Report to the Ranking Minority

Member, Committee on Governmental

Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

Status of Achieving

Key Outcomes and

Addressing Major

Management

Challenges

GAO-01-729
Page i GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Letter 1

Appendix I Observations on the Department of Justice’s Efforts

to Address Its Major Management Challenges 29

Appendix II Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice 43

Tables

Table 1: Extent to Which Justice’s Performance Plan Included

Goals, Measures, and/or Strategies Related to GAO’s

Management Challenges 23

Table 2: Major Management Challenges 30

Abbreviations

BOP Bureau of Prisons

CLAIMS Computer Linked Application Information System

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

NICS National Instant Criminal Background Check System

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OJP Office of Justice Programs

OMB Office of Management and Budget

USMS United States Marshals Service

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

June 26, 2001

The Honorable Fred Thompson

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Thompson:

This report responds to your request that we review the Department of

Justice’s (Justice) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002

performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results

Act of 1993 (GPRA) to assess agencies’ progress in achieving selected key

outcomes that you identified as important mission areas for the agencies.1

These are the same outcomes we addressed in our June 2000 report2 on

Justice’s fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001

performance plan to provide a baseline by which to measure agencies’

performance from year to year. These selected key outcomes are

• less drug- and gang-related violence;

• reduced availability and/or use of illegal drugs;

• timely, consistent, fair, and high-quality services provided by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and

• U.S. borders secure from illegal immigration.

As agreed, using the selected key outcomes for Justice as a framework, we

(1) assessed the progress Justice has made in achieving these outcomes

and the strategies the agency has in place to achieve them and (2)

compared Justice’s fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year

2002 performance plan with the agency’s prior year performance report

and plan for these outcomes. Additionally, we agreed to analyze how

Justice addressed the major management challenges, including the

governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management

and information security, that we and its Office of the Inspector General

(OIG) identified. Appendix I provides detailed information on how Justice

 1

This report is one of a series of reports on the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies’

fiscal year 2000 performance reports and fiscal year 2002 performance plans.

2

Observations on the Department of Justice’s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance Report and

Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 30, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

addressed these challenges. Appendix II contains Justice’s comments on a

draft of this report.

Justice’s overall progress toward achieving each of the four key outcomes

was difficult to ascertain because generally the performance report lacked

fiscal year 2000 performance targets to measure success and lacked clear

linkage between performance measures and outcomes. Justice did not set

fiscal year 2000 performance targets for some measures because the

measures were new, and for some measures Justice believes that setting

performance targets could cause the public to perceive law enforcement

as engaging in “bounty hunting” or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for

the sake of meeting particular goals. Furthermore, Justice states that

measuring law enforcement performance is difficult, in that it is not

always possible to isolate the effects of Justice’s efforts from other factors

that affect outcomes and over which Justice has little or no control. We

agree that measuring law enforcement performance is difficult given the

clandestine and diffused nature of illegal drug trafficking and its related

violence, and even with rigorous measurement efforts definitive results are

illusive. In general, Justice’s strategies varied in the extent to which they

included sufficient information to inform decisionmakers about initiatives

to achieve these outcomes. We note several areas of opportunity for

Justice to improve the usefulness of its reports and plans.

Planned outcome: Less drug- and gang-related violence. Overall progress

made by Justice toward achieving this outcome is difficult to ascertain

because (1) three of nine performance measures did not have fiscal year

2000 targets to measure success and (2) Justice fell short of achieving its

performance targets for four measures. For example, Justice was close to

meeting its performance targets for three of the four unmet measures, but

it met only about 51 percent of its performance target for preventing

persons with criminal backgrounds from purchasing firearms. Justice’s

strategies and initiatives for meeting its fiscal year 2002 goals generally

seem reasonable and clear. However, Justice could improve its

performance strategies by exploring potential coordination efforts that

might be used to mitigate external factors related to unmet performance

targets and by considering the use of performance evaluations to better

assess its progress toward achieving the planned outcome.

Planned outcome: Reduced availability and/or use of illegal drugs. Overall

progress made by Justice toward achieving this outcome is difficult to

ascertain because it did not have fiscal year 2000 performance targets for

two of five measures, and the relationship of one other measure to the

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

outcome was not clear. Specifically, Justice did not indicate how the

measure for positive responses for inquiries to its intelligence center

contributes toward achieving this outcome. Justice’s strategies and

initiatives for meeting its fiscal year 2002 goals generally seem reasonable

and clear. Although Justice generally explained why it did not meet certain

targets and revised those targets downward, its strategies did not

articulate what Justice would do differently to achieve its unmet

performance targets in the future. Furthermore, Justice’s strategies did not

discuss efforts to coordinate crosscutting programs in relation to its

efforts to achieve the planned outcome.

Planned outcome: Timely, consistent, fair, and high-quality services

provided by INS. Overall progress made by INS towards achieving this

outcome is difficult to fully gauge because several measures were not

clearly linked to the planned outcome. For example, the performance

measures on the number of naturalization cases adjudicated, the percent

of naturalization and benefit applications found on line, and the number of

these applications filed online do not indicate whether users of INS’

services are receiving timely, consistent, fair, and high-quality services.

Justice’s strategies and initiatives do not sufficiently discuss achieving this

outcome because the strategies primarily address maintaining or

improving application processing times and generally do not adequately

discuss consistent, fair, and high-quality services.

Planned outcome: U.S. borders secure from illegal immigration. Overall

progress made by INS towards achieving this outcome is difficult to fully

gauge because INS has a new performance measure for which there was

no fiscal year 2000 performance target, and the other two performance

measures were not clearly linked to the outcome. Because it was a new

measure, Justice did not set a performance target for high-priority border

corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence,3

 a critical performance

measure to determine whether it is securing U.S. borders. Justice provided

historical data for the new measure that showed INS’ focus has been to

reduce illegal immigration in six corridors along the Southwest border in

fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. Justice did not discuss the rationale for

the new measure or how the new measure will better enable INS to assess

its progress toward securing U.S. borders. Justice’s strategy to secure U.S.

 3

The performance report states that optimum deterrence is the level at which applying

more border patrol agents and resources would not yield a significant gain in

arrests/deterrence.
Page 4 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

borders from illegal immigration does not adequately discuss integration

of resources to achieve this outcome.

Justice’s performance reports for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 had a number

of strengths in that both generally included (1) a comparison of actual

performance with the projected level of performance and (2) an

explanation when a performance target was not achieved. In addition, a

key improvement of the fiscal year 2000 report was that, as required under

GPRA, it showed that Justice reassessed fiscal year 2001 performance

targets on the basis of its progress for fiscal year 2000. Furthermore,

Justice stated that it has developed new performance measures for goals

where in the past it had not set targets. However, several weaknesses

remain. Like the previous year’s report, the fiscal year 2000 performance

report did not consistently address reasons for measures being

discontinued, added, or revised—information that could be useful to

decisionmakers in assessing progress toward measuring outcomes.

In both its 2001 and 2002 performance plans, Justice identified strategic

human capital management goals and measures and program evaluations

being conducted, but the plans did not discuss how each of these areas

affected Justice’s ability to achieve its outcomes. In our previous review of

Justice’s performance plans for fiscal year 2001,4

 we identified as a key

weakness the lack of mutually reinforcing goals and measures among

Justice components for crosscutting activities. In its fiscal year 2002

performance plan, Justice briefly discusses crosscutting program

activities, but it does not explain how program activities mutually

reinforce achieving the goals nor does it explain common or

complementary performance indicators.

Regarding the two governmentwide high-risk areas—strategic human

capital management and information security— Justice’s performance

plan had goals and measures, and the performance report explained

progress in resolving these challenges. Although the strategic human

capital management goals and measures were identified in its 2001 and

2002 performance plans, Justice’s 2002 performance plan did not address

human capital strategies in relation to achieving programmatic outcomes

for two performance measurements—dismantling major drug trafficking

organizations and providing timely processing of naturalization

applications. In addition, we identified 12 major management challenges

 4

GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 30, 2000.
Page 5 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

facing Justice. Justice’s performance report discussed the agency’s

progress in resolving 8 of the 12 management challenges that we

identified. Justice had performance goals and measures that either directly

or indirectly addressed the management challenges or had strategies for 9

of the 12 challenges.

In its June 19, 2001, letter, Justice commented on a number of aspects of

our draft report. Justice focused on four major areas—our report’s overall

focus, outcome goals that were evaluated, limited consideration of new

goals and measures in Justice’s performance plan, and the presentation of

progress on management challenges. Justice believes that the overall

focus of our report centers mainly on what Justice did not discuss in its

performance report and on targets it failed to establish or failed to meet.

Although our report discusses Justice not achieving some of its

performance targets, we also discuss many of the improvements Justice

has made. Justice does not believe that the outcome of reduced

availability and/or use of illegal drugs is part of its mission and, thus, its

annual goals and measures will not directly relate to this outcome. In our

opinion, reducing the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying,

disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations is directly

related to reducing the availability and/or use of drugs. Justice also

questioned why five of the performance measures for the outcome drugand gang-related violence were selected, indicating that it believed that

they were not related to the outcome. In its performance report, Justice

included these five measures under its strategic goal to reduce the threat,

incidence, and prevalence of violent crime, especially as it stems from gun

crime, organized crime, and drug and gang-related violence. While

Justice’s strategic goal is not an exact match to the planned outcome, we

believe that the performance measures included in our analysis are

appropriate. For example, one disputed performance measure is the

number of persons with criminal backgrounds prevented from purchasing

firearms and we believe that this measure is related to the outcome

because members of gangs may be prevented from purchasing firearms

because of criminal background checks. Justice also said that our report

did not give them sufficient credit for establishing new performance goals

and measures. We added text to reflect the development of new

performance measures in our comparison of the performance report and

plan.

And finally, Justice believes that the format used to report on management

challenges was, although technically correct, misleading. We added text to

the first paragraph in appendix I to explain this point. Justice noted that it

continues to face conflicting pressures to keep its performance report and
Page 6 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

plan streamlined and yet to include more detailed information. Our point

is not necessarily that Justice needs to include more detailed information,

but rather that it needs to better articulate and explain how performance

and strategies relate to achieving desired goals. Justice’s comments are

discussed in more detail on page 24 and reprinted in appendix II.

GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking,

management, and accountability from activities and processes to the

results and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable

information on the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been

provided since federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA,

annual performance plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the

public of (1) the annual performance goals for agencies’ major programs

and activities, (2) the measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3)

the strategies and resources required to achieve the performance goals,

and (4) the procedures that will be used to verify and validate

performance information. These annual plans, issued soon after the

transmittal of the president’s budget, provide a direct linkage between an

agency’s longer-term goals and mission and day-to-day activities.5

 Annual

performance reports are to report on the degree to which performance

goals were met. The issuance of the agencies’ performance reports, due by

March 31 each year, represents a new and potentially more substantive

phase in the implementation of GPRA—the opportunity to assess federal

agencies’ actual performance for the prior fiscal year and to consider what

steps are needed to improve performance and reduce costs in the future.6

As the nation’s chief law enforcement agency, Justice is charged with,

among other things, enforcing laws in the public interest and playing a key

role in protecting the public from violence and criminal activity, such as

drug smuggling and acts of terrorism. With a fiscal year 2001 budget of

over $24 billion and a staff of about 111,000, including attorneys,

investigators, and agents, Justice is a multifaceted organization whose

functions range from securing the nation’s borders to helping state and

local agencies improve their capacity to prevent and control crime.

