U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–748 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

U.S. SECURITY CONCERNS IN ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2000

Serial No. 106–112

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

PETER T. KING, New York

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JOHN MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MICHAEL P. ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director

DR. ROBERT KING, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MATT REYNOLDS, Counsel

ALICIA A. O’DONNELL, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command ..................................................................................................................... 3

Mr. Rust M. Deming, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 5

The Honorable Franklin Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................... 8

APPENDIX

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from Nebraska .. 32

Admiral Dennis C. Blair ......................................................................................... 35

Mr. Rust M. Deming ................................................................................................ 64

The Honorable Franklin Kramer ........................................................................... 68

The Honorable John Cooksey, a Representative in Congress from Louisiana ... 74

Answer provided by the State Department to question on page 9 from Hon.

Doug Bereuter ...................................................................................................... 75

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U.S. SECURITY CONCERNS IN ASIA

Wednesday, March 8, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:30 p.m., in Room

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Doug Bereuter (Chairman of

the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific meets today to examine U.S. security interests in Asia. The Chair would first like to express his gratitude to Chairman Sensenbrenner and the Science

Committee for graciously permitting us to use their meeting room.

We hope that the reconstruction on the International Relations

Full Committee hearing room will be completed in the next few

weeks. Perhaps this is the last time we will have to impose on another Committee for a suitable meeting room.

Congressman Lantos, the Ranking Member, is on a plane on the

way back from California. He has certainly expressed his willingness to have us proceed on time. I think in order that we complete

our hearing in a reasonable time, before we are interrupted by

votes, it is a good time to start.

Soon after I assumed the Chairmanship of this Subcommittee, I

tried to establish a set of guidelines which I sought to apply to this

Subcommittee’s oversight. In establishing these guidelines, my goal

was for them to reflect America’s vital and growing interest in Asia

and to provide greater assurance for the continuity of American engagement within the region.

The first immutable principle that I identified was the advancement of U.S. security interests in the region; thereby ensuring that

the U.S. remains engaged, committed to peace, and dedicated to

strengthening our alliance and friendships in the region. Historically and geographically, the United States has strong links with

Asia.

As a result, we have a fundamental interest in the peace and security of the region. Moreover, the nations of Asia have reciprocated by demonstrating a fundamental interest in keeping the

U.S. militarily deployed in the region. It is readily apparent that

every nation in Asia, with the possible exception of North Korea,

wants to see American military forces in the region for the sake of

stability.

We have our differences, but, overall, they are very pleased to

have us there. It is also important to reassure our Asian friends

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of our long-term commitment. I want to emphasize that I am a

strong advocate of enhanced military-to-military relations, high

level visits such as the visit to Asia that Secretary Cohen is just

now embarking upon, port calls, and appropriate military education and training programs can all serve a very positive function.

Such contacts can go a long way toward alleviating unnecessary

misunderstandings. Peaceful military exchanges may not always

turn adversaries into friends, but they certainly are an antidote to

fears that are based solely on ignorance. The training and education programs of the United States are aimed at enhancing the

professionalism and respect for civilian authority among the armed

forces of our friends and allies.

Admittedly, there are sometimes individuals selected whose participation in U.S. training does not bring the desired result. It is

absolutely clear to me that the overwhelming majority of those who

receive military education and training in the United States return

to their homelands as better, more responsible military leaders,

better steeped in the traditions of democracy and respect for

human rights.

Today, the United States has a forward-based military presence

in Asia because very real threats to the stability and the security

of the region still exist. Some of the major considerations include

the following. First, the recent escalation of threatening rhetoric by

the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan, backed by the increased deployment of missiles with what seems to be an overt attempt to again affect the outcome of the upcoming presidential

election.

In recent days, the PRC has issued a White Paper that holds out

the prospect of military action should Taiwan intentionally fail to

negotiate in good faith in the cross-strait dialogue. In addition, it

is now clear that China has acquired some of the most sensitive information regarding U.S. nuclear and missile technology, and it is

probable that it intends to use that knowledge to significantly enhance their nuclear strike capability.

Even more immediately alarming is the threat posed by North

Korea’s rapid moves toward the development of long-range ballistic

missiles. Of course, there is also understandable skepticism regarding whether the North Koreans have really stopped their nuclear

programs. There are also competing claims of sovereignty over the

scattered territories of the South and East China Sea, including

the Spratly Islands issue which directly involves China, Vietnam,

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan, as well as the

Senkaku Islands issue, which involves China, Japan, and Taiwan.

I would be remiss if I neglected to mention the seemingly everpresent tension between India and Pakistan (both nuclear-capable

nations), and the recent instability in Indonesia, both economically

and politically.

In short, the menu of priorities is large for those who place themselves in harm’s way. Today, this Subcommittee is honored to have

a very important panel of witnesses from the military and civilian

sides of the Executive Branch to share with us their views on these

and other important issues.

Our first panelist is Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief,

U.S. Pacific Command. Answering to the President and the SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:30 Jun 29, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64748.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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retary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

for the collective defense arrangements in the Pacific, he is commander of approximately 100,000 sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines deployed in the region.

Admiral Blair is the Chief U.S. military representative from Hawaii to the Indian Ocean, an area of over 100 million square miles.

This will be Admiral Blair’s initial testimony before this Subcommittee, having replaced Admiral Peruher in 1999. Admiral

Blair has only recently returned from an official visit to China, the

first high-level military visit since our mistaken bombing of the

Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

The Admiral is joined by Mr. Rust Deming, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. A career Foreign Service

Officer, Mr. Deming has served in numerous positions throughout

East Asia. This is likely to be his only opportunity to testify before

the Subcommittee in the immediate future, as his name has recently been put forward to be Ambassador to Tunisia. Congratulations, Mr. Deming.

Completing our panel today will be Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Prior to

assuming this position in 1996, Mr. Kramer served briefly as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs.

In the private sector, Mr. Kramer has been a partner in the law

firm of Shea & Gardner and President of the World Affairs Council

of Washington, D.C.

Admiral Blair, we will call upon you first. I have had a chance

to go over your testimony in some detail. I am not going to set any

limits on the time that you have to present your testimony. Your

entire statement will be made a part of the record. You may proceed as you wish after I ask Mr. Manzullo if he has any comments

that he would like to make.

[The statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. MANZULLO. No comments, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Very well, Admiral, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY,

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Adm. BLAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could just make a couple of points from my written testimony. I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee. I appreciate your interest in the military component of our

security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. As CINC, my bedrock

responsibility is operating trained and ready forces in support of

our interests in the region.

I have told your colleagues on the Armed Services Committee

that there are needs in the Pacific Command; needs that could not

all be met within current budgets. I am particularly concerned

about operating and maintenance funding for spare parts, exercises, and for the maintenance of our camps, posts, and stations,

and the quality of life of our people. On balance, I have the necessary forces and they are ready to do the job.

What is that job in the Pacific? First, there is deterrence of direct

threats to U.S. interests in the region. Our forces in Korea, with

reinforcements both from within the Pacific Command and from

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other supporting CINC’s, fighting with allies, are capable of throwing back a North Korean attack and then destroying the North Korean regime that launched it.

Our forces today can carry out our relationships under the Taiwan Relations Act, which are to resist any resort to force or other

forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, social, or economic systems of the people of Taiwan. Deterrence of immediate

threats is really just the beginning of trying to form a better AsiaPacific region.

We are working pro-actively to create a security framework there

which will favor American interests over the long-term. We are

working with traditional allies, like Japan, under the defense

guidelines to expand our cooperation from the defense of Japan to

dealing with threats in the region and encouraging greater Japanese participation in wider issues within the region.

We are also encouraging them to continue their support to our

mutual interests under the Special Measures Agreement, which

provides resources for the forces that we have stationed in Japan.

As you mentioned, we are reestablishing our military dialogue with

China. During my recent visit, I discussed areas of difference with

the People’s Republic of China, areas of potential cooperation, and

the best way to move forward to reach peaceful resolution of the

issues. Our vision is the creation of security communities in the region; communities that have dependable expectations of peaceful

change. The emphasis on cooperative behavior rather than formal

agreements makes this approach particularly suited to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, on the military side, we are knitting together many of our bilateral exercises into regional exercises.

We are directing them toward realistic scenarios of common challenges in the region, such as non-combatant evacuation, peacekeeping. Our participation in East Timor, I believe we are creating

a new model for U.S. participation in international relations. Australia lead the coalition and we supported it with contributions that

the United States is uniquely capable of making; airlift communications, mobility, intelligence, and planning skills.

