### *The Hon. John Bailey Jones, United States District Judge for

the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. _____________ No. 95-2749EM

_____________
Donald C. Anton, * * Appellant, * * v. * * * Carol Pavilack Getty, U.S. * Parole Commissioner; Carol * Muller, a Hearing Examiner for * the U.S. Parole Commission, * On Appeal from the United North Central Region; Jeffrey * States District Court S. Kostbar, Chief Analyst for * for the Eastern District U.S. Parole Commission National * of Missouri. Office; Jerome F. Lawrenz, * Chief Probation Officer, U.S. * Probation Office, Eastern * District of Missouri; Kenneth * S. Woddail, Senior Probation * Officer, U.S. Probation Office, * Eastern District of Missouri, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 10, 1996 Filed: March 12, 1996

___________ Before RIC HARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, and JONES, * District Judge.

___________

### The Honorable Edward L. Filippine, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting th e recommendation of the Honorable Catherine D. Perry, then a United States Magistrate Judge, now a United States District Judge.
-2- RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Donald Anton filed this action against a United States Parol e Commissioner and a number of parole and probation officers, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights by causing his parole to b e delayed

. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summar y 1 judgment and denied Anton's motion to add claims against three Bureau of Prison employees. We affirm.

I.

On December 15, 1989, the United States Parole Commission informe d Donald Anton, who was then serving a six-year prison term for conspiracy to comm it mail fraud, extortion, and obstruction of justice, that hi s presumptive parole date was September 24, 1991. The Parole Commissio n condit ioned Anton's tentative release date "upon [his] development of a suitable release plan."

In July o f 1991, Anton suggested to Judy Holt, a probation officer, that he would like to work for Vandalia Bus Lines upon his release. Holt told Mick al Laird, an employee of the Bureau of Prisons who was Anton' s
case ma nager, that Anton's plan was unacceptable because the owner o f Vandalia Bus Lines had a criminal record. Lairddiscussed Anton's release plan with Carol Wilson Muller, a Hearing Examiner with the United States Parole Commission, who agreed with Holt's conclusion and told Anton that he could not work for Vandalia Bus Lines.
On August 25, Anton submitted a release plan indicating that he would work for Robert Baine , Esq., as a part-time paralegal and would live with his mother in St. Louis. Laird requested an

### Kostbar concedes that he was mistaken. At the time Kostbar 2 

### wrote to Anton, Anton was eligible for parole.
-3- invest igation of Anton's release plan. Kenneth Woddail, a probatio n officer, responded to Laird that Anton's plan was unacceptable because it did not call for Anton to be housed in a Community Corrections Cente r before his release. Laird notified Muller of Woddail's conclusion an d suggested that Anton' s release be delayed for 90 days so that Anton could be placed in a Community Corrections Center.

On Septem

ber 9, Parole Commissioner Carol Pavilack Getty, acting on the recommendation of Muller, rescheduled Anton' s release date to December 23, 1991, "with placement in a Community Corrections Center up to 12 0 days." Anton attempted to appeal Getty's decision, but Jeffrey Kostbar, Chief Analyst for the Parole Commission's Nation al Appeals Board, informed Anton that Getty's de cision was not appealable because the Commission did not have the authority to release a prisoner prior to his parole

eligibil itydate. On December 23, Anton was released on parole to th e 2 Dismas Community Corrections Center, from which he was discharged on March 30, 1992.
Anton filed this complaint under Biv ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Parole Commissioner Getty, Hearing Examiner Muller, Chief Analyst Kostbar, and Probation Off icers Lawrenz and Woddail. He sought to amend his complaint by adding claims against Laird, Sta n Ahlin , and Cecil Turner, two of Laird's supervisors who worked for th e Bureau of Prisons, and Probation Officer Holt. The District Court granted the original defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Anton leav e to amend his complaint. It held that Commission er Getty, Kostbar, Muller, and the probation officers were absolutely immune from suit. As for the Bureau o f Prison employees, the Court concluded that even if thes e defendants were entitled only to qualified,

### A nton has submitted a motion urging us to sanction th e 3 

### defendants for submitting a br ief that mischaracterizes the facts. We f ind the defendants' brief satisfactory and, therefore, den y Anton's motion.
-4- rather than absolute, immunity, Anton had failed to state a claim against them. 3

II.

Gene rally, qualified immunity is "sufficient to protect governmen t officials in the exer cise of their duties." Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991). Judges and officials who have duties that are "functionall y comparable" to those of judges are, however, entitled to absolute immunity

. Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). Thi s immunity, which protects the independence of j udges, administrative-law judges, and officials with simila r duties, shields not only these decisionmakers, but also othe r individuals who perform discretionary tasks that play an "integral part[]" in the decisionmaking process. Cleavinger v. Saxner , 474 U.S. 193, 20 0 (1985) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983)).

