Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC13-2091

____________

JOSEPH EDWARD JORDAN, 

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee.

[October 8, 2015]

CORRECTED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction 

of first-degree felony murder1and a sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See

art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we affirm Jordan’s 

convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

 

1. Jordan was also convicted of robbery with a firearm or other deadly 

weapon.
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Joseph Edward Jordan lived with Keith Cope in Edgewater, Florida, and was 

also an employee of Cope’s construction company. On or about Friday, June 26, 

2009, Jordan and Cope partied together, drinking and using drugs. As they partied, 

Jordan asked Cope for money that Cope owed Jordan for construction work he had 

completed. Cope claimed that he did not have the money to pay Jordan even 

though Cope had money to pay for drugs. Jordan then pistol-whipped Cope; tied 

him up; took his money, guns, and drugs; and drove away with his Ford F-450 

truck. Later that evening, Jordan appeared at the Hollywood, Florida, residence of 

his friend and former coworker Mathew Powell. Mathew’s girlfriend, Sadia 

Haque, was also present when Jordan arrived. Jordan eventually shared with 

Mathew that Cope was literally tied up and that Mathew could go to Cope’s house 

and clean out his gun safe, but Jordan did not want to go back to the Daytona 

Beach area or go near Cope’s truck. Mathew decided to go, and asked his brother

and ex-girlfriend, Marlon Powell and Cassandra Castellanos, to go with him.

Mathew, Sadia, Cassandra, and Marlon left Hollywood and arrived at 

Cope’s house on Sunday, June 28, 2009, at approximately 6 a.m. Mathew and 

Sadia entered Cope’s residence when no one answered the door. Mathew did not 

immediately see anyone after he entered, so he continued to search the house. 

When he walked into the back bedroom, he saw Cope at the foot of the bed, 

suspended by rope that was attached to it. Mathew removed tape from Cope’s 
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mouth and cut off the rope from Cope who then fell to the floor. Mathew then 

attempted to cut the tape from Cope’s legs. Sadia called 911, and first responders 

arrived shortly thereafter.

Detective Eric Seldaggio of the Edgewater Police Department responded 

with another officer to Cope’s house. Mathew, Sadia, Cassandra, and Marlon met 

the officers and directed them inside to the back bedroom. When Detective 

Seldaggio entered the bedroom, which strongly smelled of urine, he observed Cope 

lying at the foot of the bed with his hands bound behind his back and duct tape 

wrapped around his head and neck. Cope’s ankles were also bound with duct tape 

and rope. Mathew indicated that he had cut a rope that was tied on the bed and 

wrapped around Cope’s arm. Detective Seldaggio also observed rope tied to the 

four bedposts, a roll of duct tape on the bed, and rope embedded in Cope’s left 

bicep that had turned a greenish color and was cold to the touch due to suspension 

by that arm for a lengthy period of time. According to a responding emergency 

medical technician, Cope initially appeared deceased, but after multiple layers of 

duct tape were cut from his head to free his airway, Cope opened his eyes and 

moaned. Cope was later transported by ambulance to the hospital where he 

underwent emergency surgery to amputate his left shoulder and arm.

A day after the amputation, Cope’s treating physician, Dr. Melinda Rullan, 

learned that Cope had been bound and gagged for three days. Based on her review 
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of Cope’s medical records, Dr. Rullan concluded that Cope’s body was “literally 

dying.” Dr. Rullan determined that Cope entered the hospital in critical condition 

with a life-threatening illness related to a compartment syndrome of the left upper 

extremity. He had little or no blood pressure, suffered from cardiovascular 

collapse and multiple organ failures, and had multiple clots throughout his body. 

Cope also developed acute signs of a left-sided stroke and lung complications. His 

original physical examination evidenced that he had bindings on his right wrist and 

both ankles and dead tissue on his right wrist, arm, and both feet. Cope was 

unresponsive upon entering the hospital and remained unresponsive until his death 

on July 13, 2009, after being removed from life support. Medical examiner Dr. 

Marie Hermann opined that “Cope died as a result of complications of being bound 

and gagged for days, including ischemic gangrene of the left upper extremity, 

bilateral cerebral infarctions, and bronchopneumonia.”

Following interviews with the four people who found Cope in his bedroom, 

Jordan was arrested on July 18, 2009, and indicted by a grand jury for one count of 

first-degree murder and one count of robbery with a firearm or other deadly 

weapon in August, 2009. On April 19, 2013, a jury found Jordan guilty of firstdegree felony murder of Cope and also convicted him as charged on the robbery 

count. During the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a 
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vote of ten to two for the murder conviction. Following the August 2013 Spencer2

hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of death for the murder conviction and a 

life sentence for the conviction for robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon. 

In imposing the death sentence, the trial court concluded that the three aggravating 

circumstances,3 which were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, far outweighed the 

one statutory mitigating factor and thirty-seven nonstatutory mitigators.4 This is 

Jordan’s direct appeal.

