United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

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 22, 2004 

a.m. EDT AVIATION SECURITY

Private Screening 

Contractors Have Little 

Flexibility to Implement 

Innovative Approaches 

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-04-505T

Highlights of GAO-04-505T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

The terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, resulted in fundamental 

changes in the way the United 

States screens airport passengers 

and their property. One of the most 

significant changes was the shift 

from using private screeners to 

using federal screeners at all but 

five commercial airports in the 

United States. These five airports 

are part of a pilot program, where 

private screeners perform 

screening functions. The mission of 

the Private Screening Pilot 

Program, as defined by the 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), is to test the 

effectiveness of increased 

operational flexibility at the airport 

level that contractors may provide. 

GAO was asked to describe (1) the 

challenges and limitations of the 

private screening pilot program, 

(2) the operational flexibilities TSA 

has provided to the private 

screening companies, and (3) the 

performance of private and federal 

screeners in detecting threat 

objects. This testimony is based on 

our prior and ongoing work on TSA 

airport passenger and baggage 

screeners. 

In prior reports, GAO has made 

recommendations designed to 

strengthen airport passenger and 

baggage screening. GAO also has 

several ongoing reviews related to 

the issues addressed in this 

testimony, and will issue separate 

reports related to these areas at 

later dates, with additional 

recommendations as appropriate. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-505T. 

April 2004 

AVIATION SECURITY 

Private Screening Contractors Have Little 

Flexibility to Implement Innovative 

Approaches 

A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not 

established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in 

the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those 

differences. TSA provided the screening contractors with little opportunity 

to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives 

that go beyond the minimum requirements of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act. TSA officials said they had not granted 

contract officials more flexibility because they wanted to ensure that 

procedures were standardized, well coordinated, and consistently 

implemented throughout all airports to achieve consistent security. 

However, TSA recently requested input from the private screening 

contractors about the additional flexibilities they would like to implement. 

Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited 

operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airportspecific practices. These practices include screening candidates before they 

are hired through the assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order 

to utilize baggage screeners more efficiently, and, during the initial hiring, 

selecting screener supervisors from within their screener workforce rather 

than relying on the decisions of TSA’s hiring contractors. These practices 

have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve efficiencies that 

are not currently available at airports with federal screeners. 

Little performance data are currently available to compare the performance 

of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects. The 

primary source of available performance data is the results of the covert 

tests performed by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review, in 

which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through 

screening checkpoints. Although the test results cannot be generalized either 

to the airports where the tests have been conducted or to airports 

nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in detecting 

threat objects and indicate that, in general, private and federal screeners 

performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the 

ability of both private and federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA 

recognized the need to improve screener performance and has taken steps in 

this direction, including enhancing its training programs. 

Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors Responsible for Conducting 

Screening Operations 

Airport Contract screening company 

San Francisco International Covenant Aviation Security 

Kansas City International First Line Transportation Security 

Greater Rochester International McNeil Security 

To view the full product, including the scope Jackson Hole Jackson Hole Airport Board 


and methodology, click on the link above. Tupelo Covenant Aviation Security
 For more information, contact Norman J.


Rabkin at (202) 512-8777 or Source: TSA.


rabkinn@gao.gov.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) private screening 

program. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in 

fundamental changes in the way the United States screens airport 

passengers and their property. One of the most significant changes was the 

shift from the use of private screeners to perform screening functions to 

the use of federal screeners at all but five commercial airports in the 

United States. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 

enacted on November 19, 2001, mandated the federalization of airport 

security screening and required that five airports be part of a pilot 

program where screening functions are performed by private screeners. 

The mission of the Private Screening Pilot Program, as defined by TSA, is 

to test the effectiveness of increased operational flexibility at the airport 

level that contractors may provide. ATSA also includes a provision that 

allows an airport to apply to opt out of using federal screeners beginning 

on November 19, 2004. 

My testimony today addresses TSA’s implementation and evaluation of the 

contract screening pilot program. In particular, I will address (1) the 

challenges and limitations of the private screening pilot program, (2) the 

operational flexibilities TSA has provided to the private screening 

contractors, and (3) the performance of private and federal screeners in 

detecting threat objects. My testimony is based on our prior work and 

preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of TSA’s passenger 

screening program, all of which have been done in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

• 	 A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not 

established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in 

the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those 

differences. TSA has provided the private screening contractors with little 

opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and 

implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirements of ATSA. 

Because TSA requires the pilot screening contractors and Federal Security 

Directors (FSD) at airports with federal screeners to operate under the 

Page 1 GAO-04-505T 
same procedures, they faced many of the same challenges.1

 For example, 

the private screening contractors, like FSDs at airports with federal 

screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of screeners and 

establish assessment centers, where screener applicants are assessed.2 

The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has limited their 

ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA officials stated that 

they had not granted contract officials more flexibility because they 

wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well coordinated, 

and consistently implemented throughout all airports to achieve 

consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from the 

private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they would 

like to implement. 

