IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTINA PALMER :

: CIVIL ACTION

v. :

: NO. 05-2023

AMERIBANQ MORTGAGE GROUP, LLC, :

ET AL. :

SURRICK, J. OCTOBER 6 , 2010

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Christina Palmer alleges that Defendant Ameribanq Mortgage Group, LLC,

committed violations of various federal and state laws in connection with a mortgage transaction

in 2004. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 14, 2008. (Doc. No. 35.) Count One

seeks statutory damages and attorney’s fees under the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C.

§ 1601 et seq., for Ameribanq’s alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with a notice of her right to

cancel and for Ameribanq’s alleged failure to disclose the finance charges associated with the

transaction. Count Two seeks rescission of the mortgage under § 1635(b) of TILA because

Ameribanq’s omissions were material. Count Three seeks damages under the federal Equal

Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., because Ameribanq allegedly

substituted different, less favorable terms in the mortgage transaction without advising Plaintiff. 

Count Four seeks recovery under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1 et seq., because Ameribanq made

misrepresentations and intended to confuse Plaintiff in connection with the mortgage transaction. 

After a bench trial, and after review of the parties’ post-trial submissions, we conclude that

Ameribanq did not provide Plaintiff with an accurate disclosure of the finance charges associated
with the transaction and that Plaintiff is entitled to relief on Count I. We further conclude that

Ameribanq and the other Defendants, assignees of Plaintiff’s mortgage, are entitled to judgment

in their favor on the remaining counts in the Amended Complaint. In accordance with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 52, we make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff Christina Palmer and her husband Gregory Palmer both testified at trial. 

Neither was a convincing witness. Plaintiff’s testimony was less than credible on

a number of material points. Her testimony was directly contradicted in several

significant areas. After watching Plaintiff testify and hearing what she had to say

in light of all of the other evidence presented, it was apparent that Plaintiff’s

testimony was not designed to be factually accurate but rather was designed to

support the claims that she is making. The testimony of Plaintiff’s husband was

of little value. 

2. In 2004, Plaintiff owned and resided at the residential property located at 4945

Chester Creek Road, Brookhaven, Pennsylvania (the “Property”).

3. Plaintiff had a fixed-rate mortgage on the Property. Her monthly payments were

$1429, including taxes and insurance. (Trial Tr. 33:17-25 to 34:1-6.)

4. On September 26, 2004, Plaintiff telephoned Ameribanq to apply for a loan (the

“Loan”) to refinance the Property. Plaintiff spoke with Ameribanq representative

Jared Weisfeld. Weisfeld faxed Plaintiff a loan application package. Plaintiff

signed and dated copies of the following documents and faxed them back to

Weisfeld on September 26, 2004: a Good Faith Estimate (Ex. D-1), a Preliminary

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Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement (Ex. D-3), and a Notices &

Disclosures to Applicant form (Ex. D-5). Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not

receive these documents was not credible. (See Trial Tr. 34:20-23, 35:15-17.) 

Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not date the Preliminary Truth in Lending

Disclosure Statement documents was also not credible. (See, e.g., id. 87:4 to

90:13.)

5. The Good Faith Estimate listed the amount of the loan as $217,600. The

Preliminary Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement provided estimates of

the annual percentage rate (14.015%); the finance charge ($793,459.74); the

amount financed ($208,849.83); and the total payments ($1,005,309.57). The

Preliminary Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement further estimated the

monthly payments of the Loan to commence at $1790.14 a month for the first 36

months increasing to $2914.90 a month for the final 312 months.

6. The parties do not agree with regard to the date on which the loan closed. 

Plaintiff contends that it closed on October 6, 2004. Defendants contend that it

closed on October 7, 2004. Some of the closing documents contained both dates. 

For example, the Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement contained a type-written

date of October 6, 2004, but a handwritten date of October 7, 2004. (See, e.g., Ex.

D-11.) Plaintiff testified that the loan closed on October 6, 2004. (Trial Tr. 36:5

to 37:2.) Plaintiff’s testimony on this issue was directly contradicted and it was

not convincing or credible. Defendants offered the testimony of Maureen Nihill,

the notary who attended the closing, and Frances Bedekovic, Ameribanq’s

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liquidating manager, to establish that the Loan closed on October 7, 2004. (See,

e.g., id. at 155:7 to 158:25; 207:17 to 211:9.) Nihill and Bedekovic were both

credible witnesses. We find that the closing was initially scheduled for October 6,

but it took place on October 7. (See id. at 167:16 to 169:5.)

7. Any discrepancies in the closing documents between the type-written dates and

the hand-written dates were clerical errors arising from the date change. 

Defendants offered Bedekovic’s testimony to establish that in October 2004

Ameribanq utilized a loan-document preparation software program known as

MRG. (Id. at 204:20 to 205:7.) The purpose of the software was to ensure that

loan documents were prepared in accordance with industry standards. (Id.) 

Ameribanq retained Mortgage Resource Network, an independent vendor, to audit

the documents prior to the closing. (Id. at 205:11-24.) After the closing but prior

to Ameribanq funding the loan, Mortgage Resource Network performed a second

audit of the closing documents. (Id. at 206:23-25; see also Ex. D-25.)

8. Plaintiff received and signed the following documents at the closing: a Notices

and Disclosure to Applicant form (Ex. D-5); a Settlement Statement from

Rockwood Title and Settlement Group (Ex. D-6); a Truth in Lending Disclosure

Statement (Ex. D-9 (hereinafter, the “Final Disclosure Statement”)); two copies of

the Notice of Right of Rescission (Exs. D-12, D-14; see also Trial Tr. 155:19 to

156:8); an Adjustable Rate Note (Ex. D-16); a Mortgage Contract (Ex. D-18); an

Adjustable Rate Rider to the Mortgage Contract (Ex. D-19); an Initial Escrow

Account Disclosure Statement (Ex. D-21); a Compliance Agreement (Ex. D-22);

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and a First Payment Letter (Ex. D-23). Plaintiff admitted to signing some of these

documents. (Trial Tr. 38:23.) However, she denied signing several of them,

asserting that those documents that she contends she did not sign were forgeries. 

(Id. at 46:19-22; 73:23 to 74:16; 77:9 to 79:5; 92:19 to 93:20; see also Pl.’s

Pretrial Mem. at 3.) Plaintiff’s testimony in this regard was not credible. We find

that Plaintiff did in fact sign the documents that Defendants contend that she

signed at the closing. (See id. at 153:2-20; 193:22 to 194:17; 209:1-5; 210:12-23;

Ex. D-25.) The above-listed documents from September or October that bear

Plaintiff’s signature are not forged. The testimony of Defendants’ handwriting

expert who identified Plaintiff’s signature on the documents was credible.

9. The amount of the Loan was $217,600. (Ex. D-6.) The Final Disclosure

Statement that Plaintiff received at the closing set out, among other things, the

annual percentage rate (11.184%); the fact that the “loan contain[ed] a variablerate feature”; the finance charge ($547,324.76); the amount financed

($208,808.80); and the total payments ($756,133.56). The Final Disclosure

Statement further set out the monthly payments of principal and interest on the

Loan, which started at $1790.14 a month for the first 36 months and increased to

$2137.01 a month for the final 318 months. The First Payment Letter informed

Plaintiff that her monthly payments would include additional fees for insurance

and taxes and that her initial total monthly payment was $2347.99: $1790.14 for

principal and interest; $67.42 for hazard insurance; $92.42 for flood insurance;

and $398.01 for real estate taxes. (Ex. D-23.) In addition to the First Payment

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Letter informing Plaintiff that her monthly payments would include insurance and

taxes, the Notices and Disclosures to Applicant and the Initial Escrow Account

Disclosure Statement informed Plaintiff that her monthly payments would include

escrow payments to cover taxes and insurance. (Exs. D-5, D-21.)

10. The Settlement Statement, also known as a HUD-1 form, listed the loan amount

and itemized the Settlement Charges, the Reserves Deposited with the Lender, the

Title Charges, and the Disbursements to Others. Among those receiving

disbursements from the settlement were the holder of Plaintiff’s original

mortgage, Wells Fargo Bank, in the amount of $173,215.80; Harley Davidson, in

the amount of $8473; Resorts USA, in the amount of $1676; and Dell Financial,

in the amount of $2337.

11. Plaintiff’s husband did not participate in the loan-making process. Even though

his name was not on the deed to the property, he was aware of the fact that

Plaintiff was obtaining a loan to refinance the Property. (See id. at 113:1-3.) 

Plaintiff’s husband testified to his belief that the Loan payments were supposed to

be about $1700 a month, including taxes and insurance. (Id. at 113:4-7.) When

he discovered the amount of the loan he became “angry” and “infuriated.” (Id. at

114:8; 117:3-4.) The testimony offered by Plaintiff and her husband regarding

Plaintiff’s husband’s involvement in the loan process was contradictory and

unconvincing. (See, e.g., id. at 100:13-15; 101:1-3.) 