 

2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

3. The three aggravating circumstances were: (1) prior violent felony—little 

weight; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in 

the commission of a robbery and the capital felony was committed for pecuniary 

gain were merged together as one aggravator in order to avoid improper

doubling—great weight; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel (HAC)—great weight.

4. The trial court found one statutory mitigating factor was proven: the

capital felony was committed when the defendant was under the influence of 

extreme mental or emotional disturbance—moderate weight. The following 

nonstatutory mitigating factors were considered: (1) the defendant had a history of 

mental illness and hospitalizations—moderate weight; (2) the defendant suffered 

from a closed-head injury or injuries as a child—little weight; (3) the defendant 

was physically and emotionally abused by his mother—little weight; (4) the 

defendant has a sister who loves him and will maintain a loving relationship with 

him—little weight; (5) the defendant has the capacity to form loving relationships 

with friends and family members while in custody—little weight; (6) the defendant 

had good grades in school and obtained his general education degree—little 

weight; (7) the defendant has a long history of substance abuse and was 

hospitalized because of cocaine abuse—some weight; (8) the defendant was ill as a 

child and used an oxygen tank for two years—little weight; (9) the defendant is 

bipolar and takes a prescription medication to stabilize his moods—some weight; 

(10) the defendant’s parents were divorced when he was twelve years of age—little 
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weight; (11) the defendant gave shelter to a homeless friend—little weight; (12) 

the defendant was employed as a carpenter on cruise ships and was a hard 

worker—little weight; (13) the defendant has two children—little weight; (14) the 

defendant was aware that his mother drove her car into another car in a fit of 

rage—little weight; (15) the defendant tried to commit suicide on three 

occasions—some weight; (16) the defendant has an IQ score within the average 

range—little weight; (17) the defendant has a memory impairment related to the 

effects of multiple head trauma—some weight; (18) the defendant has verbal 

memory weakness from mild traumatic brain damage—little weight; (19) the 

defendant was diagnosed as a juvenile with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder and was prescribed Ritalin—little weight; (20) the defendant had multiple 

prescription drugs to help with his mental health problems—some weight; (21) the 

defendant suffers from depression—little weight; (22) the defendant suffers from 

panic attacks—little weight; (23) the defendant has a severe substance abuse 

history—some weight; (24) the defendant received substance abuse treatment at 

fourteen years of age—some weight; (25) the defendant was attending Alcoholics 

Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous—little weight; (26) the defendant is very 

nice and would perform random acts of kindness to others—minimal weight; (27) 

the defendant acts differently when he is on his medications as compared to when 

he is off his medications—some weight; (28) the defendant has loving and kind 

relationships with friends—little weight; (29) the defendant was not taking his 

bipolar medications at the time of the crime—some weight; (30) the defendant had 

a loving relationship with his father—little weight; (31) the defendant had 

cigarettes extinguished on him as a child by his mother—little weight; (32) the 

defendant’s mother would purposely humiliate and embarrass the defendant in 

front of other people—some weight; (33) the defendant would not react with 

violence while being abused by his mother—little weight; (34) the defendant is a 

hard and diligent worker in many fields—minimal weight; (35) the defendant’s 

adoptive brother loves the defendant and will maintain a loving relationship with 

him—little weight; (36) the mother of the defendant’s child still loves the 

defendant and claims that he has a good heart—little weight; and (37) the 

defendant’s family and friends do not want him to be sentenced to death—little 

weight. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the nonstatutory mitigator that 

the crime was committed in an unsophisticated manner was not established and 

therefore not given any weight.
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On appeal, Jordan raises six issues: (1) that the trial court should have 

declared a mistrial due to the prosecutor’s improper statements during closing 

arguments; (2) that the trial court erred in finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 

aggravating circumstance; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

the victim impact statements into evidence; (4) that the trial court declined to find 

as a mitigating circumstance Jordan’s ability to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of the law was substantially impaired; (5) that the sentence of death 

should be reversed under this Court’s proportionality review; and (6) that Florida’s 

death penalty statutory scheme is facially unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 

536 U.S. 584 (2002). Additionally, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to 

uphold Jordan’s convictions. For the following reasons, we deny each of Jordan’s 

claims on appeal. We also find that there is competent, substantial evidence to 

sustain Jordan’s convictions.

DISCUSSION

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Jordan argues that the trial court should have ordered a mistrial due to ten 

comments made by the State during its guilt-phase closing argument. We review a 

trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. 

See Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2008). 

“A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to 

ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.” Cole v. State, 701 So. 
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2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997). Stated differently, “[a] motion for a mistrial 

should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the 

entire trial.” England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006); 

see Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1997) (“A mistrial 

is appropriate only where the error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the 

entire trial.”). Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s 

ruling will be upheld unless the “judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, 

or unreasonable . . . . [D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable 

[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Trease v. 

State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (second alteration in 

original) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990)). 

