PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18

- 1749

___________

TROY REESE , Appellant

v. WARDEN PHILADELPHIA FDC

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for th e Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2

- 18

- cv

- 00902 ) District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR.

, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : September 21, 2018 )2 _________

OPINION

_________

FUENTES. Circuit Judge.

Pro se appellant Troy Reese appeals the District
Court’s order dismissing his petiti on under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

. Reese, who is awaiting criminal trial in federal court, raised claims challenging the evidence supporting the charges against him

, the conduct of the law

- enforcement officers who arrested and interrogated him , and the District C ourt’s refusal to release him pending trial. As we hav e previously stated, a
detainee’ s challenge to the conduct of law enforcement officers in connection with his arrest or the validity of the charges against him must be addressed in an appropriate
pretr ial motion. See Government of Virgin Islands v.
Bolones , 427 F.2d 1135, 1136 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam). We write to address a novel question in our Court: may a federal detainee challenge his pretrial detention via a § 2241 habeas petition? We join th e two other Circuits to have
addressed this issue and c onclude that a federal detainee’ s request for release pending trial can only be considered under the Bail Reform Act and not under a § 2241 petition for
habeas relief. See Fassler v. United States , 85 8 F.2d 1016,
1017

- 19 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Pipito

, 861 F.2d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987).

The events leading to this appeal began i n December
2017

, when Reese was charged in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with one count of us ing a facility and means of3 interstate or foreign commerce to attempt to induce, entice, or coerce a minor into engaging in sexual activity in violation of

1 8 U.S.C. § 2422(b). See E.D. Pa. Cr. A. No. 17

- cr

- 0631. Reese was arrested, and the Government fi led a motion for pretrial detention. The Government argued that there was probable cause to believe that Reese had committed the charged offense, which created a rebuttable pre sumption in favor of detention, s ee 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(3)(E) , and that
other f actors, including Reese’s criminal record and the length of the sentence he faced

, further militated in favor of
detention . A Magistrate Judge granted the Government’s
motion.

In Februa ry 2018, Reese filed the § 2241 petition at issue in this appeal. I n this petition, he claimed that the criminal charge was baseless , that the police had violated his constitutional rights in the course of arresting and interrogating him, and that he was entitled to be released pending trial. This filing was docketed sep arately from the criminal action, see E.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18

- cv

- 00902 , but assigned to the same District Judge.

In March 2018, Reese, through counsel, filed a motion for pretrial release in the criminal case. The District Court held a hearing and den ied the motion , concluding that the evidence against Reese wa s “overwhelming,” that Reese had numerous prior criminal convictions, that Reese had previously violated conditio ns of bail, and that Reese lacked ties to the community. Reese appealed that orde r. That appeal is pending at C.A. No. 18

- 1748

. 1

1 Counsel was appointed for Reese in that appeal, and the appeal has been stayed pending a final competency4 After denying Reese’s request for release in the criminal action, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition, and Reese instituted the appeal now before the
Court.

We have jurisdiction over this ap peal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. See Cradle v. United
States ex rel. Miner , 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Because Reese is a federal prisoner appealing the
dis missal of a § 2241 petition

, he need not obtain a certificate of appealability to proceed. See United States v. Cepero , 224 F.3d 256, 264

– 65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134 (2012)

.

Section 2241 co nfers on district courts the authority to entertain applications for a writ of habeas corpus filed by prisoners claiming to be “ in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .” § 2241(c)(3). Nevertheless, “a habeas c ourt is ‘not bound in every case’ to issue the writ.” Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (quoting Ex parte Royall , 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)). Thus, even in cases where the habeas court has the authority to grant relief, it must consider “whether th is be a case in which that power ought to be exercised.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Ex parte Watkins

, 28 U.S. ( 3

Pet. ) 193, 201 (1830) ) ; see also Timms v. Johns , 627 F.3d 525, 530

– 31 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing prudential concerns that may counsel against using habeas power ).

determination in the District Court. We express no opinion as to the merits of that appeal.5 Courts have consistently refused to exercise their habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought
relief before standing trial

. Instead, C ourts have long stress ed
that defendants should pursue the remedies avai lable within
the criminal action. See, e.g.

