alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2018104EN.01003801.xml

| 19.3.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.3.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/38

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 February 2018 — Access Info Europe v European Commission

(Case T-851/16) (1)

1

((Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - EU-Turkey statements of 8 and 18 March 2016 - Implementation by the European Union or by the Member States of the measures concerned - Documents drawn up or received by the legal service of an institution - Legal advice - Analyses of the legality of the measures provided for in connection with the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement of 8 March 2016 - Refusal to grant access - Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 - Exception relating to the protection of the public interest in respect of international relations - Second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 - Exception relating to the protection of court proceedings - Exception relating to the protection of legal advice))

(2018/C 104/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Access Info Europe (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: O. Brouwer, E. Raedts and J. Wolfhagen, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Buchet and M. Konstantinidis, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 6029 final of 19 September 2016 confirming the refusal to grant the applicant access to documents from the Commission’s Legal Service which purportedly concern the legality of the measures adopted by the European Union and its Member States in implementing the actions set out in the statement of the Heads of State or Government of the European Union of 8 March 2016, adopted following their meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister on 7 March 2016.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls European Commission Decision C(2016) 6029 final of 19 September 2016, in so far as it refuses to grant partial access to Access Info Europe to the first sentence of the part entitled ‘Legal framework’ of the Commission document with the reference Ares(2016) 2453347, and to the first sentence of point I(a) entitled ‘EU Legal Framework’, of Attachment 1 to the Commission document with the reference Ares(2016) 2453181; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls European Commission Decision C(2016) 6029 final of 19 September 2016, in so far as it refuses to grant partial access to Access Info Europe to the first sentence of the part entitled ‘Legal framework’ of the Commission document with the reference Ares(2016) 2453347, and to the first sentence of point I(a) entitled ‘EU Legal Framework’, of Attachment 1 to the Commission document with the reference Ares(2016) 2453181;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 53, 20.2.2017.

1

---
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

 THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOLORES (DEE) BARRETT, : CIVIL ACTION NO.

:

Plaintiff, : 02-CV-4421

:

v. :

:

THE GREATER HATBORO CHAMBER : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

OF COMMERCE, INC., JOHN J. (BUD) :

AIKEN, and MICKEY GLANTZ, :

:

Defendants. :

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants, The Greater Hatboro Chamber of Commerce, Inc., John J. (Bud) Aiken and 

Mickey Glantz, hereby move this court to enter Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants 

for the reasons set forth in Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment which is attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

SIDNEY L. GOLD & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

/s/ Sidney L. Gold, Esquire SG1387 

SIDNEY L. GOLD, ESQUIRE

Identification No.: 21374

1835 Market Street, Suite 515

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 569-1999

Attorneys for Defendants

January 10, 2005

Case 2:02-cv-04421-PBT Document 23 Filed 01/10/2005 Page 1 of 2
Case 2:02-cv-04421-PBT Document 23 Filed 01/10/2005 Page 2 of 2
No. 67787.

#### Maher & Company *v.*United States,

protest 61/18054-16386 (New Orleans).

Opinion by

Wilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise and issues are similar in all material respects to those involved *321in *Falcon Sales Company*and *J. J. Murphy & Co.*v. *United States*(47 Cust. Ct. 129, C.D. 2292), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
Case No. 6,687.

#### HOPKINS v. JACKSON.

[Cited in Hovey v. Home Ins. Co., Case No. 6,743. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.]
No. 65442.

#### Gastmeyer Hinsch, Inc. *v.*United States,

protests 58/1022, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of prepared or preserved pork similar in all material respects to that the subject of *C. J. Tower & Sons*v. *United States*(43 Cust. Ct. 36, C.D. 2100), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 64806.

#### St. Mary’s Nativity Church *v.*United States,

protest 59/25167-11109 (Chicago).

Opinion by

Mollison, J.