Thus, “[i]n order for the prosecutor’s comments to merit a new trial, 

the comments must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial 

trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or 

fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory 

that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict 

than that it would have otherwise.”

Id. at 372.

In this case, Jordan asserts one preserved prosecutorial misconduct claim. 

He argues that the prosecutor impermissibly attempted to sway the jury by giving 

the impression that the State’s interpretation of felony murder was supported by 

caselaw. We have held that “[i]t is appropriate for an attorney who does not 

misstate the law to relate it to the facts of the case in closing argument.” Kaczmar 

v. State, 104 So. 3d 990, 1006 (Fla. 2012). However, “[t]he correct practice does 

not permit counsel to read authorities to the jury, and while counsel may submit his 

[or her] theory of the law in written requested charges, it is the function of the trial 

court to charge the law applicable to the issues in the case.” Id. (quoting Tindall v. 
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State, 128 So. 494, 498 (Fla. 1930)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second 

alteration in original).

During closing arguments of the guilt phase, the prosecutor made the 

following statement:

So let’s take a look at the first-degree felony murder instruction. 

To prove the crime of first-degree felony murder, the State must prove 

the following three elements:

Keith Cope is dead. Agreed by both sides and testified to by 

every witness.

The death occurred as a consequence of and while Joseph 

Jordan was engaged in the commission or attempting to commit a 

robbery.

The way the caselaw interprets that, the way the law - -

Defense counsel objected, and the parties approached the bench outside the hearing 

of the jury. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, arguing that it was 

improper for the State to support its theory of the case in closing argument with 

caselaw. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had not reached the point that 

any damage was done and cautioned the State to stay away from arguing caselaw. 

The prosecutor then continued:

Back to point number two, ladies and gentlemen, the death occurred 

as a consequence of and while Joseph Jordan was engaged in the 

commission of attempting - - or attempting to commit a robbery. The 

way that this phrase is interpreted, you see, Joseph Jordan committed 

a robbery. There’s no doubt. But under this phrase, it may look like 

Keith Cope has to die there in the house. That’s not what the law 

requires. The law requires the injury to have occurred during and as a 

consequence of the robbery. Joseph - - or Keith Cope can die later. 

He can die outside the home. He can die in the hospital sometime 

later. The law doesn’t require him to drop dead immediately on the 
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scene. That - - that would reach a preposterous result in the law, and 

it isn’t the purpose of the felony-murder instruction.

This portion of the transcript shows that defense counsel’s immediate 

objection to the prosecutor’s mention of the word “caselaw” precluded the 

prosecutor from stating any case names or citations of cases or to explain the facts 

or holdings of any cases. During his remaining argument, the prosecutor did not 

mention the term “caselaw.” Rather, he explained to the jury how the law was 

applicable to the evidence presented at trial, i.e., that Cope’s immediate death at 

the crime scene was not a required element of felony murder. Such an explanation 

is a permissible argument. See Kaczmar, 104 So. 3d at 1006. Therefore, the 

isolated comment did not deprive Jordan of a fair trial. See Card v. State, 803 So. 

2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001) (denying mistrial where an isolated reference to a phrase 

by the prosecutor during closing arguments was not so prejudicial as to vitiate the 

entire trial). Moreover, although defense counsel declined a curative instruction, 

the trial court later properly instructed the jury regarding first-degree felony 

murder. Thus, we find that the trial court properly denied defense counsel’s 

motion for mistrial.

Jordan also contends that the prosecutor’s statement, “Don’t let him get 

away with this,” constitutes an improper comment. Because Jordan failed to 

contemporaneously object to this comment, we apply a fundamental error review. 

See Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 837 (Fla. 2012) (citing Brooks v. State, 762 
- 11 -

So. 2d 879, 899 (Fla. 2000) (defining fundamental error as that which “reaches 

down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could 

not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”)). “If this 

Court finds a comment to be improper, factors to be weighed in determining 

whether an improper comment rises to the level of fundamental error include 

whether the statement was repeated and whether the jury was provided with an 

accurate statement of the law after the improper comment was made.” See Poole 

v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 415 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct 2052 (2015).

Specifically, Jordan challenges the following statement in the prosecutor’s 

rebuttal closing argument: 

You can find him guilty of first-degree murder or guilty of such 

lesser-included charges. That’s second degree, third degree, 

manslaughter with a weapon or manslaughter. Ladies and gentlemen, 

you can go all the way down the list, but the law tells you find him 

guilty of the highest one that’s been proven. Sure. Look at the 

instructions. They may all apply in this situation because of the way 

this thing developed, they may all apply. I mean, you may be able to 

technically find him guilty of all of them, but you should find him 

guilty of the highest one that has been charged and proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. And in this case it’s first-degree murder, felony 

murder, first degree. And when you get over here to - - to the 

robbery, count two right up here, count two, robbery with a fire 

weapon - - firearm or deadly weapon, right here on the first line, 

guilty of the charge of robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon, 

exactly what he confessed to, exactly what he told you he had done. 