I would like to mention one area in which I believe we could do

better, and you addressed it much more eloquently than I in your

opening statement. During this past year, our military relations

with various countries in the region—Indonesia, India, Russia, and

China—have been expanded and curtailed as actions have taken

place that are in the U.S. interest or against international norms

of behavior, and that is correct. There are two areas in which I

think we should continue to interact with these countries.

The first is education of their officers in our institutes of higher

military education. The second is participation in international

military conferences in which many countries participate in the

Asia-Pacific region, some of which we sponsor in the Pacific Command; others in which we participate.

These interactions, education, and international conferences are

very much in the interest of the United States. They expose officers

of other countries to our norms of behavior. They can help bring

reform and improvements within their armed forces.

So, in summary, Mr. Chairman, I bring you a very positive report on the military component of U.S. security strategy in the

5

Asia-Pacific region. We have the tools and are able to do our job.

As this Committee knows, and as you personally know better than

others, the Asia-Pacific region is a dynamic and vital part of the

world. What happens there is very important to the interests of the

United States.

Thank you.

[The statement of Admiral Blair appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Admiral Blair.

I know there will be a number of questions from this Member

and others. I would like now, however, to turn to Mr. Rust Deming,

Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs for

comments he wishes to make. Mr. Deming.

MR. RUST M. DEMING, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DEMING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your kind remarks in my introduction. Assistant

Secretary Roth, who has appeared before this Committee many

times, is traveling in the region. I am honored to be able to appear

here with Admiral Blair and Mr. Kramer to talk about our U.S. security interests in Asia and in the Pacific. My military colleagues

are focusing on the military aspects of security.

What I would like to do, with your permission, is to focus my remarks today on how our military efforts support our broader interests in the region. Ever since World War II, the American forwarddeployed military presence in our bilateral alliance structure has

been the foundation of security across the Asia-Pacific region.

Through the long years of the Cold War, the United States,

working with its allies, contained the Soviet threat and provided

the bulwark behind which many nations were able to build the

foundations for prosperity and stability. Together with our allies

and partners in the region, we created and maintained the environment in which Asian economies prospered and democracy has

grown steadily.

The solidarity of our alliances and our military presence in East

Asia made an important contribution to the successful end to the

Cold War by containing the threat of Soviet expansionism in the

Far East. The end of the Cold War represented the end of an era,

but not the end of the need for our key alliances or robust American military presence in the region.

Our interest in maintaining a secure environment to allow economies to develop, trade to grow, and democracy to spread has only

increased. The American naval, air, and ground forces deployed in

the Western Pacific, working with our alliance partners, continue

to play the critical role in maintaining a stable environment.

On the Korean Peninsula, we face one of the last residual challenges of the Cold War. As outlined by Secretary Perry in his review last year, we are addressing this challenge with a twopronged strategy. First, we maintain a strong deterrence on the peninsula through our alliances with the ROK and Japan, and our

forces stationed in South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere in the region.

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Second, we stand ready to improve relations with the DPRK as

it deals with issues of concern to the United States and our allies,

particularly in the missile and nuclear areas. This comprehensive

approach has the strong support of the ROK and Japan, which

fully share our view that diplomacy can only succeed if it is backed

with credible deterrence and resolve.

In Japan, our bilateral security relationship is as strong as it has

ever been and our bases there remain fundamental to our strategic

presence in East Asia. We have worked hard with the Japanese

government over the last few years to strengthen our alliance.

In 1996, President Clinton and then-Prime Minister Hashimoto

issued the U.S.-Japan Security Declaration, which set forth the

post-Cold War rationale for the alliance and called for revision of

the U.S.-Japan guidelines for defense cooperation to enable us to

cooperate more effectively in response to a regional crisis.

To further strengthen our alliance with Japan, we are working

with the GOJ to consolidate our base structure in Okinawa prefecture where almost half of U.S. Forces are stationed. We are also

expanding our research program with Japan on Theater Missile

Defense.

In Southeast Asia, we have worked in coordination with our treaty allies, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and with a number of other partners to strengthen regional stability. Our successful efforts in support of the transition in East Timor mark an important turning point.

The government of Australia, together with others in the region,

provided the leadership and the bulk of forces to respond to this

threat to stability in the region. The United States supported this

effort by providing several key capabilities for the multi-national

force that entered East Timor in October to restore security. These

included communications, logistics, and intelligence.

As part of our overall policy to engage China, we are seeking to

develop a relationship with China’s military, a subject that Admiral Blair has already addressed and Assistant Secretary Kramer

will address in more detail. Let me just say that our efforts to engage the Chinese military do not occur in a vacuum.

They occur within our commitment to ‘‘one China,’’ dialogue, and

to the peaceful resolution of differences, what we call the ‘‘three pillars’’ of our position, and within our commitment to faithful implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. They are also very much

affected by the overall atmosphere of the relationship.

In that context, let me comment briefly on the White Paper on

cross-strait relations issued by the PRC last week. The White

Paper states, in part, that Beijing would have reason to use force

against the island if Taiwan refused cross-strait negotiations on reunification indefinitely. That new formulation is unwelcome, and

we have expressed our deep concern to China at high levels, both

in Washington and in Beijing.

We have made it very clear that we are committed to seeing the

Taiwan issue resolved peacefully through cross-strait dialogue. As

you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, it is important to emphasize that

there is broad support in East Asia for a substantial U.S. military

role in the region. Japan and the ROK both demonstrate, through

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their host-nation support, the importance they attach to their alliances with the U.S. and to our forward-deployed presence.

A growing number of other countries in the region have also welcomed the opportunity to plan, train, and exercise with the U.S.

forces. Our military relationship with Indonesia remains difficult.

Military-to-military relations have been restricted for years because

of U.S. concerns about human rights abuses in Indonesia and in

East Timor, and over the issue of accountability for past atrocities

under the regime of former President Soeharto.

Because elements of the Indonesian military had backed militia

violence and devastation in East Timor, and as a means to secure

Indonesia’s acceptance of international peacekeeping operations,

President Clinton suspended, in September 1999, our remaining

military-to-military relations with Indonesia. We also have legislative restrictions under the Leahy Amendment, which affect our

ability to resume foreign military sales and IMET or EIMET. However, recently President Wahid has undertaken a bold program to

assert civilian control of TNI and to promote military reform. We

want to be supportive of this effort within the political and legislative constraints on renewing our military-to-military ties with Indonesia.

The Administration will continue to consult closely with Congress on step-by-step resumption of defense relations with Indonesia. We also strongly support the development of a series of regional organizations, including APEC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, which have brought countries and

economies together to improve economic cooperation and reduce

frictions.

In the security area, ASEAN has established, together with the

United States and the other dialogue partners, the ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss regional security and explore ways to reduce tensions, build confidence, and move toward preventive diplomacy.

The region continues to look more closely at various multilateral

fora, and the U.S. is taking a very active role in this. These organizations support U.S. interests in fostering prosperity and stability,

but they are not intended to be, and cannot be, mutual security organizations such as exist in Europe. They are not substitutes for

our bilateral alliances or for the U.S. military presence.

As we look ahead, we may need to adjust our position in our

military deployments in the region based on changes in the security environment. However, under any foreseeable scenario, it will

be in our interest, and in the interest of our allies, and the region

as a whole to maintain a formidable American forward-deployed

presence in East Asia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Deming appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

We will now hear from the Honorable Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs with the U.S.

Department of Defense. Mr. Kramer, you may proceed as you wish.

8

MR. FRANKLIN KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I fully agree with what Admiral Blair and Mr. Deming have said.

So, let me just make a few points. The importance of this region

perhaps is exemplified, as you have said, by the fact that the Secretary of Defense is leaving tonight for a trip to Hong Kong, Vietnam, Japan, and Korea. Just about 3 weeks ago, I came back from

my own trip to the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia.

Admiral Blair, of course, has just recently been in China. In other

words, we have an active and continuous involvement.

We have a policy that is built on four factors. One is our alliances: Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Close bilateral relationships like Singapore. The forward commitment that Mr. Deming mentioned of the 100,000 forces and you

mentioned yourself. We have a strategy of long-term engagement.

We have been working at that for the past several years.

The defense guidelines with Japan allow for that to be developed.

In Korea, the President of Korea has said that he welcomes continued U.S. presence, even after peaceful resolution of the situation

the peninsula. In Singapore, they have built a pier for one of our

carriers. That will be opened in December. In the Philippines, we

have signed the Visiting Forces Agreement. Admiral Blair’s forces

have been operating there, exercising there, and actually performing humanitarian assistance in the Philippines.

