FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADREE EDMO, AKA Mason Edmo, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CORIZON, INC.; SCOTT ELIASON; 

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTION; HENRY ATENCIO; 

JEFF ZUMDA; HOWARD KEITH 

YORDY; RICHARD CRAIG; RONA 

SIEGERT, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

MURRAY YOUNG; CATHERINE 

WHINNERY, 

Defendants.

No. 22-35876 

D.C. No.

1:17-cv-00151-

BLW 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
2 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

Argued and Submitted March 5, 2024

Seattle, Washington

Filed April 5, 2024

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould, 

Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY**

Prisoner Civil Rights/Attorneys’ Fees

The panel reversed in part, affirmed in part, and vacated 

in part the district court’s award of $2,586,048.80 in 

attorneys’ fees to plaintiff Adree Edmo, and remanded, in an 

action in which Edmo obtained an injunction requiring 

defendants the State of Idaho, private prison company 

Corizon, and individual Idaho prison officials to provide her 

with adequate medical care, including gender-confirmation 

surgery. 

The panel held that Edmo was entitled under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988 to fees incurred litigating her successful Eighth 

Amendment claim. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”), however, the district court erred in 

* The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 3

calculating the lodestar amount to include fees incurred 

litigating unsuccessful claims advanced in the complaint, 

even if those claims were premised on the same facts that 

supported Edmo’s Eighth Amendment claim. Similarly, 

Edmo should not have been awarded fees on the Eighth 

Amendment claim against individual defendants who were 

dismissed from the action in a prior appeal. The panel 

vacated the district court’s fee award and remanded for 

recalculation of the lodestar amount to include only fees 

incurred litigating Edmo’s successful claim against the 

defendants who remained in the case. 

The panel held that the district court did not err by 

applying an enhancement to the lodestar amount given that 

Edmo’s counsel operated under extraordinary time pressure 

and that the customary fee for counsel’s services is well 

above the PLRA cap. The district court also reasonably 

found that Edmo’s counsel achieved excellent results in what 

may properly be viewed as a landmark case. Because the 

panel vacated the underlying lodestar amount, however, the 

panel deferred ruling on whether the district court’s use of 

1.7 and 2.0 multipliers to enhance the lodestar was proper. 

The panel instructed the district court to reconsider on 

remand the amount of the enhancement after it recalculates 

the lodestar amount.
4 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

COUNSEL

Lori Rifkin (argued), Rifkin Law Office PC, Oakland, 

California; Dan Stormer, Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP, 

Pasadena, California; Craig Durham and Deborah Ferguson, 

Ferguson Durham PLLC, Boise, Idaho; Amy Whelan, 

National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Joshua N. Turner (argued), Deputy Solicitor General; 

Gregory E. Woodard and Andrea H. Nielsen, Deputy 

Attorneys General; James E.M. Craig, Deputy Division 

Chief; Raul L. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General; Idaho 

Attorney General’s Office, Boise, Idaho; Bradley S. 

Richardson and Robert R. Gates, Garrett Richardson PLLC, 

Eagle, Idaho; Steven R. Kraft, Moore Baskin and Elia LLP, 

Boise, Idaho; Peter E. Thomas, Moore Elia & Kraft LLP, 

Boise, Idaho; for Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Defendants the State of Idaho, private prison company 

Corizon, and individual prison officials in this appeal

challenge the district court’s award of $2,586,048.80 in 

attorneys’ fees to plaintiff Adree Edmo for time spent 

litigating this civil rights action. Defendants contend that the 

district court erred in both its calculation of the lodestar 

amount and its subsequent enhancement of the amount. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse in 

part, affirm in part, and vacate and remand for further 

proceedings.
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 5

BACKGROUND

Edmo filed this action while incarcerated at an Idaho 

prison in 2017. Edmo alleged violations of the Eighth 

Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 

Clause, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and negligence under Idaho 

law. The district court initially granted in part and denied in 

part Defendants’ motion for dispositive relief, with the 

denial in part being on exhaustion grounds. While the 

district court was considering the motion for dispositive 

relief, Edmo moved for a preliminary injunction based on 

three of her claims: the Eighth Amendment denial of medical 

care, the Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination, and the 

ACA sex discrimination. Edmo sought an injunctive order

requiring Defendants to provide Edmo gender-affirming 

medical care, including gender-confirmation surgery, 

hormone treatment, and gender-appropriate clothing and 

personal items. The motion also sought to prohibit 

Defendants from implementing the prison’s gender 

dysphoria policy and from retaliating against Edmo because 

of her gender identity.

