Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons Complex: 

An Opportunity for Arms Control 

Stephen P. Lambert 

and 

David A. Miller

INSS Occasional Paper 12 

Regional Series

April 1997 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

US Air Force Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force, the Department of Defense or the US Government. This report is 

approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited. 

********

 This paper is the result of research conducted under the auspices of an 

INSS research grant during 1996. 

******** 

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: 

Director, Institute for National Security Studies 

HQ USAFA/DFES, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5D33 

USAF Academy, CO 80840-6258 

voice: (719) 333-2717 

fax: (719) 333-2716 

email: hayspl.dfe@usafa.af.mil. 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss 
iv
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

A View From the West 3 

 Current Nuclear Policies 3 

 Nuclear Disarmament Efforts 4 

The View Toward Russia 5 

Physical and Technical Security 7 

Pre-Delegation and De-Escalation 9 

Nuclear Dependency in Conventional Contingencies 10 

Stockpile Consolidation and Stewardship Efforts 12 

Demoralized Personnel and Internal Security Problems 13 

A Possible Solution: An Air-Delivered Nuclear Forces Regime 15 

Preconditions for Engagement 18 

Multi-Phased Approach 19 

Technical Hurdles: Verification, Detection, and Numbers 23 

 Verified Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 23 

Detecting Nuclear Warheads 24 

The Original Baseline Warhead Number 25 

Political Challenges: France 26 

Legal Obstacles: The START Treaties 27 

Russian Motives and the 1991 Initiative 28 

Conclusion: An ANF Regime and Atlantic Security 31 

Endnotes 37 
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FOREWORD 

 We are pleased to publish this twelfth volume in the Occasional Paper

series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This 

monograph represents the results of research conducted during fiscal year 1996 

under the sponsorship of a grant from INSS. 

 This paper presents a novel response to the many security challenges 

posed by Russian perceptions of the continuing utility of their non-strategic 

nuclear forces and the related problem of “loose nucs” within the Russian 

Federation. The authors develop an air-delivered nuclear forces arms control 

regime and argue that eliminating this class of weapons would be one of the best 

ways to address these challenges. As the authors point out, despite its many 

benefits, such a regime would potentially face strong opposition due to its broad 

sweep, as well as issues such as the requirement for the United States to 

eliminate the airbreathing leg of the triad. Significantly, the authors bolster the 

case for the political acceptability of such a regime by uncovering evidence that 

the Soviets were considering advancing a similar proposal in 1991. However, 

the Soviet proposal was overtaken by the August 1991 coup attempt and 

President George Bush’s unilateral nuclear initiatives that September. 

Many readers will no doubt disagree with this proposal and its 

implications for the US nuclear triad. Nonetheless, the authors’ suggestions 

deserve careful scrutiny because they refocus attention on non-strategic nuclear 

forces—arguably the largest and most dangerous dimension of the post-Cold 

War nuclear overhang. In that regard, this paper serves as a logical successor to 

the discussion in INSS Occasional Paper 10 on the dangers of criminality and 

weapons proliferation in Russia. INSS is pleased to offer Lambert and Miller’s 

fresh ideas for public debate. 
viii

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division, 

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force 

(USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. Our other 

sponsors currently include: the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); OSD Net Assessment; the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; Army Space 

Command; and the On-Site Inspection Agency. INSS’ mission is to promote 

national security research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, and to support the Air Force national security education 

program. Our research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our sponsors: 

international security policy (especially arms control and counterproliferation), 

Air Force planning issues, regional security policy, conflict in the information 

age (including the revolution in military affairs and information warfare), 

environmental security, and space policy. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines 

and across services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. The 

Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic 

community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. INSS is in its fifth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We 

appreciate your continued interest in INSS and its research products. 

PETER L. HAYS, Lt Colonel, USAF 

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategic 

reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has 

increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the 

credibility of nuclear war-fighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical 

nuclear systems. There is one certainty about the state of Russian nuclear 

weapons, both strategic and non-strategic: the Russian Federation is convinced 

that, ultimately, its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore 

attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the 

military rollback. In addition, because Russian military planners appreciate the 

political deterrent value of nuclear weapons as well as their war-fighting 

applications, the military and scientific elite continues to invest in their 

operational future. Yet there seems to be substantial opportunity for security 

breaches, theft, and system compromise in the nuclear weapons complex of the 

Russian Federation today. 

 While the motives of strategic arms control advocates may be 

admirable, the notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could 

speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads, as a START III 

regime suggests, is misguided. Such an idea highlights a bias toward the apex 

of the nuclear weapons pyramid—the strategic nuclear forces—and ignores the 

thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by both states. The 

very real threat associated with Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal—possible 

operational use, loss of central control, and the theft or diversion of intact 

nuclear weapons—should impel those with genuine concerns to redirect their 

efforts toward the lower end of the nuclear weapons spectrum. Unlike strategic 

systems which have been the subject of years of negotiations, treaties, and 

transparency regimes, these tactical systems have been largely ignored by both 
x

the official as well as the activist community. However, while one can envision 

the US and Russia making further reductions to existing strategic arsenals, deep 

cuts in tactical systems would require a major redirection in current arms control 

efforts. 

The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporates a 

regime that would address this much larger and potentially more dangerous 

class of weapons. A regime calling for the elimination of air-delivered tactical 

nuclear weapons may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled 

process of nuclear arms reductions, while simultaneously promoting US, 

European, and Russian national security interests. Because this would create a 

global ban on air delivered nuclear weapons, it would also eliminate one leg of 

the US strategic nuclear triad, and American bombers could convert to a strictly 

conventional role. This proposal, while controversial, is not strictly original; 

indeed, the Soviet Union had a similar proposal ready for delivery to the United 

States in 1991, but the effort was overtaken by President Bush’s unilateral 

tactical nuclear reductions that fall. The authors here present details from that 

Soviet proposal for the first time. 

There are many good reasons why the United States should move 

toward a smaller nuclear force posture. This means reducing nuclear weapons 

in general, and Russian air-delivered nuclear weapons in particular. It is in the 

security interests of the democracies of Europe and North America to address 

concerns regarding the nuclear weapons program of the Russian Federation. 

While US nonstrategic nuclear forces still have a role in Europe today, their 

perceived value and utility are gradually fading, at least in the eyes of some 

observers. In fact, their final utility may be their role as bargaining chips to 

induce the Russian Federation to eliminate entirely this category of weapons. 
11
12

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

Major General Thomas H. Neary 

Director, Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

Colonel Todd A. Bodenhamer 

Chief, National Security Policy Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays 

Director 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Editor 

Major Timothy J. Krein, USAFR 

Editor 

Ms Marsha Taylor 

Cover Design 
13

INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security 

Dilemma. Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994 

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic 

Challenge? Oleg Strekal, November 1994 

3. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s 

Response. William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995 

4. Environmental Assistance as National Security Policy: Helping the 

Former Soviet Union Find Solutions to its Environmental Problems. 

Robert L. Dunaway, November 1995 

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Kevin F. Donovan, 

December 1995 

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? William H. Kincade, 

December 1995

7. Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized 

Programs. Rosalind R. Reynolds, January 1996

8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of 

Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials. Guy B. Roberts, February 

1996

9. The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare. 

Richard W. Aldrich, April 1996 

10. Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian 

Military and Security Force Dimension. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., June 

1996 

11. Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of 

Civil-Military Relations in the United States. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 

October 1996 
1

Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: 

An Opportunity for Arms Control 

The problems of victory are more agreeable than the 

problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult. 

 — Winston Churchill 

 The United States and Europe are at a crossroads. Despite the apparent 

reduction in East-West tensions brought about by the collapse of the Soviet 

Empire, the strategic calculus of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries 

remains unclear. Traditional Cold War arms control efforts between the United 

States and the former Soviet Union are at an impasse, in large part due to Russia’s 

determined resistance to the planned enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance. The 

March 1997 Helsinki Clinton-Yeltsin summit symbolized, to a large degree, the 

ambivalence in nuclear arms control. Both sides opted to focus their discussions 

on further reductions in their strategic arsenals, characterizing their initiatives to 

“slash strategic nuclear missiles to a ceiling of 2,500 warheads each by [the year] 

2007” as grand and far-reaching. Meanwhile, Russia threatens to abrogate its 

1991 unilateral initiative to withdraw all, and destroy most of, its tactical nuclear 

arsenal. In essence, both countries have resorted to a stale and safe approach, 

discussing strategic reductions while steadfastly avoiding the looming problems 

presented by Russia’s crumbling nuclear weapons complex as a whole—

specifically the troubling developments in its extensive tactical nuclear arsenal. 

 However, perpetual avoidance of the real problems within Russia’s 

tactical nuclear arsenal is not limited to government officials. In a public 

statement released on December 4th, 1996, two retired US military officers, 

General Lee Butler, former commander of US strategic nuclear forces, and 

General Andrew Goodpastor, former commander of NATO forces in Europe, 

called for the United States and the Russian Federation to take concrete steps 
2

toward the global abolition of nuclear weapons. In a surprising turn of events, 

General Butler expressed his apparently new-found belief that “nuclear weapons 

have no defensible role...[and] that broader consequences of their employment 

transcend any military utility.”1

 The following day, a group of 61 retired generals 

and admirals from 17 countries joined in issuing a statement calling for: 

• significant cuts in current nuclear stockpiles by all nations 

that currently possess nuclear weapons; 

• the removal of nuclear weapons from alert postures and 

substantial reductions in their readiness; 

• a long-term international policy “based on the principle of 

continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of 

nuclear weapons.2

Among this group’s recommendations was a call for the United States and Russia 

to continue the START process, and, as soon as practicable, to “cut down to 1000 

to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower.”3

 In the judgment of these former 

military officers, such a move could be taken quickly and without any reduction 

in the military security of either the US or Russia. 