Justice’s responsibilities are divided among a number of major

components, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the

 5

The fiscal year 2002 performance plan is the fourth of these annual plans under GPRA.

6

The fiscal year 2000 performance report is the second of these annual reports under

GPRA.

Background
Page 7 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), INS, the Office of Justice Programs

(OJP), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS).

This section discusses our analysis of Justice’s performance in achieving

the selected key outcomes and the strategies it has in place, particularly

strategic human capital management7

 and information technology, when

appropriate, for accomplishing these outcomes. In discussing these

outcomes, we have also provided information drawn from our prior work

on the extent to which the agency provided assurance that the

performance information it is reporting is credible.

Overall progress made by Justice toward achieving less drug- and gangrelated violence is difficult to ascertain because (1) three of nine

performance measures did not have fiscal year 2000 targets to measure

success and (2) Justice fell short of achieving its performance targets for

four measures.8

 Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for

its performance related to dismantling Asian criminal enterprises,

dismantling Eurasian criminal enterprises, and cases in Indian Country.9

Justice did not set performance targets for these measures because it

considered two of the measures to be new measures, and for the number

of cases in Indian Country, Justice did not want to set performance levels

because it believes that setting performance targets could cause the public

to perceive law enforcement as engaging in “bounty hunting” or pursuing

arbitrary targets merely for the sake of meeting particular goals. In

addition, even though Justice indicated that the performance measures for

 7

Key elements of modern strategic human capital management include strategic human

capital management planning and organizational alignment; leadership continuity and

succession planning; acquiring and developing staffs whose size, skills, and deployment

meet agency needs; and creating results-oriented organizational cultures.

8

The nine performance measures in Justice’s fiscal year 2000 performance report under the

strategic objective of “violent crime” that we used in our analysis included (1) percent of La

Cosa Nostra members incarcerated, (2) number of dismantled Asian criminal enterprises

[new measure], (3) number of dismantled Eurasian criminal enterprises [new measure], (4)

number of gangs dismantled of the 30 gangs targeted by the FBI as the most dangerous, (5)

number of criminal background checks, (6) number of persons with criminal records

prevented from purchasing firearms, (7) number of cases in Indian Country, (8) number of

new Interpol cases, and (9) number of new treaties with other countries.

9

The FBI created an Indian Country Unit within its Violence Crime and Major Offenders

Section to work with tribal authorities to combat and reduce the incidence of violent crime

on Indian Reservations.

Assessment of

Justice’s Progress and

Strategies in

Achieving Selected

Key Outcomes

Drug- and Gang-Related

Violence
Page 8 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

dismantling Asian and Eurasian criminal enterprises were new measures,

these same measures were included in Justice’s fiscal year 1999

performance report (albeit Eurasian was called Russian then).

Justice fell short of achieving the performance targets for four measures.

For example, although close, Justice did not meet its performance target

to perform 4.81 million criminal background checks. Justice reported that

it had perfomed 4.49 million criminal background checks. Also, Justice did

not meet its performance target to prevent 140,244 persons with criminal

backgrounds from purchasing firearms. Justice reported it had prevented

71,890 ineligible persons from purchasing firearms. In its explanation of

why it did not meet these performance targets, Justice noted that the

reported targets for these measures were based on the assumption that all

states and territories would be full participants in the National Instant

Criminal Background Check System (NICS) program.10 Justice reported

that only 27 states have become full participants since NICS began in

November 1998. In an April 2000 report, we reported that the states

generally are better positioned than the FBI to conduct background

checks and that there are potential barriers to states participating in

NICS.11 Justice’s performance report does not articulate the implications of

potential barriers if the intent is for all states to participate.

Although close, Justice also did not meet its performance measure to

initiate 20,000 new Interpol cases or enter into 10 new mutual legal

assistance treaties with other countries. Justice reported that in fiscal

year 2000, it had initiated 19,549 new Interpol cases and entered into 8

treaties. Justice noted that it had not met its performance targets for these

measures because there are a number of outside entities (such as, state

liaison offices, foreign governments, the State Department, the White

House, and the U.S. Senate) that have key roles in these efforts and that

Justice has limited control over actions of these entities. However, Justice

did not discuss any actions that it might take to mitigate the effects of

external factors. Our February 1999 report12 also suggested that to improve

 10Justice has advised us that the NICS program information may not accurately reflect the

NICS program and its accomplishments. Justice recognizes that our discussion of the NICS

program is based on the information in its fiscal year 2000 performance report and has

further advised that to the extent that this information is incorrect, it will amend such

information in subsequent performance reports.

11Gun Control: Options for Improving the National Criminal Background Check System

(GAO/GGD-00-56, Apr. 12, 2000).

12GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69, Feb. 26, 1999.
Page 9 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

the usefulness of annual plans, agencies show how strategies will be used

to achieve goals that include describing approaches to leverage or mitigate

the effects of external factors on the accomplishment of performance

goals.

For each performance measure, Justice included a brief explanation about

data collection and storage, data validation and verification, and any

known data limitations. There were data limitations associated with four

of the databases used with the performance measures. Two of the data

limitations appear to be more of a clarification rather than a limitation.

The other two data limitation explanations were more significant. One

limitation noted that a significant number of criminal history records were

not complete and that state and local agencies and the courts needed to

update and complete the records in a more timely manner. The

performance report did not indicate actions or steps that might be taken to

mitigate the data limitations with state and local agencies and the courts in

order to improve the data’s reliability. For the other limitation, Justice

reported that the current reporting system for the number of Interpol

cases was severely limited. However, Justice reported that in fiscal year

2001 the database and procedures were to be validated for accuracy and

redesigned for efficiency and that a comprehensive and flexible reporting

system to extract the statistics from the database was to be developed.

Justice’s strategies and initiatives to achieve less drug- and gang-related

violence generally seem reasonable and clear. However, Justice could

improve its performance strategies by exploring potential coordination

efforts that might be used to mitigate external factors and by considering

the use of performance evaluations to better assess its progress toward

achieving the outcome. For example, on the basis of its fiscal year 2000

performance, Justice modified its fiscal year 2001 performance target from

5.05 million to 4.54 million for the number of criminal background checks

performed. Modifying the performance target in the short term is a

reasonable step; however, Justice may want to discuss what it has

considered in response to only 27 states participating in the NICS since it

began in November 1998 and whether other strategies to assist states are

needed to achieve the outcome. As mentioned earlier, Justice did not have

performance targets for one measure because of concerns about pursuing

targets merely for the sake of meeting a goal. We suggest that Justice

could compare the relative effectiveness of programs using a program

evaluation approach to provide an indication of its progress towards

achieving its goals. Specifically, Justice has a goal to provide enforcement

assistance and training to tribal governments to combat and reduce the

incidence of violent crime on Indian Reservations, especially crime related
Page 10 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

to gang activity. This is a performance measure for which Justice did not

provide performance targets and that Justice reported the number of cases

in Indian Country. A program evaluation for this goal could compare the

difference in gang activity on reservations where assistance and training is

provided with reservations where assistance and training have not been

provided.13 While program evaluations will also be hampered by the lack

of underlying data about the drug- and gang-related violence, they might

provide some indications of the comparative effectiveness of different

interdiction programs.

Overall progress made by Justice toward achieving a reduction in the

availability and/or use of illegal drugs is difficult to ascertain because it did

not have fiscal year 2000 performance targets for two of five measures,

and the relationship of one measure to the outcome was not clear.14 Justice

did not have a performance target for measures related to drugs removed

and its efforts to seize, dismantle, and dispose of clandestine laboratories.

Justice indicated that the measure of the amount of drugs removed is to be

discontinued because it does not adequately assess performance and is not

results oriented. Justice explained that DEA could not estimate the

amount of drugs to be removed by type because these vary from case to

case. Rather, Justice reported that DEA seeks to investigate cases that will

have the greatest impact on drug trafficking, drug-related crime, and

violence and that drug seizures are merely a by-product of those

investigations. Regarding not setting targets for its efforts to seize,

dismantle, and dispose of clandestine laboratories, as previously noted,

Justice does not want the public to perceive that it is pursuing arbitrary

targets for the sake of meeting particular goals. Also, we noted that

Justice’s fiscal year 2000 actual performance of 1,888 clandestine

laboratories seized, dismantled, and disposed had decreased from its fiscal

year 1999 actual performance of 2,024. According to Justice, it receives

 13This simple example is provided to illustrate what we mean by program evaluation and is

not meant to be definitive or prescriptive regarding what a program evaluation should take

into account.

14The five performance measures in Justice’s fiscal year 2000 performance report under the

strategic objective of “drugs” that we used in our analysis included (1) number of El Paso

Intelligence Center inquiries resulting in positive responses; (2) number of major drug

trafficking organizations identified; (3) number of major drug trafficking organizations

dismantled; (4) amount of drugs removed: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, methamphetamine,

and amphetamine [discontinued measure]; and (5) number of clandestine laboratories

seized, dismantled, or disposed.

Availability and/or Use of

Illegal Drugs
Page 11 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

leads from state and local agencies or concerned citizens regarding the

location of clandestine laboratories. The number of leads vary from year

to year which results in a variance in the number of seizures in a given

year. In addition, the performance report did not explain how positive

responses for inquiries to Justice’s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

contributes toward achieving the outcome to reduce the availability of

drugs. As previously noted, we believe the usefulness of annual reports

and plans could be improved by better articulating a results-orientation

that would include explanatory information on goals and measures.

Justice fell short of achieving the performance targets for three measures.

Justice fell somewhat short on its performance target to improve

intelligence gathering. Specifically, Justice reported it had 22,624 inquiries

to EPIC resulting in positive responses instead of the performance target

of 24,602 inquiries.15 Justice reported that it did not meet its performance

measure for the number of EPIC inquiries resulting in positive responses

because EPIC did not receive as many requests for information as

anticipated. Other unmet performance measures were to identify and

dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. Specifically, Justice’s

performance target was to identify 250 and dismantle 50 U.S.-based drug

organizations. Justice reported that the FBI identified 201 major drug

trafficking organizations and dismantled 12. Justice attributed this

shortfall to the FBI overestimating what could be accomplished based on

resource constraints. Justice also indicated that the Organized Crime Drug

Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) had a base reduction of agents and

support staff at the end of fiscal year 2000 and that this would affect FBI’s

ability to identify and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations in

fiscal year 2001. Accordingly, the performance targets for fiscal year 2001

were revised.

In a July 1999 report,16 we stated that DEA did not have performance

targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. In the

absence of such targets, it is difficult to assess DEA’s overall effectiveness

in achieving its strategic goals. In our July 1999 report, we recommended

that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to work closely

 15If an agency requests only a name check, that counts as one response. If an agency

requests a series of information, such as names, social security numbers, and vehicle

licenses about an organization, EPIC counts each response separately.

16Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (GAO/GGD-99-108, July 21,

1999).
Page 12 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

with Justice and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to develop

measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug

trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets in the

National Drug Control Strategy. In response to our recommendation, DEA

(1) developed a new strategic plan, which was approved in May 2000; (2)

participated in a Justice work group to define the terms “disrupt” and

“dismantle”; and (3) formed an internal GPRA Work Committee to assess

and develop a feasible management approach to identify and establish

quantifiable performance targets. Justice indicated in its fiscal year 2000

performance report that, under DEA’s new strategic plan, DEA developed

another performance measure—percent of major drug trafficking

organizations disrupted or dismantled—and is developing a process to

capture information and data to report on this measure. Justice

anticipates, however, that the system will take between 2 and 3 years to be

fully operational.

Similar to the previous outcome, Justice’s performance report included a

brief explanation about data collection and storage, data validation and

verification, and any known data limitations. Except as noted above about

DEA developing a new process for capturing data on the percent of major

drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled, none of the

performance measures noted any data limitations.

Justice’s strategies and initiatives to reduce the availability and/or use of

drugs generally seem reasonable and clear. Fiscal year 2001 performance

targets were revised based on performance results in fiscal year 2000.

Although Justice generally explained why it did not meet certain targets

and revised those targets downward, its strategies do not articulate what

Justice will do differently to achieve its unmet goals in the future. In

addition, the strategies did not discuss determining the underlying reason

for EPIC not receiving as many requests for information as anticipated—a

piece of knowledge that might improve upon the relevancy,

appropriateness, and usefulness of the performance measure and

contribute to determining whether other measures might be more useful.

Furthermore, Justice did not include specific strategies or goals for

mitigating the implications of FBI and OCDETF resource constraints,

including human capital management issues. Although Justice’s

performance plan identifies agencies that have crosscutting activities

related to reducing the availability and/or use of drugs, the plan does not

discuss efforts in relation to achieving the outcome. For example, the plan

has FBI performance measures and expects future DEA performance

measures on dismantling drug trafficking organizations, but the plan does

not adequately explain how joint planning and coordination will contribute
Page 13 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

to achieving the overall outcome to reduce illegal drug availability and/or

use. According to Justice, interagency cooperation is key to successful

drug enforcement, and Justice reported that it has developed a number of

programs through which investigators can coordinate. However, the plan

does not include strategies for enhancing or measuring the contribution of

these programs to the overall achievement of the outcome. In our

February 1999 report,17 we note that the listing of current programs and

initiatives that were often included in agencies plans were useful for

providing an understanding of what agencies do. However, presentations

that more directly explain how programs and initiatives achieve goals

would be most helpful to congressional and other decisionmakers in

assessing the degree to which strategies are appropriate and reasonable.

Overall progress made by INS towards providing timely, consistent, fair,

and high-quality services was difficult to fully gauge because the measures

did not enable us to assess progress toward achieving this planned

outcome.18 For example, the performance measures on the number of

naturalization cases adjudicated, the percent of naturalization and benefit

applications found on line, and the number of these applications filed on

line do not indicate whether users of INS services are receiving timely,

consistent, fair, and high-quality services. Regarding the performance

target for achieving a 99-percent level of compliance with INS’ quality

standards for naturalization applications, the performance report did not

clearly explain what is covered in these standards. Therefore, it is unclear

whether compliance with these standards is an indication of timely,

consistent, fair, and high-quality services. Again, we believe that

opportunities exist for Justice to improve the usefulness of its annual

report and plan by better articulating a results-orientation that would

include explanatory information on goals and measures.

 17GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69, Feb. 26, 1999.

18The nine performance measures in Justice’s fiscal year 2000 performance report under

the strategic objectives of “immigration information services” and “immigration benefits

services” that we used in our analysis included (1) percent of public use forms available

online; (2) number of applications that can be filed online [new measure]; (3) response

time for status verification for government customers; (4) response time for status

verification for employers; (5) average case processing time, in months; for naturalization

cases; (6) average case processing time, in months; for adjustment of status cases; (7) level

of compliance with quality standards for processing naturalization and adjustment of status

applications; (8) number of naturalization cases adjudicated; and (9) number of

adjustment-of-status cases adjudicated.

Services Provided by the

INS
Page 14 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Justice reported that it had not met its performance target for an average

case processing time of 6 months for naturalization applications, instead

reporting an average case processing time of 8 months during fiscal year

2000. Justice did not explicitly discuss the reason for missing the

performance target for average case processing time, but implied that it

was a resource issue. Specifically, Justice reported that during peak

periods at the end of the year, INS met the targeted 6-month processing

time for naturalization applications by shifting resources from other

services to increase production. On the basis of its fiscal year 2000

performance, INS expects to achieve a case processing time of 9 months in

fiscal year 2001 for naturalization applications. Furthermore, historical

data in Justice’s performance report shows that improvement has been

made to reduce the average case processing time for naturalization

applications from 27 months in fiscal year 1998 to 8 in fiscal year 2000.

Similar to the previous outcomes, Justice’s performance report included a

brief explanation about data collection and storage, data validation and

verification, and any known data limitations. Justice’s performance report

indicated data limitations and efforts to improve the accuracy and

timeliness of the data. For example, Justice reported that in fiscal year

2001 INS’ naturalization case capability will be fully deployed under its

Computer Linked Application Information System (CLAIMS 4) and will

allow data for these cases to be fully automated and case-based, providing

for timely and accurate data. In a May 2001 report,19 we said that aliens

face long waits for a resolution to their case and have difficulty obtaining

accurate information on how long they can expect to wait. We reported

that INS did not know how long it took to process aliens’ applications

because the agency’s automated application data were incomplete and

unreliable. Specifically, we reported that INS’ available servicewide

automated systems contained unreliable data and its districts did not have

automated systems for tracking many types of applications. We pointed

out that, in the absence of information on actual processing times, INS had

been estimating processing times, but that the usefulness of the estimation

method was limited. We recommended, and Justice agreed, that INS

develop the capability to begin to calculate and report actual processing

times for applications as soon as reliable automated data are available

 19Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Applications Processing

(GAO-01-488, May 4, 2001).
Page 15 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

from its servicewide systems, CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4.20 Justice’s

performance report states that on the basis of its fiscal year 2000

performance, it expects to meet the corresponding 2001 targets for

average case processing times of 9 months for naturalization applications

and 14 months for adjustment of status applications and expects to meet

the 2001 performance target of 99 percent compliance with quality

standards for naturalization applications.

Justice strategies and initiatives do not sufficiently discuss achieving the

outcome to provide timely, consistent, fair, and high-quality services. The

strategies primarily address maintaining or improving application process

times and generally do not discuss consistent, fair, and high-quality

services. As previously noted, INS has quality standards that it is using as a

measure, but the performance plan does not articulate the specific quality

standards for achieving the outcome. Justice did not discuss the

implications of using strategic human capital management as a strategy to

help achieve this outcome even though one performance target was not

achieved until resources were realigned. Thus, the deployment of available

staff appears to be critical to achieving the timeliness performance targets.

In addition, the performance plan did not provide as much detail as it

could have to describe INS’ strategy to provide electronic filing of

applications and the implications for accomplishing timely, consistent,

fair, and high-quality services. Although Justice identified that it is

deploying CLAIMS 4 software to field offices in fiscal year 2001 and

upgrading CLAIMS 3 automated support, the performance report does not

explain how the information technology improvements will contribute to

achieving better INS services. In our February 1999 report,21 we note that

the listing of current programs and initiatives that were often included in

agencies’ plans were useful for providing an understanding of what

agencies do. However, presentations that more directly explain how

programs and initiatives achieve goals would be most helpful to

congressional and other decisionmakers in assessing the degree to which

strategies are appropriate and reasonable.

 20CLAIMS 4 is INS’ newest and most advanced case management and tracking system that

is used to help process incoming naturalization applications. CLAIMS 3 is used to process

applications other than naturalization applications.

21GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69, Feb. 26, 1999.
Page 16 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Overall progress made by INS towards achieving this outcome is difficult

to fully gauge because INS has a new performance measure for which

there was no fiscal year 2000 performance target, and the other two

performance measures did not enable us to assess progress toward

achieving this planned outcome.22 Because it was a new measure, Justice

did not set a performance target for high-priority border corridors

demonstrating optimum deterrence,23 a critical performance measure to

determine whether it is securing U.S. borders. Justice did not discuss the

rationale for the new measure or how the new measure will better enable

INS to assess its progress toward securing our borders. Justice said that

during fiscal year 2000, INS continued to refine the border control

operational effectiveness measure,24 in particular by using “corridors”

rather than zones, with each sector identifying the corridors within their

area of operation. Even though this was a new measure, Justice provided

historical data from fiscal years 1994 to 1999, provided actual performance

for fiscal year 2000, and projected performance targets for fiscal years

2001 to 2004 for this performance measure as an indication of its progress.

The historical data showed that INS has maintained optimum deterrence

in 6 of 26 corridors along the Southwest border during fiscal years 1998,

1999, and 2000.

In addition, while Justice met the targets for the other two performance

measures for this outcome, these measures were not directly linked to the

outcome because they omitted some aspects of the performance. For

example, to deter illegal immigration at the source, INS has a performance

measure to intercept undocumented offshore travelers en route to the

United States. Justice reported that these intercepts were accomplished as

a result of INS officers working closely with their host country

government agencies, diplomatic missions, and others to provide advice,

 22The three performance measures in Justice’s fiscal year 2000 performance report under

the strategic objective of “border enforcement” that we used in our analysis included (1)

number of high-priority border corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence [new

measure], (2) number of interceptions of mala fide and offshore travelers en route to the

United States, and (3) number of offshore prosecutions assisted by INS aided by fraudulent

document detection.

23The performance report states that optimum deterrence is the level at which applying

more border patrol agents and resources would not yield a significant gain in

arrests/deterrence.

24 The level of operational effectiveness within identified corridors (of the Southwest

border) is defined as apprehensions plus turn backs (the attempt was thwarted), divided by

attempts.

Securing U.S. Borders

From Illegal Immigration
Page 17 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

training, and assistance. Justice’s performance report does not sufficiently

discuss the working relationship with host countries and others or the

quality of INS officers’ training and assistance in relation to deterring

illegal immigration at the source. In a May 2000 report,25 we said that the

agency does not believe that overseas efforts have produced long-term

impacts because training that INS personnel provided to foreign air carrier

and law enforcement personnel diminished within a few months. In

addition, INS believes that the non-INS personnel they have trained do not

receive continual encouragement and support to perform their jobs

professionally and, therefore, revert to their old practices.

In its performance report Justice stated that it expects to meet the 2001

performance targets for the three performance measures. Specifically,

Justice’s performance report states that on the basis of fiscal year 2000

actual performance for demonstrating optimum deterrence in six

corridors, INS expects to meet the 2001 performance target for this

measure of deterrence in eight corridors. Justice exceeded, by a significant

number, its performance targets for intercepting undocumented offshore

travelers en route to the United States (the performance target was 8,283

interceptions and the actual was 19,007) and the offshore prosecutions

assisted by INS (the performance target was 107 prosecutions and the

actual was 514). Justice reported that improved and thorough reporting of

these activities by the INS overseas district offices resulted in a more

accurate account of these activities than had been available in the past,

and INS significantly exceeded its targets. Justice’s performance plan

indicates INS expects to also exceed the fiscal year 2001 performance

targets of 9,324 interceptions and 119 prosecutions.

