Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, April 29, 2004 RESERVE FORCES 

Observations on Recent 

National Guard Use in 

Overseas and Homeland 

Missions and Future 

Challenges 

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-04-670T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-670T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-670T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

April 29, 2004

RESERVE FORCES

Observations on Recent National Guard 

Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions 

and Future Challenges 

With the high pace of operations since September 11, more than 51 percent 

of Army Guard members and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been 

activated to meet new homeland and overseas demands. The Army Guard 

has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and 

ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a 

later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for 

continued overseas deployments. Moreover, units with certain specialties—

military police, transportation, and combat arms—have been in high 

demand, resulting in lengthy and repeated deployments. To ease critical 

shortages, 27 Army Guard units were retrained as military police from other 

specialties such as field artillery. The Air Guard, although less affected by 

the high pace because it is funded to deploy quickly, has also seen significant 

use for Iraq combat operations and homeland security missions. While the 

number of activated Air Guard personnel has decreased over the past year, 

some personnel were activated outside their normal rotational schedules 

and tour lengths have been extended. In addition, some units have been 

assigned new homeland missions such as flying combat air patrols and 

providing radar coverage over the United States. 

While the high use of the National Guard since September 11 has led to 

declining war-fighting readiness of non-deployed Army and Air Guard units, 

the decline is most significant for the Army Guard. To meet wartime needs, 

the Army Guard has had to take personnel and equipment from units that 

had not been activated to ready others for deployment. For example, the 

Army Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers to fill personnel shortages in 

deploying units and transferred about 22,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to ready units deploying to Iraq. The Air Guard’s readiness 

has also declined because the high pace of operations created maintenance 

challenges for its aging aircraft and limited training opportunities. Because 

DOD has not fully defined requirements, readiness standards, and readiness 

measures for the homeland security missions it will lead or support, the 

Guard’s preparedness specifically for homeland security missions is 

unknown. However, states are concerned that continuing deployments 

reduce the Guard’s preparedness and availability for all its homeland 

security and natural disaster missions. 

DOD, the states, and Congress face near- and long-term challenges readying 

and funding National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the 

Global War on Terrorism. Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army 

Guard units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with 

peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard’s ability to restructure 

its forces to meet the requirements of the new security environment will 

depend on whether it is given adequate resources and funding priority. 

Finally, DOD will need to consider how to balance Army and Air Guard 

forces needed for both homeland and overseas security requirements. 

As a result of the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks and launch 

of the Global War on Terrorism, the 

National Guard has experienced 

the largest activation of its forces 

since World War II. The Guard 

consists of 350,000 Army Guard 

soldiers and 107,000 Air Guard 

members. With its unique dual 

status, it performs state missions 

under the governor and federal 

missions at home and overseas 

under the President. Since 

September 11, the Guard’s missions 

have expanded, raising concerns 

about its ability to simultaneously 

perform all of these functions. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

funds the Army Guard for partial 

readiness to accomplish mission 

requirements assuming that there 

will be time to supply additional 

personnel and equipment in an 

extended conflict. In contrast, the 

Air Guard is funded to be an 

operational reserve ready on short 

notice. 

Today's testimony addresses GAO’s 

observations on (1) the extent and 

purpose of the National Guard’s 

use since September 11, (2) the 

effects of that use on Guard forces’ 

readiness for future missions, and 

(3) the challenges that DOD, the 

states, and Congress face in 

organizing and equipping the Guard 

to support both overseas and 

homeland missions. 
Page 1 GAO-04-670T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our observations on the 

challenges the National Guard faces in activating over 213,000 members, 

the largest activation of its forces since World War II. National Guard 

members are supporting military operations around the world—they are 

fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintaining the peace in the 

Balkans—side by side with their active duty counterparts, facing the same 

dangers and making the same sacrifices. As you know, the National Guard 

consists of the Army National Guard, with 350,000 soldiers, and the Air 

National Guard, with about 107,000 Air Guard personnel. With its unique 

dual status, the Guard performs state missions under the command of the 

state’s governor and federal missions—at home and overseas—under 

command of the President. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 

the Guard’s traditional role has been expanded to include new tasks, both 

domestically and overseas. This mission expansion has raised concerns 

about the Guard’s ability to perform all of these missions successfully 

within its existing resources. 

As you requested, my statement today focuses on the use of the National 

Guard since September 11 and on the Guard’s preparedness to perform 

both overseas and domestic missions. We will publish a final report on 

these issues later this year. My remarks today are based on the work we 

have completed to date with respect to (1) the extent and purpose of the 

National Guard’s use since the September 11 attacks, (2) the effects of that 

use on the Guard’s readiness for future missions, and (3) the challenges 

that the Department of Defense (DOD), the states, and Congress face in 

organizing and equipping the Guard to be able to support both overseas 

and homeland security missions. 

