This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 28,680 9 SHAUN S., 10 Child-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 12 Sandra A. Price, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellant 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 GARCIA, Judge. 232 Shaun S. (Child) appeals from his conditional plea of guilty for conspiracy to 1 commit residential burglary after the children’s court division of the district court 2 denied his motion to suppress. We affirm. 3 BACKGROUND 4 On September 25, 2007, Deputy Scott went to Child’s home after the 5 department received a call from Child’s fath er. Child’s father informed the officer 6 that he did not want Child in his home. Deputy Scott then took Child to a crisis 7 shelter. 8 The following day while on patrol, Deputy Nyce was called to the scene of a 9 residential burglary. As part of his i nvestigation of the burglary, Deputy Nyce went 10 to the shelter about 8:00 a.m. to speak withChild. Prior to talking with Child, Deputy 11 Nyce advised Child of his constitutional right s. Child then initialed each section of 12 and signed a written waiver of those rights. At that time, Child denied involvement 13 in the burglary. Deputy Nyce left the shelter and continue d his investigation. About 14 an hour later, Deputy Nyce returned to the shelter and again spoke with Child. Deputy 15 Nyce did not re-advise Child about his right s at the second interview. At that time, 16 Child confessed in a formalstatement to involvement in the burglary. Although 17 Deputy Nyce attempted to record his conversations with Child, the interviews were 18 not successfully recorded by his equipment. Deputy Nyce explained that he thought 193 the interviews were being recorded becau se he manually activated the recording 1 device in his car. Deputy Nyce did not reali ze that the interviews were not recorded 2 until an attorney informed him prior to the suppression hearing that there was no 3 recording of the interviews. Deputy Nyce further stated th at he knew the law and was 4 trying to comply with the law requiring recordings. 5 Child moved to suppress his confessi on on the basis that Deputy Nyce failed 6 to record the interview incompliance with NMSA 1978, Section 29-1-16(A) (2006). 7 At the subsequent suppression hearing, the parties also discussed the effect of the one8 hour delay between the interviews. The district court denied Child’s motion to 9 suppress, finding that Child was not in custody during the interviews and that he was 10 read his constitutional rights and waived those rights. The court further found that 11 Deputy Nyce attempted to comply with the electronic recording requirements of 12 Section 29-1-16(A). Subsequent to the de nial, Child entered into a conditional plea 13 agreement, admitted guilt to one count of conspiracy to commit residential burglary 14 and reserved his right to appeal the deni al of his suppression motion. This appeal 15 followed Child’s plea agreement. 16 DISCUSSION 17 Standard of Review 18 “The standard of review for suppre ssion rulings is whether the law was 194 correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the 1 prevailing party.” State v. Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 2 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 No Error in Denying Motion to Suppress 4 Child argues that the district court erred because there were no facts 5 demonstrating that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 6 constitutional rights before eventually gi ving his confession to Deputy Nyce. See 7 NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(D) (2003) (amende d 2009) (stating that the state “shall 8 prove that the statement or confession o ffered in evidence was elicited only after a 9 knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child’s constitutional rights was 10 obtained”). Specifically, Child argues that the district court’s ruling was insufficient 11 because the record does not demonstrate that the court considered the Section 32A-2- 12 14(E) factors. See id. (listing factors for the court to consider in determining whether 13 a child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the child’s rights). 14 Whether Child knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights based 15 on the factors outlined in Section 32A-2- 14(E) was not raised by Child at the 16 suppression hearing. Child never asked the court to review the factors listed in 17 Section 32A-2-14(E) and make a determination as to the validity of the waiver on 18 those grounds. Child never contested the State’s evidence that he knowingly, 195 voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights during the first interview. Since the 1 district court did not have an opportunity torule on the issues now raised, we will not 2 review Child’s argument on appeal. See Rule 12-216 NMRA (stating that in order to 3 preserve a question for appellate review, “ it must appear that a ruling or decision by 4 the district court was fairly invoked”); State v. Varela , 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 25, 128 5 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (“In order to preserve an error for appeal, it is essential that 6 the ground or grounds of the objection or mo tion be made with sufficient specificity 7 to alert the mind of the trial court to the claimed error or errors, and that a ruling 8 thereon then be invoked.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 9 Child next appears to argue that hi s confession should be suppressed because 10 he was not re-advised of his constitutional ri ghts prior to being asked further questions 11 by Deputy Nyce one hour later. At the suppression hearing, there was a lengthy 12 discussion regarding the delay between the interviews. The district court ultimately 13 found that Child was advised of his rights and waived his rights prior to confessing 14 to the burglary. The conclusion that Deputy Nyce was not required to re-advise Child 15 of his rights prior to recommencing the interv iew is implicit in the court’s ruling. On 16 appeal, Child does not present authority disputing the correctness of the court’s 17 conclusion. In fact, Childacknowledges that warnings regarding constitutional rights 18 do not necessarily have to be given after each break in the interview process. See 196 State v. Gilbert , 98 N.M. 530, 533, 650 P.2d 814, 818 (1982) (holding that a second 1 full and fresh Miranda warning was unnecessary after a one-hour break in questioning 2 when the defendant was fully aware of his rights); see also United States v. Frankson , 3 83 F.3d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1996) (holdi ng a two and one-half hour delay between 4 Miranda warning and interrogation did not compro mise the initial warning). We will 5 not conclude that the district court’s conclusions were in error. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) 6 NMRA (stating that appellate arguments sh all contain citations to applicable New 7 Mexico decisions); In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 8 (1984) (stating that an appellate court will not consider issues unsupported by 9 authority). 10 Child’s final argument is as follows: “Under the criteria set forth in Section 29- 11 1-16, both of Deputy Nyce’s custodial interrogations of [Child] were required to be 12 electronically recorded and no good cause wa s shown as to why neither interrogation 13 was recorded.” The premise of Child’s argument is that he was subjected to two 14 custodial interrogations, thereby triggering compliance with the electronic recording 15 requirements of Section 29-1-16. However, the district court found that Child was not 16 in custody as required to apply Sec tion 29-1-16 and was interviewed during 17 investigatory detentions. Other than general assertions, Child presents no argument 18 or authority challenging the district c ourt’s finding regarding the investigatory 197 detentions. See Rule 12-213(A)(4); In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. at 765, 676 P.2d 1 at 1330. In addition, Child presents no authority that investigatory detentions entitle 2 a child to the same protection afforded during a custodial interrogation. Since the 3 premise of Child’s argument is based upon a custodial interrogation and is not 4 supported by the facts, Child’s argument relying upon a custodial interrogation under 5 Section 29-1-16 is not properly before this C ourt. Again, we decline to address the 6 argument. 7 CONCLUSION 8 We affirm the district court’s decision denying Child’s motion to suppress. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10

______________________________ 11 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 12

WE CONCUR: 13

_________________________________ 14 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 15

_________________________________ 16 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 17