12. The Loan was funded on or about October 12, 2004. (Ex. D-6.) Shortly

thereafter, Ameribanq assigned the Loan to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Trial

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Tr. 240:24 to 241:14.) Countrywide later assigned the Loan to Bank of New

York. (Id. at 241:3.) Countrywide currently services the Loan, and Bank of New

York currently holds it. (Id. at 241:15-16.)

13. Approximately two months after the closing, Plaintiff received a Federal Express

envelope from Ameribanq containing a second notice of the right to rescind. (Ex.

P-4; see also Trial Tr. 48:17 to 49:2.) The letter, dated December 7, 2004, stated: 

“Thank you for giving us the opportunity to assist you with the refinance of your

home. It has come to our attention that the enclosed form(s) have been misplaced

or omitted at the time of closing. **ORIGINAL NOTICE OF RESCISSION: 

PLEASE SIGN & DO NOT DATE IT.” (Id.) Attached to the letter was a second

Notice of Right of Rescission. (Ex. P-5.)

14. Plaintiff testified that she did not read this notice or know what the notice was

about. (Trial Tr. 49:6-7; 90:22-23.) On direct examination, Plaintiff testified that

when she received the Federal Express envelope, she “opened it and looked at it

and just put it back in the envelope and put it on her entertainment center.” (Id. at

49:4-5.) On cross-examination, Plaintiff testified that she looked at the letter and

understood that it was from Ameribanq (id. at 91:18) and that, despite the fact that

she had actively yet unsuccessfully sought to communicate with Ameribanq (see

id. at 39:11 to 40:17), she did not read it. She explained that she did not read the

letter because Ameribanq “never returned my calls and I couldn’t get in touch

with them . . . . so I figured why are they sending me a letter.” (Id. at 91:19-20.) 

This explanation is unpersuasive and it lacks credibility, especially in the light of

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other testimony given by Plaintiff. She maintained that at no time could she

afford the $2300 per month payments (id. at 38:19-21), yet, she disregarded her

right to rescind sent about two weeks after her first payment was due (Ex. D-23). 

15. Plaintiff made her monthly payments of $2347.99 starting in December 2004. 

(See Trial Tr. 47:20 to 48:3.) Sometime in early 2005, Plaintiff became concerned

that she could not afford her mortgage payments. (See id. at 50:15-17.) This

coincided with her husband’s discovery of the amount of the monthly payment. 

Whether from concern about not being able to afford the monthly payments or

concern of her husband’s anger, Plaintiff retained counsel. (See id. at 51:2-5.) On

March 7, 2005, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Countrywide and Ameribanq

seeking to rescind the loan. (Ex. P-6.) Plaintiff did not receive a response from

Countrywide or Ameribanq. (Trial Tr. 51:18-20.)

16. Several court actions ensued. Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 28, 2005. 

(Id. at 51:24 to 52:4.) Bank of New York filed an action in the Court of Common

Pleas of Delaware County to foreclose on the Property. (Ex. P-15; see also Trial

Tr. 17:17-21.) In October 2006, Plaintiff and her husband filed for bankruptcy. 

(Id. at 52:21 to 53:9; see also Ex. P-14.) The bankruptcy action automatically

stayed the state-court foreclosure proceedings. (See Trial Tr. 57:15 to 58:17.) For

a time, Plaintiff made modified payments pursuant to an order by the bankruptcy

judge. (Trial Tr. 55:8-11; 56:13-16.) In April 2008, Plaintiff and her husband

received a discharge, eliminating personal responsibility for the loan. (Ex. P-14;

Trial Tr. 15:4-6.) The foreclosure action remains pending. (Trial Tr. 14:22-23;

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17:17-25; 58:20 to 59:5.)

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction

1. We have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s TILA claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) and

28 U.S.C. § 1331; Plaintiff’s ECOA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and

Plaintiff’s UTPCPL claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

B. TILA

2. “TILA is a federal consumer protection statute, intended to promote the informed

use of credit by requiring certain uniform disclosures from creditors.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va.

& Guar. Nat’l Bank of Tallahassee Second Mortg. Loan Litig., 418 F.3d 277, 306 (3d Cir. 2005). 

“[A]s a remedial statute which is designed to balance the scales ‘thought to be weighed in favor

of lenders,’ [TILA] is to be liberally construed in favor of borrowers.” Smith v. Fid. Consumer

Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., 654 F.2d 1, 3

(1st Cir. 1981)).

3. TILA authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to

promulgate regulations necessary to effectuate the Act’s purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1604. The

Federal Reserve Board’s regulations, known as Regulation Z , are codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.1

et seq. The Supreme Court has directed courts to afford Regulation Z strong deference. Cetto v.

LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 518 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (“‘Congress has specifically

designated the Federal Reserve Board and staff as the primary source for interpretation and

application of truth-in-lending law.’” (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S.

555, 566 (1980))); Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 506 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The

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Supreme Court has held that ‘deference is especially appropriate in the process of interpreting the

Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z [and,]. . . [u]nless demonstrably irrational, Federal

Reserve Board staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation should be dispositive.’” (quoting

Mihollin, 444 U.S. at 565)).

(1) Notice of Right of Rescission

4. TILA mandates that creditors clearly and conspicuously disclose to borrowers that

borrowers have the unilateral right to rescind a loan transaction for a brief period after

consummation. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3); see also Davis v. Deutsche Bank

Nat’l Trust Co., No. 05-4061, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83307, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2007). This

right allows the borrower to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day

following the transaction or the delivery of the notice of rescission along with the other material

disclosures required under TILA, whichever occurs later. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).

5. Regulation Z provides that

a creditor shall deliver two copies of the notice of the right to rescind to each

consumer entitled to rescind . . . . The notice shall be on a separate document that

identifies the transaction and shall clearly and conspicuously disclose the following:

(i) The retention or acquisition of a security interest in the consumer’s principal

dwelling. (ii) The consumer’s right to rescind the transaction. (iii) How to exercise

the right to rescind, with a form for that purpose, designating the address of the

creditor’s place of business. (iv) The effects of rescission, as described [by 12 C.F.R.

§ 226.23(d)]. (v) The date the rescission period expires.

12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1) (emphasis added).

6. Failure to provide the required notices extends a borrower’s unilateral right of

rescission to three years or until the borrower sells the property, whichever occurs first. 

12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (“If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the

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right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of all of the consumer’s

interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”); see also 15 U.S.C.

§ 1635(f).

7. As required by Regulation Z, Ameribanq provided Plaintiff with two notices of

her right to rescind at the closing on October 7, 2004. Plaintiff signed the notices. (See Exs. D12, D-14; Trial Tr. 155:19 to 156:8.) Under TILA, Plaintiff’s signature on the notices “does no

more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c). As noted

in the Findings of Fact, Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not receive the notices was not credible. 

Cf. Oscar v. Bank One, N.A., No. 05-5928, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6410, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17,

2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s assertion that he did not receive closing documents that bore

his signature was, at the summary judgment stage, insufficient to overcome presumption of

delivery), appeal dismissed, 223 F. App’x 164 (3d Cir. 2007). Since Plaintiff introduced no

other credible evidence to rebut the presumption of delivery, § 1635(c) is of no aid to her.

8. The Notice of Right of Rescission that Ameribanq provided to Plaintiff is

substantially similar to the form of notice set out in Appendix H to Regulation Z. See 12 C.F.R.

§ 226.23(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (providing that

creditors that use the Federal-Reserve-Board-drafted forms are necessarily in compliance with

TILA). The one significant difference between the form recommended by Regulation Z and the

form that Ameribanq provided to Plaintiff is that the form that Ameribanq provided to Plaintiff

contained an additional section titled “Acknowledgment of Receipt,” which contained a blank

line for a signature and the date. (Ex. D-12.) This alteration did not “affect the substance,

clarity, or meaningful sequence of the disclosure,” and thus did not alter the adequacy of the

11
disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b).

9. The Notice of Right of Rescission provided:

You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost,

within three business days from whichever of the following events occurs last:

(1) the date of the transaction, which is October 6, 2004 (i.e., the date you signed

your loan documents);

(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or

(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel.

. . . .

If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no later than midnight of

October 9, 2004 (or midnight of the third business day following the latest of the

three events listed above).

(Ex. D-12.) The closing occurred on October 7, 2009. Plaintiff signed and dated the Notice of

Right of Rescission on that date. Thus, both the description of the date of the transaction as

October 6, 2004, and the October 9, 2004, deadline for sending the notice of rescission are

incorrect. As noted in the Findings of Fact, this defect is a result of a clerical error.

