This opinion is subject to revision before publication

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

_______________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Norman R. STOUT, Staff Sergeant

United States Army, Appellant

No. 18-0273

Crim. App. No. 20120592

Argued December 4, 2018—Decided August 22, 2019

Military Judge: S. Charles Neill

For Appellant: Captain Timothy G. Burroughs (argued); 

Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany D. Pond and Major Jack D. 

Einhorn (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier and Major Julie L. Borchers.

For Appellee: Captain Sandra L. Ahinga (argued); Lieutenant Colonel Eric K. Stafford, Major Wayne H. Williams, 

and Captain Catherine M. Parnell (on brief); Major Austin 

L. Fenwick.

Chief Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the 

Court, in which Judge SPARKS joined. Judge RYAN

filed a separate concurring opinion. Judge MAGGS filed 

a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Judge 

OHLSON filed a separate dissenting opinion.

_______________

Chief Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.

As originally written, the specifications now subject to 

appeal alleged that Appellant committed offenses during 

three distinct periods, ranging from six days to five weeks in 

duration. Prior to referral, the Government amended these

specifications to conform the time frame of the offenses to 

the substance of his victim’s testimony during the preliminary hearing. As a result, each specification encompassed a 

period of roughly nine months. The increases to the charged 

time frames ranged from 264 to 300 days. We granted review to determine whether these changes were “major,” requiring preferral anew in accordance with Rule for CourtsMartial (R.C.M.) 603. While the case was pending, we re-
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Opinion of the Court

2

quested supplemental briefing to address whether our previous decision in United States v. Brown, 4 C.M.A. 683, 16 

C.M.R. 257 (1954) or whether Article 34(c), Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 834, controlled the outcome of this case.1 We now conclude that Article 34(c),

UCMJ, does.2 Prior to referral, Article 34, UCMJ, specifically permits changes to conform the charges and specifications 

to the substance of the evidence in the report prepared by 

the investigating officer under Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 

§ 832 (2012). Because that is what happened here, we affirm 

the judgment below. 

I. Background

While stationed at Fort Drum and living in Watertown, 

New York, Appellant repeatedly sexually abused his stepdaughter, NL. When Appellant deployed to Iraq, the rest of 

his family moved to Michigan, where NL disclosed the 

abuse. During the Article 32, UCMJ, investigation that followed, NL testified that she could not recall the order in 

which or the dates on which the charged acts occurred; she 

only knew that the abuse occurred while she was in Watertown. However, she stated that her mother would be able to 

provide the correct dates for that period of time. Her mother 

subsequently testified that the family lived in Watertown 

from August 2008 until June 2009.

For reasons unknown, the three specifications pertinent 

here were originally charged as occurring “between on or 

about”: August 1, 2008, and August 6, 2008;3 January 14, 

2009, to January 28, 2009;4 and February 14, 2009, to 

 1 United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273, 2019 CAAF LEXIS 358, 

2019 WL 2093326 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 22, 2019) (order requesting supplemental briefing).

2 For this reason, we need not resolve the question of whether 

the changes in Appellant’s case were “major.” We note that the 

current R.C.M. 603 in Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 

(2019 ed.), permits changes to charges and specifications prior to 

referral regardless of whether they are major or minor.

3 Specification 1 of Charge I: Appellant placing NL’s hand on 

his penis.

4 Specification 6 of Charge I: Appellant entering the bathroom 

and observing NL naked in the shower.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Opinion of the Court

3

March 22, 2009.5 These specifications were conditionally 

dismissed pursuant to a pretrial agreement when Appellant 

pled guilty to abusive sexual contact, indecent liberties, and 

possession of child pornography. After the United States 

Army Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) found his pleas improvident and set aside the findings,6 the Government made 

pen and ink changes to all three specifications, changing the 

date range of all three specifications to encompass the period 

in which the abuse occurred according to the pretrial investigation testimony: August 2008 to June 2009. The staff 

judge advocate then prepared the pretrial advice and delivered it to the convening authority, who referred the case to a 

general court-martial. 