Don’t let him get away with this. Yeah. I mean sure. You can come 

down the list again if you want to. I mean, he’s technically guilty of 

all of them. Robbery with a weapon, yep. Robbery, yep. Grand theft, 

did he steal something without any force? Well, he stole something, 

but he - - he used force. I mean, yeah. You can come down the list, 

but there’s no reason to. The law says to return it to the highest crime 
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And, ladies and gentlemen, it is 

right there. It is choice number one.

(Emphasis added). Within the context of the argument, the prosecutor told 

the jury that there were lesser-included offenses, and he listed them. He then 

beseeched the jury not to let the defendant get away with first-degree felony 

murder if that was the crime for which they chose to convict him. 

While we find the comment was indeed improper, we do not find that the 

prosecutor’s comment rises to the level of fundamental error. The prosecutor 

mentioned the comment only one time, and after saying, “Don’t let him get away 

with this,” the prosecutor still invited the jury to consider the lesser-included 

offenses. Also, the trial court read the standard jury instructions, which included 

an accurate statement of the law with regard to first-degree felony murder and the 

lesser-included offenses. See Poole, 151 So. 3d at 418.

Finally Jordan raises eight additional claims of prosecutorial misconduct 

during closing arguments in the guilt phase. We find those claims meritless and 

unpreserved for appellate review. See Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133, 139 

(Fla. 1991). We also find that none of the comments, taken individually or 

cumulatively, constitute fundamental error. See Braddy, 111 So. 3d at 837 (citing

Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001)); see also Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d

1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007). Accordingly, we deny relief for these claims.

Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Circumstance

Jordan alleges that the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating 

circumstance may not be applied to him because he did not know Cope would die 
- 13 -

or how he would die when Cope attempted to extricate himself from his bindings. 

We find this claim to be without merit.

In Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla. 2010), we explained the 

proper standard of review for aggravating circumstances:

“The standard of review this Court applies to a claim regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating circumstance is 

that of competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v. State, 965 So. 

2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007). “When reviewing a trial court’s finding of an 

aggravator, ‘it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to 

determine whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance 

beyond a reasonable doubt—that is the trial court’s job.’ ” Aguirre–

Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 608 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Willacy v. 

State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)). Rather, it is this Court’s task 

on appeal “to review the record to determine whether the trial court 

applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if 

so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.” Id.

(quoting Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695).

“ ‘[I]n determining whether the HAC factor was present, the focus should be 

upon the victim’s perceptions of the circumstances as opposed to those of the 

perpetrator.’ ” Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 497 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. 

State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003)). We further explained in Russ v. State, 73 

So. 3d 178, 196-97 (Fla. 2011), that

HAC concentrates “on the means and manner in which the death is 

inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, 

rather than the intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim 

experiences the torturous anxiety and fear of impending death.”

Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002) (citing Brown v. 

State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998)); Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 

182, 194 (Fla. 2001). Thus, there does not need to be a showing that 

the defendant intended or desired to inflict torture; the torturous 
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manner of the victim’s death is evidence of a defendant’s indifference.

See Barnhill, 834 So. 2d at 850 (citing Brown, 721 So. 2d at 277). 

The victim’s mental state may be evaluated in accordance with 

common-sense inferences from the circumstances. See Hernandez v. 

State, 4 So. 3d 642, 669 (Fla. 2009) (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 

2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)). To support HAC, the evidence must show 

that the victim was conscious and aware of impending death. 

Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 669 (citing Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 

1261 (Fla. 2004)). However, this Court has explained that the actual 

length of the victim’s consciousness is not the only factor relevant to 

HAC—“Fear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim during the 

events leading up to the murder may make an otherwise quick death 

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 669

(quoting James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997)).

Finally, we have repeatedly upheld the HAC aggravating circumstance in many 

cases involving the beating death of the victim. See Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 

1046 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 85 (2013); Lawrence v. State, 698 So. 2d 

1219, 1222 (Fla. 1997).

The record demonstrates that the trial court applied the correct rule of law. 

Further, in finding the HAC aggravating circumstance, the trial court detailed the 

slow, tortuous death of Cope at the hands of Jordan:

The evidence showed that the victim was found, hanging from 

his own bed by ropes and duct tape, drifting in and out of 

consciousness. The Medical Examiner and treating physicians 

testified to the jury as to the especially painful process leading to the 

victim’s death. Those witnesses testified as to the terrible pain and 

the psychological anguish the victim would have suffered leading up 

to his slow death.

The evidence did show clearly that the victim was robbed on 

June 25, 2009, by the defendant and the victim was beaten, held at 

gun point, and pistol-whipped by the defendant. The victim had duct 

tape wrapped numerous times around his head, covering his mouth 
- 15 -

and part of his nose. His wrists and ankles were also bound by tape 

and rope. Further, he was tied to the four corners of his bed and left 

there to struggle.