The protest was dismissed.
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER

OF

LENNAR PARTNERS, INC

Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 11, 2000

(the "Agreement"),  by and among Structured Asset Securities Corporation, as

Depositor, First Union National Bank, as Master Servicer, LaSalle Bank N.A. as

Trustee, ABN AMRO Bank N.V. as Fiscal Agent, and

Lennar Partners, Inc., as Special Servicer

(LB-UBS 2000-C5)

The undersigned, Ronald E. Schrager, as Vice President of LENNAR PARTNERS, INC.,                                

A Florida Corporation (the "Company"), in accordance with Section 3.13 of the 

Agreement, hereby certifies on behalf of the Company that (I) a review of the activities of

the Company during the year ended December 31, 2000 and of its performance under the 

Agreement has been made under my supervision, (ii) to the best of my knowledge, based 

on such review, the Company has performed and fulfilled all of its material obligations

under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such period ended December 31, 

2000, (iii) the Company has received no notice regarding qualification, or challenging the

status, of any of REMIC Pool as a REMIC or the Grantor Trust as a grantor trust from the

IRS or any other governmental agency or body.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed and delivered this Certificate as

Of the 1st day of March, 2001.

Ronald E. Schrager

Vice President

Lennar Partners, Inc.
#### PARENTS FOR QUALITY EDUCATION WITH INTEGRATION, INC., Scepter Brownlee, by his mother and next friend, Ora Brownlee, Torrey Cook, by his parents and next friends, Regina Cook and Richard Cook, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Evan Bayh, Governor of the State of Indiana, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Dr. H. Dean Evans, State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Chairman of the State Board of Education, Dr. David O. Dickson, Ted L. Marston, Paul L. McFann, David H. Swanson, Connie Blackketter, Margaret Ann Kelley, Dr. Norma J. Cook, Katherine L. Startin, J. Patrick O’Rear, Grant W. Hawkins, Members of the Indiana State Board of Education, and Indiana Department of Education, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 91-3437.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Feb. 18, 1993.

Before CUMMINGS and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and DILLIN, District Judge.*

*

 Hon. S. Hugh Dillin, of the Southern District of Indiana, is sitting by designation.

ORDER ON REHEARING

The State of Indiana is not, under the Eleventh Amendment, a proper defendant and is hereby dismissed.

The opinion of the court issued October 23, 1992, 977 F.2d 1207; is hereby modified as provided in this order.

On page 3 of the opinion, 14 lines from the top, delete the parenthetical reading:

(the State of Indiana and state officials)

On further consideration of the petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing *en banc,*no judge in active service has requested a vote thereon and all of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

                    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke Special Emphasis Panel, November 17, 2023, 10:00 a.m. to 04:00 p.m., National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852 which was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on November 3, 2023, 88 FR 77102.                

This notice is being amended to change this one-day meeting from November 17, 2023, to November 27, 2023. The meeting time remains the same. The meeting is closed to the public.

Dated: November 13, 2023.

David W. Freeman, 

Supervisory Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2023-25404 Filed 11-16-23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
No. 49104.

#### Protest 100253-K of American Sponge & Chamois Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

From an examination of the papers the court held the action of the collector to be presumptively correct.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SONNY THOMAS : CIVIL ACTION

 :

v. :

 :

JOHN IATAROLA, et al. : No. 05-03850-JF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Fullam, Sr. J. November 6, 2006

Plaintiff was arrested at the scene of a murder which

he had just committed. He was later convicted and sentenced to

life imprisonment. In this action, he asserts that the

defendants violated his constitutional rights by using excessive

force in the course of his arrest, and were motivated in part by

a desire to punish. Defendants have filed a motion for summary

judgment.

It is apparent from the record that, if the testimony

of the defendants and their witnesses is credited by the jury,

defendants will win. On the other hand, if, by chance, the jury

credits the testimony of the plaintiff, plaintiff would prevail. 

There is, in short, a sharp conflict between plaintiff’s version

of the events and the version espoused by the defendants. But

this kind of dispute cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 

Defendants argue, with considerable force, that

plaintiff’s testimony is not credible, and would be rejected by

any rational jury. But issues of credibility cannot be resolved

Case 2:05-cv-03850-JF Document 30 Filed 11/06/06 Page 1 of 3
2

on summary judgment. I cannot rule, as a matter of law, that

plaintiff’s testimony is untrue. The defense motion for summary

judgment will therefore be denied.

An Order follows.