Appellant’s trial began over ten months later. At trial, 

the defense filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 

changes to the charge sheet were major changes barred by 

R.C.M. 603. The military judge ruled that the changes were 

minor. The military judge also noted that, because the 

changes were made before referral, “[t]he accused has been 

on notice of these changes and his counsel have been able to 

prepare accordingly.”7

Analysis

Article 34,UCMJ, specifically allows the Government to 

make changes to the charges and specifications to bring 

them into alignment with the evidence adduced by the pretrial investigation:

If the charges or specifications are not formally correct or do not conform to the substance of the evidence contained in the report of the investigating 

officer, formal corrections, and such changes in the 

 5 The Specification of Charge II: sodomy of NL. 

6 United States v. Stout, No. ARMY 20120592, 2014 CCA 

LEXIS 469, at *10, *19–20, 2014 WL 7227360, at *4, *7 (A. Ct. 

Crim. App. July 25, 2014).

7 As a factual matter, notice to the Appellant was indeed ample. The substance of the changed time frame was developed at 

the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing in 2012 and many months passed 

between the pen-and-ink changes referred to Appellant’s second 

trial in November 2014 and the trial itself in September of 2015.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Opinion of the Court

4

charges and specifications as are needed to make 

them conform to the evidence, may be made.8

We begin statutory analysis by examining the plain language. “The plain language will control, unless use of the 

plain language would lead to an absurd result.” United 

States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007). The words of 

Article 34 are clear and unambiguous: before referral, 

changes may be made to conform the specifications to the 

evidence contained in the report of the Article 32 investigating officer. In this case, that report showed that the offenses 

occurred sometime between August 2008 and June 2009, 

and the specifications were amended to reflect that. That is 

sufficient to resolve this case and affirm the judgment below.

Judgment

The judgment of the United States Army Court of

Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

 8 10 U.S.C. § 834(c) (2012). In the Military Justice Act of 2016, 

Article 34, UCMJ, was amended and restyled:

(c) GENERAL AND SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL;

CORRECTION OF CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS BEFORE 

REFERRAL. Before referral for trial by general courtmartial or special court-martial, changes may be made 

to charges and specifications–

(1) to correct errors in form; and

(2) when applicable, to conform to the substance 

of the evidence contained in a report under section 

832(c) of this title (article 32(c)).

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 

No. 114-328, § 5205, 130 Stat. 2000, 2908 (2016).
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge RYAN, concurring.

As the majority opinion explains, there is no question 

that the changes to the charge sheet at issue here comply 

with Article 34, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 

10 U.S.C. § 834 (2012), which authorizes changes to charges 

and specifications made prior to referral to conform them to 

evidence adduced at an Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 

(2012), investigation. See United States v. Stout, __ M.J. __ 

(4) (C.A.A.F. 2019). I therefore concur in full with the majority’s opinion. I write separately to express my view that Rule 

for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 603, Manual for Courts-Martial, 

United States (2012 ed.) (MCM), applies only to post-referral 

changes to charges and specifications and is thus inapplicable to this case.

The procedural posture of the instant case is unusual, 

and perhaps for that reason we are focused on the wrong 

question. The issue we granted concerns whether changes of 

300 days, 286 days, and 264 days to the time frame alleged 

in three specifications constitutes a “major change” under 

R.C.M. 603. But the inquiry into whether a change is major 

or minor under R.C.M. 603 is reserved for changes to charges that have already been referred, which is not what happened in this case.1 Rather, this case concerns amendments 

made before referral of the charges, and the most reasonable 

construction of R.C.M. 603 is that it does not apply to prereferral changes to charges and specifications.

We apply ordinary principles of statutory construction to 

the Rules for Courts-Martial. United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J.

85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007). While R.C.M. 603 does not specifically state that its limitation on major changes over an accused’s objection applies only to referred charges, its placement within the overall structure of the MCM indicates the 

point in the court-martial proceeding during which it applies. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 

(1988) (“In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the 

 1 Of course, the revised version of R.C.M. 603(c) in the MCM 

(2019 ed.) specifically recognizes that major or minor changes may 

be made prior to referral, but this does nothing more than reflect 

the statutory guidance provided by Article 34, UCMJ.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge RYAN, concurring.

2

court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a 

whole.”). R.C.M. 603 is contained within ch. VI of the 

R.C.M., “Referral, Service, Amendment, and Withdrawal of 

Charges,” which details the referral process and other applicable rules following referral (e.g., service of charges and 

withdrawal of charges). See generally MCM pt. II, ch. VI; see 

also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 

(1998) (“ ‘[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section’

are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the 

meaning of a statute.” (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 

Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947))). Given 

this structural context, the most natural understanding is 

that the 2012 version of R.C.M. 603 governs the amendment 

of charges after the convening authority’s decision as to the 

disposition of charges, R.C.M. 407, after the convening of a 

court-martial pursuant to ch. V of the R.C.M., and after the

charges have been referred to a court-martial by the convening authority in accordance with R.C.M. 601.2

Further, I am fully unpersuaded that United States v. 