Prior to his discovery, the victim was left alone tied to his bed 

for three days. During [those] three days, his body slowly shut down, 

and his arms and legs turned cold and circulation was slowly lost. 

The evidence showed that he had abrasions on his wrists and ankles as 

he struggled to get free from the ropes.

He was found three days later still partially on the bed soaked 

in his own urine.

The medical testimony showed the victim suffered from 

dehydration, acidosis, and rhabdomyolysis, renal failure, aspiration 

pneumonia, lower right lobe bronchopneumonia, splenic infarctions, 

abrasions, from being bound and gagged, lacerations to his mouth, 

and bilateral cerebral infarctions. The medical testimony clearly 

showed that these injuries were the direct result from being bound and 

gagged for the three days before the victim’s discovery.

In addition to the above described injuries, the victim had an 

acute injury to his left arm which was created during his failed attempt 

to free himself. Gangrene had started in one of his arms, because of 

the tight ropes, which led to his arm and part of his shoulder being 

amputated at the hospital prior to his death.

Though it was unknown how long the victim was left hanging 

partially off the bed and suspended by the ropes, the medical evidence 

suggested that it probably was at least 6 hours. Testimony before the 

jury by one of the doctors indicated that in the doctor’s opinion, on a 

scale of 1 to 10 for pain, the pain suffered by the victim would have 

been a 10.

These findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, especially 

considering that there does not need to be a showing that Jordan intended or 

desired to inflict torture in the instant case. See Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 

850-51 (Fla. 2002); see also Patrick, 104 So. 3d at 1053-54, 1067 (affirming the 

finding of HAC where the victim was beaten, had his head and face taped, had his 
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ankles and hands bound behind his back, and was left in a bathtub on his stomach). 

Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim.

Victim Impact Statements

Jordan argues that the trial court erred in admitting victim impact statements 

because they were so prejudicial that they amounted to a nonstatutory aggravator 

and violated his due process rights and section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes. We 

disagree.

“A trial court’s decision to admit victim impact testimony is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion.” Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 211 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S. Ct. 1547 (2014). We have stated the following with regard to the use of 

victim impact statements and their admissibility:

In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the United States 

Supreme Court held that the State may seek to introduce victim

impact evidence if it concludes that such evidence “about the victim 

and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant 

to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be 

imposed.” Id. at 827. The admission of victim impact evidence is 

protected by article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, and is 

also specifically governed by section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes.

Kalisz, 124 So. 3d at 210-11. Because Jordan’s crimes were committed on or 

about June 25, 2009, section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2008), applies, which 

states as follows:

(7) VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE.—Once the prosecution has 

provided evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating 
- 17 -

circumstances as described in subsection (5),

[5]

the prosecution may 

introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact evidence to the jury. 

Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim’s 

uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the 

community’s members by the victim’s death. Characterizations and 

opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence 

shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence.

Emilee Cope’s Victim Impact Statement

According to the record, defense counsel objected to several portions of the 

victim impact statement of the victim’s daughter, Emilee Cope. The relevant 

portions were read to the jury as follows: 

It was difficult to watch my father struggle for his last breath, 

and I begged him to let go when he was taken off of life support. 

. . . .

It is not fair that I never got to have my dad there when I got my first 

car or to take pictures with me on my prom night or wave to me 

during my graduation. 

I will never get to have my dad walk me down the aisle when I 

get married or teach my possible future children the wonderful things 

he knew. It breaks my heart that I will never hear his voice again, see 

him smile, or feel one of his big bear hugs again in my life. 

It was not just my father that was taken from me, but also a 

large piece from what was supposed to be some of the happiest years 

of my life.

. . . .

My father’s death has forever changed my life. I will always be 

vigilant about the safety of my loved ones and question whom they 

place their trust with.

I have never been able to relax when away from home out of 

fear that I will receive a phone call that someone I love has been hurt. 

 

5. The HAC aggravator is one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances 

in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (2008).
- 18 -

I know my life will never be the same. Every time I hear a 

motorcycle, Corvette or diesel truck, I look to see if maybe, just 

maybe, it was all just a nightmare and he’s coming home.

. . . .

There are no words to describe how terrifying and heartwrenching it was for me, as a 15-year-old girl, to see my father, who 

was so strong, tall and proud, to be in a hospital bed without the 

ability to even breathe on his own.

We find that Emilee’s statements about her father not being available to 

experience her first car, prom night, graduation, or wedding and her feeling 

vigilant about the safety of her loved ones are permissible testimony in a victim 

impact statement. We find that such testimony does not run afoul of section 

921.141(7) or the guidelines in Payne. See Kalisz, 124 So. 3d at 211 (finding that 

statements which were not overly emotional, did not mention the defendant’s 

name, did not implore the jury to impose the death penalty, or did not seek revenge 

on the defendant for the victim’s death were permissible victim impact statements);

Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447, 473-74 (Fla. 2013) (concluding that a statement 

constituted permissible victim impact evidence because it was directly related to 

the effect of the victim’s death on the victim’s brother); Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 

802, 817-18 (Fla. 2011) (finding no error where victim impact statement included 

testimony about a family member’s fears regarding her own security and sense of 

personal responsibility). 