Case 2:05-cv-03850-JF Document 30 Filed 11/06/06 Page 2 of 3
3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SONNY THOMAS : CIVIL ACTION

 :

v. :

 :

JOHN IATAROLA, et al. : No. 05-03850-JF

ORDER

AND NOW, this 6 day of November 2006, upon th

consideration of defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS

ORDERED:

That the motion is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John P. Fullam 

John P. Fullam, Sr. J.

Case 2:05-cv-03850-JF Document 30 Filed 11/06/06 Page 3 of 3
# C_2017269EN.01001601.xml

| 14.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 269/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 269/16

---

Order of the General Court of 13 June 2017 — Uniwersytet Wrocławski v REA

(Case T-137/16) (1)

1

((Action for annulment - Application initiating proceedings - Formal requirements - Party not represented by a lawyer - Manifest inadmissibility))

(2017/C 269/22)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Uniwersytet Wrocławski (Wrocław, Poland) (represented by: D. Dubis, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Research Executive Agency (REA) (represented by: S. Payan-Lagrou and V. Canetti, acting as Agents, assisted by M. Le Berre and G. Materna, lawyers)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application, first, seeking the annulment of the decisions of the REA, acting under powers delegated by the European Commission, terminating the Cossar grant agreement (No 252908) and requiring the applicant to repay the sums of EUR 36 508,37, EUR 58 031,38 and EUR 6 286,68 as well as to pay damages in the amount of EUR 5 803,14, and, secondly, seeking reimbursement by the REA of the corresponding sums plus interest calculated from the day of payment until the day of reimbursement.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action in Case T-137/16 is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action in Case T-137/16 is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.

| 2. | The Uniwersytet Wrocławski shall bear its own costs and shall pay the costs incurred by the Research Executive Agency (REA). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Uniwersytet Wrocławski shall bear its own costs and shall pay the costs incurred by the Research Executive Agency (REA).

---

(1)  OJ C 200, 6.6.2016.

1

---
# C_2016111EN.01001501.xml

| 29.3.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 111/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.3.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 111/15

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 27 January 2016 — Valsts ieņēmumu dienests v SIA ‘Veloserviss’

(Case C-47/16)

(2016/C 111/18)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Referring court

Augstākā tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

Applicant:

Defendant: SIA ‘Veloserviss’

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

Should the importer’s obligation to act in good faith, laid down in Article 220(2)(b) of Council Regulation No 2913/92 (1) of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, be defined as meaning that:

1

| (a) | it includes an obligation on the importer to verify the circumstances in which the Form A certificate granted to the exporter was issued (certificates regarding the parts which constitute the goods, the role of the exporter in the manufacture of the goods, etc.)? |
| --- | --- |

(a)

it includes an obligation on the importer to verify the circumstances in which the Form A certificate granted to the exporter was issued (certificates regarding the parts which constitute the goods, the role of the exporter in the manufacture of the goods, etc.)?

| (b) | the importer acted in bad faith for no other reason than that the exporter acted in bad faith (for example, where the exporter failed to reveal the true origin of the costs, the value of the parts which constitute the goods, etc., to the customs authorities of the exporting country)? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the importer acted in bad faith for no other reason than that the exporter acted in bad faith (for example, where the exporter failed to reveal the true origin of the costs, the value of the parts which constitute the goods, etc., to the customs authorities of the exporting country)?

| (c) | the obligation to act in good faith has not been fulfilled for no other reason than that the exporter submitted incorrect information to the customs authorities of the exporting country, and that is so even where the customs authorities themselves committed errors in issuing the certificate? |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the obligation to act in good faith has not been fulfilled for no other reason than that the exporter submitted incorrect information to the customs authorities of the exporting country, and that is so even where the customs authorities themselves committed errors in issuing the certificate?

May the importer’s obligation to act in good faith, laid down in Article 220(2)(b) of Council Regulation No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code be deemed to be sufficiently proved by virtue of the general description of the situation set out in the communication from OLAF and by virtue of OLAF’s findings, or should the national customs authorities nevertheless obtain additional evidence regarding the conduct of the exporter?

---

(1)  OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1.

1

---
# T ECHNICAL 

# S UPPORT 

# D OCUMENT

Department of the Environment 

### Amendments to COMAR 26.11.01.01 and 26.11.09.01 Relating to the Definition of Fuel Burning Equipment

Purpose of Amendment The primary purpose of this amendment is to rem ove the word "furnace" from the definition of fuel burning equipment in COMAR 26.11.01.01B(17) . The amended definition will be more

consistent with the federal definition as it is us ed in more recent federal requirements. This

amendment also removes the redundant definitio n of “fuel burning equipment” from COMAR

26.11.09.01.