We have a continued outstanding relationship with the Thais on

all military issues and on some of the newer problems we have,

such as counter-narcotics. We are also building up on multi-lateral

dialogues. So, we have a tri-lateral dialogue among ourselves,

Japan, and Korea. It is a Track One political dialogue.

Additionally, the Defense Department has had a tri-lateral dialogue. I have led meetings for the past 2 years at my level with

counterparts in the tri-lateral relationship. We have challenges.

You have mentioned some. One, of course, is China. We have restarted. As I think Mr. Chairman, we had talks in January, the socalled Defense Consultative Talks with the Chinese military.

We have begun a defense-to-defense relationship fundamentally

because we know that the PLA is a very important actor in Chinese national security decisions because we want them to have the

opportunity to hear from us, because we want to have the ability

to influence them, and because we want them to be able to see our

capabilities to avoid miscalculation and provide transparency. The

Taiwan issue, of course, is a very important one, both long-term

and immediately.

I agree exactly with what Mr. Deming said and the Secretary

said the other day. We support the ‘‘One-China’’ policy. We support

and adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act. We look for resolution of

this problem by peaceful means and not by threats of the use of

force or of the use of force.

We take our relationships under the TRA very seriously, as Admiral Blair said, to ensure that the Taiwanese have a sufficient

self-defense capability. Last year, for example, we notified E-2 aircraft, Knox frigates, Stinger missiles, Harpoon missiles, torpedoes,

9

helicopters, and the like. So, it is a serious effort in order to ensure

that, that sufficient self-defense capability is maintained.

We also work on what we call software initiatives with Taiwan,

training C4I, logistics in order to make sure that not only do they

have the hardware, but they have the proper capability to use

them. While Taiwan is, of course, in the news, we should not forget

that North Korea has been and remains a very serious problem.

They have a missile program. We have been successful in having

them agree to a flight test moratorium.

It, nonetheless, is a fundamental issue for us. It underlies the efforts, as you are well-aware, Mr. Chairman, with respect to our

own national missile defense effort here in the United States. They

also have a formidable conventional capability, particularly artillery, as well as a chemical capability. So, North Korea is an area

that we have to look at very carefully, as Admiral Blair said.

We want to work in other areas. We see some real possibilities

in Indonesia. They are undergoing a democratic transition. I do not

think anyone 2 years ago would have expected this kind of change.

We have seen lots of positive things and obviously some difficult

problems, some of which were exemplified by what happened in

Timor this last summer.

We think that there are possibilities for real development here,

for real engagement to work, on the one hand with the Indonesians

as they want to, and on the other hand with the Congress because

we do have not only statutory limitations, but we ought to make

this a combined effort. We have had some recent support from the

Congress that we are very appreciative of.

We have a new Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative which is funded

by the conference. It allows us to do the multilateral exercising

that Admiral Blair mentioned. We are looking at developing a area

wide network to allow countries to get information from us, and we

have other programs, defense resources, and the like. We think

that there are lots of possibilities to ensure that our long-term involvement in the region is a positive factor for security and stability that will allow political and economic development to continue to go forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Kramer appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Secretary Kramer.

I have many questions for you. We will try to move back and

forth among those of us that are here. First of all, perhaps the

question will be directly primarily to you, Mr. Deming, but any of

the three of you may contribute of course.

I think it was you that mentioned the Leahy Amendment. Is the

Administration supportive of letting it expire at the end of this fiscal year?

Mr. DEMING. I am not sure we have taken a position on that. If

I may, I would like to consult with my boss, Stanley Roth, and others, but I will get you an answer on that.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would appreciate on that. I personally would

like to see it expire. I would like to know if in fact I have the support of the Administration on it so that I might try to weigh in on

that issue.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

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Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Kramer, you focused a little bit of your remarks on Korea. Anyone who has been in the area north of Seoul

understands why we have so many land mines and other kinds of

protective deployment factors and infrastructure in that area. It is

the one area of the world where we have made the case why we

need to have at least anti-vehicular mines for a foreseeable period

of time. It seems to me it was for 7 years or it was through 2007.

Do you think the United States has adequately made its rationale for its view on the importance of those land mines known in

the international community, in light of what the Canadians initiated in the way of a land mine moratorium?

Mr. KRAMER. As you have said, Mr. Chairman, we have a very

particularized need on the Korean peninsula. That was a factor,

both for the Secretary of Defense and for the President, in deciding

our position. I think that our position was very well-known. It was,

regrettably, not accepted by many countries, including some who

are our best allies, not only the Canadians, but the U.K. and others.

On the other hand, for those who, so to speak, live in tough

areas, Korea for example, they understand and support our position. I think it is important for us to continue to adhere to that position. It is possible through technological advances that we may

find some alternatives. The Department of Defense is working hard

on seeing whether there are alternatives. We do not yet have them.

Unless and until we get those, in order to ensure that we can do

what we need to do militarily, I think we have to stick with our

position. The Admiral may have some additional comments on it.

Adm. BLAIR. I think that is just right, Mr. Chairman. Because

of the position of the South Korean capital so close to the DMZ, a

very strong, early defense is necessary in that part of the country.

The capability that current stocks of land mines have is important.

Only if we develop something that will do the things that land

mines do can we support removing them.

Mr. BEREUTER. Admiral Blair and Secretary Kramer, as mentioned, we have approximately 100,000 uniformed personnel in the

Asia-Pacific region. In fact, the House has passed a resolution that

Chairman Spence and I initiated which endorsed that level of commitment at this point and encouraged the Administration in what

it has as a policy. In light of the budget that we have available to

the Department of Defense, do you think that level of commitment

to the region is sustainable?

Adm. BLAIR. From my point of view, I think to do the job I have

to do, both in terms of deterrence and a response to crisis and engagement, the combat capability that I have is necessary to do that

job. I do not see big reductions as allowing me to do that job. So,

I would prefer not to count individual people because some of that

mix changes based on the weapons systems you have and the way

the technology is helping you. The capability represented by that,

what is now about 100,000 people, is what I need to do the job that

I have. So, I think we need to find the resources to continue it.

Mr. KRAMER. If I can add to that. We, as I know you know Mr.

Chairman, put out about a year and a half ago our East Asia Strategy Review. It has the very same point that you have, which is to

say that we think it is necessary as a policy matter to maintain the

11

approximately 100,000 people. One of the things that we are trying

to do, and that is a part of Admiral Blair’s job as you said, is to

shape the environment to ensure that the need for deterrence, the

need for the actual use of force does not arise.

Having the forces out there is a very important factor in shaping

that environment. It is possible that, as a technical matter, you

could win the wars if you were back, but you will not have them

if you are forward, or at least we hope that. So, I think keeping

the forces out there is a very important factor to maintaining the

stability of the region. That stability is the basis on which the prosperity of, let us say, the last 20 years has been built.

Mr. BEREUTER. About 10 days ago I visited the U.S.S. Bataan in

a very different part of the world as the Bataan was, along with

ships, preparing to bring back to the United States, after a 6-

month deployment in the Mediterranean, a Marine expeditionary

unit, and a battalion—plus with all of its equipment. I was very

impressed, of course, with the capabilities and with the men and

women in that Marine expeditionary unit, with the Navy personnel, and with the Marines.

When we asked questions of the sailors—especially of the Marine

and Navy airmen—about capabilities, we got all of the expected

right answers. But when we visited with them individually, we

found they had a very different story to tell us on re-supply of parts

and what they needed to do their operation. Now, it is my assumption that this unit gets the best available when it deploys or its replacement deploys.

If they in fact have that shortage and if you have the shortages

that we saw with the F–16 units in Aviano which are related to

the Balkans region, I am wondering about whether or not we really

have enough resources coming to the military to do the job. As I

pose that question, I will ask you, Admiral Blair, am I correct in

understanding that we have such a Marine expeditionary unit deployed routinely in the Pacific region as well on a similar kind of

convoy of three ships?

Adm. BLAIR. That is correct. We have one amphibious-ready

group with an associated Marine Expeditionary Unit that is forward-based in the western Pacific. It is the amphibious ready

group which is currently centered around the Belleau Wood and is

about to be replaced by the U.S.S. Essex and the Marine Expeditionary Unit that is based in Okinawa.

We also rotate from the San Diego, Camp Pendleton area; another amphibious ready group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit

that goes through the western Pacific. It operates there in places

like East Timor, in places like Korea, and then often goes on to

Central Command. So, we have both the forward-deployed and a

rotational unit like the one you visited.

