. 

Whether to believe all, any, or none of the witnesses who have now apparently changed their

stories is simply not a matter properly decided by this Court.

8

sufficient evidence existed aside from Daut’s statements to justify holding Krenar for trial.1 The

affidavit of Ardian Visha, Prosecutor at the General Prosecutor’s Office in Albania, sets forth the

evidence supporting a finding of probable cause. Among this evidence is a gun seized from the

home of Fetah Hoxha, which ballistics confirmed was the weapon used to kill the victims; the

statement of Fetah that Daut came to his house with another individual; the declaration of Rahman

Sheqeri, who states that he saw Hoxha with a gun a couple weeks prior to the killings near the

victims’ home, and the statement of Murat Kasemi, the victim’s brother, who claims to have heard

gun shots on the night of the murder.2 (Aff. of Ardian Visha ¶¶ 2-5, 7, attached as Ex. C to Gov’t

Resp.) Furthermore, Matilda Kasemi, the couple’s surviving daughter, witnessed the killings and

would be able to identify the killer if provided an opportunity. (Gov’t Resp. Ex. B.) All of this

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evidence, properly considered by Judge Hart and this Court, is more than sufficient to constitute

probable cause. Although the statement of Daut Hoxha provides additional support for a finding of

probable cause, particularly insofar as Daut led the police to the exact location of the gun, his words

are not necessary to sustain this finding. 

The Court observes that the case against Krenar appears riddled with holes, especially if one

discounts the allegedly recanted statements. In fact, Judge Hart stressed that were he presented with

the evidence before him at a trial conducted in the United States, the Government would not even

be able to present its case to the jury, because “[t]here’s absolutely no basis to find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt [based on the evidence the Government presented].” (R. at 36-37 (Feb. 4, 2005

Extradition Hr’g Tr.).) But that was not the question posed in the extradition hearing nor is it the

question posed by the instant habeas petition. The Government need not put on evidence sufficient

to convict Hoxha based on a reasonable doubt standard. Probable cause is all that is required, and

probable cause is what the Government has provided.

2. The Validity of the United States/Albania Extradition Treaty

Hoxha also claims that the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Albania is no

longer valid because the Kingdom of Albania no longer exists. (Mem. of Law in Support of Habeas

Pet. at 1.) According to Hoxha, the current sovereign, the Republic of Albania, is not a contracting

party to the Extradition Treaty and all acts of the Kingdom of Albania with foreign governments

were revoked and nullified by the governing legislature on May 27, 1944. (Id. at 1-2.) 

The flaw in Hoxha’s argument lies not with the history lesson he has laid out, see Habeas

Petition at ¶¶ 13-17, but rather in directing that lesson to this Court. The continuing validity of a

treaty between the United States and another country after a change in the status of that country is

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a “political question.” In re Extradition of Platko, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2002)

(citations omitted). Therefore, the Court must defer to the intentions of both countries’ respective

state departments when deciding the continued validity of a treaty. U.S. ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia,

109 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We will look to the intent and actions of [the countries that have

signed the treaty] to ascertain if there was a valid treaty. The nations’ conduct proves dispositive.”);

see also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285 (1902) (actions of respective governments deemed

controlling when deciding whether extradition treaty has been terminated); Then v. Melendez, 92

F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996) (continuing validity of a treaty with Singapore after that country’s

independence from the United Kingdom depended on views of state departments). Judge Hart

recognized the limited nature of the judicial branch’s review over this question when he refused to

hear testimony from Albanian legal experts on the treaty’s validity. (R. at 2-3 (Jan. 19, 2005

Extradition Hr’g Tr.).) The record clearly supports the finding that the treaty is valid, as the

declaration of Robert E. Dalton, an Assistant Legal Advisor for the governmental office responsible

for keeping and preserving records of treaties, states that “[t]he United States Government considers

that the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Albania that was signed at

Tirana March 1, 1933, and entered into force November 14, 1935, is currently in force between the

United States of America and Albania.” (Dalton Decl. ¶ 3, attached as Ex. F to Gov’t Resp.)

Included with Dalton’s declaration is a copy of the relevant portion of the Department of State

publication, Treaties in Force, which lists the extradition treaty between the United States and

Albania as a currently valid treaty. (Id.) Furthermore, the declaration of Virginia Prugh, Attorney

Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Department of State, also asserts that the

Extradition Treaty is “in full force and effect.” (Prugh Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, attached as Ex. E to Gov’t

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Resp.) Congress has also listed the extradition treaty with Albania as one of the bilateral extradition

treaties the United States maintains with foreign countries. 18 U.S.C. § 3181. Finally, Judge Hart

noted that Albania has extradited individuals under the Treaty, a clear indication that Albania

believes the treaty is in full force and intends to honor its provisions. (R. at 3 (Jan. 19, 2005

Extradition Hr’g Tr.) .) Accordingly, the appropriate governmental entities of both the United States

and Albania have spoken on this matter and have indicated that the Extradition Treaty is in full force

and effect.

