Mr. Dalie named as defendants the following individuals: Correctional Officer Joseph 1

Jones, Correctional Officer Hollis Goodwin, Correctional Officer Kevin Schiable, Correctional

Officer Lieutenant R. Cochlin, Correctional Officer Lieutenant John McMillan, Correctional

Officer Lieutenant Captain P. Walker, Correctional Officer Lieutenant P. Sanders, Correctional

Officer Captain Taylor, Counselor Broomal, and Deputy Warden Ramon Rustin. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GEORGE DALIE, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

J. JONES, ET AL. :

Defendants. : No. 04-5884

M E M O R A N D U M A N D O R D E R 

PRATTER, J. DECEMBER 4, 2007

This is an action brought by an inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning

allegations of use of excessive force and denial of due process by prison officials. At all times

relevant to the events described in the Complaint in this action, George Dalie was confined as a

pretrial detainee at Chester County Prison in Pennsylvania. In December 2004, Mr. Dalie

initiated this action against certain correctional officers at Chester County Prison related to an

event that occurred on July 28, 2004.1

JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Dalie alleges that on July 28, 2004 he hung a bed sheet over half of the bars of his

cell in order to create some privacy while he used the toilet in his cell. (Compl., Statement of

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 1 of 10
2

Claim ¶ 5.) He claims that certain of the defendants removed the bed sheet and laughed at him in

the view of the entire cell block. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 7.) Mr. Dalie alleges that when

he approached the officer control room to question the officers and complain, Officer Jones

kicked and punched him. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶¶ 9-10.) He claims that Officer Jones

attempted to push him to the ground, at which point Officer Goodwin hit him in the back of the

head with thick, large, brass keys. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 11.) Mr. Dalie claims that

Officer Jones continued to punch him while Officer Goodwin continued to hit him in the head

with the keys, kick him and step on his head with his boots. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶¶ 12-

13.) Mr. Dalie alleges that while Officers Goodwin and Jones assaulted him, Officer Schiable

was in the control room, where he saw the entire incident, and failed to intervene to assist Mr.

Dalie. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 14.) 

Mr. Dalie claims that he suffered cuts and bruises to his head, a swollen face, “busted” lip

and welts. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 17.) He claims he received medical treatment for his

injuries. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 38.) According to Mr. Dalie, Correctional Officers

Goodwin and Jones applied excessive force, which he claims violated his due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, he claims that Correctional Officer Schiable

failed to intervene and stop the altercation, also in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Second, Mr. Dalie claims that following the incident he was sent to punitive isolation

prior to his disciplinary hearing, and was “punished” prior to a determination of guilt in violation

of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Compl., Statement of Claim ¶ 18.)

Third, Mr. Dalie alleges that the disciplinary proceedings that occurred as a result of the

July 28 altercation violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Dalie

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 2 of 10
 Because Mr. Dalie is a pretrial detainee and may not, as such, be “punished,” his Eighth 2

Amendment rights are not implicated in this case. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16

(1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977). Accordingly, his Eighth

Amendment claims were dismissed. 

3

alleges that Officer Jones issued a “fabricated” misconduct report charging him with certain

offenses related to the incident in order to disguise Officer Jones’s own misconduct. (Compl.,

Statement of Claim ¶¶ 19, 20, 29.) Mr. Dalie claims that at the misconduct hearing, which was

presided over by defendants Broomal, McMillan and Cochlin, he was found guilty. (Compl.,

Statement of Claim ¶ 22.) Mr. Dalie claims that Officer Saunders’ approval of Officer Jones’s

allegedly fabricated misconduct report, defendants Broomal’s, McMillan’s and Cochlin’s finding

Mr. Dalie guilty based on Officer Jones’s allegedly fabricated misconduct report, defendants

Walker’s and Rustin’s refusal to overturn the results of the disciplinary proceeding, and

defendant Taylor’s refusal to “objectively investigate” Mr. Dalie’s claim that he was assaulted by

Officers Jones and Goodwin, each violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(Compl., Statement of Claim ¶¶ 29-32.) 

