Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE Must Address 

Significant Issues to Meet 

the Requirements of the 

New Design Basis Threat 

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment Team 

GAO-04-773T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-773T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robin M. 

Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841 or 

nazzaror@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-773T, a testimony to 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, House of Representatives 

May 2004

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE Must Address Significant Issues to 

Meet the Requirements of the New Design 

Basis Threat 

DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of 

themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE’s sites are 

adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat 

present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO found: 

• DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in 

developing an intelligence community assessment—known as the 

Postulated Threat—of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, 

(2) DOE’s lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, 

and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations 

over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the 

availability of resources to meet these threats. 

• While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the 

previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less 

than the threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated 

Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT 

identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or 

biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for 

determining when facilities may need to be protected against these 

forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical 

sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to “industry standards;” 

however, such standards currently do not exist. In response to these 

concerns, DOE has recently agreed to reexamine some of the key 

aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. 

• DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as 

issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT 

implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, 

that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in 

the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE’s deadline to meet 

the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is 

probably not realistic for some sites. 

A successful terrorist attack on 

Department of Energy (DOE) sites 

containing nuclear weapons or the 

material used in nuclear weapons 

could have devastating 

consequences for the site and its 

surrounding communities. 

Because of these risks, DOE needs 

an effective safeguards and 

security program. A key 

component of an effective program 

is the design basis threat (DBT), a 

classified document that identifies, 

among other things, the potential 

size and capabilities of terrorist 

forces. The terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, rendered the 

then-current DBT obsolete, 

resulting in DOE issuing a new 

version in May 2003. 

GAO (1) identified why DOE took 

almost 2 years to develop a new 

DBT, (2) analyzed the higher threat 

in the new DBT, and (3) identified 

remaining issues that need to be 

resolved in order for DOE to meet 

the threat contained in the new 

DBT. 
Page 1 GAO-04-773T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on physical security at 

the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA)—a separately organized agency within DOE. 

DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site 

containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons—

called special nuclear material—could have devastating consequences for 

the site and its surrounding communities. Because terrorist attacks against 

sites that contain special nuclear material could have such devastating 

consequences, DOE’s effective management of the safeguards and security 

program, which includes developing safeguards and security policies, is 

essential to preventing an unacceptable, adverse impact on national 

security.1

 For many years, DOE has employed risk-based security 

practices. To manage potential risks, DOE has developed a design basis 

threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the potential size and 

capabilities of terrorist forces. DOE’s DBT is based on an intelligence 

community assessment known as the Postulated Threat. DOE requires the 

contractors operating its sites to provide sufficient protective forces and 

equipment to defend against the threat contained in the DBT. The DBT in 

effect on September 11, 2001, had been DOE policy since June 1999. DOE 

replaced the 1999 DBT in May 2003 to better reflect the current and 

projected terrorist threats that resulted from the September 11, 2001, 

attacks. 

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, we reviewed physical 

security at DOE sites that have facilities with Category I special nuclear 

material. Category I special nuclear material includes specified quantities 

of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in forms of assembled nuclear 

weapons and test devices, major nuclear components, and other highgrade materials such as solutions and oxides. Specifically, we examined, 

among other things, (1) the reasons DOE needed almost 2 years to develop 

a new DBT; (2) the higher threat contained in the new DBT; and (3) the 

 1

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its 

Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003). 
Page 2 GAO-04-773T 

remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to fully defend 

against the threat contained in the new DBT.2

To carry out our objectives, we reviewed draft DBTs, the final May 2003 

DBT, and DOE policy and planning documents, including orders, 

implementation guidance, and reports. We met with officials from DOE 

and NNSA headquarters and field offices. We obtained information 

primarily from DOE’s Office of Security, Office of Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance, and Office of Environmental Management; 

NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security; and NNSA’s Nuclear 

Safeguards and Security Program. We visited all three of NNSA’s three 

design laboratories and its two production plants that possess Category I 

special nuclear material, as well as NNSA’s Office of Secure 

Transportation. We also visited the four EM sites that, at the time, 

contained Category I special nuclear materials. At each site we met with 

both federal and contractor officials and reviewed pertinent supporting 

documentation. We also discussed postulated terrorist threats to nuclear 

weapon facilities with two Department of Defense (DOD) organizations: 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

We also reviewed The Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon 

Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities, henceforth referred to 

as the Postulated Threat, which is the intelligence community’s January 

2003 official assessment of potential terrorist threats to nuclear weapon 

facilities. 

