U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–589 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

EUROPEAN COMMON FOREIGN, SECURITY AND

DEFENSE POLICIES—IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

UNITED STATES AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 10, 1999

Serial No. 106–106

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

HILLEL WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

Elmar Brok, M.E.P., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human

Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy, The European Parliament ..... 4

Iain Duncan Smith, M.P. Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, House

of Commons, London, England ........................................................................... 9

John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute ................... 28

Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Rand Corporation ............................................... 30

Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, The Nixon Center ...... 33

Dr. Simon Serfaty, Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy, Old Dominion University 36

APPENDIX

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 50

Elmar Brok, M.E.P., European Parliament ........................................................... 52

Iain Duncan Smith, M.P., United Kingdom .......................................................... 57

John Bolton, American Enterprise Institute ......................................................... 65

Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, RAND Corporation ............................................. 79

Peter Rodman, The Nixon Center .......................................................................... 88

Dr. Simon Serfaty, Old Dominion University ....................................................... 94

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EUROPEAN COMMON FOREIGN, SECURITY

AND DEFENSE POLICIES—IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Wednesday, November 10, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

The Committee on International Relations meets today to receive

testimony on European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense

Policies—Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.

We are privileged to have before us two distinguished foreign

visitors—Chairman Brok of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of

the European Parliament, and Mr. Iain Duncan Smith, Shadow

Secretary for Defense in the British House of Commons.

We welcome you both and also the next panel of distinguished

experts on our topic today.

The United States has, since the end of the Second World War,

supported in various ways what is sometimes called the European

Project, the gradual unification of Europe.

Postwar statesmen, confronted with a continent largely in ruins,

decided that an ever-closer union was the solution to decades of onand-off war. If Europeans could unite into one entity of some sort,

they would be less likely to make war on one another. That project

is now being carried out through the European Union.

The United States also set its own stamp on European security

and defense policy by leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fifty years old, NATO has proven to be the most successful

defensive alliance in history.

NATO, having expanded several times, most recently to the east,

is now being challenged. Some Americans and Europeans call the

United States to end its role in Europe because they think that it

is time for Europeans to go it alone. Others profess to support a

continued role for the United States, but press for changes to European security structures that would leave us without influence

commensurate with our contribution, or would undermine other

members of the NATO alliance not part of the European Union.

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I have felt that American support for European unification was

appropriate. Presidents of both parties have a long history of supporting unification. If unification is what our democratic, European

friends want, we ought to support it, but we should not be blind

to the problems it may cause for our Nation.

The problems of European unity, as well as the advantages, are

noticeable today in the area of our economic relations. That, however, is not the topic of this hearing. But I believe that some of our

present trade problems with Europe may be avoided with the advent of greater European political and foreign policy unity.

The powers of the EU in Brussels have not been responsible for

considering the security implications of decisions on trade and development. These have been solely the concerns of the national governments. If a security consciousness can permeate the EU, it

might take a different view of Iran, for example.

On the other hand, we need to be concerned as tested security

and political structures change. We can’t force Europeans to organize themselves in a manner most convenient for us, but we can

let them know about our concerns.

NATO may have come under some unexpected criticism in this

country of late, but perhaps the only thing that is more likely than

European agriculture policy to upset Americans is the idea that the

EU wants to displace NATO as the main security structure in the

Euro-Atlantic area.

European political, foreign policy and security unification clearly

poses a host of challenges for the United States.

We may have a Mr. Europe to call, but will he be able to talk

back without checking in with 15 captains?

Will European foreign policy be the least common denominator?

Will Europeans get together mainly about the fact that they may

resent American initiatives?

Will Europe really develop a military force that will operate independently of NATO and the United States?

Will Europe divert resources and forces away from NATO to create independent capabilities? If so, who will cover the slack created

in those NATO functions, especially with European defense spending on the downturn?

Will the EU discriminate against the non-EU European NATO

allies?

These are among the questions I hope we can address during today’s session.

At this time, I would like to turn to the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening statement he might have.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for

holding these hearings, and I think it is terribly important for us

to develop an understanding with our European allies about security.

I feel that it is time for Europeans to take a greater role. The

Europeans will hear conflicting responses from Americans. We ask

them to take more of the burden and then, as soon as they do, we

will be concerned about their going off on their own course.

I think as democratic nations with similar goals, it is important

for us to be more equal partners, and I think it does make sense

for Europe to join together to be able to carry out its responsibilVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ities. The lesson of the battle in Kosovo is that the Europeans have

to figure out a way to have the various assets necessary for robust

engagement, technologies in air and ground and missile systems.

Looking to the United States, you cannot blame our European

friends for being confused. We saw the Senate rejecting the test

ban treaty, and a hundred Members of the Republican Party, including the vast majority of the Republican leadership, voting

against Mr. Bereuter’s resolution, simply commending our involvement in NATO. We would have to excuse our European friends if

they are somewhat confused by the actions here in Washington.

So I am thrilled that you are holding this meeting, Mr. Chairman. It is an important discussion that we should undertake.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Are there any

other Members seeking recognition?

Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. No.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would like to amplify what the gentleman from

Connecticut said about burden-sharing. I think it is perhaps the

biggest rip-off in history that the United States has been forced to

bear the burden of defending democracy and freedom around the

world while a block of countries richer than ourselves does so little,

that they do less than half of the combat on their own continent,

and do zero to protect South Korea and zero to protect Taiwan.

I want to comment on the French and the European reaction to

our proposals for missile defense. I don’t know whether missile defense is cost-effective. That is a U.S. decision. But for the French

to tell us that we need shared risk is to add a level of chutzpah

to international affairs.

Because what is the risk that the missile defense system is supposed to deal with? It is basically nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles from rogue states. Which country in the world—which democracy in the world—has done the most to make sure that rogue

states may get nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles? Well,

France. So France says we should have a shared risk, a risk they

helped create.

Not only that, they insulate themselves from that risk by the policy of accentuating it. That is to say, I don’t think that Iranian missiles are going to get Paris if Paris dollars are flowing to create

those missiles. So they buy off the Iranians by giving them the

tools necessary to destroy Americans, and then say that we should

live under shared risk.

Obviously, there are nondemocratic countries, particularly Russia, which has a much worse record than France on providing technology to Iran and others; but among the democracies, the French

have been the most critical of us protecting ourselves from the risk

that they have done so much to create.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Is there any other Member seeking recognition?

If not, our first panel consists of Mr. Elmar Brok and Mr. Iain

Duncan Smith. These distinguished leaders were chosen as repVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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resenting quite different schools of thought on European foreign

policy and security unification.

Mr. Brok is Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Human Rights and Common Defense and Security Policy of the European Parliament. He is a senior Member of the center-right

Christian Democratic party in Germany, and a leader of the Group

of the European People’s Party-European Democrats in the EP.

He is also a long-time participant in the U.S.-European Parliament Exchange, which is how we got to know one another many

years ago. He is a long-time observer of north Atlantic security affairs. He visits with us in Washington quite often.

We welcome you, Mr. Chairman.

This hearing is also a historic step in cooperation between the

Congress and the European Parliament. We look forward to our

forthcoming joint meeting in Brussels in January.

Mr. Iain Duncan Smith is Shadow Secretary of State for Defence

in the British Parliament. That makes him the main spokesman

for the conservative opposition party on defense issues. He is a

graduate of Sandhurst and served with the British Army in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe. He is known for his special interest in

Euro-Atlantic cooperation on a ballistic missile defense capacity

and would not, I believe, be offended if I were to describe him as

a committed Euro-skeptic.

Gentlemen, your remarks will be entered in the record and you

may summarize them as you see fit.

Chairman GILMAN. Chairman Brok, would you begin with your

testimony?

STATEMENT OF ELMAR BROK, M.E.P., CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMON SECURITY

AND DEFENSE POLICY, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Mr. BROK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor to address the Congress of the United States and, in particular, the distinguished

Members of the International Relations Committee of the House of

Representatives on the issue of the European defense and security

identity after the EU Summit in Cologne and the Transatlantic

Link. Everyone knows the enormous contribution made in the past

by the U.S. to peace, democracy and freedom in Europe, especially

in Germany. This is something which shall never be forgotten.

Exactly ten years ago, I was dancing on the Berlin Wall before

the Brandenburg Gate, and I knew from then on that this opening

of the Berlin Wall was only possible because of the U.S. Congress

and the United States Administration, and we will never forget

this in Germany. I want to say this especially, now that we have

the tenth anniversary of the fall of The Wall in Berlin. I was in

a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, and Helmut Kohl

on Monday; and Helmut Kohl explained the same position, that

without American policy over the decades, the reunification of Germany and Europe would never have happened. I would like to

thank you for this today.

Who could have thought, in the aftermath of World War II, that

a Union would emerge out of the ruins of Europe, and that this

Union would encompass 15 democratic nations with different tradiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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tions but united by common values? Who could have thought that

this European Union would be about to welcome 12 new members

in the near future, ten of them formerly incorporated in the Soviet

Empire? Who could have thought that the mere existence of a European Union would change the whole pattern of interstate relations on the European continent?

The European Union is a state under construction. The founding

fathers—Adenauer, De Gasperi, and Schuman—decided in 1950 to

create a single market for coal and steel products. They had in

mind the political unity of Europe, not just the free movement and

the control of two items which were vital for producing guns and

tanks at that time.

The first European Community, for coal and steel, was followed

shortly after by the attempt to create, with the support of the

United States, a European Community for defense. Unfortunately

the corresponding treaty was defeated in 1954 before the French

National Assembly.

In 1957, the European Economic Community was created, and in

1987, a European single market was established. But the political

dimension of the European construction was never forgotten. Every

achievement was seen as one more step to the final goal: a politically united European Union, which makes war between its members impossible.

The European Union, a name first used in the Treaty of

Maastricht in 1992, is the implementation of this political project.

Launched by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, this treaty

put on track the European Monetary Union, the Common Foreign

and Security Policy, and a policy for justice and home affairs.

The EU has statelike features. It has an elected parliament, a

court of justice and an executive sui generis. The Union has the

power to make laws—called regulations and directives—applicable

in our member states, just like Federal laws. Most of them are codecided by the Council, acting by qualified majority, and the European Parliament. This is a two-chamber model, like in the United

States.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force earlier this

year, is a continuation of the political project set in motion in the

1950’s. It reinforces the Treaty of Maastricht in many aspects, such

as the codecision procedure, but its main features can be seen in

CFSP. The post of High Representative for CFSP as part of a new

troika has been created. The integration of the Western European

Union into the European Union is foreseen in order to give the EU

an access to a military capacity; the so-called Petersberg tasks,

which were defined in 1992 by the WEU Council of Ministers, have

been included in the European Union. A new EU instrument has

also been created, a common strategy which makes the use of majority voting in CFSP possible.

The success of the European Union can best be measured by the

reality of the European single currency, the Euro. The European

Union is also the trading power in the world with the most widelyopened market. Finally, the European Union plays an active role

in world affairs. The foreign aid of the European Union and its

member states in 1997 amounted to $33 billion; that given by the

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United States amounted to less than $7 billion. This is also part

of burden-sharing.

The success of the EU is not only the success of the Europeans.

It is also your success, the success of the United States and of

NATO. Isn’t it a good sign for our future relationship that our new

High Representative for CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana, was very recently Secretary General of NATO?

NATO is an organization which has been preserving peace, democracy, freedom, and stability in Europe for 50 years and which

will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. NATO is a free association of countries on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, which

links Europe, the United States and Canada. Conceived in a geopolitical environment, characterized by the division between two

antagonistic blocks, NATO—unlike the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself—survived the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the

Iron Curtain. One can say that NATO won the Cold War in a

peaceful way. In fact, since 1989, NATO has shown a remarkable

capacity to adapt to the new geopolitical context prevailing in Europe, wherein cooperation has replaced rivalry. But Europe itself is

just on the way to doing so.

Since 1990, the classical, regional, conventional wars are possible

again, implicating the danger that the old rule of violence will come

back to Europe. We cannot expect that the U.S. will continue to do

the job of preventing or stopping war on the regional level in Europe for us.

The way NATO took military action in and around Kosovo to protect a whole population from ethnic cleansing was one of its greatest achievements. At the same time, this war, fought on behalf of

common democratic values, acted as a catalyst for Europe’s consciousness because it became clear to the Europeans that no diplomatic action could ever be successful if it could not be sustained,

if necessary, by military action. The Kosovo War will be considered

in the future as a milestone in the history of the EU, because it

was the key factor, which led to the declaration adopted on 4 June

1999 in Cologne by the EU’s 15 heads of state and government.

The aim of this declaration was to provide the EU with the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces

in order to implement the Petersberg tasks. This is to be done by

incorporating the WEU into the European Union. Collective defense, however, will remain within NATO.

The Cologne Declaration is in line with the decisions taken in

1996 in Berlin by the North Atlantic Council to develop a European

security and defense identity within the Alliance. I quote ‘‘taking

full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be

grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the program

control and strategic direction of the WEU.’’ This is exactly what

we are aiming at in bringing the WEU into the EU.

What the ESDI will involve in the way of action and planning

for action has been defined to some extent in Berlin and Washington. There can be European action within NATO which does not

involve all NATO members with, for example, the use of combined

joint task forces, and the Europeans may have a chain of command

7

running down from the European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander—Europe.

The other aspect of the ESDI is that of participation. Which

countries will be involved? There are 17 European countries in

NATO—11 of them EU member states and six currently outside

the EU, although four have applied for membership. The WEU actually covers some 28 European countries, ten of them being full

members and 18 being associated in one way or another.

