Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 1 of 12

APPELLANT PRO SE

Rhonda DeLap Tipton

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Kevin D. Koons

Steven E. Runyan

Kroger Gardis & Regas, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rhonda DeLap Tipton,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Estate of Virginia D. Hofmann,

Appellee-Respondent.

January 17, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-EU-1009

Appeal from the Johnson Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kevin Barton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41D01-1505-EU-159

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 2 of 12

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Rhonda Delap Tipton (Tipton), appeals the trial court’s 

Order on Administrator’s Final Account with respect to Appellee-Respondent, 

the Estate of Virginia D. Hofmann (Estate). 

[2] We affirm and remand.

ISSUES

[3] Tipton presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the 

trial court’s Order, approving the Final Account, is clearly erroneous.

[4] In its Appellate Brief, the Estate requests an award of appellate attorney fees 

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[5] Virginia D. Hofmann (Decedent) died testate on March 30, 2015, leaving three 

surviving children, Tipton, Kenneth DeLap (DeLap), and Denise Webb 

(Webb), who are each equal one-third residuary beneficiaries of the Estate. On 

May 27, 2015, Tipton and DeLap filed a petition for unsupervised 

administration of the Estate and were appointed co-executors, as provided in 

the Decedent’s will. The Estate’s assets consisted mainly of non-cash illiquid 

assets, such as a residence and household goods, as well as a bank account at 

Horizon Bank, which Decedent held jointly with Tipton and DeLap and which 

held a balance of approximately $8,300 (Horizon Account). On or about June 

26, 2015, Tipton and DeLap opened a bank account on behalf of the Estate at 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 3 of 12

PNC Bank (PNC Account). Both Tipton and DeLap used the PNC Account 

and the Horizon Account to pay Estate-related expenses. By August 25, 2015, 

Tipton and DeLap had each contributed $4,000 of their personal funds to these 

accounts. In late August 2015, an emotional altercation occurred between 

Tipton, Webb, and Webb’s husband concerning the Decedent’s personal 

property. In response, Tipton filed for—and later dismissed—a protective order 

against Webb and her husband. Subsequently, on September 3, 2015, the trial 

court revoked the unsupervised administration of the Estate.

[6] In an effort to work out their differences, the three siblings reached a 

compromise which culminated in the Family Settlement Agreement 

(Agreement). This Agreement provided, in pertinent part, 

2. The Parties agree that the promises and considerations given 

by each Party are fair and reasonable, and therefore the Estate, 

[Tipton], [DeLap], and [Webb] agree to completely release and 

forever discharge one another of and from any and all past, 

present or future claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of 

action, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses, 

compensation of any nature, whatsoever, whether based on tort, 

contract, or other theory or recovery and whether compensatory 

or punitive damages which either the Estate, [Tipton], [DeLap], 

and [Webb] now has or which may hereafter accrue or otherwise 

be acquired which had resulted or may result from the alleged 

acts or omissions of the Parties relating to any action taken at any 

time prior to the date that all Parties have signed this 

[Agreement] and Mutual Release, including the incident at 

[Decedent’s] residence in late August 2015, between [Tipton], 

[Webb] and [Webb’s husband], and the resulting action of 

[Tipton] petitioning for an Order of Protection against [Webb] 

and [Webb’s husband] (which was subsequently dismissed by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 4 of 12

written request of [Tipton]). This release on the part of the 

Parties shall be a fully binding and complete settlement among 

the Parties save only the executory provisions of this 

[Agreement] and Mutual Release.

* * * *

4. [Tipton] and [DeLap] have loaned the Estate various 

amounts. Prior to any residuary distribution of the Estate, 

[Tipton] and [DeLap] shall be reimbursed for any amounts 

loaned to the Estate.

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 39-40). On November 30, 2015, the trial court 

approved the Agreement and allowed Tipton and DeLap to resume the

unsupervised administration of the Estate.

