Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-709 | April 19, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Ruth Johnson

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

Michael C. Borschel

Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Adrian Anthony,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 19, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1506-CR-709

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

Lisa F. Borges, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1312-MR-77010

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Adrian Anthony (“Anthony”) was convicted after a jury trial of murder,1 a 

felony, robbery2 as a Class A felony, and carrying a handgun without a license3

as a Class A misdemeanor and was sentenced to sixty-two years. He appeals 

his convictions and raises the following restated issue for our review: whether 

the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that Anthony had 

possessed and fired the murder weapon eight days before the present crime 

because, he asserts, the evidence was inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 

404(b).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 27, 2013, Ron Gibson (“Ron”) and his brother Robbie Gibson 

(“Robbie”) were working together on a duplex they were remodeling on Gray 

Street in Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana. The brothers had started work 

that day at around 9:00 a.m. At some point later that day, when the brothers 

were working on the porch area of the duplex, two men, later identified as 

Anthony and Christopher Bell (“Bell”), walked into the front yard of the home. 

They were both wearing black hooded sweatshirts. Ron had previously seen 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). We note that the statutes under which Anthony was charged were amended 

effective July 1, 2014. However, he committed his offenses in November 2013, and we apply the statutes in 

effect at that time. 

2

See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. 

3

See Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1. 
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Anthony walking around the neighborhood during the prior two weeks. 

Anthony asked for a cigarette, and Ron replied that he did not have any 

cigarettes and that he was waiting on his boss. Anthony then asked “where the 

weed was at,” and Ron stated that he did not know because he did not smoke. 

Tr. at 22. 

[4] At this point, Ron assumed that the two men would leave, but instead, they 

walked onto the porch. Once on the porch, Anthony pulled out a handgun and 

told the brothers that he “didn’t want no weed and he didn’t want a cigarette, 

that it was a robbery.” Id. at 23. Anthony pointed the gun at Robbie and took 

his wallet. Anthony handed the wallet to Bell and then told Ron to empty his 

pockets. Anthony approached Ron and held the gun to the back of Ron’s neck 

when Ron told him he had nothing in his pockets. Anthony checked Ron’s 

pockets and found Ron’s cell phone. He demanded that Ron show him how to 

unlock the phone with a special pattern. At that time, Anthony stated to Ron, 

“I’m going to give you to the count of five and I’m going to shoot you,” and he 

began counting down, “Five, four, three.” Id. at 30-31. 

[5] At the same time, a truck full of ladders and pulling a trailer turned onto Gray 

Street. Anthony asked Ron if it was Ron’s boss, and he answered that it was. 

As the truck approached, Ron began yelling at it for help, causing the truck to 

slow down, and Anthony put the gun into his hooded sweatshirt. Bell ran 

across the street, and Anthony began to pace in the middle of the porch near 

Robbie. Ron also ran from the porch and across the street. As he got to the 

middle of the street, he saw Robbie’s wallet on the ground. At that time, he 
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heard a gunshot and heard Robbie screaming, “Ronnie, he shot me.” Id. at 32. 

Ron saw Robbie fall to the ground and saw Anthony flee from the porch in the 

same direction Bell had run. 

[6] The police arrived at the scene, and Ron gave them a description of Bell and 

Anthony. Robbie was taken to the hospital, where he later died. Once police 

obtained a description of the men, they set up a perimeter of two to three blocks 

in every direction around the scene of the crime. Shortly thereafter, an officer 

saw two men matching the suspects’ descriptions. These two men, later 

identified as Bell and Anthony, saw the police vehicle and ran to a nearby 

church. They tried to open the doors to the church, but the church was locked. 

The officer ordered Bell and Anthony to the ground, and both turned to the 

officer with their hands up. Bell complied, and the officer was able to 

apprehend him; however, Anthony fled the scene. Ron was brought to the 

location, and a show-up identification was conducted, in which Ron was 

unable to identify Bell as one of the perpetrators. Bell was released and walked 

away from the area.

[7] At the scene of the robbery and shooting, police found a fired nine millimeter 

cartridge casing. In their investigation, the police obtained information about 

Ron’s stolen cell phone, and were able to track the phone to Terre Haute, 

Indiana, where they discovered that Bell had traveled by Greyhound bus. The 

police were able to get a potential address for Bell in Terre Haute, and on 

November 29, 2013, they arrested him at that address. The police found Ron’s 

stolen cell phone inside of the apartment where Bell had been found. While the 
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police were searching for Bell in Terre Haute, they were also searching for 

Anthony in Indianapolis, and on November 30, Anthony was arrested. Ron 

was able to identify both Bell and Anthony after looking at a photographic 

array.

[8] The State charged Anthony with two counts of murder,4 Class A felony 

robbery, and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Prior 

to the trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence, stating that it 

intended to introduce evidence that, in addition to the instant crime, Anthony 

had also been charged with Class A felony attempted robbery resulting from 

events that transpired on November 19, 2013. Appellant’s App. at 62. The State 

sought to present evidence that, on that date, Anthony had fired a single shot 

during an attempted robbery and that the nine millimeter cartridge casing in 

that case matched the one from the present case. Id. The State was seeking to 

“introduce this evidence as proof of identity of the murderer and access to the 

murder weapon.” Id. 