The district court ordered expedited discovery and 

conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing. After that 

hearing, the district court granted an injunction on Edmo’s 

Eighth Amendment claim and ordered Defendants to 

“provide Edmo with adequate medical care, including 

gender-confirmation surgery.” Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of

Correction, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1129 (D. Idaho 2018). 

The district court made findings of fact, and its injunction 

was effectively permanent. Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of

Correction, No. 1:17-CV-00151-BLW, 2019 WL 2319527, 

at *1-2 (D. Idaho May 31, 2019). The district court denied 

preliminary injunctive relief on Edmo’s Fourteenth 
6 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

Amendment and ACA claims because the record had not 

been sufficiently developed. Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1128-

29. The district court did not rule on the other remedies that

Edmo had sought.1 Id. at 1129.

Defendants appealed, and the injunction was stayed. We

initially ordered a limited remand instructing the district 

court to clarify issues of mootness. See Case No. 19-35019, 

Dkt. 92. When the appeal returned and was considered on 

the merits, we affirmed the district court’s decision except as 

it applied to five defendants in their individual capacities. 

Case No. 19-35017, Dkt. 96. Defendants petitioned for en 

banc review, which was denied. Id., Dkt. 105. We partially 

lifted the stay of the injunction, and Edmo received genderconfirmation surgery in July 2020, even as Defendants 

petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id., 

Dkts. 113-114. After a writ was denied, the parties engaged 

in settlement negotiations that led to Edmo voluntarily 

dismissing the remainder of her claims. 

The district court awarded Edmo $2,586,048.80 for

attorneys’ fees incurred up until the injunction became 

permanent and all appeals were resolved. The figure was 

based on the lodestar and a subsequent enhancement, for 

which the district court used 1.7 and 2.0 multipliers for local 

and out-of-state counsel, respectively. Defendants appeal 

the award, claiming that the lodestar, the application of an 

1 The district court deferred ruling on Edmo’s request to enjoin 

enforcement of the prison’s gender dysphoria policy because the prison 

had revised the policy after Edmo filed her motion. Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 

3d at 1129. Because the new policy appeared to allow Edmo access to 

gender-appropriate clothing and personal items, the court also deferred 

ruling on those remedies. Id. The district court did not expressly rule on 

the other remedies sought by Edmo, such as hormone treatment and 

retaliation.
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 7

enhancement, and the amount of the enhancement were 

erroneous.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Attorneys’ Fees Generally

A. Standard of Review

The district court has broad discretion in calculating

attorneys’ fees. A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 

446, 450 (9th Cir. 2013). We review fee awards for abuse 

of discretion and “affirm unless the district court applied the 

wrong legal standard or its findings were illogical, 

implausible, or without support in the record.” Gonzalez v. 

City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(internal alteration and quotations omitted). The district 

court also must “fully explain[] its reasoning in making an 

award.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Lodestar and Enhancement

To calculate attorneys’ fees, courts in the Ninth Circuit 

use the two-step “lodestar method.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 

1202. The first step is to determine the presumptive lodestar 

figure. Id. The court begins by tallying the number of hours 

an attorney reasonably expended on the prevailing party’s 

case. Id. The court then multiplies the number of hours by 

a reasonable hourly rate, based on evidence of the market 

rate for the services provided. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 

F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). The result of this 

equation is the lodestar figure, which is treated as a 

presumptively reasonable award.

After calculating the lodestar figure, the court proceeds 

to the second step: considering whether to enhance the award
8 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

based on the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 

Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). These factors are:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the 

legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of 

other employment by the attorney due to 

acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, 

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or 

the circumstances, (8) the amount involved 

and the results obtained, (9) the experience, 

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, 

(10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the 

nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client, and (12) awards 

in similar cases.