A.
We begin by applying these principle s to Parole Commissioner Getty's decision to delay Anton's parole. In Evans v. Dillahunty , 711 F.2d 82 8 (8th Cir. 1983), we held that "parole officials in deciding to grant, deny , or revoke parole, perform functions comparable to those of judges," an d are, therefore, entit led to absolute immunity. Id. at 831. Commissioner Getty's decision to d elay Anton's parole was based on her conclusion that Anton had not prepared an adequate release plan and, thus, had not met the requireme nts for parole. It was no less judicial in character than ar e decisions to deny parole. Accordingly, Commissioner Getty is

### Anton argues that Commissioner Getty lost her absolut e 4 

### immuni tybecause she violated Anton's constitutional rights. W e disagr ee. Although "an official acting outside her jurisdictio n loses her immunity, . . . [a] decision about whether or not t o grant parole is at the heart of a parole board member' s jurisdiction, whether that dec ision is based on lawful or unlawful considerations." Patterson v. Von Riesen , 999 F.2d 1235, 12 39 (8th Cir. 1993). The same is true of a parole commissioner's decision to del ay a release date. Thus, even if we believed tha t Commissioner Getty acted uncon stitutionally (which we do not), she would still be absolutely immune from suit. Our decision in Ray v. Pickett , 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1984), 5 

### is not to the contrary. In Ray , we held that two federal pr obation officers who were accused of filing a false parole-violationreport were entitled only to qualified immunity. We noted that the "effect of filing [a parole-vi olation] report is merely to trigger an inq uiry by another officer that may or may not lead to a n administrative proceeding." Id. at 373. These duties wer e -5- entitled to absolute immunity. 4

Heari ng Examiner Muller and Probation Officers Lawrenz, Holt, an d Woddail are protected by absolute immunity, as well. Anton claims tha t these defendants violated his constitutional rig hts by concluding that his release plan was unacceptable and recommending t hat his parole be delayed. These tasks are similar to the ones performed by probation officers when they pr epare a presentence report. In both cases, officials evaluat e facts, draw legal conclusions, and make recommendations which play a significan t part in a decisionmaking process. A number of our siste r circui ts have held that because presentence reports are so closel y associated with the exercise of a judicial function, probation officers wh o prepa re these reports are entitled to absolute immunity. See Young v
. Selsky , 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 183 7 (1995); Tu rner v. Barry , 856 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (pe r curiam); Demoran v. W itt , 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1986); Hughes v. Chesser , 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen , 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979). Because the conclusions and recommendation s of Muller, Holt, Lawrenz, and Woddail had a similar, close connection to Commissioner Getty's decision to delay Anton's parole, these officers are protected by absolute immunity. 5

### analogous to those "of a police officer in deciding whether there

is pro bable cause for an arrest. . .," id. at 374, and were , therefore, too far removed from the decision to revoke Ray's parole to merit absolute immunity. In contrast, the duties of Hol t, Muller, Lawrenz, and Woddail were closely connected to Parole Commissioner Getty's decision to delay Anton's parole. They di d not merely take actions that might have precipitated an inquiry which could have led to a decision by Commissioner Getty. Instead, these defendants made recommen dations that were an important part of an ongoing evaluation of whethe r Anton had met the requirements for parole.
-6- Next, we consider whether Chief Anal yst Kostbar, who determined that Commissioner Getty's decision was not appealable because Anton's paroleeligibilitydate had not yet occurred, is entitled to absolute immunity. In Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Dist. of Nevada , 828 F.2d 1385 (9t h Cir. 1987), cert. denied , 486 U.S. 1040 (1988), the Ninth Circui t
con fronted a similar question. Mullis filed suit against a bankruptcy

court clerk who failed to accept a bankruptcy petition because the petitio n
was n ot written in the correct form. The court held that the clerk wa s entitled to absolute immunity because his refusal to accept the petition
was " an integral part of the judicial process." Id. at 1390. See als o Oli va v. Heller , 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Courts have grante d absolute immunity to court clerks where they wer e performing discretionary acts of a judicial na ture."). The same reasoning applies to Kostbar, who perfo rmed a discretionary task which played an "integral part" in th e National Appeals Board's decisionmaking process. Indeed, Kostbar' s conclusion that Anton's appeal was not ripe is the sort of decision that judges often make. K ostbar is, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity.

### -7- B.
Finally, we turn to Anton's claims against Case Manager Mickal Laird, and Stan Ahlin and Cecil Turner, two of Laird's supervisors. Anton assert s that Laird, acting under the direction of Ahlin and Turner, violated the Constitution by suggesting to Parole Officer Mul ler that Anton's parole be delayed. Although we do not believe that Laird, Ahlin, and Turner ar e entitled to absolute immunity, we agree with the District Court that Anton has failed to state a claim against them.

After Pro bation Officer Woddail decided that Anton would have to be housed in a Community Corrections Center, Laird told Muller that it would take 9 0 days to place Anton in one of these facilities. Laird' s
reco mmendationthat Anton's parole be delayed was based on this tim e esti mate, not on an assessment of Anton's release plan. This purel y logist ical calculation is not comparable to a judicial decision

. Theref ore, Laird and his supervisors are not protected by absolut e immunity. See Forrester v. White , 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) (absolut e immunity does not protect officials when they make "administrative," rathe r than "judicial," decisions).

The proposed complaint, however, failed to state a claim agains t these three defendants. In requesting that Anton's parole be delayed so that Anton could be placed in a Community Corrections Center, Laird, Ahlin , and Turner did not vi olate any constitutional rights. Their actions were
a law ful and quite reasonable response to Anton's failure to submit a n adequate release plan. See Bermudez v. Duenas , 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (dismissing a § 1983 claim brought against a parole-board member who delayed the plaintiff's parole hearing because his pa role application "did not contain sufficient information about hi s proposed home placement").

### -8- III.
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.