THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Diane Bass and Otis Bass, I ndividually and as Parents and Guardians of Alex B., a minor under the age of ten (10) years, and Hanna B., a minor under the age of ten (10) years, Petitioners,

v.

South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001332

ON WRI T OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From Fairfield County R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27593 Heard March 17, 2015 – Filed December 2, 2015

REVERSED

Lee Deer Cope, of Peters Murdaugh Parker Eltzroth & Detrick, PA, of Hampton; John K. Koon and Jamie L. Walters, of Koon & Cook, PA , of Columbia, all for
Petitioners.Patrick John Frawley, of Davis Frawley, LLC, of Lexington, for Respondent.

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Diane and Otis Bass, indi vidually and on behalf of their minor children (collectively, Petitioners), appeal the court of appeals' decision reversing a jury verdict in their favor against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) for gross negligen ce and outrage in connection with a DSS investigation. See Bass v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 403 S.C. 184, 742 S.E.2d 667 (Ct. App. 2013). We reverse.

F ACTUAL /P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

Diane and Otis Bass are married and have three children: Brittany, Hanna, and Alex. All three children have specia l needs, but Hanna and Alex are also autistic. Otis works outside the home, and Diane cares for the children.

Due to their forms of autism and their other cognitive issues, both Hanna and Alex were prescribed Clonidine to help them sleep at night, in addition to other medications. A compounding pharmacy filled the Clonidine prescription. In April 2008, the prescription was inadvertently mixed at one thousand times the
recommended concentration.

On the evening of May 11, 2008, Diane administered the wrongly compounded Clonidine to Hanna. During her bath that evening, Hanna "went blank," "[h]er eyes turned around in the back of her head, and her skin turned
cold." Diane took Hanna to Fairfield Memo rial Hospital, but she was not admitted. Two days later, Hann a became lethargic, so Diane took her to their family doctor. At that time, the family doctor sent Hanna to Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital (Richland Memorial) in Columbia due to his concern over Hanna's lethargy and respiratory issues, and Hanna was admitted.

On May 15, Alex became ill after taki ng the Clonidine. Diane took him to the family doctor. The nurse practitioner on call testified that Alex was very ill upon arrival. Alex was transported via am bulance to Fairfield Memorial Hospital, and then via helicopter to Richland Memorial and placed on life support.

That same day, DSS received a report that two special needs children were in the hospital due to "possible poisoning by parents." The agency assigned anoverall danger rating of "medium" to the ca se because while Hanna and Alex were very young—seven and three at the time, re spectively—they were not in imminent danger while they were in th e hospital. Nonetheless, the "medium" danger rating mandated that a DSS employe e respond to the report and initiate an investigation within twenty-four hours. Caseworker Monique Parrish arrived at the hospital within forty-five minutes af ter DSS received the report.

At the hospital, Parrish spoke to Otis , who "had no idea what was going on." She also questioned the oldest child, Britta ny, who told Parrish that Diane "poured medicine in soda and gave it to Alex and Hanna," and th at they became ill shortly thereafter. Moreover, the hospital staff speculated to Parrish that the children had been overly medicated. Parrish took the bottle of medicine, but did not arrange to
have it tested and did not otherwise i nvestigate its contents. After observing Hanna and Alex, Parrish aske d Diane and Otis to meet her at the DSS office the next morning.

On May 16, after a family meeting with Diane, her sisters, and her niece,
Parrish determined the children should be removed from the Bass home and placed with Diane's sister, Linda. 1 Diane and Otis signed a safety plan to this effect, 2 and Linda took custody of the three children. 3 Diane and Otis we re permitted to visit the children "whenever they wanted" so long as Linda was present during the visit.

1 Prior to this placement, Parrish pe rformed the requisite home visit and background check. However, Parrish di d not investigate whether Linda could address the children's special care re quirements, instead relying on Diane's assurances that Linda was capable of addressing the children's basic needs.

2 At trial, it was heavily disputed whet her Diane and Otis voluntarily signed the safety plan. Some of the testimony indicat ed that Parrish informed Diane and Otis
that their children would be separated and placed in fo ster care if DSS could not achieve placement with a rela tive. However, DSS's expert testified that Diane and Otis could have refused to sign the sa fety plan, at which time DSS would have been required to seek a court or der to place the children.

