SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1847-22 

BRIAN LAUL, SR., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

INSTANT AIR HEATING & 

COOLING, and JAIME DEDIOS, 

individually and/or as agent, servant, 

and/or employee of INSTANT AIR 

HEATING & COOLING, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

______________________________

Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided August 22, 2024

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-2297-19.

Thomas W. Matthews argued the cause for appellants 

(Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg, LLC, attorneys; 

Thomas W. Matthews, of counsel and on the briefs).

Kevin L. Parsons argued the cause for respondent 

(Hanus & Parsons, LLC, attorneys; Kevin L. Parsons, 

on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1847-22

PER CURIAM 

Defendants, Instant Air Heating & Cooling (Instant Air), and its 

employee, Jaime Dedios, appeal from a February 16, 2023, order entering a 

$3,367,401.42 judgment in favor of plaintiff Brian Laul, Sr. The judgment 

reflected a jury verdict for injuries plaintiff sustained in an auto accident caused 

by defendants, and followed the entry of a February 3, 2023, order denying 

defendants' motion for a new trial. We affirm. 

We glean these facts from the record. On October 12, 2017, plaintiff was 

driving on the Garden State Parkway when his vehicle was struck by a tire that 

dislodged from a truck owned by Instant Air and driven by Dedios. Plaintiff 

filed a complaint against defendants on March 21, 2019. In the complaint, 

plaintiff alleged he sustained "severe and permanent" injuries because of 

defendants' negligence. On October 15, 2020, the trial judge granted plaintiff's 

unopposed summary judgment motion "as to all issues of liability." As a result, 

the case proceeded to trial on damages only. 

Prior to trial, plaintiff moved in limine to exclude certain evidence. By 

way of background, in addition to the October 12, 2017, automobile accident at 

issue, plaintiff had been involved in two other automobile accidents—the first 

occurred on January 30, 2012, and the second occurred on December 4, 2017. 
3 A-1847-22

In the in limine motion, plaintiff sought to bar all references to the December 4, 

2017, accident and associated medical treatment as well as to "redact[]" all 

questioning about the accident posed to his expert, Dr. Joshua Landa, during a 

July 1, 2021, de bene esse deposition. Defendants opposed the motion. On 

August 6, 2021, the judge denied plaintiff's motion, agreeing with defendants 

that the evidence bore on "the issues of credibility and causation." 

Trial began on December 7, 2022. Plaintiff testified that during the 

October 12, 2017, accident, the tire from defendants' truck struck his vehicle 

"[o]n the passenger bumper, grill, and hood area," resulting in both the driver 

and passenger air bags deploying and hitting plaintiff "in the face," "torso[,] and 

arm." Plaintiff experienced pain in his "neck," "left shoulder, [and] left arm," 

and was taken by his son to the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital 

Emergency Room, where he received a "quick examination and x-ray." 

 A couple weeks later, on October 30, 2017, plaintiff was treated by Dr. 

Sheref Hassan, an orthopedic surgeon at the Landa Spine Orthopedic Center who 

was qualified as an expert in the field of orthopedic medicine. Plaintiff testified 

that he sought treatment because "[he] was in pain" and he was "getting worse." 

Hassan testified that during his evaluation, plaintiff "primarily complain[ed] of 

symptoms going to his left shoulder area." Plaintiff described the shoulder pain 
4 A-1847-22

as "sharp," "sever[e]," and "limiting [at] times." Plaintiff told Hassan that he 

had been in a previous auto accident in 2012 "where he [had] sustained a cervical 

spine fracture, rib fractures, and a left shoulder injury." However, plaintiff 

informed Hassan that after treatment, which included cervical fusion surgery, he 

had a full recovery and "no pain in his left shoulder" until the recent October 12, 

2017, accident.1 

Upon examination, Hassan found "measurable weakness" in plaintiff's left 

shoulder "compared to the other side." Initially, Hassan diagnosed plaintiff with 

"bursitis," "impingement," and "[muscle] strain" in the left shoulder. He 

prescribed "physical therapy," "anti-inflammatory medications," and 

"modif[ied] . . . activities." On November 16, 2017, plaintiff returned to Hassan,

complaining of "localized . . . left shoulder pain." Despite attending physical 

therapy, plaintiff told Hassan "his pain was worsening and he was struggling 

more and more in the use of his shoulder[ and] . . . overhead activities." Hassan 

referred plaintiff for an MRI. 