[9] At the hearing on the motion, the State informed the trial court that it did not 

“necessarily believe that access to the murder weapon is considered 404(b)” and 

that it would “tailor the evidence . . . [it presented] to be that the witnesses 

would . . . [identify Anthony] as possessing the gun on November 19” and that 

the casing from that incident matched the casing recovered in the present case. 

 

4 The State charged Anthony under two different subsections of Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1 for the same 

crime. 
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Tr. at 564-65. Anthony objected to this evidence being introduced, but the trial 

court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be introduced. 

Anthony requested that a limiting instruction be given, and the trial court 

agreed to do so. At trial, the State called two witnesses to testify about the 

November 19 incident, to which Anthony objected. During final instructions, 

the trial court gave the following limiting instruction:

Evidence has been introduced that the Defendant was involved 

in conduct other than that charged in the information. This 

evidence has been received solely on the issue of Defendant’s 

identity. This evidence should be considered by you only for that 

limited purpose.

Appellant’s App. at 110. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Anthony 

guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered 

judgment of conviction on only one count of murder, one count of Class A 

felony robbery, and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a 

license. Anthony was given an aggregate sentence of sixty-two years executed, 

and he now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

(citing Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. We 

reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 
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and circumstances. Id. Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of 

discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Id.

[11] Anthony argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the 

State to introduce prior bad act evidence in violation of Indiana Evidence Rules 

403 and 404(b). He contends that the trial court erred because it did not 

specifically find that the State sufficiently proved that he shot a handgun on 

November 19, 2013. Specifically, Anthony asserts that the “quantity and 

quality of the information from the two prior bad act witnesses [was] minimal” 

and did not establish a signature crime. Appellant’s Br. at 12. He further claims 

the slight probative value of this evidence was greatly outweighed by the unfair 

prejudice and, therefore, should have been excluded. 

[12] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 

action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 

purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” The rationale behind this 

evidentiary rule is that the jury is precluded from making the “forbidden 

inference” that the defendant had a criminal propensity and therefore 

committed the charged conduct. Rhodes v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. 1997)), 

trans. denied. To determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, “the 

court must (1) determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the 
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charged act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its 

prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.” Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 

160 (Ind. 2000). This court has held that “[e]vidence that a defendant had 

access to a weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue 

other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. 

State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

[13] Here, the State introduced evidence that, eight days before the murder and

robbery in this case, Anthony had possession of and fired the weapon used to 

shoot Robbie. This evidence that Anthony had access to the weapon used to 

kill Robbie was relevant as to whether Anthony murdered Robbie and was not 

merely evidence of Anthony’s propensity to commit the charges crimes. Thus, 

the evidence regarding the events of November 19 was relevant to show that 

Anthony had access to the weapon used in Robbie’s murder. 

[14] Anthony argues that the probative value of the evidence was slight, and the 

danger of unfair prejudice greatly outweighed this slight probative value. We 

disagree. Possession of the murder weapon eight days prior to the murder is 

highly probative. The trial court attempted to limit any unfair prejudice by not 

allowing any inquiry into the specific details of Anthony’s attempted robbery on 

November 19. Tr. at 350-60, 571. Additionally, the trial court gave a limiting 

instruction regarding the challenged evidence in the present case that sought to 

limit the purpose of the evidence to prove the identity of Anthony. Appellant’s 

App. at 110. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence of the events of 

November 19 were relevant to prove an issue other than his propensity to 
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commit the present crime and the possibility of unfair prejudice was 

outweighed by the probative value of the evidence that, a mere eight days 

before the murder of Robbie, Anthony had access to the weapon used to 

commit the murder.

[15] Anthony, however, asserts that the trial court erred in not applying the threestep analysis in Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 2009). In that case, our 

Supreme Court stated that, “the law governing the admissibility of specific acts 

evidence for ‘other purposes’ requires a trial court to make three findings”: (1) 

that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue 

other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; (2) that the 

proponent has sufficiently proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act; and (3)

that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect pursuant 

to Rule 403. Id. at 223. We conclude that the evidence was also admissible 

under this three-step analysis.

[16] Under the first step, Indiana courts have held that evidence of access to a 

weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the 

defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act. Pickens, 764 N.E.2d at 299. 

Here, the evidence of the events of November 19, 2013 was introduced to 

establish that Anthony had access to the murder weapon. As to the second 

step, sufficient evidence was presented that Anthony was the person who 

committed the acts of November 19. Two eye witnesses identified Anthony as 

possessing and firing a weapon on November 19, and a firearms expert testified 
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that the casing from the attempted robbery on November 19 was fired from the 

same weapon as the casing found at the scene of Robbie’s murder. Tr. at 351-

53, 359, 368-70. Lastly, as to the third step, evidence that Anthony had 

possession of the murder weapon just eight days prior to the murder was highly 

probative, and the trial court took measures to limit the prejudice of this 

evidence by restricting the evidence allowed regarding the November 19 

incident and giving a limiting instruction. Therefore, the possibility of any 

unfair prejudice was outweighed by the high probative value of the evidence. 

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence that Anthony possessed and fired the murder weapon eight days prior 

to the murder.

[17] Affirmed.

[18] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.