Recently in Bosnia or Kosovo, for example, other countries which

may be considered European, like Russia and the Ukraine, have

worked with NATO/WEU Members.

So where is the ESDI? Is it to be built around the EU, even with

its neutral member states, sometimes called ‘‘non-Allies,’’ or around

the European nations within NATO or around the WEU; or is it

a broader concept which could include Russia, Ukraine, Georgia,

Armenia and beyond?

In my opinion, the European Union should be the focus of ESDI

for the following reasons. Within the Amsterdam Treaty, we created mechanisms which will make the CFSP more effective, such

as the principle of ‘‘constructive abstention’’. This enables member

states—and those most concerned are likely to be our ‘‘non-Allies,’’

for example, the four countries not members of NATO—to abstain

on a decision by the EU to take military action without preventing

such a decision being taken at all. The abstainers would not be expected to participate in such military action, although all member

states would be able to participate if so desired.

Second, we also have established Mr. CFSP, the public face of

our common foreign and security policy, together with the foreign

relations commissioner, who will make our foreign policy more visible and coherent. He will be supported by a policy planning and

early warning unit, a political and military committee, and by the

relevant instruments of WEU, such as a military committee, a

headquarters, a situation center, a satellite center and an institution for security studies, once the WEU has been incorporated into

the EU, which may happen by the end of 2000.

The European Union will consequently be able to decide and act

more quickly.

Third, if the European Union decides on military intervention in

order to deal with a crisis, the door must remain open for non-EU

members to take part, as is the case in the WEU. If the military

action is conducted autonomously, the European Union must be

able to invite other countries to take part in it by preserving its

autonomy of decision under the CFSP. If the action is conducted by

making use of CJTF, the NATO/WEU arrangements will prevail,

which means that after the WEU’s incorporation into the EU, the

EU and the NATO will have to find the best format for their new

Cupertino.

I am pleased to see that NATO has been adapted in such a way

that it enables the Europeans to conduct military operations with

the means and capacities of the Alliance, by making use of a European chain of command.

Fourth, finally, we cannot ignore the fact that while NATO’s

remit is limited to military matters, the EU cannot only be involved in, indeed undertake, military action, but also plan and fiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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nance postwar rehabilitation. The EU can provide humanitarian

aid and economic assistance to reconstruct a war-torn region, and

it can decide on political measures such as the stability pact for

Southeast Europe in order to bring an entire region closer to Europe and the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Fifth, the EU with its common legal order, common market, common currency, common environment and social policy has created

a common interest which is the base for a credible security and defense policy. The authority for our common trade policy is entirely

in the hands of the Union—a fact that is important for the questions discussed here, too.

Consequently, if we do not want to make a Freudian concept out

of ESDI, the search for identity, we should be pragmatic and consider that the EU will be the basket in which ESDI will take

shape. In fact, the EU can take over the responsibility for European-led operations, the sword being provided by the EU member

states and their non-EU partners, a coalition of the willing, and/

or by NATO.

We know that some people in the U.S., without necessarily opposing the construction of a common security and defense policy for

the European Union, fear that this would weaken the Transatlantic Link. For three reasons, I think that this fear is not justified. First, decoupling Europe from the U.S. would not be sensible

at all because a strategic link which exists at present between both

sides of the Atlantic Ocean is vital for peace and stability in the

world.

Second, discriminating between the European NATO allies on

the basis, for instance, of whether they are EU members or not is

not what we have in mind. We should offer everyone the possibility

of joining the EU in a military operation if we think that it might

be valuable.

Third, the issue of duplication is a bit more complex. We should

avoid unnecessary duplication, but extra capacity is needed. During

the Kosovo war, the means and capacities of the Atlantic Alliance

were used in some fields to their maximum. If the Europeans had

been able to put more combat aircraft, more air refueling tankers,

more electronic jamming equipment, more airlift capacity and so on

into the battle, it would have been better for the Atlantic Alliance

as a whole. I do not think that American public opinion would understand if the Europeans, in carrying out Petersberg tasks, have

each time to ask the U.S. for help. This could lead to isolationism

in the United States.

Consequently, Europe must meet the need for burden-sharing by

being prepared to spend more on its own security and defense policy, in line with the defense capabilities initiative approved in

Washington. A strong Europe is in the interest of the United States

because it would be a viable strategic partner sharing the same

values and many interests.

In conclusion, the European Union and the U.S. must work together to secure peace, security and prosperity in the world. A

strong European Union, with its economic strength, its own currency and a credible foreign policy backed up by genuine military

capacities will be the partner that the United States needs and has

always asked for. Our collective responsibilities are immense: We

9

must help Russia to find a new equilibrium after the collapse of its

empire; we must help the peace process in the Middle East; we

must help Africa to overcome its tribal wars and tackle its problems of underdevelopment; finally, we must make every endeavor

to divert Asia from getting into a new arms race, above all when

nuclear weapons are at stake.

Finally, I am convinced that other countries are willing to join

us in order to make the world better. Many of the issues we are

faced with nowadays are not of a military nature. They are linked

with economic development, illegal trafficking of all kinds, drugs,

threats to the environment, ethnic hatred, et cetera. On these

issues, it is possible to work together—Europe, America, Russia,

China, Japan, Africa. In order to achieve this, let us start by consolidating our Transatlantic Link on the basis of an equal partnership.

A final appeal to you: Trust this Europe which is building itself

and giving itself a security and defense dimension. I am convinced

that President Truman, General Marshall and Dean Acheson, who

helped us 50 years ago, would be proud of what they could see nowadays if they were still alive. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Elmar Brok.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brok appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Duncan Smith, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF IAIN DUNCAN SMITH, M.P. SHADOW SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, HOUSE OF COMMONS,

LONDON, ENGLAND

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. Mr. Chairman, first let me start by saying

what a pleasure it is to come and address this Committee. Perhaps

I can get my House to return the compliment to you or anybody

else on this same subject. I am going to try to keep my comments

reasonably short, because I know that you have copies of my written evidence.

Chairman GILMAN. Your full statement will be made part of the

record.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I will keep it quite narrow. Perhaps I can

say from the outset that I want to ask the simple question: is the

ESDI leading to a better defense for the Nations of Europe and for

the United States, or is it now heading in the direction which is

more likely to render the NATO alliance less powerful and less

positive?

First of all, by summarizing what the threat was, I have to say

that I was one of those who for a long time after the fall of the

Berlin Wall took the view that the nations of NATO, including the

U.S.A., had misread the situation globally and had cut too far and

too fast into their defense forces before recognizing exactly what

the problems were likely to be over the next 10 or 15 years.

One of the key areas is the knowledge that without the two-superpower rivalry, we were likely to see regional conflicts over ethnic wars blowing up much more often than before because the restraining pressure placed by those two superpowers on their allies

was now going to be missing. We have seen much of that take

place; and as we have already seen, both the U.S.A. and my country and others in Europe to a greater and lesser extent have been

10

sucked into those conflicts. We only have to look at the commitment levels of the armed forces in the United Kingdom to recognize

that we are pretty much deployed all over the world involved in

peacekeeping operations. I can rightly say up to about a month ago

we were nearly 50 percent committed to peacekeeping operations,

which is a pretty significant figure.

What kind of a threat does that pose to what was the traditional

defense posture of NATO, not just because there is a regional

threat to Western interests and to trade interests, but then how

does that become global? I guess really the main point to be made

here was made earlier on by Congressman Sherman, who talked

about ballistic missile threats.

I have believed for a long time that the proliferation of ballistic

missiles is the horse that got out of the stable, and there is no way

that we are going to shut that door and keep it in. It’s gone. We

have to accept that the world that we see over the next ten years

is more unstable and one which will progressively find some of

these unstable nations armed with weapons of mass destruction

with the capability to project them at either the U.S.A. or my country or the countries of Western Europe. That is what makes this

issue of NATO all the more important now after a period when too

many cynical people had assumed that threats to their homeland

were gone.

I am glad to see that the U.S.A. has recognized this and started

on a ballistic missile defense program. I am fully in support of that,

and I wish that the nations of Europe would wake up to that immediately and try to involve themselves with the U.S.A. in that

same program. However, this is not happening, and that has got

to be a clear concern for the U.S.A. because what the U.S.A. is

doing at the moment has a knock-on effect for Europe.

I am also interested to note that President Chirac’s comments

created a storm over here. I noticed that Mr. Rubin—perhaps I

should say on the edge of diplomatic language retaliated in criticism of France, and some might say that he is justified in doing

it. But, importantly we are beginning to see the tensions emerging

between the nations of Western Europe and the United States, and

I believe that much of the reason for that lies at the door of the

ESDI process as we see it emerging. There was a major change in

direction a year ago. Yes, we have heard about the Petersberg

agreements and what we are meant to be doing in terms of more

low-level unification in terms of defense in Europe. What I believe

happened a year ago was that there was a major change. A year

ago my government decided that they would agree with France,

hence the St. Malo agreement to accelerate that process and to

drive it forward to a much bigger scheme which would involve a

much greater range of military capacity in Europe. At that stage,

it was said within NATO, but as we have seen from there, through

Cologne, I believe actually that it is progressively being moved, by

those who would like to see it moved out of NATO, separate from

NATO. You will see that is becoming quite clear.

Some of the phraseology, both in the St. Malo and the Cologne

agreements, speaks louder than any words I can use here. In St.

Malo it was made clear that, ‘‘the European Union will also need

to have recourse to suitable military means, European capabilities

11

predesignated within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational means outside of the NATO framework’’.

If you have a look at what was reported by the individual nations

and their own press, you begin to see how this was interpreted. In

France, it was interpreted for the first time as ‘‘an autonomous capability for action backed by credible military forces’’ to take place

within the E.U. common foreign and security policy. Around Europe, that became much the same case.

It was greeted as a change of heart for Britain. For the first

time, Britain apparently was no longer going to block any separate

defense capability. It was talked of in Spain as ‘‘the new openness’’,

and I gather that the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer,

called the St. Malo initiative ‘‘useful from the viewpoint of European policy.’’

My point that I am making here is that about 12 or so months

ago a shift took place, and critical to that shift was the U.K. At

that time, we were told that the U.S.A. didn’t have a problem with

that because, of course, at the Washington agreement, the Washington meeting, it was made quite clear that the European defense

initiative would somehow find favor. Yes, I read the pages relevant

to that—page 65 and on the back of 65—and it is quite interesting

to note that throughout the bit dealing with the ESDI, what you

find is that the organization in Europe which is referred to is the

WEU. It is the WEU. Only one reference is made outside of the

main points to the EU, and that was in a final paragraph at the

end.

My point is that since this was agreed, what has happened

across the EU is that now, as you heard from Mr. Brok, the WEU

is to be wound progressively into the EU. That was never made absolutely clear at the time of the Washington Summit, and I think

that tells us exactly where this is going.

It is the EU, which is the political body; and if you talk about

winding what had previously been a defense identity within NATO

into the political body of Europe, what you begin to see is a political military structure that is progressively going to drive itself outside of NATO. We hear, endlessly, justification for this process is

that we will do more, it will be done better.

Then, as you see from my testimony—I put a series of tables together for expenditure and the quality of expenditure across the

nations of Europe; what you see there is quite the contrary. What

you see in countries—in Germany and Italy, Spain included—you

see a dramatic falling off in defense expenditure.

But even that level of defense expenditure hides a truly important factor which is the quality of defense spending. In far too

many of the countries in Europe, these are very much dominated

by what I would call conscription-based armies, which means you

spend a lot of the proportion of your money on troops and very little, by comparison, on equipment.

Not much of that is likely to change. Even the German foreign

minister made that quite clear about a week ago when he accepted

that while they will try to reduce some of that spending on conscription, it will never go away completely. It is seen as a process

of social engineering, which is a fair political point, but it leads us

to the conclusion that the quality of that spending is not likely,

12

necessarily, to rise to any great degree. Isn’t that really the nub of

the point?

From the U.S.A.’s point of view, you say quite rightly you want

the nations of Europe after Kosovo to be able to do more and do

it better. My answer to you, very simply, to that question, is how

do you do it? You have to either spend more and spend it better;

no amount of new structures in Europe that we designate in the

ESDI are going to change that if, at the end of the day, the capacity of your armed forces is not up to the job of deploying, and deploying in such a way as to resolve the problem of the conflict.

Kosovo highlighted that; and the one point about Kosovo that

showed that, ironically, the U.K.’s position at the moment is much

closer to the U.S.’s than any other nation in Europe, both in quality

terms, you will see from my figures—both in R&D and equipment—that the U.K. spends very similar amounts and proportions

to the U.S.A., whereas most of the nations of Europe do not. That

is the key point.

I see this process of the ESDI as a political maneuver that is

being hijacked to take away from the real question which has to

be answered: how will the nations of Europe ante up to their major

responsibilities in defending both Western Europe, with the United

States and Western interests which I define inside my submission;

and then I come back to ballistic missile defense.

I actually believe that there is now a very serious threat emerging from rogue nations. Across Europe, no real discussion is taking

place; hardly a word is said about this. You can’t provoke any discussion. It is for two reasons: A, they don’t want to spend the

money; and B, it reminds them very seriously of how important the

link with the U.S.A. is because most of the development has been

taking place over here. Personally, I wish that would change, and

I would like to see all of the nations of Europe recognize the importance of defending themselves against this potential threat.