Although Justice briefly explained its data collection and storage, and data

validation for each performance measure, there is some question about the

credibility of the performance data. Specifically, Justice reported that all

three performance measures related to securing the U.S. borders from

illegal immigration had data limitations. With respect to measuring border

corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence, the report states that

collecting data to measure this goal is currently an intensive manual

process and that INS is implementing a process to standardize recording

and reporting of data to ensure consistency and validity. Justice also

reported that data provided for corridors demonstrating optimum

 25Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address

Growing Problem (GAO/GGD-00-103, May 1, 2000).
Page 18 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

deterrence prior to fiscal year 1999 were estimated because data was not

available for corridors during that period and that projected corridor

effectiveness for fiscal years 2001 through 2004 is dependent on sufficient

allocation of resources.

Justice’s strategy to secure U.S. borders from illegal immigration does not

adequately discuss integration of resources to achieve the outcome.

Justice’s basic strategy is to apply increased levels of Border Patrol staff,

technology, and other resources in the busiest areas until the risk of

apprehension is high enough to be an effective deterrent, thus creating

acceptable areawide control. Justice’s performance plan does not discuss

the mix of staffing, equipment, and technology needed to achieve the

desired level of deterrence in each area nor does it clearly discuss the

basis upon which a determination is made that a particular corridor has

achieved optimum deterrence. In addition, in December 1999, we reported

that INS had had difficulties attracting and retaining qualified applicants

for Border Patrol positions.26 Justice’s performance report indicates that

INS did not meet its performance target to have 9,377 Border Patrol agents

on board at the end of fiscal year 2000, falling short by 196 agents.

According to Justice, additional Border Patrol resources (personnel and

technology) are needed in fiscal year 2002 to maintain and extend control

along the border. INS expects to meet its hiring goals for agents in fiscal

year 2001, reaching an on-board strength of 9,807 and projected an onboard strength of 10,377 agents for fiscal year 2002. According to Justice,

INS has overcome difficulties in hiring Border Patrol agents. The Justice

report also states that INS set records in fiscal year 2000 for the number of

qualified applicants and the number passing the required tests. However,

Justice did not discuss actions planned to bringing agents on board nor did

it explain how having more applicants and candidates passing tests will

ultimately result in achieving the targeted level of agents to be on-board in

fiscal year 2001. While hiring more agents is a first step, INS did not

discuss training and deployment of hired agents--initiatives that also

impact on INS’ ability to have agents at the border. Furthermore, the

performance plan did not explain Justice’s plans for obtaining equipment

and technology needed to implement the border control strategy. As

previously mentioned, strategies can be more useful if they describe how

they will enable the agency to achieve its goals.

 26Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not

Met (GAO/GGD-00-39, Dec. 17, 1999).
Page 19 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Justice stated in its 2002 performance plan that it continuously evaluates

the effectiveness of its border control strategies, particularly for the

Southwest border, and quarterly evaluates progress through the

Commissioner’s Performance Management Reviews. In addition, Justice

reported that several special studies have been initiated and are ongoing to

evaluate border enforcement effectiveness. In a December 1997 report on

the Southwest Border Strategy,27 we recommended a comprehensive and

systematic evaluation plan of INS’ border strategy be developed to obtain

information about the effectiveness of the strategy in reducing and

deterring illegal entry. Justice anticipates conducting additional studies

related to the effectiveness of INS’ enforcement activities at the border

that includes one that responds to our recommendation. In a May 1999

report,28 we concluded that information on INS studies was too limited for

us to assess whether these studies will provide the information needed to

comprehensively and systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the

strategy.

For the selected key outcomes, this section describes strengths or

remaining weaknesses in Justice’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report

in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report and (2) fiscal year 2002

performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. This section

also discusses the degree to which the agency’s fiscal year 2000 report and

fiscal year 2002 plan addresses concerns and recommendations by us and

Justice’s OIG.

 27Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation

Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997).

28Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation

(GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999).

Comparison of

Justice’s Fiscal Year

2000 Performance

Report and Fiscal

Year 2002

Performance Plan

With the Prior Year

Report and Plan for

Selected Key

Outcomes
Page 20 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

We identified several strengths in Justice’s performance reports. First,

both fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance reports generally included (1)

a comparison of actual performance with the projected level of

performance (when a goal had a performance projection) as set out in the

performance goals and (2) an explanation for why the goal was not met,

where a performance goal was not achieved. Second, a key improvement

of the fiscal year 2000 report was that, as required under GPRA, the report

showed that Justice generally reassessed fiscal year 2001 performance

targets on the basis of its performance for fiscal year 2000. Third, Justice’s

performance report included historical data to provide perspective on its

progress. And finally, we also noted that this year Justice issued a

combined fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002

performance plan. The information is now presented in a sequential

manner, discussing the results of the past year, then the anticipated

performance for the current year, and finally the impact of next year’s

performance. Presenting the information in this manner, we believe,

provides decisionmakers with a better understanding of the agency’s

progression toward achieving its goals.

The fiscal year 2000 performance report, like the 1999 report, also contains

several weaknesses in that it does not consistently address changes in the

performance report as to why certain measures were discontinued, new

ones added, or revisions made to existing measures. For example, INS

changed its performance goal to measure deterrence in relation to

corridors rather than zones; however, there is no discussion as to the

rationale for changing the areas of operation to be measured or how the

new measure will better enable INS to assess its progress toward securing

our borders. We believe an explanation in the performance report would

be useful to better understand the relationship of revised or new goals and

measures toward achieving the performance goal. Furthermore, although

Justice generally explained why it did not meet certain targets and revised

those targets downward, its strategies do not articulate what Justice will

do differently to achieve its unmet goals in the future.

In addition, eight management challenges identified in our 2000 GPRA

report continue to be management challenges. Progress in resolving two of

the eight management challenges—INS restructuring and internal control

weakness at DEA—was not discussed in either the 1999 or 2000

performance report.

Comparison of

Performance Reports for

Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000
Page 21 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Our comparison of Justice’s performance plans for fiscal years 2001 and

2002 found that many of the weaknesses previously identified by us in the

2001 plans were present in the 2002 plan. Although the strategic human

capital management goals and measures were identified in its 2001 and

2002 performance plans, Justice’s 2002 performance plan did not address

human capital strategies in relation to achieving programmatic outcomes

for two goals—dismantling major drug trafficking organizations and

providing timely processing of naturalization applications. In addition,

Justice identified personnel skills that supported each strategic goal, but

did not discuss whether it had the staff with these skills or whether it

needed to acquire or develop staff to meet agency needs. The performance

plans also consistently identified program evaluations related to each of its

strategic goals. However, the plans do not discuss whether these

evaluations could be used in assessing the achievement of goals or as

alternative measures for performance. For example, we noted that Justice

reported on a program evaluation to verify and validate CLAIMS, which

supports INS’ benefit processing that may provide information to improve

operations, but will not provide outcome measures. However, we noted

that another program evaluation concerning a multiyear study of the

employment verification pilots may provide some information toward

measuring progress. We believe that providing information on how the

program evaluations would help measure Justice’s achievement of its

outcomes could be useful to decision-makers.

Like its fiscal year 2001 performance plan, Justice’s fiscal year 2002

performance plan consistently identified crosscutting activities, but its

discussion of crosscutting activities generally did not discuss how the

activities could be coordinated to improve overall performance within

Justice. For example, to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking

criminal enterprises, the performance plan states that interagency

cooperation is key to successful drug enforcement and provides

information on a number of programs through which investigators from

various agencies can coordinate. The plan cites DEA, FBI, the Criminal

Division, and other federal law enforcement agencies as participants in

these programs. However, the plan does not explain how the strategies of

Justice’s components are mutually reinforcing, nor does it explain

common or complementary performance indicators.

Justice stated that it has developed new performance measures for goals

where in the past it had not set targets. Most of Justice’s performance

measures in its 2002 performance plan had targets against which to

measure progress. However, we do not know the extent to which the new

performance measures will clearly demonstrate results achieved. As

Comparison of

Performance Plans for

Fiscal Years 2001 and

2002
Page 22 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

mentioned earlier, in our September 2000 report,29 we provided

information and examples to assist agencies in identifying how they might

use evaluations to improve their performance reporting. We noted that

program evaluations are objective, systematic studies that answer

questions about program performance and results. An evaluation study

can explore the benefits of a program as well as ways to improve program

performance by examining a broader range of information than is feasible

to monitor on an ongoing basis through performance measures. For

example, a program evaluation was conducted of an INS border control

initiative in El Paso, Texas, called Operation Hold the Line. Operation

Hold the Line was a new INS enforcement approach introduced in 1993.

Rather than apprehending aliens after they had illegally crossed the border

in El Paso, INS sought to prevent illegal entry from occurring in the first

place by increasing the number of Border Patrol agents in El Paso and

position them in high visible locations along the border. The evaluation

collected data to assess the effects of Operation Hold the Line on a

number of outcomes, including illegal and legal crossings, business

activity, crime, education, births, and the use of social services in El Paso.

By collecting quantitative and qualitative data on a range of outcome

indicators, the researchers were able to draw conclusions about the

representativeness, scope, and magnitude of the Operation’s effects.30

The fiscal year 2002 performance plan clearly identified the OIG

management challenges and Justice designated areas of material

weaknesses. The plan does not consistently identify our recommendations

or concerns in relation to achieving goals and performance measures. For

example, the Justice plan provided information on actions taken to

address our recommendation to DEA regarding its performance measures

but the performance plan did not address actions taken in response to our

recommendation to INS regarding its estimation for application processing

times.

 29Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program Performance

(GAO/GGD-00-204, Sept. 29, 2000).

30Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States/Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation

Hold the Line on El Paso/Juarez, University of Texas at Austin, July 1994.
Page 23 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

We identified two governmentwide high-risk areas: strategic human capital

management and information security. Regarding strategic human capital

management, Justice’s performance plan had goals and measures related

to human capital, and the agency’s performance report explained its

progress in resolving human capital challenges. With respect to

information security, Justice’s performance plan had goals and measures

related to information security, and the agency’s performance report

explained its progress in resolving its information security challenges.

In addition, we identified 12 major management challenges facing Justice.

Justice’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving

many of its challenges, but it did not discuss the agency’s progress in

resolving the following challenges: (1) internal control weaknesses at

DEA, (2) options for restructuring INS, (3) weaknesses in Justice’s asset

forfeiture program, and (4) program management weaknesses in the Weed

and Seed program. As shown in table 1, of the agency’s 12 major

management challenges, its performance plan (1) had goals and measures

that were directly related to five challenges; (2) had a goal but no

measures that were directly related to one challenge; (3) had goals and

measures that were indirectly applicable to one of the challenges; (4) had

no goals and measures related to two of the challenges, but discussed

strategies to address them; or (5) had no goals, measures, or strategies to

address three of the challenges. Appendix I provides detailed information

on how Justice addressed these challenges and high-risk areas as

identified by us and its OIG.