10. This clerical error raises the question of whether the Notice of Right of Rescission

that Plaintiff received at the closing on October 7, 2009, violated TILA and Regulation Z, thus

extending Plaintiff’s right of rescission to three years from the date of the transaction. See 12

C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). To answer this question, we must determine what standard to apply to the

defective notice form and whether TILA’s bona fide error exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c),

applies to the error.

11. There is a split among the courts of appeals that complicates the first step of our

inquiry. Some courts have adopted a “hyper-technical” or “punctilious compliance” standard for

TILA while others have adopted an “any reasonable person” standard. Compare Hamm, 506

F.3d at 529-30 (“We have held that, when it comes to TILA, ‘hypertechnicality reigns.’ This is

12
not, we recognize, the formulation that some of our sister circuits use.” (citations omitted)), with

Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Our test is whether any

reasonable person, in reading the [disclosure] form provided . . . , would . . . understand it.”). See

also Aubin v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, 565 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397 n.3 (D. Conn. 2008)

(noting the “apparent conflict among circuits regarding whether technical errors are sufficient to

trigger the three-year rescissory period”). In 1995, Congress passed amendments to TILA “to

clarify the intent of [the] Act and to reduce burdensome regulatory requirements on creditors.” 

Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271, 271. The First

and Eleventh Circuits interpret the 1995 TILA amendments as a congressional rejection of the

hypertechnical standard of review of TILA disclosures. See Santos-Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg.

Corp., 485 F.3d 12, 17 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) (“As this court has recently said, the 1995 TILA

amendments . . . were intended by Congress to ‘provide higher tolerance levels for what it

viewed as honest mistakes in carrying out disclosure obligations.” (quoting McKenna v. First

Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2007))); Smith v. Highland Bank, 108

F.3d 1325, 1327 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the legislative history of the 1995 TILA

amendments to mean “that Congress would not have us adopt a hypertechnical reading of any

part of TILA”).

12. The Third Circuit’s approach to TILA rescission disclosures in In re Porter, 961

F.2d 1066, 1076-78 (3d Cir. 1992), which was decided before Congress amended TILA, provides

some guidance. In In re Porter, the plaintiff took out several mortgages with the defendants,

which were affiliated entities. Id. at 1068-69. The parties disputed whether the final loan that

the plaintiff took out was a new mortgage or a partially exempt refinancing, a distinction that

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materially altered the implications of electing to rescind the transaction and thus the form of

notice to which the plaintiff was entitled. Id. at 1070-71. The defendant provided the plaintiff

with a rescission notice modeled on the one promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board for new

mortgages (an H-8 notice). The defendant argued that the H-8 notice was sufficient. Plaintiff

maintained that she should have received the model notice for refinancings (an H-9 notice). See

id. at 1076. The court disagreed with the contention of both parties, finding that neither notice

accurately reflected the transaction. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that

[the plaintiff’s] case does not stand or fall on what notice she could have received,

but on the clarity of the notice that she did receive. The mere existence of the H-9

is not enough to demonstrate that the H-8 was inappropriate in her “refinancing”

context. Ideally, because neither the H-8 nor the H-9 applied perfectly to the 1987

transaction as structured, [the defendant] should have provided [the plaintiff] with

its own nonstandard notice form, perhaps a hybrid of the two. But the law does not

require an ideal notice of rescission rights, just a clear, accurate, and conspicuous

one. To determine whether the notice that [the plaintiff] did receive was confusing

or misleading, we have no choice but to embark on a close reading of that notice . . . .

Id. (emphasis added). The court found the defendant’s use of the H-8 was confusing or

misleading because the form was subject to two “sensible” readings that had “quite different

legal implications.” Id. at 1077 (“Because both readings are plausible, we conclude that the H-8

did not provide [the plaintiff] with a clear notice of what her right to rescind entailed.”). As a

result, the defendant violated TILA and the plaintiff was entitled to rescind the loan. Id. at 1078. 

13. The court in In re Porter concluded its analysis with an acknowledgment

that [the defendant’s] violation of TILA was probably unintentional, and that [the

defendant] mayhave relied upon the bankruptcycourt’s earlier decisions that similarly

structured transactions were not “refinancings” so that the H-8 was an acceptable

notice for those transactions. Moreover, [the plaintiff] herself, like most borrowers,

may never have read or been confused by [the defendant’s] cancellation notice.

Nevertheless, “TILA achieves its remedial goals by a system of strict liability in favor

of the consumers when mandated disclosures have not been made. A creditor who

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fails to comply with TILA in any respect is liable to the consumer under the statute

regardless of the nature of the violation or the creditor’s intent. ‘Once the court finds

a violation, no matter how technical, it has no discretion with respect to liability.’” 

Smith v Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations

omitted). Our decision thus cannot turn on whether or not [the defendant] is

blameworthy in an abstract sense, or on whether or not [the Plaintiff] has suffered an

injustice.

Id. In re Porter stands for the proposition that once a violation has been found, the creditor’s

fault and the borrower’s reliance are irrelevant. However, as the court’s analysis makes clear,

there must first be a violation before strict liability applies. In In re Porter the violation arose

from there being two plausible readings of the rescission notice, which created the possibility of

confusion. See id. at 1077. Hence, the notice was not clear, accurate, and conspicuous.

14. The First Circuit recently addressed defective TILA rescission notices that are

similar to the one at issue in the instant case. See Melfi, 568 F.3d at 310-11; Palmer v. Champion

Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2007). These cases are instructive. In Melfi, the rescission

notice contained blank spaces for the date of the transaction and the date to rescind. Melfi, 568

F.3d at 310. The court concluded that the blank spaces did not render the notice confusing and

noted that “technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a notice that effectively

gives him notice as to the final date for rescission and has the three full days to act.” See id. at

312-13.

15. In Champion, the plaintiff received closing documents, including a rescission

notice, several days after the March 28, 2003, closing on her loan. 465 F.3d at 26. Despite the

fact that the plaintiff received the closing papers several days after the closing, the rescission

notice listed the date of the transaction as March 28, 2003, and the cancellation date of April 1,

2003, a date that had already passed when the plaintiff received the closing papers. Id. The court

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refused to treat the defect as a violation of TILA that would extend the rescission period from

three days to three years. The Court reasoned that:

[a]lthough the Notice does state, in part that rescission has to occur “no later than

midnight of APRIL 01, 2003,” the plaintiff wrests this statement from its contextual

moorings. The statement is followed immediately by a parenthetical reading “(or

midnight of the third business day following the latest of the three (3) events listed

above).” We fail to see how any reasonably alert person – that is, the average

consumer – reading the Notice would be drawn to the April 1 deadline without also

grasping the twice-repeated alternative deadlines.

This facial transparency is bolstered by the fact that the language of the Notice closely

tracks the language of the model form. This is, at the very least, prima facie evidence

of the adequacy of the disclosure. See 12 C.F.R. § 226 Supp. I, Intro. para. 1 (“Good

faith compliance with [the Federal Reserve Board’s] commentary affords protection

from liability under [TILA].”). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the

Notice was crystal clear and, thus, did not trigger an extended rescission right under

the TILA.

Id. at 28-29 (footnote omitted; alterations in original).

16. The approach taken by the First Circuit in Melfi and Champion is not substantially

different than the approach taken by the Third Circuit in In re Porter. The difference in outcome

does not result from a difference in approach. Both courts looked to whether the allegedly

defective notice was subject to more than one plausible reading. The primary difference between

the cases is factual: whereas the Third Circuit found two plausible readings of the notice of

rescission at issue in In re Porter, the First Circuit found that, notwithstanding facial defects, the

rescission notices at issue in Melfi and Champion were not subject to more than one plausible

reading.

17. Applying this standard to the instant case, we conclude that the notice form that

Plaintiff received at the closing is not subject to more than one plausible reading. Plaintiff knew

that she received the form on October 7. Thus it was clear that the first of the three conditions

16
did not apply to her. There was then, and is now, only one plausible reading of the rescission

form in this case: Plaintiff had three business days from October 7 to send in her rescission th

notice.1

18. Even if the defect in the Notice of Rescission were a violation of TILA and

Regulation Z, Defendants have raised the bona fide error defense contained in

15 U.S.C. § 1640(c). That exemption from liability provides that a creditor may not be held

liable for a TILA violation if the creditor “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the

violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the

maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Id. Errors covered by

the exemption include clerical and calculation mistakes, but do not include errors of legal

judgment. Id.

19. The errors contained in the Notice of Rescission are clerical in nature. There is no

dispute that the closing was originally scheduled for October 6, 2004. It is apparent from the

closing documents and from the testimony of Maureen Nihill, the closing agent, that the closing

was rescheduled to October 7, 2004. (See, e.g., Ex. D-12; Trial Tr. 156:18 to 158:2; 167:16 to

169:7.) As discussed in the Findings of Fact, Plaintiff’s testimony that the closing occurred on

 October 7, 2004, was a Thursday. Under Regulation Z, Saturday is a business day. 12 1

C.F.R. § 226.19(a). At trial, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that it is not clear that Saturday is a

business day and that, therefore, the notice violated Regulation Z because Plaintiff could not be

expected to know that Saturday is a business day, making the notice confusing and misleading. 