Mr. BEREUTER. Another thing that concerned me in talking to

several people, enlisted men and officers, is the impact on their

families of what they call the OPTEMPO. We are, at least in that

part of the world, deployed so often on peace enforcement missions

and for other disaster-related activities, for example.

One officer, for example, had spent only 3 months with his family

in the last 2 years, just by the cycle of how he happened to hit a

different ship in deployment. Now, I noticed the Defense DepartVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:30 Jun 29, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64748.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ment just enunciated a new policy which will go into effect prospectively, as I understand it. I do not know if it applies to active military, but I know it applied at least to National Guard and Reservists. The policy says that they will be deployed for no more than

6 months at a time.

I assume that this is a part of the response to the concern about

the impact on recruitment and the impact on quality of life of our

personnel. I wonder if you could also address that issue, either of

you.

Adm. BLAIR. Yes, sir. Let me take first crack at it; then if Secretary Kramer wants to add to it from the defense perspective.

First, back to your issue on the spare parts and the readiness. The

readiness trends within the Pacific had been declining over about

the last 18 months. Then, in recent months, they have stabilized.

They are lower overall than we would like, but they are not going

down now. There has been money put in, in terms of recent increases to bring them back up. We have not seen the effect yet. I

will give you an example of the counterpart to the Bataan, which

was the Peleliu amphibious ready group and the Constellation carrier battle group deployed during the course of last year.

Those units exceeded the deployed goals for the readiness of their

systems. We measure these pretty carefully under a standard system. Some of that was based on the people working harder, like the

people you have talked to when they were deployed, but also the

spare parts were getting there in time for them to be able to maintain it. Back at home, which was also a part of what those Sailors

and Marines that you were talking to were remembering, we are

still not where we should be. Our readiness between deployments

goes down further than we would like. We have to wrench it back

up higher in order to meet the deployment we need when we send

forces forward. So, we need to do more readiness work. The folks

you talked to are exactly right.

On what we call Personnel TEMPO, or PERSTEMPO, the Navy

establishes, and I work very hard to support guidelines on that,

which are basically that you are out for 6 months. You are back

for 12 months. Then you also spend a certain amount of your time

within home port. You would spend a certain amount over a rolling

3-year period. With about one exception, all of the forces in the Pacific have been able to meet that.

That is measured on a unit basis. So, there are individuals, such

as that officer you met, who was deployed in one unit, gets transferred to another one, and then he is deployed again. We do not

capture that. Staff are also under more stress because they are

running around doing exercises. The other services, the Marine

Corps and the other services, have similar policies that they track.

They do not meet them 100 percent of the time. But in most

cases which they do not, there is very careful attention to trying

to compensate for that. We all recognize that if a balloon goes up,

a big crisis or war, we all go do what we have to do. I can give

you one example of the kind of thing we do to try to alleviate that.

In East Timor, we were providing helicopters off of Navy amphibious ships for the operations. We provided two rotations of that.

First, the Belleau Wood. Second the Peleliu. When it came time for

the third one, we did not have an available big deck amphibious

13

ship or an associated Marine Expeditionary Unit that could meet

it while maintaining the Personnel TEMPO goals that we had.

So, what we did was let a contract to rent helicopters to provide

the support that we had committed to the Australians to provide.

We went out and spent Navy money, which would normally support a deployment, to do a contract to provide the helicopters and

avoid the U.S.S. Essex and Marine helicopters having to make that

deployment to precisely that region.

So, we watch it closely. We try to do it. We keep it pretty well

under control, but there are numbers of instances like the ones you

encountered when people do work harder than our expectations.

Mr. BEREUTER. These are types of questions you might have expected from the Armed Services Committee. I will get to international relations questions on China, Korea, and the Philippines

in a few minutes. I will turn now to my colleagues; first, Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you very much. We appreciate you coming

this morning. Admiral, there was an article that appeared in today’s paper, the Washington Times. I think you have seen it. It

mentions your name and spells it correctly.

Adm. BLAIR. That is high praise; is it not?

Mr. MANZULLO. That is high praise. That is correct. If you have

a name like Manzullo, it is kind of hard to spell. It talks about how

you spoke out against the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. It is

pretty unusual for somebody in the military to take a political position. First of all, I want to commend you for having the courage

to speak out. It is commendable, even though I may not agree with

you. The fact that you spoke out is commendable. That you are exercising independent judgment.

Did you read the article, Admiral?

Adm. BLAIR. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. MANZULLO. Obviously, you disagree with the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. For the record, tell us your objections to it.

Adm. BLAIR. Yes, sir. I did not volunteer my opinion. I was asked

it. What I told the Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee was that I applied two criteria to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. One, does it provide any authorities or capabilities

that I do not now have to carry out my responsibilities under our

policy? The Taiwan Relations Act is an important part of that, that

applies to me. The answer is no. It does not provide additional capability or authorities.

My second criteria was, what does it do in terms of working toward the right answer for Taiwan, which again is expressed in our

policy, which is to reach a peaceful resolution, which I believe is

the right thing for us, as well as the right thing for China and the

right thing for Taiwan. I think the Taiwan Security Enhancement

Act, in general, raises the degree of tension. It does not advance,

as far as a peaceful solution.

So, by those criteria, on balance, I do not think it is something

that is a good idea and I do not support it. That was the rationale

and that is the way I feel, sir.

Mr. MANZULLO. As I examined that particular piece of legislation, Mr. Bereuter, I believe you were the author of a good portion

of it.

14

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes. I offered the amendments that changed it

dramatically. I am hoping that Admiral Blair has seen the latest

version.

Mr. MANZULLO. As I read it, and even though I voted for it, I

came to the same conclusion that you did. It does not give the

United States any more authority to do things. It does not give us

access to any more materials with which to supply Taiwan. So, I

guess I read it the same way you did. Basically, it becomes a political decision that you do not think it would be proficient at this

time to raise the level of tension for a bill that essentially does not

do anything. That was your conclusion.

Adm. BLAIR. That is correct, Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. OK. I appreciate that. Thank you very much.

That is fine. I wanted to hear from the Admiral himself. He has

given a very clear answer on it.

Mr. BEREUTER. I call on Mr. Pomeroy from North Dakota, our

colleague.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the Admiral’s comments are extremely important and

need to be considered on this topic and on other topics. Goodness

knows we, in the House International Relations Committee, do not

to make your job more difficult, heighten the security tensions in

which your troops are performing so admirably without serving any

other particular good purpose, other than maybe press releases

back home. That would be terribly irresponsible of us.

I think we need to reflect carefully on what you have told us on

this matter. It does seem to be, and in looking at the last several

year history in this region, particularly between PRC and Taiwan,

an area where words matter very much, and where words can give

rise to reactions that build up hostilities or build up the threat of

hostilities significantly.

To this end, we are struggling a little with the PRC White Paper

that seems to expand the range of issues, the range of activities by

Taiwan whereby military force might be considered against Taiwan

by PRC. We are very familiar with that part of the argument.

There was a different dimension brought out in the Washington

Post today, an article that talks about maybe other aspects of the

very same paper that send mixed messages in this message.

The fact that President Lee’s two Taiwan policy was not explicitly repudiated in the White Paper, and indicates that potentially

this is a debate occurring internally within China, two ways of advancing their own positions, vis-a-vis Taiwan. There might be indeed a mixed message in the report. I would like you, Admiral, as

well as our other witnesses to comment on that Washington Post

analysis.

Is there something in here reflecting maybe a divide? If so, what

would be the best course for this Committee and Congress in terms

of advancing a more responsible dialogue with China and trying to

promote within China the more responsible view to move forward.

Mr. DEMING. If I may, Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you very much. I

have not read the Washington Post article, but let me just comment on our analysis of the White Paper, if I may. As I said in my

testimony, we are very concerned about this new formulation on

15

the use of force if Taiwan refuses cross-strait negotiations on reunification indefinitely that becomes a basis for China’s use of force.

I think it is extremely unhelpful, and we have made that view

known very strongly to the Chinese. At the same time, as you

noted, in reading the White Paper there are three elements that we

find that could facilitate cross-strait talks. The first is that the

White Paper calls for a cross-strait dialogue on an equal basis. We

find that as a positive step.

Second, it endorses a flexible agenda for such a dialogue, opening

the way for discussions of technical and economic, as well as political, issues. Again, we think that could be a potentially helpful

step. Third, although it very strongly criticizes the state-to-state

formulation, it does not demand that Taiwan renounce this formulation as a precondition for talks.

So, I think, on balance the troubling aspects of the White Paper

are very serious and need to be taken very seriously, but there are

these other aspects. In terms of the second part of your question,

I want to endorse Admiral Blair’s comments about our strong view

that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act would be a net detriment, not a net positive contribution, to the security of Taiwan,

and to try to move the China-Taiwan dialogue forward which, after

all, is fundamental to the security of Taiwan.