So what I am really proposing is that now, as ever, or more than

ever before, it is time for NATO to think of itself again as one unit.

In other words, the countries that make up NATO, the nations that

make up NATO do have minimum obligations, and that is in terms

of defense expenditure and the quality of that expenditure and

there is no way around that. That is the key point to be putting

across and that is never answered when we get to that question.

Ballistic missile defense needs to be taken on as a NATO Program,

and it is time the nations of Europe woke up to that, and I think

the ESDI allows them to slide away from that responsibility far too

easily.

I would say that the key to this is the U.K. It is the key because,

as I said, of its defense spending and quality of spending and the

fact that almost alone in Europe it has the ability to project troops

and equipment to places around the globe. Quality is every bit as

important in the U.K. as I believe it is over here. We have seen

that in Kosovo, in the Gulf. It is a capable ally that is capable of

backing up what its obligations are.

I think that the trouble with the ESDI from the U.S. point of

view is the danger as we get sucked more and more into this political framework, what you get more in terms of the framework is

13

less in terms of the military potency in response to your requirements.

I do not want to see that. I believe that the nations of Europe

and the U.S. have common purpose in defending Western Europe

and the continental United States and North America, as well as

joining together to face threats to Western interests around the

globe. Now is surely not the time to create an artificial divide in

NATO that will only exacerbate the problems and the rows.

The comments from Mr. Rubin are an example of what happens

if you release some of the anti-American sentiments that are nascent in politicians’ minds across Europe. This gets driven away

from the core of NATO, and that will only create problems for

NATO to act cohesively in the future.

I say that I believe what we need to do is restate the preeminence of NATO, restate the reality that nothing needs to be

done beyond NATO. NATO has always had the capacity for individual nations to operate by themselves or in groups, operate with

the heavy lift, including the intelligence. We need to restate that,

restructure around that, and not look for this division. I would urge

you here in Congress to think very carefully about offering a blank

check to what is going on in Europe.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duncan Smith appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Duncan Smith.

We appreciate the testimony of both of you very much.

Mr. Duncan Smith, in your September, 1999 remarks at the Enterprise Institute, you stated that European contributions to the

ballistic missile defense project would, and I quote, ‘‘require some

major revisions to the European project.’’ Can you tell us why that

case would be your conclusion, and could Britain not lead European

support of a ballistic missile project under any foreseeable European security arrangement?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I would very much like my country to lead and

persuade the nations of Europe, Western Europe, to get on board

and come alongside the U.S. in the process, in the development and

certainly in the deployment of such defense structures. I believe,

typical sometimes of the generosity here, that the U.S. would be

willing—from what I understand from discussions with Administration officials and Members of this House, be willing to deploy

such a system in Europe; and I think it is up to the nations in Europe to actually face up to that and come alongside and do something about it.

I think the problem is that too many in Europe don’t want to be

reminded of the need to increase defense expenditures, certainly to

improve the quality of it. Second, I think the preeminence of the

U.S. in terms of the technology and capability would be a huge reminder in this case. Ballistic missile defense reminds them and

seems to move in the opposite direction to what is so often stated

in these agreements, including Cologne and after.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Brok, you said recently, ‘‘I quite like the

idea of including Article V of the WEU treaty, commitment and

mutual assistance, in a protocol to annex to the EU treaty to which

those countries, so wishing, could sign up.’’.

14

Mr. Brok, could you comment further on that? What reaction

have you received from the neutral EU members to that proposal?

If the EU treaty were to incorporate an Article V guarantee, would

non-NATO EU members essentially be receiving a back-door security guarantee from the United States?

Mr. BROK. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I do not need to deliver

speeches as a member of the opposition party for my internal country affairs on the basis of NATO, because NATO is, in my opinion,

much too valuable to misuse it for such purposes.

Second, to answer your question directly, I believe that it would

be very helpful to increasingly integrate the neutral countries of

Europe into our common responsibility. Due to the internal situation of such neutral and nonallied countries, it is with difficulty

that they go directly to any defense alliance. But if we put Article

V into a protocol of the EU treaty, then it would be an easier after

a time of cooperation on that basis, that such Congresses individually sign up for membership, which I think would be in our common interest.

I know, for example, that many parties in such countries—in

Sweden, in Finland, in Austria—would like to support such a proposal. It is more or less a problem of the social democratic parties

of such countries. Anyway, I can imagine that it will be part of the

intergovernmental conference which will take place next year.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Duncan Smith, some of our Members are

beginning to question a new strategic concept that has been adopted by NATO at the Washington Summit, which says that the Alliance should be prepared to defend our shared common interests

and values when they are threatened. Those who question the strategic concept point out that it seems to bolster the new doctrine of

humanitarian intervention that has been used to justify the NATO

military intervention in Serbia.

Do you believe that NATO itself may be suffering from strategic

fuzziness in conceptualizing its fundamental purposes in a new

post-Cold War environment?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I do think that is a criticism that NATO has

to take on board. I have watched with interest the development of

this new humanitarian doctrine with some cynicism. One has to

look across to Chechnya and ask what is different about the humanitarian option over there; and the answer is, practical politics

is the difference. That is what NATO has always been about, deciding how and when it can operate. The same goes for politics of all

nations. They decide what they can do and can’t do, what is within

the scope of their power and capability, and they try to do good

within those limitations.

Now, I think, therefore, if there is less said about pure humanitarian intervention and more about what we believe to be the defense of natural and classic Western interests and Western values,

then we get a much closer concept or much easier concept of how

NATO will operate. That brings into clear perspective the justification for the operations in Kosovo, much as it did in the Gulf, and

that should form the basis of the doctrine.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gejdenson.

15

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Brok, my sense here is that the new proposal simply provides a process within the EU for Europeans to rationalize their defense procurement and manufacturing. Am I

wrong on that? Basically what you look to this new process to do—

Mr. Smith says I am wrong—is to use the EU’s structure to develop a European-wide manufacturing system—what countries are

going to be responsible for what, what items they are going to

buy—and you feel that will give you a better ability to be an equal

partner in NATO, as well as, obviously, some independent ability

to act?

Mr. BROK. No, I do not think this is the main purpose. The main

purpose is to enable Europeans to do something like in the former

Yugoslavia where, with certain capacities, we could have avoided

war. I think such a capacity must be effective, and this is then a

real burden-sharing.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Do you mean in the military sense?

Mr. BROK. Both in prevention policy, and also financial aid and

trade could be a part of that. If I could follow my partner from the

U.K., then Mr. Marshall pursued with the Marshall Plan a wrong

policy; but I think he created a right policy in order to change Europe in a positive sense.

Second, I believe Europe must have also military capacities, because if we are to be able to prevent war in negotiations, we must

show that we have military capacities to do so. In this way, also,

we can be part of a better burden-sharing. If we organize our defense policy in a better way, we can also take more burden-sharing

in actions around the world together with the United States. At the

moment, we have no capacities to do so. We could also make better

use of our budgets in order to combine our abilities. To this procurement and manufacturing question, this may be a result of the

internal market, but is not at the output of ESDI. This is output

of the common market, when you see the mergers of different companies; and I think this European defense initiative has nothing to

do with getting Europe in a better position to American——

Mr. GEJDENSON. That wasn’t my question, although that is the

one that you obviously wanted to answer at this stage.

My question really, is that what you have got to do? You can’t

have each of the European countries trying to manufacture every

item; you can’t have each of the European countries trying to sustain a defense budget that has every kind of system in it. You have

got to rationalize not just the manufacturing, but the choices that

you are making collectively, and the EU process will do that for

you?

Mr. BROK. It will do this in a certain way, that is true.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I think that is a positive development.

Mr. Duncan Smith——

Mr. BROK. If I may say just one more word about it, I believe

very much that this European ability will be brought also to the

closer cooperation of armies, that we have a common procurement

policy.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I just wanted to make the point that again

this really should be seen in a wider NATO context. If we talk

about nationalization of defense production, quite right, you don’t

want lots of poor-quality companies running around not being able

16

to produce what is required. But then you can’t have ‘‘fortress Europe’’ defense production.

Actually this speaks volumes about a transatlantic involvement,

both U.S. and European manufacturers. If you take the politics out

of it, what you see across from Germany and Britain are those

manufacturers making that decision. They are saying if we can

within Europe, we do, but we also recognize that we need to work

with the U.S.A.

Mr. GEJDENSON. It seems to me that the present activities just

within NATO haven’t achieved those goals, as Kosovo proved.

When we went into Kosovo, we had, I think, the best political cooperation we have ever had on an activity, but America was just

technologically in a different place and able to operate in conditions

that Europeans couldn’t. So the current structure hasn’t had the

political capability of bringing the Europeans to a point where they

have made those decisions so they can be an equal partner. Maybe

this new structure will then give the Europeans the ability within

NATO to come to that point.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. You are going to see that take place because

there is not the defense base to sustain the level.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Let’s assume that you are correct. What is the

danger of having a unified Europe, working with a unified United

States all within NATO? What is the danger of using the EU to

help make the decisions within Europe so that instead of the

United States trying to negotiate with Italy, with England, France,

Poland, and all of these other countries, that the Europeans rationalize, and in that process there is one place for the Americans to

have contact.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. What you will see from the companies is

that they will do it themselves. When you said the capacity Kosovo

showed, actually, the U.K.’s capacity is much closer to the U.S.’s

because their spending levels and the quality is much higher than

the others.

If you are dealing with defense budgets that are falling and poor

quality, you will end up with a ‘‘fortress Europe’’ for the wrong reasons that won’t produce that capacity.

Mr. BROK. I would like to make one short remark.

To work together is to use synergy effects, and therefore a European procurement agency makes sense. But the biggest European

armament company, which was set up in France, is owned partly

by the United States because of the Daimler Chrysler merger.

Therefore, I do not see the danger of any ‘‘fortress Europe.’’ .

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] Mr. Brok, Mr. Duncan Smith, it is

nice to see you both here. I wish I had been here for all of your

testimony.

We will call on Dr. Cooksey from Louisiana for the five-minute

rule.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Duncan Smith, in looking at your testimony,

do these numbers for your defense budget reflect the cost of the

war in Kosovo?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. No, the extra costs from Kosovo would presumably have to be factored in. Those don’t have that factored in

yet. But in terms of the overall spending, I don’t think that they

will shift it dramatically. A couple of nations will have an effect.

17

Certainly not in the R&D and procurement side; you will not see

any shift in proportionate terms.

For a country like U.K., the treasury has already agreed this is

an exceptional spend, and therefore it isn’t directly out of the defense budget, as it were.

Mr. COOKSEY. So the percentage of defense spending——

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. You have to take the peaks out and even out

the trend. I think the trends are in here, which are falling budgets,

falling quality for the most part.

Mr. COOKSEY. You made a statement; you said that the politicalmilitary structure will drive itself out of NATO. Would you elaborate on that? You predicted that could happen.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. My concern is that the whole process as we

have certainly seen it shift in the last 12 months has moved beyond

what was originally conceived, I believe, in Petersberg, which is

more about consolidating and procurement and some of the smaller

arrangements. It has moved to a much bigger process, which is

about moving the European defense initiative into the EU, bringing

in the WEU and creating a political-military structure which has

a life of its own, and I believe will actually play to this idea.

I look back over the development of the European Union over the

last 25 or 30 years, and I believe there is a natural process that

takes place which begins to create an identity which separates

itself. In this case it creates an artificial divide. I have never believed that there was a division between Europe and the U.S.A. in

NATO. The beauty of NATO was that it believed in the concept of

partnership of nations within NATO. In creating a European dimension, I ask the question, what exactly is it we are going to be

doing, where the United States will simply disagree with us fundamentally; and where is the capacity for us to do that in the sense

that somehow we will replicate or change direction and have the

capacity to develop or deploy forces in the same way that the

U.S.A. might do.

There are some people across Europe who believe in a counterbalance principle to the U.S.A., and that somehow Europe should

act as a counterbalance against some of what they might consider

to be some of the more extreme gestures or policy positions of the

U.S. I don’t follow that, but this allows that process to develop, I

believe.

Mr. COOKSEY. One of you mentioned the anti-American sentiment in the EU, and we are accustomed to that, and I probably

agree with it at times, because sometimes we do send a mixed message about what our foreign policy is.

What are the sources of that within the EU, the major sources?

What countries specifically are those anti-American sentiments

coming from? I assume that it is not Germany or Great Britain.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I don’t want to comment on individuals, but

I did raise the point—and I am interested to hear what Mr. Brok

has to say about this—the comments Mr. Rubin made in the last

24 hours about the Chirac speech concerning ballistic missile defense.

There has always been an element of that around. It exists probably in almost every nation in Europe, some stronger than others.

Sometimes it makes its way into policy statements, more often

18

than not, but it is always a developing undercurrent which has to

be kept in check as compromises are made on policy.

But the concern that I am talking about, is that this process allows that to flourish rather than keep it under tight control.

Mr. COOKSEY. We expect a certain amount of that.

I am from Louisiana, and Louisiana has ties to France, and I

was over there a month ago, and I always enjoy my time in France.

But in Louisiana we still have a few little Napoleons, and I think

there are still probably some in France, too. That may be the

source of the problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. BROK. Is it possible to answer the question from my side, or

are you not interested in this?

Mr. COOKSEY. Yes, but I ran out of time.

Mr. BROK. First of all, we do this European policy because the

present situation is not satisfying. Everyone agrees on this because

Europe does not play the role it should play; therefore, we want to

make changes, changes in order to play a better role, in order to

get more burden-sharing in our common transatlantic interest.