(See Trial Tr. 9:17-18; 60:2-5.) Although at least one court has entertained this argument, see

Aubin, 565 F. Supp. at 397, accepting it would simply inject confusion into Regulation Z. 

Treating Saturday as a non-business day for borrowers could mean that creditors and borrowers

could be subject to different counting standards: creditors would be responsible for counting

Saturdays as business days while borrowers would not.

17
October 6, 2004, was not credible. The credible evidence presented by Defendants established 

that there was a change in the dates of the closing. That change provides a reasonable

explanation of how the erroneous typewritten dates of October 6, 2004, and October 9, 2004,

made their way into the Notice of Rescission.

20. Defendants introduced evidence regarding Ameribanq’s maintenance of

reasonable procedures under § 1640(c). Ameribanq employee Frances Bedekovic testified about

the general procedures employed by Ameribanq to ensure compliance with Regulation Z and

accuracy in the loan documents. (Trial Tr. 204:2 to 208:3; 209:22 to 210:7.) Those procedures

included use of specialized software to generate the loan documents (id. at 204:7 to 205:10), use

of Mortgage Resource Network to perform a pre-closing audit of the documents (id. at 205:11-

24), and use of Mortgage Resource Network to perform a post-closing audit of the closing

documents (id. at 210:1-4). Bedekovic also testified about specific steps that would have been

taken with regard to the Notice of Rescission. (Id. at 210:12 to 211:3.) Mortgage Resource

Network documented its review of the post-closing documents in a Funding Authorization Form. 

(Ex. D-25; see also Trial Tr. 209:10-25.) That form indicates that the closing documents,

including the Notice of Rescission, were reviewed after the closing. (See Ex. D-25.) Thus, the

Notice of Rescission was prepared by a software program designed to produce documents in

compliance with Regulation Z, it was audited before the closing, and it was audited after the

closing. The Notice of Rescission contained a mistake despite the existence of these procedures,

which were reasonably calculated to avoid such a mistake.

21. We conclude that these procedures served as “a safety catch or rechecking

mechanism” sufficient to satisfy 15 U.S.C. 1640(c). See Molenbeek v. W. Mich. Auto & Truck

18
Outlet, Inc., No. 00-286, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3433, at *13 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2001)

(quoting Gallegos v. Stokes, 593 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1979)) (brackets omitted); see also

Davison v. Bank One Home Loan Servs., No. 01-2511, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 514, at *27 (D.

Kan. Jan. 13, 2003) (determining that in promulgating 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c), “‘Congress required

more than just a showing that a well-trained and careful clerk made a mistake’” and that “‘a

showing that the first well-trained clerk’s [action] was checked by a second well-trained clerk or

that one clerk [employed a procedure to double check his or her own action] would satisfy

Congress’ requirements’” (quoting Mirabal v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871,

878-79 (7th Cir. 1976), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Marquette Sav. & Loan Ass’n.,

686 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)) (alterations in original)). Therefore, the bona fide error

exception would apply even if the mistake on the Notice of Rescission were a violation of TILA

or Regulation Z.

22. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the the Notice

of Right to Recision claim.

(2) Disclosure of Finance Charge

23. TILA requires that creditors in home mortgage transactions disclose the finance

charge to the borrower. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3)-(8), (11); see also id. §§ 1605, 1631. Under

TILA, the finance charge is “the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to

whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to

the extension of credit . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a). Regulation Z further defines the term

“finance charge” as “the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. It includes any charge

payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor

19
as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a). The finance

charge excludes “any charge of a type payable in a comparable cash transaction.” Id. Regulation

Z provides creditors with elaborate guidance in determining what must be disclosed to

borrowers. See generally id. § 226.4.

24. Over the course of this litigation, Plaintiff has raised several issues regarding the

adequacy of Ameribanq’s disclosure of the finance charge. However, Plaintiff’s allegations

remained unfocused through the trial. Therefore, the best way to analyze these issues is to

examine what fees were actually disclosed and what fees Plaintiff argues should have been

disclosed. In order to do this, we look to the Settlement Statement and the Itemization of Prepaid

Finance Charge. (Exs. D-6, P-11.) The Settlement Statement lists on numbered lines the closing

fees in the transaction. (See Ex. D-6.) The Itemization of Prepaid Finance Charge disclosed to

Plaintiff what fees were part of the finance charge. (See Ex. P-11.) Ameribanq disclosed ten of

the fees listed on the Settlement Statement (lines 801, 805, 806, 808, 809, 810, 811, 901, 1101,

and 1102) in the Itemization of Prepaid Finance Charge. Plaintiff argues that seven fees listed on

the Settlement Statement (lines 803, 804, 807, 1108, 1103, 1104, and 1111) should have been

disclosed but were not. (Pl.’s Pretrial Mem. at 4.) We will assess, line by line, the adequacy of

the disclosure.

25. Line 801 of the Settlement Statement lists $6528.00 for a Loan Origination Fee. 

That amount was properly included in the calculation and disclosure of Plaintiff’s finance charge. 

See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(3) (defining “[p]oints, loan fees, assumption fees, finder’s fees, and

similar charges” as part of the finance charge); Abel v. Knickerbocker Realty Co., 846 F. Supp.

445, 448 (D. Md. 1994) (finding that the defendant-creditor’s failure to include the origination

20
fee in the finance charge violated TILA).

26. Line 803 of the Settlement Statement lists a $50.00 appraisal fee. That amount

was properly excluded from the calculation and disclosure of Plaintiff’s finance charge. See 15

U.S.C. § 1605(e)(5) (excluding appraisal fees from the finance charge in “any extension of credit

secured by an interest in real property”); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7)(iv) (excluding “[p]roperty

appraisal fees or fees for inspections to assess the value or condition of the property if the service

is performed prior to closing, including fees related to pest infestation or flood hazard

determinations” from the finance charge); Chiles v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 551 F. Supp. 2d 393,

397 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that “TILA does not require a lender to list the price of property

appraisal fees” if those fees are bona fide and reasonable in amount). Plaintiff’s testimony that

the Ameribanq representative, Jared Weisfeld, was supposed to pay the appraisal fee was not

credible. (See Trial Tr. 42:6-9; 44:1-3.) Plaintiff offered no affirmative evidence that the fee

listed in line 803 of the Settlement Statement was for anything other than an appraisal service

performed by Ameribanq prior to closing for the purpose of assessing the value or condition of

the property. Nor did Plaintiff offer any evidence that the $50.00 fee was not “bona fide and

reasonable in amount.” See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7) (excluding real estate related fees from the

finance charge so long as those fees are “bona fide and reasonable in amount”). Since there is

nothing in the record to suggest that the appraisal fee in line 803 should have been disclosed as

part of the finance charge or that the amount was not bona fide and reasonable, Plaintiff has not

met her burden to establish that the appraisal fee should have been disclosed.

27. Line 804 of the Settlement Statement lists $35.00 for a credit report. That amount

was properly excluded from Plaintiff’s finance charge. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(6) (excluding

21
credit reports from the finance charge in “any extension of credit secured by an interest in real

property”); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7)(iii) (excluding “[n]otary and credit report fees” from the

finance charge); Seldon v. Home Loan Servs., No. 07-4480, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68246, at *27

& n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2009) (noting that credit report fees are among those excluded from

disclosure in the finance charge in transactions secured by real property). Plaintiff’s testimony

about her understanding of the credit report fee was inconsistent. (Compare Trial Tr. 42:12-13

(“Q: And do you know what [the credit report fee in line 804 is] for or what that is? A: No.”),

with id. at 107:3-6 (“Q: All right. 804, credit report. Did you understand you were paying for

that? A: For my credit report to be ran [sic]. Mark [the mortgage broker] explained to me he

had to get it, yes.”)) In any event, Plaintiff offered no evidence that the credit report fee was not

bona fide and reasonable. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7). Even though Defendants did not bear the

burden of proof, Defendants introduced evidence that the $35.00 fee was reasonable. (See id. at

226:12-14.) The $35.00 credit report was properly left out of the finance charge.

28. Line 805 of the Settlement Statement lists $150.00 for underwriting. (Ex. D-6.) 

That amount was properly included in the finance charge. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(3); Romaker

v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., No. 94-3328, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22252, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3,

1995) (“Both the tax service fee and the underwriting fee are usually fees which are required to

be included as part of the finance charge.”).