Background The term "fuel burning equipment" was defined several years ago in order to differentiate

between a boiler that involves the indirect heatin g of air or water and fu el burning installations

that involve direct heat exchange. Fuel burning installations, such as a kiln, are subject to the general requirements for SO 2 and particulate matter whereas fu el burning equipment is subject to

different standards in th e form of pounds of SO 2 per million Btu per hour heat input or the sulfur

content of the fuel.

Requirements for fuel burning equipment include a curve that provides allowable particulate matter emissions per million Btu heat input. Fuel burning installations and other installations are subject to a general conc entration type standard such as a 0.03 grain loading standard. As another example, a cement kiln is a fuel burning installati on subject to an SO 2 concentration requirement. The sulfur in fuel requirements that apply to fuel burning equipment do not apply

to a cement kiln.

Sources Affected Since a "furnace" is usually direct heat exchange , it should not be included in the definition of fuel burning equipment. There are few examples of indirect heat exchange furnaces. In search of any affected facility, the Department has found only one indirect heat exchange furnace in the State. That furnace, however, has been subject to the general requirements as a fuel burning installation and not subject to " boiler" requirements. Therefore, to the Department's knowledge there are no sources affected by this amendment.

Expected Emissions Reductions Since there are no sources affected by this am endment there is no expected emission reductions.

Economic Impact Since there are no sources affected by this am endment, there is no economic impact on sources or the Department. The amendment will only clarify the requirements that apply to fuel burning equipment.

Revision to Maryland's SIP This amendment will be submitted to the EPA to be included in the approved SIP.

1800 Washington Boulevard | Baltimore, MD 21230-1718 | www.mde.state.md.us 410-537-3000 | 800-633-6101 | TTY Users: 800-735-2258
Case No. 5,273.

#### GAUGHRAN v. ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-ONE TONS OF COAL.

[39 Hunt, Mer. Mag. 75.]

District Court, S. D. New York.

1858.1

AnMiKALTV — Lien fou Fueight — Advances.

[1. Admiralty has jurisdiction of a libel for freight on goods transported over navigable 'tide waters lying between two states.]

[2. For transporting goods landwise after voyage completed, not expressly contracted for in the shipping contract, there is no lien in admiralty.]

[3. The lien in admiralty for freight on cargo shipped in bulk is not lost by delivering the same at the consignee’s place of business on land.]

[4. On a libel for freight on coal, compensation for carting it to consignee’s coal yard, for which there is no lien in admiralty, may be charged against advances made.]

In admiralty.

Before BETTS, District Judge.

This was a libel to recover freight upon the coal brought by the libelant [John Gaughranj *94from Schuylkill Haven to this port for $1.85 per ton. The libelant alleges that he brought "the coal to this port and carted it to the claimant’s place t>f business, for which he also claims compensation. The claimant sets up drafts paid by him, on account of the freight, to the amount of $109, denies any indebtedness, and alleges that, by delivery, the libel-ant has lost his lien.

1

 [Affirmed in Case No. 10,520.]

HELD

BY THE COURT.

That, the route necessarily including navigable waters lying between two states, and waters subject to the ebb and flow of tide, the locus is now within the jurisdiction of the court. Such actions have been sustained in this court by its familiar practice for years. That the libelant did not lose his lien by delivering the coal to the claimant in his coal yard on land. But as the bill of lading does not undertake to deliver the cargo in bulk at any specific place, it will not be implied that the owner was bound to transport it landwise across the city, or to any place of deposit from the ship, ■and there may be, at least, doubt whether that service, if expressly contracted for, would come within theprotectionof thelien,or can in any form become a ground for a maritime action; and the court will not allow the libelant to recover his charges for carting the coal from the vessel to the yard. Decree for libelant, with a reference to ascertain and report the amount due after deducting previous payments. But the price of cartage may be charged against advances made to the libelant, if clear proof is given by him that the cartage was done or paid for at the instance of the defendants.

[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of the district court was affirmed. Case No. 10,-520.]