 While the motives of this group may be admirable, the notion that the 

two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could speedily draw down their 

arsenals to under 2000 warheads is misguided. Such an idea highlights a bias 

toward the apex of the nuclear weapons pyramid—the strategic nuclear forces—

and ignores the thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by 

both states. The very real threats associated with Russia’s tactical nuclear 

arsenal—possible operational use, loss of central control, and the theft or 

diversion of intact nuclear weapons—should impel those with genuine concerns 

to redirect their efforts toward the lower end of the nuclear weapons spectrum. 

Unlike strategic systems which have been the subject of years of negotiations, 

treaties, and transparency regimes, these tactical systems have been largely 

ignored by both the official as well as the activist community.4

 However, while 

one could envision the US and Russia making further reductions to existing 
3

strategic arsenals, deep cuts in tactical systems would require a major redirection 

in current arms control efforts. 

 Regardless of how daunting such a task may seem, grave doctrinal as 

well as safety and security concerns regarding Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal 

make it imperative that steps finally be taken toward real, verifiable cuts in 

tactical warheads. This proposal incorporates an arms control regime that would 

address this much larger and potentially more dangerous class of weapons. A 

regime calling for the elimination of air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons, which 

we propose, may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled process 

of nuclear arms reductions, while simultaneously promoting US, European, and 

Russian national security interests. 

A View from the West 

Current Nuclear Policies. The present US administration openly 

reaffirmed a reduced, but nonetheless robust, nuclear posture in the 1994 Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR).5

 Since then, however, US policy makers have largely 

avoided public discussions involving nuclear weapons. In the United States as 

well as most NATO European countries, officials have eschewed nuclear 

weapons issues out of concern that acrimonious debates could result from public 

discussion of nuclear weapons or deterrence as a whole. Additionally, as a 

consequence of the end of the Cold War and efforts to build new political 

relationships with former adversaries, what had been the Alliance’s primary 

function—collective (nuclear) defense—is being de-emphasized. NATO’s 

nuclear weapons are increasingly portrayed as serving “all azimuths” functions, 

yet their enduring relevance is not as clear as during the Cold War. Instead of 

emphasizing the Article 5 commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty6

, NATO is 

moving toward a strategy of selective engagement, whereby Alliance members 

will opt in or out of future operations (e.g., peacekeeping and humanitarian relief) 
4

based on their own national interests. In some ways this may seem inevitable as 

the Alliance adapts to the new international environment. 

Nuclear Disarmament Efforts. Traditionally, Western attention on 

nuclear disarmament has focused primarily on intercontinental, strategic weapons. 

This focus stems, at least in part, from a long-term trend in arms control policy. 

The United States, which has been beyond the immediate reach of Soviet and 

Russian tactical nuclear weapons, has historically sought to gain limitations and 

reductions in Russian strategic systems. However, as nuclear expert Bruce Blair 

explains, “the risk [of nuclear employment] is being unintentionally driven up by 

a deep-seated bias in US arms control strategy. The American obsession with 

Soviet counterforce capabilities resulted in the reduction of the forces that 

happened to have the strongest safeguards (the silo-based missiles) and in greater 

Russian reliance on weapons with relatively weak safeguards,” especially airdelivered, theater-based nuclear weapons.7

 

 Ironically, as politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of 

strategic reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has 

increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the 

credibility of nuclear warfighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear 

systems. Most would agree that while all-out strategic nuclear war is unlikely to 

occur, the employment of theater or tactical nuclear weapons is a much more 

plausible and, according to some (especially in Russia), legitimate solution to 

certain military dilemmas. Ivo Daalder addresses the heart of the problem when 

he writes that an arms control focus on long-range, land-based missiles eventually 

created a new gray area problem concerning nuclear weapons systems, because 

air- and sea-based theater or tactical nuclear weapons were excluded from prior 

negotiations.8

 In a recent demonstration of this continual strategic focus, at the 

March 1997 Helsinki summit President Clinton attempted to jump-start the arms 

control process with “START III,” proposing further Russian and American 
5

reductions to 2000-2500 strategic warheads by the year 2007.9

 Nevertheless, 

experts agree that nuclear arms control will remain stalled as the Russian Duma 

continues to hold START II hostage to the anticipated enlargement of the Western 

Alliance. 

The View Toward Russia: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issues 

and Problems 

 The Russian Federation continues to place great value on nuclear 

weapons both in terms of their war-fighting potential as well as political weapons 

for strategic deterrence. Russian national security planners see their country 

surrounded by significant risks in a political atmosphere of ambiguity and fluidity. 

Moscow therefore will continue to anchor its national security in nuclear weapons 

as the ultimate guarantee of Russia’s survival. Russian military doctrine 

prescribes a strong role for nuclear deterrence and affirms its value in the world 

today. As Konstantin Sorokin, an expert on these matters states, this “official 

position in support of Russia’s maintaining its nuclear status is unlikely to change 

much with time, whatever the internal political shifts.” Russia presently views 

itself as being in a transitional period and therefore must avoid “irrevocable 

marginalization in the world community.”10 Nuclear weapons help Russia avoid 

marginalization because they recall Russia’s former superpower status and convey 

a much stronger “hands-off” message than do conventional weapons. 

 Tactical nuclear weapons occupy a noteworthy position within Russia’s 

nuclear posture. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union widely deployed and 

dispersed its tactical nuclear weapons in order to guard against preemptive strikes 

and to ensure their survival in the event of hostilities. This operational philosophy 

was complemented by a high level of pre-delegation with respect to launch 

authority and local weapons control. In essence, the Soviet tactical nuclear 

weapons posture reflected a nuclear-warfighting doctrine. The likelihood of their 

employment during war was quite high. Today these weapons remain an integral 
6

part of the Russian arsenal, and the Soviet employment doctrine remains in place. 

In the event of a crisis or hostilities, tactical nuclear weapons are probably the 

least-controlled element of the Russian nuclear arsenal—and the ones most likely 

to be employed. 

 Disturbingly, the security management of these weapons does not meet 

NATO standards. Indeed, a recently leaked CIA analysis entitled “Prospects for 

Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons” reportedly concluded that the 

“Russian nuclear command and control system is being subjected to stresses it 

was not designed to withstand as a result of wrenching social change, economic 

hardship, and malaise within the armed forces.”11 According to published 

accounts of the report, Russian controls over tactical nuclear arms are poor. The 

report placed these weapons in the highest risk category for unsanctioned use or 

sabotage. It is widely recognized that the Russian nuclear weapons and fissile 

materials infrastructure has been under unprecedented stress since the collapse of 

the Soviet Union.12 In this regard, the threat of proliferation or leakage from 

tactical nuclear weapons is particularly acute. Major General Belous, the head of 

the Military Policy Section of the Center for Scientific Research in Moscow, 

points out that “tactical nuclear weapons are especially vulnerable due to the fact 

that they are numerous, relatively compact, and widely distributed.”13 

 In general terms, a modern and capable nuclear safeguard system 

consists of four basic and important elements. A physical protection program is 

designed to deter and repel the forcible intrusion into nuclear facilities. A 

material control and accountancy system is designed to protect nuclear weapons 

from removal by insiders as well as to monitor movement of warheads and control 

inventories. A human reliability program ensures that those personnel that have 

access to facilities are properly vetted and controlled. Finally, an integrated 

national system includes a centralized support system with regulatory oversight 

and a national computerized data base used for tracking purposes.14 The Russian 

nuclear infrastructure suffers deficiencies in all of these categories. The threat of 
7

operational use, loss of control, or leakage of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia is 

multi-faceted and can be divided into five general areas: 

• Physical and technical security 

• The doctrine of pre-delegation 

• Nuclear dependency in the face of certain military 

contingencies 

• Stockpile consolidation and stewardship efforts 

• Personnel and internal security problems 

Physical and Technical Security. Normally tactical weapons are kept 

in specially designed storage depots separate from their delivery systems.15 

According to Russian expert Oleg Bukharin, “The depots, usually underground 

bunkers, are located inside heavily guarded exclusion areas, surrounded by 

several layers of engineering barriers and equipped with access control 

systems.”16 While these physical security methods seem to be quite normal, it is 

not readily apparent how they were designed to operate. The Soviet weapons 

security system was intended to thwart an attack by NATO’s special operations 

forces on the eve of a Third World War. The system relied mostly on the strength 

of the physical barriers (guard fences, barbed wire, etc.). Today, as in the past, 

Russian tactical nuclear weapons facilities make minimal use of electronic 

protection and surveillance systems.17 In other words, the security system is 

oriented toward external attack and is based on the strength of the protecting force 

and the robustness of the physical barriers in place. As one expert explains, 

“under these circumstances, [and without the presence of an electronic monitoring 

and accountability system] a principal risk of diversion is a corrupted insider (or 

group of insiders) in the security force.”18 In his testimony before the US Senate 

on March 20, 1996, John Deutch, then Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, indicated that “a knowledgeable Russian has told us that, in his opinion, 

accounting procedures are so inadequate that an officer with access could remove 

a warhead, replace it with a readily available training dummy, and authorities 
8

might not discover the switch for as long as six months.”19

 The size and relative simplicity of tactical nuclear weapons make them 

easier to use, as well. Bukharin points out that, “tactical weapons...are easy to 

hide and transport and, under certain circumstances, are directly usable. Indeed, 

although tactical weapons are protected by mechanical locks and special 

equipment is required to use them, a state, or even a group of terrorists, can 

overcome such difficulties given time and resources.”20 Experts familiar with 

Russian locks on tactical systems indicate that the technical safeguards found on 

gravity bombs and cruise missiles deployed with Russian bomber divisions are 

the weakest. Locks on the gravity bombs are not sophisticated, and cruise 

missiles lack adequate technical protection to inhibit unauthorized use. In fact, 