I think this is a new dimension in order to achieve this goal, in

order to make available the transatlantic relationship on the basis

of a partnership, and not on dividing the transatlantic relationship.

I can remember that, in the discussion about setting up the

Euro-Corps in the beginning of the 1990’s, it was said that this

would bring the German troops out of NATO. We said no, it would

bring France closer to NATO. This is true. The whole European

Union and other countries of Europe become closer to the United

States with such a European defense identity.

Last, I would like to mention anti-American statements you can

get everywhere, as you can get isolationist statements everywhere

in the United States. Nevertheless, I think that European governments, or the overall majority, and all national parliaments and

the European Parliament are in favor of the transatlantic relationship; and certain examples cannot be misused for other purposes,

and even I would like to talk about France.

We always know that France has a special attitude, but I don’t

remember a time since 1945 when this made real problems, France

was always on the side of the United States. It was like this in the

Cuban crisis. It was like this in the Gulf crisis. France was on the

spot despite certain statements. Therefore, I would not see any

danger that this European defense initiative would be misused

against a transatlantic relationship in NATO.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Those are very good comments, and I am

glad to hear that.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to the countries we are discussing this morning,

how strong is the consensus and the judgment of each of you as to

the nature of the security risk that we face individually and collectively in the years to come?

Mr. BROK. I would say that this position is not quite clear everywhere. Too many people still believe that with the changes of 1990,

19

the whole world became more peaceful, and it is not understood

that it becomes more dangerous.

For example, we face a certain development in the Mediterranean and in Northern Africa: there is more military threat than we

have faced in the time of the Cold War, perhaps. To foresee the

question of proliferation and other problems, I think we increasingly need to stick together in NATO because of such military

risks, to have our instruments against it. But that would mean

that NATO has to be changed, and NATO has already changed and

adapted to this, and the United States has adapted to this, but not

Europe. Our development for a defense identity is in order to enable Europe to adapt to the new situation and give our proper

share to the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I agree with the assessment of what faces

us, and I think across Europe the nations have actually been more

content to assume peaceful outcomes than I suspect that they have

a right to. Interestingly enough, your question does unite us in our

observation of what the threat is. The question is, how do you deal

with it, and what should we be doing?

My concern is if you look at what the budget positions are across

the nations of Europe, you actually see a very serious determination to reduce the budgets, reduce the defense spending, some of

that driven by concerns over budgets that Euro has brought in

sharp focus, that is true. The reality is that some of the budget

constraints—for many reasonable reasons—that they would have to

change some of their social and welfare spending, and perhaps that

is too difficult; defense does tend to bear the brunt of that spending

reduction because it is an easy target, because there is no general

view that there is a threat.

I believe there is a very serious threat emerging, and I would

like to see that dealt with as each nation recognizes as part of

NATO that it has some obligations to have a viable defense capability and to work with the United States, as well as other partners, in developing their defenses in such a way that they meet

that threat. That is, in essence, the difference in how we approach

it. I don’t believe that the ESDI actually does that. I think it panders to a reductionist tendency, rather than to a tendency of improving defense.

Mr. DAVIS. As we discuss the value of a collective force, what lessons do you think we have learned from Kosovo that should lead

us to acknowledge the limited value of trying to operate on a consensus or most-common-denominator basis?

Mr. BROK. What we have learned from Kosovo and from the

whole Yugoslavia conflict is that with proper European capacities,

we could have avoided war in the very beginning and the loss of

many, many lives in this region before the shooting started in the

beginning of the 1990’s. I think this is our main concern, to get capacities to prevent such wars. We can only prevent them if we have

enough military capacity to show that we can also use military instruments.

I think, therefore, if Europe would have had the capacity, it

would have meant less work for us and you, because we could have

solved the issues together with you.

20

Mr. DAVIS. It appeared that certain countries had greater difficulty discussing the possibility of ground troops in Kosovo, which

ultimately succeeded in stifling public debate regarding the use of

ground troops. Obviously, that is illustrative of one of the prices

you pay in trying to govern military decisions on a collective basis.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. In answer to the two questions that you

really put together, you have to go back to the start of this, which

is the original change of Slovenia breaking away and recognition

of Croatia. There was a misreading of what was taking place out

there. I think it teaches us lessons in understanding just how powerful some historic animosities are and what the real pressures are

ethnically. We have tended over the last 20 years to assume that

those tensions were no longer in existence in Europe; and I have

to say this has shown that if we worry about the Middle East and

other countries, we have to worry about ourselves here, as well,

that we don’t pander to those splits and tensions.

But having said that, recognizing how to deal with it is dealing

with it early on, and to arrive at conclusions that all come together

within the NATO framework, both the U.S.A. and the nations of

Europe. But it does give us a very strong signal about what is likely to be the case in other parts of the world on how powerful some

of those tensions will be. Given when we now talk about the likelihood of many of those nations being capable in terms of the ballistic missile threat and weapons of mass destruction, it does make

it quite important that we recognize NATO as the one, clearly to

deal with some of those threats, both directly to our Nations and

to our interests abroad.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hyde.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I apologize for being late. I would like to have been

here.

Elmar, you and I have known each other for a long time, and you

have been a leading spokesperson on foreign defense.

Mr. Duncan Smith has written some things which I find very interesting, relating to ESDI within the European Union and his concerns about it, particularly as it relates to missile defense. I find

them to be troublingly compelling.

I am concerned, very frankly, about placing the European pillar,

or the ESDI, within the European Union despite all of my prior

contacts with the European Union and the parliament. My concerns are as follows: we have the problem of membership; Norway,

Turkey, and the three newest members of NATO are not members

of the EU. In fact, Turkey has had the door slammed in its face,

and there is no prospect in the short term of its becoming a member.

You have neutrals that are not a part of NATO that will play an

increasingly large role in the European Union. Some people see the

St. Malo meeting and then the Cologne summit as being the elements that put in place this ESDI concept within the EU; and

rather than causing the British to spend more on defense, it may

21

be the unstated view that Prime Minister Blair would be able to

spend less on defense in Britain with that initiative.

Finally, to name another high point of many concerns, the concern that this is another effort on the part of France to marginalize

the influence of the United States.

We have supported a European pillar, a strong one, within

NATO to use those joint resources with the concept of a joint task

force. But the European Union troubles us a great deal for some

of the reasons that I have mentioned. I would appreciate anything

that you can say, in brief, to try to ease those concerns.

Mr. BROK. Thank you. First of all, the main point is that we

want to answer a question which was posed to us by President

Kennedy and Secretary of State Kissinger, to give the United

States a telephone number which is to be called. ESDI is to deliver

such a telephone number. I believe that it will make it much easier

to do things together.

The European defense initiative has nothing to do with keeping

Turkey or Norway out. We know that Turkey will get the status

of candidate for membership in the European Union in Helsinki,

and that we will develop a system of flexibility, a close relationship

to Norway, Turkey, and other NATO countries, so that they will be

involved in that mechanism as the WEU is already involved in certain European policies.

The neutrals cannot stop it because the Treaty of St. Malo has

foreseen a decisionmaking procedure in a way that a neutral country cannot veto such questions. Therefore, I think it will bring

those neutrals closer to our common purpose in an indirect way

and will strengthen this partnership between the United States

and Europe as we discuss, for example, Article V of the WEU treaty.

I also believe this European pillar of the Alliance has the possibility of synergy effects in budgets. If we use our synergy effect, the

budget can be used in the proper way. But that does not mean we

will not increase the budget.

Also, I believe that, for example, via the European budget, crisis

management like in Kosovo can be paid for collectively, which

means that even countries who do not play an active role have to

take their share in the financing of such crisis management. Therefore, we will have more money for our common purposes than less.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. May I make two small comments?

First, is that I noticed quite recently that Mr. Kissinger has explained those comments by saying he doesn’t, I think, believe that

will necessarily bring any solution to the problems that NATO

faces.

The second thing is, sometimes if you have one telephone number, which has a lower common denominator, what you may get

when you ring that number is that they are not available; and that

is what would worry me.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Brok, this is a followup to the initial question that Mr. Gejdenson posed to you when you referred to prevenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
22

tion and the existence of an ESDI which would have made a difference in terms of what occurred in the Balkans.

Are you suggesting that simply the threat of an effective military

force would have made a difference, or do you see it in terms of

exerting influences based upon commercial relationships or diplomacy? Can you just amplify on that?

Mr. BROK. I think that just economic policy and trade policy cannot avoid war in certain circumstances. It is a very important instrument, and the European Union is using this; and I think it is

very important that the European Union has already been granted

competence by their member states in this case. But there is something more.

In the Bosnia crisis Slobodan Milosevic negotiated around 34

cease-fires. None of the cease-fires really worked because Milosevic

knew that the Europeans had no military capacities in order to uphold the cease-fires. It worked only when the United States of

America got involved, and then it became possible. Therefore, I

think to have our own military capacity would help us in a much

earlier stage than such cease-fires in finding a political solution.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you are suggesting that an effective military

deterrent based upon a European concept would have effected an

earlier resolution in the Balkans, maybe would have prevented

them?

Mr. BROK. Nobody knows, but I think there would have been a

very good chance.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is your hypothesis?

Mr. BROK. Nobody knows. But from the very beginning we had

no chance against Slobodan Milosevic because we had no capacities. I think we want to develop our chance, so that not all of the

time the U.S. has to get involved and solve our problems in Europe.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I find your testimony, both from you and from

Mr. Duncan Smith, fascinating—and NATO. In terms of the new

reality of NATO, particularly the debate, I think, has been provoked by Kosovo.

I think it was you, Mr. Duncan-Smith, who talked about the mission, or maybe I am interpreting your words, that the mission of

NATO in the past has been a collective defense posture, and now

you use the words such as ‘‘defending Western values’’ which is

clearly more nebulous than defending Western Europe and American national interests in terms of the Soviet Union.

Is part of this debate, what we are talking about now, provoked

by a lack of clarity in terms of what the new mission of NATO

ought to be?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. What I said wasn’t values; I used it very

much as add on, as a purpose. I said that we have got to recognize

what those values are. They are about democratic governments, liberal democratic governments.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think you were incorporating a question posed

by Mr. Gilman or Mr. Gejdenson. In Kosovo the situation was a humanitarian premise, and I think you incorporated that or encapsulated that into your Western values.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. If you just have a woolly description of humanitarian support, you don’t have a clear idea what is going to

happen or who is going to do it. I think that is the important purVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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pose for NATO, just to decide where its relevant spheres of influence are, and I think to that extent that process is a developing

process.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, the point that I am trying to make is that

this debate, which is one that is very worthwhile to engage in, is

in my own sense, really now a lack of clarity and an unease about

the rationale and the mission of NATO in the aftermath of a bipolar world.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I agree, but I also say, if we really step back

and examine what the threats are, what is likely to emerge and

what is emerging—something that both of us have touched on—I

think they in many senses help define what NATO is all about as

well. If you perceive there to be no threat, you really do have a

problem with deciding what NATO is for.

I am saying that there are regional threats to our interests, legitimate trade interests as well as interests with countries who

share our values in those areas we consider to be partners.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think we can agree to that.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. And ballistic missiles adds to that as a direct threat to the nations themselves, the homelands of Europe and

the United States. That threat is developing. I hope and believe

that the nations of Europe have got to wake up to that very quickly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I wonder if you can define what threats will

predicate a NATO response? Again, I think we are struggling to get

to this clarity issue, and I think that is one point from which to

have the debate about definition for NATO.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I agree. The first one that is clearest—and

this is the best focus—is ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, which I think are emerging very fast. That, if nothing

else, I believe is and should be a NATO-driven policy.

Mr. DELAHUNT. When I see in terms of ESDI—and this is just

from a distance, and someone who is not necessarily conversant

with the nuances of the issue—here we see a Europe with a common currency. There is a European Parliament and obviously a

trading block, and now the beginning—and I guess this goes to

your point, Mr. Duncan Smith—in terms of a common defense

predicated within that political structure. There is a real trend

there.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. You ask the critical question, which is, what

is the end destination for this European trend; and those of us in

my particular case, many of us believe that a state called Europe

is not a good option and not a viable option. We would say that has

limits, and I think we have reached the limits.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Brok.

Mr. BROK. I would like to make a short remark on this.

The European Union is not a state, but it has a political purpose.

The European Union acts like a state, and it is not just about

trade. That is the classical British conservative misunderstanding.

It is not a trade association; it is a common market with a common

environmental policy, with a common legal order like a state; it has

a common currency. I think that it is very clear that, in the long

term, we cannot have such an entity where regions have different

24

quality of security. But this entity has the interest you are talking

about.

We have a common interest because we have a legal order, a

common market and a common currency. Our own social environmental policy is much more than trade, and because of this——

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. It sounds like a state.

Mr. BROK. Yes, the European interest must be combined with the

interests of the United States of America. Therefore, the vast majority of the European Parliament and the member countries of the

European Union are looking forward to the development of a transatlantic marketplace. We have to combine our interests in more

areas than just defense, because that goes deeper and will keep us

longer together than just the defense question. Therefore, discussions about a transatlantic marketplace are of very high importance for the subsequent development of NATO in order to keep

the public opinion that we have a collective interest; and therefore,

collective defense and collective security policy makes sense.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I didn’t intend

to ask questions, but the more I think about what I have heard and

the subject matter, the more I have questions.