Jordan also argues that Emilee’s descriptions of her feelings as she watched 

her father take his last breath and his inability to breathe on his own were improper 
- 19 -

direct comments on the HAC aggravating circumstance in violation of section 

921.141(7) and the United States Constitution. Because “[f]amily members’ 

emotions resulting from the loss of the victim, including feelings of pain, anger, or 

fear, are directly related to the family’s affection for the victim and the impact 

caused by his or her death,” Emilee’s two remaining statements also are 

permissible victim impact evidence. See Baker, 71 So. 3d at 818. Accordingly, 

we deny relief.

Madgalene “Maggie” Cope’s Victim Impact Statement

Regarding Maggie Cope’s victim impact statement, the record reflects that 

defense counsel objected to the use of the words “horrific” and “horrible” in 

describing Keith Cope’s death. He also objected to the victim impact evidence 

being used to support the HAC aggravating circumstance. The trial court agreed 

only to the redaction of the words “horrific” and “horrible.” 

Jordan asserts that portions of Maggie’s victim impact statement 

impermissibly characterize the crimes in violation of section 921.141(7). We 

disagree. In her statement, Maggie described her last days with her ex-husband, 

how she felt serving as his health care surrogate, her experience in watching her 

daughter grieve over her father, and her personal experience in grieving her exhusband’s death, including the mention of items that jogged her memory of how he 

died. We hold that such remarks do not violate section 921.141(7) or the 
- 20 -

guidelines set forth in Payne regarding victim impact statements. See Jackson, 127 

So. 3d at 473-74; Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 222 (Fla. 2010). Therefore, 

Maggie’s statement is permissible victim impact evidence, and we deny relief. 

Lucinda Jenkins’ Victim Impact Statement

Jordan contends that the admission of Lucinda’s victim impact statement, to 

which defense counsel failed to object and which was read to the jury by the victim 

advocate, was fundamental error and therefore violated his due process rights. We 

disagree. We recognize that

evidence that places undue focus on victim impact, even if not 

objected to, can in some cases constitute a due process violation. The 

United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 

111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991), held that where state law 

permits, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to the state 

presenting evidence about the victim, the impact of the murder on the 

victim’s family, and argument on these subjects. Id. at 827, 111 S. Ct. 

2597. However, the Supreme Court also stated: “In the majority of 

cases, and in this case, victim impact evidence serves entirely 

legitimate purposes. In the event that evidence is introduced that is so 

unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 

mechanism for relief. Id. at 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (emphasis added). 

The analysis to determine if admission of victim impact evidence has 

violated a defendant’s due process rights in the penalty phase of a 

capital trial parallels the analysis for fundamental error. See, e.g.,

F.B. [v. State], 852 So. 2d [226,] 229 (Fla. 2003) (“[A]n error is 

deemed fundamental ‘when it goes to the foundation of the case or the 

merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due 

process.’ ”). Fundamental error is also defined as error that “reach[es] 

down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that [the advisory 

verdict] could not have been obtained without the assistance of the 

error.”
- 21 -

Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 3d 599, 606 (Fla. 2009). 

In the present case, we find no fundamental error. Lucinda’s statement 

demonstrates evidence of her grief and suffering due to the loss of her nephew. 

See Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 496 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 

1893 (2014). In addition, Lucinda did not opine about or characterize the murder 

or robbery, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence that Jordan should receive. 

As such, Lucinda’s statement does not reach the foundation of the case or the 

merits of the cause of action. Thus, her victim impact statement is not fundamental 

error, and we therefore deny relief.

Rejection of a Statutory Mitigator

Jordan contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator 

that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See

§ 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008). Specifically, Jordan asserts that section 

921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes, does not require an expert witness to employ the 

exact wording of the statute in his or her testimony for this mitigator to apply. He 

also asserts that there was other witness testimony that would have supported the 

mitigator. Jordan highlights evidence of him suddenly “snapping” immediately 

before committing the crimes against Cope, and his demeanor shortly after 

committing the crimes, including being antsy and nervous and experiencing 
- 22 -

withdrawals from drug use. “[W]hether a [mitigating] circumstance has been 

proven is subject to the competent, substantial evidence standard of review.”

Martin v. State, 107 So. 3d 281, 318 (Fla. 2012) (citing Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 

175, 189 (Fla. 2010)). In Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 444-45 (Fla. 2012), we set 

forth the following requirements regarding mitigating circumstances:

A trial court must expressly evaluate all statutory and nonstatutory 

mitigators a defendant has proposed. See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 

186 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 224 (2011). A trial court 

must find a proposed mitigating circumstance when the defendant has 

established that mitigator through competent, substantial evidence. 

See Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1159 (Fla. 2006). However, 

a trial court may reject a mitigator if the defendant fails to prove the 

mitigating circumstance, or if the record contains competent, 

substantial evidence supporting that rejection. See Ault, 53 So. 3d at 

186. “Even expert opinion evidence may be rejected if that evidence 

cannot be reconciled with other evidence in the case.” Id. (quoting 

Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1003 (Fla. 2006)). A mitigator may 

also be rejected if the testimony supporting it is not substantiated by 

the actions of the defendant, or if the testimony supporting it conflicts 

with other evidence. See Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1257 

(Fla. 2004) (holding that although testimony supported a mitigator, 

the trial court did not err by not finding it because the actions of the 

defendant did not substantiate that testimony); see also Coday, 946 

So. 2d at 1005 (“The expert testimony from the defense could be 

rejected only if it did not square with other evidence in the case.”).

The trial court’s rejection of this mitigator is supported by competent, 

substantial evidence. According to the testimony of Dr. Eric Mings, Jordan’s

expert psychologist who tested Jordan for six hours using various psychological 

exams, Jordan had a history of bipolar disorder, severe polysubstance abuse, and 

mild memory impairment. Dr. Mings’ testing determined that Jordan had an 
- 23 -

average to lower-than-average IQ and lower-than-expected memory abilities. Dr. 

Mings observed nothing to suggest that Jordan was psychotic or delusional, and 

during the six-hour evaluation, Jordan communicated effectively. On crossexamination, the State asked Dr. Mings if he agreed that Jordan had the capacity 

and the ability to follow the law if he chose to do so, to which Dr. Mings 

responded, “Probably so.”

Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, the defense’s expert psychiatrist who also evaluated 

Jordan, testified that Jordan experienced multiple head injuries as a youth which 

required him to be hospitalized, was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity 

disorder as a juvenile and bipolar disorder as an adult, and attempted suicide twice 

in his lifetime. Jordan also admitted to the use of several illegal drugs, including, 

but not limited to, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and ecstasy. Dr. Danziger 

described Jordan as being cooperative and pleasant during the evaluation. Dr. 

Danziger further testified that Jordan did not appear to be intellectually impaired; 

he did not show any extreme or atypical psychotic symptoms; and he demonstrated 

average intelligence. On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Danziger if Jordan 

had the ability to conform his conduct to the laws of society, and Dr. Danziger 

answered that he did not see anything to indicate that Jordan lacked self-control, or 

could not control himself or behave appropriately.
- 24 -

The State did not offer additional expert witnesses to refute Dr. Mings’ 

testimony. Also, the lay witnesses testified only about Jordan’s demeanor a few 

days after the crime was committed. Therefore, based on the record, the expert 

witnesses’ testimonies are consistent at least to the extent that neither expert’s 

evaluation of Jordan demonstrated that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of 

his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 

impaired at the time he beat, robbed, and tied up Cope. See Cook v. State, 542 So. 

2d 964, 971 (Fla. 1989) (affirming the trial court’s rejection of a mitigating factor 

because the record contained positive evidence that the defendant’s mental 

capacity was not severely diminished on the night of the killings). Accordingly, 

we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and deny relief with respect 

to this claim.

Proportionality

We conduct a comprehensive review of each death sentence to determine if 

the murder falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least 

mitigated murders in order to ensure uniformity in the application of the death 

sentence. See Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003). We review 

the totality of the circumstances and compare the case to other capital cases.

Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 205 (Fla. 2010) (citing Offord v. State, 959 So. 

2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007)). This analysis does not involve a quantitative comparison 
- 25 -

between the number of aggravating and mitigating factors, but rather requires a 

qualitative review of the underlying basis for each aggravating factor and 

mitigating factor. Id. Additionally, the prior violent felony and HAC aggravators 

are qualitatively among the weightiest aggravating circumstances. See Kocaker v. 

State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1232 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2743 (2013); Hodges v. 

State, 55 So. 3d 515, 542 (Fla. 2010).

In the instant case, the trial court found that three aggravating circumstances 

were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) prior violent felony conviction—little

weight; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in 

the commission of a robbery, and the capital felony was committed for pecuniary 

gain were merged together as one aggravator in order to avoid improper 

doubling—great weight; and (3) HAC—great weight. The trial court concluded 

that only one statutory mitigating factor applied—the capital felony was committed 

while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 

disturbance—which was accorded moderate weight. The trial court also found 

thirty-seven nonstatutory mitigators and gave one moderate weight, ten some 

weight, two minimal weight, and the rest little weight. Additionally, the trial court 

concluded that the nonstatutory mitigator that the crime was committed in a 

unsophisticated manner was not established and therefore not given any weight. 
- 26 -

After reviewing the totality of the circumstances and decisions from this 

Court, we conclude that Jordan’s death sentence is proportionate in relation to 

other death sentences that we have upheld. See Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 