Russian sources indicate that a captured cruise missile armed with a nuclear 

warhead could readily be launched from a variety of aircraft and would produce a 

nuclear detonation.21

 Indeed, an acknowledged expert in Russian nuclear weapons control 

indicates that the blocking devices are really “just gimmicks designed to buy 

time.” In all probability, the Russian ministries in charge of nuclear weapons are 

still relying on old Soviet security methods. According to Bruce Blair, “in the 

event of a serious breach of safeguards in the field, the Russian military 

establishment would need to promptly dispatch personnel to suppress the 

disobedience and restore physical control.” Moreover, “if social and political 

circumstances weaken the cohesion of the military, then its ability to deal with 

such violations would obviously be diminished.”22 As a matter of comparison, 

the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review in the United States mandated that all US 

nuclear weapons have Permissive Action Links (PALs) installed on them by 

1996.23 Essentially, this meant that even if an intruder was able to breach the 

physical and electronic security of a US nuclear facility, the weapon would either 

disable itself or not function. In Russia this level of protection is limited to 

Russian strategic systems. Western estimates indicate that only about 45 percent 
9

to 65 percent of Russian systems are equipped with PALs and that Russian 

tactical weapons lack this type of modern security feature.24

Pre-Delegation and the Doctrine of De-Escalation. One of the 

concerns cited by officials involved in nuclear weapons control issues relates to 

the doctrine of pre-delegation. This policy has its roots in Cold War-era Soviet 

weapons control strategies and is tied to long-standing Soviet practices of 

maintaining vast and dispersed nuclear forces in launch-ready configuration.25 

The danger involved with maintaining this type of rapid reaction posture is that 

nuclear missiles could very well be fired on the basis of a false warning. And as 

Blair indicates, “the breakup of the former Soviet Union increased this risk by 

politically dismembering the missile attack early-warning network.”26

 Even though Russia still operates under a launch-on-warning concept,27

the control mechanisms for its strategic systems are relatively secure. The 

operational philosophy of pre-delegation nonetheless extends to Russia’s tactical

weapons. In order to increase the survivability of the tactical nuclear systems 

(which are more widely dispersed and suffer from a shortage of communications 

links), launch authorization codes are pre-delegated to local commanders during 

times of increased tension. Thus, the potential for local use is significantly 

increased during times of conflict. 

 To compensate for Russia’s current conventional weakness, Russian 

strategists have explicitly sought to “extend the threshold for escalation 

downward,”28 thereby increasing the likelihood of tactical nuclear release in the 

face of hostilities. Thus there are two distinct concepts at work: (1) the procedure 

of pre-delegating the launch codes; and (2) the operational doctrine of lowering 

the nuclear threshold. These trends are corroborated by interviews with Russian 

officials familiar with nuclear weapons strategies. Dr. Nikolai Sokov, an expert 

on the Soviet delegation to START I as well as other US-Soviet summit meetings, 

affirms that with such a doctrine in place, one “cannot rule out that a local 
10

commander could individually take the authority to launch a weapon.” 29 

 The assumption that the Russian weapons control system is more stable 

during peace-time is also suspect. Due to the lack of technical safeguards, 

especially on air-delivered weapons (cruise missiles and gravity bombs), 

individual attempts to acquire these weapons even during times of peace are 

possible. Moreover, the lack of adequate locking mechanisms on these weapons 

would then make them deliverable, with a full nuclear yield, even without launch 

authorization. 

 Media attention has been overwhelmingly dedicated to the apex of the 

control system; this focus seems to be at least partially misplaced. While it is 

largely true that the absence of a stable political system and the reliance on a 

control system with the potential for sudden shifts in allegiances could cause a 

breakdown of control, the most important dangers of misuse of Russia’s nuclear 

weapons are not to be found at the apex, but at the lower echelons of the 

command system. The Russian practice of pre-delegation carries with it the 

dangers of a premature weapons release or the employment of a nuclear weapon 

because of the judgment of a local military commander. 

Nuclear Dependency in the Face of Conventional Contingencies. 

Concerns regarding Russia’s nuclear policies have been deepened by Russia’s 

increasing reliance on its nuclear forces in the face of dramatically reduced 

conventional force quality and readiness. Igor Khripunov, a former Soviet 

diplomat and expert on security affairs, recently noted that some Russian military 

analysts “make a strong case for maintaining and improving nuclear weapons, airbased weapons in particular, without which Russia cannot adequately protect its 

security in the current geostrategic situation.”30 It seems to be clear that “the 

demise of the Red Army that formerly protected Russia shifted the burden of 

security onto nuclear forces. Russia’s new military doctrine abandons its former 

pledge of no-first-use of nuclear arms, and widens the conditions under which it 
11

might use them. By increasing its reliance on these weapons, Russia also 

magnifies the significance of its nuclear strategy.”31 

 In order to operationalize this new reliance on nuclear weapons, Russian 

officials have chosen to emphasize the value and role of tactical nuclear weapons. 

They understand that posturing with strategic nuclear systems is practically 

useless, since they perceive there is a very basic state of strategic equilibrium 

between the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, the solution to making 

the nuclear threat more credible is to articulate a greater role for tactical nuclear 

weapons since these weapons are viewed as “warfighting weapons.” In fact, there 

has been evidence that some Russian officials have not ruled out redeploying 

tactical nuclear weapons in forward locations (such as land-based systems in 

Belarus and Kaliningrad and sea-based systems on the ships of the Baltic fleet).32 

Sergei Kortunov, a member of the Russian security council and the deputy 

director of the Analytic Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, 

recently warned that in the face of a mounting unfavorable balance in the 

correlation of forces, Russia might resolve to re-evaluate the 1991 unilateral 

tactical nuclear weapons initiatives.33 Other Russian officials have also alluded to 

potential initiatives regarding tactical nuclear systems. Major General Belous has 

stated that “there is no doubt that in the present geopolitical situation a number of 

Russian TNW [theater nuclear weapons], particularly air-based ones, should be 

retained....” Belous regards tactical nuclear weapons as “the equalizer which 

would deprive NATO of its new-found military superiority.” He mentions the 

possibility that Russia may choose to “carry out a ‘demonstration’ TNW 

detonation to prove to an aggressor our resolve to use nuclear weapons,” and 

concludes that, “faced with an economic crisis and a rather modest ability to equip 

its army and navy, for the foreseeable future Russia will be forced to rely on 

nuclear weapons to ensure its security.”34 

Stockpile Consolidation and Stewardship Efforts. Following 
12

President Gorbachev’s unilateral weapons reduction initiatives in October 1991, 

the Soviet Union initiated a long-term consolidation and dismantlement program, 

engaging the entire spectrum of its nuclear weapons arsenal. While these efforts 

have, to some degree, reduced the concern about the security of Russian nuclear 

weapons, they have also, for the foreseeable future, increased the danger. 

 When the Soviet Union first initiated the process of weapons 

consolidation (mainly out of fear of the loss of control as the USSR was 

collapsing), tactical nuclear weapons were broadly dispersed across the empire. 

In fact, they were “scattered throughout at least nine or ten republics; were kept in 

hundreds of storage sites, a large number of which were adjacent to the 

operational forces that would use the weapons in the event of a conflict, came in a 

substantially wide variety of models; and not all varieties possessed safeguards.”35 

Furthermore, the weapons were deployed among four different military 

organizations (the Red Army, the Soviet Navy, the air defense forces, and the air 

force); the Russian military owned nearly 15,000 tactical weapons, of which 

almost 6,500 were deployed outside of the Russian republic; and the system was 

not prepared for the rapid saturation that it experienced.36 

 Much to the credit of the General Staff and the Ministry of the Defense, 

the weapons were withdrawn from outlying regions rapidly—although not always 

under the safest of circumstances. Once consolidation efforts were underway, it 

rapidly became apparent that the Russian nuclear weapons storage and 

stewardship capacity was under serious stress, and was unable to handle safely the 

large number of weapons which were being withdrawn to the Russian Federation. 

Oleg Bukharin explains that, “although Russia is used to high rates of 

dismantlement, what is new is the mass relocation of tactical warheads from frontline units to central staging bases and assembly plants, unplanned increases in 

storage requirements for warheads and weapons components, economic crises, 

and...the deteriorating security environment that may compromise safety and 

security.”37
13

 Credible studies reveal that storage capacities have been sharply 

reduced.38 Before the collapse in 1991, the Soviet armed forces and the Ministry 

of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had approximately ninety storage sites for 

nuclear weapons; forty-three of them were situated beyond the borders of the 

Russian Federation. In addition, three more army missile technical bases were 

evacuated from the North Caucasus military district after instability and 

turbulence broke out in that area. Consequently, the Russian Federation now 

operates only 38 storage facilities, three of them located at disassembly and 

refurbishment plants. According to knowledgeable experts, Russian nuclear 

weapons storage sites are currently operating at 167 percent capacity.39 Security 

and safety measures are likely to suffer under such levels of overloading and 

stress on Russia’s nuclear weapons management system. 

 While some Western officials have alleged that MINATOM has 

refabricated some of the weapons grade material into new warheads, this is 

difficult to prove or verify. However, it is well known that MINATOM and the 

Ministry of Defense have taken advantage of the unilateral initiatives and the 

consolidation process to rid themselves of old and obsolete weapons and 

warheads.40 While the view that the Russians are dismantling between 2000 and 

3000 warheads per year has been widely circulated,41 this should be placed in 

perspective: (1) many of these weapons were scheduled for dismantlement 

anyway; (2) the actual dismantlement process is unverified and unobserved; (3) 

one cannot be sure that new warheads are not being designed and built; and (4) no 

mechanism exists to encourage accountability for the highly enriched uranium 

and plutonium that are obtained through the dismantlement process. 

