IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30618

Summary Calendar

DANNY R. JEFFERSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,

on behalf of Probation & Parole Division; DANNY FULLER; DAVID W.

CAGNOLATTI,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC 3:09-CV-49

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Danny Jefferson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order

setting aside entry of default against the defendants. He argues the defendants

should not have been permitted to file a proposed answer while in default.

Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 15, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2010
No. 10-30618

On January 12, 2009, Jefferson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

State of Louisiana employees Danny Fuller and David Cagnolatti. Jefferson

claimed the defendants violated his constitutional due process rights in a parole

revocation hearing. He sought $4,022,000 in compensatory and punitive

damages.

The defendants did not answer or otherwise respond. On February 26,

2009, Jefferson filed for entry of default. The clerk entered default the next day.

The clerk’s one-page “Notice of Entry of Default” included the following: “For the

court to issue a default judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55, a motion to that effect

must be filed by plaintiff. A delay of at least ten (10) days from the date of this

notice must elapse before issuance of a default judgment by the court under LR

55.1 M&W.”

On March 6, 2009, the State of Louisiana, on behalf of its employees, filed

a motion to set aside the entry of default and a proposed answer. It attributed

its delay in answering the complaint to “inadvertent neglect” of counsel. Four

days later, Jefferson moved for default judgment.

The district court granted the State’s motion to set aside the entry of

default. It found that the State had good cause for its untimely response, had

not willfully failed to respond, and “took quick action to cure the default.” The

court also found that the State had a meritorious defense to Jefferson’s suit, and

that Jefferson would not be prejudiced by setting aside the entry of default.

After two earlier appeals to this court, which were dismissed, the district

court granted summary judgment for defendants. This appeal followed.

Jefferson’s primary argument is that the relevant procedural rule

prohibits a party in default from filing a proposed answer. The cited rule states:

“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside

a default judgment under Rule 60(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Jefferson has

pointed to no other rule, case, or authority to support his argument.

2

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/15/2010
No. 10-30618

Rule 55(c) makes no reference to a party’s answer and cannot be read to

prohibit a party in default from filing a proposed answer. Id. A proposed

answer can usefully detail the defaulting party’s allegedly meritorious defenses.

Those points will support the movant’s argument that there is good cause to set

aside the entry of default. Jefferson’s claim of error is meritless.

In addition, Jefferson assumes he was automatically entitled to a default

judgment on the eleventh day after the clerk’s entry of default. That is incorrect.

There are two steps in the default judgment process – one for the clerk, and one

for the court. The first step is entry of default. If the plaintiff files a sufficient

application for entry of default, “the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Id. at

55(a) (emphasis added). The clerk did so here.

The second step is consideration of a default judgment. Id. at 55(b).

Because Jefferson’s claim is a Section 1983 action with uncertain damages, the

court could evaluate the proper amount of damages, “conduct hearings or make

referrals[,]” or “investigate any other matter” as it saw fit. Id. at 55(b)(2).

Entering a judgment based on the default is at the discretion of the court, which

means Jefferson was not entitled to a default judgment simply because of the

earlier entry of a default. A defendant is entitled to file a motion to have either

an entry of default or even a default judgment set aside by showing “good cause.”

Id. at 55(c). The district court found that the State had shown good cause.

We review a court’s order vacating an entry of default for an abuse of

discretion. Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2000). Default

judgments are “generally disfavored in the law and thus should not be granted

on the claim, without more, that the defendant had failed to meet a procedural

time requirement.” Id. at 292 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing

supports this default judgment other than the State’s failure to meet the

requirement of a timely answer. The district court accordingly did not abuse its

discretion in vacating the entry of default.

3

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/15/2010
No. 10-30618

We have just discussed the only argument fully addressed in Jefferson’s

brief. Because Jefferson is proceeding pro se, however, we exercise our discretion

to address other arguments reasonably inferred from his brief. In re Texas Pig

Stands, Inc., 610 F.3d 937, 941 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010).

Jefferson argues that the State’s motion to set aside the entry of default

and its proposed answer are “illegal” pleadings because counsel failed to attach

a proposed order, thereby resulting in default judgment. See W.D. La. R. 7.4.1W.

We note first that Jefferson himself filed a pleading with the same deficiency one

month prior to the State’s pleadings in question. Additionally, as discussed

above, the expiration of the 10-day waiting period would not have automatically

resulted in a $4 million default judgment. Regardless, while the State’s

pleadings were deemed deficient upon filing, the State soon corrected its error

by filing a proposed order. The district court then cautioned the State’s attorney

to comply with the federal and local rules. The district court’s resolution of this

issue did not constitute error.

As a final matter, Jefferson complains that counsel for the State falsified

the certificate of service for the motion to set aside the entry of default. This

argument is based on the State’s certificate of service referring to Jefferson with

the wrong last name. Jefferson claims this was intentional, designed to ensure

he did not get the documents and thus hampering his ability to respond.

This issue was addressed by the district court in its order of April 6, 2009.

The court looked at Jefferson’s filings in opposition to the State’s motion, found

that he was aware of the State’s motion, and therefore found any deficiency to

be harmless. The court declined to strike the motion or penalize the State. We

review the district court’s decision on sanctions for an abuse of discretion.

Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2003). There

was none. AFFIRMED.

4

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/15/2010