29. Line 806 of the Settlement Statement lists a $80.00 tax service fee to Ameribanq. 

(Ex. D-6.) That amount was properly included in the finance charge. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)-

(b); Romaker, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22252, at *9.

30. Line 807 of the Settlement Statement lists a $18.50 flood certification fee to

22
Ameribanq. That amount was properly excluded from the finance charge. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1605(e)(5) (excluding flood hazard inspections from the finance charge in “any extension of

credit secured by an interest in real property”); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7)(iv) (excluding “[p]roperty

appraisal fees or fees for inspections . . . including fees related to . . . flood hazard

determinations” from the finance charge); Johnson v. Know Fin. Group [Johnson II], No. 03-

378, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9916, at *18-19 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2004) (noting that flood

certification fees are “ordinarily excluded from the finance charge”). Plaintiff offered no

evidence that suggests that the flood certification fee was not bona fide and reasonable in

amount. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7). Nor did she offer any evidence that the fee was for

anything other than a flood hazard determination that was performed prior to closing. 

Accordingly, it was properly excluded from the finance charge.

31. Line 808 of the Settlement Statement lists a $250.00 processing fee to Ameribanq. 

That amount was properly included in the finance charge. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(3); Jefferies

v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 543 F. Supp. 2d 368, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that lender’s

processing fee must be disclosed).

32. Line 809 of the Settlement Statement lists a $310.00 administration fee to

Ameribanq. That amount was properly included in the finance charge. See 12 C.F.R.

§ 226.4(b)(3); Jefferies, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (noting that lender’s administration fee must be

disclosed).

33. Line 810 of the Settlement Statement lists a $35.00 wire fee to Ameribanq, which

was a charge for the service of wiring the funds from the title company to the bank. (See Trial

Tr. 230:7-10.) That fee was included in Plaintiff’s finance charge. Defendants argue that the

23
wire fee was appropriately disclosed under 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(1), which includes certain fees

charged by third parties in the finance charge. Section 226.4(a)(1) provides that 

[t]he finance charge includes fees and amounts charged by someone other than the

creditor, unless otherwise excluded under this section, if the creditor:

(i) requires the use of a third party as a condition of or an incident to the extension

of credit, even if the consumer can choose the third party; or

(ii) retains a portion of the third-party charge, to the extent of the portion retained.

Id. The wire fee is listed as being paid to Ameribanq, which was the creditor, seemingly

obviating the applicability of the section. However, the parties did not introduce sufficient

evidence at trial for us to ascertain which, if either, of the subsections of § 226.4(a)(1) would

apply to the wire fee. Defendants offered testimony that wire fees are customarily included in the

finance charge. (See id. at 230:14-16.) Plaintiff does not contend that the wire fee should not

have been disclosed in the finance charge. Since the matter is not contested and since we do not

have sufficient facts to ascertain the exact nature of the wire fee, we will treat it as properly

disclosed.

34. Line 811 of the Settlement Statement lists a $75.00 appraisal fee to Landsafe

Appraisal. That fee was included in the finance charge. As noted above, § 226.4(c)(7) of

Regulation Z provides for the exclusion of real estate related fees from the finance charge so long

as they are bona fide and reasonable in amount. Appraisal fees are real estate related fees that do

not need to be disclosed so long as they “assess the value or condition of the property if the

service is performed prior to closing.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7)(iv). We have determined that the

$50.00 appraisal fee listed in line 803 of the Settlement Statement was properly excluded from

the finance charge because Plaintiff offered no evidence that the fee was not bona fide and

reasonable in amount and that the fee was not for an appraisal prior to the closing of the deal. 

24
For similar reasons, we determine that the appraisal fee listed in line 811 was properly included

in the finance charge. Although Defendant introduced evidence suggesting that the appraisal fee

to Landsafe was bona fide and reasonable in amount (see Trial Tr. 231:16-21), neither party

introduced any evidence regarding the timing of the appraisal. There is thus no evidence that the

appraisal occurred before the closing and should have been excluded from the finance charge

under Regulation Z, § 226.4(c)(7)(iv).

35. Line 901 of the Settlement Statement lists a $1118.20 charge for prepaid interest. 

That amount was properly included in the finance charge. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (listing interest

as an example of a fee included in the finance charge); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(1) (same); In re

Strong, 356 B.R. 121, 153 n.28 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (“[T]he finance charge includes prepaid

interest pursuant to [Regulation Z].”), aff’d, No. 04-4699, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12136 (E.D.

Pa. June 21, 2005).

36. Lines 1101 to 1104, 1108, 1111, and 1112 list fees paid to Rockwood Settlement

Group, Inc. Lines 1101 and 1112 of the Settlement Statement respectively list a $195.00

settlement or closing fee and a $50 courier fee. These fees were included in the calculation of the

finance charge. (Ex. P-11.) Lines 1102 to 1104, 1108 and 1111 respectively list a $125.00

abstract or title search fee, a $380.00 title examination fee to Rockwood, a $100.00 title

insurance binder fee, a $654.00 title insurance fee to Rockwood, and a $50.00 fee for judgments. 

These fees were not included in the calculation of the finance charge.

37. Plaintiff argues that the fees that she paid to Rockwood were unreasonable and

that they should have been disclosed in the finance charge. (Trial Tr. 22:12-14; 139:12-18.) We

do not understand Plaintiff to be arguing that the title insurance fees were not bona fide. A fee is

25
not bona fide if the services for which the fee is charged were not in fact performed. See

Brannam v. Huntington Mortg. Co., 287 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Nowhere does Plaintiff

contend that the fees to Rockwood, which are listed on her HUD-1 form, were for services that

were not performed.

38. TILA excludes title insurance and related fees from the finance charge. See 15

U.S.C. § 1605(a) (“The finance charge shall not include fees and amounts imposed by third party

closing agents (including settlement agents, attorneys, and escrow and title companies) if the

creditor does not require the imposition of the charges or the services provided and does not

retain the charges.”); id. § 1605(e)(1) (providing that certain fees “shall not be included in the

computation of the finance charge,” including “[f]ees or premiums for title examination, title

insurance, or similar purposes”).

39. Regulation Z provides that title insurance fees that are not bona fide or reasonable

must be disclosed in the finance charge. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7) (excluding “[f]ees for title

examination, abstract of title, title insurance, property survey, and similar purposes” from the

finance charge); McCutcheon v. Am.’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]itle

insurance is treated as a finance charge if it is not ‘bona fide and reasonable in amount.’”

(quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7))).

40. Courts in this circuit “assess the reasonableness of title insurance premiums

through comparison of the disputed charges with the prevailing rates of the industry in the

locality.” In re Madera, No. 07-1396, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25864, at *30 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27,

2008) (citing Jones v. Aames Funding Corp., No. 04-4799, 2006 WL 2845689, at *5 (E.D. Pa.

Mar. 8, 2006)), amended by 388 B.R. 586, aff’d, 586 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2009). Courts in this

26
district look to the Manual of the Title Insurance Rating Bureau of Pennsylvania (the “Manual”)

to assess the reasonableness of title insurance fees in transactions occurring in Pennsylvania. See

id. at *31 (citing Johnson II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9916, at *22 & n.6; Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 83307, at *16). But see Johnson v. Banc One Acceptance Corp. [Johnson I], 278 F.

Supp. 2d 450, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Van Antwerpen, J.) (observing that “it is not clear to us that

the Manual of the Title Insurance Rating Bureau of Pennsylvania is binding on [lenders]”).2

41. Plaintiff’s loan transaction occurred in October 2004. In 2005, the Title Insurance

Rating Bureau of Pennsylvania amended the Manual. Because there is no indication that the

2005 amendments were intended to be retroactive, we apply the 2003 version of the Manual.

42. Plaintiff contends that she was charged the basic rate for title insurance when she

was, in fact, entitled to a discounted rate because her loan was a refinance transaction. (See, e.g.,

Trial Tr. 139:10 to 140:9.) The Manual provides discounted rates for reissue and refinance

 We understand why Judge Van Antwerpen would question whether the Manual is 2

binding on lenders. It governs the conduct of Pennsylvania title insurance providers, not the

conduct of lending institutions. Determining that one entity’s (potentially unintentional)

violation of a state quasi-regulation can constitute a violation of federal consumer protection

laws by another entity seems unfair. Nevertheless, this is the effect of TILA’s broad reach. 

Although TILA explicitly excludes payments to title insurance companies from the finance

charge, Regulation Z interprets TILA’s language as having an implicit reasonableness

requirement. In order to assess reasonableness, courts in this district have chosen to apply a

“prevailing rate in the locality” standard, and by extension reject a national or objective standard. 

See, e.g., Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83307, at *16 (quoting Jones v. Aames Funding Corp.,

No. 04-4799, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11119, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2006)); cf. Madera v.