To assess these issues, we analyzed data on National Guard utilization and 

readiness since September 11. We interviewed officials in the Departments 

of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau and 

supplemented this information with visits to Army and Air Force 

commands and Army mobilization stations. We also developed case 

studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in four states 

– Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. In each of these states, we 

visited the Adjutant General and the National Guard headquarters, as well 

as Army and Air National Guard units that had been or will be involved in 

domestic or overseas missions. We identified future challenges based on 

our analysis of the Guard’s current status and discussions with National 

Guard officials. We conducted our review in accordance with generally 
Page 2 GAO-04-670T 

accepted government auditing standards between April 2003 and April 

2004. 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, almost half of the 457,000 

members of the National Guard have been called to fulfill new 

requirements for homeland security and to support military operations 

overseas. Cumulatively, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31 

percent of Air Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for federal 

homeland security missions or overseas missions related to the Global 

War on Terrorism. The Army Guard has had difficulty in responding to 

these needs because it was largely structured and funded as a later 

deploying follow-on force rather than a ready force for rapid deployment. 

In recent operations, Guard units were asked to take on more missions, in 

some cases with little time to prepare. Certain types of units have been in 

especially high demand, leading to extended and repeated deployments for 

soldiers with specialties such as military police, transportation, and 

combat arms. For example, 92 percent of the Army Guard’s military police 

units have been deployed at least once and 18 percent more than once. To 

relieve demands on these forces, the Army has retrained some lowdemand units, such as field artillery, for high-demand capabilities like 

security. The Air National Guard has also been used more extensively than 

expected before September 11 and was tasked with new homeland 

missions such as flying armed air patrols over U.S. cities, known as 

combat air patrols, and providing radar coverage for the United States. 

While the number of activated Air Guard personnel has fluctuated since 

September 11, it has declined over the past year to the current level of 

about 7,500. 

The readiness of non-deployed Army and Air National Guard units for 

wartime missions has declined because of the high pace of operations 

since September 11. However, readiness for homeland security missions is 

unknown because DOD has not fully defined requirements for homeland 

security missions or established readiness standards and measures for 

them. Declining readiness is a more serious problem for the Army Guard 

because it is not funded to field the numbers and types of deploymentready units that recent operations have demanded. Army Guard units are 

only funded to meet a portion of their personnel, equipment, and training 

requirements, even though theater commanders require the Guard to 

provide fully manned and equipped units when they deploy to actual 

military operations. For example, some units had only about three 

quarters of the personnel they needed when they were alerted. As a result, 

the Army National Guard has taken personnel and equipment from units 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-670T 

that were not activated but might be needed in the future to prepare 

deploying units. Since September 11, the Army Guard has initiated over 

71,000 transfers to provide specific skills or fill shortages of qualified 

personnel and transferred at least 22,000 pieces of equipment to units 

deploying to Iraq from non-deploying units. As of March 2004, the 

remaining non-deployed Army National Guard units lacked over one-third 

of the critical equipment they need to be ready to execute their federal 

missions. Although the Air Guard is maintained at a higher level of 

readiness overall than the Army Guard, its readiness has also declined 

since September 2001. Some Air Guard units—such as those that conduct 

combat air patrols over U.S. cities, provide airlift capability, or conduct 

tanker refueling operations—have reported that high operational demands 

made it difficult to meet their training requirements. Some state officials 

we spoke with were concerned about the Guard’s preparedness for 

homeland security missions as well as for state requirements such as 

natural disaster response because of the large numbers of personnel and 

equipment that have been alerted or deployed for federal missions. 

Our work thus far has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face 

three major challenges with regard to balancing the Guard’s future role in 

overseas and domestic missions. These challenges include (1) the eroding 

readiness of Army Guard units that may be mobilized for overseas 

operations within the next few years; (2) the need to determine how the 

Army National Guard should be structured and funded to support federal 

missions in the longer term; and (3) how to balance homeland and 

overseas requirements. The Army and National Guard have a number of 

initiatives in most of these areas, such as reorganizing the Army Guard 

into modular units as part of the Army’s reorganization and adjusting how 

forces are distributed among states to provide units with the skills needed 

for state and homeland security missions. However, funding and force 

adjustments needed to implement these changes for the Guard have not 

been identified and will require close coordination between the National 

Guard, DOD, the states, and Congress. In addition, the Army plans to 

reorganize its active and Guard combat units to make them more modular 

and responsive, but it has not identified funding to implement these 

changes for the Guard. 

The National Guard, comprised of the Army and Air National Guard, has a 

unique dual mission that consists of both federal and state roles. In their 

federal status, the Army and Air National Guard are part of the Army and 

Air Force’s reserve components, along with the Army Reserve and the Air 

Force Reserve, respectively. In their federal status, Guard units are 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-670T 

deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo for stabilization operations and to 

Afghanistan and Iraq in the war on terrorism. The National Guard can be 

activated under a variety of legal authorities that differ in terms of 

duration, mission types, command structure, and funding source. The 

National Guard may be activated under state law to provide critical 

infrastructure protection or respond to state emergencies under control of 

the governor and paid for with state funds. The Guard can also be 

involuntarily activated under federal law for federal domestic or overseas 

missions. Title 10 of the United States Code, which is the section that 

prescribes the use of the Armed Services while in federal service, gives the 

President authority to activate reservists for various periods of time. 

Following the terrorist attacks, the President declared a national 

emergency on September 14, 2001, whereby reservists can be activated for 

up to 2 years. Title 10 provisions also enable Guard members to volunteer 

for service. In addition, the Guard can be activated under Title 32 U.S.C. by 

which Guard forces remain under the control of the state governor but 

receive federal funding. 