Brown, 4 C.M.A. 683, 16 C.M.R. 257 (1954), stands for the 

proposition that R.C.M. 603 controls the disposition of this 

case. First, the holding in Brown primarily dealt with the 

question whether a change in dates that had been fully explored at an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation the appellant 

 2 I recognize that R.C.M. 603(b) provides that “[a]ny person 

forwarding, acting upon, or prosecuting charges on behalf of the 

United States except an investigating officer appointed under 

R.C.M. 405” is permitted to make minor changes before arraignment. But while “forwarding” and “acting upon” charges are 

events that occur prior to referral, the context of these words in 

the rule makes it clear that they modify the person that is permitted to make the authorized minor changes, not the point in time to 

which it applies. See R.C.M. 603(b). The fact that so-called minor 

(as well as “major”) changes that conform with the statute would 

already be permissible under Article 34, UCMJ, counsels in favor 

of construing R.C.M. 603(b), and by extension all of R.C.M. 603, as 

applying only to post-referral changes. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 

U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (providing that a statute “should be construed 

so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 

inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”).
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge RYAN, concurring.

3

insisted upon was permissible under Article 34, UCMJ. 4 

C.M.A. at 684–85, 688, 16 C.M.R. at 258–59, 262. As in this 

case, the changes were permissible under Article 34, UCMJ.

4 C.M.A. at 688, 16 C.M.R. at 262. Second, while Brown certainly mentioned—in passing only—that its analysis of Article 34, UCMJ, conformed with the text of para. 33d of the 

MCM (1951 ed.), 4 C.M.A. at 686, 16 C.M.R. at 260, that 

paragraph occupied a different place in the overall structure 

of the earlier editions of the MCM than R.C.M. 603 occupies

after the 1984 amendments to the MCM (1984 ed.). Para. 

33d was situated in ch. VII of the MCM (1951 ed.), which 

covered “Submission of and Action Upon Charges”—any actions taken on the charges by the officer exercising courtmartial jurisdiction. It could thus be construed as applying 

both to pre- and post-referral changes. By comparison, the 

structure of ch. VI of the current version of the R.C.M., as 

detailed above, strongly suggests that R.C.M. 603 deals solely with the referral process and post-referral procedures. Finally, even assuming arguendo that changes in dates of 300, 

286, and 264 days constitute “minor” changes for purposes of 

R.C.M. 603, see United States v. Stout, __ M.J. __ (3–4) 

(C.A.A.F. 2019) (Maggs, J., concurring in the judgment),

such changes would only be permissible under Article 34, 

UCMJ, if made to conform the charges and specifications to 

the evidence adduced at an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation. 

See Article 34(c), UCMJ. In short, calling date changes “minor” does not permit them to diverge from the substance of 

the evidence adduced at the Article 32, UCMJ, investigation.

But see Stout, __ M.J. __ (3–4) (Maggs, J., concurring in the 

judgment).

In this case the substance of the evidence upon which the 

changes were based was elicited in the Article 32, UCMJ, 

investigation (indeed it was the charges referred to Appellant’s first court-martial that were inconsistent with that 

evidence), and the charges and specifications were the subject of an Article 34, UCMJ, staff judge advocate recommendation. Specifically, the report from the Article 32, UCMJ,

investigating officer indicated that the offenses occurred 

during the period between August 2008 and June 2009—

which corresponded to the time Appellant and his family 

lived in Watertown, New York—and the changes conform 
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge RYAN, concurring.

4

the specifications to this evidence. Because Article 34,

UCMJ, governs changes to charges and specifications made 

prior to referral and R.C.M. 603 governs changes made after 

referral, this is simply not an R.C.M. 603 case.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge MAGGS, concurring in the judgment.