Ameriquest Mortg. Co. (In re Madera), 586 F.3d 228, 233 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (interpreting the

term “prevailing rate” to be synonymous with “reasonable”). Since the Manual sets rates in

Pennsylvania, it is, for lenders operating in Pennsylvania, the measure of a rate’s reasonableness

for purposes of TILA compliance. Thus, while the Defendants here offered evidence that the

fees listed in Lines 1101 to 1104, 1108, 1111, and 1112 were objectively reasonable (see Trial

Tr. 231:22 to 235:18), that evidence was not based on what is reasonable in Pennsylvania (see id.

at 238:11-13), and Defendants’ reliance on it was misplaced.

27
transactions. For mortgages of up to and including $2 million, the reissue rate is 90% of the

basic rate. See 2003 Manual §§ 5.3, 5.50. Section 5.3 of the Manual sets the standard for the

reissue rate:

A purchaser of a title insurance policy shall be entitled to purchase this coverage at

the reissue rate if the real property to be insured is identical to or is part of real

property insured 10 years immediately prior to the date the insured transaction closes

when evidence of the earlier policy is produced notwithstanding the amount of

coverage provided by the prior policy.

(Id. § 5.3.) Section 5.6 of the Manual sets the standard for the refinance rate:

When a refinance or substitution loan is made within 3 years from the date of closing

of a previously insured mortgage or fee interest and the premises to be insured are

identical to or part of the real property previously insured and there has been no

change in the fee simple ownership, the Charge shall be 80% of the reissue rate [i.e.,

by the associative property of multiplication, 72% of the basic rate]. . . .

(Id. § 5.6.) Thus, under section 5.6 of the Manual, borrowers in refinance loan transactions are

entitled to a discounted rate if the transaction satisfies three conditions: (1) a refinance or

substitution loan is made within 3 years from the date of closing of a previously insured

mortgage; (2) the premises to be insured are identical to or part of the real property previously

insured; and (3) there has been no change in the fee simple ownership.

43. The parties contest whether Rockwood or Ameribanq had an obligation to provide

Plaintiff with the refinance rate. The disagreement centers on whether the Manual imposed on

Plaintiff, as the borrower, the burden of providing evidence to Rockwood or to Ameribanq that

she had title insurance on her previous mortgage. Defendants argue that Plaintiff bore the burden

of providing evidence demonstrating that she was entitled to the refinance rate. Plaintiff

contends that she was not required to furnish proof of a prior policy because Ameribanq had an

obligation to ascertain whether Plaintiff was eligible for the refinance rate. This dispute is not a

28
matter of settled law. Several district court and bankruptcy court decisions, and at least one 

Third Circuit panel decision, have held that a borrower must offer evidence that the lender knew

or should have known at the time of the transaction that the plaintiff was entitled to the refinance

rate. These decisions were challenged recently in the case of Escher v. Decision One Mortgage 3

Co., 417 B.R. 245, 252-58 (E.D. Pa. 2009), appeal pending, No. 09-4242 (3d Cir. 2009).

44. In Escher, the plaintiffs sued the defendants in bankruptcy court for violating

TILA by not disclosing overcharges in title insurance in the finance charge. There was no

dispute that the plaintiffs were charged the basic rate when they qualified for the discounted

refinance rate. The sole issue was whether was “the borrowers had the burden of providing

evidence to the lender, at or prior to closing, that they had title insurance in connection with the

previous mortgage, or whether it is the lender’s obligation to ascertain at closing that the

borrowers had preexisting title insurance.” Id. at 253. The bankruptcy court determined that the

plaintiffs, as borrowers, had the burden of establishing that they were entitled to the lower rate at

the time of closing. On appeal, the district court held that borrowers do not have that burden and

Ricciardi v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 164 F. App’x 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2006) (not 3

precedential); In re Madera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25864, at *36; Chiles v. Ameriquest Mortg.

Co., 551 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83307, at *18 n.6;

In re Fields, No. 06-1753, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52934, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2006), aff’d

on other grouds, 283 F. App’x 897, 899 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential); Jones, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 11119, at *18-19; see also In re Escher, 369 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007),

vacated in part by Escher v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 08-4719, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

89646 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009); In re Glauser, 365 B.R. 531, 536-39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). 

We note that there are several pending lawsuits against title insurers alleging failure to provide

borrowers with the appropriate reissue or refinance rate under the Manual. See, e.g., Alberton v.

Commw. Land Title Ins. Co., No. 06-3755, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6650, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Jan.

27, 2010); McDuffie v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 08-5038, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67116, at

*3-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2009); White v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 982 A.2d 997, 1001 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2009). None of these courts have addressed the issue of whether the borrower or the lender is

responsible for ensuring that the borrower receives the refinance rate.

29
that the bankruptcy court had applied the wrong standard. The district court based its decision on

two grounds. The first was that the difference in language between section 5.3 and section

5.6—i.e., that section 5.3 explicitly places the burden on borrowers, while section 5.6 is silent on

the issue—was an indication that borrowers in refinance transactions do not have that burden

under the canon of statutory construction that “where one section of a statute does not include a

specific term used elsewhere in the statute, it is presumed that the omission was intentional and

the drafters did not intend the missing language to apply.” Id. at 256 (citing Office of the

Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2009)). The second was a policy

determination that lenders are better suited than borrowers to ensure a fair outcome, which the

district court based on the application of “common sense [to] the circumstances of the typical

refinancing transaction.” See id. at 258. The district court observed that borrowers are unlikely

to know that they are entitled to a discounted rate, rendering unreasonable the expectation that

they would produce evidence of a prior policy at closing. By contrast, “most lenders would not

extend credit secured by a mortgage without title insurance,” so placing the burden on them is

reasonable. See id.

45. The district court departed from the existing case law on this issue because the

other cases had mechanically applied the standard without critically analyzing its basis in law or

in the plain language of the Manual. We find the analysis of the District Court persuasive. . 

Accordingly, we adopt that standard here.

46. Plaintiff introduced evidence showing that she satisfied the three requirements set

forth in section 5.6 of the Manual. (See Exs. P-1, P-1A.) She was thus entitled to the discounted

refinance rate.

30
47. Determining what Plaintiff was actually charged and what she should have been

charged is complicated by the fact that the HUD-1 form contemplates that title charges will be

itemized separately. Pennsylvania law and the Manual, however, regulate aggregate charges by

title insurers. Section 1.6 of the Manual specifies that the term “charge” is “the premium, the

examination and settlement or closing fees, and every other charge, whether denominated

premium or otherwise, made by a title insurance company . . . to an applicant for insurance, for

any policy or contract for the issuance of . . . title insurance.” (See Manual § 1.6 (adopting the

definition of “fee” set forth in section 701 of Pennsylvania’s Insurance Company Law of 1921,

40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 910-1).) Thus, under the Manual’s broad definition, all the fees listed in

Lines 1101 to 1104, 1108, 1111, and 1112, which total $1554, are the title insurance charge.

48. For a $217,600 loan like Plaintiff’s, the basic title insurance rate was $1446.75. 

(See Manual § 5.50.) The reissue rate was $1302.08, and the refinance rate was $1041.66. (See

id. §§ 5.3. 5.6, 5.50.) Since the amount charged for title insurance above the reasonable rate

must be disclosed in the finance charge, Ameribanq had to disclose the difference between $1554

and $1041.66 (i.e., $512.34). As note above, Ameribanq included Lines 1101 ($195 settlement

or closing fee) and 1112 ($50 courier fee) in the finance charge. Thus the finance charge is

understated by $267.34.

49. TILA authorizes the Federal Reserve Board “to permit tolerances for numerical

disclosures other than the annual percentage rate so that such tolerances are narrow enough to

prevent such tolerances from resulting in misleading disclosures or disclosures that circumvent

the purposes” the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(d). Regulation Z provides that the finance charge in

mortgage transactions shall be treated as accurate if it “(i) is understated by no more than $100;

31
or (2) greater than the amount required to be disclosed.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d)(1). Accordingly,

the $267.37 overcharge rendered the disclosure of the finance charge inaccurate. We must

therefore assess the remedies that TILA affords Plaintiff.

C. TILA Remedies

50. TILA provides borrowers with both legal and equitable remedies. Depending on

the circumstances, an aggrieved borrower may obtain damages, rescission of the loan, or both. 

Plaintiff has requested both legal and equitable relief.

(1) Damages

51. TILA provides for actual and statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a)(1), (2);

see also id. § 1635(g) (providing that courts may award rescission and damages).

52. Plaintiff is not entitled to actual damages because she did not establish at trial that

she detrimentally relied on the under-disclosure of the title insurance fee or that her detrimental

reliance caused her to enter into the transaction. See Vallies v. Sky Bank, 591 F.3d 152, 156 (3d

Cir. 2009) (“[A] showing of detrimental reliance is necessary to recover actual damages for TILA

disclosure violations.”), aff’g 583 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (collecting cases).