I think our position is, if it is not broken, do not fix it. We think

that under the existing Taiwan Relations Act, we can have the

kind of informal relationship, including in the military area, that

serves Taiwan interests fully, and serves our interests fully. So, I

think it would be in the interest of Taiwan and of the United

States not to move forward with the Taiwan Security Enhancement

Act.

I think also it is very important for all of us to keep reiterating

to the Chinese, in particular, that we are absolutely committed to

a peaceful settlement of the cross-strait differences, and that comments and threats of intimidation are extremely unhelpful, and essentially unacceptable to us.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you.

Mr. KRAMER. I read the article myself and I got copies of the

statements by Qian Qichen that were mentioned in it. I think it is

important to underscore that the White Paper is unhelpful. That

is a kind word.

Mr. POMEROY. Yes.

Mr. KRAMER. We are opposed to threats of force, obviously to the

use of force. The White Paper suggests, whereas before in effect the

conditions that the Chinese talked about potentially using force for,

were in effect changes from the status quo. The difference in the

White Paper is that because it says that there is a possibility of

using force if something is not done, then you have to have a

change to the status quo arguably.

Now, we do support cross-strait dialogue. We supported that

strongly. That, I think, is what the Chinese mean themselves when

they say there is no change. We do not agree with that. This is a

change. Having said that, the emphasis, and I would not want to

over-state, but the emphasis in the Qian Qichen statement is that

he urges—and this is just a quote out of FBIS article, I can give

this to you—he urges the Taiwan authorities to sit down with us,

16

the Chinese, for dialogue and discussion. So, I think the emphasis

there is the notion that this is to have talks to have a kind of

peaceful resolution. We have obviously had a lot of other comments

where the focus is somewhat different by Zhang Wannian, by Chi

Haotian, and by the White Paper itself.

Mr. POMEROY. On the second part of my question, the response

that we might have that will be constructive on our part and perhaps assist in some way the more constructive elements in the

PRC. Any comments on that? Maybe even a reflection upon the

permanent normal trade relations vote that some are going to try

and cross-link here to the White Paper?

Mr. KRAMER. I think we have to do a variety of things. One is,

I think, very important to talk quite straightforwardly to the Chinese. Admiral Blair was there after the White Paper. We actually

had a high-level delegation there just before. We will have other

contacts with the Chinese. The State Department has regular contacts with the Chinese. I think we need to emphasize the point

about peaceful resolution.

I think the Congress has a very important role in likewise emphasizing that point. With respect to how we ensure that they do

it, I do not think that we can ensure it. I think this is something

that has to be worked out step-by-step over time. I think if we are

clear on what our expectations are, our approaches are, and we are

firm in our approach, that has the best chance of a positive solution.

Adm. BLAIR. If I can add one thing, Mr. Pomery. What I noticed

when I was in China recently is that there is a tendency among

Chinese to try to determine who their friends are in the United

States and who their enemies are in the United States. This tendency, I think, to divide us up into pro-Chinese and pro-Taiwanese

Americans is something that we ought to fight against.

What we are talking about is an American policy here; what is

best for this Country. I think what is best for this Country is expressed in the policy that we now have; the support of ‘‘OneChina,’’ but the absolute insistence that it be achieved peacefully.

That is a commitment, like other commitments that we have in

Asia, and that is what American policy is in this.

So, do not look over there and see somebody who is favoring one

side or the other. What we are favoring is this thing that is in the

best interest of the United States and to keep clear on that. Keep

steady on that and not zig-zag. I think that is what is the best

thing for this country.

That was what I tried to tell the Chinese when I was over there

and explained that this is not a partisan political issue. This is a

national interest of the United States which we are talking about

in this region here and we are going to continue it.

Mr. POMEROY. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving

me this kind of time. Admiral, I think that says it precisely correct.

I voted against the Taiwan Security Act, but that does not mean

that I am pro-PRC as opposed to Taiwan on the question of ‘‘OneChina’’ and peaceful resolution of that, as opposed to any military

resolution.

I think that all of us, virtually 435 in the House, each and every

one of us stand very, very strongly on that point. If they are trying

17

to look at pitting one camp against the other, their making fiction

out of fact. We are resolved, I think, regardless of how strategically

we advance this strongly held position of ours in absolute unison

on the point that you just mentioned.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will turn now to Dr. Cooksey. The gentleman

from Louisiana is recognized.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement

that I would like to submit for the record.

Mr. BERMAN. Without objection, that will be the order.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you.

Admiral, my question has already been addressed to you to a certain extent. I still would like to distill it and come up with an answer. We need to make sure that these people do not go to war.

It just so happens that these are all people that look alike. They

are relatives. They are cousins, perhaps brothers and sisters that

are on opposite sides of the strait.

How can we send them a message that number one, they do not

need to go to war, but if they do threaten to go to war, and it involves our national interests, we might in some way intercede?

How can we send that message at a time when one group is talking

about independence and another group is talking about bombing?

How can we send them a message that this is the year 2000?

An hundred years ago at the beginning of the last century, probably less than 5 percent of the people in the world were under a

full democracy and had full voting rights, and that includes us. We

were not. There were segments of our society who could not vote.

But today, 48 percent of the 6 billion people are in democracies and

they can vote. How can we send the message to these people that

they need to tame the rhetoric and that probably we need to tame

our rhetoric here until at least after March 18th? It would be interesting to have a response from each of you.

Mr. DEMING. Thank you; if I may. First, I think that message is

very clearly there. It should be. The language of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 says the U.S. would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan, by other than peaceful means, a threat

to the peace and security of the western Pacific area, and a grave

concern to the United States. This is not simply rhetoric.

This has been demonstrated very clearly in our actions in 1996,

which the Admiral can address, and in our dialogue with the Chinese, and with Taiwan as well. The settlement must come through

a cross-straits dialogue. Rhetoric on either side, particularly on the

Chinese side, that threatens the use of force is not conducive to

producing that dialogue, which is the solution.

We are doing everything we can diplomatically and otherwise to

try to get that message through to the Chinese and indeed to reinforce that message with Taiwan. We hope that in the wake of the

election on March 18th, however it comes out, that there will be

a resumption of cross-straits dialogue. That is the key to reducing

tensions and to a long-term peaceful solution of this problem.

Mr. COOKSEY. Ambassador, can I have your opinion?

Mr. KRAMER. I agree with what Mr. Deming said. I think the additional point I would make, which was also made by the Taiwan

Relations Act, is that we need to keep an appropriate military balVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:30 Jun 29, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64748.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
18

ance in the Strait. We have a statutory obligation to do so, but we

would do so even if there were no statute because it is good policy

to do so.

We have actually acted in that way. I mentioned in my opening

statement some of the things we have actually done from a deterrence point of view. So that the combination of being very clear as

to what our national aims are, that they really should be seen as

national aims. That there is not really division among the parties

here. That we are clear in our messages. That we ensure the Taiwanese have the appropriate capabilities and that we maintain our

own capabilities in the Pacific Command.

Adm. BLAIR. I think we need to watch both words and deeds, Mr.

Cooksey. Right now, for instance, the military situation in that

part of the world is relatively normal. There are some small movements. If I look at them overall, I do not see China and Taiwan

increasing military actively. I know the United States is getting

ready for major exercises, operations in that part of the world. So,

as you look at the reality of the military situation there, it is closer

to normal than it is to crisis conditions. So, I think it is a combination of keeping cool, determined, and prudent in our military actions along with being consistent with our rhetorical actions.

I think talking directly with the Chinese and the Taiwanese

about it in those terms will get us through to the only solution

which makes sense to me in the long-term. I think it is in the interest of all three parties to this issue. That is working it out

peacefully in a long-term political sequence. So, I think it is just

keeping your head and keeping on course.

Mr. COOKSEY. Were you suggesting that maybe some of us do not

always keep our head with our rhetoric?

Adm. BLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. I am. I think it is true. I think it is interesting

to hear some of the comments here from my colleagues. These colleagues are all very thoughtful and introspective and made good

comments. There are some rather strident statements that come

from the House at times. I agree they do not serve any purpose,

particularly when it involves someone else’s politics.

Of course, they get involved in our politics too. Is there any

threat to the military from a political standpoint in terms of them

losing influence with, say, the current leadership of the PRC?

Adm. BLAIR. Could you phrase that again because I did not quite

get that?