Table 1: Extent to Which Justice’s Performance Plan Included Goals, Measures, and/or Strategies Related to GAO’s

Management Challenges

Had goals and

measures that were

directly related to the

challenges

Had goals but no

measures that were

directly related to the

challenges

Had goals and

measures that were

indirectly applicable to

the challenges

Had no goals and

measures related, but

discussed strategies to

address the challenges

Had no goals,

measures, or strategies

to address the

challenges

Information systems

planning and

implementation

Financial statements and

systems

Removal of illegal aliens Asset forfeiture program Internal control

weaknesses at DEA

Police Corps program

had a slower than

expected start, due to

funding and staffing

limitations

Program management

weaknesses remain in

weed and seed program

Efforts to reduce

unauthorized

employment face

impediments

Justice’s Efforts to

Address Its Major

Management

Challenges Identified

by GAO
Page 24 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Had goals and

measures that were

directly related to the

challenges

Had goals but no

measures that were

directly related to the

challenges

Had goals and

measures that were

indirectly applicable to

the challenges

Had no goals and

measures related, but

discussed strategies to

address the challenges

Had no goals,

measures, or strategies

to address the

challenges

Develop measurable

DEA performance

targets to determine

progress in reducing the

availability of illegal

drugs

Shortcomings in

programs to control alien

smuggling

INS’ organizational

structure remains

undecided

INS Southwest border

strategy

Source: GAO analysis.

As agreed, our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of

GPRA, the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, guidance to agencies from

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for developing performance

plans and reports (OMB Circular A-11, Part 2), previous reports and

evaluations by us and others, our knowledge of Justice’s operations and

programs, GAO identification of best practices concerning performance

planning and reporting, and our observations on Justice’s other GPRArelated efforts. We also discussed our review with officials in the

Department of Justice and its OIG. The agency outcomes that were used

as the basis for our review were identified by the Ranking Minority

Member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as important

mission areas for the agency and do not reflect the outcomes for all of

Justice’s programs or activities. The major management challenges

confronting Justice, including the governmentwide high-risk areas of

strategic human capital management and information security, were

identified in our January 2001 performance and accountability series and

high-risk update and were identified by Justice’s OIG in December 2000.

We did not independently verify the information contained in the

performance report and plan, although we did draw from our other work

in assessing the validity, reliability, and timeliness of Justice’s

performance data. We conducted our review from April through June 2001

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We discussed our draft report with Justice officials on June 13 and 14,

2001, and received written comments on June 19, 2001. The full text of

Justice’s written comments is included in appendix II. In its letter, Justice

discussed four major areas—our report’s overall focus, outcome goals that

Scope and

Methodology

Agency Comments
Page 25 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

were evaluated, limited consideration of new goals and measures in its

performance plan, and the presentation of progress on management

challenges.

Overall focus. Justice believes that our report focuses heavily on what its

performance report and plan do not discuss, on targets not established, or

on targets not met. In addition, Justice believes that our report does not

focus on improvements the agency has made. For example, in addressing

INS’ goal for ensuring that immigration benefit services are timely, fair,

and consistent, Justice said that our report focused on the agency missing

the naturalization case processing time by 2 months. Justice believes that

reaching an 8-month processing time is an incredible achievement, given

that the processing time was 27 months just 2 years earlier.

We addressed many of the improvements that Justice made under the

section comparing the performance report and plan with the previous

year’s report and plan. The sections discussing achieving outcomes are an

assessment of progress toward achieving results on the basis of

performance measures and targets, historical data, and our work related to

program areas. We acknowledge that Justice’s performance report

included historical data for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for many of its

measures. But other than the example Justice cited in its comments, the

historical data for the other measures did not clearly demonstrate

improvements. Furthermore, after meeting with Justice to discuss the

draft report, we revised the text to include the historical data regarding

reported improvement to reduce the processing time of naturalization

cases (the example Justice cited).

Outcome goals. Justice acknowledged that the outcomes we used in our

analysis were prescribed by the requestor, but believes that the outcome

of reduced availability and/or use of illegal drugs is not part of its mission.

Instead, Justice stated that its strategic goal relative to enforcing the

nation’s antidrug laws is to reduce the threat and trafficking of illegal

drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking

organizations. Thus, Justice does not believe that any of its annual goals

or measures will relate directly to the achievement of the outcome to

reduce the availability and/or use of illegal drugs, giving the false

impression that its report and plan are deficient. Justice also believes that,

while reducing drug- and gang-related violence is part of its mission, only

four of its measures under this outcome, not nine, should have been used

in our analysis. Thus, Justice believes that the other five measures in

assessing this outcome should be deleted.
Page 26 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

In our opinion, reducing the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by

identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations is

directly related to reducing the availability and/or use of drugs. If drug

trafficking organizations are disrupted and dismantled, clearly this will

affect the availability of drugs on the street. Concerning Justice’s

contention that five of the measures under the planned outcome to reduce

drug- and gang-related violence should be deleted, we disagree. The five

measures in question are (1) number of criminal background checks, (2)

number of persons with criminal backgrounds prevented from purchasing

firearms, (3) number of cases in Indian Country, (4) number of new

Interpol cases, and (5) number of new treaties with other countries. In its

performance report, Justice included these five measures under its

strategic goal to reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent

crime, especially as it stems from gun crime, organized crime, and drug

and gang-related violence. While Justice’s strategic goal is not an exact

match to the planned outcome, we believe that the performance measures

included in our analysis are appropriate. Specifically, all of these

measures, in our opinion, have the potential, in part, to be related directly

or indirectly to drug- or gang-related violence. For example, members of

gangs may be prevented from purchasing firearms because of criminal

background checks. Additionally, under the measure for the number of

cases in Indian Country, growing juvenile gangs is one of the major issues

discussed in Justice’s performance report. Likewise, Justice’s

performance report indicated that international law enforcement

cooperation is critical to addressing the dramatic growth of transnational

crime such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism, which may, in part,

relate to drug- and gang-related violence on an international level.

New goals and measures. Justice believes that its performance measures

have matured over time and indicated that it has discontinued old and

added new measures as appropriate. Since some measures are new in

fiscal year 2002, performance targets did not exist for the fiscal year 2000

plan. Nevertheless, Justice reported on its accomplishments by providing

historical data for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 whenever possible. Justice

believes that this is particularly significant for two outcomes: (1) timely,

consistent, fair, and high-quality services provided by INS and (2) U.S.

borders secure from illegal immigration. Concerning the first outcome,

Justice noted that it has a new performance measure for the level of

compliance with quality standards for processing naturalization cases, and

Justice reports that it has achieved 99 percent compliance with those

standards since fiscal year 1999. Concerning the second outcome, Justice

believes that it is unfair for us to report that its performance was not

considered sufficient to assess progress merely because there was no
Page 27 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

performance target against which to measure. Furthermore, Justice

believes that it is particularly discouraging for the managers and analysts

that worked to develop a measure which Justice believes is an excellent

example of reporting outcomes.

While we used performance measures and targets in our analysis, our

evaluation was also based on other factors, such as previous reports and

evaluations by us and others, our knowledge of Justice’s operations and

programs, and our identification of best practices concerning performance

planning and reporting. Furthermore, we added text to reflect the

development of new measures in our comparison of the performance

report and plan with the previous year’s report and plan. Concerning the

quality standards issue, we did not indicate that INS had not met the 99-

percent standard. We merely indicated that the performance report does

not explain what is covered by these standards. While Justice believes

that the existence of quality standards implicitly explains the relationship

to the outcome, we believe that the report could articulate what aspects of

quality service have been achieved. Moreover, we included information

from our previous work relative to CLAIMS that indicated that data

limitations could affect Justice’s assessment of the quality of services.

Management challenges. Justice believes that the format used in appendix

I of our report did not lend itself to an accurate description of its

performance report and plan. In the column describing how Justice

assessed its progress in resolving the management challenges, we

sometimes indicated that progress relative to a management challenge was

not discussed. Justice believes that, although technically correct, this is

misleading because information about some of the management

challenges may be included in the third column of the table, which

discusses applicable goals and measures in Justice’s performance plan.

Justice suggested that, where appropriate, we should indicate in the report

column that information about a particular challenge is included under the

“plan” column. Further, Justice noted that, in some instances, more

complete discussions of its progress in addressing some issues can be

found in other, more applicable, documents.

We included text in the first paragraph of appendix I to explain that

Justice did not have performance goals and measures for fiscal year 2000

to assess progress and that, for some of the management challenges,

Justice discussed the challenge in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan.

We did not verify whether additional information about Justice’s

management challenges may be found in other documents, but if

information in other documents is relevant to assessing Justice’s progress,
Page 28 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

it would have been useful to decisionmakers if Justice were to identify

these documents in the performance report.

In addition to the four areas discussed above, Justice raised one final

issue. Justice noted that it continues to face conflicting pressures to keep

its performance report and plan streamlined and yet to include more

detailed information. Justice characterized our position as one desiring

considerably more detail in its performance report and plan. Our point is

not necessarily that Justice needs to include more detailed information,

but rather that it needs to better articulate and explain how performance

and strategies relate to achieving desired goals.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to

appropriate congressional committees; the Attorney General; and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies of this report will also

be available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-8777.

Key contributors to this report were Linda Watson, Tim Outlaw, Mary Hall,

Julia Duquette, David Irvin, and Charles Vrabel.

Sincerely yours,

Paul L. Jones

Director, Justice Issues
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 29 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

The following table identifies the major management challenges

confronting the Department of Justice (Justice), which includes the

governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management

and information security. The first column lists the 19 management

challenges identified by our office and/or Justice’s Office of the Inspector

General (OIG). The second column discusses what progress, as discussed

in its fiscal year 2000 performance report, Justice made in resolving its

challenges. The third column discusses the extent to which Justice’s fiscal

year 2002 performance plan includes performance goals and measures to

address the challenges that we and the OIG identified. We found that

Justice’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving

many of its challenges, but it did not discuss the agency’s progress in

resolving the following challenges: (1) internal control weaknesses at the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), (2) options for restructuring the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), (3) weaknesses in Justice’s

asset forfeiture program, (4) program management weaknesses in the

Weed and Seed program, (5) proper management of grant funds, and (6)

enforcement efforts along the northern border. However, Justice officials

pointed out that progress for these management challenges are not

discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report because there were

no goals, measures, or strategies in its fiscal year 2000 performance plan.

Furthermore, Justice noted that some of these management challenges are

included in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan.

Of the agency’s 19 major management challenges identified by us and

Justice’s OIG, Justice’s performance plan (1) had goals and measures that

were directly related to ten challenges; (2) had a goal but no measures that

were directly related to one challenge; (3) had goals and measures that

were indirectly applicable to two of the challenges; (4) had no goals and

measures related to two of the challenges, but discussed strategies to

address them; or (5) had no goals, measures, or strategies to address four

of the challenges.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 30 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Table 2: Major Management Challenges

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

GAO-designated governmentwide high risk

Strategic Human Capital Management

GAO has identified shortcomings at multiple

agencies involving key elements of modern

human capital management, including strategic

human capital planning and organizational

alignment; leadership continuity and succession

planning; acquiring and developing staffs whose

size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs;

and creating results-oriented organizational

cultures.

(The OIG also identified human capital as a

management challenge for Justice.)

Justice’s performance report

addressed part of this management

challenge. The report did not discuss

progress related to information

technology (IT) and Bureau of Prisons

(BOP) staff recruitment and retention.

Justice’s 2000 performance report

states that current assessment of

recruitment and retention issues

indicates that recent efforts to attract

and retain qualified Border Patrol

agents have been successful.