We performed our work from December 2001 through May 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, we found that while DOE has taken some important actions 

in its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE 

struggled to develop its new DBT. The DBT that DOE ultimately 

developed, however, is substantially more demanding than the previous 

one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE wants to 

implement new protective strategies within 2 years, DOE must press 

forward with additional actions to ensure that it is fully prepared to 

 2

We testified on these issues before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, on June 

24, 2003. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: DOE’s Response to the 

September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, GAO-03-898TC (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 
Page 3 GAO-04-773T 

provide a timely and cost effective defense of its most sensitive facilities. 

Specifically, we found the following: 

• Development of the new DBT took almost 2 years because of (1) delays in 

developing an intelligence community assessment—known as the 

Postulated Threat—of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) 

DOE’s lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) 

sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the 

size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of 

resources to meet these threats. 

• While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the 

previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less 

than the threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated 

Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT 

identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or 

biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for 

determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms 

of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the 

2003 DBT requires sites to protect to “industry standards;” however, such 

standards currently do not exist. 

• DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as 

issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT 

implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that 

may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the 

new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE’s deadline to meet the 

requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not 

realistic for some sites. 

In our recent report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant 

Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat (GAO-04-623), 

we made seven recommendations to the Secretary of Energy that are 

intended to strengthen DOE’s ability to meet the requirements of the new 

DBT, improve the department’s ability to deal with future terrorist threats, 

and better inform Congress on departmental progress in meeting the 

threat contained in the new DBT and reducing risks to critical facilities at 

DOE sites. DOE said that the department would consider these 

recommendations as part of its Departmental Management Challenges for 

2004. DOE has identified the DBT as a major departmental initiative within 

the National Security Management Challenge. Recently, in response to our 

recommendations, DOE agreed to reexamine some of the key aspects and 

assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. 
Page 4 GAO-04-773T 

Category I special nuclear materials are present at the three design 

laboratories—the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New 

Mexico; the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, 

California; and the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico—and two production sites—the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, 

and the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, operated by NNSA. Special 

nuclear material is also present at former production sites, including the 

Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the Hanford 

Site in Richland, Washington. These former sites are now being cleaned up 

by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM).3

 Furthermore, 

NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation transports these materials among 

the sites and between the sites and DOD bases. Contractors operate each 

site for DOE.4

 NNSA and EM have field offices collocated with each site. In 

fiscal year 2004, NNSA and EM expect to spend nearly $900 million on 

physical security at their sites.5

 Physical security combines security 

equipment, personnel, and procedures to protect facilities, information, 

documents, or material against theft, sabotage, diversion, or other criminal 

acts. 

In addition to NNSA and EM, DOE has other important security 

organizations. DOE’s Office of Security develops and promulgates orders 

and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department’s safeguards and 

security programs. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and 

Performance Assurance supports the department by, among other things, 

independently evaluating the effectiveness of contractors’ performance in 

safeguards and security. It also performs follow-up reviews to ensure that 

contractors have taken effective corrective actions and appropriately 

addressed weaknesses in safeguards and security. Under a recent 

reorganization, these two offices were incorporated into the new Office of 

 3

At the time of our review, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Rocky Flats, 

Colorado, was in the process of shipping its remaining Category I special nuclear material 

primarily to the Savannah River Site. This has now been completed. In addition, 

responsibility for the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, in Idaho 

Falls, Idaho, which is also a Category I special nuclear material site, was transferred from 

DOE’s EM to DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy in May 2003. 

4

Federal employees instead of contractors operate the assets of the Office of Secure 

Transportation. 

5

Other DOE program offices, such as the Office of Science and Office of Nuclear Energy 

operate sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. In fiscal year 2004, these 

program offices expect to spend $118 million on security. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-773T 

Security and Safety Performance Assurance. Each office, however, retains 

its individual missions, functions, structure, and relationship to the other. 

The risks associated with Category I special nuclear materials vary but 

include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or test device at or near design 

yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a 

nuclear yield, theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon, and the potential 

for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal. Because of these risks, 

DOE has long employed risk-based security practices. 

The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security 

practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the 

characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. The DBT has been 

traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence community 

assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. 

