J-S33010-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DARREN CADORA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1922 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-35-CR-0000696-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 02, 2019

Darren Cadora appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence, 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, following the 

revocation of his probation. Counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to 

Anders and Santiago.

1 Upon review, we affirm Cadora’s judgment of 

sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

On July 8, 2015, Cadora pled guilty to one count of possession with 

intent to deliver (“PWID”).2 Cadora was sentenced to a five-year intermediate 

punishment program with a 90-day house-arrest sanction, and was placed in

a program in the Lackawanna County Veterans Treatment Court.3

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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a) (30). 

3 See Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/2019 at 3.
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On June 14, 2017, Cadora appeared before the trial court for a 

revocation hearing. At the hearing, Cadora admitted that he had ingested 

Percocet, despite repeatedly being told not to consume prescription 

medication without approval from his probation officer. On July 24, 2017, the 

court resentenced Cadora to 27 to 60 months’ imprisonment in a state 

correctional facility, plus two years of special probation. On August 2, 2017, 

Cadora filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the court denied 

on September 11, 2017. Cadora did not file a direct appeal. Cadora 

subsequently filed a timely pro se petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, on June 14, 2018, seeking reinstatement 

of his appellate rights, nunc pro tunc. The court appointed counsel, who filed 

an amended petition. By order dated October 31, 2018, the court reinstated 

Cadora’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. On November 20, 2018, Cadora 

filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Counsel now seeks to withdraw 

pursuant to Anders.

In order to withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: (1) petition 

the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the 

record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2) 

file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support an 

appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of 

his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief raising any additional 

points that the appellant deems worthy of review. Commonwealth v. 
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Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 786 (Pa. Super. 2001). In Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 

that in order to withdraw under Anders, counsel must also state his reasons 

for concluding his client’s appeal is frivolous. 

Instantly, counsel’s petition states that he has made an examination of 

the record and concluded the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders Brief, 

at 9. Counsel supplied Cadora with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining 

his right to proceed pro se, or with privately retained counsel, and to raise any 

other issues he believes might have merit.4 Counsel has also submitted a 

brief, setting out both issues raised by Cadora and, pursuant to the dictates 

of Santiago, explains in his petition to withdraw why he believes the appeal 

to be frivolous. See Appellee’s Brief, at 1. Thus, counsel has substantially 

complied with the requirements for withdrawal. 

Since counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements for withdrawal, 

this Court must now conduct its own review of the proceedings and render an 

independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Cadora first claims that the trial court’s sentence was not supported by 

evidence of a violation of probation. This Court has held that a court may 

revoke a probationary sentence at any time prior to its completion if the 

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4 Cadora has not submitted any additional or supplemental filings to this Court.
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defendant demonstrates to the court that he is unworthy of probation.

Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628, 630 (Pa. Super. 1980). In 

Wendowski, this Court found:

If, at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum 

period of probation, or before he has begun service of his 

probation, he should commit offenses of such nature as to 

demonstrate to the court that he is unworthy of probation and 

that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the 

ends of justice and the best interests of the public, or the 

defendant, the court could revoke or change the order of 

probation. 

Id. at 630, quoting James v. U.S., 140 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1944). See 

also Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31, 39 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Sentencing following a revocation of probation is within the discretion of 

the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion. Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law, once probation is revoked, a court may 

impose a sentence of total confinement upon any of the following conditions:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; (2) the conduct of the 

defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is 

not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority 

of court. Id., citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

In Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033 (Pa. Super. 2014), this 

Court found that “a probation violation is established whenever it is shown 

that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to have 
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been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to 

deter against future antisocial conduct.” Id. at 1041.

In the instant case, the court had sufficient reason to revoke Cadora’s 

probation. Cadora stipulated that he violated the terms of his probation.

Specifically, he tested positive for OxyContin and admitted that he consumed 

an old Percocet prescription despite being told repeatedly by his probation 

officer not to. Prior to that incident, Cadora had tested positive for opiates 

multiple times, admitted to illicitly using methadone, and was found to have 

solicited prostitutes over the internet. Accordingly, Cadora’s claim that the 

trial court’s sentence was not supported by evidence of a violation of probation 

is meritless. 

Cadora also claims that his sentence was illegal.5 This claim is patently 

meritless. Upon the revocation of probation, the court has available all 

sentencing options that were permissible at the time of the initial sentencing. 

“As long as the new sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory 

maximum when factoring in the incarcerated time already served, the 

sentence is not illegal.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1285 

(Pa. Super. 2010). The statutory maximum sentence for PWID is 180 months’

imprisonment; Cadora was sentenced to 27 to 60 months’ imprisonment. See

35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(1). Accordingly, he is entitled to no relief on this claim.

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5 Cadora does not explain why he believes his sentence was illegal. 
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Cadora also claims that his sentence was excessive. This claim raises a 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. Such a claim does not 

entitle an appellant to review as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. 

Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather, before this Court can 

address such a challenge, an appellant must comply with the following 

requirements:

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 

2011).

Here, Cadora filed a post-sentence motion to modify his sentence, filed 

a timely nunc pro tunc appeal, and included in his brief a statement of reasons 

in support of allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).6 Cadora 

having substantially complied with the procedural requirements, we must now 

determine if he has raised a substantial question for our review.

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6 Although counsel did not include Cadora’s specific claim in the Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement itself, a defective Rule 2119(f) statement does not impede 

our ability to review a discretionary aspect of a sentencing claim in the context 

of an Anders brief. See Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 

179, 184 (Pa. Super. 2016). 
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The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question 

exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Cadora asserts that his sentence was excessive, without any indication 

of how the sentence failed to conform to the norms of the process. Bald 

allegations of excessiveness do not raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 733 (Pa. Super. 2003). This 

Court finds that no substantial question exists,7 as the sentence imposed did 

not exceed the statutory maximum. 

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7 Even assuming that Cadora raised a substantial question, the sentence 

imposed reflects proper consideration of the underlying facts and 

circumstances.

The record demonstrates that the Honorable Michael J. Barrasse was wellacquainted with Cadora and his circumstances. Cadora committed at least 

five technical violations and disregarded instructions from his probation 

officer, demonstrating an inability to rehabilitate and showing a continued 

disrespect of the judicial system. As the court noted:

Just for the record, just so you’re aware, on 6/29/15 he tested 

positive for opiates; on 9/1 positive; on 6/14 he was sanctioned 

for soliciting prostitutes on the internet; on 4/7/16, again, tested 

positive; . . . and 5/9/17 he tested positive for oxy.

N.T. Sentencing, 7/24/17, at 2-8.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2019