• 	 Although TSA has provided private screening contractors with only limited 

operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some airportspecific practices. Flexible practices implemented by private screening 

contractors include screening candidates before they are hired through the 

assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage 

screeners more efficiently,3

 and, during the initial hiring, selecting screener 

supervisors from within rather than relying on the decisions of TSA’s 

hiring contractors. These practices have enabled the private screening 

contractors to achieve efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs 

at airports with federal screeners. 

• 	 Little performance data are currently available to compare the 

performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat 

objects. The primary source of available performance data is the results of 

covert tests performed by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program 

Review (OIAPR), in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat 

objects through screening checkpoints and in checked baggage.

4

 Although 

1

FSDs are responsible for providing day-to-day operational direction for federal security at 

airports. Additionally, the FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for the leadership 

and coordination of TSA security activities at the airports. 

2

An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA’s hiring contractor assembles to 

conduct assessments of screener applicants. The centers are generally constructed at 

locations such as hotels and TSA training facilities that are in close proximity to the 

airport(s) where the FSDs have requested additional staff. 

3

Baggage handlers move baggage from carts to belts and back. They do not perform any 

screening functions, nor are they hired through TSA’s assessment centers. 

4

OIAPR conducts covert tests designed to (1) assess screeners’ ability to detect threat 

objects and adherence to TSA-approved procedures and (2) identify systemic problems in 

the areas of training, policy, and technology. 

Page 2 GAO-04-505T 
the test results cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the 

tests have been conducted or to airports nationwide,5

 they provide an 

indicator of screener performance in detecting threat objects and indicate 

that, in general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. 

Specifically, the testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private 

and federal screeners to detect threat objects.6

 TSA recognized the need to 

improve the performance of both private and federal screeners and has 

taken steps in this direction, including enhancing its training programs. 

Background 	 ATSA created TSA to ensure security for all modes of transportation, 

including aviation. ATSA set forth specific enhancements to aviation 

security for TSA to implement and established deadlines for completing 

many of them. These enhancements included federalizing passenger 

screeners at more than 440 commercial airports in the United States by 

November 19, 2002; enhancing screener hiring and training standards; and 

establishing and managing a 2-year pilot program at 5 airports—one in 

each airport security category7

—where screening of passengers and 

property would be conducted by a private screening company and 

overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA included a provision that allows 

airport operators to apply to TSA to use private rather than federal 

screeners beginning in November 2004. TSA has acknowledged that one of 

its key challenges in 2004 will be designing appropriate criteria for the 

potential expansion of contract screening. 

As required by ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract 

screeners in lieu of federal screeners at 5 commercial airports—one in 

each airport security category. ATSA sets forth numerous requirements 

regarding the pilot program. Specifically, it requires that 

• 	 the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of the 

United States; 

5

The results of the tests cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the tests have 

been conducted or to airports nationwide because the sample tests were not identified 

using the principles of probability sampling. For cost and operational reasons, however, 

using probability sampling techniques to identify sample tests may not be feasible. 

6

We cannot disclose the actual results of the covert tests because they are classified. 

7

There are five categories of airports—X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X airports have the 

largest number of enplanements and category IV airports have the smallest number. 

Page 3 GAO-04-505T 
• 	 the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment 

standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance 

requirements that apply to federal screeners; 

• 	 all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications as 

federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship,8

 high school diploma or 

equivalent, English proficiency, and pass a criminal background check; 

and 

• 	 all private screener candidates undergo the same battery of employment 

screening tests that federal screener candidates undergo. 

In June 2002, TSA selected the 5 airports that would comprise the contract 

screening pilot program. In October 2002, TSA awarded contracts to four 

private screening contractors to provide passenger and baggage screening 

services. TSA’s role at the airports with private screeners is to provide onsite federal supervision of all passenger and property screening.9

 Table 1 

provides a list of the airports participating in the pilot program and the 

private contractors responsible for conducting screening operations. 

Table 1: Airports Participating in the Pilot Program and Contractors Responsible for 

Conducting Screening Operations 

Airport 

security 

category Airport Contract screening company 

X San Francisco International Covenant Aviation Security 

I Kansas City International First Line Transportation Security 

III Jackson Hole Airport Jackson Hole Airport Board 

IV Tupelo Airport Covenant Aviation Security 

II Greater Rochester International McNeil Security 

Source: TSA. 

Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for screening 

passengers and most used private security firms to perform this function. 

Long-standing concerns existed regarding screener performance in 

detecting threat objects during covert tests at passenger screening 

8

Federal screeners must be either United States citizens or nationals of the United States 

(persons who, though not citizens of the United States, owe permanent allegiance to the 

United States). 

9

A federal security director and his or her management team, including screening 

managers, oversee screening operations at each of the airports with private screening 

contractors. 

Page 4 GAO-04-505T 
checkpoints. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the 

potentially dangerous objects Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

undercover agents carried through checkpoints during tests—a level that 

was considered “significant and alarming.” In 1987, screeners did not 

detect 20 percent of the objects during the same types of tests. In addition, 

we reported that FAA tests conducted between 1991 and 1999 showed that 

screeners’ ability to detect objects was not improving, and in some cases, 

was worsening. In tests conducted in the late 1990s, as the testing objects 

became more realistic and the tests more closely approximated how a 

terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners’ ability to 

detect dangerous objects declined even further. Inadequate training and 

poor supervision, along with low wages, rapid turnover, and inadequate 

attention to human factors,10 were historically identified as key 

contributors to poor screener performance. 