Demoralized Personnel and Internal Security Problems. Although 

problems related to nuclear weapons storage, transportation, dismantlement, and 

refurbishment are severe, the potential impact from a fissured society and a 

disgruntled military is potentially even worse. In this sense, the overwhelming 
14

concern is that the Russian government, weakened as it is, no longer effectively 

controls its territory and its people. In the Soviet Union, the nuclear establishment 

had no need for extensive and technologically advanced barriers at its weapons 

storage facilities because of the government’s rigid internal controls. “‘Back in 

the old days,” an official recently explained, “the lack of physical safeguards did 

not matter. Even if someone had shot off a lock [and seized military goods], the 

government would send the KGB after them. The basic assumption was that 

physical security was backed up by overall control [of society].”42 The Soviet 

Union was never forced to develop a robust materials control and accountability 

system because “it had a pervasive central system regulating the movements of its 

citizens and monitoring suspicious activities.”43

 Recently, several disturbing incidents involving nuclear weapons in the 

Russian Federation have been reported. “In one highly celebrated instance, 

inspectors from the Russian Ministry of Defense found a battery of nuclear-armed 

SS-25 mobile missiles completely deserted—all the operators and guards having 

left to search for food.”44 In another incident, an enlisted man at an ICBM base in 

the Altai region went berserk in March 1994, killing two soldiers and seriously 

wounding another two. The local Strategic Rocket Forces commander initially 

tried to cover up the incident, but it leaked to the regional and then the national 

press. In a different case, a navy enlisted man took several sailors hostage onboard a Russian torpedo boat. Three of the hostages were killed before the 

attacker was subdued.45 As John Lepingwell points out, “these dramatic incidents 

suggest that if crazed troops can create mayhem in high-security facilities, rather 

more sane criminals could perhaps wreak even more havoc.”46

 Taken as a whole, there seems to be substantial opportunity for security 

breaches, theft, and system compromise in the nuclear weapons complex of the 

Russian Federation today. In addition, there is one certainty about the state of 

Russian nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, as well as the military 

personnel that operate these systems: the Russian Federation is convinced that, 
15

ultimately, its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attempted to 

shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the military 

rollback. In addition, because the Russian military planners not only appreciate 

the political deterrent value of nuclear weapons, but also have always been 

intrigued by their war-fighting applications, the Russian military and scientific 

elite continues to invest in their operational future. 

A Possible Solution: An Air-Delivered Nuclear Forces Regime 

 In September 1994, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch chose to 

emphasize that “non-strategic nuclear forces remain one of the central problems 

we will be facing in managing our nuclear relationships during the coming years.” 

He went on to hint at a means to address the problem, saying that “not every 

initiative with the Russians has to be in the context of a post-START strategic 

nuclear agreement. There could be another kind of agreement which has to do 

with security of forces, including their controllability, which we think is so 

important; improving the pace at which they dismantle their nuclear weapons; it 

could have to do with non-strategic nuclear weapons.”47 

The following regime presents a potential solution to the challenges 

created by non-strategic nuclear weapons. It posits an arms control regime 

beyond START I, START II, or even START III, based on the principles of 

reciprocity and transparency and on the control of weapons and warheads (instead 

of delivery systems). The emphasis on reciprocity and transparency is deliberate. 

An air-delivered nuclear forces (ANF) regime could only function in an 

environment where both sides could verify, to a high degree of certainty, that the 

other side was in compliance with the stated regime. This type of environment 

requires transparency—in other words, a new and heretofore unknown level of 

openness in mutual verification and inspection. This is likely to be a thorny issue, 

especially given the history of Russian hedging in this area. 

 The necessity for a new arms control initiative addressing this gray area 
16

is made even more urgent by: (1) the nature and extent of Russia’s nuclear 

dilemmas, (2) the threat of premature nuclear use to save Russian conventional 

forces in a desperate position, (3) increasing concerns regarding the long-term 

threat of nuclear proliferation, (4) the efforts of NATO and the United States to 

raise the nuclear threshold, and (5) the unique and unprecedented alignment of 

geo-strategic forces in Eurasia. This is not to say that arms control and 

disarmament initiatives are a panacea capable of reliably providing regional and 

global security and stability in all circumstances. Arms control cannot exist 

outside the bounds of national security policy. Arms control and disarmament 

regimes are inherently political and involve wide-ranging efforts to create 

multilateral stability and transparency. They are “elements of national security 

policy [by] which nations seek to regulate their respective military forces through 

mutual agreement,” but simultaneously, the political context surrounding arms 

control is not an agenda to be created, but an environment to be managed.48 As 

Hedley Bull once noted, “it is a gross error, yet not an uncommon one, to believe 

that the military relations of nations exist in one compartment and their political 

relations in another, and that opposite tendencies can prevail in each 

compartment.”49 

 Arms control for arms control’s sake is therefore a misguided notion. 

“The effectiveness of arms control, like national military strategy, must be judged 

according to whether it increases security.”50 Furthermore, any agreements must 

shore up the long-term security of all participants involved. In the words of 

President Ronald Reagan, “we must seek agreements which are verifiable, 

equitable, and militarily significant. Agreements that provide only the appearance 

of arms control breed dangerous illusions.”51

 The ANF regime proposes a global limit on air-delivered nuclear 

weapons—that is, any nuclear weapon delivered by any type of aircraft (the limit 

is on the weapons themselves, not the delivery systems). The focus is on airdelivered nuclear weapons because these systems, traditionally classified as 
17

“tactical,” “non-strategic” or “theater” weapons, actually can be seen as 

“strategic” or “pre-strategic” systems. In this sense, a gravity bomb or cruise 

missile that is delivered from a bomber or fighter-bomber from thousands of miles 

away (with limited warning) is a more offensive, deep-strike weapon than, for 

example, a lower yield nuclear shell fired from an artillery piece. The regime 

would engage the Russian Federation and the two NATO countries that are 

expected to retain air-delivered nuclear weapons—the United States and France. 

In general, it proposes to reduce and canton all weapons in declared sites. In 

subsequent stages, the numbers of weapons at each of the sites would be further 

reduced, and eventually all these air-deliverable weapons would be destroyed in 

mutually monitored facilities. 

 At this point, one may be tempted to ask—if tactical nuclear weapons are 

so dangerous, why limit only air-delivered weapons? The logic behind the 

narrow focus is two-pronged. First, air-delivered weapons are patently more 

offensive than any other type of tactical nuclear weapon. The other types—land 

mines, torpedoes, surface-to-air missiles, short-range missiles, and artillery 

rounds—are either purely defensive or of only limited offensive capability. Air 

delivered weapons combined with modern fighter or bomber aircraft and airrefueling abilities equate to a nearly unlimited range, providing the user country 

with a high-yield weapon that could strike from thousands of miles away deep 

into the heartland of the targeted country. Additionally, while not allencompassing, an ANF regime represents an important first attempt at reducing an 

enormous category of weapons (engaging both sides in a more substantial 

arrangement than the 1991 unilateral and unverified pledges). Lessons learned in 

the process of dealing with air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons could be 

applied during future attempts to address the remaining weapons in this category. 

Preconditions for Engagement. While an in-depth discussion of the 

relative merits of specific proposals is beyond the scope of this article, it would be 
18

unwise not to acknowledge that before any fresh initiatives can go forward, all 

sides need to reach conclusions about several relevant and, in some cases, 

controversial policy issues. These include, but are not limited to, START I and II, 

a fissile materials cutoff agreement, and the development of significant 

transparency initiatives. 

 Although the ratification and full implementation of START II is 

probably not required for an ANF regime to be pursued, these developments 

would certainly be conducive to the overall acceptance of nuclear arms control 

within domestic political circles. Furthermore, it would make little sense to 

carefully limit and dispose of the excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and 

plutonium (Pu) resulting from dismantled warheads from an ANF agreement, if 

unrestricted and unchecked production of fissile materials were to continue. Most 

observers in Western nations agree that it is in their interest to halt the further 

production of materials that are already present in quantities far in excess of 

security needs (although both the Russians and the Chinese continue to produce 

fissile materials). Hence, a fissile materials cutoff is a reasonable prerequisite to 

implementing an ANF regime. Finally, although there are several transparency 

programs in place, the scope of these initiatives needs to be significantly 

expanded.52 Recent efforts in this area have not proven very successful, owing in 

large part to Russian efforts to avoid implementing the May 1995 Yeltsin-Clinton 

agreement on stockpile transparency, as well as repeated Russian foot-dragging in 

transparency issues as a whole. Russian hedging in this area comes, to some 

degree, as a result of the continuing debate about the role of nuclear weapons as 

well as the perceived high utility of nuclear weapons generally. Current 

transparency programs, however, could serve as precursors to the more extensive 

programs that would be required for a workable ANF regime. 

 On the other hand, one promising type of interaction is on the lab-to-lab 

level. Under the auspices of scientific and technological exchanges and joint 

problem-solving, individuals working directly for the national laboratories have 
19

often been able to achieve more in face to face contacts with their Russian 

colleagues in one afternoon than highly placed officials have been able to 

negotiate over several months. An example of this level of interaction is the 

exchange between Sandia National Laboratories and the Kurchatov Institute in 

Moscow, during which Sandia technicians helped to substantially upgrade the 

Institute’s physical security arrangements and materials control and accounting 

procedures.53 In a different case, the Institute for Experimental Physics in 

Arzamas-16 (MINATOM’s counterpart to DOE’s Los Alamos National 

Laboratory) and Los Alamos National Laboratory have begun to cooperate in the 

area of fissile materials control and accounting.54 As Frank von Hippel, former 

Assistant Director for National Security in the Office of Science and Technology 

Policy, points out, “this ‘lab-to-lab’ program has taken off more quickly than the 

government-to-government approach, not surprisingly, because it empowers US 

and Russian technical experts to negotiate directly with each other....”55 This type 

of interaction is productive and may lead to the level of transparency required to 

implement a warhead accounting and destruction agreement such as the proposed 

ANF regime. 

The Multi-Phased Approach. Arms control can be described not only 

as an event, but as a process, involving years of tedious work and negotiations.56 

In a similar vein, the ANF regime would not be an event, but a long-term and 

multi-staged process. It would require the gradual establishment of a receptive 

environment in the highest levels of Russian and Western governments, since 

officials would probably be unwilling to move quickly with an unexplored or 

immature proposal. Therefore, an environment that is built upon long-term and 

positive interactions between scientists, scholars, and non-governmental 

organizations would be likely to yield the basis for higher levels of confidence. 