Mr. COOKSEY. It is my understanding that the PRC, the military,

the Chinese Communist Army, has a lot of political strength in the

current communist government. Is there any threat to them losing

political power from any of the rhetoric, or will their political power

be enhanced by the rhetoric across the straits or from across the

Pacific?

Adm. BLAIR. I think if you will look at the last year at the combination of circumstances, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in

Belgrade, followed by the mob violence against our embassy and

consulates in China, followed by the break-off of military relationship at the rhetorical level, it has given them arguments for saying,

hey, we need more resources. We need to have more emphasis on

what we do.

19

However, at the end of that discussion, and at the end of the consideration, I think the four modernization criteria, which the PRC

has are still intact, which is that there are three modernizations

relating to science and technology, industry and agriculture ahead

of military modernization. The part is that the Chinese are concentrating on the development of their country ahead of modernizing

their armed forces. They recently announced themselves that they

have increased their defense budget, and they have.

Mr. COOKSEY. About 12.8 percent.

Adm. BLAIR. I would not believe figure number one that I heard

about the Chinese military budget. I do not think they understand

it themselves, much less us. There is this whole business of them

being involved in civilian enterprises, which some of them are divesting and some of them are not. So, I think you have to look at

what they are actually fielding and what they are actually doing.

What I see is them increasing, but not in a way that upsets the

fundamental balance there in the region. So, I think they gained

some in the course of the previous year of what happened over the

course of the last year. I do not see it making a decisive change.

I think the military balance across the straits, for the present, remains unchanged. But they are clearly building up. We have to

watch it.

Under the Taiwan Relation Act, we have to evaluate both what

we do ourselves and the degree of support that we provide to Taiwan. That is a part of what we are considering right now.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Deming, my closing question; on each side of

the strait, who is having great influence over Asia, Taiwan or PRC;

military, political, economic? That is an easy question.

Mr. DEMING. I think obviously China is an enormous country

with enormous economic, political, and military resources. China

sees itself as a major regional and indeed global player. It is increasing. It is becoming more active, as the Admiral has said,

building up its military forces. It is becoming much more active

diplomatically.

I think our objective is to try to ensure that, China’s diplomatic

activity, and its political and economic weight, are used in constructive areas. That is one of the primary reasons why we are supporting Chinese membership in the WTO and associated passage of

Permanent Normal Trade Relations Act because we think it not

only benefits the U.S. economically by getting us into the Chinese

market, but it helps the forces of reform within China, particularly

in the economic area.

That indeed spills over inevitably into the political area. The

whole focus of engagement is to try to make China as constructive

a player as possible in the region. China will be a greater player

politically. There is no question about that. The key is to try to influence it in a positive direction. That is our challenge.

Mr. COOKSEY. I think that is a good closing summary. My contact

with the Chinese people on both sides of the strait has been very

positive. I feel that the people that I have met in government are

very sophisticated and very enlightened, but yet when it comes to

their political rhetoric, they are just about, both sides, can be just

about as bad as we are here. We have had some examples of that

in the last few weeks. The message should be to the Chinese people

20

that we want them to have peace, and to have political stability,

and economic security, and security in general, if they can do all

of that without a war. I hope we are there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Cooksey appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey. I will come back to Mr.

Davis in a few minutes, if he has questions. I am going to start

then another round of questions. While I might comment later on

that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and the Taiwan Relations Act, I think it is important that we not forget there are other

countries in the region and other interests to pursue.

First, my view is that the kind of military relationship we have

with Singapore and Australia is extraordinarily beneficial to us at

this point as well as to them. Despite some status of forces differences from time-to-time with the Japanese and Republic of

Korea, that certainly is true with respect to those two key allies as

well.

We do not want to forget about the positive things that are happening in the region with respect to our security interests and our

relationships with the allies. Admiral, I understand that you have

just come back or at least concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement

with the Philippines. I wonder if you could outline that, particularly in light of recent news reports which suggest that the state

of the Philippine military establishment is in some decline and that

they may not be able to protect themselves, as one of the commentators recently suggested. What have you recently concluded

for the United States with respect to the Philippines? What do you

expect will happen in our relationship with them?

Adm. BLAIR. I think Secretary Kramer and I both need to answer

that because we each have a piece of it, but let me start from the

operational side, which is my purview, which is that the Visiting

Forces Agreement allowed us to undertake military exercises with

the Philippines which had been limited because our service people

did not have legal protection when they went into the country.

As a result of that, we have begun a modest port visit program.

The Seventh Fleet flagship Blue Ridge made a very successful visit.

There have been several since then. In addition, we just finished

exercise Ballicatan, which had traditionally been the major exercise

between the United States and the Philippines. It had been suspended during the period that the Status of Forces Agreement

lapsed before the Visiting Forces Agreement started.

So, this was a good step in reestablishing basic workmen like relations between the armed forces of the Philippines and our armed

forces. I think the military operational relationship is going to be

different in the future from what it was in the past. Previously, it

relied on big bases of the U.S. in the Philippines and very little

military activity by the Philippines themselves. Now, I think a new

chapter has been set.

The Philippines is assuming lead agent status for the United Nations. Transition authority in East Timor is really the model. Major

General de los Santos is now the military commander of the U.N.

force there. We did some planning with his staff and with him to

get ready for that operation.

21

We provided some material, for instance, vehicles that were refurbished and turned over to the Philippines which they are using

in East Timor or a part of that relationship. So, I think this is a

new chapter in which the Philippines assumes more of an operational role in this relationship, not simply this base support relationship, which was there in the past.

That being said, I think the armed forces of the Philippines need

to continue to concentrate on their own capabilities. The maintenance, the personnel support, and the other aspects of being able

to operate are less than they should be. We worked with the Philippines on doing that.

They have the lion share of that responsibility, which is to make

sure that the forces that they have can operate and can participate

with us in much more of an equal fashion than was true in the

past. That being said, we need to work out the relationship in

terms of sales and in terms of making assistance available to them.

I think Secretary Kramer has been really more in the middle of

that than I have.

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you very much. In addition to what the Admiral has said, we have had a series of high-level visits. The Secretary has visited the Philippines. The Minister of Defense of the

Philippines has visited us. I was just there in the Philippines and

met with Mr. Mercado and also with their Chief of Defense, General Reyes.

One of the things that we are doing to assist the Philippines is

doing what we call a defense expert exchange to help assess the

state of their forces and talk with them about the areas in which

we think they need to emphasize in order to modernize in what is

for them necessarily a resource-constrained environment.

Perfectly sensibly, their national priority is economic development, yet they still want to do some modernization. We are trying

to help them evaluate where you can put funds in the most costeffective way and the highest leveraging. When I was out there a

few weeks ago, Mr. Mercado accepted to have the team come. We

are actually in the process of doing that now.

We also, as the Admiral said, provide EDA defense articles from

time-to-time. We provided a cutter. I actually was a part of the

turnover ceremony for some of the trucks that the Admiral mentioned. We gave 145 EDA trucks. I think we have an approximate

similar number that are actually physically in Timor for them to

use. We need to continue to do training with them.

If I can put a pitch in to add to what the Admiral said in his

opening testimony, there is nothing that we do, period, from a military point of view that is more valuable internationally than the

IMET and the FMS training that we do. If this Committee could

do one single thing to enhance that IMET capability and to provide

that ability to work with these countries through the use of funding, it would be terrifically valuable.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. As you may know, in the last several

years, the International Relations Committee has authorized all requested funds. Your problems and my problems exist in certain elements of the Appropriations Committee in the two Houses. Those

elements are on both sides of the aisle.

22

Do you want to have another question, Mr. Pomeroy? I know you

have to leave so I will recognize you.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one other

question on the topic of North Korea and I do have to leave. I appreciate it. Thank you for your forbearance.

I would ask the Admiral if, from a security standpoint, as we

look at the unpredictable North Korea whether you are comfortable

with the approach advanced in the Perry report which basically

talks about maintaining a strong effect and then seeking improvements in a variety of strategies? I think some within Congress believe that the portion of activity that might be in the range of seeking improvements sends a message to North Korea that maybe we

are not as alarmed—bad conduct somehow in North Korea. Are you

comfortable with, for example, humanitarian assistance to address

the starvation in North Korea at a time that we maintain this very

vigilant defense posture relative to this unpredictable nation?

Adm. BLAIR. My main concern is the second half of the equation,

Mr. Pomeroy, which is making sure that we maintain strong deterrence and making sure that North Korea knows that if they start

a war with the United States and the Republic of Korea, it will be

the end of the regime.

Mr. POMEROY. Absolutely.