The results I am presenting today are based on preliminary observations of 

our ongoing review of TSA’s passenger screening program, which includes 

a review of TSA’s efforts to implement and evaluate the contract screening 

pilot program. As part of our ongoing review, which we are conducting for 

this subcommittee, we interviewed TSA officials and visited all 5 pilot 

program airports and 23 airports with federal screeners. During these 

visits, we observed screening operations and interviewed FSDs, their 

staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority and airline officials. At the 

5 pilot program airports, we also interviewed representatives of the private 

screening contractors. Additionally, we interviewed representatives of 

several aviation associations. We plan to conduct additional analysis 

during the remainder of our review, including assessing the results of our 

recent survey of all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations. We will 

also review the results of the final report submitted to TSA by 

BearingPoint, Inc., which compared the performance of private screeners 11 to federal screeners. 

10Human factors refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of, and the 

constraints it imposes on the individuals performing the function. Some of these factors 

include repetitive tasks screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to 

detect threat objects, and the stress involved in dealing with the public who may dislike 

being screened or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights. 

11ATSA gave TSA the responsibility to review the requests for those airports wishing to opt 

out of using TSA screeners in November 2004. TSA contracted with BearingPoint Inc., to 

develop an evaluation plan for assessing screening at the pilot program airports, and 

conduct an evaluation of the performance of private screening contractors, as well as 

compare screener performance at airports with TSA screeners. 

Page 5 GAO-04-505T 
Private Screening 

Contractors Have Had 

Little Opportunity to 

Demonstrate 

Innovations and 

Achieve Efficiencies 

A key limitation of the private screening pilot program is that it was not 

established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in 

the performance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those 

differences. TSA has provided the private screening contractors with little 

opportunity to demonstrate innovations and achieve efficiencies. Because 

TSA requires the pilot screening contractors and FSDs at airports with 

federal screeners to operate under the same procedures, they faced many 

of the same challenges. For example, the private screening contractors, 

like FSDs at airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize 

the hiring of screeners and establish assessment centers, where screener 

applicants are assessed. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed 

basis has limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. TSA 

officials stated that they had not granted contract officials more flexibility 

because they wanted to ensure that procedures were standardized, well 

coordinated, and consistently implemented throughout all airports to 

achieve consistent security. However, TSA recently requested input from 

the private screening contractors about the additional flexibilities they 

would like to implement. 

Private Screening 

Contractors Lack 

Authority to Determine 

Staffing Levels and 

Conduct Hiring 

TSA determined the screener staffing needs of the private screening 

contractors using the same computer-based staffing model that was used 

for airports with federal screeners.12 This staffing model was based on the 

congressionally mandated nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time 

equivalent13 federal screeners. Both the contractors and FSDs at airports 

with federal screeners have raised concerns about the adequacy of the 

staffing model in accounting for the unique needs of each airport, 

particularly given that the model is based on a full-time equivalent ceiling. 

Two representatives of the private screening contractors that were at or 

near their TSA authorized staffing levels told us in February 2004 that they 

were concerned about having adequate staffing levels to meet demand 

during the peak 2004 travel season. TSA had required one of these 

contractors to lay off screeners in 2003 as part of its nationwide screener 

downsizing effort, even though, according to TSA, private screeners do not 

count toward TSA’s ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalent screeners. TSA 

12The staffing model took into account factors such as the number of screening 

checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers; projected air carrier service 

increases and decreases during calendar year 2003; and hours needed to accommodate 

screener training, leave, and breaks. 

13One full-time equivalent is equal to 1 work year or 2,080 non overtime hours. 

Page 6 GAO-04-505T 
acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the 

screener workforce and hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a 

study of screener staffing levels, including levels for the 5 pilot program 

airports.

14 The study, which TSA initially expected to be completed in April 

2004, is now scheduled for completion in May 2004. We will continue to 

review TSA’s efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels during the 

remainder of our review. 

The private screening contractors’ concerns regarding their staffing levels 

are compounded by TSA’s requirement that the contractors coordinate 

their hiring through TSA headquarters. These contractors, like FSDs at 

airports with federal screeners, must rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of 

screeners and establish assessment centers—a process that can take 

several months. The inability to conduct hiring on an as needed basis has 

limited their ability to respond quickly to staffing shortages. In one 

instance, an FSD for an airport with private screeners stated that in 

response to continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance 

that additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel 

season. However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June 

2003, and the FSD had to request assistance from TSA’s Mobile Screening 

Force,15 a team of TSA screeners deployed around the country where 

additional screening staff are needed. These screeners were in place for 

2 months while TSA scheduled and conducted screener applicant 

assessments and trained candidates who were selected for employment by 

the private screening company. The private screening contractor and the 

FSD at this airport told us that the inability to hire screeners during the 

first several months of the attrition problem contributed to screener 

performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and screener 

complacency because screeners were aware that they were unlikely to be 

terminated due to staffing shortages. 