 The ANF regime would be divided into several stages and spread out 

over a long-term implementation span, as shown in Table 1: 
20

Table 1: ANF Regime Implementation

Stage One - Initial Agreement 

 1. Declaration of facilities/cantonment sites 

 2. Declaration of weapons numbers 

 3. Verification Protocol 

 4. Asymmetric Reductions to Equal Numbers 

Stage Two - Deep Reduction and Elimination Agreement 

 1. Further Deep Reductions to Lower Thresholds 

 2. Category Elimination 

Stage Three - Linkage to Further Warhead Destruction

 Stage One is designed to facilitate the initial ANF Agreement. 

Undoubtedly there would be problems on both sides with regard to internationally 

intrusive inspections because of the sensitivity of the weapons and facilities. 

There would, as well, be questions regarding the exchange of restricted nuclear 

data. The issue of verification of starting numbers would be a significant hurdle. 

Thus, Stage One would need to resolve these initial issues and establish the trust 

and confidence required to implement the ANF regime. 

 First, the number of cantonment sites would be declared during 

negotiations. For the United States, one of the principal concerns would be the 

perspectives of its NATO allies, because US weapons in Europe would fall under 

the treaty regime. The United States would probably want to retain several 

cantonment sites in NATO Europe. For the Russian Federation, one of the 

principal concerns would be to retain weapons in places where they could be 

postured against the troubled strategic areas to the south and south-east. 

 Second, the numbers of weapons would be declared and the current 

arsenal would have to be secured. Although this should not be a problem for the 
21

United States, many complications must be anticipated on the Russian side at this 

stage. The weapons, many of which are not under the most satisfactory security 

and management programs, must be inventoried, centrally monitored, and stored 

under unimpeachable security conditions. If one cannot establish a leak-proof 

system at this point, further effort is not likely to overcome the dangers of nuclear 

theft, diversion, and proliferation, to say nothing of possible cheating. Therefore 

it is imperative to accomplish this step at an early point. 

 Third, a Verification Protocol would have to be negotiated. This 

agreement would cover the following areas: (1) agreement on the types of 

national technical means or on-site inspections to be used for verification of the 

cantonment sites and the weapons and warhead destruction process, (2) an agreedupon cycle of routine on-site surety inspections at declared cantonment sites, and 

(3) a system for conducting no-notice challenge inspections. 

 Finally, the initial ANF agreement would involve actual weapons 

reductions. The US and Russian stockpiles would be reduced to equal numbers 

at a level slightly lower than the current global US inventory.57 This anticipates a 

large, asymmetric Russian drawdown along with a smaller US reduction. 

Although this is an unbalanced process, there is ample precedent for it. During 

the INF treaty implementation, for example, the Soviet Union was required to 

engage in large, asymmetric reductions in its deployed missile forces. The 

remaining weapons would be placed in the declared cantonment sites. 

Several issues must be taken into account during this stage: 

• Once the weapons are moved to their cantonment areas, 

they must not be co-located with their respective delivery 

systems. 

• The weapons would be monitored (but not controlled) at 

their cantonment sites (i.e., while monitoring systems 

would be installed to confirm treaty compliance, they 

would not prevent the individual countries from accessing 

the sites). 
22

• As the weapons and warheads are reduced and destroyed, 

the destruction process would be a jointly verified 

procedure. 

• The remaining fissile material would, in the case of HEU, 

either be diluted and committed to civilian nuclear reactor 

power programs, or be diluted and permanently disposed of 

after it has been mixed with other radioactive waste. The 

plutonium would also be permanently disposed of. These 

processes would be monitored by an internationally 

sanctioned agency such as the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA). 

 Whether the ANF regime as a whole could be fully implemented would 

depend on the level of success in carrying out the initial agreement in Stage One. 

This initial agreement might contain an obligation to seek a linkage to Stage Two, 

(e.g., further deep reductions and eventual category elimination, pending 

verifiable implementation of Stage One). 

 The initial part of Stage Two would entail further and deeper reductions 

of the weapons systems in addition to possible reductions in the number of 

cantonment sites. The final removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would 

occur during the second part of Stage Two, when all weapons in this category 

(i.e., all air-delivered nuclear weapons) would be targeted for elimination. During 

this final phase, France’s air-delivered nuclear weapons would also be eliminated 

along with those of Russia and the United States. In this manner, NATO would 

retain instruments of US nuclear protection in Europe until all Russian airdelivered nuclear weapons (especially those assigned to the Russian Long-Range 

Bomber divisions which could strike Europe with less warning time) have been 

withdrawn. 

 Stage Three might come into being as an extension of the ANF regime. 

Aside from the nuclear warheads addressed by the ANF regime, thousands of 

other nuclear warheads have been retained under both the START and INF 

regimes. These weapons could also be targeted for eventual destruction based on 

the experience gained from implementing the ANF regime. 
23

Technical Hurdles: Verification, Detection, and Numbers. It is 

reasonable to expect a series of challenges and hurdles if this regime were 

implemented. Three broad questions must be addressed. First, how would the 

verified elimination of nuclear warheads occur? Second, could the verification 

process detect nuclear weapons that may be hidden from the agreement? Third, 

how would the initial base-line number of warheads be determined? 

The verified elimination of nuclear warheads.

58 The process of 

conducting the verified elimination of nuclear warheads would be complex and 

involved, but not insurmountable. Its principal focus is “to verify that warheads 

specified by [the] treaty for elimination are, in fact, completely dismantled, their 

components rendered useless for construction of new warheads, and the contained 

fissile materials placed under international safeguards or disposed of in such a 

manner as to make them unusable in weapons.”59

 Each step in the process of eliminating warheads must be completely 

verifiable and has to ensure that (1) all warheads and associated payload hardware 

identified by the owner country and earmarked for elimination are in fact 

correctly described; (2) all items earmarked for elimination are destroyed, and (3) 

none of the nuclear material from the dismantled warheads is diverted to 

unauthorized uses. “These guarantees must be provided without the need to 

disclose sensitive information about the design of the warheads or other 

associated equipment, such as re-entry vehicles, penetration aids, or shielding 

against radiation.”60

 Although it will be complex and arduous, the most crucial benefit of this 

process is that warhead dismantlement and elimination are not only verifiable, but 

the regime can also be designed to be resistant to tampering and cheating. 

Moreover, if one assumes with Taylor that the dismantlement facility employs a 

“full-time work force of 100 direct labor employees, at $100,000 per person-year 

(including overhead),” the labor costs would amount to $10 million per year. In 
24

sum, “it is therefore unlikely that the total costs of dismantling...nuclear warheads, 

and providing the contained fissile materials for use as nuclear fuel or for direct 

disposal would exceed a few billion dollars.”61

Detecting Nuclear Warheads.

62 While it is possible to design a system 

for the verified destruction of nuclear warheads, the ANF treaty regime must also 

provide for a mechanism to detect behavior that violates the treaty boundaries 

(e.g., the withholding and hiding of nuclear warheads). This capability is more 

technologically complex, but is presently being developed in the United States. 

What follows is a brief summary of the methods currently being designed to 

provide this capability. 

 Steve Fetter has written that 

Fissile materials [HEU and Pu] are radioactive; they are very 

dense and absorb certain radiation very well; and they can be 

fissioned. Therefore, there are three basic ways to detect 

fissile material: ‘passive’ detection of the radiation emitted by 

its radioactive decay, or ‘active’ detection involving either 

radio-graphing (‘x-raying’) an object to detect dense and 

absorbing materials, or irradiating an object with neutrons or 

high-energy photons and detecting the particles emitted by the 

resulting induced fissions.”63 

The wide-area tracking system (WATS) concept, under development at Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, incorporates multiple passive detectors in a 

sensor network, and can provide detection, some characterization, and 

monitoring/tracking of nuclear-weapon material for treaty verification.64 

Essentially, WATS incorporates a series of systems (ground and space-based) that 

provide for “continuous monitoring of nuclear-material diversion attempts.” Most 

significantly, WATS does not employ intrusive monitoring of only known and 

declared facilities; instead, “it provides comprehensive oversight of all facilities in 

the monitored area, even unknown sites.”65 According to an expert familiar with 

the system’s capabilities, this feature “significantly mitigates the material source 

term initialization problem—the inability to confidently know the initial location 
25

of all material subject to monitoring.” WATS will incorporate “an easily 

deployed array of fixed sensors that can be supplemented with moving sensors 

that can be tailored to a specific need. By correlating the output of many sensors, 

the [WATS] system is capable of achieving much higher probability of detection 

and lower false alarm rates than are obtainable with individual sensors.”66

 Thus WATS provides comprehensive oversight by detecting the 

presence and movement of nuclear-weapon materials without on-site presence—it 

is non-intrusive and does not require access to facilities. In other words, the 

ability to detect and locate the presence of materials that violate an ANF treaty 

regime within a monitored area is currently being developed by the national 

laboratories. This, along with other measures, should reduce the incentives to 

cheat and evade the treaty boundaries, and allow for the creation of a robust and 

comprehensive verification regime. 

The Original Base-Line Warhead Number. One of the most basic 

potential obstacles within the ANF regime is the question of how many warheads 

each side really has. While at first this seems to be quite a significant challenge, 

in reality it may not be an insurmountable one. Both sides would declare the 

base-line numbers early in Stage One. Essentially, the inventories of weapons 

should be mutually declared and transparent. Following this exchange, the regime 

would incorporate a base-line inspection timeline, during which all parties could 

arrange for standard confidence inspections according to agreed-upon protocols. 

At the conclusion of Stage One all cantonment facilities must be declared and all 

warheads located within these facilities. Therefore, any warheads outside these 

boundaries would be in violation of the treaty regime. At this point, each party 

could initiate a series of challenge inspections, during which time all suspect sites 

would be subject to an on-site review within twenty-four hours of the request. In 

addition to this procedure, each party would be able to rely on national technical 

means (such as wide-area nuclear detection systems) in order to further enhance 

confidence in the reliability of the regime. Therefore, under the circumstances, it 
26

would be fairly difficult to successfully evade the treaty restrictions. 