3. Humanitarian Exception to Extradition Laws

Finally, Hoxha argues that he should not be extradited because he would face torture and

possible death should he be returned to Albania. Article III of the UN Convention Against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“Convention Against Torture”) forbids the

extradition of a person to a country if there are substantial grounds to believe that the person will be

tortured upon return. According to Hoxha, this provision has been both ratified and codified into

law by the United States. (Mem. of Law in Support of Habeas Pet. at 4.) Hoxha further argues that

this Court should create a “humanitarian exception” that would allow the Court to ignore the

extradition order because the actions to which Hoxha might be subjected in Albania would greatly

offend the Court’s sense of decency. (Id. at 6.)

Hoxha’s argument, while appealing on a certain level, fails to square with the law, and is a

matter clearly committed to the discretion of the Secretary of State. The State Department has

enacted regulations, pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act , 8 U.S.C. § 1231

(2005), aimed at implementing the Convention Against Torture. The clear policy of the United

States is “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country

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in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subject

to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” Act of Oct.

21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681. The regulations, however, mandate that “the

Secretary is the U.S. official responsible for determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign

country by means of extradition.” 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (2005). In other words, while the judicial

branch is charged with deciding whether an individual is extraditable, the decision to extradite the

individual rests with the executive branch. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 1986).

It is within the sole discretion of the Secretary of State to refuse to extradite an individual on

humanitarian grounds in light of the treatment and consequences that await that individual. Singh,

123 F.R.D. at 130 (citing Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789-90); see also In re Extradition of Chan-Seong-I,

346 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54 (“Whether humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition is an issue

committed to the sole discretion of the executive branch, specifically the Secretary of State.”).

Indeed, regulations are in place for situations when allegations of torture are asserted. In such cases,

“appropriate policy and legal offices review and analyze information relevant to the case in preparing

a recommendation to the Secretary as to whether or not to sign the surrender warrant.” 22 C.F.R.

§ 95.3(a). Then, the Secretary is charged with surrendering the individual, denying surrender of the

individual, or surrendering the individual subject to conditions. 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(b). The

Secretary’s decision, in this regard, is not subject to judicial review. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (“Decisions

of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion

not subject to judicial review.”). 

In sum,the separate branches of government each have clearly defined roles in the extradition

process. It is the duty of the judicial branch to ensure that the individual sought is subject to

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3

 The U.S. State Department is aware that Albanian police have beaten and tortured

suspects and that prison conditions in Albania are poor. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Report

on Human Rights Practices in Albania - 2004 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41666.htm. Sending any individual to a country where

he or she faces even the prospect of cruel or inhumane treatment cannot be squared with the

ideals of freedom and respect for the individual embodied by our laws and cherished by our

citizens. As President Bush has declared, “torture is never acceptable, nor we do hand over

people to countries that do torture.” See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW YORKER,

Feb. 14, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa_fact6.

Nevertheless, it has been alleged that U.S. and Albanian agents have collaborated to further the

U.S. policy whereby persons suspected of terrorism are sent to countries that engage in

deplorable and illegal interrogation practices. See id.; see also Megan K. Stack & Bob Drogin,

Detainee Says U.S. Handed Him Over for Torture, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1. 

Accordingly, this Court trusts that the State Department will seriously examine the charges of

torture that Hoxha has levied against Albanian authorities and faithfully uphold this

Government’s clear policy of refusing to extradite a person when there are substantial grounds

for believing that person would be subjected to torture. 

13

extradition, while it is the duty of the executive branch, which possesses great power in the realm

of foreign affairs, to ensure that extradition is not sought for political reasons and that no individual

will be subject to torture if extradited. See Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 133 (“It is the settled rule that it is

within the Secretary of State’s sole discretion to determine whether or not a country’s requisition for

extradition is made with a view to try or punish the fugitive for a political crime, i.e., whether the

request is a subterfuge.”) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, this Court rejects Hoxha’s

invitation to create a judicial humanitarian grounds exception to the laws of extradition.3

III. CONCLUSION

Jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge in this case was clearly proper, the crime of murder falls

within the terms of the Extradition Treaty, and probable cause exists that Krenar Hoxha is

responsible for the three murders for which Albania seeks his extradition. This Court’s scope of

review limited to those issues, the Court must therefore deny Hoxha’s habeas petition. An

appropriate Order follows.

Case 2:05-cv-01211-BMS Document 5 Filed 05/25/05 Page 13 of 14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KRENAR HOXHA, :

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

TROY LEVI, : No. 05-1211

Respondent. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of May, 2005, upon consideration of Krenar Hoxha’s Petition

for Habeas Corpus (Document No. 1), the Government’s response thereto, the record before

Magistrate Judge Jacob P. Hart, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the

Petition is DENIED and that the stay imposed by this Court’s March 16, 2005 Order is

LIFTED.

BY THE COURT:

Berle M. Schiller, J.

Case 2:05-cv-01211-BMS Document 5 Filed 05/25/05 Page 14 of 14