1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL ACTION

:

v. :

:

TYREE STRATTON : No. 05-68-2

:

Goldberg, J. January 5, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Tyree Stratton, a 41-year-old inmate housed at Federal Correctional Institution 

Fort Dix, requests compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The 

parties dispute whether Stratton exhausted his remedies prior to seeking court intervention. Upon 

review of Stratton’s request to the warden where he is incarcerated, and recognizing that he is 

proceeding pro se, I conclude that exhaustion has occurred. But consideration of the factors 

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3582(c) necessitates that I deny Stratton’s release request.

I. BACKGROUND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Defendant’s Criminal Conduct and Conviction

On December 1, 2005, a jury found Stratton guilty of conspiracy to commit armed bank 

robbery, armed bank robbery, and using and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of 

violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(d), and 924(c). The Government makes the 

following representations regarding the offense conduct, which Stratton does not contest:

a. Stratton was one of three masked gunmen who staged a “takeover” armed 

robbery of the Wachovia Bank branch in the Roosevelt Mall in Philadelphia, in 

the early afternoon of November 12, 2004. At least two of the robbers were 

armed with handguns. The robbers fled the bank with approximately $2,763 in 

cash, escaping in a sky-blue Chevrolet minivan, which they wrecked at the 

conclusion of a high-speed flight from the police. . . .

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 1 of 7
 

2

b. Stratton and his cohorts threatened, manhandled, and injured a number of 

people during the armed robbery and its aftermath. . . . The defendants wore 

ski masks, matching gloves, and dark clothing to hide their identities. At the 

start of the robbery, the defendants pushed a female bank customer, who had 

been outside using the ATM machine, into the bank at gunpoint. One female 

bank employee was pistol-whipped in the head; another was hit on the arm with 

a gun and dragged by the front of her shirt across the floor. The pistol-whipped 

employee was treated at the hospital for lumps on her head.

c. The defendants herded seven tellers into a small office to force them to turn 

over the key to the bank’s vault. As the defendants yelled at the tellers to go 

into the office, one defendant pushed a teller who was six months pregnant, 

with great force, shoving her into another teller. After the defendants had 

herded all the tellers into the office, one defendant kept screaming and cursing 

at the tellers, demanding the vault key. . . . [O]ne defendant fired a round into 

the office floor, so close to the feet of the tellers that one woman was hit in the 

head by bullet fragments, which cut her scalp. The defendants left the bank 

with money from the teller drawers only after the terrified tellers persisted in 

telling them that the bank manager who had the vault key was at lunch. . . . 

d. The defendants then led the police on a high-speed chase, during which their 

van ran several red lights. The chase ended when the defendants attempted to 

run another red light . . . [and] hit a car coming through [an] intersection, 

causing a serious four-car accident. At least four other persons in the other 

three cars were injured in the crash; four persons were taken to the hospital.

e. After the accident, the three defendants got out of the van in an attempt to flee 

on foot. One of the co-defendants, Anthony Archer, left the van with a semiautomatic handgun in his hand, which he pointed in the officers’ direction. In 

response, one of the officers fired his service weapon, striking Archer in the 

back. The firearm that Archer had been holding fell to the pavement. It was 

loaded with 13 rounds of ammunition. . . .

f. Meanwhile, Stratton and the third co-defendant, Davis, ran from the wrecked 

getaway van in an attempt to elude the police. Stratton and Davis ran from the 

intersection into an alley, where they shed the gloves they had worn during the 

robbery. Stratton and Davis jumped a fence and ran together into an adjacent 

yard, where they turned toward the two police officers who were chasing them 

on foot. One officer, believing that Stratton was reaching for a weapon at his 

waistband, fired his service revolver but did not hit either man. That same officer 

captured Davis . . . Stratton was found minutes later, hiding in a shed . . .

(Gov’t Opp. at 1–4, ECF No. 206 (citations omitted).)

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 2 of 7
 

3

On April 11, 2006, Stratton was sentenced to 260 months of imprisonment by the 

Honorable Stewart Dalzell. On October 7, 2016, the case was transferred to my docket. On appeal, 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. United States v. Archer, et al., 

282 F. App’x 164 (3d Cir. 2008). Stratton is serving his sentence at FCI Fort Dix with an 

anticipated release date of May 27, 2023.

B. Defendant’s Requests for Compassionate Release

On July 31, 2020, Stratton submitted a written request to the warden of FCI Fort Dix

seeking “to be evaluated and released pursuant to CARES Act due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”1

(Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, ECF No. 205.) On August 3, 2020, the warden denied his request. (Id.; Govt 

Opp. at 5.) On September 14, 2020 and November 13, 2020, Stratton submitted requests for relief 

to this Court. The Government filed a response in opposition on November 9, 2020. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Once a defendant exhausts his administrative remedies, the First Step Act permits the 

sentencing court to reduce a term of imprisonment based upon: (1) consideration of the factors set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) a finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such 

a reduction”; (3) a determination that the reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).2 The applicable policy 

statement is the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which includes an Application Note that

defines extraordinary and compelling reasons that may justify compassionate release:

1. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.–Provided the defendant meets the 

requirements of subdivision (2) [not a danger to the safety of any other person or to 

1 The “CARES Act” refers to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–

136, § 12003.