Political Challenges: France. Although the ANF regime would deal 

primarily with US and Russian air-delivered nuclear weapons, France’s nonparticipation would leave it as the sole state possessing these weapons in Europe. 

The Russian Federation would therefore probably not agree to the regime unless 

French air-delivered nuclear weapons were incorporated. 

 The French approach to arms control has traditionally reflected the 

importance of nuclear weapons as France’s ultimate guarantee of security as well 

as political and strategic autonomy in an uncertain and unstable world.67 

President Jacques Chirac reaffirmed his confidence in France’s current posture in 

September 1995 when he stated, “Our present force is enough of a deterrent, it’s 

in sufficient working order to take us up to the year 2010.”68 Historically France 

has declined to participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations such as SALT and 

START by arguing that these efforts should be pursued first by the superpowers. 

In 1983 François Mitterrand specified three requirements that must be satisfied 

before France could consider playing a role in such efforts: 

• The reduction of the superpower nuclear arsenals to levels 

much closer to those of other nuclear powers. 

• Limitations on defensive systems capable of neutralizing 

offensive deterrent forces (such as antimissile, 

antisubmarine, and anti-satellite weaponry). 

• Significant progress in the reduction of the conventional 

force imbalances in Europe and the global elimination of 

chemical and biological weapons.69 

Historically both France and the United States have rejected attempts by Moscow 

to count French nuclear weapons with US totals (in the SALT and INF 

negotiations, for example). 

 More recently, French experts have indicated that France does not expect 

to engage in nuclear arms control efforts (other than deliberations related to the 
27

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the 

fissile material cutoff discussions) in the foreseeable future due to enduring 

differences in the force levels of France, the United States, and Russia.70 

However, in his comments on the 1994 French Defense White Paper, Prime 

Minister Edouard Balladour acknowledged that the country’s nuclear deterrent 

should be “constantly adapted to the evolution of threats.”71 Recent unilateral 

cuts in France’s nuclear forces reflect, among other things, the reduction in the 

threat as well as the impact of fiscal constraints. 

 Despite these policies, France might consider participating in the ANF 

regime if it believed its security would be enhanced by the elimination of a class 

of Russian nuclear weapons postured primarily against Europe. The reduction of 

US and Russian nuclear arsenals would help to redress long-standing French 

concerns regarding numerical imbalances. Additionally, the opportunity to reduce 

the defense budget might be welcomed in these times of fiscal austerity. Finally, 

the regime might be attractive to French political elites since it would promise 

France a genuine “seat at the table” on a par with the United States and Russia 

regarding a high-profile security issue. Notwithstanding these considerations, it 

seems likely that France would only participate if it believed that the ANF regime 

served its vital national security interests. 

Legal Obstacles: The START Treaties. START I and II provide for 

different sets of constraints on heavy bombers and air-delivered nuclear 

weapons.72 The ANF regime would significantly modify these constraints while 

retaining all other elements of the START treaties. Currently, the US Air Force 

must hold its B-2 bombers in reserve for the nuclear missions and is therefore 

unable to take full advantage of the aircraft’s conventional capabilities. In 

addition, as the B-52 fleet continues to grow older and a significant number are 

also held in reserve for nuclear roles, fewer aircraft are available for conventional 

scenarios (e.g., Desert Storm). Essentially, the ANF Regime would allow the 
28

USAF to release these aircraft from their nuclear taskings because the ANF 

regime would ultimately supersede all START restrictions on heavy bombers, 

freeing these delivery systems for conventional missions. 

 It should be noted that the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that 

20 B-2s and 66 B-52s assigned to nuclear missions would serve as the heavy 

bomber leg of the nuclear triad for the foreseeable future. The nuclear warheads 

assigned to these aircraft would eventually be eliminated under an ANF regime, 

thus confining the mission of strategic deterrence to ICBMs and SLBMs. The 

ANF regime would not affect START ceilings on ICBMs and SLBMs. However, 

it might change the composition of the strategic nuclear force since the warhead 

numbers initially reserved for air-delivered nuclear weapons would no longer 

count against the accountable warhead ceilings. The changes to the strategic triad 

(i.e., the removal of the bomber leg) would require extensive deliberations 

involving numerous government agencies and the executive and legislative 

branches. While the outcome of such a process cannot be forecast, it represents a 

significant potential obstacle to the realization of an ANF regime. 

Russian Motives and the 1991 Initiative. Many officials and experts 

would question whether the Russian Federation would ever be a willing 

participant in an ANF regime. For example, a July Russian 1996 report states that 

under the conditions of economic crisis and its fairly modest 

capabilities to equip the army and navy with new weapons, 

Russia will have to rely on nuclear weapons to safeguard its 

security in the foreseeable future... Because of Russia’s 

geostrategic position, tactical nuclear weapons are of much 

greater military-political significance to Russia than to the 

United States.... That is why Russia can hardly expect the 

composition of its tactical nuclear weapons to be symmetrical 

with the US composition.”73 

Given Russia’s current conventional weakness and corresponding reliance on 

nuclear weapons for its security, it will require adroit persuasion to secure its 

participation in such a regime. Furthermore, Russia would have to accept large 
29

and asymmetric reductions in its nuclear forces. 

Russian officials may seek tradeoffs in other areas—e.g., stopping or 

slowing the process of NATO enlargement, economic benefits, cutbacks in US 

SLBMs and SLCMs, or an adjustment or change to CFE or START II. In 

addressing these issues, the following should be considered. First, there are 

historical precedents for asymmetric weapons reductions (e.g., the INF and CFE 

treaties). Second, as stated earlier, the ANF regime should not be offered to 

Russia as a bargaining chip in conjunction with NATO enlargement (the regime 

could proceed in a “separate but parallel” mode). Third, NATO and the United 

States should insist that the ANF regime (including its focus on warhead 

reduction and elimination) be implemented as a testbed agreement before any 

other arms control treaties are modified. 

 While these are all potential complications, some experts might be 

surprised to learn that the USSR came close to proposing an arms control treaty 

regulating, among other systems, air-delivered nuclear weapons in late 1990 and 

early 1991.74 In fact, according to Nikolai Sokov, the only reason that the 

initiative was not pursued was that President Bush’s 1991 unilateral initiative preempted the Soviet proposal. The Soviet concept, devised by members of the 

Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control and Disarmament and agreed to 

by the General Staff, advocated a “leap forward” toward the reduction of 

warheads instead of delivery systems. The first stage of the proposal involved 

asymmetric Soviet reductions down to an equal level below the level of either side 

at the time. Following stages were designed to further reduce, and eventually 

eliminate, all theater weapons. The proposal envisioned concentrating the 

warheads at designated facilities with portal and perimeter monitoring systems as 

well as on-site inspectors. In order to increase confidence in the proposal, both 

base-line and challenge inspections were incorporated. The warheads were to be 

destroyed at jointly-monitored facilities. While foreign inspectors would not have 

been allowed to observe actual warhead dismantlement, all fissile materials were 
30

to be accounted for and all other components were to be destroyed in the presence 

of inspectors. The Soviet proposal suggested several layers of intrusive and nonintrusive inspection and detection systems that would ensure that a warhead 

would be detected even if it was initially missed or not accounted for. The 

projected Soviet initiative envisaged the eventual establishment of a nuclear-free 

zone in the center of Europe and over 1,000 km wide (stretching roughly from the 

Atlantic to the Urals). In other words, the Soviet proposal would have 

denuclearized all of Europe, including the European USSR. This zone would 

have “prevented” the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the case of an armed 

conflict. 

 In the 1991 Soviet proposal theater weapons were defined to 

include all ground-based systems (such as nuclear artillery, land mines, 

etc.) as well as all theater aviation assets. Significantly, however, the 

projected Soviet proposal did not include Long Range Aviation assets, 

and thereby preserved the USSR’s ability to strike at Central and 

Western Europe, even from beyond the Urals. One of the key 

differences between the Soviet proposal and the ANF regime is that the 

ANF regime would limit all air-delivered nuclear weapons. 

 It is critical to note that the projected Soviet proposal, if carried out, 

would have achieved a long-standing Soviet objective, namely the 

removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. Simultaneously, it would 

have preserved the Soviet capability to use LRA forces against NATO 

Europe. Surprisingly, however, the projected Soviet proposal does not 

seem to have addressed British and French nuclear forces. This is not 

likely to be the case in any future regime. Although the British will no 

longer deploy air-delivered weapons by 1998, the French intend to retain 

this capability for the foreseeable future. 

 The proposal nonetheless provided for an unusual level of transparency, 

and the Foreign Ministry was prepared to make a formal approach. Indeed, 
31

according to Sokov, the negotiating teams had already been assembled and the 

personnel assignments completed. Although the motives for such a proposal also 

involved the removal of NATO’s European-based US nuclear deterrent forces, the 

terms of the proposal suggest an openness on the part of Russian policy makers to 

an exceptional degree of transparency. The fact that the proposal envisioned the 

limitation, reduction, and verified destruction of nuclear warheads is surprising, 

given the normally secretive and closed nature of the Russian and Soviet 

governments. 

Conclusion: An ANF Regime and Atlantic Security 

 The present global alignment of nuclear weapons between East and West 

is increasingly being supplanted by a new multi-polar dynamic. The uncertainty 

of this dynamic does not allow for an immediate reduction and withdrawal of all 

US nuclear weapons in Europe. In the words of Laurence Martin, “even in 

Europe this is not the time to dismantle deterrence. Rather it is an opportunity to 

adjust it; make it less expensive, oppressive and intrusive; and retain it as the 

latent source of stability within which the NATO powers can recast their 

relationships and Europe as a whole build a new, continental order.”75 While US 

nonstrategic nuclear forces still have a role in Europe today, their perceived value 

and utility are gradually fading, at least in the eyes of some observers. In fact, 

their final utility may be their role as a bargaining chip to induce the Russian 

Federation to eliminate entirely this category of weapons. It is in the security 

interests of the democracies of Europe and North America to address concerns 

regarding the nuclear weapons program of the Russian Federation. 