Id. The lodestar is presumed to include (or “subsume”) at 

least some of these factors, and an enhancement can be

justified only in “rare” and “exceptional” cases where the 

presumption is overcome. See Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 

1085, 1103 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 

U.S. 542, 553-54 (2010)); see also Morales v. City of San 

Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996) (enumerating 

factors presumptively subsumed in lodestar).

C. Multiplier

If an enhancement is justified, then the court “may adjust 

the lodestar upward . . . using a ‘multiplier.’” Van Gerwen 

v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2000). A multiplier must be supported by “specific 

evidence” of the typical hourly rate for comparable services 
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 9

in the relevant forum. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del.

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 

(1986)). Specific evidence is often provided by expert 

testimony. E.g., Trulsson v. Cnty of San Joaquin Dist. 

Attorney’s Office, 2014 WL 5472787, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

28, 2014); Leuzinger v. Cnty of Lake, 2009 WL 839056, at 

*12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009); Steward v. Cnty of Santa 

Clara, 2022 WL 94911, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022). 

“[T]he general rule is that the rates of attorneys practicing in 

the forum district . . . are used” unless the moving party 

presents evidence that a different rate should apply. See 

Gates, 987 F.2d 1405.

II. Attorneys’ Fees in Prisoner Civil Rights Cases

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 

(“§ 1988”) allows attorneys’ fees to be awarded to a plaintiff

who prevails in a civil rights action brought under § 1983. 

42 U.S.C. § 1988. The scope of most § 1983 fee awards is 

guided by the Supreme Court’s Hensley decision, in which 

the Court created a two-step analysis for assessing fees in 

cases involving both successful and unsuccessful claims. 

See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-40 (1983); 

Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). Under 

Hensley, when a case involves claims based on “different 

facts and legal theories,” id. at 434-35, the plaintiff is not 

entitled to fees for an unsuccessful claim “that is distinct in 

all respects from his successful claims,” id. at 440. In sharp

contrast, if a lawsuit consists of related claims—with similar 

legal theories or a “common core of facts”—then the court 

proceeds to the second step, where the “most critical factor 

is the degree of success obtained.” Id. at 435, 440. The 

measure of success is the “overall relief obtained,” not the 

success of individual claims. Id. at 435. If the plaintiff

achieves a high degree of success, then under the Hensley 
10 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

rule, time spent on unsuccessful claims may be included in 

the lodestar calculation. Id. at 440.

Although Hensley remains good law and is controlling 

in most § 1983 cases, the enactment of the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”) displaced Hensley in actions brought 

by prisoners. As we have explained, “[i]n actions by 

prisoners, it is not enough that fees are authorized under 

[§ 1988]” because the PLRA explicitly limits awards to fees 

“directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 

violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 

910, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(d)(1)(A)); see also Kelly, 822 F.3d at 1103 (“The 

PLRA alters the lodestar method in prisoner civil rights 

cases . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 104-21 at 28 (Feb. 6, 1995) 

(expressing Congress’s intent to “narrow[] the judicially 

created view of a ‘prevailing party’” in prisoner cases). 

Under the PLRA, only fees incurred litigating successful 

claims are compensable, and time attorneys spend on 

unsuccessful claims must be excluded from the lodestar 

calculation. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2003). Unlike Hensley, the PLRA excludes 

unsuccessful claims even if they are based on related legal 

theories or share a “common core of facts” with a successful 

claim. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-21 at 28 (noting the PLRA’s

“[n]arrowing the definition of ‘prevailing party’ will 

eliminate . . . attorney fees incurred in litigating unsuccessful 

claims, regardless of whether they are related to meritorious 

claims”).

Although the PLRA alters the lodestar in prisoner civil 

rights cases, the standard broadly governing when to give 

enhancements under § 1988 (discussed supra) applies 

equally to PLRA cases, notwithstanding the PLRA’s cap on 
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 11

the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Kelly, 822 

F.3d at 1103; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (requiring 

that hourly rate be capped at 150% of rate used for appointed 

counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). 

The PLRA rate is treated as presumptively reasonable but 

may be enhanced under appropriate circumstances. Kelly, 

822 F.3d at 1103.

DISCUSSION

I. Lodestar

The district court’s lodestar calculation here included 

time Edmo’s attorneys spent on both successful and 

unsuccessful claims. Although the district court cited both 

Hensley and the PLRA, its determination that unsuccessful 

claims were compensable because they shared a “common 

core of facts” with the successful Eighth Amendment claim 

was a rationale clearly rooted in the theory and language of

Hensley.