First of all, I am a big supporter of NATO and I am a big supporter of the European Union and all of that, but I can’t help wonder—and I would be most interested in your responses, both of

you—how relevant is NATO to the real present threat to the West

which is in the Far East? It is China, it is India, Pakistan, it is

Iran. It’s Libya, it is North Korea, and the real danger spots are

over there where nuclear proliferation is occurring.

Iraq—God knows what is going on in Iraq; we don’t.

I am just wondering, here we have this marvelous working structure to protect us from the Soviet Union—and parenthetically, I

don’t write that off; the Soviet Union is very much a work in

progress, but the real threats right now for a major confrontation

are out of the area of NATO.

I just wonder what your comments are vis-a-vis the relevance of

NATO to the threat from the Far East—from India, Pakistan, and

North Korea? Thank you.

Mr. BROK. The United States is the only superpower left in the

world, and it has a global point of view. Most Europeans are only

able to look in our neighborhoods. That is one of the problems. But

even if you look in our neighborhoods, we have a lot of common interests.

You explain the situation in Russia, for example. You mentioned

the Mediterranean. There are a lot of interests which we share and

on which we have to work together. But I also believe that an

emerging European Union would be better able to have a more outward look to other parts of the world in order to have a real burden-sharing with you.

I think the question, for example, of proliferation is a global

question. It is a question of common interest. Until now, the division of Europe, the political division of Europe, the political method

of the lowest common denominator of political directors from foreign offices made Europe unable to consider real strategy and policy on these questions. I believe that we must be able to develop

25

our policy in such a way that we, for example, can come together

with you on questions like proliferation, the possibilities of preventive strokes, and so on.

I have not given up the hope that we can keep proliferation in

certain corners and that we have justice stand up for such defense

systems. I think we still should fight for a world where proliferation has no chance politically, by accepting treaties, but also by

being ready to do our job in a certain way of crisis management.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I think NATO is hugely relevant in the

sense of the threats that you are talking about. We are talking

about proliferation, and you have got threats from the Middle East.

I made a speech recently, I called it the Iron Chain of Proliferation;

it stretches from the Far East to the Middle East. Clearly, in the

U.S. you look to the Far East and you see North Korea and others

posing a possible threat to mainland United States, as well as to

your interests and possibly to already deployed troops. My answer

is simply that NATO is the only organization that could be effective

against that because the threat is, by its very nature, global.

I agree with the assessment of the Soviet Union. My concern

comes back to the simple point, for too long in Europe they have

considered NATO to be about the defense of Western Europe; and

that is really where we need to push, from being an inward-looking

process to an outward-looking process. My concern about ESDI is

that it actually panders to an inward, isolationist view of Europe

regarding its involvement and its obligations, both within NATO

and generally in the global trade.

My concern is, that is happening at the moment: There is being

an internal focus, and more is less here. Because I keep coming

back to the simple fact, talk is cheap.

But if you look at the budgets, you actually see what they mean,

which is that they don’t intend to be able to project power. The one

nation which has historically believed in power projection alongside

the U.S. has been the U.K. it still has that enshrined in its strategic defense review. To do that requires equipment and it requires

political commitment. I sense that, perhaps is not there, and I

think that is my concern, that too often when people talk about the

development of Europe, they refuse to say that the end result is a

European nation. My answer is, if that is the case, then it would

be an inward-looking one that actually takes it away from global

responsibility. That is the wrong turn.

Mr. BROK. You, Mr. Duncan Smith, and I agree that the present

European performance is not good. Mr. Duncan Smith wants to

continue the present method which has brought us to such a situation. The supporters of European defense identity want to use new

methods and ideas to make it better for the transatlantic relationship.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just may ask the gentleman, Mr. Duncan Smith, when you mentioned ‘‘Western values,’’

could you explain what that is?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. Yes. I referred to them as a backup to what

I was talking about in terms of NATO, what NATO is about, and

I simply define them in the document that you have got as being

26

those of liberal democracies who believe in free trade under the

rule of law and the law of property; and those are the main principles, it strikes me, that Western Europe clearly and the United

States, North America, and many others around the world would

consider themselves to be about.

They are the key elements that stop people from going to war

with each other. We find that where those are enshrined with decent democratic institutions——

Mr. PAYNE. And social justice?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. Yes.

Mr. PAYNE. Would South Korea be a part of Western values or

the Philippines, India? The oldest democracy in Asia is India.

Would you consider them a part of your notion of Western values?

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. Is that addressed to me?

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. I think that all those nations that strive to

emulate those values are actually working toward what I loosely

call ‘‘Western values.’’ I am simply talking about the values that

started in the West. But they are what I sense, at the end of the

day, are the most powerful structures.

But all I am saying is that they are an observation. What NATO

has protected over the last 30 or 40 years is the existence of those

from a totalitarian regime whose desire was to overtake all of that

and get rid of it.

Mr. PAYNE. I think that when we are looking for allies, and we

are looking, as you mentioned, to people to have democratic values,

I think when we put in a superficial kind of a barrier, saying

‘‘Western values’’ would almost mean that it then excludes values

of people that are not in the West, even though they may not have

the connotation of what you see as Western values.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. It is not meant like that.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me ask you, where do you find Russia in the new

Europe, with glasnost and perestroika—and 10 years ago the world

witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The U.S., in the early part, was very generous about loans and

aid. Then NATO expansion started, and Russia felt that NATO expansion was, in essence, a way to contain Russia. Don’t get me

wrong, I just would like to know what Europeans’ view of Russia

in the future is, and I am still working with the majority here to

try to figure out what our position with Russia is going to be,

friend or foe, in the future. How do you see Europe’s position in the

new Russia?

Mr. BROK. I think Russia is a country in transition. To answer

your first question, it is always a question between values and interest. The bigger a country is, the more interests play a role which

may be, from the point of morality a wrong position, but that is a

classical question between the two issues.

I believe that we really have to help Russia to develop toward

democracy. It is not a full democracy now; and this is also in our

common interests—it is in our own interests in terms of security

and defense. Therefore, the European Union has set up major programs in order to help Russia to set up better administrations to

get democracy more deeply rooted, and to help on the economic side

27

in order to support Russia’s transition toward a democracy and our

common interests.

Mr. DUNCAN SMITH. Going back to Western values, I don’t want

you to assume that I am using that as an absolute. Of course, governments have to deal with different variables and different types

of expression of that. But also there are times when some would

pervert those processes and create instability in those regions and,

therefore, nations of Europe have to decide how they might deal

with changes to those. Examples are Pakistan and Chile. I am not

saying that they are absolutes; far from it. I recognize that politics

is not about that. I am saying that those are the things that people

strive for. I am not saying to use it as an absolute.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much. Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Brok, I will ask you this, not only in your capacity as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs, Human Rights,

Common Security and Defense Policy Committee of the European

Parliament, but also in your experience as a private sector businessman, a role I highly regard.

I have some concerns about the difficulty that you are going

through in Germany. Do you feel, as you make this integration,

over the next ten years that you will be able to keep Germany’s

same commitment to a common European foreign policy and a common defense and security policy that existed when you were just

West Germany? Is it difficult to conform the East Germans to this

concept?

Mr. BROK. It was the position by the German Government in

1990 that the membership in NATO was a condition for unification.

Chancellor Kohl didn’t accept any proposal for German unification

without NATO membership. Major German parties in parliament,

besides the former Communists, have this position nowadays. Even

the Green Party has developed in such a way. So the German support in the German parliament for NATO membership as a unified

Germany is nowadays stronger than it was ten years ago.

Mr. COOKSEY. That is good to hear. That is reassuring.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.

I want to thank our panelists for your patience and excellent testimony and for traveling to be with us. I would like to invite Mr.

Brok and Mr. Duncan Smith to sit up here on the dais for the balance of the hearing.

We will now proceed to panel number two. I would like to ask

our next panelists to take their seats. We are on a roll call vote,

but our vice chairman is on his way back and we will continue

right through. I think I will ask you to speak in alphabetical order.

Each of our experts has a deep understanding of Europe and its

importance to the United States, but differing perspectives on how

the United States ought to deal with a unifying Europe.

The Honorable John Bolton has served the United States as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Bureau of International

Organization Affairs in the Bush Administration. He was Assistant

Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division during the Bush

Administration. During the Reagan Administration, he was in

charge of Legislative Affairs at Justice, and prior to that was AsVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
28

sistant Administrator and General Counsel of the Agency for International Development, and served in the White House counsel’s office. He is currently Vice President at the American Enterprise Institute.

The Honorable Robert Hunter is at the RAND Corporation. He

served until recently as America’s Ambassador to NATO. Ambassador Hunter was Vice President of the Center for Strategic and

International Studies, was involved in the Clinton and Mondale

campaigns, and was on the National Security Council staff in the

Carter Administration. He has also worked on Capitol Hill, as well

as in the Johnson White House.

The Honorable Peter Rodman is Director of National Security

Studies at The Nixon Center. He has served on the staff of the National Security Council in the Bush and Reagan Administrations

and in policy planning in the State Department. He also was on

the staff of the NSC during the Nixon Administration.

Professor Simon Serfaty came to the United States in the 1960,

and is a graduate of Hunter College in New York. He has a Ph.D.

from Johns Hopkins and was associated with that institution for

many years before taking up his present position at Old Dominion

University. He is also associated with the Center for Security and

International Studies and runs, among other things, a highly regarded program to bring experts on European affairs to the Hill for

talks with senior staff. He has written 15 books and monographs,

including one entitled ‘‘Taking Europe Seriously.’’

Gentlemen, thank you again for being here. Let us begin in the

order I introduced you. Your written statements will be entered

into the record in full, and you should summarize them in your oral

remarks. After we hear from the panel, we will turn to questions.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bolton, why don’t you start?

STATEMENT OF JOHN BOLTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say, speaking as a strong supporter of NATO, I think

NATO is at a crisis point for its future. I think that the crisis is

caused not, as some would say, by inward-looking or isolationist

views of the United States, but by the conscious and not—very—

hidden agenda of many European nations to develop a separate security and defense identity, one that would, at a minimum, distance themselves from the United States and, in the most disconcerting option, create them as an alternative.

I think that a fully effective ESDI—and I think it is a long way

from happening because of the split between rhetoric on some European leaders’ part and the reality of their actual defense and political structures—but a real ESDI would result in the fragmentation of NATO and the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance as we know

it. I think that the original idea underlying the Marshall Plan,

whatever utility it has had and did have during the Cold War, is

confronted with a very different set of circumstances today. The

continued development of the European Union is not something

that the United States should be——

Chairman GILMAN. Gentlemen, I am told that I have two minutes to vote. Mr. Bereuter is on his way back.

29

The Committee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] I understand that you were in midstatement when I went to cover the vote. I am sorry that we are

having to do this. Please proceed.

Mr. BOLTON. [Continuing.] What I was saying, is that it ignores

reality not to think that a European Security and Defense Identity,

if it came into being, would have a dramatic impact on the internal

decisionmaking and effectiveness of NATO.

I have tried in my testimony to give some examples of what has

already happened in the playing out of a closer European Union in

the economic area. When the G–7 now meet on trade questions,

they meet as four: Japan, the United States, Canada, and the EU.

It is hard to deny that that changes the dynamic, it changes the

perspective of the European Union representative.

In the context of the United Nations, which is a small example

here, ten years ago when the Western group of nations met, although the Presidency of the EU might give an ‘‘EU’’ perspective,

other EU members also spoke. The Brits would speak, the Italians

would speak, the French would speak. Today in Western group

meetings, the EU presidency speaks, and all of the rest remain silent.

This difference in the political dynamic has already affected

NATO. I think it will affect it more so in the future, and I think

it is just inherent in the logic of a separate European identity that

it will develop an agenda different from ours. If the Speaker of the

House came to this Committee and said: ‘‘I would like another

International Relations Committee as an alternative to this one,’’

one might well ask why that was necessary. It would be to pursue

a separate agenda.

I find that very troubling, and I think we have seen it play out,

for example, in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Even

within the EU, the differences that were debated produced a policy

that led to incoherence. The German push to recognize Slovenia

and Croatia, I think helped precipitate the disintegration of Yugoslavia and everything that flowed from it.

I think we have seen that despite the State Department’s conventional wisdom—that the European Union sometimes favors the

United States, sometimes works to its disadvantage, but on balance

it is useful—has been proven conclusively wrong time and time

again in the context of Middle East policy where the European

Union’s lowest-common-denominator position has been nothing but

trouble.

I think the same is true for the European Union in the context

of European Monetary Union, where the purpose of a single European currency is precisely to be an alternative to the dollar. I think

Mr. Brok said just about as clearly as one can say in the third

paragraph of his statement, ‘‘The European Union is a state under

construction,’’ which implies it will, when it finishes construction—

if it does—be a direct alternative and perhaps opponent in some instances of the United States.

I think we have seen that play out most recently in the case of

Kosovo where, on a number of issues, there was just a fundamental

disagreement between the European Union vision of what to do

30

and the American vision, first, on the question of whether to seek

Security Council approval, where the European view clearly was to

seek it and ours was not. Second, as we have seen in recent testimony on the Senate side on internal NATO decisions on targets

and other military matters, that there is just a different way that

the Europeans viewed what they were after in Kosovo.

It is not just the tactical decisions themselves, but the larger political agenda that it reflects. The unseemly and corrosive public

debate over use of ground forces which the United States is, in

part, to blame would be a further split within the Alliance that I

worry about.