How would the ANF Regime affect the health of nuclear deterrence for 

the United States and its NATO allies? One can certainly argue that the perceived 

value or validity of nuclear deterrence has been eroding since the collapse of the 

bipolar world order, both as a doctrine as well as a publicly articulated policy. 
32

The elimination of a major category of nuclear weapons in conjunction with the 

gradual withdrawal of remaining US nuclear forces in Europe would be consistent 

with this trend. The INF treaty and its zero-zero provisions are proof that NATO 

governments are capable of maintaining the credibility of their deterrent posture, 

even if the most capable European-based NATO nuclear weapons (i.e., those 

mounted on Pershing II and GLCM missiles) were completely eliminated. 

 Assessing the likelihood of a US nuclear response in the defense of its 

Allies should not be based on individual weapons systems, but rather on the 

stakes for US vital interests in maintaining and honoring Alliance commitments in 

Europe. The argument is not a new one; it has been discussed repeatedly since 

1957, when Sputnik dramatized America’s vulnerability to prompt Soviet nuclear 

retaliation in the event of US employment of nuclear weapons in defense of its 

Allies. For the remainder of the Cold War, the United States labored to assure its 

Allies that, vulnerability notwithstanding, US commitments to NATO Europe 

stood firm. Fortunately, the debate between vulnerabilities and enduring interests 

was never put to the test of nuclear war. 

 The ANF regime’s impact on NATO cohesion is difficult to predict. It 

seems reasonable to assert that the formula describing US nuclear weapons as 

“the glue that binds the Alliance together” could erode along with the perceived 

credibility of nuclear deterrence. In other words, the value assigned to nuclear 

weapons as instruments for the preservation of alliance cohesion may be overemphasized. Therefore, depending in part on the circumstances and associated 

Alliance policies, a gradual withdrawal of US nuclear weapons might not 

undermine Alliance cohesion. As Karl-Heinz Kamp and others have argued in 

the past, one possible result of such a withdrawal is that NATO would simply 

redefine its requirements for nuclear deterrence and thus preserve Alliance 

cohesion. Observers familiar with NATO nuclear planning indicate that such a 

withdrawal could be combined with a restructuring of the NATO nuclear 

consultation process that would link European security more clearly with US 
33

strategic nuclear forces. Intensified nuclear planning with nuclear and nonnuclear allies could be part of this process. 

 There can be little doubt that the ANF regime would curtail Russian airdelivered nuclear threats in the Eurasian area. While this regime neither 

recommends nor endorses the complete renunciation of nuclear deterrence, it does 

seek to promote raising the nuclear threshold and the containment of the threat of 

“loose” Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials. In fact, the threat of 

Russian WMD probably does not reside in deliberately planned employment 

against NATO countries, as was the case during the Cold War. Rather, today’s 

threat emanates from either (1) the loss of control over nuclear weapons systems 

or (2) the commitment of nuclear weapons in what is perceived to be a desperate 

situation in a conflict on Russia’s periphery. Furthermore, the lack of modern 

permissive action links on these systems makes their control even more 

questionable. As Igor Khripunov explains, Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons 

with inadequate permissive action links increases “the likelihood of unauthorized 

or accidental launchings, as well as misinterpretations and disruptions in 

communications.”76

 The issue of whether the ANF regime would mitigate “new” WMD 

threats is less clear. Some might argue that lower numbers of US nuclear forces 

would entice others to play “catch up” with the United States and NATO in an 

effort to gain equal power and prestige. However, as Ivo Daalder points out, few 

countries could actually marshal the resources necessary to build up a nuclear 

force strong enough to challenge the nuclear posture of the United States. The 

United States and its NATO allies will in the foreseeable future have the ability to 

stay ahead of the few proliferants who may attempt this.77 In any event, the 

perceived value for proliferants of possessing nuclear weapons and threatening 

their use, even with only one or two weapons, negates the parity argument, which 

was valid during the Cold War when NATO faced a multi-dimensional nuclear 

threat from the Soviet Union. After the late 1960s, US-Soviet nuclear parity was 
34

viewed as stabilizing because it undermined the incentives that higher numbers of 

weapons provided for a preemptive nuclear strike. Proliferants do not require nor 

aim for strategic parity. The possession of merely one or two weapons might, in 

some circumstances, credibly threaten NATO and the United States because of 

what is believed to be the completely different cost-benefit calculus of some 

proliferants. Thus, the ANF regime would probably not lessen the possibility of 

proliferant WMD threats. 

Regarding proliferation by parties outside the Atlantic Alliance, Daalder 

writes, “a deliberate strategy to cut nuclear force levels can help to reduce the 

perception that nuclear weapons endow their possessors with power, prestige, and 

international stature—a perception that in itself contributes to proliferation.”78 

Daalder goes on to ask, 

is it really in the US interest to advertise the centrality of 

nuclear weapons to power in international affairs at a time 

when countries like ... Japan and Brazil aspire to a greater role 

in, and responsibility for, preserving international security? 

Surely the United States has much to gain and very little to 

lose in arguing the opposite—that power and responsibility 

reside in the political and economic well-being of nations 

rather than in their nuclear status.79 

Thus the perceived de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in the international sphere 

might provide an impetus for non-proliferation. On the other hand, proliferant 

states are not likely to define their national security strategies based simply on an 

ANF regime, and it is likely that they may find other factors more compelling—

e.g., their own ambitions and perceived security needs. The drive to acquire 

nuclear weapons is not likely to decrease simply because the major powers have 

reduced their own nuclear weapons arsenals. Instead, the likelihood for nuclear 

proliferation will probably be driven by each state’s specific security concerns. 

 If one accepts that the concept of extended deterrence remains valid, and 

that the US membership in the Atlantic Alliance continues to further American 

national security interests, then deterrence should remain robust under the terms 
35

of the ANF regime. “This would be true even if the US nuclear force levels 

continue to decline to still lower levels, provided that the nuclear capabilities 

potentially threatening to the allies (especially Russia) did so as well.”80 

Stationing American military personnel and nuclear weapons in Europe 

represented the US commitment and assured that stability would be maintained. 

The ANF regime would require first an asymmetric reduction, and then an equal 

and verified elimination of this category of weapons. If one accepts that nuclear 

weapons acquisition is driven primarily by a country’s security concerns, then the 

ANF regime should lessen these concerns by introducing transparency, and by 

reducing and then eliminating these weapons. Unlike other arms control regimes, 

which have preserved Russia’s ability to rapidly strike Western Europe with airdelivered nuclear weapons, this regime would reduce and ultimately eliminate this 

capability and would leave Russia with only strategic systems (ICBMs and 

SLBMs) and short-range tactical nuclear weapons to target Europe.81 

 The basic strategic stability between the United States and Russia 

(inherent in START I and II), as well as ongoing commitments by the United 

States to provide a nuclear umbrella for its NATO Allies and to further its 

political and economic interests throughout Europe would contain the risk of the 

Russians using variable-range ICBMs or SLBMs (or short-range tactical nuclear 

weapons) against NATO Europe. Nonetheless, one can anticipate that some 

European analysts and policy makers might prefer to retain a US nuclear presence 

in Europe, even if the successful implementation of an ANF regime would 

eliminate all Russian air-delivered systems. This political factor would have to be 

addressed by the Alliance in pursuing an ANF regime. 

 In order to guarantee the long-term future security of the European area, 

NATO must be willing to change. The collapse of the Communist regime in 

Russia has altered the nuclear dynamic in that state. What once was a tightly 

controlled and strictly enforced nuclear archipelago is now a system under great 

strain, in which some Russians advocate greater operational reliance on nuclear 
36

weapons. As Graham Allison indicates, the dimensions of this threat will be 

perfectly clear the day after a catastrophe results from premature Russian nuclear 

employment or Russian nuclear leakage.82

 Experts and officials alike believe that the chances of an intercontinental 

nuclear exchange are remote. However, the very weapons which all parties have 

sought to exclude from any mutually secured obligations are the same weapons 

that are perhaps the most likely to be used by the Russian Federation in a conflict, 

and are probably the most unsecure and mismanaged and, therefore, most likely to 

be the source of proliferation and leakage problems. A long-term ANF agreement 

would address these problems and simultaneously establish multiple fora for 

transparency and constructive engagement in the future. There are many good 

reasons why the United States should move toward a smaller nuclear force 

posture. As Daalder points out, “Although a residual need for deterrence will 

remain, the thrust of US policy toward nuclear weapons should now be to reduce 

the likelihood that nuclear weapons will ever be used.”83 This means reducing 

nuclear weapons in general, and Russian air-delivered nuclear weapons in 

particular. 
37

 

ENDNOTES

1

 General Lee Butler, USAF (Retired), National Press Club Remarks, Wednesday, 

December 4, 1996, Washington, DC, p. 3. 

2

 “Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals,” Press Release. 

December 5, 1996, pp. 1-2. 

3

 Ibid., p. 2. 4

 The Natural Resources Defense Council estimates that Russia possesses some 18,000 

tactical nuclear warheads, while the US possesses approximately 6,500. It should be noted 

that both numbers are only estimates. Information on tactical weapons is highly suspect, 

particularly in Russia. 

5

 The NPR reaffirmed the nuclear triad (ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers), and while 

it moved to establish US thresholds at START II levels, it advocated a “lead and hedge” 

strategy, preserving the capability to reconstitute warheads if deemed necessary. 6

 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington DC, states 

the following: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently 

they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or 

Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 

such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 

the security of the North Atlantic area.” Cited from NATO Handbook, NATO Office of 

Information and Press, Brussels, 1995, p. 232. 7

 Bruce G. Blair, “Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in George Quester, ed., The 

Nuclear Challenges in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 

1995), p. 61. 