[7] On May 17, 2017, the trial court, sua sponte, issued an Order for Tipton and 

DeLap to personally appear as no closing statement for the Estate had been 

filed within one year of its opening, pursuant to Ind. Code § 29-1-7.5-3.8. After 

the parties personally appeared on June 19, 2017, the trial court issued an Order 

finding that the conflict between DeLap and Tipton prevented them from 

preparing a final account. The trial court removed Tipton and DeLap as copersonal representatives, and appointed Brian J. Deppe as the Administrator 

Cum Testamento Annexo of the Estate (Administrator). It instructed Tipton 

and DeLap to provide the Administrator within 30 days with the details for all 

amounts they contended the Estate owed them. The Order gave the 

Administrator 60 days to provide the trial court with an account. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 5 of 12

[8] On July 10, 2017, Tipton filed a motion to set aside the Agreement, which the 

trial court denied on August 28, 2017, after conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

On February 9, 2018, the Administrator filed a verified petition to settle and 

allow final account, which included both approvals and disapprovals of various 

amounts that Tipton and DeLap contended the Estate owed them. On March 

28, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the objections to the 

Administrator’s final account and issued an Order, providing, in pertinent part:

12. [Tipton] identifies the following objections to the Final 

Account of the [Administrator]:

A. Issues pertaining to a refund of fees from Brian Hewitt;

B. Issues pertaining to request for compensation for bills, 

claims and loans; and

C. Issues pertaining to the grave marker.

13. By Order on Attorney Fees dated May 27, 2016, the [c]ourt 

assessed attorney fees against the claimant, Jann D. Hull, in the 

amount of One Thousand Thirty-Five Dollars ($1,035.00). The 

amount was paid to Brian C. Hewitt by the claimant. Mr. Hewitt 

refunded to the Estate Nine Hundred Ninety Dollars ($990.00) 

which has been advanced by the Estate. [Tipton] deposited the 

money personally.

[Tipton] raises an issue as the [Administrator’s] representation 

that she did not respond to the issue of the refund. By his 

Response, the [Administrator] acknowledges that the statement 

that he did not receive a response was in error. However, [the 

Administrator] correctly notes that “(t)he point was that [Tipton] 

received funds which should have been deposited in the [E]state’s 

checking account, and she retained them.”

14. The amount due the Estate from [Tipton] is Nine Hundred 

Ninety Dollars ($990.00). The amount is not reflected in the 

Final Account. The amount is subject to being equally divided 

between [Tipton], [DeLap], and [Webb].

15. [Tipton] seeks reimbursement for the following:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 6 of 12

A. payment of “mom’s bills” in the amount of Three 

Hundred Twenty-Nine Dollars and Seventy Cents 

($329.70). 

B. payment of expenses of the [E]state in the amount of 

One Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars and Eight-Five Cents 

($155.85);

C. payment of personal services provided for cleaning in 

the amount of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Eight-One 

Dollars and Seventy-Five Cents ($2,981.71); and 

D. repayment of loans in the amount of Sixteen Thousand 

One Hundred Twenty-Six Dollars and Sixty Cents 

($16,126.60).[]

16. As to the request for reimbursement for payment of “mom’s 

bills,” the [Administrator] denied payment on the basis that 

[Tipton] did not file a claim. In the absence of a claim, [Tipton] 

is not entitled to payment for amounts advanced before death 

under Indiana Code [section] 29-1-14-1(a). The [c]ourt sustains 

the denial of the request for payment due to the absence of a 

claim.

17. As to the request for payment of expenses of the [E]state, the 

[Administrator] denied payment for lack of sufficient 

documentation, some accounts were pre-death and payment was 

waived by the [Agreement].

* * * *

19. [Tipton] presents no evidence of any amounts subject to 

reimbursement subsequent to the order accepting the 

[Agreement] on November 30, 2015. Amounts incurred prior to 

November 30, 2015 would either be subject to the bar for failure 

to file a claim or would be barred by the [Agreement]. 

20. [Tipton] seeks reimbursement for amounts paid for cleaning 

services or for personal services. [DeLap] acknowledges that the 

requests for reimbursement of four bills in the total amount of 

Ninety-Five Dollars and Fifty Cents ($95.50) are appropriate. 