In January 2005, the Defendants moved to dismiss this action. Mr. Dalie opposed the

defense motion. By Order dated March 19, 2005, the Court granted the Defendants’ motion in

part. Because Mr. Dalie was a pretrial detainee, the Court granted the motion to the extent that

Mr. Dalie’s claims alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The 2

Court denied the motion to the extent that Mr. Dalie’s claims alleged violations of his Fourteenth

Amendment rights. 

The Court instructed the Defendants to answer Mr. Dalie’s Complaint, and instructed the

Clerk of the Court to appoint counsel for Mr. Dalie. However, for various reasons the Clerk was

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 3 of 10
 On November 9, 2007, the Clerk of the Court received a letter from Mr. Dalie notifying 3

the Court that he has been moving around the Pennsylvania prison system, and does not currently

possess his legal documents related to this lawsuit. Accordingly, Mr. Dalie requested additional

time in which to respond to Defendants’ motion. The Court notes that Mr. Dalie’s request was

docketed under Civil Action No. 07-2097, which is another action pending before the Court

initiated by Mr. Dalie, in which there is a motion to dismiss pending. However, Mr. Dalie’s

letter clearly references both Civil Action No. 07-2097 and the above-captioned action, and the

Court understands Mr. Dalie to be requesting additional time to respond to the motions that are

currently pending in both actions. For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum it will not be

necessary for Mr. Dalie to respond to the summary judgment motion in this action. 

4

unable to secure counsel for Mr. Dalie, and Mr. Dalie subsequently informed the Court that he

wished to proceed pro se. The Court issued a Scheduling Order that permitted the parties to

engage in discovery, and set due dates for certain pretrial submissions. After the discovery

period concluded, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remainder of Mr. Dalie’s

claims. Mr. Dalie has not responded to Defendants’ motion.3

LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion for summary judgment should not be presented to the Court without

demonstrating professional efforts to meet the standards for such a motion. The standards are

familiar. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of

the case under governing law. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 4 of 10
 See supra note 2 and supporting text. 

4

5

the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the

moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district court that there is

an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325. After the moving

party has met its initial burden, “the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise

provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by

making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

In its March 19, 2005 Order granting in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court

noted that Defendants’ motion “was less than rudimentary and strayed from the rubric of a

motion to dismiss” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion set forth a factual

scenario at odds with that set forth in the Complaint, and only included a single reference to case

law, without providing any recognizable conventional citation. However, as discussed above,

4

despite the shortcomings in Defendants’ motion, the interests of justice compelled the Court to

dismiss Mr. Dalie’s Eighth Amendment claims at that time.

After being admonished by the Court for submitting a significantly sub-par motion, one

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 5 of 10
 Notably, Defendants did not argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with 5

respect to any or all of Mr. Dalie’s claims. 

6

might have expected the Defendants to devote the requisite effort to present a comprehensible,

organized, adequately-researched, and reasoned motion for summary judgment if they

determined to continue with pretrial motion practice. They did not. 

The motion for summary judgment is woefully deficient. It contains two paltry

arguments that, Defendants claim, warrant granting summary judgment in their favor with

respect to all of Mr. Dalie’s claims. 

First, Defendants argue that Mr. Dalie’s excessive force claim must be dismissed, citing

one case. Without providing any legal analysis to support their argument, the Defendants

summarily conclude that “[t]he facts show that there is no factual dispute that Plaintiff was not

subjected to excessive force and only reasonable force was used as necessary to subdue his

aggressive behavior.” (Def. Mot. Summ. J. at 3.) 

Next, Defendants argue that Mr. Dalie’s due process claims must be dismissed. Again,

without providing any actual legal analysis, Defendants merely state that Mr. Dalie has “alleged

no liberty interest triggering Constitutional protection and no retaliation.” The text of 5

Defendants’ “legal arguments” consists of approximately 130 words. In this instance, brevity is

not a virtue. 