Adm. BLAIR. I have the confidence that that is true now. I think

that is the basis of whatever we had to do. Then as long as we have

that, the question is how do we make that happen in the best possible way. It is hard to make a military judgment on passing food.

I had talked to the people who supervised that food distribution.

I think they have a fairly decent system of checking that it gets

to civilians who need food. I am convinced that happens. You can

say that then frees food to be able to have well-fed soldiers. It is

the well-fed soldiers that threaten the United States. That is legitimate as well. Speaking personally, I think the American tradition

of helping those in need, whether they work for a country that is

oppressing them or not is the right thing to do. I do not think it

significantly affects the military balance. I am for feeding people

who are in need.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. BEREUTER. I will resume questioning. I should have mentioned a long-term positive relationship we have with the Thai

military. I assume that is in place today as well. Speaking of that

part of Asia, the ASEAN organization is an interesting experiment.

Generally, we are quite supportive of it on a bipartisan basis

It is an association of diverse countries, including a rogue regime

in one case, and recently expanded to include Vietnam, but it

seems to me that Asian offers a real opportunity for us to pursue

a variety of subjects since we are participants. Mr. Deming, you

can confirm my understanding that the U.S. participates. China

participates. Russia participates. I assume Australia and New Zealand do as well.

Mr. DEMING. Everybody, but North Korea.

Mr. BEREUTER. Speaking of North Korea, this is where I am

leading. Is this not an opportunity for us to more aggressively help

all of the countries in the region to understand the proliferation

difficulties that North Korea provides? Are we doing everything we

23

can to convince China that the North Korean missile development

program is in fact leading to a greater interest in theater missile

defense which they regard as a negative happening in the region

involving Japan and potentially Taiwan?

Mr. DEMING. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chinese have reached

that conclusion quite clearly.

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Albright has made that view forcefully

known to them, I know.

Mr. DEMING. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would imagine that Secretary Cohen has as

well.

Mr. DEMING. Yes. I think the Chinese on their own understand

the obvious consequences of the August 1998 launch of the

Taepodong-2 Missile over Japan on their interest. The Chinese are

quite quiet and subtle about exactly what they do, in terms of their

relations with North Korea. I think we have reason to believe that

they have played a constructive role.

They certainly played a constructive role in the four-party talks.

I think that that is one area where we and the Chinese do share

a fundamental security interest. We do not want to see a conflict

on the Korean peninsula. We would like to see North Korea evolve

toward a more peaceful society. The Chinese, of course, have their

own interest as well. They have a long historical relationship with

North Korea.

They treat it very delicately. But on balance, the Chinese have

been a positive force in that direction. We continue to encourage

them to play that role. More broadly on the ASEAN Regional

Forum, or ARF, as I mentioned, the only country in the region that

is not a part of the ARF right now is North Korea. We would very

much like to see North Korea get into that environment.

We think it would be very educational and constructive to get

them into the original framework. We have in ARF and in our bilateral contacts certainly emphasized our concerns about the North

Korean Nuclear and Missile Program. I think that has gotten some

resonance. Although frankly, we are disappointed that we have not

gotten more financial support for KEDO from our Asian colleagues,

except for Australia.

I think they do appreciate the security concern. They do attach

a lot of value to the efforts that we are making to try to implement

the Perry process. I know how difficult that is, given the history

of that regime.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to move to a question related to General Musharraf’s military government which we now find in Pakistan. I would welcome responses from anybody. Perhaps, Secretary

Kramer, you could give us the views of the Administration now on

what if anything we should be doing in military contact with respect to Pakistan.

Admiral Blair, what orders do you have? What involvement do

you have at this point? Are you directed to have, or are you encouraged to have with respect to the government of Pakistan? I asked

this on the eve of President Clinton’s visit to Pakistan, which was

a bit of a surprise to most of us, in light of what had been said

earlier.

24

Mr. KRAMER. The Admiral is free to answer. General Zinni is the

CINC that has that.

Mr. BEREUTER. You are right in correcting me on that.

Mr. KRAMER. He has his thoughts. As you said, the President is

going to go there. Right at the moment, we do not have any kind

of normal military engagement. Among many other reasons, there

are statutory limitations. Of course, there was the coup itself,

which even if there were not statutory limitations would have had

an impact on the policy.

What we have said and what I am confident the President will

say in substance, but we have previously done so, is we have focused first and foremost on the necessity of restoring a democratically-elected government. Second, which was true even before the

coup was the need for progress on the non-proliferation goals. That

is true for Pakistan. That is true for India, of course.

Third, we have issues with respect to cooperation on Afghanistan. We seek to have both the Pakistanis and the Indians improve

their bilateral relations. Then Pakistan, although this is really out

of my area, but it has an impact ultimately. It really needs to undertake a substantial economic reform. So, those are the broad categories of our overall policy.

From a military-to-military point of view in the sense of an engagement program that we have been talking about here, we really

are not ready to do that until there is progress on these goals. Obviously the President will be talking about this when he is in Pakistan.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Deming, do you know the Administration’s

point of view with respect to IMET and Pakistan?

Mr. DEMING. Mr. Chairman, the jurisdiction of my bureau stops

at the border of Burma. I think that if I started to get into trying

to make policy about India and Pakistan——

Mr. BEREUTER. I am just asking if you know what it is?

Mr. DEMING. I would be in real trouble. I am sorry. I had better

refrain from speculating.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. I do want to comment on my experience

with the Chinese military, which is not tremendous. Rhetorically,

these are the most belligerent people I run into when I go to China.

Perhaps it is because the State Department intentionally focuses

me on the most belligerent elements in the Chinese military. I am

not sure.

If anything, the deliverance it has gotten worse. We typically go

through an anti-Taiwan tirade at the beginning of the discussions.

I am wondering to what extent do you think their influence is increasing with respect to the leadership in China itself? I will try

you, Mr. Deming.

Mr. DEMING. I am not an expert on the PLA or Chinese politics.

I think that certainly the Chinese military has traditionally played

an important role in policy there. It continues to play an important

role. I think it is very difficult for us to determine with precision

exactly where the various influences are and what the balance is

at the moment.

It was instructive to me that if you looked at the statements

coming out of the National People’s Congress this week, over the

weekend, that there was a nuanced difference between the stateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:30 Jun 29, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64748.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
25

ments by the President, and by the Prime Minister, and by the

Vice Chairman of the Military Commission with the Vice Chairman

being much stronger and more confrontational.

I am not sure whether that reflects real policy differences or

whether it is simply that they are playing out different roles. There

is no question that the influence of the PLA is substantial in Chinese policy.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Admiral may have something to add to that.

Adm. BLAIR. I had the same experience you had, Mr. Chairman,

in the range of people I meet there. Those who are wearing uniforms are the most belligerent, the most hard-lined, and the most

aggressive. I think that when you read their papers, the military

newspapers are generally harder-lined and more opposed to the

United States than are the government papers.

When I was there, I went, for example, to the National Defense

University and talked to the President. I said, I read all of these

open press articles that come out of some of your faculty on how

to sink nuclear aircraft carriers, how to fight unlimited wars with

superpowers. What are you guys talking about? Is this what you

are really working on and planning to do?

Of both the President of NDU and the other leaders, the Chinese

military leaders, I asked the same questions. They said, oh, those

are personal views. They are not official views. The general tone

of the Chinese military official press and their conversations that

I have had with them are much harder-edged, more belligerent and

more aggressive than is the general line.

So, it is hard to conclude that they are playing a helpful role toward seeking the peaceful resolution that we favor. So, I think your

impression is correct. I think we ought to keep working the problem, but without a lot of illusions in terms of who we are dealing

with.

Mr. BEREUTER. Admiral, are the Chinese able to come to the

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies? That is an institution that

I think very highly of in its formative stage. Are they invited? Are

you able to invite them?

Adm. BLAIR. We are able to invite them at their expense and

they have chosen not to pay their way. I believe that we should,

in time, pay their way. As I say, I believe it is in our interest to

do so. But we are not to that point yet.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I did notice your comments in the appendix of your statement related to your desire to have the passage

of legislation with respect to the Center. My understanding is to

some extent, DoD has been pulling back at the request of certain

legislators, saying you need to deal with the schools in a more comprehensive fashion.

I am not sure if that is right, but I happen to be supportive of

what you have requested. We only got part of what you requested

in the past. Mr. Kramer, did I see you wanted to speak?

Mr. KRAMER. Yes, on that point. I have four Centers, so to speak.

We have one, as you well-know, the Marshall Center for Europe,

the Asia-Pacific Center, the Center for Hemispheric Studies for

Latin America, the Africa Center, and we are in the process of creating a fifth in the Near East/South Asia Studies which has money

in the POM.