The National Guard is composed primarily of Guard members who serve 

on a part-time basis, usually 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year for 

annual training. In addition, both the Army and Air National Guard have 

some full-time personnel who enhance readiness by assisting unit 

commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. Overall, 

the Army National Guard has about 350,000 members and makes up more 

than one-half of the total Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its 

support forces, such as military police and transportation units. The Army 

National Guard has units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 

states and 4 U.S. territories. As a part of the Army, much of the Army 

National Guard has been organized, trained, and resourced as a strategic 

reserve that would receive personnel, training, and equipment as a followon force to augment active Army units in an extended conflict. The Air 

National Guard has about 107,000 Air Guard personnel that make up 20 

percent of the total Air Force with 88 flying units and 579 mission support 

units located at more than 170 installations nationwide. The Air National 

Guard has been integrated with the Air Force’s active and reserve 

component and resourced as a part of its operational force. 

After September 11, 2001, the Guard’s homeland missions were expanded 

to include activities that it had not previously undertaken, such as 

guarding airports and critical infrastructure, that are known as homeland 
Page 5 GAO-04-670T 

security missions. Homeland security is a broad term that encompasses 

efforts to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist 

attacks as well as respond to an attack that might occur.1

 The Guard can 

be tasked with homeland security missions under the state governors or, 

when activated, by DOD under command of the president. DOD refers to 

its contributions to the overall homeland security effort as “homeland 

defense.” Homeland defense activities include military missions conducted 

within the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary 

circumstances with support, as needed, by other agencies. Flying combat 

air patrols over U.S. cities and guarding military installations are examples 

of these activities. DOD will also support civilian authorities to provide 

quick response or capabilities that other agencies do not have. The U.S. 

Northern Command provides command and control for DOD’s homeland 

defense missions and coordinates DOD’s support to civil authorities for 

homeland security missions. U.S. Northern Command would take a 

leading role in homeland defense missions including land, air, aerospace, 

and maritime defense operations. 

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, nearly half of the National 

Guard’s members have been alerted2

 or activated to meet the multiple 

federal requirements at home and abroad arising out of the Global War on 

Terrorism. Specifically, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31 

percent of Air Guard personnel have been alerted or activated for 

homeland security or overseas missions. Although largely programmed 

and funded as a later deploying strategic reserve, the Army Guard has 

taken on extensive and ongoing overseas missions. Moreover, Army Guard 

units with high-demand specialties have faced extended and repeated 

deployments. To compensate, the Army Guard is retraining units to fill 

high-demand capabilities. The Army Guard has also taken on expanded 

homeland missions, such as providing security for critical infrastructure, 

Air Force installations, and U.S. borders. In addition, the Air Guard has 

taken on new homeland defense missions, notably combat air patrols over 

U.S. cities, and about one-third of its members were activated between 

September 2001 and March 2004. As figure 1 shows, about 102,500 Army 

and Air National Guard members—the vast majority of whom are Army 

 1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, Washington, 

D.C.: July 2002). 

2

 DOD has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a minimum of 30 days written 

notification, referred to as “alert,” before they are mobilized for active duty. 

Army and Air National 

Guard Have 

Participated in 

Multiple Missions and 

Experienced High 

Activations for 

Overseas and 

Homeland Security 

Operations 
Page 6 GAO-04-670T 

Guard members—were on active duty as of March 2004 to support the 

National Guard’s ongoing participation in operations under federal 

authority. 

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity Under Title 10 

a

Army National Guard data represent the number of soldiers alerted and mobilized. Air National 

Guard data represent the number of airmen who are mobilized. 

b

Because Army National Guard data for January 2003 are not available, chart data point was 

estimated based on trend. 

The high level of Army Guard forces needed for federal missions for the 

foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s 

planned role as a strategic reserve force that would have additional time to 

train following the onset of war to an operational force that has had to 

respond quickly. The number of Army Guard members activated for 

federal missions more than quadrupled from about 5,500 in the days 

before the September 11 attacks to about 23,000 in the first month after 

the attacks because Army Guard forces were called on to perform an array 

of new federal homeland security missions. As figure 2 shows, by the end 

of March 2004, about 97,000 Army Guard members were activated for 

overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping 

operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or federally funded homeland defense 

missions such as guarding Air Force bases. This equates to more than one 

quarter of the Army Guard’s force. In addition, Army Guard members have 

experienced lengthy deployments. For example, as of February 2004, over 

57,000 soldiers (about 16 percent of the Army Guard) had been away from 

home for more than 220 days in the past year. DOD reports that the steady 

High Use and Expanded 

Missions of Army Guard 

Signify Change from 

Strategic Reserve Force to 

Operational Force 
Page 7 GAO-04-670T 

state for the next 3 to 5 years will require a total of about 100,000 to 

150,000 reserve personnel to support on-going operations, and that many 

of these personnel will come from the Army Guard and Reserve. DOD also 

expects that mobilizations of up to 1 year or more will be the norm for 

reserve component members during the next 3 to 5 years.3

Figure 2: Post-September 11 Army National Guard Activities under Federal and 

State Authorities 

In addition to its overall high use, particular specialties within the Army 

National Guard have been used extensively and at rates that DOD reports4

cannot be sustained for long durations. DOD has reported that using more 

than 17 percent of the personnel in a career field annually indicates an 

unsustainably high pace of operations in the career field and we believe 

could indicate a need for additional capability. However, as figure 3 

shows, usage rates for personnel in some Army Guard career fields 

exceeded 50 percent in the last 2-1/2 years. Capabilities key to both 

overseas and homeland missions such as military police, transportation, 

and combat units are among those experiencing a high pace of operations. 