3 Linda testified that she understood the placement to be temporary, but she testified that DSS never attempted to return the children to their parents, even after she inquired about alternative placement due to Alex's and Hanna's special needs and the stress incumbent upon their care. Instead, Hanna was placed with another
relative.On May 20, in compliance with DSS po licy, Parrish held a five-day staff meeting with other DSS employees, during which they determined that Diane and Otis were unfit parents.

On June 17, Linda received a telephone call from the compounding pharmacy's insurer concerning the improperly filled Clonidine prescription. Linda notified DSS, and the agency subsequently concluded that the medication was the cause of the children's hospitalization. This revelation led to the eventual return of the children to Diane and Otis. However, DSS continued to make announced and
unannounced visits at the Bass home thr ough the end of 2008 and still refuses to remove its finding that Diane and Otis "harmed their children" from the agency's
file on Petitioners.

Petitioners filed a lawsuit against D SS, the compounding pharmacy, and the pharmacist, alleging negligence and gro ss negligence, and seeking actual and punitive damages. In May 2011, afte r settling with the pharmacy and the pharmacist, Petitioners served DSS with an amended complaint. In their amended complaint, Petitioners allege d causes of action for gro ss negligence, defamation, and outrage, and sought actual damages. In its answer, in addition to a general denial, DSS asserted affirm ative defenses under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the TCA), 4 as well as the affirmative defe nses of comparative negligence, negligence of a third party, legal privilege and justification, qualified privilege, and with respect to the defamation and outrage ca uses of action, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Trial testimony established that DSS ca nnot remove a child unless there is an unreasonable safety threat to the child, and that the st andard practice is to keep children in the home when possible. Moreover, in cases involving potential medical neglect, DSS caseworkers must cons ider medical evidence . To that end, Parrish testified that in order to comp lete a medical neglect investigation, a
caseworker must communicate with medical treatment providers, and that children
cannot be removed from the home without f act-finding to substantiate the medical
claim.

4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78 -30(f) (Supp. 2014) (definin g "loss" and failing to include "outrage" as method of recovery under the TCA); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78

- 60(3), (4), (5), (20), (25) (Supp. 2014) (detailing specific actions that a governmental entity is not liable for should a loss occur). See also generally S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (Supp . 2014) (containing the entire TCA).Despite these prerequisites to removi ng a medically neglected child from the home, Parrish testified that she "did not look into the poisoning," but instead "wait[ed] for the lab results." 5 Parrish acknowledged that she did not speak to a
doctor about the children's illnesses or the lab results, yet she based the removal of the children solely on the possibility that the children had been poisoned by
medication.

Parrish stated that she did not consider her investigation "complete" because she never attempted to investigate th e reasons for the potential poisoning by
medication other than to wait for the lab results. Similarly, because the case involved a potential poisoning, Parrish's supe rvisor testified that DSS should have done more to investigate the medication, such as contacting the pharmacy or
Poison Control.

Parrish testified further that she was unable to conduct a thorough investigation because she wa s unwell after a recent neck surgery, and was taking pain medication that affected her ability to perform her job functions. Specifically,
Parrish stated that at the time of the i nvestigation, she was e xperiencing substantial physical pain and was barely able to complete simple tasks such as typing or even walking. Parrish testified that although she was supposed to be on light work duty at the DSS office, her supervisor threatened her job and forced her to do field work
on Petitioners' case instead. 6

In an attempt to justify the removal, Parrish testified that when she and another DSS employee inspected the Bass hom e on May 20, they found it to be in "disrepair." 7 In addition, Parrish testified that Diane had recently been diagnosed with diabetes, and that she had conf essed to Parrish that she sometimes

5 There is some indication in the Re cord that the toxicology testing was inconclusive; however, the Record does no t indicate what testing was performed.

6 Parrish's supervisor disputed Pa rrish's claim of debilitating illness.

7 Conversely, DSS's expert te stified that the condition of the home did not present
an immediate threat of ha rm to the children.experienced feelings of "sadness," "hope lessness," and was "often overwhelmed." 8 Despite these purported grounds for remova l, this information was not known to DSS when the agency removed the children for medical neglect.

Petitioners' expert, Michael Corey, is a social worker and consultant who has assisted states in implementing safety assessment models for investigation and treatment by child protective services. He opined to a reasonable degree of certainty that DSS did not exercise sli ght care under these ci rcumstances. Corey testified that DSS has a duty to investigate allegations of abus e and neglect and the agency can do so negligently, gross neg ligently, or "competent[ly]." Corey testified that Parrish's initial response at the hospital was "very good" and that she properly provided Diane and Otis with a br ochure explaining their rights and held a family meeting; therefore, Corey found that Parrish exercised car e in responding to the report and at the beginning of her inve stigation. However, he opined that DSS should have only sought placement in a re lative's home after determining that the children were not safe in their own home, and that DSS was grossly negligent in failing to conduct a proper investigation into the poisoning claims, and therefore was grossly negligent in removing the children from the home.