14Specifically, the consultant is to, among other tasks, develop a model for collecting and 

analyzing data to realistically portray specific airport conditions rather than using a 

generalized large/small airport protocol; develop a comprehensive modeling approach with 

appropriate details to account for the considerable variability that occurs among airports; 

and implement a staffing analysis model to be used as a management tool to determine 

daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model to commercial airports nationwide. 

15TSA’s Mobile Screening Force—replaced by the National Screening Force—was created 

in early 2002 primarily to support the initial deployment of federal screeners to commercial 

airports. The National Screening Force provides screening support to all commercial 

airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances 

that require a greater number of screeners than currently available to FSDs. 

Page 7 GAO-04-505T 
Pilot program contractors have requested the opportunity to 

independently establish and operate assessment centers on an as needed 

basis. Accordingly, in December 2003 and February 2004, TSA submitted 

to the screening contractors requests for proposals for additional 

flexibilities. TSA’s December 12, 2003, request for proposal, which 

solicited input from the private screening contractors on potential 

program innovations regarding day-to-day operations, was followed by a 

more specific request for proposals, dated February 24, 2004, to provide 

human resource services, such as screener assessments, qualification, 

examination, and selection of security screener candidates.16 TSA received 

proposals from 3 of the private screening contractors, and found that they 

were insufficient in meeting the requirements set forth in the request for 

proposal.17 However, TSA officials said they are providing the contractors 

a second chance to clarify their proposals. 

Private Screening 

Contractors Have Limited 

Authority to Implement 

Training 

According to TSA, there are three key elements of passenger screening 

training: (1) basic training, (2) recurrent (refresher) training, and 

(3) remedial training. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic 

screener training program comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of 

classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training for all passenger 

and baggage screeners. TSA also requires private and federal screeners to 

participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week, averaged over a 

quarter. Consistent with ATSA, TSA further requires remedial training for 

any private or federal screener who fails an operational test.

18 

Representatives of the private screening contractors stated that a 

challenge they face in implementing their screening functions is the 

limitations TSA places on them in developing and implementing locally 

based training programs. Private screening contractors at the pilot 

program airports are required to participate in the basic screener training 

16In addition to stating the required standards that each private contractor must meet 

during the hiring process, the request details TSA’s expectations for the proposals. For 

example, the request requires the contractor to propose the manner in which 

administration of the assessments will be accomplished, including the most effective and 

efficient way to deliver the assessments. 

17TSA officials said they had not received any proposals in response to the December 2003 

request for proposal. 

18ATSA requires that screeners who fail an operational test be prohibited from performing 

the screening function related to the test they failed until they successfully complete 

remedial training on that screening function. 

Page 8 GAO-04-505T 
provided by TSA’s training contractor and to maintain the same recurrent 

and remedial training curriculums used by TSA. To provide training 

beyond TSA’s curriculums, the private screening contractors must have 

their training reviewed and approved by TSA. Contractors expressed 

concern that TSA had either rejected or was slow to approve their 

requests to provide additional training outside of TSA’s approved 

curriculum. This was of particular concern during the first year of the pilot 

program when TSA had not yet deployed a recurrent or supervisory 

training program to airports to ensure that screeners were effectively 

trained and supervised. TSA officials told us, on the other hand, that the 

private screening contractors have yet to submit any requests for approval 

of locally developed recurrent training. 

Private screening contractors also expressed concerns about the lack of 

specific feedback regarding screeners’ performance on the annual 

recertification tests, which assess their proficiency in identifying threat 

objects and adhering to standard operating procedures. TSA stores the 

results of the recertification tests in a database that FSDs can access to 

determine whether screeners for their respective airports passed or failed. 

However, private screening contractors told us they cannot view how 

screeners performed on specific questions. These performance data would 

provide private screening contractors with information on the specific 

training needs of screeners, and enable them to appropriately tailor 

training to address screener performance deficiencies at their airports. 

FSDs at Airports with 

Federal Screeners Faced 

Similar Challenges as 

Contractors 

FSDs at airports with federal screeners faced many of the same challenges 

as the private screening contractors, particularly regarding imposed 

staffing levels, a cumbersome hiring process, and limited flexibility in 

implementing local training programs. In September 2003, we reported 

that FSDs had little input in determining their screener staffing levels.19 

Since then, FSDs have continued to express concerns about their limited 

role in establishing airport-specific staffing levels and the need for realistic 

staffing levels based on the unique needs of each airport. In February 2004, 

we reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern 

with the lack of a continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost 

through attrition, and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as 

19U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations 

on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 

2003). 

Page 9 GAO-04-505T 
needed basis.20 The FSDs also complained of the time lag between their 

requests for additional staff and having trained and certified screeners 

onboard. Some FSDs reported that this time lag has hindered their ability 

to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee 

screening operations at their airports. Contractors at 3 of the pilot 

program airports reported difficulties in getting an assessment center 

established for hiring at their airport, particularly after the first cadre of 

screeners had been hired, trained, and deployed. Likewise, an FSD at an 

airport with federal screeners reported that inadequate staffing is his most 

critical issue. He stated that to address the staffing inadequacies and 

maintain a reasonably acceptable passenger wait time level, FSD staff and 

screening management personnel have assisted in staffing of exit lanes, 

checking boarding passes, and transporting bags, among other tasks. 

