* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-20173 Summary Calendar ROYCE EUGENE MITCHELL, JR. Plaintiff-Appellant

v. MARC W. HOLDER Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:07-MC-45
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Royce Eugene Mitchell, Jr. is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to proceed IFP in the district court based on a failure to state a claim. The district court relied on the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 in making its ruling. Mitchell seeks declaratory and injunctive reliefto enjoin the enforcement ofstate court orders imposing a fine for a speeding ticket that Mitchell received. He contends that the matter should have been reviewed by an agency and that United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D January 10, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-20173

2 the state municipal and county courts, and in particular, County Judge Holder, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. He also argues that T EX
. G OVT
. CODE A NN
. § 30.00027 should be dec lared unconstitutional because it resulted in the denial ofhis right toappeal the county court’sdecision. Mitchell argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint based on the Anti-Injunction Act because it resulted in the denial of his constitutional rights. Under the Anti-Injunction Act , “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act ofCongress, or where necessary in aid of itsjurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (emphasis added). The listed exceptions “are narrow and are ‘not [to] be enlarged by loose statutory construction.’” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (citation omitted). Mitchell has not alleged that the state court action is subject to any statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act or that the proceedings will have any effect on thejurisdiction of the federal court or any of itsjudgments. Thus, Mitchell has not shown that the district court erred in determining that his complaint seeking injunctive relieffailed tostate a claim upon which reliefcould be granted. Mitchell has failed to raise a nonfrivolous issue on appeal. His motion to proceed IFP on appeal is denied, and his appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See 5 TH C IR
. R. 42.2; Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Mitchell was previously cautioned that filing additional frivolous suits or appeals could result in the imposition ofsanctions. SeeMitchell v. Texas, No. 03- 20836 (5th Cir. June 30, 2004). It is ordered that a sanction of $150.00 is imposed and that the clerk accept no further pleadings from Mitchell until the sanction is paid. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1988).No. 07-20173

3 IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION IMPOSED; MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER DENIED.