53. For mortgage transactions like Plaintiff’s, TILA prescribes statutory damages for

violations in the form of either “twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the

transaction” or “not less than $ 200 or greater than $ 2,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A). The 4

 In 2008, Congress increased the statutory damages range to $400 to $4000. See The 4

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2502, 122 Stat. 2654,

2857. Prior to the amendment, the statutory damages range was $200 to $2000. The language of

the Housing and Economic Recovery Act does not reflect a congressional intent for the increase

in the statutory damage range to apply retroactively. Since Ameribanq’s violation took place

before the 2008 TILA amendments, the pre-2008 statutory damages govern. See generally

Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265–85 (1994).

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TILA violation at issue here is insignificant. Moreover, it arises out of a technicality that was

neither foreseeable nor directly attributable to an affirmative action by any Defendant. Rather, it

arose from the conduct of a third party that was unaffiliated with Ameribanq. (See Trial Tr.

206:12-14.) Likewise, it does not appear to have been material to the transaction. Given the

2005 amendments to the Manual and the lack of TILA cases in this district regarding title

insurance, it is unlikely that this violation poses a recurring threat that a high statutory damages

award would motivate lenders to avoid. Accordingly, a statutory damages award of $200 is

appropriate.

54. There are three named Defendants in this action: Ameribanq, Countrywide, and

Bank of New York. As assignees of the mortgage, Countrywide and Bank of New York are

afforded protections against civil liability under TILA, which permits assignees to be held liable

“only if the violation for which such action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the face of the

disclosure statement, except where assignment was involuntary.” 15 U.S.C. § 1641. Plaintiff did

not establish that the assignment of her loan was involuntary. She also did not establish that the

understatement of the finance charge was apparent on the face of the disclosure statement. TILA

provides that “a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure statement includes, but is not

limited to (1) a disclosure which can be determined to be incomplete or inaccurate from the face

of the disclosure statement or other documents assigned, or (2) a disclosure which does not use

the terms required to be used by this title.” Id. Neither of the enumerated factors is implicated

here. See McCutcheon, 560 F.3d 146 (describing with approval the district court’s determination

that the defendant-assignee was shielded from liability by § 1641 where the lender failed to

provide the borrower with the refinance rate for title insurance). Nor did Plaintiff establish the

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existence of any other facts that would weigh in favor of holding Countrywide or Bank of New

York civilly liable.

55. Since neither Countrywide nor Bank of New York can be held civilly liable, we

will enter a judgment in the amount of $200 against Ameribanq and in favor of Plaintiff.

(2) Rescission

56. As discussed above, TILA permits borrowers three days to unilaterally rescind a

consumer credit transaction in which the lender takes a security interest in the borrower’s

principal dwelling. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a). The three-day rescission

period is extended to three years when the lender fails to make a material disclosure. See 15

U.S.C. § 1635(f). Such a failure renders a transaction voidable, but it does not automatically

void the transaction. Bertram v. Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 (M.D.

Pa. 2003) (citing Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002)). To

make a transaction void, an aggrieved borrower must invoke rescission in accordance with the

procedures set forth in TILA and Regulation Z. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d).

57. Inaccuracies in the finance charge constitute a failure to make a material

disclosure by the lender. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(g); In re Porter, 961 F.2d

at 1073; Johnson II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9916, at *10. In most situations, the finance charge

is considered accurate if it is not overstated by more than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the

“face amount of the note”—for instance, $1088 where, as here, the mortgage is for $217,600. 

See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(g)(1). However, the tolerance for error in the finance charge drops to

$35 dollars when there has been an “initiation of foreclosure on the [borrower’s] principal

dwelling that secures the credit obligation . . . .” Id. § 226.23(h); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i). On

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October 10, 2006, Bank of New York commenced a foreclosure action on the Property in the

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County to foreclose on the Property. (Ex. P-15; see also

Trial Tr. 17:17-21.)

58. Defendants argue that the $35 threshold does not apply in this action because the

$35 threshold is meant only to be an affirmative defense to foreclosure actions and that since

Plaintiff is asserting her right to rescission affirmatively, the threshold does not apply. 

Defendants cite no cases, statutes, or legislative history to support their reading of TILA and

Regulation Z. Instead they cite a law review article that baldly asserts that “[w]hen a borrower

wants to use rescission as a defense to foreclosure, the tolerance for an under-disclosed finance

charge drops to $35.” (Doc. No. 80 ¶ 227 (paraphrasing Elwin Griffith, Truth in Lending – The

Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount Financed

in Closed-end Transactions, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 191, 196 (1998)) (emphasis added by

Defendants).) We reject Defendants’ argument. It contradicts the clear language of TILA and

Regulation Z, which both state that the $35 threshold governs “after the initiation” of the

foreclosure process. See 15 U.S.C. 1635(i)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(h)(2); see also Glucksman v.

First Franklin Fin. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying the defendants’

motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had stated a claim where the defendants had commenced

a foreclosure action and the alleged understatement of the finance charge was greater than $35);

Oscar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6410, at *13 (construing the $35 threshold to apply where “the

mortgage loan on the consumer’s principal dwelling is in foreclosure”); cf. McCutcheon, 560

F.3d at 149 (observing that since the defendant did not follow through with its threat to

commence a foreclosure action, the $35 threshold did not apply). Nothing in the text of the

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statute or regulation suggests that the $35 threshold is available only as an affirmative defense. 

Reading such a requirement into TILA and Regulation Z would not only be improper, it would

also construe them in favor of the lender in direct contravention of the mandate that TILA and its

implementing regulation are to be construed in favor of borrowers. See, e.g., Smith, 898 F.2d at

898.

59. Unlike damages, TILA does not exempt assignees from a borrower’s right to

rescission. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (“Any consumer who has the right to rescind a transaction under

[15 U.S.C. § 1635] may rescind the transaction as against any assignee of the obligation.”);

Carmen v. Metrocities Mortg., No. 08-2729, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7984, at *18 (D.N.J. Feb. 1,

2010) (finding that the plaintiff’s right to rescind extended to the assignee of the plaintiff’s

mortgage). Thus, Bank of New York’s assignee status does not protect it from rescission.

60. Because Bank of New York commenced a foreclosure on the Property, the $35

threshold applies. And since the finance charge was understated by $267.37, there was a material

violation of TILA, extending Plaintiff’s ability to rescind the transaction from three days to three

years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). On March 7, 2005, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter informing of

Plaintiff’s intent to rescind. (Ex. P-6.) On April 28, 2005, Plaintiff commenced this action. (See

Doc. No. 1.) Both of these actions were undertaken within three years of the transaction and both

were sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiff’s intent to rescind. See, e.g., Robinson v. Holiday

Universal, Inc., No. 05-5725, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65082, at *29 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2006)

(“[T]he filing of a complaint seeking declaratory relief and recission [sic] is sufficient to

demonstrate the requisite intention to rescind.” (citations omitted)). Just as a material violation

of TILA does not void a transaction, Plaintiff’s invocation of her right to rescind does not

36
automatically effect a rescission of the transaction.

61. Rescission is an equitable remedy whose goal is “to return the parties most nearly

to the position they held prior to entering into the transaction.” Williams v. Homestake Mortg.

Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992); Parker v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d

528, 537 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“The equitable goal of rescission under TILA is to restore the

parties to the ‘status quo ante.’” (citations omitted)). Under TILA and Regulation Z, when a

borrower “exercises his right to rescind . . . , he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and

any security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law,

becomes void upon such a rescission.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. 226.23(d)(1). The

borrower must provide the lender with a notice of the right to rescind, and within 20 days of

receiving notice, the lender must “return to the [borrower] any money or property given as

earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to

reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2). After the lender has returned the specified funds and

terminated its security interest, the borrower must “tender the property to the creditor, except that

if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its

reasonable value.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(3).

62. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co.,

“[t]he sequence of rescission and tender set forth in § 1635(b) is a reordering of common law

rules governing rescission.” 968 F.2d at 1140 (observing that “[u]nder common law rescission,

the rescinding party must first tender the property that he has received under the agreement

before the contract may be considered void”) (citation omitted). Reordering the common-law

37
rules governing rescission has the twofold effect of placing the borrower in a stronger bargaining

position than he would occupy under the common law and serving as “an important enforcement

tool, insuring creditor compliance with TILA’s disclosure requirements.” Id. The reordering of

the rules does not, however, alter the equitable nature of the remedy or tie courts’ hands in

ensuring an equitable result. See, e.g., Dawson v. Thomas (In re Dawson), 411 B.R. 1, 41

(Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (determining that “despite being statutorily granted,” the rescission remedy

in TILA, “‘remains an equitable doctrine subject to equitable considerations’” (quoting Brown v.

Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 683 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).