 3 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve, Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), 

15 January 2004. 

4 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve.
Page 8 GAO-04-670T 

In particular, 92 percent of military police units have deployed during this 

time period, with 18 percent deployed more than once. Army Guard forces 

that are frequently called on by state governors to respond to state needs 

such as natural disasters have also been affected by current operational 

demands—about 70 percent of the enhanced brigades5

 and separate 

battalions and 75 percent of the Guard’s divisional combat battalions have 

been deployed at some point since September 11 and, when deployed, 

were not available for state needs. 

Figure 3: Types of Army National Guard Units with Highest Post-September 11 Use 

Note: Data through March 31, 2004. 

 5

 Enhanced brigades are the Army National Guard’s highest priority combat units. These 15 

brigades receive specialized training and higher priority than other National Guard units for 

personnel and resources during peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to 

be ready to deploy overseas within 90 days. 
Page 9 GAO-04-670T 

The Army National Guard is being adapted for expanded missions both at 

home and overseas and has been used in different configurations than 

DOD war planners had anticipated. In all four of our case study states, 

Guard officials reported that their units were adapted and personnel were 

trained for previously unanticipated homeland tasks, such as guarding 

airports and Air Force bases in the United States. As of March 31, 2004, 

about 5,500 Army Guard soldiers were still guarding Air Force bases in the 

United States. In our case study states, Army Guard units reported 

responding to specific needs in support of governors and federal 

authorities. For example: 

• The New Jersey Army Guard provided security for bridges, tunnels, and 

nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and continues 

to provide security at two nuclear power plants. 

• The Oregon Army Guard provided security at federal installations, such 

as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Ft. Lewis, Washington, during 2002 

and 2003. 

• The Texas Army Guard performed border security assisting U.S. 

Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002 and provided 

security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from 

October 2001 to October 2002. 

• In Georgia, Army Guard personnel provided airport security almost 

immediately after September 11 and were still guarding Army bases 

and Air Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003. 

Army National Guard units were also adapted for overseas missions to 

increase the supply of high-demand specialties, meet new operational 

requirements, and fill personnel shortages in deploying units. For example, 

to avoid critical shortages of military police units, 27 Army National Guard 

units, containing over 7,000 personnel, were converted from other 

specialties such as field artillery to military police units, some of which 

have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy 

security. In total, more than 34,000 soldiers deployed with new units that 

were tailored to provide specific capabilities needed as a result of the new 

security environment. 
Page 10 GAO-04-670T 

The Air National Guard has also faced expanded roles and high utilization 

since September 11, 2001. As figure 1 shows, Air Guard activations 

increased in the fall of 2001 to support both homeland security activities 

and operations in Afghanistan and declined in 2002. Air Guard activations 

increased again in the spring of 2003 at the beginning of operations in Iraq 

but have since declined to about 7,500 as of March 2004. The effects of the 

increased operations have not been as severe on the Air National Guard as 

on the Army Guard because the Air Guard is structured and funded to be a 

ready operational force. The Air Force, using an Air and Space 

Expeditionary Force concept, divides its forces into 10 groups, each 

containing a mix of active, Guard, and reserve forces, and operates on a 

standard 15-month rotational cycle. The Air Guard often uses volunteers to 

fill rotational requirements, rather than activating large units, for missions. 

Because the Air National Guard is structured to deploy in small units and 

is funded to achieve readiness levels comparable to the active Air Force, 

these small units can deploy within 72 hours after being alerted. 

Since the terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Air National Guard has 

been called on to perform new missions such as flying combat air patrols 

and providing radar coverage for the continental United States. Units in 

the states we visited played key roles in homeland defense missions. For 

example: 

• The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located 

near major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, 

and Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying combat 

air patrols over these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th 

had flown 1,458 combat air patrol missions. 

• The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 combat air patrol 

missions over New York City and Washington, D.C., between 

December 2001 and March 2002. Since September 11, the unit has also 

flown combat air patrols over Houston, the Gulf Coast, and in support 

of special events such as the Super Bowl and the Winter Olympics. 

Like the Army Guard, the Air Guard is also experiencing a higher demand 

for particular specialties with some specialties used at rates DOD reports 

cannot be sustained over time.6

 As figure 4 shows, among career fields 

with more than 500 personnel, 86 percent of tanker pilots, 84 percent of 

 6 Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve. 

Significant Use of Air 

Guard Occurred for Iraq 

Combat Operations and 

Homeland Defense 

Missions, but Number of 

Activated Personnel Has 

Decreased 
Page 11 GAO-04-670T 

security personnel, and 81 percent of flight engineers have deployed at 

least once since September 2001. Further, about 10,000 Air Guard 

members have been deployed for more than 220 days in the past year and 

about 6,400 of those have been deployed for more than 401 days in the last 

2 years. 

Figure 4: Types of Air National Guard Specialties with Highest Post-September 11 

Use 

Note 1: Data through March 8, 2004. 

Note 2: Chart contains career fields with more than 500 personnel and are more than 50 percent 

utilized. 