So, Mr. Chairman, I think that we have come past the point

where we can all say, ‘‘We favor NATO, we favor the European

Union; we favor greater European political cooperation and a common European Security and Defense Identity,’’ and act as if those

two are entirely consistent. I think the evidence is clear that they

are not consistent with the continued vitality of NATO. I think that

represents a real challenge for the United States.

I believe NATO should be prepared to expand its activities out

of area. I think that is something that is very much under threat.

It is important that we stitch ties of economic cooperation more

closely across the North Atlantic to help prevent that. That is not

something that most European Union members have in mind.

We are at a very troubling time for NATO and a very critical

point in its future: whether we will see a second 50th anniversary.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Bolton, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Hunter, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER, RAND

CORPORATION

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. It is an honor to appear before you and

the Committee today.

Let me first compliment the Chairman and yourself for holding

this hearing. I think it is very important that the American people

understand exactly what our stakes are in international security

and in Europe and the best way of going about it; and I also thank

you personally and, through you, other Members of the Committee

for the extraordinary bipartisan support that you provided the

whole time while I was NATO Ambassador. We are able to be effective abroad and especially effective in NATO only when we have

the strong support of the Congress. I understand that you will be

leading a delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly this

weekend.

Mr. BEREUTER. We hope so.

Mr. HUNTER. I salute you on doing that.

Let me cut to the bottom line.

First, the Europeans are working to complete European integration. This has been a U.S. goal for more than 40 years, and the

progress that they are making and the steps that they are taking

are underscored by the fact that we have just reached the 10th anniversary of the opening of the Berlin Wall and the effort, as President Bush said, to create a Europe whole and free.

31

Second, both CFSP and ESDI are very much a natural progression taking place over a long period of time. This is the last act of

devolving sovereignty, giving up national control of your military

forces, and that is not going to happen simply or easily.

I welcome the major step taken to appoint Javier Solana to be,

in the English phrase, ‘‘Mr. CFSP.’’ The EU’s choosing a man with

such distinguished service at NATO augers well for the Atlantic Alliance as well as for Europe.

There are some doubts here about the way that this is going, but

it is not going to happen suddenly. We have a long time to help

the Europeans get it right.

Third, let’s be clear. Virtually every European country sees

NATO as continuing to be preeminent. When push comes to shove,

NATO is their bottom line in terms of where security gets done.

They see the U.S. role as continuing to be absolutely critical, and

I don’t think any of them, including the French, are going to risk

that engagement.

Fourth, we should welcome, I believe, this development and be

clear in our fundamental support before we get into the details,

frankly, because there has been a lot of uncertainty in the past in

Europe about whether we are really prepared to see them create

a strong European pillar. ESDI is, in fact, a major element in getting the Europeans to take more responsibility, something we have

long urged them to do, whether it happens through NATO on a

particular occasion or ESDI on a particular occasion. This is going

to help over time to encourage the Europeans to be more outward

looking, rather than less.

Very little of what we are talking about today is new. As you

know, Mr. Chairman, back in 1996 NATO struck a basic bargain

with the Europeans, from which I think everyone gains. I had the

honor of negotiating this for the United States. The agreement was

that, in order to ensure the primacy of NATO and to make sure

that resources were not wasted, ESDI was to be built within

NATO, not outside it, and with a doctrine that some assets could

be separated from NATO, but they wouldn’t be separate from it.

The NATO chain of command is to be preserved. There is to be

one NATO, not two; not one for what we call Article V operations

and one for non-Article V. NATO primacy is underscored. This is

the place, it is all agreed by all 19 allies, for dealing with transatlantic security, and everyone recognizes that that does mean the

preservation of U.S. leadership. Frankly, from our perspective, I

think we have to recognize that continuing to be engaged buys us

a lot of influence in Europe, far beyond defense issues.

It has also been agreed that NATO has the first call on forces,

including institutions like the EUROCORPS; and also, if NATO assets were transferred to ESDI, NATO could have them back any

time it wants.

On the European side of the bargain, there was agreement on

certain kinds of NATO assets could be transferred to ESDI on

agreement of the North Atlantic Council, where we have a veto. I

could go through the list; it is extensive. The basic thing is, we

struck this bargain. It has been negotiated and agreed, and this is

something that I believe is very much in our interest.

32

Now we have a new debate in the last several months, partly because of Kosovo—a recognition that there is need for better burdensharing and for the Europeans to be able, if not yet willing, to do

more in their own backyard. There is also a new European desire

for a greater capacity for self-reliance, something that we have

been urging on them for decades and should welcome. However, I

believe, that most of the new impetus for ESDI is not Kosovo, but

the decisions taken by the British and French governments last

December at St. Malo. If you read the document agreed at that

meeting, you will see that the only thing that is new, building on

the Berlin decisions of 1996, is to move the executive agent for

ESDI from the Western European Union to the European Union,

in time, followed up by the employment of Javier Solana in his new

role. It is true that some, particularly in France, want to increase

the degree of European military independence from NATO through

ESDI, and perhaps even to complete with us. Let’s be clear, this

is decidedly a minority view, and I don’t think that anyone is prepared to risk the transatlantic ties.

We have on this side of the Atlantic expressed some concerns

about ESDI in terms of the three D’s: discrimination, decoupling

and duplication.

‘‘Discrimination’’ really means Turkey. Yet it was agreed in 1996

that, if Turkey doesn’t get to take part in what WEU does, it will

not get any NATO assets—period. We can veto the decision, and

we should do so. German Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping said

last week that Germany stands fully with us on this matter.

Next is ‘‘decoupling.’’ If we look fundamentally at the Transatlantic Alliance, we are engaged with the Europeans in NATO and

they are engaged with us because our respective interests, if not

identical, at least are fully compatible. Frankly, if they weren’t, we

would not have a NATO alliance, much less anything we are talking about today.

My real concerns about decoupling are three: first, decoupling by

accident. If because of a desire to build their institutions, what the

Europeans say they are able to do militarily runs ahead of what

they can actually do, we in the U.S. might think that we could do

less before it is possible.

Second, I do have a concern that the EU might create a ‘‘European Caucus’’ within NATO, in which all ten WEU Members in

NATO, today, and more later, would take the same positions and

have to refer back to the European Council to change their views.

I think that would be very dangerous for the effective working of

NATO, and we have to oppose it.

Third, if there is too much talk about CFSP too soon, it could indeed produce a lowest common denominator among the Europeans.

One thing on which we have to work with the Europeans—and this

is an absolute bottom line—is to get them to be more outward looking, whether through NATO or through ‘‘coalitions of the willing.’’

Regarding ‘‘duplication,’’ there will be some of that. The Europeans have to be able to make decisions and have some command

and control. But none of the allies, including France, will spend the

money to do excessive duplication. In fact, I am more worried that

they will not spend money even to fulfill their NATO commitments;

33

very worrying is the fact that Germany is planning to cut its defense spending by a substantial amount.

Now, where do I think the real problem is today and what should

we be focusing on right now, as opposed to later? That issue is

about capabilities, not structures. Here, I believe the most important thing we have to get done within the Alliance right now is the

so-called Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Whether that helps

NATO or helps ESDI or both, DCI is, I think, the critical factor.

This was dramatized by Kosovo, where the United States flew

about 80 percent of the sorties—in part, of course, because collectively the Alliance wanted to sustain as few casualties as possible.

Let’s be clear: if there had been a ground campaign, most of the

fighting would have been done by Europeans. Thus Kosovo was not

just a matter of our pulling European chestnuts out of the fire.

The most immediate issue within DCI, which is still undersolved,

is the role of the defense companies within Europe and across the

Atlantic. We are now seeing something we have pushed for finally

taking place within Europe: greater consolidation of European defense industries. The U.K. has taken the lead. We now see the potential creation of a European Aerospace and Defense Company

with Germany, France, and Spain. The real question is whether

that will be protectionist or outward-looking. Are we going to have

transatlantic teaming and some common procurement, or will we

see a ‘‘fortress Europe?’’ This is a central risk. Here is something

on which we Americans have a lot to say, particularly because we

have the bulk of the high technology that is needed to make NATO

work in the future; and here I think we in the U.S. are falling

short in three areas.

First, we need to speed up the licensing process for high technology transfers so Europeans can start doing things with us. Second, we need to start thinking about buying effective defense goods

from Europe if we want them to buy from us. Third, we have to

face up to a critical issue about technology transfer to the Europeans—not just providing them with the ‘‘black boxes,’’ but also

with what is inside of them. The Europeans have to be willing at

the same time, to protect our technology so it doesn’t fall into the

hands of other states, especially that are hostile to us.

But I think we need a ‘‘rule of reason’’ here. Otherwise, if we find

a ‘‘fortress Europe’’ and a ‘‘fortress America’’ in defense procurement, we will all lose. It is here, with the Defense Capabilities Initiative and this transatlantic defense industry relationship, that we

really need to focus now.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Rodman, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF PETER RODMAN, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

SECURITY PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much.

First, I want to commend the Committee and the Chairman for

the leadership that you have shown on this issue we are discussing. The Committee’s engagement on the issue has been timely

34

and important, and I believe it is having an effect on the unfolding

debate across the Atlantic.

Now, Americans have always wanted the Europeans to do more

on defense. We have always wanted the Europeans to coordinate

more, to improve the effectiveness of what they are doing in defense. Since the Balkan crisis in particular, Americans have welcomed the prospect that Europeans might be able to act autonomously.

So it is important to stress that the debate here is not about

America wanting to see Europe weak. It is not about America

wanting to keep Europe divided. It is not about America wanting

to keep Europe in a condition in which it is not capable of acting

effectively on its own. On the contrary, the issue boils down to

whether this European drive for autonomy strengthens the Alliance or divides it; whether the manner in which the Europeans go

about this is going to compete with NATO or complicate NATO’s

procedures. That is the question.

On one level it is a very mundane question. Maybe there is some

procedural formula, some institutional formula, some way of linking the EU tightly to NATO in this field. Maybe ingenuity will

come up with some way of doing this. But it is also a profound

issue, because if it is not done the right way, what we have for the

first time in 50 years is a competing defense organization, and that

is a revolution in transatlantic relations.

The European Union, of course, is now developing not only the

Common Foreign and Security Policy, but St. Malo does imply a

new defense institution of some kind. This is coming about because

the British, who for years had resisted this, have now reversed direction, as Mr. Duncan-Smith was describing in the first panel.

This is a new departure.

The question inevitably arises, how does this new EU entity relate to NATO? How does it fit into NATO or link up to NATO? The

disturbing answer is that we don’t know yet. We don’t know how

this new defense entity is going to link up with NATO or coordinate with NATO or whatever.

What we see, what we read is ambiguous. St. Malo was ambiguous about the Europeans wanting to have the option of acting ‘‘inside or outside of NATO;’’ and the French, of course, stress that St.

Malo is about giving the EU a capacity outside of NATO. The Cologne EU Summit was disturbing to many people here because,

again, the language seemed to suggest that the emphasis was on

what is independent of NATO, not what is coordinated with NATO.

President Chirac gave a speech at Strasbourg on October 19th,

where he spelled out the French view of an all-European chain of

command, a procedure whereby Europe would have its own military committee, it would make decisions, convey the decisions to a

European general staff, which would give orders to European

forces—again, all of it outside of NATO.

What is more disturbing to me is, in President Chirac’s speech,

he even ruled out the idea of discussing how this relates to NATO.

He was vehement on the point. He said it is ‘‘premature.’’ He said

it is ‘‘putting the cart before the horse,’’ there is ‘‘no need for it at

the present time.’’ Whereas, on the contrary, I believe the sooner

we resolve this institutional question, the better.

35

As I said, there may be a formula. It would certainly make use

of the Berlin formula that Ambassador Hunter described whereby

the Alliance has already set up a procedure for autonomous European action within the Alliance framework. But the French seem

to be resisting the idea of discussing now how these institutions are

going to relate. That is a mistake, and I think it is imperative—

now, at this formative stage of European institution-building—to

address this question and try to find some formula to reflect what

Ambassador Hunter said, the primacy of the Alliance. Even President Chirac talks about the Alliance being the ‘‘centerpiece of Europe security.’’ I would like to see some operational reflection of

that principle in the EU’s deliberations.

I have to say that the resolutions that were passed in the House

and the Senate recently could not have been more timely. House

Resolution 59, which was your initiative, Mr. Chairman, which

passed overwhelmingly, and Senate Resolution 208, which passed

unanimously on November 8th, both expressed the kinds of concerns that we have been expressing—the fear that this might

evolve in a way that divides the Alliance.

These resolutions were especially timely because the EU is about

to meet again in Helsinki in mid-December. The EU will have one

of its semiannual summits in Helsinki to carry this project to the

next stage. It is important, as the Europeans meet again that they

understand the American view. It is important that they not be

misled by our silence into thinking that the trend has American acquiescence or American support or does not portend some serious

consequences in European-American relations.

The expression by Congress of this concern is enormously important, and I hope it will have an effect on how the Europeans go

about their project.

As Ambassador Hunter pointed out, the French view is not the

unanimous view in Europe, and there are many in Europe who do

pay attention to what we think, who do care about the American

connection, and who might well share the concerns that we are all

expressing.

The last point I would stress is that, of course, the administration shares the same views. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe

Talbott gave an important speech in London on October 7 reiterating the Administration’s concern about the evolution of the EU

defense project. It is the Atlanticists in this country that are expressing these concerns, it is not the isolationists. I think the isolationists in this country would be happy to see Europe go its own

way; they would wave good-bye and would not be unhappy to see

NATO fall apart. But it is the Atlanticists, including the Members

of Congress who have passed these resolutions, and it is the

Atlanticists in this country who do value the Alliance, who are expressing these concerns. If the Europeans seem to think that the

Alliance is dispensable, it is reasonable to fear that there might be

a reaction here strengthening the hands of isolationists in this

country.