63. TILA’s rescission remedy is meant to protect borrowers. It is not meant to

provide borrowers with a free house or other financial windfall. To that end, courts have the

ability to condition rescission on the borrower’s tender of the loan proceeds to the lender. Am.

Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 820 (4th Cir. 2007); Yamamoto v. Bank of New

York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yamamoto is 5

See also Decision One Mortg. Co. v. Fraley, 238 F.3d 420 (Table), No. 00-3270, 2000 5

U.S. App. LEXIS 33881, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (non-precedential) (holding that “the

district court did not err by exercising its equitable powers to condition rescission upon the

[plaintiffs’] return of the loan balance received”); Brown, 683 F.2d at 447 (“A court may

condition the granting of rescission upon plaintiff’s repayment of the principal amount of the

loan to the creditor.”); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hughes Dev. Co., 938 F.2d 889, 890 (8th Cir.

1991) (“[TILA] gives courts discretion to . . . condition[] rescissions upon the debtor’s prior

return of the principal.” (citations omitted)); Kratz v. Countrywide Bank, No. 08-1233, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86479, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) (noting that “[w]here rescission is

not conditioned on the borrower’s prior return of loan proceeds, rescission can result in the ‘free

house’—or ‘gotcha’—phenomenon”); Jobe v. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC, No. 06-0697, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 70311, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009) (observing that § 1635(b) “confers upon a

trial judge . . . the discretion to condition rescission on tender by the borrower of the property he

has received from the lender” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker, 534 F.

Supp. 2d at 537 n.9 (“When a borrower is unable to tender the loan proceeds, the remedy of

unconditional rescission is inappropriate.”); Stanley v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Stanley),

315 B.R. 602, 614-15 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (“The concept that a debtor is entitled to a free

38
instructive. In Yamamoto, the plaintiffs alleged that the lender failed to provide them with the

statutorily required notice of the right to cancel. 329 F.3d at 1169. At summary judgment, the

plaintiffs conceded that they were unable to tender the proceeds of the loan. The district court

found a triable issue of fact regarding the lender’s failure to provide the plaintiffs with the

requisite notice, but held that if the plaintiffs could not establish their ability to tender the loan

proceeds in sixty days, then the court would dismiss the action. When the plaintiffs failed to 

tender the loan proceeds, the district court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the district court, holding that “a court may impose conditions on rescission that assure

that the borrower meets her obligations once the creditor has performed its obligations.” Id. at

1173.

64. The holding in Yamamoto and similar cases have their basis in the express

provisions of TILA and Regulation Z that afford courts the discretion to modify the prescribed

rescission procedures. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4). They are also based

in equity. Forcing a lender to relinquish its security interest despite evidence of a borrower’s

inability to meet her § 1635(b) rescission obligation of returning the loan proceeds would be

irrational and unfair, and it would frustrate the “equitable goal of rescission under TILA” of

“restor[ing] the parties to the ‘status quo ante.’” See Shelton, 486 F.3d at 820.

65. The parties in this case did not specifically address whether Plaintiff is capable of

tendering the loan proceeds. Nevertheless, both parties adduced evidence that calls into question

Plaintiff’s ability to do so. For instance, Plaintiff and her husband have filed for bankruptcy. 

home or financial windfall because a creditor failed to check a box on a notice of right to rescind

form is an irrational result that fails to recognize the full scope and policy behind the TILA’s

rescission framework.”).

39
(Trial Tr. 52:21 to 53:9; Ex. P-14.) The bankruptcy judge initially ordered Plaintiff to pay $1669

a month on the mortgage, but Plaintiff eventually stopped making all payments. (Trial Tr. 57:4-

18.) Because there is a distinct possibility that Plaintiff will be unable to meet her rescission

obligations, conditioning rescission on her ability to do so is appropriate here. In addition, the

equities of the instant case favor conditioning rescission on Plaintiff’s repayment because

Ameribanq’s conduct was unintentional and the inaccuracy in the disclosure of the finance

charge was not significant. See Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1171 (discussing the court’s holding in

LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1976), and observing that because the

“TILA violations [in LaGrone] were not egregious . . . , the equities favored the creditor who

would otherwise have been left in an unsecured position in the borrower’s intervening

bankruptcy”). Accordingly, Plaintiff shall have 60 days from the entry of this Memorandum and

accompanying Order to proffer the loan proceeds to Bank of New York in the amount of

$205,472.43—the amount of the loan minus the finance charge and other charges on the

disclosure statement. (See Ex. D-9.) See also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (providing that when a

borrower invokes a valid right to rescission, she “is not liable for any finance or other charge”);

Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff may

decrease this amount by payments she has made to any Defendant that are supported by proper

documentation. Upon a showing of good cause, Plaintiff may petition the Court for more time to

comply. However, if Plaintiff is unable proffer the loan proceeds within a reasonable time. 

Plaintiff’s right to rescission is recinded.

D. ECOA

66. Plaintiff bases the ECOA claim in Count Three of the Amended Complaint on

40
allegations that Ameribanq “significantly changed the terms of the . . . credit transaction and

substituted different, less favorable terms without . . . advising the Plaintiff . . . .” (Am. Compl.

¶ 21.) Specifically, “Plaintiff maintains that the only pre-settlement disclosures she received

were oral assurances from an Ameribanq loan officer that the monthly payments would not

exceed $1700.” (Pl.’s Pretrial Mem. at 2.) We have determined that the alleged factual predicate

of Plaintiff’s claim is false. On September 26, 2004, Plaintiff received and signed a Good Faith

Estimate (Ex. D-1), a Preliminary Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement (Ex. D-3), and

a Notices & Disclosures to Applicant form (Ex. D-5). (Exs. D-3, D-5.) Thus, she did not meet

her burden of proof on her ECOA claim.

67. Furthermore, we note that Plaintiff has never argued, let alone introduced

evidence, that Ameribanq discriminated against her. This is significant because ECOA is an

anti-discrimination statute, which provides in pertinent part that

[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with

respect to any aspect of a credit transaction--

(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age

(provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);

(2) because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance

program; or

(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer

Credit Protection Act.

15 U.S.C. § 1691; see also 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (“The purpose of this regulation is to promote the

availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants without regard to race, color, religion, national

origin, sex, marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); to the fact

that all or part of the applicant’s income derives from a public assistance program; or to the fact

that the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection

41
Act.”). Plaintiffs alleging ECOA claims have the burden of showing that (1) they are a member

of a protected class; (2) they applied for credit from defendants; (3) they were qualified for the

credit; and (4) despite qualification, they were denied credit. In re Chiang, 385 F.3d 256, 259

(3d Cir. 2004) (citing Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.

1999)). Here, Plaintiff introduced no evidence regarding the first, third, or fourth elements of the

claim. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s ECOA

claim.

E. UTPCPL

68. Plaintiff has contended over the course of this litigation that her UTPCPL claim is

predicated on the alleged federal violations, arguing that “violations of truth in lending and of

ECOA, . . . equate to violations of the Unfair Trade Practices law.” (Trial Tr. 142:1-3; Pl.’s

Pretrial Mem. at 2.) Plaintiff’s argument is incorrect as a matter of law. A violation of TILA is

not a per se violation of the UTPCPL. See, e.g., Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

656 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (collecting cases and observing that “[m]any judges in

[the Eastern District of Pennsylvania] have rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that TILA and RESPA

violations are per se violations of the UTPCPL”); see also id. at 515 n.9 (noting that the

plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to consider the case law was “unacceptable advocacy” and that “[a]

good lawyer is expected to cite, and then attempt to distinguish or disagree with, contrary

authority”). The UTPCPL requires the plaintiff to prove that a defendant “made a false

representation that deceived or had a tendency to deceive.” See Fisher v. Advanta Fin. Corp. (In

re Fisher), No. 03-4666, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 884, at *71 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2005) (citing Fay

v. Erie Ins. Group, 723 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)). In addition, plaintiff “has the

42
burden of establishing a causal connection to or reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.” 

Fay, 723 A.2d at 714.

69. Plaintiff’s case highlights why there cannot be a per se rule that a violation of

TILA is a violation of the UTPCPL. Defendants’ TILA liability arises from a difficult-to-detect

error of a third party. Plaintiff did not need to establish deceit or detrimental reliance, which are 

essential elements of a UTPCPL claim. Plaintiff failed to offer credible evidence establishing

that Ameribanq’s conduct was in any way deceitful or that she detrimentally relied on

Ameribanq’s TILA violation in deciding to proceed with the transaction. Defendants are

accordingly entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s UTPCPL claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, judgment against Ameribanq will be entered in the amount of

$200; Plaintiff will have 60 days to proffer $205,472.43 to Bank of New York; and judgment

will be entered in favor of Defendants on the remaining counts of the Amended Complaint. 

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

_________________________

R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J.

43