However, he noted that these practices are not sustainable in the long 

term. 

We recently surveyed all 155 FSDs regarding their screening operations. 

As of April 13, 2004, we had a response rate of about 90 percent for our 

general survey and about 85 percent for our airport-specific survey.

21 We 

asked the FSDs the extent to which they needed additional authority to 

perform their staffing and screening operations. As shown in table 2, the 

overwhelming majority of the FSDs, and in two instances all five of the 

FSDs at the pilot program airports, reported that they needed additional 

authority to a great or very great extent. 

20U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and 

Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

21We sent two surveys to the Federal Security Directors on March 23, 2004. In the general 

survey, we asked FSDs to answer security-related questions that will pertain to all of the 

airports for which he/she is responsible. In the airport-specific survey, we asked FSDs a 

number of airport-specific questions about screening and other security concerns. 

Page 10 GAO-04-505T 
Table 2: Summary of Selected FSD Survey Responses as of April 13, 2004 

“In your opinion, to what extent, if at all, do you need or would you like to have the following to better address specific staffing or 

security needs at the airport(s) that you oversee?” 

Very great extent Great extent Moderate extent Some or little extent No extent 

Federal Federal Pilot Federal Pilot Federal Pilot Federal Pilot 

Greater authority in 

determining the 

number of screeners 78% 100% 15% 0 6% 0 1% 0 0 0 

Greater authority in 

the selection of 

screeners 100% 19% 0 10% 0 3% 0 1% 0 

More flexibility to 

design and conduct 

local training 44% 20% 25% 0 4% 0 1% 0 

Pilot 

67% 

80% 24% 

Source: GAO analysis of survey of 155 FSDs, including the five FSDs at airports with private screeners. 

Note: The percentages do not total 100 because we did not include the not applicable/no opinion 

response. 

Flexibilities Have Although, overall, TSA has not provided private screening contractors with 

much operational flexibility, it has allowed them to implement some 

Been Provided to airport-specific practices. Practices implemented by the private screening 

Private Screeners in a contractors include screening candidates before they are hired though the 

assessment centers, hiring baggage handlers in order to utilize baggage

Few Areas 	 screeners more efficiently, and promoting screener supervisors from 

within rather than hiring them directly from the assessment center. These 

practices have enabled the private screening contractors to achieve 

efficiencies that are not currently available to FSDs at airports with federal 

screeners. 

Contractors Have Greater 

Role than FSDs in 

Screener Selection Process 

Although the private screening contractors can only hire applicants who 

have been screened through the assessment center, the contractors have 

greater flexibility than FSDs at airports with federal screeners in weeding 

out candidates they deem unsuitable. For example, at one airport, 

following the applicants’ successful completion of the first assessment 

phase at the assessment center, the private screening contractor 

interviews the candidates to assess whether the company thinks they are a 

good fit for the job. Individuals whom the contractor agrees to hire are 

sent through the second phase at the assessment center and, upon 

successful completion of that assessment phase, to training. FSDs at 

airports with federal screeners have expressed the need for a role in the 

hiring process. Several FSDs told us that it is important for them or their 

Page 11 GAO-04-505T 
staff to participate in the hiring process to both build a rapport with the 

screeners early in the process and to determine whether the screener 

candidates would be a good fit for their airport, thereby possibly reducing 

the high levels of attrition. TSA officials told us that they are planning to 

redesign and streamline TSA’s hiring process, particularly the assessment 

center process, to allow for greater involvement by FSDs and their staff. 

Specifically, officials reported that they are beginning to (1) ensure that 

the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in recruiting planning, including 

obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor recruits; (2) allow 

FSDs to participate with TSA’s hiring contractor in the structured 

interview of the candidates; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear in the 

candidates and provide organizational briefings on their first day of 

orientation. 

TSA Allowed Contractor to 

Hire Baggage Handlers 

TSA has also allowed a private screening contractor to hire baggage 

handlers to enhance checked baggage screening operations. The 

contractor uses baggage handlers instead of trained baggage screeners to 

move checked baggage to and from the explosive detection system or 

explosive trace detection equipment and onward through the baggage 

system. While the baggage handlers still count toward the full-time 

equivalent authorized staffing level established by TSA for that individual 

airport, both TSA and the contractor report that this flexibility has 

provided a means to reduce costs without diminishing security by allowing 

trained baggage screeners to devote a greater proportion of time to 

screening bags. The contractor officials also told us that while they were 

operating below their authorized staffing levels, they were still able to 

effectively operate screening checkpoints due in part to their use of 

baggage handlers.

22 TSA has not provided FSDs with the authority to hire 

baggage handlers, and thus, FSDs at airports with federal screeners where 

baggage handlers would be useful are more limited in their ability to 

efficiently maximize staffing resources. 