The DBT considers a variety of threats in addition to the terrorist threat. 

Other adversaries considered in the DBT include criminals, psychotics, 

disgruntled employees, violent activists, and spies. The DBT also considers 

the threat posed by insiders, those individuals who have authorized, 

unescorted access to any part of DOE facilities and programs. Insiders 

may operate alone or may assist an adversary group. Insiders are routinely 

considered to provide assistance to the terrorist groups found in the DBT. 

The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat 

contained in the DBT. 

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted 

protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all 

protective systems at DOE’s most sensitive sites employ a defense-indepth concept that includes sensors, physical barriers, hardened facilities 

and vaults, and heavily armed paramilitary protective forces equipped with 

such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, 

and chemical protective gear. 

Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE Category I special 

nuclear material sites are designed to accomplish the following objectives 

in response to the terrorist threat: 

• Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, such as the 

creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may employ a protection 

strategy that requires the engagement and neutralization of adversaries 

before they can acquire hands-on access to the assets. 
Page 6 GAO-04-773T 

• Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices that terrorists 

might seek to steal, DOE requires the prevention and/or neutralization of 

the adversaries before they can complete a specific task, such as stealing 

such devices. 

• Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear material (instead 

of a nuclear weapon) is the likely terrorist objective, DOE requires that 

adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that DOE protective 

forces recapture the material as soon as possible. This objective requires 

the use of specially trained and well-equipped special response teams. 

The effectiveness of the protective system is formally and regularly 

examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is 

a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative 

techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective 

protection of specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct 

such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, 

such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and 

force-on-force performance testing, in which the site’s protective forces 

undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. 

The results of these assessments are documented at each site in a 

classified document known as the Site Safeguards and Security Plan. In 

addition to identifying known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection 

strategies for the site, the Site Safeguards and Security Plan formally 

acknowledges how much risk the contractor and DOE are willing to 

accept. Specifically, for more than a decade, DOE has employed a risk 

management approach that seeks to direct resources to its most critical 

assets—in this case Category I special nuclear material—and mitigate the 

risks to these assets to an acceptable level. Levels of risk—high, medium, 

and low—are assigned classified numerical values and are derived from a 

mathematical equation that compares a terrorist group’s capabilities with 

the overall effectiveness of the crucial elements of the site’s protective 

forces and systems. 

Historically, DOE has striven to keep its most critical assets at a low risk 

level and may insist on immediate compensatory measures should a 

significant vulnerability develop that increases risk above the low risk 

level. Compensatory measures could include such things as deploying 

additional protective forces or curtailing operations until the asset can be 

better protected. In response to a September 2000 DOE Inspector 

General’s report recommending that DOE establish a policy on what 

actions are required once high or moderate risk is identified, in September 
Page 7 GAO-04-773T 

2003, DOE’s Office of Security issued a policy clarification stating that 

identified high risks at facilities must be formally reported to the Secretary 

of Energy or Deputy Secretary within 24 hours. In addition, under this 

policy clarification, identified high and moderate risks require corrective 

actions and regular reporting. 

Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its 

safeguards and security policies are being complied with and are 

performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and 

are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. DOE Orders also 

require field offices to comprehensively survey contractors’ operations for 

safeguards and security every year. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance provides yet another check through its 

comprehensive inspection program. All deficiencies identified during 

surveys and inspections require the contractors to take corrective action. 

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized 

that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a 1998 

intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. The September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger groups of terrorists, larger vehicle 

bombs, and broader terrorist aspirations to cause mass casualties and 

panic than were envisioned in the 1999 DOE DBT. However, formally 

recognizing these new threats by updating the DBT was difficult and took 

21 months because of delays in issuing the Postulated Threat, debates over 

the size of the future threat and the cost to meet it, and the DOE policy 

process. 

As mentioned previously, DOE’s new DBT is based on a study known as 

the Postulated Threat, which was developed by the U.S. intelligence 

community. The intelligence community originally planned to complete 

the Postulated Threat by April 2002; however, the document was not 

completed and officially released until January 2003, about 9 months 

behind the original schedule. According to DOE and DOD officials, this 

delay resulted from other demands placed on the intelligence community 

after September 11, 2001, as well as from sharp debates among the 

organizations developing the Postulated Threat over the size and 

capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to meet 

these threats. 