, Jones v. Perkins , 245 U.S. 390,
391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus
should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v.
United States , 199 U.S. 547, 5 51 (1905) (vacating order granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because
there was “ nothing in this record to disclose that there were any special circumstances whi ch justified a departure from the regul ar course of judicial procedure” of pretrial motions and, if necessary, appeal ) ; see also Medina v. Choate , 875 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) ( adopting “ the general rule that § 2241 is not a proper avenue of relief for federal prisoners awaiting federal trial ” ). 2

2 T he Supreme Court has suggested t hat pretrial habeas relief might be ava ilable to a federal defendant in “ exceptional
circumstances

. ” See Jones , 245 U.S. at 391; Johnson v. Hoy

, 227 U.S. 245, 247 (1913); see also Martin

- Trigona v. Shiff

, 702 F.2d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1983)

. Neither the Sup reme Court nor this Court has delineated the circumstances that might qualify as “exceptional” in this context. See generally
Medina , 875 F.3d at 1029 (“If a federal prisoner is ever entitled to relief under § 2241 based on something that happened before trial, the circumstances are so rare that they have apparently not yet arisen.”). We have ruled that a state prisoner may pursue a pretrial § 2241 petition without exhausting state remedies in “extraordinary circumstances

, ” which might exist when there is a showing of “ delay,6 Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the
criminal action encourages an orderl y, efficient resolution of
the issues , maintains respect for the appellate process, and prevents duplication of judici al work and judge

- shopping.
See United States v. Addonizio , 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.10 (1979) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal

, ” and that “[t]his rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is t o be maintained” (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann , 317 U.S. 269, 274 ( 1942 ) ); s ee also Medina , 875 F.3d at 102 8

– 2 9 ( identifying similar interests)

.

We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin
Islands v. Bolones , 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Ci r. 1970) (per curiam), to affirm the District Court’s denial of pretrial habeas petitions filed by federal defendants. We rejected the defendants’ challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the ground that a pretrial motion in the criminal case, “rat her than
their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the appropriate avenue of relief before trial .” Id. at 1136. We similarly held that the defendants’ claim that they had been denied a speedy trial should be resolved “ on an appropriate pretrial motion .” Id. Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law

-

harassment, bad fait h or other intentional activity” on the part
of the state. Moore v. De Young , 515 F.2d 437, 447 n.12 (3d Cir. 1975). We need not delimit the precise bounds of any exception here because Reese’s claims

— run

- of

- the

- m ill challenges to his indictment, arrest, interrogation, and denial
of pretrial release

— are not “exceptional” under any plausible
definition of that term

.7 enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal case, not via a pretrial § 2241 petition. See id.

Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for Reese to challenge his detention pending trial . The Bail
Reform Act of 1984

, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141

– 3150, provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial

- release decis ions.
See generally United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 742

– 43 (1987). First, a judicial officer will order the defendant’s
release or detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142. If an initial detention order is issued by a magistrate judge, the defendant
can file a mo tion asking the District Court to revoke or amend
that order. See id. § 3145(b)

. And, if the District Court denies relief, the defendant can file an appeal, which “shall be determined promptly.” Id. § 3145(c)

.

F or all the reasons discussed above with respect to Reese’s other claims

, federal defendants who seek pretrial release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail Reform Act, not through a separate § 2241 action. See
Fassler v. United States , 858 F.2d 1016, 1017

- 19 (5th Cir. 1988) (pe r curiam) ; United States v. Pipito , 861 F.2d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987) ; see also Stack v. Boyle , 342 U.S. 1, 6

- 7 (1951) (“ the District Court should withhold relief in this collateral habeas corpus action where an adequate remedy
available in the criminal proceeding has not been
exhausted ”). 3 The District Court therefore did not err in

3 In Bolones

, we sustained a challenge to a denial of bail in a habeas corpus proceeding , but we did not consider, and it appears that the parties did not raise, the pertinent question here about whether § 2241 is an appropriate vehicle to assert8 refusing to entertain the request for pretrial release that Reese pressed in his § 2241 petition.

For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial q uestion,” and we will hence summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d C ir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Reese’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. To the extent that any of Reese’s other filings in this Court request add itional relie f, they are denied.

such a claim

. See Grant v. Shalala , 989 F.2d 1332, 1341 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Questions which merely lurk in the r ecord, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Webster
v. Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)).