1 We note that while Petitioner is not currently a resident of the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, venue here is proper in that he is challenging a Lehigh County prosecution and

conviction.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL CRANDALE WILLIAMS, : CIVIL ACTION 

Petitioner, [15831-056] :

:

v. :

:

TROY WILLIAMSON, et al., :

Respondents. : No. 05-1203

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE July 14, 2005

Before the court is Petitioner Michael Crandale Williams’s (alternatively “Williams” or

“Petitioner”) pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. By this

petition, Williams, who is currently a resident of the United States Penitentiary Allenwood, WhiteDeer, Pennsylvania, challenges his state court conviction on grounds alleging the ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, the denial of his right to appeal and the ineffective assistance of Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) counsel.1 For the reasons set forth below, we believe Williams’s

petition is untimely and recommend that the petition be DENIED with prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As we are addressing an untimely petition, we will dispense with a full recitation of the facts

and limit our discussion to the pertinent procedural history.

On March 27, 1997, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of two counts of attempted criminal

homicide, seven counts of first-degree felony aggravated assault, seven counts of second-degree

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 1 of 6
2 The charges arose from an incident in 1994, where Petitioner, in retaliation for a

previous altercation with George Lugo, Carlos Lugo and Erik Garcia, fired shots at them in a

mini-mart and a taxi-cab parked in front of the mini-mart. (R., 7/15/03 Super. Ct. PCRA Op. at

1.)

3 Regarding his first petition, the Court of Common Pleas appointed PCRA counsel

to represent Williams and ordered counsel to file an amended petition. (R., 6/8/01 Comm. Pleas

PCRA Op. at 2.) PCRA counsel represented to the court that Williams’s petition was meritless

and, for that reason, did not file an amended petition. (Id.)

4

 Williams previously filed for habeas relief in this civil action on March 11, 2005,

dated March 9, 2005. However, he failed to file on the requisite current standard 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 form, so the Court (Bartle, J.) granted Williams leave to re-file this petition on the

appropriate form. (Doc. No. 2.)

2

felony aggravated assault, seven counts of simple assault, seven counts of recklessly endangering

another person, and one count of firearms not to be carried without a license.2 (R., 7/15/03 Super.

Ct. PCRA Op. at 1.) On May 12, 1997, the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,

Pennsylvania (“Court of Common Pleas”) sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of eleven years

nine months to twenty-five years. (R., Comm. Pleas PCRA Op. at 1.) Petitioner did not file a direct

appeal from this judgment of sentence in the Pennsylvania state courts. (Id. at 2.)

Williams, however, filed three separate petitions for state court collateral review pursuant

to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-46. (R., 3/28/05 Comm.

Pleas PCRA Order and Notice at 2, ¶ 2.) His PCRA petitions were filed on October 31, 2000,3 April

26, 2002, and February 3, 2005. (See R., 6/8/01 Comm. Pleas PCRA Op. at 2, 7/15/03 Super. Ct.

PCRA Op. at 3, 3/28/05 Comm. Pleas PCRA Order and Notice at 2, ¶ 2.) Each PCRA petition was

dismissed as untimely by the Pennsylvania state courts. (See id. generally.)

Williams filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated May 15, 2005, on May 20,

2005.4 (Doc. No. 3.) In his petition, he presents three claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 2 of 6
3

failing to correct the Clerk of Court’s error in not docketing his pro se notice of appeal, (2) the Court

of Common Pleas erred in its denial of his motion for a direct appeal and for reinstatement of appeal

in violation of his constitutional right to due process, and (3) PCRA counsel was ineffective with

regard to the first PCRA petition. After reviewing the Pennsylvania state court record and the papers

before us, we believe that Williams’s petition is untimely.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year

limitation period for filing applications for writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In

pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides that the one-year limitation period

. . . shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review . . . .

Id. Section 2244 further provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

However, this Court emphasizes that only properly filed applications for collateral relief may

statutorily toll the limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

When, as here, a petitioner fails to file a direct appeal of his convictions in the Pennsylvania

Superior Court, that conviction will be considered final upon the expiration of the thirty-day period

provided under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure for such appeals. See Pa. R. App.

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 3 of 6
5 We note that the earliest date this petition can be deemed filed is March 9, 2005,

the date on which Williams’s first habeas petition in this matter was signed. Burns v. Morton,

134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (“a pro se prisoner’s petition is deemed filed at the moment he

delivers it to prison officials for mailing to the district court”). 

6 The remaining exceptions to the one-year limitations period found in § 2244(d)(1)

explain that, if applicable, the limitations period shall run from the latest of the following:

4

P. 903(a). Our analysis then necessarily begins with the May 12, 1997 date when the Court of

Common Pleas convicted Petitioner. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his convictions, so on

June 11, 1997, the thirtieth day to file his appeal, the convictions became final. AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period began to run the next day. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, and

absent any tolling, Petitioner had until June 11, 1998 to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See

§ 2244(d)(1).

This habeas petition was not filed until March 2005.5 Williams’s three petitions for collateral

relief under the PCRA do not toll the limitations period because the petitions were untimely, and,

therefore, not properly filed. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3705, *18 (Apr. 27, 2005)

(where the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not “properly filed,”

and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)); Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157 (3d Cir.

2003) (an untimely PCRA petition does not toll the federal limitations period, even where the

petitioner sought to pursue his PCRA petition under a statutory exception to the PCRA’s time bar).

This habeas petition was filed almost seven years after AEDPA’s one-year limitation period had run.

Thus, it is untimely and must be dismissed absent the applicability of some statutory or equitable

exception.

Petitioner does not satisfy any of the remaining statutory exceptions to the period of

limitations set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).6 Petitioner does not allege any state action that

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 4 of 6
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral appeal; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

7 Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner raises ineffective assistance of PCRA

counsel, ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (applying Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.

551, 556 (1987) and holding a petitioner may not raise constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel in state post-conviction proceedings).

5

prevented him from filing his petition, nor does he assert any claim that relies on a new rule of

retroactively applicable constitutional law. Further, the factual predicates upon which his claims are

based concern events that took place in 1997, or soon thereafter, when he claims to have filed a

Notice of Appeal, and would have been clearly discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence.7 

Finally, Petitioner does not present any extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that

would meet the judicially established criteria for disregarding the limitations period pursuant to the

doctrine of equitable tolling. A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, et al., No. 03-9627, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3705,

*18 (Apr. 27, 2005); Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001); Miller v. New Jersey Dept.

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 5 of 6
6

of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998) (petitioner must show that he exercised

reasonable diligence in bringing his claims; mere excusable neglect is not sufficient). After almost

a seven year delay, Petitioner does not set forth any argument that would justify the equitable tolling

of the limitations period.

Having determined that this petition is untimely and fails to meet any exception to the

limitations period set forth in §2244(d)(1), this Court’s recommendation follows.

RECOMMENDATION

AND NOW, this 14th day of July 2005, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED WITH

PREJUDICE. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability should NOT

ISSUE in that we do not believe that Petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ David R. Strawbridge 

DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01203-HB Document 10 Filed 07/14/05 Page 6 of 6