While waiting for the new Postulated Threat, DOE developed several 

drafts of its new DBT. During this process, debates, similar to those that 

occurred during the development of the Postulated Threat, emerged in 

Development of the 

New DBT Took 

Almost 2 Years 

Because of Delays in 

Developing the 

Postulated Threat and 

DOE’s Lengthy 

Review and Comment 

Process 
Page 8 GAO-04-773T 

DOE. Like the participants responsible for developing the Postulated 

Threat, during the development of the DBT, DOE officials debated the size 

of the future terrorist threat and the costs to meet it. DOE officials at all 

levels told us that concern over resources played a large role in developing 

the 2003 DBT, with some officials calling the DBT the “funding basis 

threat,” or the maximum threat the department could afford. This tension 

between threat size and resources is not a new development. According to 

a DOE analysis of the development of prior DBTs, political and budgetary 

pressures and the apparent desire to reduce the requirements for the size 

of protective forces appear to have played a significant role in determining 

the terrorist group numbers contained in prior DBTs. 

Finally, DOE developed the DBT using DOE’s policy process, which 

emphasizes developing consensus through a review and comment process 

by program offices, such as EM and NNSA. However, many DOE and 

contractor officials found that the policy process for developing the new 

DBT was laborious and not timely, especially given the more dangerous 

threat environment that has existed since September 11, 2001. As a result, 

during the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only 

required to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT, 

which, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized was 

obsolete. 

While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the 

previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less 

than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community’s 

Postulated Threat. The Postulated Threat estimated that the force 

attacking a nuclear weapons site would probably be a relatively small 

group of terrorists, although it was possible that an adversary might use a 

greater number of terrorists if that was the only way to attain an important 

strategic goal. In contrast to the Postulated Threat, DOE is preparing to 

defend against a significantly smaller group of terrorists attacking many of 

its facilities. Specifically, only for its sites and operations that handle 

nuclear weapons is DOE currently preparing to defend against an 

attacking force that approximates the lower range of the threat identified 

in the Postulated Threat. For its other Category I special nuclear material 

sites, all of which fall under the Postulated Threat’s definition of a nuclear 

weapons site, DOE is requiring preparations to defend against a terrorist 

force significantly smaller than was identified in the Postulated Threat. 

DOE calls this a graded threat approach. 

The May 2003 DBT 

Identifies a Larger 

Terrorist Threat, but 

in Most Cases is Less 

Than the Terrorist 

Threat Identified by 

the Postulated Threat 
Page 9 GAO-04-773T 

Some of these other sites, however, may have improvised nuclear device 

concerns that, if successfully exploited by terrorists, could result in a 

nuclear detonation. Nevertheless, under the graded threat approach, DOE 

requires these sites only to be prepared to defend against a smaller force 

of terrorists than was identified by the Postulated Threat. Officials in 

DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance 

disagreed with this approach and noted that sites with improvised nuclear 

device concerns should be held to the same requirements as facilities that 

possess nuclear weapons and test devices since the potential worst-case 

consequence at both types of facilities would be the same—a nuclear 

detonation. Other DOE officials and an official in DOD’s Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence disagreed with the overall graded threat approach, 

believing that the threat should not be embedded in the DBT by adjusting 

the number of terrorists that might attack a particular target. 

DOE Office of Security officials cited three reasons for why the 

department departed from the Postulated Threat’s assessment of the 

potential size of terrorist forces. First, these officials stated that they 

believed that the Postulated Threat only applied to sites that handled 

completed nuclear weapons and test devices. However, both the 2003 

Postulated Threat, as well as the preceding 1998 Postulated Threat, state 

that the threat applies to nuclear weapons and special nuclear material 

without making any distinction between them. Second, DOE Office of 

Security officials believed that the higher threat levels contained in the 

2003 Postulated Threat represented the worst potential worldwide 

terrorist case over a 10-year period. These officials noted that while some 

U.S. assets, such as military bases, are located in parts of the world where 

terrorist groups receive some support from local governments and 

societies thereby allowing for an expanded range of capabilities, DOE 

facilities are located within the United States, where terrorists would have 

a more difficult time operating. Furthermore, DOE Office of Security 

officials stated that the DBT focuses on a nearer-term threat of 5 years. As 

such, DOE Office of Security officials said that they chose to focus on 

what their subject matter experts believed was the maximum, credible, 

near-term threat to their facilities. However, while the 1998 Postulated 

Threat made a distinction between the size of terrorist threats abroad and 

those within the United States, the 2003 Postulated Threat, reflecting the 

potential implications of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, did not 

make this distinction. Finally, DOE Office of Security officials stated that 

the Postulated Threat document represented a reference guide instead of a 

policy document that had to be rigidly followed. The Postulated Threat 

does acknowledge that it should not be used as the sole consideration to 
Page 10 GAO-04-773T 

dictate specific security requirements and that decisions regarding 

security risks should be made and managed by decision makers in policy 

offices. However, DOE has traditionally based its DBT on the Postulated 

Threat. For example, the prior DBT, issued in 1999, adopted exactly the 

same terrorist threat size as was identified by the 1998 Postulated Threat. 

Finally, the department’s criteria for determining the severity of 

radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. For 

example, the criterion used for protection against radiological sabotage is 

based on acute radiation dosages received by individuals. However, this 

criterion may not fully capture or characterize the damage that a major 

radiological dispersal at a DOE site might cause. For example, according 

to a March 2002 DOE response to a January 23, 2002, letter from 

Representative Edward J. Markey, a worst-case analysis at one DOE site 

showed that while a radiological dispersal would not pose immediate, 

acute health problems for the general public, the public could experience 

measurable increases in cancer mortality over a period of decades after 

such an event. Moreover, releases at the site could also have 

environmental consequences requiring hundreds of millions to billions of 

dollars to clean up. Contamination could also affect habitability for tens of 

miles from the site, possibly affecting hundreds of thousands of residents 

for many years. Likewise, the same response showed that a similar event 

at a NNSA site could result in a dispersal of plutonium that could 

contaminate several hundred square miles and ultimately cause thousands 

of cancer deaths. For chemical sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT requires 

sites to protect to industry standards. However, we reported March 2003 

year that such standards currently do not exist.6

 Specifically, we found 

that no federal laws explicitly require chemical facilities to assess 

vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities against 

a terrorist attack. Finally, the protection criteria for biological sabotage 

are based on laboratory safety standards developed by the U.S. Centers for 

Disease Control and not physical security standards. 

In response to our concerns, DOE recently agreed to reexamine some of 

the key aspects and assumptions of the May 2003 DBT. DOE expects to 

complete this review by June 30, 2004. 

 6

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under 

Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown, 

GAO-03-439 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2003). 
Page 11 GAO-04-773T 

While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently resolved 

a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to fully 

meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion and is still 

addressing other issues. Fully resolving all of these issues may take several 

years, and the total cost of meeting the new threats is currently unknown. 

Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the higher threat 

contained in the new DBT for up to several years, these sites should be 

considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they were under 

the old DBT. 

In order to undertake the necessary range of vulnerability assessments to 

accurately evaluate their level of risk under the new DBT and implement 

necessary protective measures, DOE recognized that it had to complete a 

number of key activities. DOE only recently completed three of these key 

activities. First, in February 2004, DOE issued its revised Adversary 

Capabilities List, which is a classified companion document to the DBT, 

that lists the potential weaponry, tactics, and capabilities of the terrorist 

group described in the DBT. This document has been amended to include, 

among other things, heavier weaponry and other capabilities that are 

potentially available to terrorists who might attack DOE facilities. DOE is 

continuing to review relevant intelligence information for possible 

incorporation into future revisions of the Adversary Capabilities List. 

Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation 

guidance. In a July 2003 report, DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance noted that DOE sites had found initial DBT 

implementation guidance confusing. For example, when the Deputy 

Secretary of Energy issued the new DBT in May 2003, the cover memo said 

the new DBT was effective immediately but that much of the DBT would 

be implemented in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. According to a 2003 report 

by the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, many 

DOE sites interpreted this implementation period to mean that they 

should, through fiscal year 2006, only be measured against the previous, 

less demanding 1999 DBT. 

In response to this confusion, the Deputy Secretary issued further 

guidance in September 2003 that called for the following, among other 

things: 

• DOE’s Office of Security to issue more specific guidance by October 22, 

2003, regarding DBT implementation expectations, schedules, and 

requirements. DOE issued this guidance January 30, 2004. 

DOE Has Been Slow 

to Resolve a Number 

of Significant Issues 

That May Affect the 

Ability of its Sites to 

Fully Meet the Threat 

Contained in the New 

DBT 
Page 12 GAO-04-773T 

• Quarterly reports showing sites’ incremental progress in meeting the new 

DBT for ongoing activities. The first series of quarterly progress reports 

may be issued in July 2004. 

• Immediate compliance with the new DBT for new and reactivated 

operations. 

A third important DBT-related issue was just completed in early April 

2004. A special team created in the 2003 DBT, composed of weapons 

designers and security specialists, finalized its report on each site’s 

improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. The results of this report were 

briefed to senior DOE officials in March 2004 and the Deputy Secretary of 

Energy issued guidance, based on this report, to DOE sites in early April 

2004. As a result, some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift 

to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. This special 

team’s report may most affect EM sites because their improvised nuclear 

device potential had not previously been explored. 

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, DOE recently agreed to reexamine some of 

the key aspects and assumptions of the new DBT. DOE expects to 

complete this review by June 30, 2004. If DOE’s reexamination results in a 

revised DBT that contains increases in terrorist threat levels or changed 

assumptions regarding the threats it faces, DOE sites could need 

additional security funding. 

Finally, DOE’s Office of Security has not completed all of the activities 

associated with the new vulnerability assessment methodology it has been 

developing for over a year. DOE’s Office of Security believes this 

methodology, which uses a new mathematical equation for determining 

levels of risk, will result in a more sensitive and accurate portrayal of each 

site’s defenses-in-depth and the effectiveness of sites’ protective systems 

(i.e., physical security systems and protective forces) when compared with 

the new DBT. DOE’s Office of Security decided to develop this new 

equation because its old mathematical equation had been challenged on 

technical grounds and did not give sites credit for the full range of their 

defenses-in-depth. While DOE’s Office of Security completed this equation 

in December 2002, officials from this office believe it will probably not be 

completely implemented at the sites for at least another year for two 

reasons. First, site personnel who implement this methodology will require 

additional training to ensure they are employing it properly. DOE’s Office 

of Security conducted initial training in December 2003, as well as a 

prototype course in February 2004, and has developed a nine-course 

vulnerability assessment certification program. Second, sites will have to 
Page 13 GAO-04-773T 

collect additional data to support the broader evaluation of their 

protective systems against the new DBT. Collecting these data will require 

additional computer modeling and force-on-force performance testing. 

Because of the slow resolution of some of these issues, DOE has not 

developed any official long-range cost estimates or developed any 

integrated, long-range implementation plans for the May 2003 DBT. 

Specifically, neither the fiscal year 2003 nor 2004 budgets contained any 

provisions for DBT implementation costs. However, during this period, 

DOE did receive additional safeguards and security funding through 

budget reprogramming and supplemental appropriations. DOE is using 

most of these additional funds to cover the higher operational costs 

associated with the increased security condition (SECON) measures. DOE 

has gathered initial DBT implementation budget data and has requested 

additional DBT implementation funding in the fiscal year 2005 budget: $90 

million for NNSA, $18 million for the Secure Transportation Asset within 

the Office of Secure Transportation, and $26 million for EM. However, 

DOE officials believe the budget data collected so far has been of generally 

poor quality because most sites have not yet completed the necessary 

vulnerability assessments to determine their resource requirements. 

Consequently, the fiscal year 2006 budget may be the first budget to begin 

to accurately reflect the safeguards and security costs of meeting the 

requirements of the new DBT. 

Reflecting these various delays and uncertainties, in September 2003, the 

Deputy Secretary changed the deadline for DOE program offices, such as 

EM and NNSA, to submit DBT implementation plans from the original 

target of October 2003 to the end of January 2004. NNSA and EM approved 

these plans in February 2004. DOE’s Office of Security has reviewed these 

plans and is planning to provide implementation assistance to sites that 

request it. DOE officials have described these plans as being ambitious in 

terms of the amount of work that has to be done within a relatively short 

time frame and dependent on continued increases in safeguards and 

security funding, primarily for additional protective force personnel. 

However, some plans may be based on assumptions that are no longer 

valid. Revising these plans could require additional resources, as well as 

add time to the DBT implementation process. 

A DOE Office of Budget official told us that current DBT implementation 

cost estimates do not include items such as closing unneeded facilities, 

transporting and consolidating materials, completing line item 

construction projects, and other important activities that are outside of the 

responsibility of the safeguards and security program. For example, EM’s 
Page 14 GAO-04-773T 

Security Director told us that for EM to fully comply with the DBT 

requirements in fiscal year 2006 at one of its sites, it will have to 

• close and de-inventory two facilities, 

• consolidate excess materials into remaining special nuclear materials 

facilities, and 

• move consolidated Category I special nuclear material, which NNSA’s 

Office of Secure Transportation will transport, to another site. 

Likewise, the EM Security Director told us that to meet the DBT 

requirements at another site, EM will have to accelerate the closure of one 

facility and transfer special nuclear material to another facility on the site. 

The costs to close these facilities and to move materials within a site are 

borne by the EM program budget and not by the EM safeguards and 

security budget. Similarly, the costs to transport the material between sites 

are borne by NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation budget and not by 

EM’s safeguards and security budget. A DOE Office of Budget official told 

us that a comprehensive, department-wide approach to budgeting for DBT 

implementation that includes such important program activities as 

described above is needed; however, such an approach does not currently 

exist. 

The department plans to complete DBT implementation by the end of 

fiscal year 2006. However, most sites estimate that it will take 2 to 5 years, 

if they receive adequate funding, to fully meet the requirements of the new 

DBT. During this time, sites will have to conduct vulnerability 

assessments, undertake performance testing, and develop Site Safeguards 

and Security Plans. Consequently, full DBT implementation could occur 

anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008. Some sites may be able 

to move more quickly and meet the department’s deadline of the end of 

fiscal year 2006. 

Because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat 

contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these sites 

should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they 

were under the old DBT. For example, the Office of Independent Oversight 

and Performance Assurance has concluded in recent inspections that at 

least two DOE sites face fundamental and not easily resolved security 

problems that will make meeting the requirements of the new DBT 

difficult. For other DOE sites, their level of risk under the new DBT 
Page 15 GAO-04-773T 

remains largely unknown until they can conduct the necessary 

vulnerability assessments. 

In closing, while DOE struggled to develop its new DBT, the DBT that 

DOE ultimately developed is substantially more demanding than the 

previous one. Because the new DBT is more demanding and because DOE 

wants to implement it by end of fiscal year 2006—a period of about 29 

months—DOE must press forward with a series of additional actions to 

ensure that it is fully prepared to provide a timely and cost effective 

defense of its most sensitive facilities. 

First, because the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks suggested larger 

groups of terrorists with broader aspirations for causing mass casualties 

and panic, we believe that the DBT development process that was used 

requires reexamination. While DOE may point to delays in the 

development of the Postulated Threat as the primary reason for the almost 

2 years it took to develop a new DBT, DOE was also working on the DBT 

itself for most of that time. We believe the difficulty associated with 

developing a consensus using DOE’s traditional policy-making process 

was a key factor in the time it took to develop a new DBT. During this 

extended period, DOE’s sites were only being defended against what was 

widely recognized as an obsolete terrorist threat level. 

Second, we are concerned about two aspects of the resulting DBT. We are 

not persuaded that there is sufficient difference, in its ability to achieve 

the objective of causing mass casualties or creating public panic, between 

the detonation of an improvised nuclear device and the detonation of a 

nuclear weapon or test device at or near design yield that warrants setting 

the threat level at a lower number of terrorists. Furthermore, while we 

applaud DOE for adding additional requirements to the DBT such as 

protection strategies to guard against radiological, chemical, and 

biological sabotage, we believe that DOE needs to reevaluate its criteria 

for terrorist acts of sabotage, especially in the chemical area, to make it 

more defensible from a physical security perspective. We are encouraged 

that the Department has agreed to reexamine the May 2003 DBT. 

Finally, because some sites will be unable to effectively counter the threat 

contained in the new DBT for a period of up to several years, these sites 

should be considered to be at higher risk under the new DBT than they 

were under the old DBT. As a result, DOE needs to take a series of actions 

to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as quickly as possible. To 

accomplish this, it is important for DOE to go about the hard business of a 

comprehensive department-wide approach to implementing needed 
Page 16 GAO-04-773T 

changes in its protective strategy. Because the consequences of a 

successful terrorist attack on a DOE site could be so devastating, we 

believe it is important for DOE to better inform Congress about what sites 

are at high risk and what progress is being made to reduce these risks to 

acceptable levels. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee 

may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Robin M. 

Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. James Noel and Jonathan Gill also made key 

contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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