To meet the requirements of both its domestic and overseas missions, Air 

Guard officials said they added personnel to planned rotation cycles by 

activating some units earlier than planned and extending their duty tours. 

And, except for some high-demand specialties, the Air Guard returned to 

its usual rotation schedule in March 2004. 
Page 12 GAO-04-670T 

Since September 11, 2001, the extensive use of both the Army and Air 

National Guard in recent operations has resulted in a steady decline in the 

warfighting readiness of non-deployed units. The greatest negative impact 

has been on the Army National Guard because it is not structured or 

funded to meet the demands of recent operations. The extensive transfers 

of personnel and equipment needed to prepare lower resourced Army 

Guard units to meet wartime deployment standards have eroded the 

readiness levels of the remaining Army Guard force. Certain Air Guard 

personnel specialties and equipment are also facing continued stress due 

to the ongoing pace of operations and aging aircraft. The effect of this 

readiness decline on the Guard’s ability to perform homeland security 

missions is unknown because DOD has not completed its efforts to define 

requirements and readiness standards and measures for the homeland 

defense missions it would lead or the civil missions is would support. 

Some state officials we spoke with voiced concern about the preparedness 

of their Guard units for recurring state emergencies or new homeland 

security missions given the level of the Guard’s ongoing support to 

overseas operations. 

Preparation of deploying Army Guard units to meet the theater 

commanders’ requirements for recent overseas operations has resulted in 

extensive transfers of both personnel and equipment that degraded the 

readiness of remaining units. For the Army Guard, DOD provides units 

with varying levels of personnel, training, equipment, and full-time support 

based on how quickly they are expected to be used. For example, DOD 

aims to provide certain types of Guard units, such as early deploying 

support and Special Forces units, all the personnel and equipment they 

require to undertake their wartime missions. Other forces, such as most 

combat brigades and divisions which are expected to deploy later, are 

authorized fewer personnel and less equipment than they need to meet 

their wartime missions. 

The Army’s goal is to provide the Guard’s enhanced brigades, the most 

ready of its combat forces, about 85 percent of the personnel and 90 

percent of the equipment they need to deploy. However, we found that the 

two enhanced separate brigades activated in support of operations in Iraq 

needed 2,100 additional soldiers, about one-fourth of their required 

personnel, to meet deployment requirements. Combat divisions are 

authorized only 65 percent of the personnel and equipment they need, and 

it could take months before they are ready to deploy. Moreover, soldiers 

must be qualified in their military specialties by attending required training 

and meeting training standards to be ready to deploy, but as of March 

Readiness of Nondeployed National 

Guard Units Has 

Declined, but Decline 

Is Most Significant for 

the Army Guard 

Extensive Personnel and 

Equipment Transfers to 

Deploying Units Erode 

Preparedness of 

Remaining Army Guard 

Units 
Page 13 GAO-04-670T 

2004, only 68 percent of the Guard’s required personnel were qualified in 

their specialty. Guard members may not be qualified because they have 

not been able to attend training when it is scheduled. Since September 11, 

2001, the Army National Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers of 

personnel from one unit to another to enhance the readiness of deploying 

units. 

In addition to personnel shortfalls, most Army Guard units are not 

provided all the equipment they need for their wartime requirements. 

Moreover, the equipment they have is often older than that of the active 

Army and in many cases does not meet the warfighting commander’s 

requirements because it is not compatible with the active Army’s newer 

equipment. For example, many Army Guard units have radios that cannot 

communicate with new communications systems and old trucks for which 

the active Army does not stock spare parts. Units deploying in support of 

operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 needed about 22,000 pieces of 

equipment—including night vision goggles, machine guns, trucks, 

decontamination apparel, and radios—to meet deployment requirements. 

The Army National Guard filled these shortages by transferring equipment 

from other units. In fact, between December 2002 and March 2004, Army 

Guard units in every state and territory supplied equipment to three 

deploying enhanced brigades. Initially the Guard managed transfers so 

that many units shared the burden of losing equipment and could remain 

at their planned readiness levels. For example, the enhanced separate 

brigade we visited in Georgia transferred machine guns, night vision 

goggles, and global positioning systems to deploying units, but officials 

said that the unit maintained its readiness rating because the equipment 

was not deemed critical or taken in quantities that degraded the unit’s 

overall readiness level. However, in November 2003, the Director of the 

Army National Guard directed that personnel and equipment be 

transferred to deploying units, even if that meant degrading the readiness 

of remaining units, a strategy that may not be sustainable over the long 

term. By 2004, deployments and existing shortages left the remaining Army 

Guard units without about 33 percent of the critical equipment they need. 

In New Jersey, officials told us that some units had less than 65 percent of 

their wartime equipment requirements and reported critical shortages of 

spare parts, utility trucks, night vision goggles, and pistols. 

Air National Guard units have also experienced difficulty in maintaining 

their warfighting readiness while conducting overseas and homeland 

defense missions and reported overall declines in readiness. The Air Force 

High Usage and Aging 

Equipment Eroding Air 

National Guard Readiness 
Page 14 GAO-04-670T 

and Air Guard attribute these readiness declines to the high pace of 

operations and problems associated with aging aircraft. 