Before referral and arraignment, the Government 

amended the dates stated in three specifications of the 

charge sheet. The amendments expanded the time frames in 

which the alleged offenses occurred by 300 days, 286 days, 

and 264 days respectively. The applicable version of Rule for 

Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 603(b) provided that “[a]ny person

. . . prosecuting charges on behalf of the United States . . .

may make minor changes to charges or specifications before 

arraignment,” while R.C.M. 603(d) provided that “[c]hanges 

or amendments to charges or specifications other than minor 

changes may not be made over the objection of the accused

unless the charge or specification affected is preferred

anew.”1 R.C.M. 603(a) defined “[m]inor changes” as “any 

[changes] except those which add a party, offenses, or substantial matter not fairly included in those previously preferred, or which are likely to mislead the accused as to the 

offenses charged.” The military judge and the United States

Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) concluded that the

changes in the dates were permissible under R.C.M. 603(b) 

because they were all minor changes as defined in R.C.M. 

603(a). United States v. Stout, No. ARMY 20120592, 2018 

CCA LEXIS 174, at *13–14, 2018 WL 1756631, at *6 (A. Ct. 

Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

Appellant argues that the changes to the dates were not 

minor changes, and thus they were not permitted under 

R.C.M. 603(b) and were prohibited under R.C.M. 603(d). I 

disagree with Appellant’s argument. I share the ACCA’s

view that the changes were minor, and I would affirm the 

judgment of the ACCA on that ground. Unlike the Court today, I express no opinion on the issue of whether Article 

34(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. 

 1 The Government made the changes to the charge sheet on 

November 3, 2014. The applicable version of R.C.M. 603 is therefore found in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2012 

ed.) (MCM). The President subsequently substantially amended 

R.C.M. 603 in the MCM (2019 ed.).
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge MAGGS, concurring in the judgment

2

§ 834(c), permits changes to charges prior to referral, regardless of whether they are major or minor changes.2

The Court addressed the issue of whether the government may amend the dates expressed in a specification in 

United States v. Brown, 4 C.M.A. 683, 16 C.M.R. 257 (1954). 

In Brown, a specification in the charge sheet originally alleged that the accused had engaged in lewd and lascivious 

conduct in violation of Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934, 

on June 13, 1951. Id. at 684, 16 C.M.R. at 258. Prior to referral and arraignment, based on new information received 

in a related case involving another accused, the convening 

authority ordered the specification to be amended to allege 

that the conduct in question had occurred “ ‘on or about 1 

March 1951.’ ” Id. at 684, 16 C.M.R. at 258. The key issue in 

the case was “whether the convening authority could properly order a change in the date of the commission of the offense” without preferring the charge anew. Id. at 685, 16 

C.M.R. at 259. 

Paragraph 33d of the MCM (1951 ed.) stated the applicable rule. This paragraph provided in relevant part: “Obvious errors [in charges] may be corrected and the charges 

may be redrafted over the accuser’s signature, provided the 

redraft does not include any person, offense, or matter not 

fairly included in the charges as preferred.” The Court in 

Brown held that the change in dates was permissible under 

para. 33d because “the elements of the crime, both before

and after amendment, were identical” and because the

amendment could not have “misled the accused as to the nature or identity of the offense against which he was required 

to defend.” Brown, 4 C.M.A. at 688, 16 C.M.R. at 261. The 

Court reasoned more generally:

[W]here time is not of the essence, it is the general 

rule that an erroneous statement of the date of the 

 2 I prefer to resolve this case by addressing the issue of whether the changes were major or minor under R.C.M. 603 because the 

ACCA decided this issue, we granted review of this issue, and the 

parties have contested this issue in their original and supplemental briefs. Although they may be correct, neither party has 

advanced the positions taken by the Court’s opinion or Judge 

Ryan’s concurrence in this case.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge MAGGS, concurring in the judgment

3

offense constitutes a matter of mere form, and 

amendments are freely permitted where they do 

not operate to change the nature of the crime 

charged, and there is no showing that the defendant had been misled or prejudiced in his defense on 

the merits.

Id. at 688, 16 C.M.R. at 262 (citations omitted).

The Government argues that this Court should follow 

this precedent and conclude that the changes to the specifications at issue here are permissible as “minor changes.” As 

in Brown, the Government contends, the changes merely altered the alleged dates of offenses, and did not affect the nature or identity of the offenses against which Appellant had 

to defend himself. I agree.

The present case is indistinguishable from Brown. True, 

the changes to the dates in the three specifications at issue 

in this case added up to 300, 286, and 264 days respectively, 

while the change in dates in Brown was for only 104 days.