Again, I commend the Chairman and the entire Committee for

the leadership it has shown on these issues. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Rodman.

36

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Serfaty, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. SIMON SERFATY, PROFESSOR OF U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY, OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

Mr. SERFATY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, too, for

the opportunity to be here this morning. I have provided a prepared statement, and given the eloquence of my friends and colleagues on this panel, I will limit myself to a few short points.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be

made a part of the record.

Mr. SERFATY. First, the war in Kosovo, as well as the war in Bosnia and the Dayton Accords, were about the unfinished business of

Europe, namely the need to attend to the pre-Cold War legacies of

territorial and ethnic conflicts which the Europeans, left alone, cannot manage by themselves for lack of capabilities and institutional

unity.

That business is unlikely to go away for the indefinite future,

and our commitment to the management of that business is unlikely to fade either.

Second, that such would be the case is a matter of interest. Quite

clearly, we have in Europe a range of interests, the likes of which

are not matched anywhere else in the world. There is now between

the United States and Europe a complete relationship that is not

found anywhere else, to repeat, outside of the Western Hemisphere.

These interests shape our commitments, and not the other way

around. It is on that basis that we remain supportive of the European allies in the management of that unfinished business.

Third, discussions in Europe about the need for common foreign

policy and the desirability of a European security and defense identity are not new. In fact, these discussions have become so repetitive over the past 50 years as to become, frankly, boring. Yet these

initiatives are more serious today than they have been at any time

over the past 50 years. That this would be the case has to do with

an unprecedented level of consensus amongst the European allies,

including the big three—Germany, France, and the U.K..

France has become more pro-Atlanticist over the past few years,

while the U.K. government, as Mr. Duncan-Smith was suggesting

this morning, has become more pro-European than at any point

over the past many years.

Fourth, a stronger, more coherent and more united Europe is a

goal which the United States has been seeking for the past 50

years. Any sort of ambivalence about the fulfillment of that goal

would mark a dramatic change in what have been established U.S.

policies since 1949.

This being said, however, there are legitimate questions about

the complications and the dilemmas and the ambiguities which the

development of an ESDI or of a CFSP, might introduce—and there

are many more D’s than the three usually mentioned. I have counted at least five of them:

A duplication of NATO resources and capabilities that would be

wasteful;

37

A decline of the EU states’ commitment to NATO that would be

self-defeating;

A re-distribution of authority between well-established NATO

mechanisms and a newly created EU bureaucracy of standing committees and competing military staffs that would be far too ambiguous;

Some discrimination toward NATO states that do not belong to

the EU, like Turkey, which would be troubling; and a dangerous

back-door diversion of NATO security commitments to non-NATO

states that do not belong to the EU.

All of these concerns are real, and we should be aware of them.

But they are premature at this point because this is no more, or

no better, than the beginning of a process that is going to take a

number of years before coming to its end point. Indeed it is incumbent upon us to influence the process even while it unfolds in order

to prevent those outcomes which we fear or might fear.

Fifth, in the context of that process, what the Europeans are

most likely to do is not so much to spend more on defense as to

stop spending less, and spend better. Only later might they spend

more. I suspect that in the next few years, the Europeans will

adopt criteria for defense convergence somewhat comparable to the

criteria that were developed for their economic and monetary

union.

The first of those criteria will be defined in terms of comparable

percentages of research and development and procurement spending, for example, and convergence in the professionalization of national armies or in the area of privatization of the defense sector.

I suspect that these initiatives will be announced at the end of the

French presidency in December 2000, with the year as a possible

point of arrival.

Sixth and finally, I must say a few words about enlargement because enlargement defines the ‘‘C’’ of CFSP and the scope of Europe’s common foreign policy. Europe’s commitment to enlargement

to the East is certain and credible, but there should be a more reliable, more readily identifiable, more transparent time line as to its

form and schedule.

Our concern over enlargement should not be that the EU will renege on this commitment. Our concern has to do with the backdoor commitments might develop as the WEU becomes part of a

larger EU. I would like to think that between the EU Summit of

2000, December and the next NATO summit in the latter part of

2001, we will begin to work toward a progressive convergence of

European membership for both of those institutions. Over time,

NATO states in Europe that do not belong to the EU should become members of the EU, and EU states that do not belong to

NATO should become members of NATO. That guideline has been

implemented since the 1949 Washington Treaty and the 1957

Rome treaties, and it ought to be the flashlight that will help us

move toward a convergence of the two institutions that shape the

Atlantic community.

Mr. Chairman, the way to approach the debate on CFSP and

ESDI and other related matters is with a vision statement that

does nothing more than stay the course. We are coming to the end

game of the process that started in 1949. U.S. policies toward EuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
38

rope have been extraordinarily successful to the benefit of both

sides on the Atlantic.

Those policies were shaped by two fundamental ideas: the idea

of a strong and united Europe on the one hand, and the idea of a

cohesive and coherent NATO on the other. These ideas were never

deemed to be contradictory or conflicting. They were always compatible and complementary. The way to approach the 21st century

is to keep that vision afloat and to stay the course.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Serfaty.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serfaty appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Let me open up our questions with Mr.

Bolton.

You have identified some of the major pitfalls that face the transatlantic relationship as a process of an ever-closer union as realized

by the EU. Do you believe that the policy of the U.S. should be to

stop the development of Europe’s common foreign and security policy of the ESDI entirely? If so, how can we accomplish that without

risking a permanent rift in our relations with our allies?

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t think that we can stop it, but I think what

we should do very clearly is say to the Europeans, that number one

we are not indifferent to what you are doing.

Number two we do have legitimate interests in it. I think that

the Europeans have operated certainly during the last six or seven

years, and before that, on the assumption, because of repeated official statements, that we do simply welcome continued integration

on political and military matters and that we don’t have any concerns about it.

I think, and I was sort of in mid-sentence when we broke; let me

go back to that thought.

It is certainly true, in the Marshall Plan, we welcomed closer European economic integration. It made good sense as economic policy

for them, and it suited our purposes in dispensing Marshall Plan

aid; but the circumstances of Europe in 1999 are very different

from the circumstances of Europe in 1949. Accordingly our interests have changed as well. Although I don’t usually quote John

Maynard Keynes, somebody once said to him, ‘‘Well, you have

changed your opinion. You have changed your policy.’’ and he said,

‘‘Sir, when the facts change, I do change my opinion. What do you

do?’’.

I think that the real threat now comes from a European identity

that sees itself, defines itself, in large measure as something different than the United States. This is playing out in a number of

respects. I think it has consistently played itself out that way in

the former Yugoslavia and in dealings with states like Iran and

Iraq. The most current example is the subject of missile defense,

and there had been reference here earlier today to President

Chirac’s speech last week where the idea that somehow the development of missile defense is—U.S. development of missile defense—is a threat to the Europeans of separating ourselves out.

This is not only wrong factually, but shows the hidden agenda not

just of the French, but of many others beyond France who won’t

say it publicly in a hearing like this, but say it privately very effectively. That is why the French and others in Europe don’t refer to

us as the world’s sole superpower, they refer to us as

39

‘‘hyperpuissance,’’ or ‘‘hyperpower,’’ and they don’t mean it as a

compliment. Think of ‘‘hyperthyroid.’’ That is what they are worried about the United States, and that is driving a wedge between

us and Europe.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bolton.

Mr. Hunter and Dr. Serfaty, let me address a similar question

to you. You call for continued U.S. Involvement in European integration. Accepting for the moment that it is in our national interest

to continue that involvement, what are the most important things

that our Nation can do that it is not doing now in that regard? We

also note that Britain, France and Germany want to avoid a U.S.

veto on the use of NATO assets for strictly European operations.

I would ask you both if you can comment on that.

Mr. HUNTER. First, Mr. Chairman, I think we should not overreact to some things that we are hearing, particularly statements

out of France. When it comes to the bottom line, the French are

with us whenever we need them to act.

However, when we get to a point where there is less of a challenge, overall, and the French have a chance to act in terms of

their own political opportunity within Europe, they take that opportunity.

But it is also true that other states in Europe don’t agree with

the French view. Whether in public or private, I hear something

very different from what Mr. Bolton is saying. The Europeans very

much stand with us.

As I indicated in my testimony, Mr. Chairman, in terms of what

we do right now, it is most important to continue pressing for the

Defense Capabilities Initiative, to get Europeans to do things so

that, either through NATO or ESDI, they can work effectively with

us. In that context, we have to be very careful that we don’t get

a ‘‘fortress Europe’’ and a ‘‘fortress America’’ in terms of defense

companies. There are steps that we need to take to make sure that

U.S. technology and U.S. weapons get into the hands of Europeans

where they can actually work with us.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Serfaty, would you care to comment on

that?

Mr. SERFATY. There is very little I can add to what Ambassador

Hunter just said. We tend to hear different views of selective

speeches as they are being made by President Chirac and others.

The French president has said many things over the past months.

Two short points, though. John Bolton said our interests have

changed since 1949. Of course, they have changed, but they have

changed in the direction of being genuinely overwhelming. The

range of economic, political, military security, and cultural interests that did not exist in the late 1940’s now make disengagement

no longer meaningful, let alone possible.

You can argue that those interests have become so significant as

to not be possible to leave them up to others to protect, but I happen to think that the Europeans can be helpful in that context, and

that we can work them out in such a way that those interests are

protected by contributions from both sides.

As to what to do, I would rather have suggested what not to do.

I think that U.S. statements that tend to question such European

40

initiatives are often used by European states as alibis for not doing

what they did not want to do in any case.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rodman, you point out that there is a

gap between European rhetoric on an independent defense capability and the reality of their actual capabilities in an environment

of sharp cuts in defense spending on the continent. You also pointed out the experience in Kosovo, which made this gap glaringly

clear, has fueled the debate in Europe and driven it in a direction

of putting the Alliance unity in possible jeopardy.

Do you believe that our Nation should put a higher priority on

assisting Europe to address that ongoing gap between U.S. technology and Europe’s defense capabilities and, in effect, treat the

European debate on CFSP and ESDI as a manifestation of some

kind of an inferiority complex?

Mr. RODMAN. We do have an interest in helping the Europeans

expand their capability, partly for burden-sharing reasons and

partly for the health of the Alliance. A relationship of dependency

is very unhealthy and corrupting. So I take no comfort in European

weakness.

The fact that this CFSP or this St. Malo initiative may fall on

its face does not give me pleasure, because we may end up with

the worst of all worlds: we may end with a Europe that still does

not have the capability to do very much, and yet they will have created an institution which complicates NATO’s unity.

We need to persuade the Europeans that we are not trying to

keep them weak, we are not trying to keep them divided. This is

not a divide-and-rule strategy for American dominance. I agree

with what Ambassador Hunter said. We need to look at the issue

of defense industries and see if barriers on our side are impeding

proper business mergers or tech transfer that would help the Europeans improve their effectiveness.

We need to do that. But my bottom line is that I think that the

unity of the Alliance is the formula for Western unity, and I don’t

want to see them complicate that.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rodman.

I regret that I am going to have to go to a Policy Committee. I

am going to ask Mr. Bereuter if he would conclude the remainder

of the questioning.

I want to thank our witnesses and also Karen Donfried and Paul

Gallis of the Congressional Research Service, who helped our staff

prepare for this hearing. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. I will try to review some of your testimony that

I missed.

I want to paint a scenario and I want someone to disagree with

me and prove me wrong.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Cooksey, excuse me. I have a recorded vote

in Banking so if you will take the Chair while you are doing your

questions.

Mr. COOKSEY. [Presiding.] ESDI becomes larger, and as it becomes large, NATO becomes smaller. Rogue nations, rogue missiles, and there are no leaders in Europe; and quite frankly, I don’t

41

think that there are any great leaders anywhere in the world right

now. I am not impressed with many people. There are a lot of people that have these titles who are very effective in the medium of

the day, which is television. They are very good television communicators.

Let’s say that the rogue missiles from the rogue nations start

falling on Europe. Is there a leader out there in Europe who has

the courage to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship, who

has the courage to tell his people that they have got to commit to

maintaining a strong military, so that they can either intimidate

these rogue nations into behaving or respond in a very forceful

manner when it does occur?

Mr. HUNTER. Can I try that?

Mr. COOKSEY. Sure.

Mr. HUNTER. I think it has been remarkable how far we have

come at NATO in the last ten years from a time, right after the

Cold War, when a lot of people wanted to wrap it up. It was argued

that there were no more threats. We will have a big party and off

you go.

We have managed to reconstruct NATO according to a number

of propositions, including integrating the Central European states,

including even trying to engage Russia. NATO is acting in a

strange place that is far away from virtually all of the allies, called

Bosnia and now Kosovo. That took a lot of American leadership.

America is an effective European power in the post Cold War

world— I am pleased to say, begun by President Bush and carried

on by President Clinton, with the solid support of the U.S. Congress throughout.

The major task now, as you put it directly, is to get the European

allies, individually and severally, to take more seriously precisely

the kinds of threats that you are seeing. That leadership, right

now, still has to come from America, but in time it also has to come

from individual European countries and all of them collectively.

