IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WENDY L. KOERT, :

:

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION

:

 v. :

:

GE GROUP LIFE ASSURANCE : 

COMPANY ET AL., :

:

Defendants :

: NO. 04-CIV-5745

MEMORANDUM

Wendy Koert filed suit against GE Group Life Assurance Company, alleging that

Defendant improperly denied her claim for disability benefits, breached its fiduciary

duties by failing to properly administer the policy, and failed to comply with claim

procedures required by ERISA. Her original complaint also contained state law claims

for breach of contract and bad faith denial of insurance benefits, which were dismissed on

grounds of preemption. 

Plaintiff filed this Motion for Leave to Serve Discovery Beyond the Administrative

Record for the stated purpose of determining: “(1) whether Defendant was granted

discretionary authority to make disability determinations under the express terms of an

ERISA plan; (2) the extent of Defendant’s conflicts of interest with respect to its

consideration of Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits; and (3) the full extent of the

procedural irregularities, bias, and unfairness in Defendant’s review of Plaintiff’s claim

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for disability benefits that are readily apparent from the administrative record in this

case.” Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Motion at 1. In response to the motion, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(b) is barred by the statute of

limitations, that Plaintiff cannot simultaneously seek benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(b)

and section 1132(a)(3), and that, in any case, discovery beyond the administrative record

is unwarranted. Defendant asked the court to address the validity of Plaintiff’s claims

before deciding whether additional discovery should be permitted, and the court directed

Plaintiff to brief the issue. I find that Plaintiff is not barred from asserting either her

claim for denial of benefits or her breach of fiduciary duty claim and I will grant

Plaintiff’s request for discovery beyond the administrative record. 

I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Defendant’s challenge to the validity of Plaintiff’s claims is in the nature of a

motion to dismiss. The court may grant a motion to dismiss only where “it appears

beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim that would entitle him to relief.” Carino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir.

2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In deciding a motion to

dismiss, the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see

also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).

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II. Statute of Limitations for a Claim Pursuant to Section 1132(a)(1)(B)

Defendant challenges the validity of Plaintiff’s claim for benefits pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) on the basis that the claim is time barred. Because ERISA does

not provide a statute of limitations for non-fiduciary claims, courts must apply the most

analogous state law limitations period. See Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179

(3d Cir. 1992). In deciding which state law is the most analogous, the Third Circuit

offered the following guidance:

[W]hen ERISA does not provide an applicable statute of

limitations and the most appropriate limitations period of

Pennsylvania is borrowed, the following limitations periods

apply. First, claims for delinquent employer contributions or

for payments past due that are most analogous to claims under

the Wage Payment and Collection Law are governed by its

three-year limitation, and measured from the date the

delinquent payment was due. Second, claims that were

bargained for but have not yet become payable most closely

resemble contract claims for anticipatory breach, and are

governed by Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations

measured from the time when a claimant first knows that the

benefit has been infringed or removed. Third, other ERISA

claims, such as those seeking to reinstate an improperly

removed non-bargained-for benefit or to avoid a prohibited

transaction, have no counterpart in Pennsylvania law and are

thus governed by Pennsylvania’s general six-year statute of

limitations.

Id. at 1181. In this case, the disability benefits to which Plaintiff claims she is entitled

were bargained for as part of her employment compensation package. The onset of

disability as defined by the Policy triggers Defendant’s obligation to pay those benefits. 

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 Defendant urges this court to adopt the three-year statute of limitations under Pennsylvania’s Wage

Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 260.1 et seq., citing Syed v. Hercules, Inc., 214 F.3d

155 (3d Cir. 2001), as support for this position. In Syed, the Third Circuit applied the one-year statute of limitations

under a Delaware employment statute. The holding in Syed, however, is not dispositive as to which cause of action is

most analogous in Pennsylvania. If fact, in response to a reference by the dissent to the WPCL, the majority dropped

a footnote, stating: “[W]e wish to make clear that we express no view regarding the statute of limitations that would

apply if a claim such as Syed’s were brought in Pennsylvania. We note, however, that we have held that some

ERISA claims are governed by the WCPL’s statute of limitations and others are not.” Id. at 162 n.6 (citing Gluck,

960 F.2d at 1180-81). 

The Pennsylvania and Delaware employment statutes are distinguishable. The language of the Delaware

statute provides: “No action for recovery upon a claim of wages, salary, or overtime for work, labor, or personal

services performed, ...or for any other benefits arising from such work, labor or personal services performed shall be

brought after the expiration of one year from the accruing of the cause of action on which such action is based.” 