22The same contractor also has a system in place to continuously monitor lines at 

checkpoints and check-in counters in order to deploy resources where they are most 

needed. This system, which uses security cameras at an airport operations center that was 

already in place at the airport, is used to determine if and where screeners should be 

redeployed. The monitoring system has also contributed to the contractor’s ability to 

effectively operate below its authorized staffing level. TSA officials told us that any FSD 

could work with an airport that has such an operations center in place to implement this 

effort. 

Page 12 GAO-04-505T 
This contractor is working with a local university to set up a program 

where college students working as baggage handlers would earn a regular 

hourly wage and tuition reimbursements in lieu of benefits. Officials at this 

company told us that the use of baggage handlers would provide relief to 

current full-time screeners by relieving them of time spent carrying bags to 

and from checked baggage screening systems and enable them to focus 

more on screening functions. While this proposal has yet to be 

implemented, it demonstrates how private screening contractors might 

use their flexibility to recruit employees. In contrast, TSA officials told us 

that the agency has not established a tuition reimbursement program for 

federal screeners. 

Selecting Screener 

Supervisors from Within 

Little Information 

Exists to Measure 

Differences in 

Performance of 

Private and Federal 

Screeners 

TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense in 

detecting threat objects. During the initial hiring of screeners, TSA’s hiring 

contractor selected screener supervisors for both the airports with federal 

and private screeners. However, one of the private screening contractors 

did not hire screener supervisors directly through TSA’s assessment center 

process, but instead hired all applicants as screeners and, after monitoring 

their performance, promoted screeners to the supervisor position. Thus, 

rather than accepting the decisions of TSA’s hiring contractor regarding 

applicants who would be suitable supervisors, it determined which 

screeners should be made supervisors based on actual screener 

performance. This decision to promote from within gave the private 

screening contractor more decision-making authority in the staffing 

selection process. In contrast, many of the FSDs we interviewed and 

numerous FSDs who have responded to our FSD survey reported that they 

were dissatisfied with the quality of the screening supervisors initially 

assigned to the airport. FSDs have attempted to address this performance 

gap by conducting subsequent promotions based on their observations of 

screeners’ ability to effectively supervise staff. 

Little performance data are currently available to compare the 

performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat 

objects. The primary source of performance data currently available is the 

results of the covert tests performed by TSA’s OIAPR, in which TSA 

undercover agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening 

checkpoints and in checked baggage. However, relatively limited testing 

has been conducted to date. Although the results of the covert testing 

cannot be generalized either to the airports in which the tests have been 

conducted or to airports nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener 

performance in detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in 

Page 13 GAO-04-505T 
general, private and federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, 

the covert testing identified weaknesses in the ability of both private and 

federal screeners to detect threat objects. TSA is in the process of 

collecting and analyzing additional performance data on screener 

performance, including data from the Threat Image Projection (TIP) 

system, which places images of threat objects on the x-ray screen during 

actual operations and records whether screeners identify threat objects, 

and the annual screener recertification program. TSA has recognized the 

need to enhance screener performance and has taken steps in this 

direction, including enhancing its recurrent training program. 

TSA Has Enhanced Efforts 

to Measure Screener 

Performance 

Covert Testing 

TSA recognized the need to strengthen its assessment of the private and 

federal screener workforces and has taken action in this vein. Specifically, 

TSA has increased its covert testing, fully activated TIP and deployed a 

new library of 2,400 TIP images, and implemented the screener 

recertification program. However, with the exception of the covert testing 

and recent TIP data, data are not yet available to assess how well 

screeners are performing; how the performance of federal and private 

screeners compare; and what steps, if any, TSA needs to take to improve 

performance. In September 2003, TSA also hired BearingPoint, a 

consultant, to evaluate the performance of the contract screening 

program. The consultant’s report was delivered to TSA on April 9, 2004, 

but TSA has not yet publicly released the results of the study. 

TSA’s OIAPR conducts unannounced covert tests of screeners to assess 

their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved 

procedures. These tests, in which undercover OIAPR inspectors attempt to 

pass threat objects through screening checkpoints and in checked 

baggage, are designed to identify systematic problems affecting the 

performance of screeners in the areas of training, policy, and technology.23 

Currently, OIAPR’s covert test results are the primary available data 

source on screener performance in detecting threat objects. However, 

relatively limited testing has been conducted to date. Between September 

9, 2002, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted 1,164 checkpoint tests on 

passenger screeners at 127 airports and 245 tests on baggage screeners at 

23The descriptions of OIAPR’s various covert tests are classified. OIAPR designs its covert 

testing methods based, in part, on intelligence regarding the most recent threats. 

Page 14 GAO-04-505T 
119 airports.

24 Of the 1,164 checkpoint tests OIAPR conducted, 98 were 

performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 1,066 were performed at 

airports with federal screeners. Of the 245 checked baggage tests, 10 were 

performed at the 5 pilot program airports and 235 were performed at 

airports with federal screeners. Overall, these tests have shown 

weaknesses in both private and federal screeners’ ability to detect threat 

objects. While the results of OIAPR’s covert tests cannot be generalized 

either to the airports in which the tests have been conducted or to airports 

nationwide, they provide an indicator of screener performance in 

detecting threat objects. The results indicate that, in general, private and 

federal screeners performed similarly. Specifically, the testing identified 

weaknesses in the ability of both private and federal screeners to detect 

threat objects. Similar testing conducted by the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of Inspector General has also identified comparable 

screener performance weaknesses. 