26

It has been approved by the Secretary. So, number one, I think

we, DoD, and it is true of all of the CINC’s, as well as the Secretary, myself, and everyone else thinks that these are terrific institutions. We are not pulling back in any way in that regard. Secondly, we do need to watch the money, like we have to watch it

for everything else. These were started up, in a certain sense, in

an entrepreneurial way. What we are trying to do is to regularize

the budgetary process, and look at it in the overall.

We have created some mechanisms to do that so that we really

can get them into our so-called POM process, the budget process

in the right way. As far as I am aware, and I think it is indicative

by the fact that in the last year, we have had the first meetings

of the Africa Center. We have the approval to start the Near East/

South Asia Center.

The DoD is strongly behind these, including the Asia-Pacific Center, which I think everyone agrees is a very effective institution.

You may have some particular points on that, Admiral.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you expect to offer legislation in any fashion

related to the schools?

Mr. KRAMER. We do not need the legislation right now to do the

schools. We are obviously doing that. I have personally asked to

have all of the directors, and for that matter, the CINC’s to have

legislation to overcome some of the particular problems. For example, there are some issues as to where we can accept money to support the schools. Can we have outside foundations and those kinds

of things give us money? Again, what is the governmental organization? There are some particular things that could be, I think, improved. One of the Centers has that problem.

It is the Asia-Pacific Center. Whereas the Marshall Center had

some Marshall Center specific legislation that allows them to do it.

So, we do want to regularize some of the stuff. It is a long way to

say, yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Admiral Blair, do you want to add

onto that?

Adm. BLAIR. Yes, sir. We do seek the same authority that the

Marshal Center has, which is the authority to waive the fees in

order to bring someone to the Center at our expense when we consider that to be in our interest. Second, to be able to accept not

only foreign, but also domestic contributions to foundations which

support these Centers to be able to defray student costs.

We have received partial authority to do that in the Appropriations Bill last year. But we would like the Authorization Bill to establish that authority which the Marshal Center has on a full-time

basis so that we can reach the objectives of the Center.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. KRAMER. I would just say, just because I did not mention the

waiver point, there is no difference. We all agree with that. We

would like to have that for all of the Centers, including the AsianPacific Center.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am interested in helping you on that. We are

going to have a series of votes. I am going to turn to Dr. Cooksey

for a last question. Then I might have time for a concluding statement on Taiwan. Dr. Cooksey.

27

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An economics question;

I will give you the question and make a couple of other comments.

The economic slow-down in Asia started a few years ago, 2 or 3

years ago. I think it really began in Taiwan. I am sorry, in Thailand. I have a feeling that they are coming out of it.

What is going to be the first nation to come out of it and be back

to full steam? What are the major players? Which ones are going

to be the last ones to come out? Which ones are going to be the

laggards? I would ask you, are any of you economists? You have

impressive resumes. Are any of you economists?

Mr. KRAMER. A long time ago, I graduated with a degree in economics.

Mr. COOKSEY. I have two young guys on my staff that are Stanford economics graduates. I told them today that I had learned that

an economist is someone that likes to play with numbers but does

not have enough personality to be a CPA; so, with that preface.

Mr. KRAMER. My children would agree with you. I think that is

probably a good thing for Mr. Deming to talk to. I can add my impressive economics resume to whatever he says.

Mr. COOKSEY. These are bright young guys and I depend on

them heavily. They are a lot better prepared than I am.

Mr. DEMING. I took Samuelson 101 and 102. I think I will get

in real trouble with Larry Summers for speculating about the future of the Asian economy, but let me do it anyway. I think we

really have been impressed in the last few months with the speed

with which the Asian economies are coming out of the financial crisis.

Thailand is moving perhaps most rapidly. The ROK is moving

quite rapidly. In even Indonesia, there is positive growth. This, in

a way, is very good news. It has a very positive psychological effect.

There are still a lot of problems to be overcome. Unemployment is

still higher than it was in most countries when the financial crisis

began.

There are a lot of structural problems that need to be undertaken. Indeed some people in Asia argue that the recovery has

been too fast because it has taken away the crisis kind of attitude

that they needed to have to make the hard reforms. Now, there is

a sense of relief that they do not really have to do all of these hard

things, which they really do need to do to get their economies back

in order.

I would think that probably the ROK and Thailand are leading

the pack. Indonesia, of course, has a lot of other fundamental problems, along with in political difficulties. So, that is the country we

probably worry about most.

Mr. COOKSEY. Indonesia?

Mr. DEMING. Indonesia; the interconnection of uncertain political

issues and uncertain economics. Still, the Chinese that fled during

the disturbances 11⁄2 to 2 years ago have not come back in large

numbers. There is still uncertainty. So, investment from outside is

not being attracted in any great numbers. Reform is not proceeding

as rapidly as it should. So, that is a snapshot of, I think, where

things stand.

28

Mr. COOKSEY. Do you think the Asians in this part of the world

will ever be able to make the structural changes that even Europe

seems laggard in achieving?

Mr. DEMING. My own view is they are going to have to. I think

globalization is a fact of life. There is resistance to it. There is frustration about it. In Japan, we have seen the urge for or the push

for reform has slowed down. For these countries to compete in the

new global market, they are going to have to reform. It is a painful

process. It will take a long time. There will be a lot of social dislocations that go with it, and a certain amount of backlash. But I

think the long-range outcome is inevitable.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.

We had some earlier discussion about the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. I do hope the people who are critics of the act, from

many directions, will look at the act as passed by the House, which

is far different than the one introduced in the Senate and which

was then reintroduced in the House. It is far different.

Having said that, I would have preferred that it not pass in this

period of time. You can only stand in front of converging freight

trains so long. You do your best to make it a responsible piece of

legislation.

I recall that the Taiwan Relations Act was passed a couple of

months after I arrived here in 1979. It was passed over the objection of President Carter and the Administration because of Congress’ concerns about what had happened at that time. I know that

any Executive Branch of either party would probably have opposed

it, just as they opposed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. I

do think that a variety of people in this country, including some

of my colleagues, need to have an adversary. We have some Cold

War warriors that probably complicate our situation.

On the other hand, I do think that some things that President

Clinton said in his visit to China and his perceptions of what he

might have felt and intended have complicated the matter. Those

comments have also given strength to concerns that the U.S. needs

to take a less ambiguous role with respect to the defense of Taiwan, if in fact Taiwan is threatened with invasion.

I thought that Speaker Gingrich, when he visited China on a trip

in which I accompanied him, had it right when he said to President

Jiang Zemmin, ‘‘You understand and I have a House resolution

backing it up, that we will defend China, if you attack it.’’ Instead

of getting the usual anti-Taiwan tirade, President Jiang Zemmin

simply said, ‘‘We do not intend to attack.’’

During that meeting, we went on to a productive discussion on

a variety of other issues. Then the delegation went to Taiwan. The

same message was given to President Lee that they as well should

not be provocative in what they did on that side of the strait. This

was conveyed directly from the Speaker, reinforced by several

Members, including myself.

I do think this Administration (and it is true of the previous

ones), however, has forgotten that parts of the Taiwan Relations

Act require consultation with the Congress on defense issues, including weapons systems. That consultation has not taken place to

29

my knowledge. People in positions that should know if it is taking

place, in addition to myself, most directly people on the Armed

Services Committee and in certain Appropriations and Intelligence

Committees, also say it has not taken place.

That is not strictly a Republican complaint. That is a bipartisan

complaint. The Executive Branch, and not just this Administration,

has to ask if it is doing what we it is required to do under the Taiwan Relations Act, knowing full well that things are accentuated

and exaggerated here as ethnic politics plays its role in this Congress.

There is no place like this country in that anything that happens

anywhere on the globe has ramifications in this country. We have

people who have come from those far corners of every part of the

globe. They have their abuse, their remaining loyalties, and they

try to affect the political process. Sometimes we forget about what

our national interest really is.

So, if I ever have a chance to Chair the International Relations

Committee, I promise to put a banner in the back of the main hearing room with just one question that faces people every day. That

is, ‘‘What is our national interest?’’ I think we are at the time

where I need to go to vote. I want to thank you gentlemen for taking time out of your very busy days to come to Congress and spend

some time presenting your views and answering questions for those

Members of the Subcommittee who could be here.

It is an unconventional time to have a hearing for a variety of

reasons. However, I thought it was important that we have a

chance to hear from Admiral Blair when he is in town. Gentlemen,

thank you very much again for your testimony today and for your

responses.

This Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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MARCH 12, 2000

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