2 The defendant has the burden to show that he is entitled to a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). United States v. Haynes, No. 17-0042, 2020 WL 3895767, at *2 (D.V.I. July 7, 2020) 

(citing United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 

1026 (2d Cir. 1992)).

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 3 of 7
 

4

the community], extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the 

circumstances set forth below:

(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant.–

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and 

advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life 

expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not 

required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic 

lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is––

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or

(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the 

aging process,

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care 

within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she 

is not expected to recover. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Application Note 1.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The parties dispute whether Stratton has exhausted his administrative remedies in 

accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In support of exhaustion, Stratton submits his written 

request to the warden at FCI Fort Dix, in which Stratton asked “to be evaluated and released 

pursuant to CARES Act due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, ECF No. 205.) In 

opposition, the Government maintains that because Stratton’s request failed to mention 

compassionate release and referenced only the CARES Act, he failed to trigger or exhaust the 

requisite remedies mandated in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government maintains that the 

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 4 of 7
 

5

CARES Act is solely within the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and allows the BOP 

to transfer inmates to home confinement toward the end of a sentence.

The First Step Act permits courts to reduce a term of imprisonment upon a defendant’s 

motion for compassionate release “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights 

to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf” or after 

“the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,” 

whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit recently determined that this thirty-day requirement is mandatory and that a defendant’s 

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies “presents a glaring roadblock foreclosing 

compassionate release[.]” United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020). The Third 

Circuit also clarified that administrative remedies are exhausted thirty days after the warden 

receives a petitioner’s request for compassionate release. United States v. Harris, 812 F. App’x 

106, 107 (3d Cir. 2020).

In support of its position that exhaustion has not occurred, the Government cites to United 

States v. Powell, No. 15-496-4, 2020 WL 2848190 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2020). In Powell, a judge 

within this district found, in a footnote, that there was no evidence of exhaustion because the 

defendant’s written request to the warden “did not mention the First Step Act, compassionate 

release, or a request for modification of his prison term.” Id. at *2 n.5. Thus, the court declined 

“to construe [the defendant]’s request for home confinement—relief governed by a different 

statute—as a request for compassionate release.” Id. 

More recently, another judge, also in this district, reached the opposite conclusion in United 

States v. Hight, No. 04-333-1, 2020 WL 5653487 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2020). Distinguishing Powell

and reviewing the language and jurisprudence surrounding compassionate release and the CARES

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 5 of 7
 

6

Act, the Hight court stated: “if a defendant requests that the warden grant him a transfer to home 

confinement under the CARES Act, the warden denies the request, and thirty days have elapsed 

since presenting the request to the warden, the Court finds that the exhaustion requirement of 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is satisfied.” Hight, 2020 WL 5653487 at *5. The judge in Hight reasoned 

that it was “especially wary of imposing an overly-restrictive interpretation of the exhaustion 

requirement on defendants acting pro se . . .” and proceeded to analyze whether extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warranted release. Id.

I find Hight to be persuasive. Acting pro se, Stratton submitted a written request to the 

warden at FCI Fort Dix for evaluation and/or release and cited the CARES Act. While Stratton 

cited the wrong statute, he explicitly referenced the COVID-19 pandemic and requested release.

Like the judge in Hight, I am reluctant to hold this pro se Defendant to such an exacting standard 

when it is clear he was seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). I thus conclude that 

Stratton’s written request and the warden’s subsequent denial, both of which Stratton submitted in 

support of his motions, satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Therefore, I will next consider whether Stratton has presented extraordinary and compelling 

reasons justifying his release. 

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

In an effort to prove extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, Stratton cites to the 

COVID-19 pandemic and his good conduct while incarcerated, and indicates that he has atoned

for his crimes and is committed to a law-abiding life upon release. The Government points to

Stratton’s medical records, which reveal that he is 41 years old, is generally in good health, and 

does not present with any condition identified by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 

as a severe risk factor should he contract COVID-19.

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 6 of 7
 

7

Much has been written about the devastating impact that the COVID-19 pandemic has had 

on prison populations, which need not be repeated here. However, existence of the COVID-19 

pandemic alone does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction. See Raia, 954 F.3d at 597. 

Stratton’s generalized concerns about the pandemic do not constitute a “compelling reason” for 

release. United States v. Roeder, 807 F. App’x 157, 161 n.16 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[T]he 

existence of some health risk to every federal prisoner as the result of this global pandemic does 

not, without more, provide the sole basis for granting release to each and every prisoner within our 

Circuit.”). 

Moreover, consideration of several § 3553(a) factors weigh against his requested relief. 

Stratton’s crimes were alarmingly dangerous and caused numerous injuries. The nature and 

circumstances of his actions and the seriousness of his offense certainly outweigh all other § 

3553(a) factors. A reduction of his sentence would not promote respect for the law or adequate 

deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). 

An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:05-cr-00068-MSG Document 211 Filed 01/05/21 Page 7 of 7