According to Justice, INS has

overcome difficulties in hiring Border

Patrol agents. However, the

performance report indicates that INS

did not meet its fiscal year 2000

performance target. The report also

states that INS set records in fiscal

year 2000 for the number of qualified

applicants and the number of

applicants passing the required tests.

Furthermore, the performance report

indicates that based on program

performance in fiscal year 2000, INS

expects to achieve the fiscal year

2001 performance goal. Justice also

reports that its attrition rates for IT

positions are predicted to decrease as

a result of special pay rates that went

into effect in January 2000.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge. Justice’s 2002

performance plan includes an annual

goal to increase hiring and retention in

key positions, increase the quality of new

hires, and increase employee

satisfaction. Specific Justice

performance measurements related to

hiring resources needed to accomplish

agency missions are for INS to have

10,377 Border Patrol agents on-board

and for BOP to have 2,960 new

correction staff on-board in fiscal year

2002.

Justice reported that it did not set a

performance target for IT positions

because it was within the normal attrition

rates and expected additional

improvements. Justice plans to monitor

its performance to ensure that

recruitment and retention remain within

acceptable levels. Because Justice has

lost top candidates to other

organizations due to a lengthy

recruitment process, Justice has a

performance measure to reduce the

average cycle time for filling a job from

200 days to 186 days in fiscal year 2001

and 179 days in fiscal year 2002.

Lastly, Justice surveyed employees in

fiscal year 2000 (baseline) and plans to

survey employees again in fiscal year

2002 to determine if employee

satisfaction in selected areas has

increased by a target of 5 percent.

Information Security

Our January 2001 high-risk series update noted

that since our last high-risk report in January

1999,a

 efforts to strengthen information security

have gained momentum and expanded both at

individual agencies and at the governmentwide

level. However, recent audits continue to show

that federal computer systems are riddled with

weaknesses that make them highly vulnerable

Justice has acknowledged that it has

information security weaknesses and

reported information system controls

as a material weakness in its Federal

Managers Financial Integrity Act (P.L.

97-255) report for 2000. In addressing

information security, Justice noted in

its performance report that it has

revitalized its security certification

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge. Justice’s 2002

plan includes a management

performance goal to ensure adequate

information technology security. This

goal focuses on meeting an ongoing

requirement to certify department

networks and systems. This goal is
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 31 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

to computer-based attacks and place a broad

range of critical operations and assets at risk of

fraud, misuse, and disruption.

(Justice’s OIG identified security of department

systems and data as a management challenge.

In addition, the OIG reported information system

controls as a material weakness on Justice’s

fiscal year 2000 financial audit report.)

accreditation program to ensure that

components carry out comprehensive

security planning, risk assessment,

and contingency planning for all

information systems. In addition, a

penetration testing program was

initiated 2 years ago to identify

weaknesses, reduce unauthorized

access to their systems, and ensure

timely corrective action by system

owner(s).

Notwithstanding these actions, in its

fiscal year 2000 financial audit,

Justice’s OIG reported information

security weaknesses in access

controls, segregation of duties, system

software controls, change control

processes, service continuity, and

entitywide security programs.

However, Justice did not address in its

performance report steps it was taking

to ensure that all information security

weaknesses reported in connection

with Justice’s annual financial audit

were effectively corrected.

measured based on the percentage of

information systems that are certified by

department components. In addition,

Justice established a management goal

to reduce “high risk findings” by 10

percent for fiscal year 2002 through a

combination of certifying department

systems and an ongoing system

penetration-testing program. While these

measurements provide an indication of

progress made in reducing security

weaknesses, they do not provide a

measure of the overall effectiveness of

Justice’s security.

The Chief Information Officers Council in

coordination with the National Institute of

Standards and Technology and the

Office of Management and Budget has

developed a framework for agencies to

use in determining the current status of

information system controls and, where

necessary, to establish a target for

improvement. Justice could use this

framework as a means of measuring

progress in improving its information

security program.

GAO-designated major management challenge

Asset Forfeiture Program

The need to address weaknesses in Justice’s

asset forfeiture program, specifically, its

management and accountability of seized and

forfeited property.

GAO has designated Justice’s asset forfeiture

program as high-risk since 1990 because (1)

over the years, neither Justice nor Treasury

adequately focused on managing and

accounting for seized and forfeited items and (2)

Justice and Treasury had not formed a plan to

consolidate postseizure administration of certain

properties to eliminate duplication of resources

and reduce administrative costs. In recent years,

Justice has taken many actions to improve the

management and disposition of seized and

forfeited property. However, challenges remain

to address the programs’ inadequate information

systems and financial management

weaknesses, including accountability over

seized assets.

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

The 2002 performance plan had no

goals or measures directly related to this

management challenge. As this area is a

GAO-designated major management

challenge, goals or measures addressing

the weaknesses in Justice’s asset

forfeiture program should be included in

the performance plan. However, the plan

did note that in September 2000 Justice

awarded a contract to a consulting firm

to review the operational effectiveness of

Justice’s asset management and

disposal practices as they pertain to

assets seized for forfeiture. A final report

is expected by the end of FY 2001.
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 32 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

(Justice’s OIG deleted this issue from its list of

management challenges because the Asset

Forfeiture Fund received an unqualified opinion

on its most recent financial statement and

Justice closed the issue as a material

weakness.d

)

Program Management Weaknesses Remain in

Weed and Seed Program

While Justice has made some progress toward

addressing administrative and management

weaknesses, challenges remain related to

developing better performance measures for the

Weed and Seed program. We recommended

that Justice’s Executive Office for Weed and

Seed (EOWS) develop additional performance

measures to track program outcomes, noting

that indicators would help EOWS make more

informed program decisions, such as whether to

continue existing funding.

EOWS officials told us that they had sought

appropriations for fiscal year 2001 to expand

evaluation and performance measurement

efforts but that the additional funds requested

had not been approved by the Congress as of

November 2000.

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

The 2002 performance plan had no

goals or measures related to this

management challenge. The fiscal year

2002 performance plan states that

EOWS will continue to support

communities in the development and

implementation of the Weed and Seed

strategy including safe havens and

community policing. The performance

plan states that the National Institute of

Justice (NIJ) impact evaluation final

report and GAO findings have assisted

EOWS in improving data collection

efforts. EOWS is establishing a Weed

and Seed Data Center that will be

showing such things as each site’s

geographic area and Safe Haven

locations and selected demographic data

that have been estimated for each site’s

service area.

Police Corps Program Had a Slower Than

Expected Start, Due to Funding and Staffing

Limitations

While Justice has made some progress toward

addressing administrative and management

weaknesses, challenges remain related to

increasing states’ participation in the Police

Corps program. We reported in February 2000

that the majority of participant slots for the

Police Corps program, under the Community

Oriented Policing Service (COPS), remained

unfilled.e

Several states indicated that participation in the

program and reasons for the program’s slow

growth was related to the Police Corps statute

(42 U.S.C. 14091-14119) not providing funding

to pay states for program administration or for

recruitment and selection of participants. We

also reported that according to federal and state

officials, a factor contributing to unfilled positions

was that COPS dedicated insufficient staff to the

program, which led to delays in providing

The fiscal year 2000 performance

report has three performance

measures associated with this

management challenge. The Police

Corps Program had one performance

measure and the COPS had two

performance measures.

The Police Corps Program had a

performance measure for the number

of Police Corps graduates serving a 1-

year community patrol. Justice fell just

short of its target of 350, with an actual

performance level of 345 graduates

serving 1 year. The fiscal year 2000

target was not met because training

classes lost participants as a result of

removal or resignation. Justice also

reported that, based on program

performance in fiscal year 2000, it did

not expect to achieve the fiscal year

2001 goal.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly applicable to the

management challenge.

Justice reports that, in the future, to

reduce the removals and resignations, it

will encourage a careful selection

processes to correct the problem.

Justice also stated that it will continue its

past strategy of recruiting and providing

technical assistance by telephone,

through site visits, and during national

conferences—a process that Justice

states has proved successful.

The COPS office will continue to support

community-policing initiatives as a goal

and measure new police officers funded

and on the street.The 2002 performance

plan states that the COPS office will use

a combination of quantitative and

qualitative analyses to measure its

impact. These analyses include
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 33 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

program guidance, processing program

applications and payments, and answering

participants’ questions about the program.

In December 1998, the Police Corps program

was transferred from COPS to the Office of

Justice Programs (OJP). We reported that OJP

had made significant progress in obligating

funds and establishing interagency agreements

with participating states and providing program

guidance. However, at the time of our review, it

was too soon to tell whether OJP would succeed

in filling empty participant slots in a timely

manner.

Regarding COPS, one performance

measure is the number of new police

officers funded and the other is the

number of police officers on the street.

COPS exceeded the target for officers

funded (targeted performance was

109,151 and actual performance was

109,212), but fell short of the target for

the number of officers on the street

(targeted performance was 84,500

and actual performance was 73,629).

The projections for future performance

measures have been revised to more

accurately reflect the time it takes for

an officer to reach the street. In

addition, the report states that if the

agency finds that grantees are

encountering difficulties implementing

their grant, COPS will provide training

ranging from distance learning to onsite technical assistance.

examining the effect of COPS funding on

the outcome measures, using existing

evaluations to compile case studies to

examine the effect of COPS funding on

grantee communities, and examining

completed NIJ-funded studies for the

relationship between community policing

and the outcome measures adopted by

the agency, among other things.

Preliminary results are to be available in

fiscal year 2002, to be followed in

subsequent years by more complete

data.

Justice also states that it plans to

streamline component organizations

within the Department that include

consideration of alternatives for

improving the efficiency and

effectiveness of state and local

assistance programs, which may include

merging COPS’ program and

administrative offices in OJP and

additional streamlining of OJP’s

organizational structure. The

performance plan set a target date of

September 30, 2002, to develop a plan

to restructure state and local assistance

programs and stated that Justice is

awaiting further guidance from OMB.

Develop Measurable DEA Performance Targets

to Determine Progress in Reducing the

Availability of Illegal Drugs

Consistent with the Office of National Drug

Control Policy strategy to reduce the supply of

illegal drugs to our nation, one of Justice’s

strategic objectives is to reduce the threat and

trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying,

disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking

organizations that are international,

multijurisdictional, or have an identified local

impact. Despite progress that DEA made in

developing strategic goals and objectives and in

enhancing its programs and initiatives, which

are consistent with the National Drug Control

Strategy, limitations in DEA’s performance

measures make it difficult to determine its

progress in reducing the availability of illegal

drugs.

Justice’s progress in resolving this

management challenge is discussed in

this report under the outcome

“Availability and/or Use of Illegal

Drugs.”

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge.

Internal Control Weaknesses at DEA

Although DEA obtained an unqualified opinion

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

The 2002 performance plan had no

goals, measures, or strategies to
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 34 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

on its fiscal year 1999 financial statements, the

number of reported internal control weaknesses

at DEA increased from fiscal year 1998 to 1999.

These material weaknesses include, among

other things, information system controls, the

lack of a system to accurately and completely

account for property and equipment, and a weak

financial reporting process.

address this challenge.

INS’ Organizational Structure Remains

Undecided

Proposals to restructure INS have been issued

as a result of several critics’ conclusion that

“mission overload” has impeded INS from

succeeding at either of its primary functions. To

remedy problems identified, various entities and

several members of Congress have proposed a

wide range of reorganization options.