Corey specifically pointed to the following evidence to support his opinion that DSS was grossly negligent: (1) Parri sh, by her own testim ony, was not capable of conducting the investigation due to her extreme pain and medication; (2) After Diane and Otis stated that they did not know what happened to their children except that they administer ed the medication, Parrish removed the children from the home without an investigation into the medication; (3) Parrish did not interview or speak to any of the child ren's doctors, including Petitioners' family doctor; (4) Because DSS gave Diane and Otis a choice be tween removal to foster care or placement with family members and DSS did not consider whether the
children would be safe in their own hom e, DSS coerced Diane and Otis into signing the safety plan; (5) Parrish did no t inquire into the c ondition of Petitioners' home before making a decision that the children should be removed; (6) DSS
asked for a list of the children's medical providers for the first time on May 30; and (7) Parrish did not investigate Diane's me dical condition before assuming that her
condition harmed the children.

In rebuttal, DSS called its former dir ector, Jocelyn Goodwyn, as an expert in "certain aspects of [c]hild [p]rotective [s]ervi ces." Like Corey, Goodwyn testified

8 However, Parrish admitted that Diane' s personal feelings were not grounds for
removal.that DSS had acted appropriately in its in itial response, and upon review of the file, testified that DSS properly gave Dian e and Otis the DSS brochure and handbook explaining their rights under the law; held a family meeting; conducted an alternative site visit at Linda's home; ente red a safety plan with Diane, Otis, and relative caregivers; held a staffing meeting within five days to consider the case; investigated Petitioners' home on May 20; a nd interviewed Diane, Otis, and family members. Therefore, Goodwyn opined that there was no eviden ce that DSS acted
in "bad faith."

However, under cross-examination, Good wyn admitted that DSS is required to conduct a thorough investigation before removing children from their parents,
and DSS did not do so in this case. In addition, Goodwyn testified that there was
no evidence that Diane and Otis harmed the children or that the children were in imminent risk of harm. In short, G oodwyn conceded that the removal should not
have occurred "when it did."

The remaining evidence at trial establis hed that Diane and Otis loved their
children and attended to all of their medi cal needs. Moreover, Diane and Otis spent all of their free time with their child ren, and the children had never spent the night away from their parents prior to their removal by DSS. Aside from being separated from the children, Petitioners presented evid ence that Diane and Otis were injured by the implication that they would harm their children, even though they were regarded by family and othe rs, including their family doctors, as excellent parents. Further, Alex and Ha nna cried because they missed their parents during their removal, and Ha nna no longer enjoyed a close relationship with Linda upon her return to her parents. A child psychologist opined that Hanna would require therapy to overcome emotional trauma and other resulting problems caused by the removal, although Hanna's autism contributed to this diagnosis.

DSS moved for a directed verdict at th e conclusion of Petitioners' case, and again at the conclusion of all of the eviden ce. The trial judge denied both motions. At the conclusion of the evidence, Petitioners withdrew their defamation cause of action, and moved for a directed verdict re garding DSS's defenses of discretionary immunity and negligence of a third part y. The trial judge granted Petitioners'
motions for directed verdict as to those defenses.

Ultimately, the jury returned a verd ict for Petitioners, a nd awarded them $4 million in damages. DSS subsequently fi led motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for new trial absolute, and to reduce the verdict. The trial court issued an order denying DSS's post-tr ial motions. However, the trial courtgranted DSS's motion to reduce the ve rdict in accordance with the TCA's limitations on damages. 9 DSS filed a timely notice of appeal.