The date of service was subsequent to the [Agreement] and 

accordingly not barred by the [Agreement].
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 7 of 12

21. As to the remaining amounts requested, the amounts are not 

documented. [Tipton] seeks payment for services that she 

provided in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 

($2,500.00). However, [Tipton] does not provide any time 

records to support her request.

22. [Tipton] is allowed reimbursements for cleaning in the 

amount of Ninety-Five Dollars and Fifty Cents ($95.50). 

[Tipton’s] request for reimbursement is otherwise denied.

23. [Tipton] seeks reimbursement for loans. Some of the loans 

for which reimbursement is sought have been allowed by the 

[Administrator]. The request for one-half of the joint bank 

account in the amount of $3,689.00 is dealt with separately. The 

loans at issue are in the amount of $112.00, $200.00 and $80.00. 

The [c]ourt does not find evidence to support loans. 

Reimbursement of the loans of $112.00, $200.00 and $80.00 is 

denied.

24. [Tipton] lastly raises the issue of the grave marker.

* * * *

26. It was the intent of the December 5, 2017 Order that the 

design be finalized on the basis of [Tipton’s] design. While any 

differences between the design as set by Forest Lawn and 

[Tipton’s] final version may be minor, [Tipton] disputes that the 

result was consistent with her artistic standards. The intent was 

to remove [the Administrator] from the design process and 

without requirement of exercising any judgment.

27. [Tipton will have [a] period of sixty (60) days to obtain and 

have installed a grave marker through Forest Lawn Cemetery or 

another company that Forest Lawn Cemetery will permit to be 

installed in the cemetery in accordance with the design that she 

filed on December 27, 2017. The cost may be up to the cost of 

the grave marker obtained through Forest Lawn.

* * * *

Distribution shall be made as follows:

D. [Tipton]: repayment of loans/advances:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 8 of 12

1) $4,337.50 (paragraph 6(C)(1) of Final Account based 

upon testimony [])

2) $753.83 (Paragraph 6(C)(2) of Final Account)

3) $95.50 Reimbursement for cleaning services

Total: $ 5,186.83.

* * * *

I. [Tipton]: $49,165.41 (1/3rd of residuary estate).

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pp. 19-25).

[9] Tipton now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Trial Court’s Order

[10] A careful reading of Tipton’s appellate brief indicates that Tipton is requesting 

this court to review the trial court’s Order and to close the Estate “correctly” by

granting her claim for reimbursement of $9,009.86. (Appellant’s Br. p. 4). An 

appellant who proceeds pro se is “held to the same established rules of procedure 

that a trained legal counsel is bound to follow and, therefore, must be prepared 

to accept the consequences of his or her actions.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 

N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). While we prefer to decide cases on their 

merits, we will deem alleged errors waived where appellant’s noncompliance 

with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate 

consideration of the errors. Id. The purpose of our appellate rules, especially 

Indiana Appellate Rule 46, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the 

appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 9 of 12

[11] Here, Tipton’s appellate brief fails to comply in virtually every respect with 

Indiana Appellate Rule 46. Tipton violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(2) by 

omitting the table of authorities, presumably because she fails to cite to any 

authorities in her brief. The brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(4) by only 

including arguments and self-serving facts in her statement of the issues. 

Tipton’s nature of the case description, statement of facts, and summary of the 

argument pursuant to Appellate Rule 46(A)(5);-(6);-(7) are completely nonexistent and missing from her appellate brief. Although Tipton’s brief fails to 

include a separate argument section as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8), it 

could be argued that the section titled “Issues” presents Tipton’s analysis. 

However, Tipton fails to support her bare assertions with cogent reasoning,

citations to the record, or to legal authorities. One of her allegations is 

articulated as follows:

Financial issues listed in the “Final Account” (see copy, marked 

and delineated, # 12, 12a – 12g) are corrected point by point, 

also “Chargeable and Credits” #12 h-n). Spread sheets of 

financial loans to be reimbursed are enclosed (#13 a – d). 