Many Air Guard units use aging aircraft, and the high pace of operations 

has been a training and maintenance challenge. For example, 

• An airlift wing we visited in Georgia operates aging C-130 transport 

planes. Although officials said that in peacetime the wing planned for 

2,900 flying hours annually for training, it had flown over 13,000 hours 

for operations and training in 2003. This high pace of operations made 

it difficult for the unit to continue to perform its warfighting training 

requirements for tasks, such as tactical formation flying, thus lowering 

its readiness ratings. In addition, officials said that in recent 

deployments to Iraq, the unit’s aging aircraft and the harsh operating 

environment presented a maintenance challenge, as evidenced by the 

need to replace 11 turbine engines and 20 propellers to keep the 8 

aircraft operational. 

• Since September 11, 2001, fighter wings that we visited in New Jersey, 

Texas, and Oregon have been directed to dedicate some aircraft to 

domestic combat air patrol missions. This has reduced the number of 

aircraft available for air crews to use for other warfighting mission 

training. To meet training requirements, the units have had to fly the 

remaining aircraft more hours than planned, which has created 

scheduling and maintenance problems. Officials were concerned about 

the long-term effects of the continued high pace of operations on their 

ability to support both missions. 

It is difficult to assess the Guard’s preparedness for the full range of 

homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are 

not yet well defined. Moreover, DOD has not yet established readiness 

standards and measures for homeland defense or civil support missions. 

DOD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only 

the federal missions it leads. DOD’s U.S. Northern Command, which is 

charged with planning, organizing, and executing DOD-led homeland 

defense and with supporting homeland security missions led by civilian 

authorities, has not yet finalized its plans that would identify forces and 

resources for the homeland missions it may lead or support. In some 

cases, Northern Command is awaiting further guidance from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. As a result, National Guard forces that may have 

to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained, or 

equipped specifically for these missions. Without specific requirements 

DOD Has Not Fully 

Defined Mission 

Requirements or 

Readiness Standards and 

Measures for All Its 

Homeland Security 

Missions, and Some States 

Have Concerns about 

Preparedness and 

Availability of Guard Units 
Page 15 GAO-04-670T 

and plans that clarify the types of skills and equipment needed for these 

missions, it is not possible to measure the readiness of forces specifically 

for these missions. 

To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began 

establishing weapons of mass destruction civil support teams as 

authorized by Presidential Directive and Congress in fiscal year 1999. 

These teams, which are comprised of 22 full-time personnel, are 

maintained at the highest readiness levels and can rapidly respond to 

support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass 

destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in determining the nature 

of the attack, provide medical and technical advice, and help to identify 

follow-on federal and state assets that might be needed. Congress has now 

authorized at least one team for each state and territory. Currently, 32 

teams are fully operational with the remaining 23 estimated to be 

operational by 2007.7

 These teams are unique because they are federally 

funded and trained but perform their mission under the command and 

control of the state governor. 

Individual state Guards have also begun to develop plans and organize 

their Guard forces for some homeland security tasks that might be 

conducted under the authority of the governor. However, these efforts 

vary from state to state. For example, in our case study states, 

• Georgia officials told us they were in the process of identifying critical 

infrastructure sites in the state and assigning quick reaction forces to 

protect them. 

• New Jersey has assigned ready-reaction forces to protect key sites in 

each of 3 geographic regions. 

• Oregon has identified some of the critical infrastructure that must be 

protected and annually identifies those National Guard units that will 

be assigned to perform rapid response force tasks. 

Historically, Guard forces could perform state missions using the skills 

and equipment they were provided for their federal missions. However, 

mobilized and deployed personnel and their equipment are not available 

 7

 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 

Teams, Implementation Act of 2003, April 10, 2003. 
Page 16 GAO-04-670T 

for states to use for either new homeland security missions, such as 

responding to increased terrorist threats, or recurring natural disasters, 

such as floods or forest fires. As figure 5 shows, 15 states currently have 40 

percent or more of their Army Guard soldiers mobilized or deployed. 

While Air Guard units are not used as extensively for state missions as 

those of the Army Guard, as figure 6 shows, as many as one-third of Air 

Guard units were alerted or deployed from some states as of March 2004. 

None of the four states we visited had developed a state system for 

measuring the preparedness of its forces for homeland security missions, 

and officials in all four states we visited raised varying concerns about 

homeland security preparedness. For example: 

• New Jersey units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in December 

2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment such as 

humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical 

protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some 

essential equipment for its forces during this time on an emergency 

basis. In addition, at the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to 

deploy large numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was 

determining how it would respond to another such terrorist threat after 

almost 60 percent of its forces are deployed. 

• Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International Economic 

Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations in June 2004 will increase 

Georgia’s requirements for security missions such as aerial 

reconnaissance and surveillance at a time when its Army Guard 

aviation units may be deployed overseas. 

• In 2002 the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army Guard 

soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a century. 

Oregon officials stated that because many of its forces and equipment 

are currently deployed and the state has only limited engineering 

capability left, it would not be able to provide the same level of support 

as it did in the 2002 season. 