The district court erred by including in the lodestar time 

that Edmo’s attorneys spent on unsuccessful claims. The 

district court’s reasoning, as we see it, was inconsistent with 

the limiting language of the PLRA. The district court’s error 

may in part have been caused by a failure of our court to be 

explicit enough about how the PLRA had limited and 

modified the general rules derived from Hensley and normal 

civil rights practice, in cases brought by prisoners. We hold 

that Edmo is fully entitled to fees incurred litigating her 

successful Eighth Amendment claim. But we also hold that

Edmo is not entitled to fees incurred litigating the 

unsuccessful claims advanced in her complaint, even if those 

claims are premised on the same facts that supported her

Eighth Amendment claim. 
12 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

Similarly, Dannenberg holds that Edmo also should not 

be awarded fees on the Eighth Amendment claim she 

brought against several individual defendants who were 

dismissed from the action on appeal.2 Dannenberg, 338 F.3d 

at 1075. We hold that the district court must recalculate the 

lodestar to include only fees incurred litigating Edmo’s 

successful claim against the defendants who remained in the 

case. We therefore vacate the district court’s attorneys’ fees 

award and remand for recalculation of the lodestar.

II. Enhancement

The district court applied an enhancement to the lodestar 

based on the following Kerr factors: “the customary fee” 

charged by similar attorneys in the market, “time limitations 

imposed by the client or the circumstances,” “the amount 

involved and the results obtained,” and “awards in similar 

cases.” Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. 

The district court did not err in applying an enhancement. 

As an initial matter, Defendants do not contest that Edmo’s 

counsel operated under extraordinary time pressure and that 

the customary rate for counsel’s services is well above the 

PLRA cap. The district court reasonably applied these 

factors, which were supported in part by uncontested expert 

testimony. 

The district court also reasonably found that Edmo’s 

counsel achieved excellent results in what may properly be 

viewed as a landmark case. Edmo was the first person to 

2 To the extent it is difficult or impossible for the district court to identify 

fees specifically related to certain claims or defendants, it is within the 

district court’s discretion to apply a percentage reduction based on the 

district court’s reasonable estimate of the time spent on unsuccessful 

claims or dismissed parties. 
EDMO V. CORIZON, INC. 13

obtain a court order compelling a prison to provide genderconfirmation surgery. Edmo’s counsel successfully 

defended this ruling through several appeals. Defendants 

attempt to downplay this success and incorrectly assert that 

the district court’s order compelling this relief (along with 

our published opinion affirming) “did not create binding 

precedent.” 

The district court also properly considered awards in 

similar cases to determine whether an enhancement was 

justified. The degree of success Edmo achieved is no less 

than that achieved in other cases in which enhancements 

were granted based on the same Kerr factors. E.g., Kelly, 

822 F.3d at 1103 (affirming enhancement where counsel 

“obtained a contempt finding and secured significant 

remedies for their clients”); Balla, 2016 WL 6762651, at *11 

(applying enhancement where attorneys conducted effective 

discovery on short notice). Defendants cite other district 

court cases in which enhancements were denied, but the 

existence of contrary persuasive authority does not render 

the district court’s determination an abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination 

that there should be an enhancement to Edmo’s fee award.

III. Multiplier

As to the precise amount of the enhancement, we defer 

ruling on whether the district court’s use of 1.7 and 2.0 

multipliers to local and out-of-state counsel, respectively, 

was proper in light of our decision to vacate the underlying 

lodestar amount. As a general rule, a multiplier is normally

selected after the lodestar amount is correctly determined. 

See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. We hold that the district 

court here should reconsider the amount of the enhancement 

after it recalculates the lodestar. 
14 EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part as to the 

district court’s calculation of the lodestar, affirm in part as to 

the application of an enhancement, and we do not consider

the amount of the enhancement. We vacate the district 

court’s attorneys’ fees order and remand for recalculation of 

the lodestar and reconsideration of the amount of the 

enhancement. To the extent that litigation costs apart from 

fees are impacted by our ruling, the district court is 

instructed to reconsider that portion of its award as well.