But under the reasoning of Brown, the length of time involved in a change of dates is not pertinent unless time is of 

the essence. And our decisions, following Brown, have allowed even greater changes in dates. See, e.g., United States 

v. Spann, 10 C.M.A. 410, 411–12, 27 C.M.R. 484, 485–86

(1959) (following Brown and upholding an amendment to a 

specification that extended the final day of an alleged period 

of desertion from June 9, 1945, to May 14, 1958, where the 

period of desertion was not an element of the offense).

Changes to the MCM since Brown was decided also have 

not rendered Brown obsolete. The applicable version of 

R.C.M. 603 differs from para. 33d of the 1951 MCM in only 

two key respects, neither of which has relevance to Brown or 

this case. One difference makes R.C.M. 603 more permissive 

of changes than para. 33d. Paragraph 33d did not allow redrafting charges if the redraft included any “matter not fairly included in the charges as preferred.” In contrast, R.C.M. 

603 does not allow redrafting if the redraft includes a “substantial matter not fairly included in [the charges] previously preferred.” R.C.M. 603(a) (emphasis added). This difference between para. 33d and R.C.M. 603 is irrelevant because 

neither Brown nor this case involves the addition of a new 

matter, substantial or otherwise. The second difference be-
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge MAGGS, concurring in the judgment

4

tween the applicable version of R.C.M. 603(a) and para. 33d

is that R.C.M. 603(a) excludes from the definition of minor 

change any changes that “are likely to mislead the accused 

as to the offenses charged.” (emphasis added). This additional restriction does not affect the application of Brown to this 

case because Appellant does not contend that the changes in 

dates were likely to mislead him.

Finally, the central holding in Brown—that changes in 

dates are ordinarily minor changes—has not been overruled. 

Appellant argues that Brown is invalid because of our decision in United States v. Reese, 76 M.J. 297, 302 (C.A.A.F. 

2017). But Reese only eliminated the requirement, suggested 

by Brown and other cases,3 that an appellant must show 

that a major change resulted in prejudice to be afforded relief. Reese merely holds that if a major change has been 

made, no prejudice need be shown. Id. Reese does not affect 

the prior question of what is or is not a major change.

Accordingly, I would affirm the United States Army 

Court of Criminal Appeals. I therefore concur in the 

judgment.

 3 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 49 M.J. 269, 270 (C.A.A.F. 

1998); United States v. Brown, 34 M.J. 105, 109 (C.M.A. 1992); 

United States v. Johnson, 12 C.M.A. 710, 711, 31 C.M.R. 296, 297 

(1962).
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge OHLSON, dissenting.

As noted by the majority, Article 34, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 834 (2012), authorizes 

the government to make changes to a charge sheet in order 

to have it properly reflect the evidence adduced at the

Article 32, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012), hearing. They 

view this provision as being “sufficient to resolve this case 

and affirm the judgment below.” United States v. Stout, 

__ M.J. __ (4) (C.A.A.F. 2019). In my view, however, Rule for 

Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 603—which prescribes how changes 

may be made to a charge sheet—also must be complied with 

in cases such as the one before us. I reach this conclusion for 

two reasons: (a) this Court should seek to harmonize 

relevant provisions of the UCMJ and the R.C.M.—such as 

Article 34, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 603;1 and (b) the President 

has the authority—such as in R.C.M. 603—to provide 

servicemembers with rights greater than those afforded by 

Congress as long as such an enhancement of rights does not 

run counter to a specific congressional mandate or 

prohibition.2 In the course of harmonizing Article 34, UCMJ,

with R.C.M. 603, and then applying the increased 

procedural protections afforded servicemembers under the 

latter provision, I conclude that the Government failed to

follow the procedures required under R.C.M. 603. 

Accordingly, I believe that the convictions for Specifications 

1 and 6 of Charge I and the Specification of Charge II must

be reversed. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

As noted above, in Article 34, UCMJ, Congress authorized the government to make changes to a charge sheet after 

 1 “This Court typically seeks to harmonize independent provisions of a statute.” United States v. Christian, 63 M.J. 205, 208 

(C.A.A.F. 2006); see also United States v. LaGrange, 1 C.M.A. 342, 

344, 3 C.M.R. 76, 78 (1952) (expressing that it is this Court’s “duty 

to reconcile any conflicting provisions [in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial] dealing with the same subject matter and 

to construe them, in so far as reasonably possible, so as to be in 

harmony with each other”).