OIAPR initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather 

than baggage screeners. While OIAPR began conducting covert tests of 

passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert 

tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003. Consequently, 

OIAPR has collected less data related to the performance of baggage 

screeners. OIAPR has increased the number of checkpoint and checked 

baggage tests it conducts in recent months. Additionally, TSA is 

developing protocols to help FSDs conduct their own airport level 

screening testing—a practice that TSA had previously prohibited at all 

airports, including those with private screeners. 

TIP System 	 Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting 

threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to test 

screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including 

guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened during actual 

operations. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying the threat 

image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP 

identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the 

screener’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for 

24As of February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted covert tests at 137 airports, of which 109 

included tests of both passenger and checked baggage screening. Additionally, OIAPR 

conducted repeat testing at 27 airports—2 of which were tested three times and 25 of 

which were tested twice. Of the 5 pilot program airports, 1 was tested 3 times and the 

remaining 4 were tested twice. 

Page 15 GAO-04-505T 
performance trends. TSA only recently began collecting and analyzing TIP 

data and TIP is not yet available for baggage screening.25 

TSA is not currently using TIP data as a formal indicator of screener 

performance, but instead is using TIP to identify individual screeners’ 

training needs in terms of identifying threat objects on the X-ray machine.26 

TSA recently completed deploying and activating TIP with the new library 

of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the more than 1,800 passenger screening 

lanes nationwide.27 TSA considers February 2004 to be the first full month 

of TIP reporting with the new library of 2,400 images. TSA collected these 

data in early March 2004. Officials told us that they plan to analyze at least 

3 months of data—February, March, and April 2004—to determine more 

precisely how the data can be used to measure screener performance in 

detecting threat objects and to validate what the data tells TSA about 

screener performance. Additionally, officials stated that they plan to use 

TIP as an evaluation tool once sufficient data are collected to establish 

firm performance standards. 

A third indicator of screener performance is the results of the annual 

recertification testing. ATSA requires that TSA collect performance 

information on all screeners by conducting an annual proficiency 

evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and 

standards related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet this 

requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program comprised 

of two assessment components, one of the screener’s knowledge and skills 

and the other of the screener’s performance. The knowledge and skills 

assessment program consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard 

operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical 

demonstration of skills. As part of the performance assessment, screeners 

are rated on both organizational and individual goals, such as maintaining 

Annual Recertification Program 

25TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve technical challenges 

associated with using TIP for checked baggage screening on explosives detection systems 

(EDS) and have started EDS TIP image development. On April 15, TSA issued a request for 

proposal inviting EDS vendors and other third-party vendors to submit research proposals 

to improve TIP training technology for EDS. 

26TSA officials said TIP performance information has been available to FSDs on a local 

level since full activation in January 2004. 

27TIP is not yet operational at one airport (an airport with federal screeners) due to 

construction at the screening checkpoint to prepare for its installation. However, the TIPready X-ray machines have already been procured for the airport and will be installed once 

the construction issues have been resolved. 

Page 16 GAO-04-505T 
the nation’s air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost 

attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and demonstrating the 

highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of 

satisfaction with screening services. To be certified, a screener must have 

passed all the applicable modules and have a rating of “met” or “exceeded” 

standards on their annual performance assessment. 

Screeners have completed all three modules of the knowledge and skills 

assessment program. TSA is currently analyzing the results of the fiscal 

year 2004 recertification tests and plans to report on the results of the 

certification process to TSA’s Acting Administrator in late April 2004.

28 The 

report will include the results of all three modules of the knowledge and 

skills assessment tests, the outcomes of screener performance 

assessments, and the total number of screeners terminated due to failure 

to successfully pass the recertification program.29 

TSA Efforts to Enhance 

Performance of Private 

and Federal Screeners 

In October 2003, TSA began implementing a screening performance 

improvement program for private and federal screeners. The goal of the 

program is to improve screener performance through several training and 

management initiatives, including increasing covert testing at screening 

checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing 

screener training, and strengthening supervisors’ skills through leadership 

and technical training. As part of TSA’s efforts to enhance screener 

performance, TSA requires all screeners to participate in 3 hours of 

training per week averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be 

devoted to X-ray image interpretation and the other 2 hours to screening 

techniques or reviews of standard operating procedures. TSA recently 

provided FSDs at all airports, including airports with private screeners, 

with additional training tools. Specifically, according to TSA officials, TSA 

has 

• 	 provided every airport, including the 5 pilot program airports, with at least 

one Modular Bomb Set (MBS II) kit—containing components of an 

improvised explosive device—and one weapons training kit, in part 

28Screeners certified at the end of their on-the-job training on or before June 30, 2003, must 

complete the fiscal year 2004 recertification program. All other screeners are to participate 

in the annual certification process for fiscal year 2005. 