1

 Plaintiff reported that after the 2012 accident, he received a cervical spine 

MRI on January 30, 2012, and was "diagnosed . . . as having multiple herniated 

discs . . . in his neck that were pressing on the nerves and . . . causing pain to 

emanate out into his arms." Plaintiff underwent cervical fusion surgery on 

February 22, 2012, and continued to receive treatment until approximately 

August 2013, when plaintiff stopped experiencing significant pain. 
5 A-1847-22

 When plaintiff returned to Hassan on December 14, 2017, Hassan 

reviewed plaintiff's December 11, 2017, MRI results and found nothing 

significant in plaintiff's left shoulder that would explain the "severity of 

[plaintiff's] symptoms." Given plaintiff's "prior history of cervical spine surgery 

and fusion," Hassan believed plaintiff's "symptoms may be related to the 

cervical spine pathology," and "referred him for a cervical spine MRI." In 

addition, Hassan referred plaintiff to Landa, "a spine specialist" in the same 

practice. During the December 14, 2017, visit, plaintiff also told Hassan that he 

had been involved in another auto accident on December 4, 2017, during which 

he "hurt [his] nose." However, according to Hassan, there was no change in 

plaintiff's symptoms as a result of the December 4, 2017, accident.2 

On January 11, 2018, plaintiff received a cervical spine MRI. Plaintiff 

returned to Hassan on February 5, 2018, and continued to express the same 

complaints of "pain," "weakness," and "limited motion" in his left shoulder. 

Hassan reviewed the MRI and observed "a substantial disc herniation . . . on the 

2

 Plaintiff testified that during the December 4, 2017, accident, he broke his 

nose "when the air bag deployed," causing "[t]he cover on the steering wheel" 

to strike his face. Plaintiff was taken to Robert Wood Johnson University 

Hospital by ambulance. Although plaintiff reported feeling no other injuries 

besides the broken nose, he was placed in a cervical collar in accordance with 

"standard [hospital] procedure." 
6 A-1847-22

left-hand side, causing pressure on the spine." Hassan believed the MRI 

"explain[ed] a lot of what [plaintiff] was feeling and correspond[ed] to his 

symptoms." Considering plaintiff's history and the fact that he had been 

asymptomatic after the 2012 accident and cervical fusion surgery, Hassan 

opined that the "neck injury" plaintiff sustained in the October 12, 2017, 

accident "caus[ed] his . . . new[-]found symptoms." 

Based on Hassan's referral, Landa, who was qualified as an expert in the 

field of "orthopedic biomechanics and spine surgery," evaluated plaintiff on 

February 22, 2018. The evaluation revealed that plaintiff had "limited painful 

active range of motion of the cervical spine," "tenderness in the palpitation," and 

"muscular spasms." Landa detected "some pinching of a nerve in the neck," 

which sent "a shock of pain . . . down [plaintiff's] left arm" and "numbness in 

his fingers." 

Landa also examined plaintiff's medical records, ranging from 2012 to 

present. Landa noted that plaintiff had consistently complained of "[n]eck pain" 

and "left shoulder pain" at the emergency room immediately following the 

October 12, 2017, accident as well as during the ensuing physical therapy 

sessions. Landa was also aware of plaintiff's December 4, 2017, accident and 

reviewed the medical records associated with that accident, including a CT scan 
7 A-1847-22

of the neck and plaintiff's complaints of "[h]ead" and "facial pain" while at the 

emergency room. Based on his review, Landa opined that the December 4, 2017, 

accident "did[ not] cause any significant neck injury." 

In addition, Landa reviewed plaintiff's 2018 cervical spine MRI, which 

"showed a disc herniation at C5-6 pressing on the nerves on the left." Landa 

compared plaintiff's 2017 MRI with his 2018 cervical spine MRI, noting that 

plaintiff "had a normal shoulder MRI and yet a severe problem . . . [in] the 

cervical spine MRI, . . . ma[king] it quite clear that his problem was not his 

shoulder, but, rather, his neck," which "corresponded with his symptoms and his 

physical examination." Landa also examined plaintiff's 2012 MRI results, where 

the herniation present in the 2018 cervical spine MRI did not appear. 

After some additional confirmatory testing, Landa concluded that plaintiff 

had a "traumatically induced C5-6 disc herniation." Landa opined that plaintiff's 

"[c]ervical disc displacement" was caused by the October 12, 2017, accident and 

that it was "a permanent condition."3 Initially, Landa recommended "cervical 

epidural injection," which plaintiff received. However, Landa acknowledged 

3

 In contrast, defendants' expert, Dr. Wendell Scott, who was also qualified as 

an expert in the field of orthopedic medicine and orthopedic surgery, opined that 

plaintiff "had preexisting disease at the C5-6 level dating back to 2012," which 

condition "was permanent prior to 2017." 
8 A-1847-22

that "the relief would almost certainly be, at best, temporary." Ultimately, when 

plaintiff continued to complain of "persistent severe neck and left upper 

extremity pain, numbness and tingling in his left hand," Landa recommended 

cervical spinal surgery. Plaintiff underwent the surgery on May 24, 2019. 

According to Landa, although the surgery "reduced his pain," plaintiff still has 

"residual pain which will almost certainly persist for the rest of his life" along 

with "some degree of functional limitations." 

At the close of defendants' case, plaintiff twice moved for a directed 

verdict on the issue of causation, arguing defendants had failed to provide 

competent proof that plaintiff's injuries were not caused by the October 12, 

2017, accident. In opposing the motions, defense counsel explained to the judge 

that the defense position throughout the trial had been that "the need for the 

surgery was the result of the December 2017 accident or perhaps it was the result 

of the adjacent segment syndrome." For example, during opening statement, 

defense counsel had asked the jury to focus on "whether there was any diagnosis 

or any treatment . . . in between the October 2017 accident and the December 

2017 accident." During cross-examination, Hassan had been questioned about 

the fact that plaintiff "had been treated strictly for his shoulder" up until 
9 A-1847-22

December 2017, when the treatment switched to his neck. The judge denied 

plaintiff's motions, concluding there was a factual dispute regarding causation. 

During a charge conference conducted prior to closing statements, 

defendants sought to "remove the language instructing [the] jury [that 

defendants bore] the burden of establishing that the injury suffered related to a 

subsequent December accident." Defendants argued the charge improperly 

shifted the burden of proof to the defense on the issue of causation. The judge 

denied the request. 

Thereafter, during summation, defense counsel reiterated that he had 

asked the jurors "to see if there[ was] any treatment for the neck in between the 

October accident and the December accident and there was[ not]." Defense 

counsel also pointed out that although plaintiff "denie[d] that he injured his neck 

in [the December] accident," nonetheless, he was transported to the emergency 

room by ambulance where he was "put . . . in a cervical collar" and underwent 

"a CAT scan of the neck." Additionally, defense counsel stressed that "[i]t [was] 

the defense's position . . . that the neck surgery was not related" to the October 

2017 accident because plaintiff "had no treatment" to his neck "until an accident 

. . . that happened afterwards." 

 Following summations, the judge charged the jury as follows: 
10 A-1847-22

[P]laintiff alleges he sustained permanent injury to his 

cervical spine as a result of the collision and incurred 

medical expenses to treat that injury. Defendant 

disputes the nature and severity of . . . plaintiff's 

damage claim. 

. . . .

The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish 

his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In other 

words, if a person makes an allegation then . . . that 

person must prove the allegation. 

In this action, . . . plaintiff . . . has the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all of 

the facts necessary to prove the following issues: 

The injuries suffered by . . . plaintiff . . . were the 

result of the October 12[], 2017[,] incident and he

suffered and will suffer past and future pain, disability, 

impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life. 

. . . [D]efendants . . . have the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all of 

the facts necessary to prove the following issue: 

The injur[ies] suffered by plaintiff are not the 

result of the incident, but the result of a subsequent 

accident. 

 On December 9, 2022, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. 

Defendants moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1, again objecting to 

the jury instruction that defendants bore the burden of proving that plaintiff's 

injury was caused by the December 2017 accident. Following oral argument 
11 A-1847-22

conducted on February 3, 2023, the judge entered an order denying the motion. 

In an oral opinion, the judge rejected defendants' contention, finding "that there 

ha[d] been no clear and convincing miscarriage of justice . . . warranting a new 

trial," and "[n]o party [had been] prejudiced by the jury charge . . . because it 

clearly outline[d] each party's trial position." 

The judge summarized defendants' arguments as follows: 

[D]efendant[s] move[] for a new trial, arguing there 

was an improper shifting of the burden upon . . . 

defendants to disprove plaintiff's claim. Defendant[s] 

assert[] the . . . jury charges were contradictory and 

confusing because plaintiff bore the burden of proving 

the October 12, 2017[,] incident caused his injury. . . . 

[D]efendants contend the [c]ourt improperly required 

the defense to establish that the December accident was 

the probable cause of plaintiff's injury . . . . 

. . . . 

 Defendants argued that under Rodriguez v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, [66-68] (2019), they 

were raising the possibility, and not the probability, that 

the injury sustained by . . . plaintiff [was] the result of 

or exacerbated by the December 4, 2017, accident. On 

that basis, defendants contend they need not offer any 

competent proof to show a causal relationship between 

injuries sustained by plaintiff and any particular 

incident. 

 

The judge determined that defendants' reliance on Rodriguez was 

misplaced because Rodriguez did not waive defendants' "burden of proof in 
12 A-1847-22

showing the December 4[], 2017[,] accident was a potential cause of plaintiff's 

injuries." According to the judge, "[p]laintiff's burden was to show that the 

October 12, 2017[,] incident caused those injuries and that burden was never 

shifted." On the other hand, "defendants' case sought to demonstrate plaintiff 

was injured or suffered exacerbation of an injury in the subsequent December 4, 

2017[,] accident." 

The judge explained: 

Defendants elicited testimony in crossexamination to create an inference that plaintiff 

suffered neck injuries as a result of the December 

accident. Further, defendants have attempted to create 

an impression that plaintiff['s] injuries sustained in 

2012 were exacerbated not only by the October 

incident, but by some other incident, namely, the 

December accident. Defendants highlighted that 

plaintiff received no treatment to his [n]eck after the 

October [accident], but noted plaintiff did seek 

diagnosis and treatment after the December accident, 

which included the CT scan of his neck. 

Finally, defendants attempted to place into the 

minds of the jurors the possibility that a scan taken after 

the December accident showed progression or 

deterioration of plaintiff’s neck condition existing since 

2012. Again, these assertions imply that defendant

sought to establish a link between the December 

accident and the plaintiff’s injuries or exacerbations 

thereof. Defendants failed to put in competent proof on 

the record to support any of these possibilities, . . . yet 

defendant[s] now seek[] a new trial, arguing their own 
13 A-1847-22

failure to link plaintiff's injuries to the December 

accident are grounds for this relief. 

Although testimony is admissible to show 

possibilities that caused or exacerbated plaintiff's 

injuries, once admitted, defendants bear the burden of 

proving these possibilities by way of competent proof. 

. . . .

. . . Applying defendants' logic, plaintiff would be 

burdened with not only proving his contention, but also 

disproving any abstract possibility raised by defendants 

in the absence of competent proof to support such 

abstract possibilities. Essentially, defendant[s] would 

bear no burden whatsoever. Any unsupported 

allegation would remain for the jury to consider unless 

the plaintiff affirmatively disproved them. It would be 

contrary to the basic principles of the American justice 

system to have a party argue a position for which they 

are not advocating. 

[(Citation omitted).] 

To further support his ruling, the judge also considered the rationale for denying 

"plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict at the close of defendant[s'] case ."

Subsequently, on February 16, 2023, the judge entered a conforming order 

for judgment in plaintiff's favor, and this appeal followed. On appeal, 

defendants reprise the arguments rejected by the judge for our consideration. 

Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we too 

find defendants' arguments unavailing. 
14 A-1847-22

The principles governing our review are well settled. 

"A jury verdict is entitled to considerable 

deference and 'should not be overthrown except upon

the basis of a carefully reasoned and factually 

supported (and articulated) determination, after 

canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that 

the continued viability of the judgment would 

constitute a manifest denial of justice.'" Risko v. 

Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521

(2011) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 

588, 597-98 (1977)). A trial court therefore grants a 

motion for a new trial only "if, having given due regard 

to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the 

credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly 

appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the 

law." Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 511-12 (1994) 

(quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). 

"The standard of review on appeal from decisions 

on motions for a new trial is the same as that governing 

the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of 

justice under the law." Risko, 206 N.J. at 522; accord 

R. 2:10-1 ("The trial court's ruling on such a motion 

shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there 

was a miscarriage of justice under the law."). We have 

explained that a "miscarriage of justice" can arise when 

there is a "manifest lack of inherently credible evidence 

to support the finding," when there has been an 

"obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial 

evidence," or when the case culminates in "a clearly 

unjust result." Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22 (quoting

Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. 

Div. 1996)). 

[Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 385-86 (2018).] 
15 A-1847-22

Defendants seek a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict was the 

result of an erroneous jury charge. Because appropriate and proper jury 

instructions are essential for a fair trial, Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 

N.J. 245, 256 (2015), we have held that a jury instruction that misleads a jury 

may require a reversal and a new trial, Vallejo by Morales v. Rahway Police 

Dep't, 292 N.J. Super. 333, 342 (App. Div. 1996); see also Washington v. Perez, 

219 N.J. 338, 351 (2014) ("Generally, 'erroneous instructions on material points 

are presumed to be reversible error.'" (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting McClelland v. Tucker, 273 N.J. Super. 410, 417 (App. Div. 1994))). 

Indeed, "[a] jury is entitled to an explanation of the applicable legal 

principles and how they are to be applied in light of the parties' contentions and 

the evidence produced in the case." Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 18 

(2002) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 276 N.J. Super. 398, 431 (App. Div. 1994)). 

To that end, "[j]ury charges 'must outline the function of the jury, set forth the 

issues, correctly state the applicable law in understandable language, and plainly 

spell out how the jury should apply the legal principles to the facts as it may 

find them.'" Prioleau, 223 N.J. at 256-57 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Velazquez by Valazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000)). 
16 A-1847-22

"Nonetheless, not every improper jury charge warrants reversal and a new 

trial. 'As a general matter, [appellate courts] will not reverse if an erroneous 

jury instruction was "incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing 

substantial rights."'" Id. at 257 (alteration in original) (quoting Mandal v. Port 

Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 430 N.J. Super. 287, 296 (App. Div. 2013)). Still, "[i]n 

civil matters, the trial court should give an instruction that appropriately guides 

the jury on the legal basis of a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's affirmative 

defense, so long as there is a reasonable factual basis in the evidence to support 

that claim or defense." Walker v. Costco Wholesale Warehouse, 445 N.J. Super. 

111, 120 (App. Div. 2016). 

In our review of a jury charge, we "examine the charge as a whole, rather 

than focus on individual errors in isolation." Viscik, 173 N.J. at 18. "Stated 

differently, an appellate court must consider the language surrounding an 

alleged error in order to determine its true effect." Ibid.; see also Mogull v. CB 

Commer. Real Est. Grp., 162 N.J. 449, 464 (2000) ("There is no reversible error 

'where the charge, considered as a whole, adequately conveys the law and is 

unlikely to confuse or mislead the jury, even though part of the charge, standing 

alone, might be incorrect.'" (quoting Fischer v. Canario, 143 N.J. 235, 254 

(1996))). 
17 A-1847-22

Applying these principles, we discern no basis to intervene. Defendants 

contend the jury charge "misstated" their position because "[they] did not claim 

the injuries were caused by the subsequent accident." Instead, defendants 

proffer that their position "was that . . . Landa failed to properly consider the 

facts of the subsequent accident when formulating his opinion" regarding 

plaintiff's injuries. Thus, defendants reiterate that the "jury charge improperly 

shifted" the burden to them to "prove something that . . . [they] had not argued" 

and "to disprove plaintiff's claims." As such, defendants assert "[t]he 

combination of the misstatement of [their] position" and "the imposition of a 

duty . . . to prove something they had not argued" resulted in a charge that was 

"contradictory," "confusing," and "misleading." 

Our Supreme Court has "long recognized that every defendant, in response 

to an allegation that his negligence has caused injury, possesses the right of 

demonstrating by competent evidence that that injury 'could' have been caused, 

wholly or partly, by an earlier accident or by a pre-existing condition." 

Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 187 (2007) (quoting Paxton v. Misiuk, 34 N.J. 

453, 460-61 (1961)). However, a defendant "must show that the evidence has 

some 'logical relationship to the issue in the case.'" Allendorf v. Kaiserman 

Enters., 266 N.J. Super. 662, 672 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Paxton, 34 N.J. at 
18 A-1847-22

460). "[T]his logical relationship generally must be established by appropriate 

expert medical opinion." Ibid. As such, the defendant must provide "competent 

proof from which it could be found that the injury [at issue] was . . . attributable 

to" a different incident, rather than to just the incident involving the defendant. 

Paxton, 34 N.J. at 461. "The general test of admissibility of such evidence is 

'one of possibility, rather than probability.'" Allendorf, 266 N.J. Super at 673 

(quoting Paxton, 34 N.J. at 461). 

 Here, defendants do not dispute that the judge correctly charged the jury 

that plaintiff had the burden to prove that his injuries were the result of 

defendants' negligence during the October 2017 accident. See Reichert v. 

Vegholm, 366 N.J. Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 2004) ("[T]he general rule is that 

'the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the 

harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Torts, § 433B(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1965))). Instead, despite consistently advocating 

throughout the trial that the December 2017 accident, rather than the October 

2017 accident, caused plaintiff's neck injuries, defendants now assert that they 

"did not argue, either during the motion [to bar] or at trial, that the December 

accident caused the injury," and the jury charge thereby improperly shifted the 

burden of proof to them. Defendants' contention is disingenuous. 
19 A-1847-22

In response to plaintiff's allegation that the October 2017 accident with 

defendants was the sole cause of plaintiff's neck injury, defendants countered 

that the neck injury was likely caused by the later December 2017 accident. 

Although defendants were free to assert that another incident caused or 

otherwise contributed to plaintiff's injuries, see Davidson, 189 N.J. at 187, 

defendants were obligated to support that contention with competent medical 

testimony, Paxton, 34 N.J. at 461, which they failed to do. In fact, defendants 

conceded they had no "[medical] proofs" to support their contention "that the 

December accident caused [plaintiff's] injury." Although defendants produced 

Scott as an expert witness, Scott did not offer an opinion on whether the 

December accident had any effect on plaintiff's condition. 

Absent competent proof, consideration of defendant's position regarding 

the December 2017 accident would have invited the jury to engage in 

unsupported speculation. Based on our examination of the charge as a whole 

and the governing law, we are satisfied the jury instruction properly precluded 

the jury from speculating as to the cause of plaintiff's injuries without 

appropriate corroboration. Thus, the judge correctly denied defendants' motion 

for a new trial on the basis of a purportedly erroneous jury charge. 

Affirmed.