I can’t name for you any particular leader. We will have to press

the Europeans as we have been doing. In fact, the allies in the last

few days did put higher on the agenda the question of missile defense, but we will have to be very smart in the handling of this

issue, if this is not to become a major divisive issue within the Alliance. But the leadership in the foreseeable future has to come from

here, not from any individual European country.

Mr. COOKSEY. That said, do you think that their position, their

posture, or the position that these leaders are taking is because

they are playing to their political audience, that they feel that

there is a sentiment out there that they need to spend more money

on social programs and just blow off their military requirements?

Mr. HUNTER. I am afraid that there is a lot of that, Mr. Chairman. Leadership requires making tough decisions, and they have

to understand what is required for their security. I am pleased that

a number of things have been done, but it is a long way from here

to where they have to be.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Bolton, I notice in the first two paragraphs of

your statement you said that we should openly acknowledge that

the aim to align the foreign and defense policies of the EU’s members into one shared and uniform policy is at times motivated eiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:57 Jun 16, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64589.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
42

ther by a desire to distance themselves from United States influence or, in some cases, openly by anti-American intentions.

That basically addresses the question that I asked earlier. What

is your position on this, or do you think that we have a lot of great

world leaders out there that I have overlooked?

Mr. BOLTON. Unfortunately, you have not overlooked them. I

think the experience that we have, we have to look at what has

happened, the concrete experiences, and try and extrapolate from

them. It is that as the Europeans withdraw from American leadership, or in the term of a program that some of them use, ‘‘American

hegemony,’’ that they are less likely to stand with us in crisis situations.

Let me make two examples: first, dealing with Iran where the

Europeans have consistently sought economic advantage in dealing

with Iran despite our efforts to try and prevent that; and right next

door, in the case of Iraq, where the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition

has broken apart in front of our eyes with the French taking a very

different view than they did just a few years ago. This is, in part,

largely driven by domestic concerns, the question that you were

raising a minute ago that Iain Duncan Smith touched on, and in

this country, Richard Cooper of Harvard has commented on, that

the European leaders are faced with much higher social welfare

costs in their countries than we are faced with.

Although they have desired the common currency for both political and economic reasons, its coming into being makes it harder

for them in what is now a continental competitive economy to keep

those welfare costs high. Since they don’t see the same threats out

there as we do from a defense point of view, it is tempting and it

has been the fact that defense budgets are falling.

This is in the course of a situation where in the Balkans there

have been active military roles that the Europeans have wanted to

play, and their defense budgets are still falling. So I see this as a

real problem for NATO, where the rhetoric about the strong European pillar is not backed by the reality of defense expenditures.

I heard Mr. Brok say that, in the case of France, although I

think it is applicable to other European countries, we Americans

should take comfort from the fact that their rhetoric is at one level,

but their actual performance is something different. This doesn’t

give me an awful lot of comfort. I ask the question, what if some

day the French performance matches their rhetoric? What if they

actually do what they say?

Mr. COOKSEY. As they did with the Persian Gulf?

Mr. BOLTON. Exactly. So I am very concerned about this. I think

it is self-deceptive not to acknowledge that we have a major crisis

that we are facing in terms of NATO effectiveness and unity.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Rodman, did you have a comment on my question or scenario?

Mr. RODMAN. About the scenario or the anti-American

motivation——

Mr. COOKSEY. I noticed that you had your hand up.

Mr. RODMAN. I would second what John was just saying about

the motivation. It is not hard to find quotations from European

leaders—in addition to the French—who say that the motivation of

the European project is to make Europe autonomous from the

43

United States, to make Europe into a counterweight of the United

States, to give Europe the ability to act independently of the

United States. I think Maastricht reflected that.

The collapse of the Soviet Union had two effects. One was that

the common threat was gone; that is obvious. Second, it left us the

‘‘hyperpower,’’ and Europe is the continent where the idea of the

balance of power was invented. Europeans, by reflex, see the imbalance of power across the Atlantic as a problem, and maybe the biggest problem, in their foreign relations. So there is a structural

problem in the international system which compounds all of these

technical disagreements that we are having. So, I agree with what

John said in the paragraphs of his statement you were quoting.

Mr. COOKSEY. I will close with a comment. I was in the Air Force

30 years ago, and I had occasion to speak at the War College

group, the NATO War College group, or a similar group, near

Rome. Anyway, one of the messages that I gave them was that in

this period when we don’t seem to have any great leaders, that

once they finish their time in the military they should go back

home, take their uniforms off and then become involved in the political process, because that is a kind of leadership. I think these

people have a lot of training in leadership, where a lot of leaders

now have training in television skills.

Mr. HUNTER. I think that is exactly right, and I appreciate your

saying it. When I was at NATO, people asked me what my toughest job was. I said that is simple: making sure of the support of

the U.S. Congress and the American people and the next generation.

When you talk about leadership in NATO, I recall what someone

once said about a modern weapons systems: designed by geniuses

to be run by idiots. What we have to do is try to make sure that

these institutions are powerful enough and the common interests

are powerful enough that you don’t have to have a Churchill or a

de Gaulle or a Roosevelt to make them work.

Mr. COOKSEY. All great leaders.

Mr. HUNTER I am less pessimistic. I don’t see, except for the

French maneuvering for short term advantage, a wave of antiAmericanism. I have been struck, even on issues like Kosovo, by

the extent to which our leadership is being responded to and respected. There is grumbling in the ranks, but it is nothing even

compared to the time of the Cold War.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you. You have been excellent witnesses,

and your statements are quite thorough and detailed. I happen to

agree with a lot of what you are saying, and that is the reason that

I think you are such great witnesses.

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Cooksey, for taking

over. This panel, in combination with the first, probably constitutes

the most informed discussion that we have had about ESDI in this

country and its implications for America. I thank you for your generous time and your patience.

I have just a couple of concluding questions and observations to

which any of you might wish to respond.

First of all, I know it is untraditional, but it seems to me that

the West was not prepared for the end of the Cold War, and therefore we had an inability to come to grips with the use of force early

44

in the Yugoslav disintegration when it might have stopped the

whole chain of events that is still unfolding. In any case, we didn’t

have a clear commitment with those concepts in place, theoretically

at least.

If you have a combined joint task force concept operationally, you

have then, it seems to me, opportunities for coalition of the willing

to pursue things that not all would agree on; and so maybe it does

call into question for the first time—this is the untraditional part,

I think—that there really is no need for a separate European pillar, really no need for a special entity inside or outside of NATO.

Ambassador Hunter, given the things that you enunciated as

coming out of the 1996 agreement, it seems to me as you see what

is unfolding now in Brussels, you must be concerned that some of

those objectives and those elements of agreement are not likely to

be met. I would think so at least. I would think that it is inevitable

that there would be a European Caucus within the North Atlantic

Council, and that they will have to run back to Brussels, not just

back to their national capitals, and this is going to be an impediment to rapid, concise action. In some cases, the trade problems

that we have with the European Union are going to spill over into

defense issues. That seems to be inevitable.

Another unrelated observation, someone mentioned, when it

comes to the chips being down, the French will be with us on crucial elements. They were with us in the Persian Gulf, but the largely untold story is that they were totally ineffective. They didn’t

have interoperability, and I think it was a wake-up call to them.

Before we squabbled about commander slots down in Naples, it

looked like they might move more directly to full involvement in

NATO.

Finally, I think that the three ‘‘D’s’’ as enunciated by Secretary

Albright and others—it seems to me that duplication and decoupling are just very, very likely if any kind of effort is developed to

put the ESDI within the European pillar, within the European

Union. I think, despite the best intentions, that is going to be what

happens; and I would expect, given the proclivity of the Europeans

to cut their defense expenditures all the time, it will mean a weaker NATO, it will mean a weaker European pillar within NATO.

I will stop talking and see what you gentlemen would like to say

in response to those observations.

Mr. HUNTER. I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your being very direct

on that. As I indicated before, maybe my most important concern

with the structure as it is evolving is the possibility of a European

Caucus within NATO. If we got to a position where some 11 countries, or 15 or whatever it would be, would sit around the North

Atlantic Council table and, instead of wrestling with the problems

and coming up with solutions, the way the Council actually works,

would run back to the European Council for new instructions, it

might become ineffective and we might then diminish our interest

in NATO. I think this point needs to be made very, very forcefully

to the Europeans.

Regarding France, I think you put that very well, what happened

regarding the Persian Gulf and their subsequent incentive to move

back toward NATO. In fact, short of France’s actually rejoining the

integrated structure, it is doing a lot with NATO right now. I don’t

45

think that the French have gone far enough, and I think they still

have to recognize that.

Also, when we talk about two of those three ‘‘D’s’’, we will have

to press very hard. If in any way this became a matter of decoupling, the Europeans would be the losers just as much, if not more,

than we. If they did try to disperse rather than keeping the focus

on the transatlantic capabilities, they would be the poorer.

With regard to WEU’s being absorbed by the European Union,

yes, there are some real problems, and it is will take a while to

shape it. In his speech in Strasbourg a week and a half ago, President Chirac actually delayed the moment when this would happen,

delayed the demise of the WEU; but the cultural and political developments that are involved in this are extraordinary. If the Europeans don’t get it right, they will find that they have more integration but less security.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Rodman has looked at President Chirac’s

comments in Strasbourg, and he drew the conclusion that Chirac

vehemently opposed the idea of finding an institutional link between the EU and NATO. That is very troubling, and I don’t think

that we can dismiss a comment like that from the President of

France.

Mr. HUNTER. President Chirac said it was premature to talk

about this link, but he has no agreement with the other allies. He

is isolated.

Mr. BEREUTER. We will get to all four of you. Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. I think there is clearly inevitability in the European project. There is enormous momentum behind the European

idea—psychological, political, social, emotional, ideological even.

They are building Europe.

The Atlantic idea does not have that momentum, no matter how

much we try to remind them or to champion the cause of Atlantic

unity. It is not a coincidence that Javier Solana sees the EU job

as a promotion.

Our job is to harness this European energy somehow and keep

it within the Alliance framework, and that is why I was upset by

what President Chirac was saying, because the sooner we face the

institutional question, the easier it may be to solve.

To go back and supplement the beginning of what I said, one

wise thing that President Chirac said, is that European publics see

are more likely to spend more on defense if they are asked to do

it in the name of Europe than if they are asked to do it in the

name of the Alliance. I add that to the list of things that suggest

that the European idea has enormous power. We should not try to

stop it, but somehow to harness it and make sure that in the security arena the Alliance is the major institution of Western unity.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you think that his conclusion is likely, that,

in fact, they will be more willing to put up money for Europe?

Mr. RODMAN. I believe that is the domestic political reality. But

the battle is not lost if we can make sure that the European institution is somehow in the Alliance framework.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Serfaty, did you have a comment that you

wanted to make?

Mr. SERFATY. The European idea is an American idea. It is one

that was made possible in the aftermath of World War II in order

46

to force the nationalisms of Europe into a cage from which there

would be no escape. This was a way for us, in the United States,

to avoid the kind of shuttle diplomacy which we had been engaged

into during the previous 50 years, in 1917 and 1941.

That idea, which is an American idea, has now come to the end

game. In 1999—2007 the 15 members of the European Union are

going to make decisions that might be tantamount to the recycling

of the national states into member states of an institution to which

they belong.

We do not know yet what kind of governance will be set in place,

or what types of capabilities will be available, and how they should

be used. I believe we should rejoice over the fact that this idea is

indeed being fulfilled, and because it has worked so well to the benefit of American interests over the past 50 years—economic, political, cultural and security—we should do whatever we can over the

next several years to help manage the fulfillment of the emergence

of a Europe.

I am not concerned about that Europe entering into an adversarial relationship with the United States. President Chirac would

be surprised and flattered to see that his speeches in Strasbourg

and elsewhere were heard and listened to as carefully as apparently has been the case here. That was not the case in Europe.

The meaning of the idea of Europe is precisely the devaluation

of the influence of any one nation-state that becomes more and

more sensitive to the discipline of the collective way of the institution to which it belongs.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. Bolton.

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not think that the ‘‘European ideal’’ is inevitable. There is

a real disjunction between political elites on the one hand and the

average citizens of Europe on the other, and what they think the

final destination of the European enterprise is.

I don’t think that it is an American idea playing out. I don’t

think that it is an American idea that the insular, protectionist,

isolationist economic policies that we see increasingly coming out

of some directorates of Brussels are in our interests. I fear that

same insularity that we see in so many economic policies emanating from Europe would emanate from a common European security and defense identity as well.

I think the risks, if we are not more assertive about American

interests, are that ‘‘European correspondence,’’ the flow of policy at

low levels through European foreign and defense ministries that already exists already forms an informal caucus in NATO; and it is

one of the reasons that I am pessimistic and nervous about it.

We have already seen it play out, as I mentioned, in the context,

not nearly as important to be sure, of Western European group

meetings within the United Nations. It is just incredible where you

have discussions and when you reach the outer limit of what the

European Union consensus is, the Western group meetings stop

and all of the Western Europeans and other governments get up

and walk out of the room so the European Union can come to its

next consensus. If we are not careful, we will be at that point in

NATO in the very near future.

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Mr. BEREUTER. Gentlemen, you have provided a good background

brief for Mr. Davis and me to go to the Amsterdam meeting of the

NATO Parliamentary Assembly tomorrow if we can ever get out of

here and adjourn. It is extremely helpful. I think this was an outstanding contribution that you helped provide for us and for the listening and reading American public.

Thank you for the generous amount of your time and for your

testimony today. The Committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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