Syed, 214 F.3d at 159 (citing Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10 § 8111) (emphasis added). The WPCL, by contrast, states:

“No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of

unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years after the day on which such wages were due and

payable....” “Wages” include “fringe benefits” and “wage supplements,” which are defined as “all monetary

employer payments to provide benefits under any employe benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; as well as separation, vacation, holiday, or

guaranteed pay; reimbursement for expenses; union dues withheld from the employes’ pay by the employer; and any

other amount to be paid pursuant to an agreement to the employe, a third party or fund for the benefit of employes.”

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 260.2. The Delaware statute is considerably broader than the WPCL in that the Delaware

statute governs any action “arising from ...work, labor or personal services,” whereas payments under the WPCL are

limited to those made by the employer directly to or on behalf of the employee.

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Plaintiff’s claim alleging that Defendant failed to meet its obligation thus closely

resembles a breach of contract action. Like several other courts in this district, I therefore

find that the most analogous limitations period under Pennsylvania law is the four-year

statute of limitations.1 See Thomas v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 773

(E.D. Pa. 2003) (Yohn, J.) (stating that statute of limitations for breach of contract was

applicable in class action for denial of employment benefits under ERISA); Miller v.

Aetna Healthcare, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20801 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Waldman, J.) (finding

that statute of limitations for breach of contract action applied to claim for denial of

benefits for medical services); Caruso v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

9164 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2000) (Yohn, J.) (holding that breach of contract is most

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Section 1132 provides in relevant part:

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought--

(1) by a participant or beneficiary--

(A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section, or

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to

enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to

future benefits under the terms of the plan;

(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate

relief under section 1109 of this title;

(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice

which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to

obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to

enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan....

29 U.S.C. 1132.

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analogous state law claim and finding that four-year statute of limitations applied to claim

for denial of benefits); Crane v. Asbestos Workers Philadelphia Pension Plan, 1998 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 4293 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1998) (O’Neill, J.) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim

for disability pension benefits was “effectively a contract action to enforce defendant’s

obligations to plaintiff under the Plan” and therefore finding that “Pennsylvania’s fouryear statute of limitations for contract actions is most appropriate in this case”). Plaintiff

filed her complaint within the four-year limitation period, and therefore, her claim is not

time barred.

III. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Pursuant to Section 1132(a)(3)

Relying on Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), and Ream v. Frey, 107

F.3d 147, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1997), Defendant also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of

fiduciary duty claim under section 1132(a)(3), arguing that Plaintiff is not entitled to

simultaneously seek relief under section 1132(a)(1)(B) and section 1132(a)(3).2 In Varity,

the Court held that a group of beneficiaries could recover under section 1132(a)(3),

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finding that no other remedial section of ERISA applied. The Court, however, noted:

[W]e should expect that courts, in fashioning ‘appropriate’

equitable relief, will keep in mind the ‘special nature and

purpose of employee benefit plans,’ and will respect the

‘policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies

and the exclusion of others.’.... Thus, we should expect that

where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a

beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further

equitable relief, in which case, such relief normally would not

be ‘appropriate.’ 

516 U.S. at 515. Similarly in Ream, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could pursue

a breach of fiduciary duty claim under 1132(a)(3), but noted that “where Congress

otherwise has provided for appropriate relief for the injury suffered by the beneficiary,

further equitable relief ought not be provided.” 107 F.3d at 152. The Ream court did not

decide, however, “whether a plaintiff who has been denied benefits can, at the pleading

stage, maintain an action for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and an action for ‘other

appropriate relief’ under § 1132(a)(3)(B).” Tannenbaum v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of

Am., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5664, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004). 

District courts within the Third Circuit are divided on this issue. See, e.g.,

Tannenbaum, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *13-14 (citing cases); Nicolaysen v. BP Amoco

Chemical Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9325, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2002) (same). In

Parente v. Bell Atlantic, 2000 U.S. District LEXIS 4851, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2000),

Judge Reed held that, at the pleading stage, Varity does not require dismissal of a claim

pursuant to section 1132(a)(3) simply because the plaintiff is simultaneously seeking

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relief under section 1132(a)(1)(B). Rather, he explained, “under Varity, a plaintiff is only

precluded from seeking equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) when a court determines that

plaintiff will certainly receive or actually receives adequate relief for her injuries under §

1132(a)(1)(B) or some other ERISA section.” Id. at *11. I find Judge Reed’s reasoning

to be thorough and accurate, and therefore, will adopt the analysis set forth in Parente. At

this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff may simultaneously seek relief under sections

1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132 (a)(3). However, defendant may reassert its argument on a

motion summary judgment when the record is further developed through discovery. See

Nicolaysen, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8. 

IV. Conclusion

I find that Plaintiff’s claim for denial of benefits is not barred by the statute of

limitations and that she is entitled to proceed under both sections 1132(a)(1)(B) and

1132(a)(3) at this stage in the litigation. I will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Serve

Discovery Beyond the Administrative Record.

An appropriate order follows.

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