Support materials are also copied and attached (#14, 14a-r) to 

prove [the Administrator’s] mistakes.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 4). The documents she is referring to are not enclosed in her 

Appendix; rather, her Appendix merely consists of two letters that she sent to 

the trial court. She did not submit the materials admitted before the trial court, 

nor did she request the transcript of the proceedings and therefore, none has 

been provided. Even though she appears to entreat this court to award her a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 10 of 12

certain reimbursement amount, she fails to include the details or materials 

which would support the calculation and origin of this amount.

[12] “A brief is not to be a document thrown together without either organized 

thought or intelligent editing on the part of the brief-writer.” Frith v. State, 325 

N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. 1975). “It is well-settled that the duty of presenting a 

record adequate for intelligent appellate review on points assigned as error falls 

upon the appellant, as does the obligation to support the argument presented 

with authority and references to the record pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8). AutoXchange.com, Inc. v. Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 44 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Because Tipton’s contentions are too poorly expressed 

and developed to be understood, it has prevented our appellate analysis and 

consideration of her alleged errors. See Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1113 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the failure to present a cogent argument or 

citation to authority constitutes waiver of the issue for appellate review), trans. 

denied. “While we are often tolerant of minor infractions of the appellate rules 

so that we may decide appeals on their merits, those rules are nonetheless 

binding on all persons bringing appeals to this court.” Ramsey v. Review Bd. of 

Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In the 

instant case, because Tipton’s noncompliance with the appellate rules 

substantially impeded us from reaching the merits of this appeal, we are 

compelled to find the issue waived. 

II. Appellate Attorney Fees
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 11 of 12

[13] In its appellate brief, the Estate requests this court to award it attorney fees 

incurred in defending against Tipton’s appeal and “to charge them against 

Tipton’s distributive share of the Estate’s assets for her frivolous and bad faith 

appeal.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 26). 

[14] Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he Court may 

assess damages if an appeal . . . is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in 

the Court’s discretion and may include attorney’s fees.” Our discretion to 

award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited, however, to 

instances where an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, 

harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay. Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 346. 

Additionally, while Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) provides this court with 

discretionary authority to award damages on appeal, we must use extreme 

restraint when exercising this power because of the potential chilling effect upon 

the exercise of the right to appeal. Tioga Pines Living Ctr., Inc. v. Ind. Family and 

Soc. Servs. Admin, 760 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. 

[15] Indiana appellate courts have formally categorized claims for appellate attorney 

fees into “substantive” and “procedural” bad faith claims. Boczar v. Meridian 

Street Found., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). To prevail on a 

substantive bad faith claim, the party must show that the appellant’s 

contentions and arguments are utterly devoid of all plausibility. Id. Procedural 

bad faith, on the other hand, occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form 

and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and 

misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-EU-1009 | January 17, 2019 Page 12 of 12

manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the 

opposing party and the reviewing court. Id. Finally, we note that even pro se

litigants are liable for attorney’s fees when they disregard the rules of procedure 

in bad faith. Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 347. 

[16] As pointed out, Tipton’s brief violates all provisions of Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A). Her non-compliance with our appellate rules of procedure permeates 

her entire brief, and precludes our review of her allegations of error on appeal. 

Keeping in mind our duty to use great restraint when determining that an 

award of appellate attorney fees is warranted, we nonetheless find that such an 

award is appropriate under the facts of this case. See id. at 348. Finding Tipton 

to have engaged in procedural bad faith before this court, we remand this cause 

to the trial court with instructions to calculate the amount of appellate attorney 

fees the Estate is entitled to recover. 

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that Tipton has waived the issue she raised 

before this court because her brief is not in compliance with Indiana Appellate 

Rule 46(A). Moreover, we find that Tipton has engaged in procedural bad faith 

in her pursuit of this appeal, and appellate attorney fees should therefore be 

assessed against her share of the Estate. 

[18] Affirmed and remanded.

[19] Kirsch, J. and Robb, J. concur