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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMY M. MYRICK : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 05-131 

:

PENSKE TRUCK LEASING, CO. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Juan R. Sánchez, J. April 18, 2006

Penske Truck Leasing asks this Court to dismiss Amy Myrick’s claim the company failed

to accommodate the reduced mental capacity she suffered after her horse kicked her in the head.

Penske argues the claim is time-barred and Myrick does not qualify as a disabled person. Because

I find Myrick’s claim timely and her qualification as a disabled person a factual question, I will deny

Penske’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

FACTS

Myrick had been a commended contract analyst for Penske for more than two years when she

was kicked in the head by her horse on June 26, 2002. Myrick was unconscious and then

hospitalized for several weeks after the accident with amnesia, vision problems, facial fractures and

a broken jaw. Myrick returned to work in August, 2002 with her broken jaw still wired. The quality

of Myrick’s work deteriorated to the point she was put on probation March 6, 2003. 

At the time she was put on probation, Myrick consulted a lawyer and a neurologist. The

doctor said Myrick could work with accommodation. Myrick received short-term disability

payments and Social Security Disability Income (SSDI), both of which required an inability to work.

Myrick did not learn of other less intellectually demanding jobs at Penske until discovery was

Case 2:05-cv-00131-JS Document 21 Filed 04/18/06 Page 1 of 5
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underway in this case. 

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment will only be granted if there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The moving party bears the burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute and the

court must review all of the evidence in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);

Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1997). In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a court does not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations. Big Apple

BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912

(1993).

Penske argues Myrick’s claims are time barred and Myrick is not a “qualified individual”

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq., for two reasons: she

testified she could not perform any work after May, 2003, and her requests for accommodation are

unreasonable. 

Myrick’s claim is not time barred. Before bringing a civil suit under the ADA, a plaintiff

must first file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory

act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) -5(e). Myrick initiated her claim of discrimination with the EEOC on April

2, 2004, within 300 days of the June 17, 2003 decision by Penske not to accommodate her disability.

Penske also argues Myrick cannot both be totally disabled and able to work. The Social

Security Administration agreed with Myrick she could not work, or work would be intolerable, and

she receives disability payments. Myrick has also represented to Penske she is able to work with

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reasonable accommodation. Under Cleveland v. Policy Managment System Corp., 526 U.S. 795,

806 (1999), Myrick must explain her statements of total disability to defeat summary judgment by

the employer. Id. Simply averring the statutory scheme governing SSDI benefits differs from the

ADA is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Motley v. N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 166 (3d

Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit in Turner v. Hershey Co., recently decided prior statements made in

support of SSDI benefits should not estop a plaintiff from asserting she is a qualified individual

under the ADA, if those statements did not “state categorically [the plaintiff] could not work at all,

or take into account [the plaintiff’s] entitlement to reasonable accommodation.” 440 F.3d 604, 608

(3d Cir. 2006). The Third Circuit cites Cleveland, where the Supreme Court held

statements in support of an SSDI application do not take into account the concept of

reasonable accommodation under the ADA and, therefore, do not necessarily estop

a claim under the ADA that one is capable of performing the essential functions of

one’s position with reasonable accommodation. 

Turner, 440 F.3d at 609 (emphasis in original). Following Turner, statements of inability to work

“must be read as lacking the qualifier of reasonable accommodation which [does] not apply for

purposes of [an] SSDI application, but does apply for purposes of [an] ADA claim.” Id. 

Cleveland requires a plaintiff to provide a “sufficient explanation” to negate the apparent

contradiction between a statement in an application for disability benefits that she is unable to work,

and her claim for accommodation under the ADA. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. To defeat summary

judgment, this explanation must be “sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that

assuming the truth of, or plaintiff’s good faith belief in the earlier statement, that plaintiff could

nonetheless ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, with or without ‘reasonable

accommodations.’ ” Id. at 807. 

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Myrick explains the statements she made in the Social Security and short-term disability

applications refer to her former job as a contract analyst in the real estate department, and not to

other positions. Myrick contends she never said she could not work without accommodation and

her statements were made under the belief there were no other jobs available at Penske she could

perform with or without accommodation. It was not until after the institution of this suit, Myrick

argues, she obtained knowledge, through discovery, of job openings at Penske posted while she and

her attorney were requesting reasonable accommodation. Myrick also contends the inconsistency

in her statements is explained by reference to the difference between the definitions of “disability”

under the ADA and SSDI statutes. 

Myrick’s explanation is sufficient under Cleveland to negate the apparent contradiction

between her prior statements in applications for SSDI and short-term disability benefits, and her

current claim for accommodation under the ADA. A reasonable juror could conclude, assuming the

truth of or Myrick’s good faith belief in the earlier statement, that Myrick could nonetheless perform

the essential functions of another job at Penske, with or without reasonable accommodations. 

The Third Circuit, in Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., held there was a “genuine issue of

material fact” as to whether the plaintiff’s requested accommodation “would have been a reasonable

accommodation.” 257 F.3d 273, 286 (emphasis added). Myrick’s timely complaint raises an issue

of material fact; thus, I deny summary judgment. An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:05-cv-00131-JS Document 21 Filed 04/18/06 Page 4 of 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMY M. MYRICK : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 05-131 

:

PENSKE TRUCK LEASING, CO. :

ORDER

And now this 18th day of April, 2006, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Document 14) is DENIED. The scheduling order of March 2, 2006 remains in effect.

BY THE COURT:

 \s\ Juan R.Sánchez 

Juan R. Sánchez, J.

Case 2:05-cv-00131-JS Document 21 Filed 04/18/06 Page 5 of 5