8

 Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response NATO Strategy and 

Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 199. 9

 Of course, a primary motive for this move was to allay Russian concerns over NATO 

enlargement. Richard Beeston, “Russians Attack Yeltsin over NATO concessions,” The 

Times, March 24, 1997, Internet edition. 10 Konstantin Sorokin, “Russia after the Crisis: The Nuclear Strategy Debate.” Orbis, 

Winter 1994, p. 25. 11 The CIA document was reportedly leaked to the press by sources inside the agency. Bill 

Gertz, “Russian Renegades Pose Nuke Danger: CIA Says Arsenal Lacks Tight Controls,” 

Washington Times, October 22, 1996, p. 1. 12 For detailed analysis on the depth of this problem, see Graham Allison et al, Avoiding 

Nuclear Anarchy, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 12, (Cambridge: The MIT 

Press, 1996), and Quester, The Nuclear Challenges in Russia and the New States of 

Eurasia, 1995). 13 See Vladimir Semenovich Belous, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Half-Forgotten 

Reality.” Segodnya, FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 23 June 1995. 

14For a thorough discussion of these issues, see Oleg Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards and 

Security in the Former Soviet Union.” Survival, Winter 1994-95, p. 56. 
38

 

15 While most sources indicate that weapons and delivery systems are stored separately, 

there is no evidence that special procedures are undertaken to ensure separation and access 

denial between the troops that guard the weapons and those that operate the delivery 

systems. 

16 Oleg Bukharin, “Technical Aspects of Proliferation and Non-Proliferation,” in Quester, 

The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 46. 17 Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union,” p. 62. 18 Blair, “Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 47. 

19 Testimony by Dr. John Deutch before the US Senate, as reported in the Security Issues 

Digest, US NATO Wireless File, European Wireless File No. 52, Thursday, March 21, 

1996, p. 9. 

20 Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union.,” p. 61. 21 The information regarding locks on gravity bombs and cruise missiles is drawn from 

Blair, “Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 61 and 80. 

22 Ibid., p. 61. 23 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, September 1994. 24 Steven Zaloga, “The CIS Nuclear Weapons Industry.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 

4, No. 9, September 1992. 

25 Blair, “Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 59. 

26 Ibid. 27 Some Russian officials explain that while this is still necessary, it is neither desirable nor 

planned for a long-term posture. They indicate that due to the loss of warning and 

detection infrastructure (Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems, missile tracking 

facilities, communication links, etc.) with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the 

Russian capability to reliably detect a strategic strike is presently incomplete. Thus, for the 

time being, they have to opt for a less optimal posture until this deficiency can be 

adequately addressed. 

28 John R. Lepingwell, “Is START Stalling?” in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the 

New States of Eurasia, George Quester, ed., p. 108. 29 The information is based on an interview conducted by the authors with Dr. Nikolai 

Sokov on August 9, 1996. Dr. Sokov is currently serving as a post-doctoral fellow at the 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is a 

member of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Department of Disarmament and Control of 

Military Technologies) and is currently on an extended leave of absence. 30 Emphasis added. Igor Khripunov, “Russia’s Dangerous Weakness,” in Armed Forces 

Journal International, June 1996, p. 40. 31 Bruce G. Blair, “Russian Realities and the Illusion of Arms Control.” Lexis-Nexis (The

Christian Science Monitor), September 19, 1995. 32 Blair, “Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 61; “NATO Expansion Eastwards 

Could Threaten Denmark: Report,” Agencee France Presse, International News, 

Copenhagen, 17 March 1997 (Lexis-Nexis); and Andrei Smirnov, “Yeltsin May Sign 

Treaty with NATO on May 27,” Russian Press Digest, 10 April 1997 (Lexis-Nexis). 33 “Press Conference with Officials of the Presidential Analytical Directorate Regarding 

Russia’s National Security Policy.” Lexis-Nexis (Federal Information Systems 

Corporation, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast), April 26, 1996. 34 While Russian threats regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the face of NATO 

enlargement became prolific toward the end of 1995 and during the first half of 1996, 
39

 

many of those statements may have largely been political posturing leading up to the June 

1996 Presidential elections. The statements above, however, do not represent this type of 

rhetoric. On the contrary, they are brought forth by seasoned strategists who are 

contemplating Russia’s new conventional dilemmas. See Belous, “Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons: A Half-Forgotten Reality.” 

35 Steven E. Miller, “Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy.” Survival, 

Autumn 1992, p. 7. 

36 Ibid. 37 Oleg Bukharin, “Stored Nuclear Warheads Could Become Unstable.” Lexis-Nexis

(Newspaper Publishing PLC, The Independent), February 22, 1994. 38 The following estimates are obtained from a detailed report by Anton Surikov and Igor 

Styagin entitled “The Movement and Storage of Russian Nuclear Weapons.” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1994. 39 Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, “The Movement and Storage of Russian Nuclear 

Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1994, p. 203. 40 Allison, et al, pp. 180-181. 41 Ibid., p. 190. 42 Seymour M. Hersch, “The Wild East.” The Atlantic Monthly. June 1994, p. 69. 43 Frank von Hippel, “Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World.” Physics 

Today, June 1995, p. 27. 44 The SS-25 Topol, in addition to being currently Russia’s premier land-based ICBM, is a 

strategic system; and strategic weapons are, according to accepted norms, the best 

protected and secured weapons in the Russian arsenal! Allison et al, p. 8. 45 These two incidents are described in John Lepingwell’s “Is START Stalling?” chapter in 

The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, pp. 102-03. 46 Ibid., p. 103. 47 Comments by John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the Nuclear Posture Review 

press conference, news release by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Public Affairs, September 22, 1994, pp. 5-6, 12-13. 48 Schuyler Foerster et al, Defining Stability: Conventional Arms Control in a Changing 

Europe. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 9. 49 Hedley Bull cited in Foerster et al, Defining Stability, p. 9. 50 Ibid., p. 45. 51 President Ronald Reagan cited in Teena Mayars, Understanding Weapons and Arms 

Control. (Washington: Brassey’s (US ), Inc., 1991), p. 23. 52 The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, under Nunn-Lugar funding (also 

known as the Safe and Secure Dismantlement Program, funded by DoD under a 

government-to-government agreement and administered by the Defense Special Weapons 

Agency), and the Exchange in the Fields of Nuclear Weapon Safety and Security (a 

government-to-government program signed under the auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin 

commission) are examples of such programs in place today. See the prepared statement of 

Albert Narath, Director of Sandia National Laboratories, before the US House of 

Representatives Committee on National Security, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, 

March 29, 1995. 

53 Frank von Hippel, “Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World,” in Physics 

Today, Vol. 48, No. 6, June 1995, p. 28. 54 Ibid.
40

 

55 Ibid.

56 Interview with Dr. Amy Sands, formerly a deputy director of the US Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency, at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for NonProliferation Studies, August 8, 1996. Dr. Sands attributes the slow rate of this process in 

part to the immense amount of staying power in government bureaucracies on both sides. 57 While the French would be “at the table” from the outset, French reductions would occur 

only at the end of Stage Two. The French weapons, though not reduced, would be counted 

together with the US totals against the Russian ceilings. Also, in order to assuage 

European concerns, initial US reductions could come from weapons deployed in the 

CONUS and not from the current European-based US nonstrategic nuclear arsenal. 58 The information presented here was drawn from Theodore B. Taylor’s, “Verified 

Elimination of Nuclear Warheads” in Science and Global Security, Vol. 1, 1989. 59 Ibid., p. 1. 60 Ibid., p. 7. 61 Ibid., p. 22. 62 The information contained in this section is drawn from the following two sources: Steve 

Fetter, et al,. “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” in Science and Global Security, Vol. 1, 1990, 

pp. 225-302; and Zachary Koenig, et al, “Wide-Area Nuclear Detection for Monitoring 

and Tracking Nuclear-Weapon Material” in Arms Control and Nonproliferation 

Technologies, Third Quarter 1994, pp. 27-28. 63 Fetter et al, “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” p. 226. 64 Koenig et al, “Wide-Area Nuclear Detection,” p. 27. 65 Ibid. Emphasis added. 66 Ibid.

67 David S. Yost, “Nuclear Debates in France,” Survival, Winter 1994-95, p. 129. 68 Text of televised interview provided by the French Embassy, Washington DC, 

“Interview with M. Jacques Chirac,” 7 Sur 7, TF1, 18 September 1995, p. 9. 69 Francois Mitterand cited in David S. Yost, “France,” in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. 

Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, third edition 

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 266. 70 Based on interviews with several French nuclear policy experts conducted in both 

Washington, DC, and Monterey, California, from February through June 1996. 71 France. Ministry of Defense. Defense White Paper. 1994. 72 For information on START I see “START: Basic Provisions of the Treaty,” WEB 

Edition, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 21 May 1996. For information on 

START II, see “START II: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 

Federation on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Arms,” The Nuclear 

Roundtable (Background Document), Internet Edition, The Henry Stimson Center. 73 “Ratifikatsiya Dogovora SNV-2: Resheniya, Problemy, Perspectivy,” Special 

Supplement to Obozrevatel-Observer, 19 July 1996. 74 The following information was obtained during an interview with Dr. Nikolai Sokov, 

Monterey Institute of International Studies, on August 16, 1996. 75 Laurence Martin, “Dismantling Deterrence?” Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, 

1991, p. 224. 

76 Khripunov, “Russia’s Dangerous Weakness,” p. 43. 
41

 

77 Ivo Daalder, “What Vision for the Nuclear Future?” in Lexis-Nexis (The Washington 

Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology), Spring 1995. 

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, pp. 8-9. 81 Russia would retain the capability to regenerate nuclear artillery, short-range missiles, 

etc. However, the assumption is that an air-delivered nuclear weapon can be employed in a 

much more rapid and potent fashion than, for example, an artillery shell or short-range 

missile—unless, of course, the weapons target is immediately adjacent to its deployment 

site. 

82 Allison et al, p. 176. 83 Daalder, “What Vision for the Nuclear Future?”