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[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1476 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1476

 To safeguard the United States and our allies from Russian ballistic 
          and cruise missile threats, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 29, 2017

  Mr. Cardin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To safeguard the United States and our allies from Russian ballistic 
          and cruise missile threats, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering Russian Missiles Act of 
2017''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--The term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) INF Treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the Treaty between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles, signed at Washington, DC, December 8, 1987, and entered 
into force June 1, 1988.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The INF Treaty, which entered into force on June 1, 
        1988, banned the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
        from possessing ground-launched nuclear and conventional 
        missiles and launchers retaining ranges between 500 and 5,500 
        kilometers (km).
            (2) Implementation of the INF Treaty led to the 
        dismantlement of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range 
        missiles between the United States and the USSR, representing a 
        major reduction in both nuclear arsenals and evidencing key 
        efforts to safeguard the United States and its allies from 
        nuclear weapons.
            (3) Since concerns regarding a noncompliant ground-launched 
        cruise missile (GLCM) were first raised in 2008, the Russian 
        Federation has developed and tested a GLCM (currently 
        designated ``SSC-8'') that has a range violating the 
        fundamental stipulations of the INF Treaty.
            (4) In 2014, the United States labeled the Russian 
        Federation to be ``in violation'' of the INF Treaty in the 
        Department of State Report entitled, ``Adherence to and 
        Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament 
        Agreements and Commitments'', and has maintained Russia's 
        noncompliant status in each subsequent report due to the 
        development and testing of the SSC-8.
            (5) During a March 2017 hearing at the Committee on Armed 
        Services of the House of Representatives, the Vice Chairman of 
        the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva, asserted that 
        ``we believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based 
        cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the 
        Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty'' and that such a system 
        poses ``a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area 
        of responsibility.''
            (6) When examining the response options at the United 
        States disposal, the Department of Defense stated in its 2016 
        Plan for Military Response Options to Russian Federation 
        Violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
        Treaty that ``Russia's return to compliance with its 
        obligations under the INF Treaty remains the preferable 
        outcome.''
            (7) United States allies in Europe do not currently have 
        sufficient defensive articles and material to properly defend 
        against the Russian Federation's new GLCM.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) protect the United States interests and assets abroad 
        and our allies from the burgeoning threat stemming from 
        Russia's development of a new GLCM that violates the INF 
        Treaty;
            (2) promote and expand cooperation and mutual defense with 
        European and Asian allies through--
                    (A) strengthening the United States offensive 
                posture and defensive infrastructure on the European 
                continent; and
                    (B) enhancing military to military coordination 
                with key allies in Europe and Asia;
            (3) pressure the Russian Federation to abide by its 
        commitments regarding the INF Treaty and discontinue engaging 
        in hostile activities regarding its missile program by--
                    (A) diplomatically engaging the Russian Federation 
                within the Special Verification Commission;
                    (B) articulating that the Russian Federation is in 
                material breach of the INF Treaty; and
                    (C) communicating to the Russian Federation that if 
                they remain in non-compliance with the INF Treaty by 
                January 1, 2019, the United States will--
                            (i) take military actions to improve our 
                        European deterrence and defense capabilities, 
                        including the development of a conventional 
                        variant of the Long Range Stand-off system 
                        (LRSO);
                            (ii) assist United States allies in 
                        improving their air- and sea-launched 
                        conventional strike capabilities by 
                        facilitating sales of the extended-range 
                        variant of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
                        Missile (JASSM-ER) and sea-based Tomahawk 
                        cruise missile; and
                            (iii) deploy limited defenses against 
                        cruise missiles to protect key alliance assets; 
                        and
            (4) not precipitously withdraw from the INF Treaty without 
        fully consulting and coordinating with European allies.

SEC. 4. REPORTS.

    (a) Report on the Military and Security Ramifications of Russia's 
GLCM.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
        State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
        a report including the following elements:
                    (A) A description of the status of the Russian 
                Federation's new GLCM (SSC-8), its capabilities, and 
                the threat it poses to the United States' European and 
                Asian allies and assets in the region.
                    (B) An assessment of whether the United States 
                faces significant military disadvantages with the 
                introduction of the SSC-8 to the European continent.
                    (C) An assessment of gaps in the United States 
                current missile defense infrastructure in Europe and 
                what capabilities may be required to defend United 
                States and European assets against the threat posed by 
                the SSC-8.
                    (D) An assessment of capability gaps that a new 
                United States intermediate range missile, which is not 
                compliant with the INF Treaty, would address in Europe 
                and Asia.
                    (E) The timeline for fielding an INF range missile, 
                including time for research, development, and 
                deployment of the system, and the total cost for 
                development and deployment of the system.
            (2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (b) Report on Plans for Greater Missile Defense Coordination With 
Allies.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a plan 
including--
            (1) a description of how the United States will coordinate 
        with its European allies to enhance missile detection and 
        defense; and
            (2) any recommendations for additional foreign military 
        sales, financing, or international military education and 
        training to be made available to European allies for 
        strengthening missile defense capabilities.

SEC. 5. CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.

    (a) Commission Proposals.--Not later than 15 days before any 
meeting of the Special Verification Commission to discuss and resolve 
implementation and compliance issues regarding additional procedures to 
improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the President 
shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate with regard to whether the proposal, if 
adopted, would constitute an amendment to the INF Treaty requiring the 
advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 
2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
    (b) Ensuring Compliance.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary 
of State shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Member regarding 
whether the Russian Federation is in compliance with the INF Treaty, 
and if not, what steps the United States is taking to bring them back 
into compliance.

SEC. 6. RESTRICTION OF FUNDS TO LEAVE THE INF TREATY.

    (a) In General.--Except as provided under subsection (b), no funds 
may be made available or expended for any action that effects the 
withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty.
    (b) Exception.--The restriction in subsection (a) shall not apply--
            (1) after Congress has received the report required by 
        section 4(a); and
            (2) 90 days after the President certifies to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that withdrawal of the 
        United States from the INF Treaty is in the vital national 
        security interests of the United States, including the reasons 
        for such certification and an explanation of how the INF Treaty 
        would prohibit the President's intended actions.
                                 <all>
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