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

The 2002 performance plan had a goal

and measure related to this

management challenge. Justice has a

goal to streamline selected

organizational units by delayering

management levels. Specifically, the

Justice report states that INS will be

restructured by splitting it into two

components—one for immigration

enforcement and the other for

immigration services. The performance

plan had a target date to develop a plan

to restructure state and local assistance

programs by September 30, 2002, and

stated Justice is awaiting further

guidance from OMB.

Efforts to Reduce Unauthorized Employment

Face Impediments

The effectiveness of the verification process has

been undermined by aliens’ use of fraudulent

documents. In addition, employers face little

chance of being investigated by INS, in part

because resources for worksite enforcement

have been relatively small. Furthermore, INS

issued an interior enforcement strategy that

called for INS to pursue the criminal

investigation of employers who are flagrant or

grave violators. However, the strategy left

unclear what was meant by a flagrant or grave

violation, what criteria would be used for

opening investigations of employers suspected

of criminal activities, and how INS would

measure the effectiveness of its strategy.

The Justice fiscal year 2000

performance report included a

performance measure for the number

of criminal cases of employers

intentionally violating employer

sanctions (hire illegal workers or

violate other criminal statues relating

to the employment of illegal workers).

The performance measure did not

have a projected target but reported

that 229 criminal cases were identified

in fiscal year 2000. Justice’s reported

historical information showed that this

was an increase from the 182 criminal

cases identified in fiscal year 1999.

In an April 1999 report,f

 we

recommended that INS needed to

clarify the criteria for opening

investigations of employers suspected

of criminal activities. We believe that

having clear criteria is important if INS

is to effectively focus its limited staff to

achieve its enforcement goals and

intended results.

The 2002 performance plan had no

goals, measures, or strategies to

address this management challenge.

Justice’s fiscal year 2002 performance

plan states that the measure related to

employer sanctions is a discontinued

measure. The plan states that INS

projects it is unlikely to maintain the

levels achieved in fiscal year 2000 in

fiscal year 2001. Even though the

measure is to be discontinued, the plan

states that INS will continue to pursue

criminal cases against employers who

intentionally hire unauthorized workers

or who violate other criminal statutes

relating to employment of unauthorized

workers.

In fiscal year 2002, Justice will present

principals for prosecution from complex,

international and/or worksite-related

antismuggling cases, large-scale benefit

and document fraud cases, and criminal

cases against employers. Performance

measures for investigations are to be

aligned with the emphasis on criminal

violators in the Interior Enforcement
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 35 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

strategy. Other measures for sanctions,

fines, task force apprehensions, and

asset forfeiture continue to be tracked in

INS’ internal operational plan.

Shortcomings in Programs to Control Alien

Smuggling

The country’s ability to combat the significant

and growing problem of alien smuggling is

hampered by management and operational

problems at INS, such as fragmented and

uncoordinated investigative efforts and lack of

staff to perform intelligence functions.

The INS National Antismuggling

strategy is to disrupt the means and

methods that facilitate alien smuggling

utilizing traditional and nontraditional

enforcement efforts. The fiscal year

2000 performance measure focused

on the number of smugglers presented

for prosecution to the U.S. Attorneys.

Justice did not project a performance

target for this measure; rather it

reported actual numbers for alien

smuggling violations (2,520) and

benefit or document fraud cases (785).

Reported historical information

showed that this was an increase from

the 1,967 alien smuggling violations

and 636 benefit or document fraud

cases identified in fiscal year 1999.

Limited performance measurement

has hampered INS’ ability to evaluate

the effectiveness of its antismuggling

program. INS does not provide

information to measure the extent to

which INS’ antismuggling efforts have

helped achieve the strategy’s objective

for deterring and disrupting alien

smuggling. We recognized the

difficulty in directly measuring

outcomes such as deterrence and

disruption of antismuggling. We

believe that there are a variety of

measures available—including

information on smuggling fees, usage

and tactics, and shifts in the flow of

smuggled alien traffic—that could be

used to collect systematic data and

develop a composite picture of

progress toward achieving the

strategy’s objectives.

In a May 2000 report,g

 we

recommended, among other things,

that INS (1) establish criteria for

opening an antismuggling case to help

ensure that its antismuggling

resources are focused on the highestThe 2002 performance plan had no

goals, measures, or strategies to

address this management challenge.

Justice’s fiscal year 2002 performance

plan states that the measures related to

alien smuggling have been discontinued.

The plan states that INS projects it will

not maintain the levels achieved in fiscal

year 2000 in fiscal year 2001 and may

fall below its fiscal years 1998 and 1999

level. Even though the measures are to

be discontinued, the plan states that INS

will continue to pursue criminal cases

against employers who intentionally hire

unauthorized workers or who violate

other criminal statutes relating to

employment of unauthorized workers.

In support of the INS’ antismuggling

goals contained in the interior and border

enforcement strategies, INS intelligence

will continue to collect and analyze

intelligence related to alien smuggling

and endangerment of large, complex

smuggling organizations. On the basis of

intelligence from within the INS

intelligence system from domestic and

overseas sources as well as classified

information from the intelligence

community, INS will identify and develop

operations to disrupt and dismantle

major criminal organizations. For fiscal

year 2002, INS plans to target alien

smuggling and trafficking organizations.

Specifically, INS projects it will identify

five organizations, disrupt two, and

dismantle one.
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 36 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

priority cases and (2) establish

performance measures for the

antismuggling efforts and intelligence

program with which to gauge program

effects.

GAO- and OIG-designated major management challenges

Financial Statements and Systems

Achieve excellence in financial management,

including, but not limited to, a departmentwide

unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and

beyond. (GAO)

Continuing management control issues in

financial statement preparation, i.e., hire

contractors to complete financial statements;

automated systems not capable of providing

needed information during year (relied on

manual process): significant difficulties

implementing commercial off the shelf

software.(OIG)

Justice’s targets were to receive (1) an

unqualified opinion on all 6

consolidated statements and (2) all 10

components. Actual FY 2000

performance was (1) an unqualified

opinion on two statements (Balance

Sheet and Statement of Custodial

Activity) and a qualified opinion on four

statements and (2) 8 out of 10 of its

components with an unqualified

opinion.

FY 2000 is the first year Justice

achieved an unqualified balance sheet

opinion.

In FY 1999, 9 out of 10 of Justice’s

components received an unqualified

opinion, as compared with 8 in FY

2000.

The 2002 performance plan has a goal

but does not have measures related to

this management challenge.

Justice has set a goal to achieve a

departmentwide, unqualified audit

opinion. Additionally, Justice will

continue to focus on addressing the

accounting practice, reporting, and

systems weaknesses cited in the audit

reports. However, no performance

indicators or milestones for addressing

these weaknesses are provided to allow

for measurement of progress. While

obtaining an unqualified opinion is an

important goal, it is not an end in and of

itself. The key is to take steps to

continuously improve internal control and

the underlying financial and

management information systems as a

means to ensure accountability and

enhance the effectiveness of

government. These systems must

generate timely, accurate, and useful

information on an ongoing basis, not just

at the end of the year.

Justice’s OIG reports that most

components tend to view the financial

statements as an end-of-year

assignment and often must hire a

significant number of contractors.

Several components do not have

regularly functioning systems capable of

providing needed accounting information

to managers throughout the year.

Systems improvements are critical given

that all 10 components have major

accounting system enhancement or

replacement projects that are underway,

planned, or in the final phases of

implementation. Until system

improvements can be implemented,

Justice will continue to expend additional
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 37 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

resources in its accounting operations to

compensate for the system deficiencies.

Information Systems Planning and

Implementation

Justice’s mission-critical computer systems were

poorly planned, experienced long delays in

implementation, or did not provide timely, useful,

and reliable data.

Justice’s OIG also identified this area as a

management challenge.

The performance report discusses

INS’ continued move toward a more

strategic approach to manage IT. The

report states that management

approaches to IT planning and

implementation are undergoing

significant long-term changes.

Specifically, Justice noted that

emphasis has been placed on

compliance with IT architectural

standards, security requirements,

comprehensive investment review,

and procedures for accurate reporting

of current status.

However, INS continues to have

problems effectively managing its IT

resources that are critical to its

operations. In August 2000,b

 we

reported that INS lacked an enterprise

architecture to manage its IT efforts.

Further, in December 2000,c

 we

reported that INS lacked defined and

disciplined processes to manage its IT

investments.

While INS has taken some limited

steps to develop an enterprise

architecture and has established some

important capabilities for managing IT

investments, we have noted in both of

our 2000 reports that INS has

considerable work ahead to fully

implement them.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge. The 2002 plan

contains a management performance

goal to provide an adequate, costeffective, and compliant IT environment.

This goal will be measured by the

percentage of IT systems that are

determined to be compliant with (1)

security requirements, (2) system

development lifecycle standards, and (3)

supported with technologically adequate

workstations. However, the plan does

not specifically describe how system

compliance within each of these areas

will be determined. For example, in

assessing a system to be compliant with

security requirements, the Office of

Management and Budget’s (OMB)

Circular A-130, Management of Federal

Information Resources, provides

guidelines on computer security that

could be used as criteria.

INS Southwest Border Strategy

Although INS generally allocated newly hired

Border Patrol agents in accordance with its

strategy, INS was not able to meet its goal of

increasing its onboard strength of Border Patrol

agents by at least 1,000 in fiscal year 1999. INS

saw an increase of only 369 agents in fiscal year

1999 due to recruitment and retention problems.

INS lacks performance information to determine

the overall impact of its strategy to reduce the

illegal alien flow across the border, reduce flow

to the border, and reduce the number of illegal

aliens who reside in the United States. (GAO)

Justice’s progress in resolving this

management challenge is discussed

under the strategic human capital

management challenge in this table

and in this report under the outcome

“Securing U.S. Borders from Illegal

Immigration.”

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge.
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 38 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

In 1994, the Border Patrol issued a strategic

plan for controlling U.S. borders. However, the

strategic plan does not establish specific goals

to be achieved in each phase of the plan, nor

does it establish target dates for completing one

phase or beginning another. (OIG)

Removal of Illegal Aliens

We found that for fiscal year 1999, 43 percent of

the aliens released from detention prior to a

determination of their asylum status had not

appeared for subsequent removal hearings.

We recommended that INS analyze the

characteristics of those aliens who appeared

and those who did not appear for their removal

hearing and use the results to reevaluate its

policy for when to release aliens in cases when

an asylum officer determined the aliens to have

a credible fear of persecution or torture. (GAO)

OIG reported that INS was successful in

deporting only about 11 percent of nondetained

aliens after final orders had been issued. It

noted that ineligible aliens, including convicted

felons, are inappropriately granted voluntary

departure because the INS and the Executive

Office of Immigration Review have not ensured

that all eligibility requirements are met. In

addition, INS lacks an effective departure

verification system and, therefore, has no way of

knowing whether illegal aliens granted voluntary

departure have left the country.h

Additionally, Justice has classified the

monitoring of alien overstays and removal of

criminal aliens as material weaknesses

because, among other reasons, the INS has

failed to identify many deportable criminal

aliens, including aggravated felons, or initiate

Institutional Hearing Program proceedings for

them before they are released from prison. INS

also lacks an enforcement policy that specifically

targets the overstay population. (OIG)

The fiscal year 2000 performance

report does not specifically discuss

nondetained aliens. However, the

report measures the number of final

order alien removals. The

performance target for noncriminal

removals was not projected and the

performance target for criminal

removals was 55,000. Justice reported

that INS’ noncriminal removals were

34,290 and criminal removals were

64,261. The Justice performance plan

notes that current estimates of 67,000

criminal removals indicate that

performance for this measure will fall

short of the original targeted level for

fiscal year 2001 of 70,300.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures that were indirectly

applicable to this management

challenge.