• All of the aviation assets Texas would need to fight fires and all of its 

military police were deployed at the time of our visit. However, Texas 

officials said that they were able to meet their homeland security 

needs, even at the height of its Guard’s overseas deployments, because 

its largest Army Guard unit had not been fully deployed and, as a large 

state, it had ample state emergency response capability. 
Page 17 GAO-04-670T 

Figure 5: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized, and Deployed for Title 10 as of March 31, 2004 
Page 18 GAO-04-670T 

Figure 6: Percent of Air National Guardsmen Mobilized and Deployed for Title 10 as of March 8, 2004 

Some Guard officials noted that their states’ Guards had not received 

additional federal funding to take on homeland security missions, even as 

personnel and equipment that could be needed for these missions are 

being deployed overseas. Guard officials also said that the states have 

limited budgets and that homeland security requirements compete with 

other needs, although the states have funded some homeland security 

activities, such as guarding critical infrastructure, and purchased some 

equipment. Further, state officials said the Guard is not generally eligible 

for funding from the Department of Homeland Security because its grants 

are limited to “first responders” such as police or firefighters. 
Page 19 GAO-04-670T 

Most states have entered into mutual assistance agreements that may 

provide access to another state’s National Guard forces in times of need. 

These agreements are typically used to access additional forces for natural 

disaster response. However, states may withhold their forces if the forces 

are needed in their home state. For example, according to New Jersey 

officials, their state faces an elevated terrorist threat due to its proximity 

to New York City. However, they do not have a fully operational weapons 

of mass destruction civil support team in New Jersey. The officials said 

they requested access to another state’s team on three occasions. On two 

occasions, the request was not granted because officials in the team’s 

home state determined that it was needed at home. When New Jersey 

made a third request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist threat, 

access was approved. 

Our work has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face significant 

near- and long-term challenges to readying and resourcing National Guard 

units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. 

These challenges include first, enhancing the near-term preparedness of 

Army Guard units that may be mobilized for overseas operations within 

the next few years. These improvements may be difficult to realize 

because the Army National Guard is still operating at peacetime funding 

levels despite declining readiness. Second, in the longer term, the Guard’s 

ability to successfully organize for its missions in the new strategic 

environment will depend on whether adequate resources are identified for 

these efforts and whether DOD’s readiness and funding policies are 

consistent with the Army Guard’s expected high utilization for the 

foreseeable future. However, the National Guard does not have complete 

control of all the restructuring and resourcing decisions that will affect its 

mission preparedness. Finally, in addition to restructuring and funding to 

be ready for the Guard’s federal mission, DOD must consider how to 

balance homeland and overseas requirements. 

The high pace of recent operations has left Army National Guard units less 

prepared for future overseas operations and in need of additional trained 

personnel and essential equipment. In the near term, the National Guard 

must continue to provide units capable of performing challenging overseas 

missions. For example, the Army Guard has alerted 33,000 troops for 

deployment in support of operations in Iraq in 2005. Moreover, while 

future deployment figures for operations in Afghanistan had not been 

announced as of March 2004, 16,500 Army Guard soldiers are currently 

deployed to support these operations. 

Readying and Resourcing 

National Guard Units for 

Overseas and Domestic 

Missions Presents 

Significant Near- and LongTerm Challenges 

The Guard Will Be 

Challenged in the NearTerm to Enhance the 

Readiness of Army Guard 

Units for Future Overseas 

Rotations 
Page 20 GAO-04-670T 

The National Guard has attempted, where possible, to activate units that 

have not been recently deployed to minimize the hardship on personnel. 

However, some of these units have supplied personnel and equipment to 

previously deploying units, exacerbating existing shortfalls and interfering 

with the units’ ability to maintain their previous level of readiness. In 

addition, the continuing need for some skills may require the Guard to reactivate units that have only recently returned from deployment. 

Furthermore, the readiness of the equipment belonging to returning units 

is presently unknown. However, past experience with prolonged desert 

operations has shown that equipment may need extensive maintenance 

and not be available for training purposes. In addition, some redeployed 

units left equipment behind for other deploying units and will need 

replacement equipment. Because so many personnel and so much 

equipment have been taken from those units not yet deployed, improving 

their readiness may become increasingly difficult. In the long term, DOD’s 

approach of transferring people and equipment does not appear to be 

sustainable. 

The early alert of some units required for overseas operations may help 

identify readiness problems earlier and enable the Guard to take actions to 

improve unit readiness. For example, Guard officials indicated that certain 

actions, such as sending higher numbers of personnel to school to become 

qualified in their specialties, could improve readiness. However, 

complicating the Army Guard’s efforts to improve the preparedness of its 

units is the fact that the Army has not provided the Guard additional 

funding for equipment and training to support its new operational 

missions. The Army Guard has not received any wartime supplemental 

funding in fiscal year 2004 to address the equipment shortfalls caused by 

the stress of recent operations in units that might be needed in future 

operations. 

DOD has a number of efforts to restructure the National Guard to improve 

its ability to perform federal missions in the new strategic environment, 

although these are long-term efforts that have not been fully funded in 

DOD’s budget and detailed implementation plans have not yet been 

developed. For example, DOD plans to alleviate the high pace of 

operations of reserve units by increasing the availability of certain highdemand units and rebalancing the skills in the active and reserve forces. 

Other DOD-wide initiatives to use its forces more efficiently include 

moving military personnel out of activities that can be performed by 

civilians or contractors and into high-demand specialties and taking 

advantage of technological advances to reduce personnel needs. 