2 “[W]here the President unambiguously gives an accused 

greater rights than those conveyed by higher sources, this Court 

should abide by that decision unless it clearly contradicts the express language of the Code.” United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 484, 

486 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge OHLSON, dissenting

2

preferral in order to have the charge sheet properly reflect 

the evidence adduced at the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing. In 

R.C.M. 603, the President then spelled out how those changes contemplated by Article 34, UCMJ, may be made. Specifically, R.C.M. 603(b) authorizes the government to unilaterally make changes that are minor in nature without taking 

any formal procedural steps. On the other hand, when the 

government wishes to make changes to a charge sheet that 

are not minor, R.C.M. 603(d) makes it clear that the amended charges must be “preferred anew.”3

Whether a change to a charge or specification is major or 

minor is a question of statutory interpretation that this 

Court reviews de novo. United States v. Reese, 76 M.J. 297, 

300 (C.A.A.F. 2017). The Discussion section accompanying 

R.C.M. 603 provides clear and helpful guidance in regard to

making this distinction. It explains that examples of minor 

changes include, inter alia, “those necessary to correct 

inartfully drafted or redundant specifications; to correct a 

misnaming of the accused; to allege the proper article; or to 

correct other slight errors.” R.C.M. 603(a) Discussion (emphasis added).

Major changes, on the other hand, are simply defined as 

any changes “other than minor changes.” R.C.M. 603(d). 

These major changes “may not be made over the objection of 

the accused unless the charge or specification affected is preferred anew.” Id.

In the instant case, the Government wished to change 

the dates when it alleged that Appellant committed the 

charged offenses. But the change in dates was not a day or 

two, or a week or two, or even a month or two in length. Rather, long after the Article 32, UCMJ, hearing was conclud-

 3 In simplest terms, a charge sheet provides an accused with 

proper formal notice of what he needs to defend against at trial. 

Such notice is grounded in principles of fundamental fairness. And 

it is important to underscore that the government alone controls 

the charge sheet from the inception of the charges through the 

court-martial itself. Thus, the requirement that when the government makes major changes to a charge sheet it then must prefer

those charges anew—which typically is a relatively simple step—

is a small procedural price to pay to ensure that notice requirements are strictly adhered to and that principles of fundamental 

fairness are scrupulously observed.
United States v. Stout, No. 18-0273/AR

Judge OHLSON, dissenting

3

ed, the Government decided that it wanted to change the 

dates of the charged offenses by approximately 300 days.

Common sense compels the conclusion that a change of that 

magnitude is not “minor.”4

Prior to trial, Appellant timely objected to the Government’s changes on R.C.M. 603 grounds.) The Government 

easily could have resolved this matter by preferring the 

charges anew. However, the Government declined to do so 

and the military judge overruled the accused’s objection. The 

accused then was tried and convicted of the charges now at 

issue. I conclude that Appellant’s convictions were obtained 

in direct contravention of the procedures required by the 

provisions of R.C.M. 603 and thus must be reversed. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority that Article 34, UCMJ, 

applies exclusively to the instant case,5 and I therefore respectfully dissent.

 4 Indeed, although the motivation of the government is not 

relevant to a determination of whether a change is minor or major, it can be surmised that trial counsel in the instant case made 

these changes because he recognized the significant risk that the 

trier of fact would either (a) acquit the accused of the charges because the original dates on the charge sheet did not come close to 

matching the dates that would be elicited at trial, or (b) make a 

change to the dates through exceptions and substitutions that 

would on appeal be deemed a fatal variance under our case law. 

See United States v. Hunt, 37 M.J. 344, 347 (C.M.A. 1993). Therefore, it appears that even the Government likely recognized that 

the alterations to the charged time frame were not “minor” changes of little import to the successful prosecution of the case.

5 This Court has addressed R.C.M. 603 in a number of cases and 

not once has it been suggested that Article 34, UCMJ, applies exclusively to instances where the government has made changes to 

specifications. See United States v. Armstrong, 77 M.J. 465 

(C.A.A.F. 2018); United States v. Honea, 77 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 

2018); Reese, 76 M.J. at 299–302; United States v. Moreno, 46 M.J. 

216 (C.A.A.F. 1997).