1285-88 (Fla. 2009) (concluding that the defendant’s “impairment due to abnormal 

brain functioning and drug use, while mitigating, is not so mitigating as to make 

his death sentence disproportionate,” where two aggravating circumstances—HAC 

and the murder was committed during a sexual battery—were weighed against 

three statutory mitigating circumstances and ten nonstatutory mitigating 

circumstances); Merck, 975 So. 2d at 1066 (finding the death sentence to be 

proportionate in light of the trial court’s finding of two aggravating factors—prior 

violent felony and HAC; one statutory mitigating factor—defendant’s age of 

nineteen at the time of the murder; and several nonstatutory mitigating factors);

Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 286 (Fla. 2003) (concluding the death sentence

was proportionate where the trial court found the prior violent felony and HAC 

aggravators, the statutory mitigator regarding impaired capacity, and twenty-six 

nonstatutory mitigating factors). Accordingly, we find that the death sentence is 

proportionate in this case.

Ring Claim

Jordan challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing 

scheme on the basis that Florida is the only state in the country that allows a 
- 27 -

majority verdict by a jury that is already predisposed to recommend a sentence of 

death. We have “repeatedly held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme does not 

violate the United States Constitution under Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 

(2002)].” See, e.g., Martin v. State, 107 So. 3d 281, 322 (Fla. 2012) (citing Abdool 

v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 228 (Fla. 2010)). Furthermore, we have also repeatedly 

held that Ring is not implicated when, as in the present case, the prior violent 

felony . . . aggravating factor is applicable. Id. In other words, “the requirement 

that the jury make all of the findings necessary to enhance a defendant’s sentence 

is satisfied where one of the aggravators is the prior violent felony aggravator.” 

Merck, 975 So. 2d at 1067. Accordingly, we reject Jordan’s Ring claim.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although Jordan does not raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal, we nevertheless must independently review “the evidence to determine 

whether sufficient evidence exists to support a first-degree [felony] murder 

conviction.” Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 472 (Fla. 2004). “In determining 

the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the 

existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Caraballo v. 

State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1243-44 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 

1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006)).
- 28 -

Here, Jordan was convicted of first-degree felony murder and robbery with a 

firearm or other deadly weapon. First, there is competent, substantial evidence to 

support Jordan’s conviction of robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon. A 

robbery is defined as 

the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of 

larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either 

permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the 

money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the 

use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. 

§ 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). “If in the course of committing the robbery the 

offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of 

the first degree. . . .” § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). 

According to the evidence adduced at trial, Edwin Yarrow testified that 

Jordan pistol-whipped Cope, tied him up, and stole Cope’s money, guns, and 

drugs. Sadia Haque testified that Jordan had Cope’s Ford F-450 truck and drove it 

from Cope’s home in the Edgewater, Florida, area to the Hollywood, Florida, area. 

Mathew Powell also testified regarding Jordan’s use of Cope’s truck, which Cope 

never loaned to anyone, and that Jordan continually stated that Cope was tied up. 

In a letter to Cope’s ex-wife Maggie, Jordan admitted to robbing Cope with the use 

of Cope’s gun. Bank records associated with Cope’s credit card showed various 

withdrawals and purchases made on the day of and on the days following the 

crime.
- 29 -

There is also competent, substantial evidence to support the conviction of 

first-degree felony murder. Felony murder is defined in section 782.04(1)(a)2.d., 

Florida Statutes (2008), which states: 

[T]he unlawful killing of a human being . . . when committed by a 

person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, 

any . . . robbery . . . is murder in the first degree and constitutes a 

capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.

Mathew and Marlon Powell testified regarding the manner in which they 

found Cope at the crime scene. Cope was suspended from the foot of his bed by 

rope and duct tape. His face, neck, and head were duct taped, and his left bicep 

was a greenish color and cold to the touch due to Cope being suspended by that 

arm for a lengthy period of time. A first responder testified that Cope looked 

deceased when he arrived on the crime scene. Dr. Rullan also testified about 

Cope’s various injuries and stated that he was unresponsive upon entering the 

hospital and remained unresponsive until he died after being removed from life 

support. Dr. Hermann opined “that Mr. Cope died as a result of complications of 

being bound and gagged for days, including ischemic gangrene of the left upper 

extremity, bilateral cerebral infarctions, and bronchopneumonia.”

Because the underlying felony of robbery with a firearm or other deadly 

weapon is supported by the record, we conclude that first-degree felony murder is 

likewise supported by the record. 
- 30 -

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm Jordan’s convictions and 

sentences.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 

and PERRY, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, 

R. Michael Hutcheson, Judge - Case No. 642009CF002872XXXAWS

Jeffrey Duane Deen, Regional Counsel, and Michael Paul Reiter, Assistant 

Regional Counsel, Fifth District, Ocala, Florida, 

for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacey E. Kircher, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee