agreed to use a court-assigned parenting coordinator to attempt to resolve 

future disputes. 

Shortly thereafter, appellant had respondent arrested for 

assaulting him, but the state declined to prosecute her. Subsequently, the 

parenting coordinator recommended that appellant undergo a 

psychological evaluation, which appellant refused to do. Thus, on March 

24, 2011, the district court restricted appellant to supervised weekly 

visitation.' On respondent's motion, on June 9, 2011, the district court 

awarded respondent temporary sole legal custody until appellant submits 

to a psychological evaluation, and the court award respondent primary 

physical custody and child support as a result of the change in custody. 2 

On August 29, 2011, the district court approved the master's 

recommendation as to the amount of child support and denied appellant's 

request for child support arrearages. These appeals followed. 

Discussion 

In these consolidated appeals, appellant argues that the 

district court abused its discretion in modifying the physical custody 

arrangement, awarding respondent child support based on the custody 

modification, and failing to award him child support arreara.ges. Having 

"While the March 24, 2011, order is a temporary, nonappealable 

order, see In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 443, 777 

P.2d 901, 902 (1989) (explaining that no appeal may be taken from a 

temporary custody order), because the district court later entered a final 

order on June 9, 2011, we have considered appellant's arguments 

regarding both orders. 

2To the extent that appellant is challenging the district court's 

award of temporary sole legal custody to respondent, we do not address 

this issue as we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See Five Minors, 105 Nev. 

at 443, 777 P.2d at 902. 

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considered appellant's civil proper person appeal statements and the 

record on appeal, we conclude that appellant's arguments do not warrant 

reversal of the district court's orders. 

Child custody 

Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion 

when it modified the custody arrangement because the court (1) applied 

the incorrect standard, (2) failed to consider respondent's arrest for 

assault, (3) allowed the parenting coordinator to make the custody 

determination, and (4) failed to consider the children's best interests. This 

court reviews a district court's child custody decision for an abuse of 

discretion. See Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 

543 (1996). 

First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying 

the best interest standard instead of considering whether there had been a 

change in circumstances before modifying the parties' custody 

arrangement because the parties were sharing joint physical custody at 

the time of the modification, as recognized by the district court's August 

18, 2009, order. See Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 430, 216 P.3d 213, 227 

(2009) (requiring a court to consider the actual amount of time each party 

has custody of the child when determining whether the parties have a 

joint physical custody arrangement and to apply the best interest 

standard when deciding whether to modify a joint physical custody 

arrangement). Second, the district court did not improperly fail to apply a 

presumption that it was not in the children's best interests for respondent 

to have custody based on her arrest for allegedly assaulting appellant. In 

particular, the state determined that respondent should not be prosecuted 

based on the allegations, and appellant did not present any evidence not 

considered by the state to demonstrate that the domestic violence had 

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occurred. See NRS 125.480(5) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence" 

that a party engaged in an act of domestic violence in order to presume 

that custody with a particular parent is not in a child's best interest). 

Third, appellant asserts that the district court lacked 

authority to appoint the parenting coordinator, and that the parenting 

coordinator was improperly permitted to make the decision regarding the 

custody modification. NRCP 53, however, provides that a court may 

appoint a special master in a pending action, and the record demonstrates 

not only that the parenting coordinator was appointed as a special master, 

but also that appellant agreed to the use of a parenting coordinator. See 

also NRS 125.005(1) (permitting the district court to appoint a referee in a 

custody action). Additionally, the record establishes that, while the 

district court considered the parenting coordinator's recommendation, the 

district court, rather than the parenting coordinator, ultimately decided 

the custody issue. See NRS 125.510(2); see also In re A.B., 128 Nev. 

, 291 P.3d 122, 127 (2012). 

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that a modification to the custody arrangement was in the 

children's best interests. See Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543. 

The record demonstrates that appellant refused to comply with the district 

court's order to undergo a psychological evaluation, and that the court has 

indicated that it will revisit the supervised visitation and custody 

arrangement if appellant complies with that order. In light of appellant's 

refusal to comply with the court's order, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody arrangement. 3See 

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3Appellant argues that the district court denied him due process by 

failing to hold a full evidentiary hearing before the custody modification. 

We conclude, however, that the district court did not deny appellant his 

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id. (stating that "[i]t is presumed that a trial court has properly exercised 

its discretion in determining a child's best interest"). For these reasons, 

we affirm the district court's modification of the custody arrangement and 

the interlocutory order for supervised visitation pending appellant's 

psychological evaluation. See id. 

Child support and arrearages 

On appeal, appellant also asserts that the district court erred 

by awarding respondent child support contrary to the September 29, 2009, 

stipulated order, and that the district court erred in failing to award him 

child support arrearages. While the parties had previously agreed to 

waive child support, an agreement regarding child support is modifiable 

by the district court regardless of a contrary agreement between the 

parties. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. , , 222 P.3d 1031, 1035- 

38 (2010) (concluding that the parties' agreement to never modify a child 

support order was unenforceable). Given that appellant does not 

challenge the amount of support awarded to respondent, we affirm the 

district court's child support award. See Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 

577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003) (explaining that this court reviews a 

district court's child support award for an abuse of discretion). Further, 

...continued 

due process rights because appellant was provided with extensive 

opportunities to present his positions, as well as the chance to avoid 

modification by complying with the requirement that he undergo a 

psychological evaluation with a specific psychologist chosen by the court. 

See Moser v. Moser, 108 Nev. 572, 576-77, 836 P.2d 63, 66 (1992) ("At a 

minimum, observance of this right [to a full and fair custody hearing] 

requires that before a parent loses custody of a child, the elements that 

serve as a precondition to a change of custody award must be supported by 

factual evidence. Furthermore, the party threatened with the loss of 

parental rights must be given the opportunity to disprove the evidence 

presented."). 

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the district court's award of child support does not negate the parties' 

agreement to waive arrearages accrued by respondent, and thus, we 

affirm the district court's denial of appellant's request for child support 

arrearages. See Parkinson v. Parkinson, 106 Nev. 481, 483, 796 P.2d 229, 

231 (1990) (explaining that a party may waive his or her current right to 

child support through the "intentional relinquishment of a known right"), 

abrogated on other grounds by Rivero, 125 Nev. at 435, 216 P.3d at 230- 

31). 

For the reasons discussed herein, we 

ORDER the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED. 4 

4We have reviewed appellant's remaining contentions, and we 

conclude they are without merit. We deny appellant's February 3, 2012, 

February 15, 2012, and April 10, 2012, motions. In addition, we deny 

respondent's March 14, 2013, motion because it is not properly before this 

court and needs to be addressed by the district court in the first instance. 

We have reviewed all of the additional documentation submitted in 

these appeals and, to the extent that documentation was part of the 

appellate record, and thus, is properly before us, we have considered it in 

resolving these appeals. Further, we have reviewed respondent's 

September 10, 2012, letter, and in regard to any confusion surrounding an 

order from this court regarding child support, we clarify that this court 

has never issued an order directing respondent to pay child support 

arrearages. 

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cc: Hon. Mathew Harter, District Judge 

Abraham Lublin 

Mary D. Perry 

April Lawson 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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