The court of appeals revers ed the jury's verdict. See Bass , 403 S.C. at 184, 742 S.E.2d at 667. First, the court of appeal s found the trial court erred in refusing to grant DSS's motion for JNOV because th ere was no evidence in the record that DSS acted with gross negligence in conducting the investigation. Id. at 190, 742 S.E.2d at 670. The court of appeals foun d the twenty-four hour time constraint associated with the medium danger rati ng to be particularly instructive. Id. at 192, 742 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Little , 309 S.C. 122, 125, 420 S.E.2d 499, 501 ( 1991)). During this initial period, the court of appeals noted that (1) Parrish interviewe d family members and learned the children
became ill after Diane admini stered prescription medicine to the children; (2)
Parrish obtained Diane's and Otis's c onsent to have the children's medical information released to DSS; and (3) Pa rrish procured the children's toxicology report, which was inconclusive. Id. Thus, the court of a ppeals found that DSS's investigation into the possible poisoning, "[w]hile far from perfect," demonstrated the exercise of slight care. Id. at 191, 742 S.C. at 671.

In so holding, the court of appeals f ound Corey's opinion that DSS failed to exercise slight care insufficient to defeat DSS's motion for JNOV because the record was "devoid of any indication that Corey in any way took into account the expediency with which DSS must invest igate claims of abuse and neglect." Id. at 191–92, 742 S.E.2d at 671. Therefore, the court of appeals found "Corey failed to establish his opinion was based upon a prop er statement of DSS's duty," and his opinion "could not, without more, defeat DSS's motion for JNOV." Id. at 192, 742 S.E.2d at 671 (cita tion omitted).

Finally, in reversing the trial judge's re fusal to grant JNOV as to the outrage claim, the court of appeals held that, because it determined DSS was not grossly negligent, Petitioners' outrage claim must fail. More specifically, the court of appeals held that as a matt er of law, DSS's conduct could not be reckless if the conduct was not found to be at least grossly negligent. Id. at 193, 742 S.E.2d at 672 (citations omitted). 10

9 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 2014).

10 The court of appeals found DSS's argument that the trial court erred in denying
the JNOV motion because Diane and Otis vol untarily participated in the placement of the children unpreserved, and DSS did not appeal this finding. Bass , 403 S.C. atWe granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals.

I SSUES

I. Whether the court of appeals erre d in finding that the trial court should have granted DSS's motion for JNOV?

II. Whether the court of appeals erre d in reversing the verdict as to the outrage claim?

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

In ruling on directed verdict or JNOV motions, the trial court is required to
view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. Sabb v. S.C. State Univ.

, 350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S. E.2d 231, 236 (2002) (citing Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation , 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 ( 1999)). "[T]he trial judge is concerned with the existen ce of evidence, not its weight." Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003). Similarly, on appeal, "[t]he jury's verdic t must be upheld unless no evidence reasonably supports the jury's findings." Id. at 320, 585 S.E.2d at 274 (citing Horry Cnty. v. Laychur

, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993)). Moreove r, neither an appellate court nor the trial court has authority to decide credib ility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence. Garrett v. Locke , 309 S.C. 94, 99, 419 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Ct. App. 1992).

L AW /A NALYSIS

I. Gross Negligence

Petitioners ask this Court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals because under the applicable standard of review, the court of appeals was required to accept the jury verdict unless there was no evidence in the record that DSS acted with gross negligence. DSS argues that because the evidence only yielded one
reasonable inference—that DSS exercise d slight care—the court of appeals' decision should be upheld.

192, 742 S.E.2d at 671 (c itation omitted).As an initial matter, we find as a matter of law that DSS did not act in a grossly negligent manner in the Emergency Protective Custody (EPC) removal of the poisoned children. EPC removal is typically associated with exigent
circumstances and time constraints. Thus , this opinion should not be read to impose on DSS a duty to conduct the post- EPC investigation in a pre-EPC setting. However, because DSS's post-EPC investig ation presented a jury question on the issue of gross negligence, we re verse the court of appeals.

Under the TCA, a "government al entity is not liable for a loss resulting from

. . . responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner ." S.C. Code Ann. § 15- 78-60(25) (emphasis added).

"Gross negligence is the intentional c onscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought
not to do." Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One , 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000) (citing Clyburn v. Sumter Cnty. Dist. Seventeen , 317 S.C. 50, 451 S.E.2d 885 (1994); Richardson v. Hambright , 296 S.C. 504, 374 S.E.2d 296 (1988)). In other words, "[i]t is th e failure to exercise slight care." Id. at 310, 534 S.E.2d at 277 (citation omitted). "Gross negligence ha s also been defined as a relative term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under the
circumstances." Id. (citing Hollins v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. One , 310 S.C. 486, 427 S.E.2d 654 (1993)). Normally, the ques tion of what activity constitutes gross negligence is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. However, "when the evidence supports but one reasonable inference, the question becomes a matter of law for the
court." Id. (citation omitted).

Expert Testimony

Petitioners first argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that Corey's expert opinion lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis. We agree.

In finding Corey's opinion was not based on a proper statement of DSS's duty, the court of appeals relied on Harris Teeter, Inc. v. Moore & Van Allen

, P.L.L.C. , a professional ma lpractice case. See 390 S.C. at 275, 701 S.E.2d at 742. There, the Court found th at summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff's experts failed to define the correct legal standard of care or opine specifically how the defendants breach ed the standard of care. Id. at 289, 701S.E.2d at 749. For example, when asked about the definition of standard of care upon which he relied to form his opinion, one of the experts responded, "It's my
standard." Id. He further explained that his st andard was that "of someone reading this at the end of the case," or "t hat of a businessman's lawyer." Id. Thus, the Court found that because the expert did not accurately portray the proper standard of care, his conclusory statement that th e defendants breached the standard of care did not create a genuine i ssue of material fact. Id.

Similarly, the plaintiff's second expert in Harris Teeter testified that the legal malpractice standard of care is a determination of what a "reasonably competent lawyer [would] do given the fact s and situations they were handed."
Id. While the Court agreed th at this "generic" statement was "true in the abstract," it found that the expert's testimony about how the defendants breached the standard of care was too general. Id. at 290–91, 701 S.E.2d at 749–50. Thus, the Court found that this expert's testimony lik ewise did not create a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 291, 701 S.E.2d at 750.

Unlike the experts in Harris Teeter , in this case, Corey stated the proper standard of care and provided specific ex amples to support his opinion that DSS
breached the standard of care. Therefore, we find the court of appeals erred in relying on Harris Teeter to discredit Corey's expert testimony and in finding that his testimony lacked a suffici ent evidentiary foundation. Cf. Carter v. R.L. Jordan
Oil Co. , 294 S.C. 435, 441, 365 S.E.2d 324, 328 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating "[a]n expert is given wide la titude in determining the basis of his testimony"), rev'd on other grounds , 299 S.C. 439, 385 S.E.2d 820 (1989).

Evidence of Gross Negligence

Having determined that the court of appeals erred in discrediting Corey's testimony, we must next decide if there wa s any evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict. See Curcio , 355 S.C. at 320, 585 S.E.2d at 274 (stating that in deciding a motion for JNOV, "the trial judge is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight"). Petitioners argue that Corey's testimony constituted
sufficient evidence in the r ecord to support the jury finding that DSS was grossly negligence. In addition, Petitioners argue that, notwithstanding Corey's testimony, there was ample evidence in th e record to support the ju ry verdict. We agree.

As an initial matter, we find the cour t of appeals misapprehended Parrish's trial testimony in finding that Corey's testimony did not constitute evidence of gross negligence. Rather than testifying that she had twenty-four hours to conductthe initial investigation, Parrish testif ied that she had twenty-four hours to respond to the initial report.

Therefore, Corey agreed with DSS th at the agency exer cised care in its initial response to the report, testifying th at Parrish's response to the intake was "very good," in that Parrish arrived at the hospital within forty-five minutes, properly provided Petitioners with copies of required DSS brochures, conducted the required family meeting, and perfo rmed the required home study on Linda before placing the children with her. Where Corey found fault with DSS's investigation was in DSS's failure to conduct a post-EPC investigation into the
stated reason for the children's rem oval from the home—potential poisoning by prescription medication. For example, Core y noted that Parrish failed to interview the children's doctors, other medical staff at the hospital, or their family doctor who initially treated the children, and failed to investigate the medication after being told that the children fell ill shortly after Di ane administered the Clonidine to them. Thus, we find that the court of appeals improperly found that Corey's testimony did not constitute evidence of DSS's gross negligence.

Moreover, because there was other ev idence in the record that DSS was grossly negligent with respect to the post- EPC investigation, we find that the court of appeals placed undue weight on Corey's expert testimony. See Berkeley Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n , 304 S.C. 15, 20, 402 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1991) (stating "[w]here the expert's testimony is based upon facts sufficient to form the basis for an opinion, the trier of fact determines its probative value") (citation omitted)); see also Madden v. Cox , 284 S.C. 574, 583, 328 S.E.2d 108, 114 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating an appellate court cannot judge the credibility or weight that should be given expert testim ony, as these considerations are for the jury) (citation omitted)). In addition to Corey's testimony, DSS's employees
testified that DSS failed to conduct any investigation into the medication during its post-EPC investigation, even though they claimed they based their decision to
remove the children on the medicine. Even DSS's own expert testified that the children's post-EPC removal from the hom e was unlawful. Thus, there was additional, independent evidence that D SS acted in a grossly negligent fashion with respect to this investigation.

In sum, we agree with Petitioners that the court of appeals applied the wrong analysis, and in doing so, acted outside its limited scope of review. Rather than examining the record to discern whethe r there was any evidence put forward at trial to support the jury verdict, the cour t of appeals seems to have searched the
record for evidence to corroborate DSS's theory of the case—that it acted withslight care. However, even though DSS pr esented some evidence that it acted with slight care regarding certain aspects of its investigation, especially in the pre-EPC removal setting, there was likewise ample evidence in the record that DSS acted with gross negligence with respect to the post-EPC investigation—or lack thereof. Accordingly, we cannot say that the record was devoid of evidence to support the jury's verdict, and we revers e the court of appeals.

II. Outrage

Next, Petitioners contend the court of appeals' misapprehended the scope of their outrage claim because that clai m was not limited to the initial improper removal of the children, but involved Petitioners' averments that they were subjected to reckless, cruel, inhumane, and unwarranted family disruption over a period of eight months following the retu rn of the children to the home. We disagree with Petitioners that the evidence supported a verdict in their favor for the outrage claim.

To recover for outrage—otherwise known as intentional infliction of emotional distress—a plaintiff must establish the following:

(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or was certain, or substantially certain, that such distress would result from his conduct;

(2) the conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" so as to exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and must be regarded as "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community;"

(3) the actions of the defendant caused plaintiff's emotional distress;
and

(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was "severe" such
that "no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."

Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Health, L.L.C. , 392 S.C. 462, 475, 710 S.E.2d 67, 74 (2011) (quoting Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C. , 374 S.C. 352, 356, 650 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2007)). In Hansson , this Court stated:

Under the heightened standard of proof for emotional distress claims emphasized in Ford, a party cannot establish a prima facie claim fordamages resulting from a defendant's tortious c onduct with mere bald assertions. To permit a plaintiff to legitimately state a cause of action by simply alleging, "I suffered emotional distress" would be
irreconcilable with this Court's devel opment of the law in this area. In the words of Justice Littlejohn, the court must look for something "more"—in the form of third pa rty witness testimony and other corroborating evidence—in order to make a prima facie showing of
"severe" emotional distress.

374 S.C. at 358–59, 650 S.E.2d at 72 (citing Ford v. Hutson , 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981)).

There is no evidence in the Record that DSS's conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" that it exceeded "all possi ble bounds of decency" and must be regarded as "atrocious, and utterly in tolerable in a civilized community." Id. ; see,
e.g. , Gattison v. S.C. State Coll. , 318 S.C. 148, 157, 456 S.E. 2d 414, 419 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating "these facts do not rise to the level required for outrage in South Carolina" because the plaintiff "has show n no hostile or abusive encounters, or coercive or oppressive conduct," even though the facts demonstrated "unprofessional, inappropriate behavior"). Thus, even considering the eight-month time period during which DSS c ontinued to have contact with the Bass family, the evidence does not support the verdict as to the outrage cause of action.

However, because the jury was provide d with (and neither party objected to) a general verdict form and because we have upheld the gross negligence finding, we reverse the court of appeal s and reinstate the verdict. See, e.g.

, Anderson v. West, 270 S.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 551 (1 978) (where a case is submitted to the jury on two or more issues and a general verdic t is returned, the verdict will be upheld if the verdict is supported by at least one issue); see also Harold Tyner Dev. Builders, Inc. v. Firstmark Dev. Corp. , 311 S.C. 447, 429 S.E.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1993) (same); Dwyer v. Tom Jenkins Realty

, 289 S.C. 118, 120, 344 S.E.2d 886, 888 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Where a decision is based on two grounds, either of which, independent of the other, is sufficient to support it, it w ill not be reversed on appeal because one of those grounds is erroneous" (quoting 5 Am. Jur

. 2d Appeal & Error § 727 (1962)); id. ("[E]rroneous findings by the trial court . . . are [not] reversible error where the inclusion of such findings . . . would not change the judgment . . ." (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 819 (1962)). 11

11 We reinstate the verdict subject to th e trial court's reduction of the award in
accordance with the TCA's limitations on damages.C ONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is

REVERSED.

PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDG E and HEARN, JJ., concur.