29Based on the results of the screener recertification testing, TSA officials anticipate 

terminating less than 1 percent of the screener workforce due to failure to successfully 

pass the recertification testing. 

Page 17 GAO-04-505T 
because screeners had consistently told OIAPR inspectors that they would 

like more training with test objects similar to ones used in the tests;30 

• 	 instituted a program called “Threat in the Spotlight” that, based on 

intelligence TSA receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat 

information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past 

screening checkpoints; 

• established video training and fielded the first two videos in the series; and 

• 	 fielded an Online Learning Center—a Web based tool with 366 self-guided 

training courses available to all screening staff, including staff at the 5 

pilot program airports. 

As we reported in February 2004,31 staffing shortages and lack of highspeed connectivity32 at airport training facilities have made it difficult for 

screeners to fully utilize these programs. According to TSA officials, the 

Online Learning Center is now available via the Internet and the Intranet; 

therefore the issues of connectivity have been mitigated.33 In January 2004, 

OIAPR began to gather data on selected training initiatives and to conduct 

repeat covert testing at airports. At each of the airports OIAPR visited to 

conduct covert tests between January 5, 2004, and February 1, 2004, 

OIAPR inspectors interviewed screeners about whether they had 

participated in the training initiatives. Based on these interviews, OIAPR 

found that the training initiatives they discussed with the screeners had 

not been fully implemented at every airport. 

TSA officials said that they have begun to focus attention on airports 

where screeners performed particularly poorly on covert tests. For 

example, TSA officials said that mobile training assist teams were 

deployed in November 2003 to identify causes of poor performance at 

these airports and work with FSDs to devise and implement solutions. 

Additionally, in January 2004, OIAPR began conducting repeat covert 

30The MBS II and weapons training kits were fielded to airports to address the identified 

training gap by allowing screeners to see and feel the threat objects that they are looking 

for. These kits contain some of the test objects used by OIAPR to conduct the covert 

testing. 

31GAO-04-440T. 

32High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA’s field operations training 

sites and checkpoints. 

33TSA officials stated that the Chief Information Officer’s office is currently working with 

FSDs who have not received high-speed connectivity to identify alternative means of 

connectivity. 

Page 18 GAO-04-505T 
testing at airports to determine whether TSA’s initiatives designed to 

enhance screener performance, such as additional recurrent training, have 

in fact improved performance.34 Furthermore, FSDs are to be held 

accountable for screening performance and delivery of security. 

Specifically, annual performance assessments for all FSDs are to be tied to 

the overall performance level of their screeners as well as to their ability 

to address deficiencies quickly and adequately. 

Despite its efforts to collect screener performance data and enhance 

screener performance, TSA officials acknowledged that they had not 

established overall performance targets by which to assess whether 

screeners within and across airports are achieving a desired level of 

performance. However, TSA has made progress in establishing 

performance standards for one screening function—X-ray image 

interpretation. In March 2004, TSA established interim TIP performance 

standards and plans to finalize these standards in May 2004. TSA is 

currently considering developing performance indexes for representing 

the performance of passenger and baggage screeners. During the 

remainder of our review, we plan to continue to examine TSA’s efforts to 

measure screeners’ performance, establish performance standards, and 

assess the performance of the private screening pilot program. As part of 

this effort, we will review the results of the BearingPoint, Inc. evaluation 

of the private screening pilot program, which was provided to TSA on 

April 9, 2004. 

The private screening pilot program was not established in a way to enable 

an effective evaluation of the differences in the performance of federal and 

private screening and the reasons for those differences. In developing the 

pilot program, TSA did not develop an evaluation plan or performance 

targets by which to assess how the performance of federal and private 

screening compares. Additionally, TSA did not collect data in ways that 

would enable it to reach generalizable conclusions about the performance 

of private screeners. Further, the program was not designed to achieve its 

intended mission, as defined by TSA—to test the effectiveness of 

increased operational flexibility at the airport level that contractors may 

provide. Key operational areas, such as staffing and training have to a 

34Between January 5, 2004, and February 1, 2004, OIAPR conducted repeat testing at 15 

airports. OIAPR officials reported that they conducted repeat testing at an additional 29 

airports between February 2, 2004, and March 31, 2004. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 19 GAO-04-505T 
large extent been held constant across all airports, and therefore, are not 

within the control of the private screening contractors. Therefore, it is not 

surprising that TSA’s available screener performance data indicate little 

difference between federal or private screeners in detecting threat objects. 

It would have been informative to have an evaluation of a true pilot 

program where the private screening contractors were provided with 

operational flexibility that could assist in identifying practices that lead to 

improved screener performance and higher security at the most efficient 

cost to the taxpayer. Without data to better assess the performance of 

private screening operations and flexible practices, TSA and airport 

operators have little information on which to plan for the possible 

transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening 

contractor. We will continue our work and make recommendations for 

TSA actions, as appropriate, in a future report. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin 

at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Dave Hooper, Christopher Jones, 

Thomas Lombardi, Stuart Kaufmann, Maria Strudwick, Cady Summers, 

and Susan Zimmerman. 

Contact Information 

and 

Acknowledgements 

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(440301) Page 20 GAO-04-505T 
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