At the summary judgment phase, the moving party’s initial obligation is to inform the

Court of the basis for its motion and identify those portions of the record that it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In

this case, the “record” entirely consists of four affidavits submitted by Correctional Officers

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 6 of 10
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “a corrections officer’s failure to 6

intervene in a beating can be the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under §

1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do

so.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002); see Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d

335 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment standards

apply to a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim arising in the context of a prison disturbance). 

It is not inconceivable that the same non-intervention can form the basis of actionable claims

under other constitutional provisions. 

7

Goodwin, Schaible, Jones and McMillan, respectively. The affidavits submitted by Officers

Goodwin, Schaible, and Jones – the three officers who are alleged to have participated in, or

witnessed, the alleged altercation with Mr. Dalie – are essentially verbatim echoes of each other. 

In other words, according to Defendants, Officers Goodwin, Schaible, and Jones have exactly the

same recollection of the altercation, use identical language to describe their recollections of the

altercation, and formed the same opinion of their use of force under the circumstances. None of

the Defendants endeavored to describe the altercation with Mr. Dalie in any detail, or to describe

their conduct under the circumstances with any precision. 

Notwithstanding Mr. Dalie’s allegations that Officers Goodwin and Jones kicked him,

punched him, beat him while he was on the ground, and hit him with brass keys, and that Officer

Schaible watched the other officers beat Mr. Dalie but failed to intervene, these Defendants’

6

affidavits attempt to rebut Mr. Dalie’s allegations merely by stating that the officers used

“reasonable force . . . to subdue” Mr. Dalie, and that “[a]t no time was any unnecessary force

used” by any of the Defendants during this altercation. (H. Goodwin Aff., J. Jones Aff., K.

Schaible Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) Despite the Defendants’ expected opinions that the force they used was

“reasonable” and was not “unnecessary,” where a plaintiff alleges actual injury inflicted by a

corrections officer during the course of an altercation with corrections officers, “and supports his

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 7 of 10
 The “pivotal inquiry” in examining an inmate’s excessive force claim under § 1983 is 7

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002). The

Supreme Court articulated the following factors to guide this inquiry, including: “(1) the need for

the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was

used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and

inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them;

and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 321 (1986). 

Although Defendants did recite these factors, they made no effort to walk the Court

through the analysis needed to establish that their conduct did not constitute excessive force, or

that Mr. Dalie has failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s

Complaint includes allegations of a possibly brutal beating at the hands of prison corrections

officers. Because summary judgment in favor of a defendant is not appropriate if “it appears that

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference

of wantonness in the infliction of pain,” the Court is obligated to deny the defense motion.

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322; see Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).

8

allegation with specific facts so that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the use of force was

objectively reasonable, the issue of whether excessive force was employed must be left to the

trier of fact.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004). Defendants’ affidavits have 7

served merely to highlight for the Court that issues of fact remain that preclude granting

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor with respect to Mr. Dalie’s excessive force claim.

With respect to the Defendants’ arguments that Mr. Dalie’s due process claims also must

fail, the Defendants have attempted to satisfy their summary judgment burden by offering only

the conclusory statement that “there are no facts” that support Mr. Dalie’s due process claims. 

(Def. Mot. Summ. J. at 3.) However, the Court finds that the Defendants have failed to meet

their initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Quite simply, “[i]t

is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with

a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.” Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion will be denied with respect

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 8 of 10
9

to Mr. Dalie’s due process claims as well. It will not be necessary for Mr. Dalie to respond to the

motion because the motion did not meet the required standards in any respect. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be

denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum follows. 

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 9 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GEORGE DALIE, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

J. JONES, ET AL. :

Defendants. : No. 04-5884

O R D E R 

AND NOW, this 4th day of December, 2007, upon consideration of the Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 31), to which no response has been filed and no

response will be required, it is ORDERED that the Motion (Docket No. 31) is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

S/Gene E.K. Pratter

GENE E.K. PRATTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-05884-CDJ Document 35 Filed 12/05/07 Page 10 of 10