Long-Term Initiatives to 

Restructure Army National 

Guard Face 

Implementation 

Challenges 
Page 21 GAO-04-670T 

The Army plans to restructure its forces, including National Guard units, 

into modular units that can be tailored for specific needs. After 

restructuring, the Army Guard would have 34 fully manned brigades, 

instead of its current 15 enhanced brigades, 2 separate brigades, and 21 

brigades in 8 divisions that are not fully manned. The Army plans to begin 

restructuring active units immediately, but, according to National Guard 

officials, it has not established the time frame and funding for the 

conversion of Army Guard units. 

As the Army Guard is being restructured over the long-term, the Army’s 

current resourcing policy, which provides most Guard units with fewer 

personnel and less equipment than they need for their wartime missions, 

may need to be reevaluated given the Army Guard’s operational role at 

home and overseas in the Global War on Terrorism. 

For example, one Army Guard initiative would address its long-standing 

problem of having insufficient full-time personnel to support its units. Fulltime Guard members enhance unit readiness by performing tasks such as 

monitoring member readiness; recruiting and training personnel; and 

maintaining supplies, equipment, and aircraft. Without sufficient full-time 

personnel, these tasks, which are critical to unit readiness, suffer. The 

Army Guard was authorized only 59 percent of its full-time manning 

requirement in fiscal year 2003, as compared to the Air Guard’s full-time 

manning of 100 percent of its requirement. The Army Guard plans to 

increase full-time manning gradually to an average of about 71 percent by 

2012, if funding is provided. However, there are no plans to increase fulltime manning to 100 percent of the Guard’s requirements. 

Efforts to restructure the National Guard are focused on its primary 

federal mission and do not address the individual state Guard’s critical 

role in homeland security. As noted earlier, DOD planning and resourcing 

for National Guard units has assumed that homeland security tasks can be 

accomplished with the personnel and equipment supplied for the wartime 

mission. However, in the new security environment, the assumption that 

Guard units can perform their domestic missions with personnel and 

equipment trained for overseas missions needs is questionable. The U.S. 

Northern Command, which is responsible for DOD-led efforts to defend 

the homeland, has not completed its efforts to identify all the forces and 

capabilities needed for homeland defense or homeland security. 

In the future, the National Guard would like to adopt a rotational 

deployment model that would maintain at least 50 percent of a state’s 

Restructuring Efforts 

Should Consider Balance 

between Overseas and 

Domestic Requirements 
Page 22 GAO-04-670T 

Guard force available for the use of state officials to perform domestic 

missions. In addition to assuring the ready availability of personnel, the 

Guard would like to be able to provide each state with capabilities that 

could be used for homeland security such as transportation, medical, 

aviation, engineering, and military police, among others. Although 

providing the variety of assets for state use has been a Guard goal, not 

every state has all these capabilities at this time. Further, DOD’s plans to 

rebalance the active and reserve forces are based on the general goal of 

deploying individuals no more than 1 year over a 6-year period. However, 

overseas commitments may challenge the Guard’s ability to meet these 

goals. Moreover, the Guard will have to work with state officials to 

balance the mix of capabilities among the state Guards. 

As homeland security requirements are identified, DOD, the states, and 

Congress may also need to evaluate the need for some specialties or 

additional equipment or capabilities. The National Guard is providing 

some training and specialized equipment, such as decontamination 

equipment, for homeland security missions. At a total cost of about $9 

million for equipment, the National Guard is creating 12 enhanced 

response forces to augment its civil support teams who are tasked and 

trained to respond if weapons of mass destruction are used. Each Guard 

team will have responsibility for 1 of 12 geographic regions in the United 

States. When fully implemented, these enhanced response forces will have 

the medical, decontamination, engineering, and security forces required to 

respond to a mass destruction event. However, these units will retain 

overseas missions and could be deployed overseas. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the high pace of operations has caused 

some difficulties for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, the Army Guard’s 

efforts to ready units to deploy by taking trained personnel and critical 

equipment from other units has created urgent personnel and equipment 

shortages in units that have not yet been deployed. Unless replacement 

equipment and personnel are identified, the Army Guard will have to 

continue to take personnel and equipment from one unit to ready another, 

which means that the units called in the future will likely be even less 

ready. The extensive use of Guard forces and eroding readiness of the nondeployed units suggest a comprehensive reassessment of the Army 

Guard’s current structure and resourcing assumptions may be needed. 

Furthermore, while homeland security requirements have not been 

defined, equipment and personnel may not be available to the states when 

they are needed because they have been deployed overseas. Moreover, the 

Guard may have difficulty ensuring that each state has access to units with 

Conclusion 
Page 23 GAO-04-670T 

key specialized capabilities—such as engineering or medical assets—

needed for homeland security and other domestic missions. The National 

Guard has a number of initiatives to address the mismatch between the 

Army Guard’s tasks and the priority it has received for personnel, training, 

and equipment. Most initiatives are long-term in nature, such as 

reorganizing units, and face implementation challenges, including the need 

for funding. However, unless DOD, Congress, and the states work closely 

to address these challenges, Guard units may continue to experience a 

high pace of operations and declining readiness that could affect their 

ability to meet future requirements both at home and overseas. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 

For more information regarding this testimony, please call me, at (202) 

512-4402. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include: 

Margaret Morgan, Suzanne Wren, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern 

Saavedra, Daniel Omahen, Barbara Gannon, Tina Morgan, James Lewis, M. 

Jane Hunt, Jennifer Popovic, Jay Smale, and Kenneth Patton. 

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