In fiscal year 2002, INS will continue to

use alternative orders of removal, such

as administrative, reinstated, and

expedited, as well as partner with the

Executive Office of Immigration Review

and the Board of Immigration Appeals to

improve the hearing process. INS will

maintain the Institutional Removal

Program in conjunction with state and

federal prison systems to identify and

process illegal aliens for removal prior to

their release from custody. INS will

continue to improve its relationship with

state and local law enforcement. To this

end, INS will improve coverage to law

enforcement activities through the use of

Quick Response Teams and the Law

Enforcement Support Center. The

projected performance measure for fiscal

year 2002 is 31,500 final orders for

noncriminal alien removals and 71,700

final orders for criminal alien removals.

OIG-designated major management challenges

Departmental Response to Terrorism

The OIG said that GAO found governmentwide,

antiterrorism resources were not clearly linked to

a threat analysis and a national antiterrorism

strategy.i This situation creates the potential for

Justice had six performance measures

related to preventing terrorist acts.

Four of these measures had no

performance target. For the two

measures that had a performance

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures that were indirectly

applicable to this management

challenge. Justice has set goals to

prevent terrorists’ acts, improve
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 39 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

gaps or duplication in U.S. antiterrorism

strategy. The OIG also noted that management

of counterterrorism funds is a concern because

of discrepancies found in a previous audit of the

fund. The OIG plans to assess the readiness of

selected state and local emergency response

agencies that receive Justice funding and

determine whether grant funds are being used

for their intended purpose.

target, Justice met the performance

level. Justice’s performance measures

do not address concerns to link

resources to threat analysis and a

national antiterrorism threat.

The OJP Office for State and Local

Domestic Preparedness Support

(OSLDPS) is to assist state and local

emergency response agencies (law

enforcement, fire, hazardous

materials, emergency medical

services, emergency management,

and public health) to enhance their

capabilities to respond to the threat

posed by terrorist uses of weapons of

mass destruction. Justice has a goal

that the OJP OSLDPS effectively

manage counterterrorism efforts.

OSLDPS is to continue to provide

targeted assistance to states through

on-site monitoring based on the

specific needs identified with each

state’s plan. Justice’s performance

report shows that OJP conducted 34

monitoring visits in fiscal year 2000.

response capabilities to terrorists’ acts,

and protect critical infrastructures. In

fiscal year 2002, Justice will continue to

combat terrorism by building maximum

feasible capability throughout Justice to

attack terrorism by investigating and

prosecuting those persons and countries

that finance terrorist acts. Justice’s

performance measures for its goal to

prevent terrorist acts are the number of

terrorist cases investigated and the

number of terrorist convictions. Justice

provides actual performance but does

not provide a performance target level

for these two measures.

To improve response capabilities to

terrorists’ acts Justice’s strategy is to

build maximum feasible capability in the

counterterrorism program, allowing

Justice to identify and address terrorist

threats. Justice will expand partnerships

with other federal agencies as well as

state and local, foreign, and international

entities to enhance domestic and

international responsiveness to terrorist

acts. The performance measure for this

goal is the number of U.S. Attorney

Offices with crisis response plans.

To protect critical infrastructure (to

enhance U.S. national security by

preventing infrastructure damage

through a multifaceted approach to

maximizing its investigative and

preventive resources to thwart cyber

attacks on the nation’s infrastructure),

the National Infrastructure Protection

Center is working to develop maximum

feasible capacity in detecting, deterring,

assessing, investigating, and responding

to cyber attacks on the nation’s

infrastructures from both a reactive and

increasingly proactive field,

headquarters, and interagency

standpoint. The performance measures

for this goal are (1) computer intrusions

investigated, (2) computer intrusions

convictions, and (3) key assets

identified. Only the third measure has a

performance target level.
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 40 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

In fiscal year 2002, OSLDPS will

continue to provide targeted assistance

to states through on-site monitoring

based on specific needs identified within

each state’s plan. OJP is projected to

conduct 52 monitoring visits in fiscal year

2002.

Prison Overcrowding

Justice continues to make slow progress in

reducing prison overcrowding, a material

weakness for Justice since 1985. Prison

overcrowding will remain a management

challenge for Justice as long as the number of

incarcerated inmates outstrips available BOP

housing. Any solution must be cost-effective and

provide the appropriate level of security for staff

and inmates. BOP’s management challenge is

to find the optimum mix of new facilities,

expansion of existing facilities, alternatives to

incarceration, and privatization options.

To reduce prison overcrowding is a

performance goal for Justice. BOP has

set targets for each of three security

levels. For fiscal year 2000, BOP met

its goal for medium (50 percent

overcrowding compared with a target

of 58 percent) and high (54 percent

compared with 69 percent) level

prisons, but not for low (44 percent

compared with 36 percent). Justice

reported that BOP revised its

classification in fiscal year 2000, which

resulted in a short-term population

reduction at the medium- and highsecurity levels and an increase at the

low security level. In addition, Justice

commented that increases of

immigration cases had a substantial

impact on overcrowding at the lowsecurity level.

BOP also has a performance measure

related to the number of prison beds

put into service and under

development or construction. For fiscal

year 2000, BOP’s target was 6,695

new beds; it actually activated 5,346

new prison beds. Its target for beds

under development or construction

was 20,417; it actually had 23,904

beds under development or

construction. Justice noted that it had

activated some beds in fiscal year

1999, ahead of schedule, which

resulted in fewer being activated in

fiscal year 2000. Justice attributed the

increase in beds under development

or construction to provision of funding

for several new facilities.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge. As a step

toward achieving the fiscal year 2007

target of reducing systemwide

overcrowding to 30 percent, Justice is

planning to achieve the following goals in

fiscal years 2001 and 2002: Low – 40

percent and 36 percent; Medium – 57

percent and 61 percent; and High – 56

percent and 57 percent. Justice expects

BOP to meet its targets for fiscal year

2001. We note that, except for the low

security level, these goals are headed in

the wrong direction – BOP is predicting

more overcrowding, not less.

With regard to beds put into service and

under development or construction,

Justice has targets for activating 3,723

beds in FY 2001 and 5,455 in FY 2002.

Justice expects to fall short of the fiscal

year 2001 target by only activating 3,609

beds. It also has targets for the number

of beds under development or

construction in each fiscal year. Justice

acknowledges that, in the longer run, the

beds under development and

construction will address only some of its

overcrowding concerns.

Detention Space and Infrastructure – U.S.

Marshals Service and INS

This has been a management challenge for

The USMS administers the federal

prisoner detention program. Federal

detainees are people who are

detained while awaiting trial or

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures directly related to this

management challenge. USMS and INS

each have increasing targets for average
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 41 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

Justice since 1989. Both the USMS and INS are

experiencing rapid growth in their need for

detention space. This places increasingly heavy

demands on the agencies’ infrastructure,

including buildings, transportation,

communications equipment, and staff.

sentencing, a hearing on their

immigration status, or deportation.

USMS depends on state and local

governments and BOP to house

detainees.

Justice uses four performance

measures to assess its success in

achieving this goal: both USMS and

INS measure the average daily

population in custody and the cost of

an average jail day. For fiscal year

2000, both agencies had less average

daily population than they had

targeted. INS met its average jail day

cost target; USMS slightly exceeded

its target.

daily population for fiscal years 2001 and

2002. USMS expects its average jail day

cost to increase to $62; INS expects its

cost to stabilize at $75.

Justice expects to achieve its fiscal year

2001 performance targets. Its plan states

that it will work cooperatively with the

private sector and state and local

governments as well as BOP to establish

and maintain adequate capacity for

federal detainees.

Grant Management

The infusion of funds for the COPS grants has

resulted in a management challenge for Justice

to properly dispense and monitor funds under

the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcment

Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). Justice’s multibillion

dollar grant programs are a high risk for fraud

given the amount of money involved and the

tens of thousands of grantees.

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

The performance report has no

quantifiable targets associated with

grant management. Administration of

grants could be strengthened through

better monitoring and by obtaining

more timely and definitive information

about project funding and the progress

of program implementation.

The 2002 performance plan has goals

and measures that were directly

applicable to this management

challenge. Justice has set a goal to

ensure effective management of grants.

Justice plans to achieve this goal by

continued progress toward full

implementation of the Grants

Management System (GMS) as a way of

standardizing and streamlining the grant

process. However, the system is still in

its initial implementation phase; 5

percent of new grants were processed

through GMS in FY 2000. Out-year

targets based on FY 2000

implementation success project only 45

percent of new grants being processed

by GMS by FY 2003. Once

implemented, GMS will electronically

track and process grants from initial

application to closeout. The plan does

not address how Justice will effectively

manage grants in the interim while GMS

is being implemented.

INS Enforcement Efforts Along the Northern

Border

In a recent Justice OIG report,j concerns were

raised regarding enforcement efforts along the

northern border. Specifically, the OIG report

indicated that organized criminal activity along

the northern border was encountered more often

than along the Southwest border and that the

level of illegal activity along the northern border

is likely much greater than the Border Patrol can

Progress in this area was not

discussed.

Since its inception in 1994, the Border

Patrol’s National Strategic Plan has

been the basis for a multiyear,

multiphased approach to the

deployment of new resources along

the Southwest border, the northern

border, and coastal areas. The

The 2002 performance plan had no

goals, measures, or strategies to

address this management challenge.
Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice’s Efforts to Address Its Major

Management Challenges

Page 42 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major

management challenge as

discussed in the fiscal year 2000

performance report

Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

document because of the lack of intelligence

information to the northern border and the

limited number of agents available to patrol the

area. In addition, the OIG report noted that most

of the world’s prominent terrorist organizations

have established operational bases in Canada,

which help facilitate the illegal transit of

members into the United States.

performance report states that

progress toward this management

challenge will not be addressed until

phase IV of this strategy. Phase three

is not expected to begin until after

fiscal year 2004.

a

High Risk Series: An Update (GAO-01-263, Jan. 2001).

b

Information Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the Development of It Enterprise Architecture

(GAO/AIMD-00-212, Aug. 1, 2000).

c

Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment Management Capability (GAO-01-

146, Dec. 29, 2000).

d

Justice’s OIG report #00-24.

e

Police Corps: Some Problems Resolved, But Most Positions Remain Unfilled (GAO/GGD-00-69,

Feb. 22, 2000).

f

Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/GGD99-33, Apr. 2, 1999).

g

Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem

(GAO/GGD-00-103, May 1, 2000).

h

Justice’s OIG report #I-99-09.

i

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO-T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr.

2000).

j

Justice’s OIG report, #I-2000-004

Source: Prepared by GAO on the basis of Justice and GAO data.
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S.

Department of Justice

Page 43 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S.

Department of Justice
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S.

Department of Justice

Page 44 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S.

Department of Justice

Page 45 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S.

Department of Justice

Page 46 GAO-01-729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes (440044)
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